Part 30

As regards naval operations in war--indeed, as regards naval affairs in general--it has been shown times without number that it is impossible for any one without naval experience to take a comprehensive or accurate view of naval conditions. This is by no means to disparage what shoregoing writers have done in naval history or in the discussion of some subjects largely though not totally naval. As long as they record facts they do very valuable work. It is when they express opinions and draw inferences from very technical data that they are almost certain to go astray. As a searcher in authoritative records and a narrator of detailed occurrences James is distinctly superior to Mahan; but who would give a fig for James's opinions? Whereas Mahan's govern the naval thought of the world.

JUTLAND RECORDS INCOMPLETE

Thomas G. Frothingham's "Review of the Battle of Jutland" in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE is a valuable account of the events of the engagement. It would not have been possible within the limits of his article to have related every incident, but he has made a judicious selection of those which he does bring forward. He had, of course, to depend on his sources; and on some important points these contained little or no information. Anything like a full account from the German side was virtually nonexistent. It would have been instructive to have put the German naval authorities into the witness box and to have subjected them to that species of cross-examination which consists in a comparison of some of their statements with others and with the statements of their opponents. It would be here that a writer with the true instinct of a historian, which Mr. Frothingham evidently does possess, could render valuable service had the necessary materials been at his disposal.

A writer who draws inferences from data by no means full and perhaps open to dispute can hardly expect to carry conviction to every reader. It might be sufficient to deal with Mr. Frothingham's general conclusion concerning the battle of Jutland; but it will be well before doing so to notice also one or two minor but still important inferences which he draws from the events of the battle.

GERMAN FLEET'S OBJECT

Mr. Frothingham maintains that the German fleet came out with the object, and no other, of engaging the British fleet, a force known to be greatly superior in number of ships and power of ordnance. He apparently, but not quite clearly, suggests that the Germans knew how the British fleet would be employed and how it would be disposed. It would be difficult to put any other construction on the words--"With the object of engaging a fleet usually so disposed and so employed, the Germans came out from their bases." Surely this is a pure assumption which can only be supported by other assumptions founded on improbability rather than on probability. There is another assumption which is more plausible and which is supported by evidence--indirect, it is true, but copious. The war had been going on for more than a year and a half, and yet the German High Sea Fleet, in spite of its name, had sedulously refrained from venturing on the high seas. This made it the object of perpetual taunts by the enemies of Germany. There was some not completely suppressed restlessness among the German people.

It has been an almost invariable rule in war that the fleet which keeps on lying in port is eventually forced to put to sea by public opinion. The tone and wording of many official German statements justify the conclusion that the German fleet put to sea with the object, not of meeting the British fleet, but of returning to port with the assertion that the British fleet had kept out of the way and that the North Sea had been "swept" for it in vain. Contrary to the probable expectation, Sir David Beatty's force was met with and there seemed a chance of being able to attack him with the whole strength of the German Navy. Unforeseen opportunities of the kind have frequently occurred in naval war, and may be expected frequently to occur again.

FRENCH EXPERT'S OPINION

Here may be quoted some observations, dated March 11, 1918, by the very distinguished French flag officer Vice Admiral E. F. Fournier, in a preface to a translation of an account of the general work of the British Navy:

Je m'associe également aux regrets de l'auteur de cette notice qu'une ombre injustifiée ait été portée sur le tableau, si flatteur pour l'amour-propre de la Grande Bretagne, par certains critiques de la presse anglaise sur la bataille du Jutland. Je le fais d'autant plus volontiers que, dès la nouvelle de cette memorable rencontre navale, j'écrivis dans le Matin un article ou je vantais l'esprit de décision et la résolution si opportune de l'Amiral Beatty, n'hésitant pas à se jeter, malgré l'infériorité de ses forces, à la tête de la flotte allemande toute entière pour la contrecarrer dans ses desseins, en s'y accrochant énergiquement jusqu'a l'arrivée du renfort anglais, comme l'eût fait, sans aucun doute, Nelson lui-même, en pareil cas.

TRANSLATION:

I regret as much as does the author of this article that an unjustified shadow has been cast upon the picture, so flattering for the self-esteem of Great Britain, by certain English press criticisms upon the battle of Jutland. I indorse his view the more willingly because, on first receiving the news of that memorable naval combat, I wrote for the Matin an article in which I extolled Admiral Beatty's spirit of decision and very opportune resolution, in not hesitating to throw himself, despite the inferiority of his forces, at the head of the whole German fleet to checkmate its designs, and in hanging on firmly until the arrival of English reinforcements, as Nelson himself undoubtedly would have done in such a case.

Mr. Frothingham holds that the German fleet had not been led into a trap. Here, perhaps, something turns on the meaning given to particular words. A trap may be reasonably defined as an unforeseen and unfavorable position. Was it a deliberately sought or an unforeseen result that at 9 P. M. the German fleet was so placed that it had between it and its bases a hostile fleet which, as Mr. Frothingham tells us, still had an "overwhelming superiority in ships and guns?" Was such a position favorable or unfavorable? Surely there can be but one answer to each of these questions.

LOSS OF BRITISH SHIPS

Those who prefer to do so may use long words like "psychology" and "mentality," but the plain English of the situation is that the public mind in the allied and neutral countries was greatly impressed by the news that the British fleet had lost several ships, and by the fact that these losses were announced in the earlier part of the official communiqué concerning the battle. In the few great sea fights of which anything was generally remembered, the British had not lost ships. This, however, was far from being the universal rule.

In the great naval actions of the seventeenth century we lost many ships. It was recognized that a fleet might be victorious and still lose ships. The great Lord Hawke at Quiberon Bay lost ships. The contending fleets of the present day are so very large that they recall those of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when ships were lost in action by both sides. This, especially in view of the power of the naval ordnance of today, is almost certain to occur again. There is a wide difference between the naval gun of the present day and that of Nelson's and earlier times. The primary object of the older gun was to cause casualties among the enemy's crews; the modern naval gun is meant to destroy his ships. A fifteen-inch gun is not necessary to kill or wound a man. Naval weapons would be complete failures if, in sea fights, they were to prove incapable of destroying ships, and there is no probability that the destruction will fall on one side only.

Mr. Frothingham's final conclusion is that the "actual tactical result of the battle was indecisive." A very full definition of an indecisive tactical result would be instructive. One result of the battle of Jutland is beyond dispute and is in no way a matter of opinion. These lines are being written on the 12th of May, 1918, close upon two years after the battle of Jutland was fought. Not once during all that long time has the German High Sea Fleet ventured on the high seas or done more than just peep over the edge of its sheltering mine fields.

Comment by Mr. Arthur Pollen

_Arthur Pollen, the English naval critic, offers the following observations on debatable phases of the battle:_

I have read Mr. Frothingham's article, and it seems to me to be substantially accurate as a synopsis of the officially published events of the afternoon and evening. The writer's comments also seem to be judicious and fair. The battle raises, however, so many and such large problems, strategical, tactical, and technical, that it is impossible for any writer to exhaust the matter, or even to indicate the disputable points in so small a space as Mr. Frothingham has been able to devote to it.

In one or two not unimportant particulars I hold a different view of the facts and different opinions from the writer. For example, it seems to me that the Grand Fleet did not, as Mr. Frothingham states on Page 339, at 6:25 form in battle line astern of the battle cruisers. The plan published with the dispatches makes it seem more probable that the van of the Grand Fleet followed a course considerably to the north though parallel to that of the battle cruisers, and that it was not until about 7:05 that they turned from an easterly to a southerly course and formed astern of the Vice Admiral commanding the battle cruiser fleet. The story of the action might have been very different had circumstances permitted of the Grand Fleet going into action astern of the Vice Admiral at 6:15.

Again, Page 337, I cannot agree that it is evident that the German fleet was not forced into action with the Grand Fleet, but that Vice Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage that force. There is nothing to show that Scheer suspected Jellicoe was on the scene until he began to turn from north to southeast about a quarter of an hour before the Grand Fleet was sighted.

Again, Page 339, I cannot agree that it was the night disposition of the fleet that was the crucial decision. It is true it ended the battle for the night, but the decision which gave the battle its character was taken earlier in the day, when the enemy was allowed to open the range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens. In the existing atmospheric conditions and light it was impossible for gunnery to be effective, even at 12,000 and 9,000 yards and the only terms on which the German fleet could be defeated and sunk would have been those of close action. The refusal of close action was due to the menace of the German destroyer attacks, used on this occasion for purposes of defense and to afford an opportunity of evasion, with masterly skill and decisive effect. The dispositions and tactics of the night action are a different matter, but of these we are still completely ignorant.

Battle of Skagerrak as Germany Sees It

By CAPTAIN VON KUEHLWETTER

_of the German Imperial Navy_

[This article on the battle of Jutland was written during the week which it was fought, May 31, 1916]

Although Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Skagerrak will be treated and discussed together in future naval histories, it is not yet possible to draw the full historical consequences from the two last-named naval battles. We can estimate the effects of Trafalgar on the history of the world, for we know that it laid the foundations of British naval supremacy. With the exception of the immediate military advantage gained, the full results of the battle of Tsushima have not yet been developed. Still less can the battle of Skagerrak have left its impress upon world history.

For us Skagerrak [Jutland] has been a great, decisive victory, which our whole High Sea Fleet gained after a long, bitterly contested battle on the open sea, far from the home coast and its points of support, against the superior British Grand Fleet. Our naval forces inflicted upon the British fleet losses which, in terms of tons, even according to the British Admiralty, were double ours. But the tonnage does not fully represent the seriousness of the losses, since the British lost three dreadnoughts, as against one of ours, and three armored cruisers, as against one of our old armored cruisers.

If we add to this what our own observations, supported by statements of British prisoners, show, the enemy's losses were three and a half times ours; that is, in terms of fighting units, six dreadnoughts, including two older types, as against one dreadnought and one pre-dreadnought, and four armored cruisers and one small cruiser, as against four small cruisers.

The purpose of a battle is destruction, the victor being the side which goes further in this direction. The figures just quoted can leave no doubt on this point.

The German fleet remained on the battle area. After the repeatedly successful attacks of our torpedo boat flotillas the British fleet was forced to sheer off, and we never saw it again. Although the British ships were superior in speed and were reinforced by the arrival of twelve additional battleships, they made no attempt to recover contact with us and continue the battle. Our numerous torpedo boats searched for the British fleet all night without finding it, and instead utilized the opportunity to rescue a large number of British sailors.

This justifies us in calling the battle an absolute victory for us. It has demonstrated that the German fleet had within it the power to beat the more numerous and more up-to-date British fleet, and it opens up great possibilities for the future.

The battle of Skagerrak did not decide the war. Neither did Trafalgar nor Tsushima, nor did Tannenburg or the battle of the Masurian Lakes. A single battle between great powers will never be ultimately decisive. How much it contributes to the final outcome of a war cannot be estimated. The greatest result so far is not in the fact that Great Britain lost ships, but in the victory.

TRAFALGAR AND JUTLAND

Trafalgar and the name of Nelson stand high in naval history. Let us draw a military comparison between Trafalgar and the battle of Skagerrak. At Trafalgar there were on the British side 27 ships of the line, (of which 8 had 80 guns, 16 had 74 guns, and 3 had 64 guns,) four frigates, and two smaller vessels. On the side of the allied French and Spanish fleet there were 33 ships of the line, (of which 10 had from 80 to 110 guns, 22 had 74 guns, and one had 64 guns,) three frigates, and two smaller vessels. The French and Spanish fleet was not only numerically stronger, but its ships were better built and better armed.

In the battle of Skagerrak we had opposing each other: On the British side, thirty-one dreadnoughts, inclusive of six battle cruisers, and four armored cruisers; on the German side, twenty-one dreadnoughts, inclusive of five battle cruisers, and six older cruisers. Roughly speaking, we had twenty-seven big ships against thirty-five. Here also the better quality, judged by size, up-to-dateness, and armament, was on the side of the larger fleet. Apart from these big ships, there were on each side about fifty smaller vessels.

The total tonnage of the British fleet at Trafalgar was equal to about two modern dreadnoughts, as one of the ships of the line in Nelson's time was of about 2,000 tons. In numbers of guns and of crew there were more at Trafalgar, as at that time the ships were sailing vessels.

The British had between 17,000 and 20,000 men engaged, against 21,000 to 24,000. At Skagerrak we had from 35,000 to 40,000, as against 45,000 to 50,000 men. In this way we can compare the battle in its general aspect with Trafalgar. But if we look into the matter more closely, the French and Spanish fleet had within it an element of weakness arising from the fact that it consisted of two allied forces, between which there is never complete co-ordination. The French were further weakened by effects of the Revolution and exhaustion from previous battles. The French Admiral himself said: "Never before was the French fleet at such a low standard. We had bad masts, bad sails, bad rigging, bad officers, and bad seamen." Of the Spanish, Nelson said: "They have neither seamen nor officers." At the head of the allied forces was a French Admiral who had no confidence in the fleet and who was acting under instructions issued by Napoleon, which he felt incapable of carrying out. Opposed to him was the seasoned and well-schooled fleet of Nelson, so that it was not a battle of equal opponents and the result was annihilation. None of the French or Spanish ships was again seen at sea; nineteen were captured or destroyed, ten were driven into harbor and blockaded; four escaped, only to fall into the hands of the victors a few days later.

COMPARED WITH TSUSHIMA

And now Tsushima, another parallel. A Russian fleet, made up of any old vessels the Russians could get together, and of what ships still remained in the East--supported by Port Arthur--made one last bid against the sea power of the enemy. Without training, without points of support, honeycombed with revolutionary ideas, the Russian fleet started on its trip to the Far East, where it arrived on May 27, after suffering terrible hardships and being more than six months on the way to meet the enemy. Meanwhile, Port Arthur, with its fleet, had fallen. The Russian Admiral knew that he had absolutely no chance, but he did not have enough courage to retreat. Blindly and without confidence he started the battle against an opponent who was superior in numbers, equipment, and training. Of the 38 Russian ships which arrived on the morning of May 27, 1905, in the Strait of Korea, 19 were sunk and 7 captured, including 2 hospital ships. The Russian Admiral, 273 officers, and 5,833 petty officers and men were taken prisoner; 201 officers and 4,344 men were killed. Against this the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats and about 700 men.

Trafalgar was not a battle between equal forces, and still less so was Tsushima; hence, as regards their military value, they cannot be compared with Skagerrak. In this battle for the first time there were two sides equally well trained, equally imbued with the same spirit, equally determined. Here also the smaller force won. The superior force had to quit the battle area, and only the power it retained within itself saved it from annihilation. This battle gave us, in the military sense, a victory such as naval history has never yet recorded. Its moral effect upon our fleet, especially after the long harassing wait, cannot be expressed in words. It did not end the war, but it gave us more confidence and startled England, who always thought she had an invincible fleet.

On the victory of Trafalgar England founded her colonial world power, because she thereby obtained the mastery of the seas, which remained unchallenged. Tsushima gave Japan the sea power in the East which she needed to carry out her military plans on land. It no more ended the Japanese-Russian war than Trafalgar had ended the struggle of that day, but it gave Japan a military success which was of great value to her in peace negotiations. We hope that Skagerrak is a blow against the victory of Trafalgar and the first step toward the smashing of British sea power, and that other mighty hammer blows will fall against the barriers which shut off other peoples from the freedom of the seas.

International Socialists' Peace Campaign

A Message Sent to the Socialists of the Central Powers by Those of the Entente Nations

Emile Vandervelde and Camille Huysmans, the Chairman and Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, on March 1, 1918, signed and transmitted a message to the Socialists of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, inviting them to consider the declaration on war aims adopted by the Interallied Labor and Socialist Conference in London, Feb. 23, and asking them to propose conditions of their own for comparison. The communication was printed April 17 without comment in the German Socialist organ, Vorwärts, being reproduced by it from the Paris Humanité. It is as follows:

The third Interallied Socialist Conference, which was held in London from Feb. 20 to Feb. 23, has commissioned the President and Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau to communicate to you the authentic text of the memorandum which has been adopted by the meeting of delegates of the Labor and Socialist organizations of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. The main ideas of this document have received, or had received in advance, the approval of the parties of Serbia, Portugal, Greece, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

A special mission, consisting of Stuart, Bunning, (England,) Jouhaux and Cachin, (France,) a Belgian delegate, an Italian delegate, and the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, Camille Huysmans, has gone to the United States in order to obtain the adhesion of the American working class to this memorandum, which expresses the point of view of the organized proletariat of the Entente countries with regard to the necessary foundations of a democratic peace and the principal conditions for a general international Labor and Socialist conference, which has been summoned to a neutral country by "a committee which provides all guarantees of impartiality toward the various elements which are called to take part."

In making this communication to you the signatories of this message consider it profitable to recall objectively the reasons which determined the acceptance of the procedure proposed by the London Conference.

The conference was of the opinion that it would be of no use to assemble a general congress unless its aim had been established in principle.

The conference was of the opinion that "the principal condition for the holding of a plenary assembly of the International consists in its organizers satisfying themselves that all the organizations to be represented formulate in precise terms and by a public declaration their peace conditions upon the basis of the principles of peace without annexations and without indemnities of a punitive character, and the right of the peoples to self-determination," and, further, that these organizations will "work with all their power to obtain from their Governments the necessary guarantee that these principles shall be applied honestly and without _arriere-pensées_ in the settlement of all questions raised at the official peace conference."

In order itself to satisfy these conditions, the London Conference has considered it necessary to state precisely its views and its action in the memorandum which we are commissioned to communicate to you.

The conference expects that your party, following the same idea, will resolve to issue a public declaration of a similar kind, whether separately or jointly with the Labor and Socialist organizations of Central Europe.