Part 32

"His plan was, in his own words, without interfering with England's existing friendship, which had no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany to bring the two groups [of powers] nearer." In pursuance of this policy, the British Government went a very long way to meet German wishes in respect to the Bagdad Railway. They agreed to let it be prolonged to El Basra; they included the whole of Mesopotamia as far as that town in the German sphere of influence, and also the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway, i.e., all the centre of Asia Minor.

Not less large were the concessions made in South Central Africa. "The new agreement [regarding the interests of Germany and England in the African possessions of Portugal] was fully in accord with German wishes and interests. For these the British Government showed the greatest consideration. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his good-will toward us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole." These arrangements were embodied in two treaties highly advantageous to Germany, which, however, the German Government, for some reasons of its own, had postponed signing, so that they remained unpublished up till the outbreak of the war. Had we in the inner spirit of the German Government, and the use it would make of our concessions, British Ministers might well have hesitated to go so far as they did. But that they conceded so much is the completest proof of their good-will and the most convincing refutation of the charges which the German Ministers and press have brought against them.

It would take too long to follow out in this article the constant efforts of the British Government during the fateful days before the outbreak of the war to avoid a conflict by means of Sir E. Grey's repeated plans of mediation and adjustment. The memorandum shows how earnestly he labored for peace at Berlin, at Petersburg, at Vienna, and how all his attempts were baffled by the settled purpose of the German Government to force on war.

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

Britain may, like other nations, have in the past sometimes indulged her ambition, sometimes abused her strength, sometimes embarked in wars that might well have been avoided. But on this occasion at least she is blameless. Never in her long history has she had so perfectly clear a conscience as in the case of this war. Her people neither contemplated it nor desired it. They were driven into it by the action of the German Government, which persisted in pushing it on even when Austria seemed willing to draw back. All had evidently been settled at that famous Potsdam conference, when (as the German Ambassador at Constantinople, before Italy had declared war against Austria, told his Italian colleague) the Emperor had inquired of his military and naval chiefs whether they were ready for the conflict for which, during some months preceding, preparations had been in progress. Neither when the war began did Britain wish to do more than prevent Germany from destroying Belgium and mortally wounding France. Sir E. Grey spoke truly for the nation when, as the memorandum records, he said: "We don't want to crush Germany."

Germany and Great Britain in 1912

Lord Haldane's Official Report of His Conciliatory Mission Prior to the War

_Lord Haldane, the British Minister for War in 1912, was sent on a mission to Berlin in that year to confer with the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, in the hope of reaching some agreement with Germany for a mutual reduction of armament, and for the establishment of conditions that would preserve European peace. The hope regarding armaments was not fulfilled, and the conversations that had taken place were not made public by either Government; but late in May, 1918, in view of the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky regarding Germany's responsibility for the war, the British Government at length published Lord Haldane's report. It is in the form of a daily record, beginning Feb. 8, 1912, and is here reproduced in full, with the exception of parts relating solely to British defensive measures:_

"At the interview with the Chancellor, which took place at 2 o'clock and lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him the message of good wishes for the conversations and for the future of Anglo-German relations with which the King had intrusted me at the audience I had before leaving. He was pleased with this message, and intimated that he would write through the German Ambassador to thank the King. I then said that perhaps it would be convenient if I defined the capacity in which I was in Berlin, and there to talk to him; and I defined it as above intimated. I proceeded to ask whether he wished to make any observations or desired that I should begin. He wished me to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him as arranged in a conversation I had had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London."

"I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent armaments, and with the aid of the Triple Alliance she had become the centre of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment Germany's policy, but this was the natural and inevitable consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same situation with France when she was very powerful on the sea that we had with Germany now. While the fact to which I referred created a difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of powers might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia except those that were in writing and published to the world.

"The Chancellor interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really so. I replied that I could give him the assurance that it was so without reserve, and that in the situation, which now existed I saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new and cordial friendship, carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps, to the profit of Russia and France as well as Germany herself. He replied that he had no reason to differ from this view."

"In connection with my remarks as to the events of last Summer, he interposed that we had military preparations. I replied that no preparations had been made which were other than those required to bring the capacity of the British Army in point of mobilization to something approaching the standard which Germany had long ago reached, and which was with her a matter of routine. For this purpose we had studied our deficiencies and modes of operation * * * We could not be caught unprepared."

NO AGGRESSIVE ALLIANCES

The Chancellor seemed much pleased with Lord Haldane's explanation, and said: "There had been much talk of our fleet and our army, and the steps we had taken, but that he understood the position I had indicated." "I said, in reply, that it was a pleasure to me to hear this, and that I hoped I should carry him with me still further in my belief that if Germany had really, which I did not at all suppose, intended to crush France and destroy her capacity to defend herself, we in England would have had such a direct interest in the result that we could not have sat by and seen this done."

"He said he did not dissent from this view, nor did he wish to hamper our freedom in such a case. But he wished to propose a formula; the balance of power was a phrase he did not like, though he admitted that the historical considerations I had referred to made it natural that some grouping should take place, and that England should lean toward the weaker side. He had, however, proposed, in his communication to us, a formula of neutrality which might go a long way to help."

"I said I cordially agreed with the good intention of his formula, the working of which was that neither was to enter into any combinations against the other. If this meant combinations for attack or aggression, I was entirely of his mind. But I must put on spectacles in looking at his words, and, first of all, I would put on German spectacles. How would Germany find herself if, when bound by such a formula, we were so wicked as to attack her ally Austria or to try to grab Denmark, which was of deep strategical interest to her? Again, suppose Germany joined in an attack on Japan or Portugal or Belgium--he then interposed 'or Holland'--but I said I really hadn't all our treaties sufficiently in my head to be as sure about Holland as I was about the others. Or if, I added, Germany were to pounce upon France and proceed to dismember her, what would happen? He answered that these cases were not at all likely, but he admitted that they were fatal to his formula. I asked him whether he would be satisfied with mutual undertakings against aggressive or unprovoked attacks and against all combinations, military and naval agreements, and plans directed to the purpose of aggression and unprovoked attack. He said it was very difficult to define what was meant by aggression or unprovoked attack. I replied that you could not define the number of grains which it took to make a heap, but one knew a heap when one saw one." * * *

QUESTION OF GERMAN FLEET

"We then passed on to the question of the German fleet, as to which he asked me to make any observations. I said I must. He and I had been talking with the most absolute candor and friendliness to each other, and I felt he would regard me as wanting in character were I not very frank with him about the new navy law. What was the use of entering into a solemn agreement for concord and against attack if Germany at the same moment was going to increase her battle fleet as a precaution against us, and we had consequently to increase our battle fleet as a precaution against her? This was vital from our point of view, because we were an island power dependent for our food supplies on the power of protecting our commerce, and for this we needed the two-power standard and a substantial preponderance in battle fleets. He said that it was absolutely essential to Germany to have a third squadron in full readiness for war. At present, owing to her system of recruiting, for three months in the year she had virtually, owing to the necessity for training recruits, no fleet ready at all. I said I did not contest this; she was quite entitled to have it if she thought it necessary, but the result would be that we should not be able to rely on the two battle squadrons and reserve squadrons which had sufficed hitherto, but that we should be compelled to have five, or even six, squadrons ready in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the Mediterranean to strengthen them."

"He asked me was that necessary if we had a friendly agreement? I said it would be a less convincing proof of friendliness if Germany prepared her third squadron, and we should have no option. Still, I said, this was not so serious as the proposal to add a third ship every second year to the German construction program. This would put us in great difficulties so far as securing the good opinion of the public in England about the value of an agreement. We should certainly have to proceed at once to lay down two keels to each one of the new German additions, and that would cost money and cause feeling. It was true that each country could bear the additional cost without difficulty. They were rich and so were we. If it was for the purpose of the navy our people would not complain, in my opinion, of the addition of another shilling to the income tax, but it would be a great pity. He asked was that really likely to be our program, the laying down of two additional keels for each German one. I said that I had no doubt that it would be the result, and the Government would be turned out if they failed to accomplish it; and therefore some modification seemed to be of the utmost importance, if the agreement was to be a real success."

"After a pause he said he would consider this and 'die Sache überlegen.' The conversation up to this point had been largely in German, I taking to English whenever there was a delicate topic, and the Chancellor occasionally speaking English, but nearly always German. In order to avoid misunderstanding repeated sentences in the other language. I was impressed by his evident desire to meet us wherever he could, and I derived considerable hope from the manner and emphasis with which he said that he would reconsider the question of the ships. But I must add that he went on to say that the question of the new squadron was vital, and that some new ships would be necessary in it. Could I suggest any way out, for they must keep to the plan of a new law. I observed that it was not for me to venture to make any suggestion to his Excellency, but that a spreading out in size of the new program might make a difference. He said, 'Perhaps, eight or nine years'; I added, 'or twelve, if he could not do better.' He again said that he would take this matter into serious consideration and consult his experts. 'My Admirals,' he said, 'are very difficult.' 'That was an experience,' I observed, 'which we sometimes found in England also.'"

THE KAISER AND VON TIRPITZ

On the following day, Feb. 9, Lord Haldane had an interview with the Emperor, the Chancellor, and Admiral Tirpitz on the navy, at which Tirpitz held out for the new German naval program, which was discussed at great length. Lord Haldane wrote:

"I insisted that fundamental modification was essential. The tone was thoroughly friendly, but I felt that I had come to the most difficult part of my task of getting material fit to bring back for the consideration of my colleagues. The utmost I was able to get was this: The Emperor was so disturbed at the idea that the world would not believe in the reality of the agreement unless the shipbuilding program was modified that he asked me what I would suggest. I said that it was a too technical matter for me to discuss here, but that if he would not drop the new law--which I saw he felt he could not--he might at least drop out a ship. This idea was never abandoned, but Admiral Tirpitz combated it so hard that I said: 'Well, can we not spread the tempo?' After much talking we got to this, that, as I insisted that they must not inaugurate the agreement by building an additional ship at once, they should put off building the first ship till 1913, and then should not lay down another till three years after, (1916,) and not lay down the third till 1919."

"Admiral Tirpitz wanted us to give some understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the two-power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any admission about it. I said it was not a matter of admission. Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us, but with them. An idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about shipbuilding in the if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the fleet law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned."

"The Emperor thought the agreement would affect profoundly the tendency in shipbuilding, and he certainly should not desire to go beyond the three ships. The fact of the agreement was the key to everything. The Chancellor, he said, would propose to me this afternoon a formula which he had drafted. I said that I would see the Chancellor and discuss any further territorial questions with him, and would then return as speedily as I could and report the good disposition which I had found to my colleagues, and leave the difficulties of not being able to stop shipbuilding more completely, and, indeed, all other matters to their judgment. I could only assure the Emperor that I had been much struck with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and that he would find a not less friendly disposition in London."

NO AGREEMENT REACHED

Lord Haldane mentions that he was in communication with M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and recounted his conversations to him. The Ambassador quite appreciated that the purpose of the mission was to create a detente, as distinguished from an entente. M. Jules Cambon reported his conversation with Lord Haldane to M. Poincaré.

Lord Haldane had another conversation with the Chancellor in the hope of arriving at a formula with regard to the navy. The Chancellor said that the "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron, and he must have these. I said we could not contest Germany's right to do in these matters, and indeed in other matters, as she pleased. But why not postpone the shipbuilding for longer and adapt the law accordingly? * * *"

"The Chancellor said he would try. He asked me to consult the experts in London and make a suggestion. I had said, he remarked, that everything was good only on balance, and Germany must for a greater end give up a minor advantage. The new squadron and the new fleet law she must have, but it was a question for the experts, on which he did not pronounce, whether a retardation of greater magnitude than Tirpitz proposed might not be possible. I promised to let him know privately the state of feeling here about the Tirpitz proposals on my return."

The Ministers then endeavored to arrive at a formula, the whole purpose of which was to bring about conditions which would prevent to endeavor to get a definition of the duty of neutrality; and, in the event of war, to combine in order to localize the conflict.

After Lord Haldane's return to London, negotiations in search of a formula were continued. Prince Lichnowsky preserved a friendly atmosphere, but the German Government never agreed to conditions which would have safeguarded the neutrality of Belgium or maintained her honorable obligations to our allies. The nearest they got at the eleventh hour was, as Lord Grey said, "far too narrow an engagement for us."

British Official Statement Issued in 1915

_The German press in 1915 made certain incorrect allegations regarding the Haldane Mission, whereupon on Aug. 31, 1915, the British Government issued the following official statement:_

THE FOREIGN OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT RESPECTING THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912:

An account of the 1912 Anglo-German negotiations was published in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung last month. This account was misleading, and was no doubt intended to mislead, and made it appear that the British Government had at that time rejected what would be regarded in many quarters as a reasonable offer of friendship from Germany.

In these circumstances it may be as well to publish a statement of the facts compiled from official records here. Early in 1912 the German Chancellor sketched to Lord Haldane the following formula as one which would meet the views of the Imperial Government:

1. The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other power directed to such an end, and declare not to be bound by any such engagement.

3. If either of the high contracting parties become entangled in a war with one or more powers in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other party will at least observe toward the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavor for the localization of the conflict. If either of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the provisions in Article 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising between either of them and other powers.

GERMAN PLAN ONE-SIDED

These conditions, although in appearance fair as between the parties, would have been grossly unfair and one-sided in their operation. Owing to the general position of the European powers and the treaty engagements by which they were bound, the result of Articles 4 and 5 would have been that, while Germany in the case of a European conflict would have remained free to support her friends, this country would have been forbidden to raise a finger in defense of hers.

Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria and Russia were at war, Germany would support Austria, as is evident from what occurred at the end of July, 1914; while as soon as Russia was attacked by two powers France was bound to come to her assistance. In other words, the pledge of neutrality offered by Germany would have been absolutely valueless, because she could always plead the necessity of fulfilling her existing obligations under the Triple Alliance as an excuse for departing from neutrality. On the other hand, no such departure, however serious the provocation, would have been possible for this country, which was bound by no alliances with the exception of those with Japan and Portugal, while the making of fresh alliances was prohibited by Article 5. In a word, as appeared still more evident later, there was to be a guarantee of absolute neutrality on one side but not on the other.

It was impossible for us to enter into a contract so obviously inequitable, and the formula was accordingly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

Count Metternich upon this pressed for counter proposals, which he stated would be without prejudice and not binding unless we were satisfied that our wishes were met on the naval question. On this understanding Sir Edward Grey on the 14th of March, 1912, gave Count Metternich the following draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet:

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy toward her.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and suggested two alternative additional clauses: