Part 5

But the change in the German plan of strategy had been recognized by the Allies, and a new English army from Havre was hurried to the line Bethune-Dunkirk to extend the allied left wing to the coast and block the road to Calais. It reached West Flanders on Oct. 13, and on Oct. 16 it came in contact with the German Army that approached from Antwerp. The latter joined the German right wing north of Lille and extended it to Westende. On the 18th, after having brought up all their reserves, the Germans began their onslaught to break through in the region of Dixmude and Ypres.

While, by Oct. 27, no appreciable impression had been made on the allied battleline, the situation in the eastern seat of war had begun to assume an alarming aspect, and necessitated the complete change in the German plan of strategy, which marks the beginning of the second phase of the war.

On the western front this second phase meant for the Germans the going into the defensive along the entire battleline, which the allied armies have been relentlessly attempting to break. In spite of their continuous heroic efforts only minor successes, such as that of the British at Neuve Chapelle and that of the French to the north of Arras, have been achieved. Counter attacks, forming the most essential element of the modern defensive, have been launched by the Germans incessantly, and have on several occasions resulted in successes similar to those of the Allies, as, for instance, at Soissons and at Ypres. On the whole, no changes of strategic importance have taken place, and the German wall in France stands firm to this day.

II.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

While, in the early days of August, the bulk of the German Army was moving westward, not more than ten army corps were available for the campaign against Russia. To them and to the Austrian armies fell the task of laying the basis for the offensive contemplated for a later date. The plan of campaign was to draw the Russians into the Polish bag and tie it up. It was based on the knowledge that Russia's principal strategic aim must, under all circumstances, be Cracow, the gateway to Vienna and Berlin.

The enemy was to be allowed to reach it through Poland, while the Germans should hold on to East Prussia and the Austrians to Galicia, to flank the Russian advance from the north and south in preparation for a campaign against the Russian lines of communication. This scheme of bagging the enemy has governed all strategic moves of the campaign against Russia to this day.

But the Muscovites were on their guard. They paid little attention to the few German divisions that were thrown into Poland in August, in order to attract a Russian offensive, and began hammering at the Teutonic flanking positions along the East Prussian frontier in the north and the line Lublin-Tarnopol in the south.

While the Russian offensive in East Prussia came to grief at Tannenberg, it was most successful against Galicia, and the eighth week of the war already found the Russian invasion west of the San, Przemysl besieged, and the Austrian right wing flanked by vast bodies of cavalry, which had penetrated the Carpathian passes and reached the region of Munkacs.

To relieve the pressure exerted on their Allies and give them a chance once more to establish themselves in north-eastern Galicia, four German army corps invaded Poland and advanced toward Radom and Ivangorod. This counter move was successful. Menaced in their right flank, the Russians quickly took back their army beyond the San. The Austrians followed, raised the siege of Przemysl, and drove the invaders from Hungary and straightened out their line from Sandomir to Czernowitz.

Meanwhile heavy Russian reinforcements had been brought up from Ivangorod and were gradually put in action against the Germans east of Radom. On Oct. 24, as soon as the Russian superiority became alarming, the four German army corps, having, temporarily at least, accomplished their purpose of re-establishing the Austrian campaign, beat a hasty retreat toward Silesia, during which the second purpose of their invasion, to draw into the Polish bag great masses of Russian troops, was successfully achieved, the Russians having been led to believe that they were pursuing a great German army.

Simultaneously, though, with their advance in the path of the German retreat in Poland, the Russians once more concentrated vast forces against the menacing projection of the Austrian battleline in Galicia, and the early days of November witnessed the second invasion of the Austrian province. At the same time a new drive was made on East Prussia, and the Germans were forced back into the region of the Masurian Lakes.

The retirement of the entire Teutonic battleline before the Russians, who toward the end of October had reached the maximum of their strength, marks the end of the first phase of the eastern campaign. It had not accomplished all that had been expected of it. The enemy had been drawn far into South Poland, but the base of operations for the general offensive against his communications in the north had not been established just where it should have been, and the Russian frontier fortifications had been found better prepared for resistance than those of Belgium, while in the south the Austrian base of operations was entirely in the hands of the enemy.

The second phase of the eastern campaign was therefore opened from a new base--Thorn, where the main army had been gathered ever since Oct. 27, when the Russian danger had become alarming, and the offensive in the west had been abandoned. It was suddenly launched with irresistible force on Nov. 12, and rolled back numerically inferior Russian armies, whose task it had been to protect the right flank of the Russian advance on Silesia.

Recognizing the danger to their operations in South Poland and Galicia, where they had meanwhile approached the line of the Warta, Cracow, and Neu Sandec, the Russians threw troops into North Poland from all sides and succeeded in temporarily detaining the German advance there, while they were continuing their supreme efforts to break the Austro-German line south of Cracow. But the line held. At the same time the German drive in North Poland was making steady headway.

On Dec. 6 the Germans took Lodz, and further north advanced on Lowitz, and the Russian offensive in the Cracow district was given up. While all troops that could be spared were sent northeast to support the prepared lines of the Bzura and Rawka Rivers, the Russians in the south fell back behind the Nida and Dunajec, joining with their right wing their northern army in the region of Tomaschew, and extending their left through the region of Gorlitz and Torka toward the Pruth. In this line the Teutonic advance was checked. A new German drive on the road from Soldau to Warsaw could likewise make no headway beyond Mlawa, while on the other hand in East Prussia the Russian offensive had been brought to a standstill.

A siege warfare, like that in France, seemed imminent, except in the Bukowina, where Russian forces during January were driving Austrian troops before them. The Russian invasion of that province, however, so distant from all strategically important points, was but a political manoeuvre.

The first movement of any consequence to occur was a desperate attempt of the Austrians early in February to push forward with their right wing in the direction of Stanislau, chiefly to bring relief to the garrison of Przemysl. Simultaneously they began sweeping the Russians out of Bukovina. The latter undertaking was successful, but the advance on Stanislau was thrown back toward Nadworna.

While the Austrian offensive was under way, General von Hindenburg unexpectedly launched a vigorous attack in East Prussia, which resulted in the destruction of the Russian East Prussian Army in the region of the Masurian Lakes. Once more a successful drive at the Russian "bread line" from the north seemed at hand. Already the armies pursuing the Russians were hammering at the Russian fortifications along the Niemen, Bobr, and Narew when the surrender of Przemysl, the siege of which had uninterruptedly gone on behind the Russian lines since November, on March 22 again presented to the Russians an opportunity to break the Austrian battleline.

To check the onslaught of the reinforced Russian armies against the Carpathian passes early in April, troops must be drawn from General von Hindenberg's armies, and the consequence was another deadlock in the north. Meanwhile the reinforced Teutonic troops were hurriedly concentrated for the counter-attack against the Russian offensive in the Carpathians, and a great drive began against the Russian positions on the Dunajec line, east of Cracow, early in May. Breaking all resistance, it swept on toward Jaroslau and Przemysl on a sixty-mile front.

Threatened in their right and left flanks, respectively, the Russian lines on the Nida and in the Carpathians fell back rapidly, while reinforcements were sent to stem the Teutonic advance along the San. But the Russian efforts were in vain. The momentum the Teutonic offensive had gained carried it across the river, while further south the Austrian right wing cleared the entire Carpathian front of the enemy, hotly pushing his retreat.

Przemysl was recaptured, the third Russian line of defense from Rawa-Ruska to Grodeck and the Dniester was broken, and the end of June saw Lemberg once more in the hands of the Teutons, and the Russian line on the defensive and sorely pressed along a front extending from the Bessarabian frontier along the Dniester to the mouth of the Zlota-Lipa, and from there along the Zlota-Lipa and the Bug, well into Russian territory, leaving the river southeast of Grubeschow, and continuing from there in a northwesterly direction to the region of Krasnik.

Here it joined hands with the left wing of the Russian Army of the Nida, which had retired before the Austro-German advance in a northeasterly direction, intrenching along a line from Krasnik across the Vistula and through Sjenno and Jastrshob (about fifteen miles southwest of Radom) to the region of Tomaschew on the Pilitza.

While this great Spring offensive from the Dunajec line was well under way, small German forces invaded the Russian province of Courland. Finding at first little resistance in the path of their unexpected advance, they took Libau and established themselves on the Dubissa-Windau line. During July the operations in Courland steadily assumed greater proportions.

Two bases for the campaign against the Russian lines of communication have thus been firmly established in the flanks of the Russian Armies west of the Vistula, both protruding far into their rear. Drives against the Dunaburg-Warsaw line from the north and the Minsk-Ivangorod line from the south will open the second year of the eastern campaign. The first year of the incessant struggle has brought the aims of the German strategy, the bagging of the Russian Armies, within sight of its realization.

III.

CAMPAIGNS OF MINOR IMPORTANCE

While the struggle in the two principal seats of war has been going on, the passing year has witnessed fighting also of secondary importance, though not less heroic, in three other fields of action: Serbia, Turkey, and the Austro-Italian frontier. Whereas Turkey joined the Teutons but three months after the beginning of hostilities, and Italy was involved only at the end of May, Serbia was one of the first nations to take the field.

Austria's campaign against the little kingdom could under no circumstances influence the events of the war, and was therefore void of any strategic importance. For this reason, but three Austrian Army corps were engaged in it.

The purpose was merely to keep the Serbians busy, and prevent them from invading Austrian soil. For the sake of the moral effect on the other Balkan States the capture of Belgrade should be attempted. In view of the strength of the Danube fortifications the operations were launched from Bosnia and resulted in the forcing of the Drina line and the capture of Valjevo on Nov. 17. The Serbian positions on the Danube having thus been flanked, the abandonment of Belgrade on Dec. 2 was a natural consequence of the Battle of Valjevo.

Misled by their successes into the belief that the Serbian army had been placed hors de combat, the Austrians advanced beyond the lines destined to constitute the object of their offensive. In the difficult mountain districts southeast of Valjevo the Serbians turned on the invaders with superior forces and defeated them. The Austrian retreat to the Drina which followed, necessitated the evacuation of Belgrade on Dec. 15. Since then, the situation on the Serbian frontier has been a deadlock, only desultory and insignificant fighting occurring for the rest of the year.

In contrast to the operations in Serbia, Turkey's campaign has direct bearing on the European war. Its chief feature, the closing of the Dardanelles, has been a serious blow to Russia. The frantic efforts of the Allies to open them are the plainest evidence of its importance.

The attempt in March to force the straits by naval power having resulted in failure, an army was landed on the west coast of Gallipoli, and after heavy fighting established itself on a line running from Eski-Hissarlik on the south coast of the peninsula to the region of Sari-Bair, on the north coast, constituting a front of approximately twenty miles, within five miles of the west coast. No progress further than this have the Allies been able to make up to the present, and the watch at the Dardanelles stands firm as yet.

The attacks of the Anglo-French armies, however, exerted influence on Turkey's operations in other fields of action. They caused the complete abandonment of a contemplated invasion of Egypt and compelled the Turkish troops to go on the defensive in the Caucasian seat of war. This enabled Russia to call back to Poland troops sorely needed there, with which they had had to check the Turkish advance on Kars in January. Since February both battlelines along the Caucasian front have been weakened and no fighting of any consequence has occurred in this campaign of merely secondary importance.

The operations in the latest field of action, along the Austro-Italian frontier, have been going on for but eight weeks, and do not, therefore, allow any conclusions as to their importance to be made as yet. So far the Italians have been unable to make any effective impression on either Austria's Tyrolese frontier or on the front of the Isonzo. All attempts to break through the Austrian lines have thus far failed. The aim of Austria's strategy is to maintain a deadlock until the issue has been decided in Poland.

In determining the results of the first year of the world war the question as to which side is holding the advantage at the close of this important period depends entirely upon what were the political aims of the adversaries. The Teutonic allies' contention has ever been, rightly or wrongly, that they are not waging a war for territorial aggrandizement, but purely one in self-defense. From this point of view they can be well satisfied with the results they have so far attained.

An American View

By the Military Expert of The New York Times

FIRST PHASE

Opening the Way to France Through Belgium

By Aug. 4, 1914, war had been declared by all the nations now engaged except Turkey and Italy. Subsequent events have proved that of them all the Teutonic allies were the only nations actually prepared and that as between Austria and Germany the preparation of the latter was much more complete. It was the Germans, therefore, who, with the entire campaign carefully mapped out in advance, took the initiative. Germany, too, at the very outset saw the one clear path to victory.

One or the other of her Continental enemies must not only be defeated, but crushed and eliminated from the conflict before the other could mobilize against her. One of them, Russia, would probably take the longer time to effect her mobilization. Russia had started, it is true, before war was declared. But interior railroads in Russia are few. Russia, too, is proverbially slow, if for no other reason than by virtue of her ponderous numbers. France, on the other hand, is checked and counter-checked by good strategic railroads, and, having no such vast territory over which her troops would have to be moved, would be able to mobilize in a much shorter time than her ally. England, for a few weeks at least, could be disregarded. Deceived as to the extent of Russian unpreparedness and believing that Russia's slowness would prevent an active offense for some weeks, Germany selected France as her first objective, and took immediate steps to hurl twenty-four army corps across the French border at various points, aiming at Paris.

These twenty-four corps were divided into three armies--the Army of the Meuse, based on Cologne; the Army of the Moselle, based on Metz and Coblenz, and the Army of the Rhine, based on Strassburg. All of these three armies were naturally to converge on Paris. The route of the Army of the Meuse would pass through Liége, Namur, and Maubeuge, and would therefore have to cross a part of Belgium; the Army of the Moselle would take a route through Sedan and Soissons, passing north of the Verdun fortress, but of necessity crossing the Duchy of Luxemburg; the Army of the Rhine, after crossing the screen of the Vosges Mountains, would pass through Nancy and Toul, between the fortresses of Epinal and Belfort.

It is obvious that the march to Paris would be most quickly achieved through the flat country of Belgium, where the French frontier is practically unguarded and only the weakly manned barrier fortresses of Belgium barred the way. The remainder of the French frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland was well fortified, and Germany had no time to spend in reducing fortified places.

The main advance was therefore to take place through Belgium, the Army of the Moselle co-operating, while to the Army of the Rhine was assigned the offensive-defensive rôle of advancing to the barrier fortresses of Epinal and Belfort to check any French advance that might be directed against the communications of the Armies of the Moselle and the Meuse to the north. The railroad communications through the Belgian plain were splendidly adapted to this plan, backed as they were by the military railroads which Germany had constructed several years before, running through the industrial districts in the north of the German Empire up to the Belgian border.

Germany's first move was the invasion of Luxemburg, violating the neutrality of a State which, under the treaty making her independent and guaranteeing neutrality, (to which treaty Germany was a party,) was not permitted to maintain an army. Two days later Germany asked passage for her troops through Belgium, for the purpose of attacking France. Belgium promptly refused, and on Aug. 4 Germany began the forcing of this passage by an attack on Liége.

Thus, at the outset the German plan went awry. Although the contemplated line of advance was through Liége and Namur, it was not sufficient, with Belgium openly in arms to defend her country, to reduce only these two towns. The Belgian Army could, and later did, fall back to the north on Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp, and so be directly on the German flank and in a position to strike at the line of communications. It was therefore necessary to subjugate all of Belgium either by destroying the Belgian Army or driving it before them in their advance.

Thus, the German advance was not only doomed to delay, but at least 100,000 troops were needed to garrison a hostile country and to protect the life lines running to the rear.

Three days after the attack on Liége opened the Germans penetrated between the outer forts, their infantry advancing in close formation and sustaining enormous losses. But Liége was worth the price paid. Some of the forts held out for days, but were finally reduced by the fire of the 42-centimeter guns--the first of the German surprises. The Belgian garrison, however, had done its work. The German advance was delayed for ten precious days, during which the first consignment of the British expeditionary force had reached the Continent and France and Russia had largely completed their mobilization.

As soon as it was realized that the unexpected Belgian resistance had retarded the German advance and in all probability had disarranged the German plan of campaign, the French, even before the guns of Liége had cooled, struck at Alsace, through the Belford Gap and over the Vosges Mountains. At first this French offensive was successful. Points on the Metz-Strassburg Railroad were taken and the town of Mülhausen captured. But almost before the news of success reached Paris the French had been defeated, not only in Alsace but also in Lorraine, whence French troops had been sent to engage the German Army of the Moselle. The result was the retirement of the French to the line of their first defense--a line that had been prepared for just such an emergency during the years since 1871.

While the German armies of the Moselle and of the Rhine were thus occupied in repelling the French advance the Army of the Meuse was forcing its way through Belgium. Throwing out a strong cavalry screen in its front, this army advanced through Tongres, St. Frond, Laugen, Haelen, and Terlemont, and finally confronted the Belgians on the line from Louvain to Namur. Fighting on this front filled almost a week, when the destruction of the fortifications of Namur forced the Belgians to fall back, pivoting on Louvain to the line from Louvain to Wavre, the last line in front of Brussels. On Aug. 20 the Belgians were defeated at Louvain and the Germans entered Brussels, the Belgian Government having previously retired to Antwerp. The first phase of the German advance was thus completed and the way to France was open.

SECOND PHASE

From the Fall of Brussels to von Kluck's Retreat to the Aisne

Immediately following the fall of Namur, which forced the Belgians to take up the Louvain-Wavre line, the main German Army of the Meuse started for France, leaving possibly two army corps to drive the Belgians from Brussels and to protect their flank and their lines of communication. The German advance first came in contact with the French and British along a line from Mons to Charleroi, southwest of Brussels. The British were supposed to have been between two French armies, but for some reason the army which had been assigned to position on the British left did not appear. Being outflanked, a retreat followed, the French being defeated at the same time at Charleroi. The German Army of the Moselle then attacked along the Meuse, and, being also successful, was on the flank and rear of the British and French retreating from Mons and Charleroi.

Thus a great enveloping movement was disclosed which for some days gave every evidence of being successful. It was defeated, however, entirely by the British, who, though outflanked and outnumbered three to one, fought steadily night and day for six days, their small force holding in complete check all of von Kluck's army corps. Retreat was of course inevitable, but the retreat was made in good order and with the morale of the troops unshaken.