Part 4

Military Review From May 18 to June 18, 1918--Fighting on the Marne and Oise--The Austrian Offensive

The third month of the great German offensive may be considered the complement of the second; it has been an attempt to accomplish south of the great Picardy salient what north of it had been tried and had failed. In the second month the Lys salient had been developed, but the barrier ridges of Ypres and Arras still held. At the end of the third month the southern barriers--the Chemin-des-Dames and the watershed of the Oise-Aisne--had been carried by the enemy, but the terrain of occupation was so constricted, the enemy troops so distributed, that neither of his ambitious objectives had been brought nearer attainment. These objectives were the reaching of the sea by the Somme via Amiens, with its corollaries, the isolation of the allied armies north of that river and the occupation of the Channel ports; the decisive defeat of the French armies in the field, with whatever moral and political corollary that eventuality might produce; the occupation of Paris, and the demoralization of the French body politic. [See map on Page 19.]

But the German failure of the third month is far more significant, has a far greater bearing on the war, than the failure of the second. The enemy has not only failed to broaden the Picardy front so as to permit a further advance down the Somme, to inflict vital losses on the Allies, to force the French back on the defenses of Paris, but, in attempting to do these things he has transformed all his potential resources into active resources, and these give evidence of approaching exhaustion.

Only one conclusion is possible: Ludendorff with an initial preponderance of men and war material, with the tactical advantage of being able to manoeuvre from the centre outward, has been outgeneraled both in tactics and in strategy by Foch, so that the former's gains of terrain, while being of no advantage whatever--even a danger in certain sectors--have been purchased at an expenditure of men and material utterly incommensurate with their area and position.

FORCING THE AISNE

Ludendorff, on May 27, with a simultaneous diversion on the Lys salient and another at the southwest angle of the Picardy salient, northwest of Montdidier, began, with the most stupendous preparations ever concentrated, an attack on the southern barriers over a forty-mile front. He forced the Aisne the next day on an eighteen-mile front, and on May 31 he brought up at the Marne on a six-mile front, having made a penetration of thirty miles to the south. There he attempted to deploy both east and west, and was held.

Meanwhile his baseline had been extended twenty miles to the west--to near Noyon. He had occupied about 650 square miles of new territory and had reduced his nearest approach to Paris from sixty-two to forty-four miles.

Then, on June 9, with even a greater array of men and material, he attempted to invert the western bow-like side of the salient already formed by turning it outward. He made a fierce attack from a twenty-mile front between Montdidier and Noyon in the direction of Compiègne. With this objective attained, his Picardy front would have been sufficiently broadened to enable him to resume his journey down the Somme. Moreover, he would have been within striking distance of Paris. He gained seven miles, which was later reduced to less than six by French counterattacks. French counterattacks and a thrust of American marines on his flanks in the three succeeding days not only held him in a vise, but revealed his tremendous losses and the extraordinary means he had expended in preparations. By June 12 his failure, the ramifications of which actually demonstrated his defeat, was an established fact. Then, on the following Saturday, June 15, this failure was acknowledged by the sudden launching of an Austrian offensive in Italy. How this was an acknowledgment we shall see in the proper place.

SECOND MARNE BATTLE

Held at the Ypres and Arras barriers in the north it was inevitable that Ludendorff's next move would be in the south. The railways freed by the expansion of the Picardy salient in March, the unhampered concentrations made possible at Péronne, St. Quentin, La Fère, and Hirson, and the admirable surface of the Laon Plateau for purposes of manoeuvring large bodies of troops--all pointed to the line northwest of Rheims as the probable point of attack. Then, when it came on May 27, consternation reigned among military critics as they observed the apparent ease with which the Germans carried, first, the mighty Chemin des Dames, protected on the east by Craonne and its three plateaux and on the west by the Ailette and the Oise, and then the south bank of the Aisne, with its formidable prepared fortifications at Soissons. The German feints in the Lys salient and before Amiens in the preceding week were said to have distracted Foch, who had thus been outgeneraled. And when the Marne was reached between Dormans and Château-Thierry, it was remembered how the Third German Army under General von Hausen had swept across the river at that identical spot on Aug. 25, 1914.

In the first three days of the drive the Germans with the greatest auxiliary force of tanks, machine guns, and poison gas projectors they had ever mobilized employed twenty-five divisions, or 325,000 men. When they doubled their base line and had reached the Marne and were trying to deploy they were using forty divisions containing over 400,000 of their best troops. When the offensive quieted down in the first days of June it was estimated that they had lost fully 30 per cent. of the total in casualties. On the other hand, they claimed to have captured over 45,000 prisoners and taken 400 guns. They had come thirty miles and had occupied 650 square miles of territory. But they were held.

What is the explanation of this seeming paradox? Foch could by calling on a certain number of reserves easily have held the Chemin des Dames until--he had been flanked and enfiladed out, between Neufchatel and Rheims on the east and from the Oise where it enters the Aisne on the west. He might have held out longer on the southern bank of the Aisne, but the result would have been the same--losses equaling if not surpassing those of the enemy and the surrender of thousands of guns and large quantities of war material. Finally, he would have gained nothing and might even have been unable to hold the Marne.

It is obvious that he did none of these things. But what did he do? He left his front protected by only sufficient men and guns to produce the greatest possible losses among the enemy as he slowly advanced south and concentrated heavily on the enemy's flanks. It was he and not Ludendorff who decreed that the Germans should reach the Marne between Dormans and Château-Thierry, and nowhere else. But it was Pétain who executed the plans of Foch.

THE FIGHT IN DETAIL

The German attack under the personal command of the Crown Prince launched on the morning of May 27 was mainly directed against the British 8th, 50th, 25th, and 21st Divisions and the French 6th Army, which occupied the front from Vauxaillon eastward to the Brimont region--from north of Soissons to the north and a little west of Rheims. Certain sectors at once gave way under the strong pressure--particularly in the Chambrettes. There was no mistaking this for the main offensive, although in the Lys salient, between Ypres and Arras in the north, and on both sides of the Somme and the Ardre in the centre, there were simultaneous artillery preparations of great violence. Toward the end of the day the weight of the enemy's attacks carried his troops across both the River Aisne and the Chemin des Dames. The line, however, remained unbroken, as the Allies retreated across the Aisne between Vailly and Berry-au-Bac, which are eighteen miles apart, and then gave way across the Vesle near Fismes.

On the 28th Franco-British troops proved the assault in the north to be abortive by quickly re-establishing their lines east of Dickebusch Lake and capturing a few prisoners. On the main field of battle in the south the Franco-British right deployed to the east covering the Brouillet-Savigny-Thillois line protecting Rheims. On the west they did the same, but with more elasticity, while the centre continued to give. On the 29th the acute angle of the German penetration, with its vertex covering Fismes, suddenly sprung to the shape of a bow. The line still held covering the Cathedral City, but on the west the defenders of Soissons were killing their last Germans, and in the south Savigny on the Ardre had been reached. At Savigny the line of advance was diverted westward until it embraced Fère-en-Tardennois and Vezilly. And still the retreating but unbroken Allies were deploying east and west as its pressure increased, or were taken prisoner when retreat became impossible.

On the 30th the enemy attempted to broaden his front northwest of Rheims and failed, but he succeeded in obliterating the salient south of Noyon, from the Oise Canal to Soissons, and on the 31st by an advance from a twenty-five-mile curved front he reached the Marne between Château-Thierry and Dormans on a contracted six-mile front. Here he met on the south bank the prepared defenses, and has been kept on the north bank ever since.

AMERICAN MARINES

In the enemy's attempts to broaden his front on the Marne salient, June 1 and 2, he managed to rectify the eastern side by reaching Sarcy and Olizy and by working along up the Marne a couple of miles east of Dormans. He also measurably consolidated his positions between the Oise Canal and Soissons, and south of the latter stretched the line into a segment with a five mile vertical as far south as, but not including, Château-Thierry on the Marne. This swing to the westward appears to have been a deliberate attempt to force Foch to meet shock with shock by throwing in his reserves, as the German advance had reached a point only forty miles from Paris.

This was unnecessary, however, for here, north of Château-Thierry, the enemy was to meet a new foe--the American marines. It is doubtful whether the extraordinary performance of this corps and its French supports between June 6 and June 12, when they bent back the lower part of the bow between La Feste-Milon and Château-Thierry--from Grandeles, Champillon, and Clerembant Wood to Bussiares and Bouresches--can be included in the second battle of the Marne or serves as a diversion to the later battle of the Oise, directed against Compiègne. At any rate, the ardor of the marines had the desired effect, for on the very day they began their work the inspired Berlin Vossische Zeitung said: "The German Supreme Command cannot well proceed now against the newly consolidated French front, which is richly provided with reserves, and bear the great losses which experience shows are entailed by such operations." Thus ended the second battle of the Marne, sometimes called the Aisne-Marne battle.

BATTLE OF THE OISE

The flanking lines between which the Germans were directed to the Marne made the battle of the Oise inevitable as far as the Marne salient was concerned. For the salient, there was only this alternative, if its front could not be broadened: it must be "dug in" or be abandoned. But, being necessary, if it could be waged beyond a certain point, it would also become ambitious. It would supplement the Picardy front by continuing its line down to the Marne. Reaching the Oise at Montmacq, it would flank the French salient north of the Oise. Utilizing the Oise and Ourcq Valleys, it would envelop the defensive forests of Aigue, Compiègne, and Villers-Cotterets. This would mean Compiègne. From Compiègne the investment of Paris was possible.

The battle, as far as the Germans are concerned, was probably their most disastrous effort of the war within the given time. Between thirty and thirty-four divisions were completely used up--a cost of over 400,000 effectives. Not only did their advance lack the element of surprise, but it entered a veritable trap. Their front was enfiladed with a destructive fire from impregnable flanks.

The battle was also a revelation; it demonstrated as nothing else the waning man power of the enemy--the desperate mobilization of 16-year-old boys, of old men, of convicts, even.

The artillery preparation, rich in gas shells, began at midnight on June 8-9. On the following morning at 4:30 the attack was launched over the twenty miles from Montdidier to Noyon. And, as usual, there was the northern diversion--the pounding of the British lines by gunfire from Villers-Bretonneux to Arras. Even on the first day of the assault, when the German centre advanced two and a half miles, the French made a spirited counterattack near Hautebraye, between the Aisne and the Oise. On the second day the enemy took at tremendous cost the villages of Mery, Belloy, and St. Maur and debouched from Thiescourt Wood. On the third day, with the aid of four fresh divisions, he managed to reach the Aronde, on the west; to descend a mile astride the Matz and to occupy its northern bank almost to the Oise, in the centre; and to envelop the forest of Ourscamps, on the east. Before the sun set the French, by a counterattack, had entirely won back the gains on the west, with over 1,000 prisoners captured. On the fourth and fifth days (June 13 and 14) the French heavily attacked on the flanks of the centre--at Courcelles and at Croix Ricard. Then came two final kicks from the foe; on June 16 he attempted to cross the Matz near its junction with the Oise and was driven back with heavy losses. The next day he drenched the south bank of the Marne with gas shells, but did not attempt to cross the stream.

All this time abortive diversions had been going on in the north, in the Lys salient, where on June 15 the British and Scottish troops took the initiative and captured two miles of enemy positions seven miles west of La Bassée and just north of Béthune.

THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE

Just as the German defeat on the Marne and Oise was beginning to be realized abroad--its losses calculated, its meaning interpreted--the Austrians, on June 15, suddenly launched an offensive in the mountain region of Veneto and from the left bank of the Piave. So far the enemy has been firmly held in the mountains, but has crossed the river at two places without, however, being able to bring over any effective artillery--on the middle reaches he has gained the Plateau of Montello, defended by the intrenchments prepared there by the British under Plumer last December, and near the mouth he has succeeded in establishing one or two bridgeheads in the vicinity of Capo Sile.

As a military proposition the offensive has lacked the so far inevitable successes of a prepared initiative; in the mountains the first attacks were almost instantly broken up by simultaneous counterattacks. Along the river, especially in the vicinity of the crossings, the battle is developing in scope and intensity.

Aside from the military paradox already noted, this offensive possesses several characteristics, some military, some political, which seem well worth while dwelling upon.

In the first place, the location of the active front east of the Lago di Garda, from the Asiago Plateau to the sea, offers a certain indication of the German military situation in France. Its abortive character may also indicate the political situation in Austria-Hungary. With the lines in the mountains held, the operations on the Piave present no formidable danger to Italy.

It was well known by the Italian General Staff that the Austro-German High Command intended to make the attempt to confirm the Italian disaster of Caporetto as soon as the melting of the snows permitted the transportation of men and supplies through the Alps. In the first place, the material and man power lost by the Italians in the retreat to the Piave, which included the actual elimination of the 2d Army, were replaced. In the second, it was absolutely necessary to rectify, even in the Winter, the northern mountain line east of the Lago di Garda. West of the lake up to the Tonale Pass, over the great glacier of the Adamello, it was practically invulnerable, save through the Giudicaria Valley.

From west to east there were three doors, as it were, which had only been partly shut--the Vallarsa south of Rovereto, the path of the Frenzela Torrent and the angle it forms with the Brenta just above Valstagna, and the approach down the Piave in the region of Monte Monfenera from the Calcina Torrent. There were also other minor openings--the passes of Monte Asolone, between the Brenta and the Piave, covering the path south along the Val San Lorenzo, the Nos and Campo Mulo Valleys between Asiago and the Brenta. All these were closed in December and January, with a total loss to the enemy of over 10,000 men and 100 guns, save the domination of the Vallarsa, that was taken from the Austrians by the capture of Monte Corno on May 15. Meanwhile, the British and French armies had been transferred, the former from Il Montello on the Piave to the Asiago Plateau, and the latter from the Monfenera region to that of Monte Grappa. Between 200,000 and 300,000 Italian troops had been sent to the aid of France.

Thus the Italian General Staff awaited the inevitable with confidence--a confidence fully seconded by people and press, for if the mass of the Italians had fought in ignorance before the catastrophe of Caporetto, since then they had learned the objects of the war--national as well as allied.

But the General Staff had also learned something else. This was most important. If Ludendorff in France should be successful--if he should succeed in isolating the allied armies north of the Somme, or force the French back upon the defenses of Paris, or both--then the Austrian Commander in Chief with his million men would be aided by German generalship and German divisions, and, together, they would strike down the Giudicaria to the west of the Lago di Garda, with all strength and disregarding all sacrifices in order to reach the metallurgic centre of Italy in Lombardia and Emilia, thereby forcing Italy out of the war and gaining access to the back door of France. If, however, Ludendorff should be blocked in France, the offensive must still be made at the propitious moment, but its plan of attack would be to the east of the Lago di Garda, from the Astico to the sea. It would be entirely an Austrian affair, and would naturally be limited by the political and military situation in the Dual Monarchy.

It is of significance, therefore, that the offensive has been launched to the east and not to the west of the Lago di Garda. Its locality reveals Ludendorff's conviction that he is at least blocked in France, if nothing else, whatever light its development may later throw upon the parlous internal conditions of the Hapsburg Empire.

This admitted, the Austrian plan of campaign becomes a simple problem--simple because there could be no other. At the beginning of the war Italy attempted to neutralize the Trentino and the Carnic region by sealing the passes and then made her attack across the Isonzo. But she could never be certain that the passes had been effectually sealed. A successful Austrian invasion through them would jeopardize her armies on the Isonzo, isolate them by cutting their lines of communication. That was the danger which threatened those armies when the Austrians made their drive upon the Asiago Plateau in May, 1916, which was ultimately outflanked and forced back. That was also the disaster when last October the Austro-German armies, having penetrated the Isonzo line from the north, forced it to retire westward, forced a withdrawal from the passes in the Carnic and the Dolomite Alps, and again reached the Asiago Plateau, this time free from the danger of being flanked.

It is thus of most vital influence upon the operations going on along the Piave that the British on the Asiago Plateau, on June 15, and the French on Monte Grappa, the next day, and the Italians elsewhere even covering a diversion at the Tonale Pass, should have hurled back with severe losses the initial assaults of the enemy in the mountain regions. On June 18 the Austrians claimed to have taken 30,000 prisoners and 120 guns since the 15th; the Italians and their allies claimed 2,500 prisoners.

That the Greeks are certainly in the war was revealed on May 31, when the news was published that they had, with the aid of French artillery, captured some 1,500 Bulgar-German troops on the Struma front in Macedonia. Meanwhile, however, General Guillaumat, who succeeded General Sarrail as commander of the allied armies there in December, has returned to France to take charge of the defenses of Paris.

Advices from Constantinople, via Moscow and London, indicate that the Turks, having reached an agreement with the Caucasus peoples, are assembling troops across the Armenian-Persian frontier, so as to block the advance of General Marshall with the Anglo-Indian forces up the Tigris. The left wing of the Turks, on June 14, reached Tabriz and Lake Urumiah, in Persia, 200 miles northeast of Mosul on the Tigris. Marshall is 60 miles south of that place.

Captain Rizzo of the Italian Navy, who on the night of Dec. 9-10 sank the Austrian pre-dreadnought Wien in the Harbor of Trieste and put another ship of the 5,000-ton class, now known to be the Budapest, out of commission, again distinguished himself on June 10, when with two torpedo boats he cut through the destroyer convoy of two dreadnoughts of the Viribus Unitis class (20,000 tons) and sent certainly one and probably both to the bottom off Dalmatia--one being seen to sink before his eyes and the wreckage of the other being subsequently picked up. This exploit leaves only one of these mighty ships afloat, the first having been torpedoed in the Harbor of Pola on May 15.

Trying to Corrupt Italy's Troops

The Astounding German Order for Fraternization and Penetration on the Italian Front

The April issue of CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE contained the text of a German order for undermining the morale of Russian troops by fraternization. Early in May a similar order was found on a German prisoner captured by French troops on the Italian front. The order is as follows:

281ST DIVISION, FIRST SECTION, NO. 226.--CONFIDENTIAL.

_Not to be communicated to troops in the first line._

First--Following the telephone order, Geroch No. 2,080, you are asked to intensify with efficacy the propaganda with the enemy army.