Part 22

Germany, by bursting her way through Belgium, was enabled to seize eighty to ninety per cent. of the coal and iron resources of France and the greater part of her apparatus for the production of arms. She holds also the entire resources of Belgium, both of raw material and finished product. The foul blow by which she possessed herself of these indispensable treasures had two consequences which she did not look for--the active hostility of England and the moral indignation of all other nations. In helping France to make good the loss which she sustained through such perfidy the American people think that they are doing God's service, and their only regret is that they cannot do more of it. If they had foreseen the present conditions they would have enlarged their gun factories and powder mills to meet the emergency more promptly.

A German writer in the New York _Times_ of May 30, Mr. Vom Bruck, says: "If the German nation is wiped out with the help of American arms and ammunition no man of the white race in the United States would be able to think of such a catastrophe without horror and remorse." All of the contending nations say that they are fighting for existence, which means that if they do not win in the end they will be wiped out. With such an alternative staring us in the face very few tears would be shed by Americans, of any color, if both the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, with all their belongings, should be wiped off the face of the earth.

War and Non-Resistance

The pacifist "mollycoddle," as Theodore Roosevelt dubbed him in his San Francisco Exposition speech, finds expression in these words of Bertrand Russell in the August number of the Atlantic Monthly:

All these three motives for armaments--cowardice, love of dominion, and lust for blood--are no longer ineradicable in civilized human nature. All are diminishing under the influence of modern social organization. All might be reduced to a degree which would make them almost innocuous, if early education and current moral standards were directed to that end. Passive resistance, if it were adopted deliberately by the will of a whole nation, with the same measure of courage and discipline which is now displayed in war, might achieve a far more perfect protection for what is good in national life than armies and navies can ever achieve, without demanding the carnage and waste and welter of brutality involved in modern war.

But it is hardly to be expected, Mr. Russell reluctantly concludes, that progress will come in this way, because "the imaginative effort required is too great." He adds:

It is much more likely that it will come, like the reign of law within the state, by the establishment of a central government of the world, able and willing to secure obedience by force, because the great majority of men will recognize that obedience is better than the present international anarchy.

A central government of this kind would command assent not as a partisan, but as the representative of the interests of the whole. Very soon resistance to it would be seen to be hopeless and wars would cease. Force directed by a neutral authority is not open to the same abuse or likely to cause the same long-drawn conflicts as force exercised by quarreling nations, each of which is the judge in its own cause. Although I firmly believe that the adoption of passive instead of active resistance would be good if a nation could be convinced of its goodness, yet it is rather to the ultimate creation of a strong central authority that I should look for the ending of war. But war will end only after a great labor has been performed in altering men's moral ideals, directing them to the good of all mankind, and not only of the separate nations into which men happen to have been born.

"Good Natured Germany"

The leading article in the June issue of the Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Munich) is by Dr. George Grupp, one of Germany's most able scholars, and is entitled, "Never Can Germany be Overcome if She be United." Dr. Grupp finds evidences for this assertion all through history, and quotes some of the earliest commentators and historians to this effect:

As early as 1487 Felix Fabri, a Dominican of Ulm wrote: "Si Germani essent ubique concordes, totum orbem domarent." (If the Germans were united they would conquer the whole world.)

The sentence is an echo of the fiery address which one Aeneas Silvius, later to become pope, delivered to the German princes after the fall of Constantinople, and from which Felix Fabri himself gives a quotation....

To Germany alone the Greeks looked for any considerable help. An evidence of this is the beautiful and often quoted remark of the Athenian Laonikos Chalkokondylas: "If the Germans were united and the princes would obey, they would be unconquerable and the strongest of all mortals."

We encounter similar statements very frequently, both earlier and later, from the Roman courtier Dietrich von Nieheim and from the humanists, from the Alsatian Wimpheling and Sebastian Brant, from the Swabian Nauclerus and the Frank Pirckheimer. "What could Germany be," they cry, "if she would only make use of her own strength, exploit her own resources for herself! No people on earth could offer her resistance!"

Dr. Grupp claims that Germany's lack of unity has resulted only from her rule of goodwill toward all, within her borders as well as without.

It never occurred to the Germans as to other peoples to disturb the peaceful development of their neighbors. They allowed mighty powers to build themselves up unmolested and to rise above Germany's head. In their internal affairs they observed the same principle of justice; no line, no class, no province, no grant succeeded in obtaining so oppressive an ascendancy, that other lines and classes, other provinces and grants were simply annihilated. The unfortunate consequence was lack of unity.

Nowhere were or are there so many cultural centres, so many different movements, tendencies, parties. This great multifariousness of the German life was recognized and admired by others. But this very multifariousness had its darker side, the fatal, much deplored lack of unity.

Through the centuries, Dr. Grupp claims, Germany has been altogether too good-natured, allowing other nations to all but bleed her to death.

In her peaceable disharmony Germany has dreamed along carelessly and good-naturedly for centuries until the abrupt awakening when she saw a yawning abyss opened up at her feet. Good-naturedly she has allowed herself to be plundered and faithfully she has fought other nations' battles. As early as the 15th century the humanists remarked the fact that alien states gladly took German soldiers into their service, and later on it was worse than that. Foreign countries gladly waged their wars on German territory. Here was decided for the most part the fate of the Spanish world-empire, here France and England battled for supremacy. The Seven Years' War was not only a question of Schleswig; it was a question of whether North America and even far-away India should be French or English.

Now the condition is suddenly reversed; the Germans are fighting for themselves, and the fact arouses the limitless rage of their opponents. Let us console ourselves with the fact that even in the Middle Ages it was said: "Teutonici nullius amici," in spite of their peaceableness.

Italy's Defection

Dr. Eduard Meyer has contributed an article to the Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Munich) on "Ancient Italy and the Rise of the Italian Nation." Dr. Meyer is professor of history in the University of Berlin, and is a brother of Dr. Kuno Meyer who recently attracted much attention in this country by severing his connection with Harvard University because of a prize "war poem" written by one of the undergraduates. A postscript reflects Dr. Meyer's present feeling toward Italy's defection:

The views which I have presented in this article are the fruit of long years of study and research; and I feel myself constrained to state explicitly that they are in no wise influenced by the events which we have experienced during the last few weeks. But it may be that a short postscript is necessary.

Italy has not won her present national unity by reason of her own strength; she owes it to the combinations of the changing world-situation and the victories of foreign powers, which her statesmen have known how to use to the best advantage.

According to Dr. Meyer, Italy's claim to be one of the great powers is not based on any actual ability to uphold that claim; it merely happens that her assertion has not been challenged.

She has claimed for herself the status of a great power on a par with the other large nations of the world; but she has not possessed the inner strength of herself to support such a claim without the help of stronger powers.

In August, 1914, Italy had the opportunity to decide her fate. If she could have made the choice then, if she could have gone into the world-war with all the might that she possessed and, staking her whole existence, have fought toward the highest goal, she might have won for herself a powerful and self-sufficient place in the world.

On account of his many utterances since the outbreak of the war, Ludwig Thoma's März (Munich), a weekly founded by him, has attracted much attention. An article entitled "Italy's Defection," in a recent issue, is most bitter in tone, accusing Italy of long-standing intrigue and treachery.

We know that Italy went still further from the fact that at the renewal of the alliance in 1912 in Paris she expressly announced that she would not march against France. It will be remembered how quick the French army command was to take stock of relations on the southeastern border, with the result that in the very first days of mobilization their troops were called from the Savoy Alps and by the eighth of August were giving battle on the Alsatian border.

But Italy still guarded the neutrality which she had proclaimed and with apparent reasonableness she was able to hold that the letter of the Triple Alliance did not compel her to enter the conflict. Laughing in her sleeve she could even give it out that her sympathetic neutrality would sufficiently guarantee to her allies certain suspended contracts of an economic nature. Neutral Italy furnished Germany to a considerable extent with products of its own land and others which were not unwelcome.

That the mobilization of an Italian army on France's borders might have been able to decide the war as far back as September, is a consideration which, in the face of this hypocritical neutrality, one cannot face without driving one's nails into one's flesh!

It was through the connivance of England that Italy weakly found herself forced to enter the war against her former allies.

Sir Edward Grey found the way to do it. Italy learned that England was no longer in a situation to hold the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal open and was obliged to take over the control of Italian imports. Even before this British agents had control of the port of Genoa and there was no doubt that through most irritating measures on England's part which skillfully concealed the motive behind them, a blow would be struck at the very roots of Italy's existence and famine would set in. Presently the Italian politicians and the crown were confronted with a dilemma which left them the choice only between war and revolution....

Not every people has the political government which it deserves; the Italian people are the victims of a government, essentially undeserved but traditionally faithless.

But Mars is now shaking the dice and behind the curtain of the future Revolution stands waiting.

Apologies for English Words

An indication of the height to which the "Gott Strafe England" feeling has climbed in Germany is shown in the following announcement by the management of Die Woche (Berlin):

TO OUR READERS!

Many readers of Die Woche have taken offense at the words "Copyright by ..." (in English) and demand that this English formula be rendered hereafter in German. This desire, springing from patriotic motives, is easily understood, but unfortunately cannot be carried out for the form "Copyright by ..." is demanded by the American copyright law in this form. If we did not print these words in English, which is the official language of the United States, our copyright in America would be void and the protection both of ourselves and our writers would be forfeited.

Germanic Peace Terms

[From the Budapest Correspondent of The London Morning Post.]

To the Revue de Hongrie, the only French paper in Budapest, Count Andrássy contributes an article for July entitled "Les garanties d'une paix durable," and discusses the peace terms the Central Empires are to put forward in the event of final victory. He objects to the idea of annexation or anything more than "boundary corrections," and says:

Our war is a defensive war, which will achieve its aim when our enemies have been expelled from our territory and their ring has been broken. This aim could be best served by making peace with one or other of our enemies and winning him over to our cause. This would be of immense advantage to the future of civilization and ensure us against the horrors of a prolonged war. A separate peace would be the best chance for certain Powers to change their international policy. To my mind the issues of this war will greatly change the attitude of some hostile States toward us, and will bring about more intimate relations between them and ourselves, besides widening the foundations of the alliance between Hungary and her allies. And this is to be the rock upon which the European balance of power is to rest in the future. Our war is not a war of conquest, and the boundary changes of which some people speak are not the _sine qua non_ of a good peace. Therefore I do not even wish to speak about certain territorial alterations, which, nevertheless, might be necessary.

Regarding the question of England and nationality, Count Andrássy says:

Victory no doubt affords us the right to demand the alteration of the map of Europe, yet, this not being our aim and not to our interest, we can be satisfied with certain compensations, as no doubt our enemies would not spare us if they were victorious. Lloyd George said that the States are to be shaped in the future according to nationalities, which means that the Monarchy is to be disrupted. An English scholar not long ago expressed the same view, and, in fact, in England this idea is being impressed upon the people. This policy is sounded in a country which dominates so many millions of alien nationalities. If England speaks in this way, though she is not in direct conflict with us, what can we expect from Russia or Italy? Everyone knows that Russia wants Galicia, the Bukovina, Màramaros; Serbia wants Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and the Banat; Italy they won to their side by promising her our territory; Transylvania is promised to the one who cares to take it; henceforth, if we wish to defend it, we shall have to prepare for a new attack from another quarter. Yet nothing would be more alien to our thoughts than that if victorious we should annex foreign territory, for we would have seriously to consider if such conquest would be to our advantage or not. The same policy ought to be applied in Germany. Though her enemies would not spare her either, she must be cautious not to go too far in her appetites, and should seek for monetary compensations. Most of all she has to be careful not to claim territory, which would mean everlasting unrest and a new irredentism. It would be a bad policy even to touch the Balkans, for such interference would sooner or later bring Russia back to the Balkans, and the peoples there, menaced in their independence by us, would turn to Russia. We would thus place nations used to independence under alien rule, and such an act would neither be a wise nor a paying policy.

As regards Italy, Count Andrássy has also a solution which is quite generous. He says:

We would not do well if we were influenced by just revenge and turned our eyes on Italian territory. To force territory from a country whose people are so patriotic would be a source of weakness on our part. In the worst case, only boundary corrections can be thought of, and no conquest. Italy must recompense us by money and not territory, for not the Italian people, but its Government, committed a breach of faith against us.

France's Bill of Damages

The agricultural problem in France is the subject of an article by Professor Daniel Zolla in La Revue Hebdomadaire (Paris). Professor Zolla is a leader in the agricultural school at Grignon, and the main part of his article is a discussion of France's agricultural losses and how to repair them. He sums the present situation as follows:

At the end of May the enemy were occupying territory amounting to about two million hectares. In this zone as in the regions invaded though immediately evacuated, the agricultural losses have been admittedly severe: harvests, livestock, implements, fodder, have been stolen or destroyed; the buildings, burned or ruined, will have to be entirely rebuilt. The soil itself, ploughed with trenches, dug up by shells, infested with weeds, has lost much of its fertility....

In the invaded region which is one of the richest and most fertile in all France, the farming capital amounts at the least to five hundred francs per hectare, not counting the value of the buildings and of the land itself. For a total of two million hectares, the sum thus represented in the personal advances of farmers reach or surpass a billion, for in French Flanders and in Artois this minimum estimate of five hundred francs is greatly exceeded.

Concerning future indemnification for these losses, Professor Zolla writes:

It is the entire country at which the enemy wished to strike by ruining a certain number of the people; it is the country which should repair the ruin and indemnify the losses. Never will the principle of national solidarity apply with more justice and reason. The interest of the state can demand, it is true, that the victim who has become a creditor of the country shall not exact immediate payment of the sums due him. This is a question of the time needed to enable the country to pay and the representatives of the nation must be the judges of that.

But admitting the principle, it will suffice if it be known that the Treasury accepts the liability; it will be sufficient if certain annuities are promised and managed so that the parties can procure through the ordinary avenues of credit, the necessary indemnities.

This is the method which the National Assembly adopted in 1873. A sum of one hundred and eleven millions voted as relief, was represented by twenty-six annuities including interest at five per cent. and redemption.

Professor Zolla admits that France is going to encounter a serious difficulty in the scarcity of labor which is sure to follow the close of the war. It is not too early, he advises, to begin working on the solution of this problem so that France will be ready to meet it when it arises:

There are in the main, two methods by which the scarcity of farm labor can be offset:

1. By multiplying the machines which replace manual labor,

2. By modifying our agricultural methods so that preference is given to those which demand the least proportion of manual labor....

All the associations which are fortunately so numerous in our country, all the agricultural societies, all the co-operative societies which are already formed, should double their efforts to put at the disposition of their members those implements which on account of their high price are not available for the individual farmer.

Prices will rise after the war, but this, argues Professor Zolla, will be beneficial rather than otherwise.

High prices will be offset by large production: this excess of production will, however, follow on the activity of the rural producer, and that activity will be maintained and increased by high prices which always insure large profits.

In short, the rise in price wall be most favorable to the agricultural interests just at a time when the difficulties of obtaining labor will come to swell the necessary expenses of production. The crisis which might be in store is thus dissipated and the agricultural situation remains much as it was before the war--that is to say, very satisfactory.

The losses undergone will be considerable in the invaded regions, the obstacles which the farmer must overcome will be great but not insurmountable, but success will recompense the valor and the hard labor of our countrymen. And to be just we must not forget that this will be made possible by the work of the French women in the fields.

A French Rejoinder

In the Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris), of which he is managing editor, M. Francis Charmes, of the Académie Française, replies to a speech made by von Bethmann-Hollweg before the Reichstag, in which the German Chancellor expressed sympathy for the deluded French soldiers, who had not an inkling of the true course which the war was taking. M. Charmes ironically remarks:

We do not publish, he [von Bethmann-Hollweg] claims, any of the German dispatches, so that opinion is quite unenlightened as to what is actually happening on the field of battle.

One would think, according to M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, that the German dispatches are a source on which one can rely with full confidence, and one would imagine, too, since he had thus reproached us, that the German newspapers published the French dispatches.

As a matter of fact, they do not and if it is necessary to hear both sides to know the truth then the Germans are quite ignorant of it. They are indeed very far removed from knowing it, and it is a constant surprise to our officers and our soldiers to discover when they question their prisoners, the profound illusions under which they labor.

Dr. von Bode's Polemic

Some time ago Dr. Wilhelm von Bode, the well-known director of the Berlin Art Museums and Germany's authority in matters of art, issued a justification of German conduct in Rheims and Louvain, which he supported by a review of Germany's world-contribution to art. "The German Science of Art and the War," was the title of the article. Jacques Mesnil, writing in the Mercure de France, presents a reply to Dr. von Bode's polemic.