Part 31

In the opinion of those who took part in the London Conference the comparison of these documents will be of the greatest importance. It will be a principal means of establishing whether a sufficient agreement of views exists between the proletariats of the two belligerent groups to make possible a common action against imperialism and for a democratic peace. This preliminary examination is all the more necessary, because it is obvious that no important party, conscious of its responsibility, will run the risk of having the resolutions of an international congress imposed upon it by the will of a majority. Only resolutions which were the expression of a general and common will would possess moral authority and practical effect.

The sum of the matter is that the Socialists of the Entente countries request you in this grave hour, in which it is necessary to know whether the world is to be freed by democracy or to be handed over to imperialism, to ask your consciences whether a real, sincere, and effective agreement of the wills of the proletariats is possible in order to put an end to the law of violence, in order to lay the foundations not of a peace, but of the peace, and in order to help the peoples to liberate themselves from the endless chain of military war which leads to economic wars, and of economic wars which will again produce military wars.

We add to the messages only one observation. Since the London Conference momentous events have taken place which constitute the gravest menace for the workers of all countries. The principles to which they appeal have been shamefully violated. The right of the peoples to self-determination has been openly disregarded. In Austria and Germany themselves Socialists have expressed the fear that Russia, disarmed and for the moment impotent, might become a battleground in which the rival imperialisms and their claims would meet and ultimately satisfy themselves jointly at the cost of the defeated revolution.

The working classes have a common interest in protesting against such events and in preventing the realization of such projects.

That is the wish of the authors and the signatories of the memorandum. In the same spirit we beg you to subject this document to a conscientious and thorough examination.

In communicating this request to you we address to you, comrades, our Socialist greetings.

At a meeting of the Socialist Party Committee in Berlin on May 31, according to the Vorwärts, Friedrich Ebert, Vice President of the Social Democrats, announced that the party leaders had indirectly received a copy of the Entente Socialist memorandum on war aims. Philipp Scheidemann declared that the aims of the Entente Socialists were to a great extent in complete accord with the annexationist aims of the Entente Governments. The committee adopted a resolution pledging continued adherence to the Reichstag peace resolution of July, 1917, which declared for no annexations and no indemnities.

Trade After the War

The State Department at Washington announced on June 5, 1918, that it had appointed an economic representative, who was to join the American Embassy at Rome. This was regarded as the first step in a general policy of more active participation by the United States in preparations of the nations at war with Germany for the after-the-war trade struggle.

The new treaty of alliance between Germany and Austria to control all Central European sources of raw materials, and to exclude other nations from equal trade privileges, with similar restrictions imposed by the new treaties forced on Finland, Ukrainia, and Rumania, changed the attitude of the American Government, which at first had not assented to the proposals of the Paris Economic Conference to interpose artificial obstructions to free commerce with the Central Powers after the war.

The Italian Government recently named a commission to study after-the-war problems, and with this commission the American economic delegate will have close relations. Italian importing and exporting interests in the United States also have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the decision of the Italian Government to consider this important subject, and have joined in the dispatch of a committee to Italy to co-operate. Italian industries, though of great potential strength and capable of returning large profits on their capitalization, are said to require substantial assistance from America if they are to go on after the war without relapsing into the control of German financiers.

It is reported that economic representatives will be sent to the American Embassies in all the allied capitals.

On May 14 Mr. Bonar Law, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in the House of Commons that, in order to leave its country's hands free for the time when peace arrived, the French Government had denounced all commercial conventions containing a general clause regarding "most-favored nations"; and that, in view of the probable scarcity of raw material after the war and the necessity for providing for the needs of the British Empire and the Allies, the British Government intended to adopt a similar course.

In answer to other questions, Mr. Bonar Law said that the British Government had not changed its policy expressed in the Paris resolutions since the entrance of the United States into the war; he had every reason to believe that America was very anxious for unity of economic control, and agreed that any useful action would be much more effective if taken in conjunction with our allies.

Lord Balfour of Burleigh's committee considered the question of the denunciation of commercial treaties and reported against it. The report contains a summary of the various commercial treaties which are in existence between Great Britain and other countries. Those with enemy countries have been terminated by the war. In the case of allied countries commercial treaties on the basis of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment are in force between the United Kingdom and Italy, Portugal, Russia, the United States, Japan, Serbia, and Montenegro. There is a similar treaty with Rumania. United Kingdom goods have most-favored-nation treatment in France, owing to a legislative enactment and not by treaty right, for customs duties were excepted from the scope of the Anglo-French commercial convention of 1882.

Great Britain has commercial treaties on the most-favored-nation basis with Switzerland and Greece. In the case of the Netherlands and Denmark, the general principle of most-favored-nation treatment is subject to minor limitations. The position with regard to Sweden and Norway is doubtful; but the old treaty of 1826 with Sweden and Norway on a reciprocal most-favored-nation basis has continued in operation in practice, in spite of the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905.

Outside Europe, Great Britain has commercial treaties providing for reciprocal and unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Those with Costa Rica and Liberia are conditional.

Nearly all these commercial treaties are subject to a fixed period of notice on either side as a condition of denunciation. The treaty with Japan cannot be terminated before 1923. The treaty with Portugal has only recently been completed, after years of negotiation. Twelve months' notice of termination is required in the case of the treaty with Switzerland and of most of those with neutral countries outside Europe. The Spanish agreement--it is based on an exchange of notes in 1894--is subject to six months' notice.

Before the war there was no commercial treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. The United Kingdom enjoyed most-favored-nation treatment in Germany in customs matters by virtue of a biennial law.

Exchange of Naval Greetings With England

The following exchange of greetings between the heads of the navies of the United States and Great Britain was made public:

_Washington, April 5, 1918._

MY DEAR SIR: Your references to the splendid spirit of co-operation between the navies of our two countries, and your warm praise of the officers and men of the navy who have gone abroad, have been most grateful to me and to the men in the navy and to all Americans. The brightest spot in the tragedy of this war is this mutual appreciation of the men in the naval service. Our officers who have returned confirm the statements of Vice Admiral Sims of the courtesies and kindness shown in every way by the Admiralty and officers of the British fleet, and we have reciprocated by receiving cordially the able and efficient officers who have come from your country to confer and work elbow to elbow with our officers in the difficult work which this war imposes upon the naval service of all the countries allied in the war against the submarine menace.

I had hoped to have the pleasure of visiting Great Britain and personally expressing this feeling of mutual working together and of exchanging views, but the task here of making ready more and more units for the fleet is a very serious one, and my duty chains me here. The order in all the navy is "full speed ahead" in the construction of destroyers and other craft, and the whole service is keyed up to press this programme forward as rapidly as possible. Therefore I shall not have the pleasure until this program shall materialize better and better of personal acquaintance and conference, which would be of such interest and value.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOSEPHUS DANIELS. Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, London.

* * * * *

_April 23._

DEAR MR. DANIELS: I am exceedingly grateful to you for your letter of April 5, in which you thank me for the public reference which I have made to the very cordial relations which exist between the navies of our two countries. As you know, we all of us here have a great admiration for your officers and men and for the splendid help which they are giving in European waters; and, further, we find Vice Admiral Sims invaluable in counsel and co-operation.

I fully appreciate how onerous your office must be at the present time; and much though I regret that you do not see your way to visiting this country in the near future, I hope that we may some day have the pleasure of welcoming you here. Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E. C. GEDDES.

* * * * *

_Commander in Chief's Office,_

_Queenstown, May 4._

On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States men-of-war at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good nature which they have all consistently shown, and which qualities have so materially assisted the war by enabling the ships of the allied powers to cross the ocean in comparative freedom.

To command you is an honor, to work with you is a pleasure, and to know you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race.

(Signed) LEWIS BAYLY,

Admiral, Commander in Chief.

England and the War's Causes

Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum a Document of Vital Importance to History

By VISCOUNT BRYCE

_Former British Ambassador to the United States_

The secret memorandum which Prince Lichnowsky wrote as a record and vindication of his conduct while German Ambassador in England is the most important single document which has come before the world since the first days of the war. It was not meant to become known during the war, perhaps not within his own lifetime. It was written not to justify England but to criticise the policy which tied Germany to Austria, and was published without, and indeed against, its author's will. It may have been composed partly to relieve the writer's own feelings, from an impulse which those will understand who are prevented by considerations of public duty from vindicating their conduct to the world. It may also be due to the sense, natural to men who have borne a part in great events, that they owe it to posterity to contribute what they can to the truth of history. Anyhow, it has exposed him to the anger and persecution of the German Government; and this persecution is evidence of the importance it attaches to it as a condemnation of its conduct. The truth of its contents has been confirmed, if indeed it needed confirmation, by the statements of Herr von Jagow, late German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Herr Mühlon, one of the Krupp directors.

Prince Lichnowsky appears in this document as a man of clear vision and cool judgment, an acute observer of social as well as political phenomena, a good witness both to what he noted during his residence here and to what he knew of the action of his own Government. And now let us see what he records.

When the war began in August, 1914, the German Government entered on two campaigns, which it has ever since prosecuted with equal energy and an equal disregard of honor and humanity.

One of these was the campaign by arms. It suddenly invaded Belgium, a peaceful neutral country, whose neutrality it was pledged to respect, and which it has treated with the utmost cruelty, murdering, or reducing to the slavery of forced labor, its civilian and noncombatant inhabitants. It has similarly enslaved the inhabitants of Poland, and has encouraged its Turkish allies to massacre their innocent Armenian subjects.

A CAMPAIGN OF FALSEHOOD

The other campaign was one of falsehood, conducted by speeches and through the press, and intended to mislead public opinion. It was an effort to deceive both its own people and neutral nations by mendacious misrepresentations of German aims, purposes, and conduct, and by equally false descriptions of the aims, purposes, and conduct of Germany's antagonists, and especially of the British Government and the British people. It tried to represent the war as having been forced upon Germany by Britain. Germany, it said, was merely defending herself against an unprovoked attack. She desired to live at peace with her neighbors, developing her own resources, cherishing no aggressive designs. Her enormous army and navy had been created only to protect her against the jealous and malicious enemies by whom she was surrounded, and especially against Great Britain. Britain, it seems, was envious of Germany. Being herself "a decadent nation"--this was the prevailing German the commercial competition of Germany, and tried to keep the latter out of all foreign markets. British policy--so they said--under the direction of King Edward VII., had formed alliances with France and Russia in order to hem in Germany, and after trying to block Germany's outlets in Africa and Asia, contrived this war to destroy by arms the rival whom she could not face up to in trade and manufacturing industry.

While these accusations were brought against Britain, attempts were made to excuse the invasion of Belgium by the false stories, dropped as soon as they had served their temporary purpose, that French officers had been sent into Belgium to help to organize the Belgian troops against Germany and that French aviators had been flying over German territory.

Grotesque as all these inventions were, they were repeated with such audacity as to produce some effect in neutral countries. But their chief and more lasting influence was on the German people. A large part of the German press, inspired and controlled by the German Government, had for some time past been holding up England as the persistent foe of Germany. It now redoubled its falsehoods, representing Sir Edward Grey as having plotted to bring about a war, and urged Russia to refuse a peaceful solution; and it added equally groundless charges that England had secretly planned with Belgium to attack Germany through Belgian territory. These fables, repeated incessantly by German politicians, as well as by the newspapers, found ready credence with the German people, easily led by their press, always docile to the orders of their Government, and now swept off their feet by a wave of patriotism and by the belief that they were about to achieve a victory as rapid and complete as that of 1870. It was this conviction of the malevolence and the grasping ambition of England that created that ferocious hatred of the English which has continued to display itself in the treatment of English prisoners and in the exultation over such crimes as the sinking of the Lusitania.

ORGANIZED HATE

This sudden outburst of hatred in a nation so intelligent startled and amazed us. It can be understood only when we remember that the German Government did everything in its power not only to create hatred, but also to stifle every voice that was raised to let the people know the truth. They never have been permitted to know the truth, and the disappointment that fell upon them when their march on Paris was arrested with the help of a British Army and their coasts strictly blockaded by a British fleet added fuel to their anger and has made it ever since an easier matter to keep the truth from them.

Now, what was the truth?

The British people bore no hatred whatever toward the German people. King Edward VII. meant no harm to Germany when he showed his liking for the French. Neither did his Ministers when they took steps to remove the differences that had been causing trouble between ourselves and France, and again when they came to a friendly understanding with Russia. These arrangements were made in the interests of European peace and good-will, not in order to damage Germany. British merchants and manufacturers never dreamed of fighting Germany to get rid of her commercial competition. Had such an idea occurred to them, they would have reflected that Germany was England's best foreign customer, not to add that two years of even a successful war would have inflicted far more loss upon them than the extension of German trade competition could have repaired in twenty years. British men of science and learning admired the immense contributions Germany had been making to the progress of knowledge, and they had many personal friends in Germany. British statesmen did not desire to add to British possessions abroad, feeling that we had already all we needed, and that the greatest interest of the British Empire was a universal peace.

No section of our people, neither traders, nor thinkers and writers, nor statesmen, had any idea of the dangers to the mind and the purpose of those who ruled Germany. We did not realize what the feudal aristocracy and military caste of Germany were pondering and planning, nor how little weight they attached to considerations either of good faith or of humanity. Hence, beyond maintaining a strong fleet, the indispensable protection of a country open to sea attack which did not maintain a large army, we had made no preparations for war, and had scarcely bethought ourselves of what action we should have to take on land if we became involved in war. In this belief and attitude there may have been less prudence than was needed. But our absence of suspicion is the best proof of how little we expected aggression. It is an absolute refutation of the calumny that Britain, with her tiny army, was planning an attack on the greatest military power in the world.

All this every Englishman knows. I repeat it only because it has now received not only a confirmation but also a valuable further proof in the Lichnowsky memorandum, a proof unsolicited and uncontemplated, and, moreover, unimpeachable, because it comes from one who bore a leading part in what it records, and who never meant to let it become known.

ENGLAND'S PACIFIC SPIRIT

First--The memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the British people. Here are some of its words:

"The commercial jealousy about which we [in Germany] hear so much is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power after 1870 and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles which with their industries and export houses had held a virtual monopoly. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards British exports, had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the background. Notably, in commercial spirit and the effort to further our common commercial interests."

"At the English cities to which I was invited (by the Chambers of Commerce and municipalities) I was well received everywhere. * * * In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and co-operation--at Court, in society, and from the Government."

"On account of our fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war. * * * It was possible to arrive at an understanding in spite of the fleet, and without a 'naval holiday,' [intermission of naval shipbuilding.]"

Second--The memorandum shows that the attitude of the British Government, and in particular of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of Sir Edward it contains is too long to quote, but it testifies to his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good relations with Germany, and after describing how "the simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents," it adds: "This is a true picture of the man who is decried [in Germany] as 'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."

The memorandum goes on to show how sincerely Sir Edward had worked for peace, first in 1913, during the Balkan troubles, when he went hand-in-hand with Germany, "hardly ever supporting the French or Russian claims. He conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact." Frequently, when appealed to by Lichnowsky to use his influence with the Russian Government to arrange difficulties between it and Germany, "Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over."

Third--A still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British Government is supplied by the account given of the concessions made to German wishes in Asia and Africa. "Sir Edward Grey," says the memorandum, "after having outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and, by a network of treaties, which would no doubt have led in the end to an agreement on the troublesome question of naval armaments, to insure the peace of the world."

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY