Chapter 4

_Week Ending_ _Vessels._ _Lives._ February 25 11 9 March 4 1 0 March 11 7 38 March 18 6 13 March 25 7 2 April 1 13 165 April 8 8 13 April 15 4 0 April 22 3 10 April 29 3 0 May 6 24 5 May 13 2 1,260 May 20 7 13 May 27 7 7 June 3 19 32 June 10 36 21 June 17 19 19 June 24 3 1 July 1 9 29 July 8 15 2 July 15 12 13 July 22 2 0 --- ----- Total 218 1,652

Of the two vessels torpedoed in the week of July 22, the Russian steamer Balwa was attacked on July 16. On the following day another Russian steamer, the General Radetzky, was torpedoed. Both hailed from Riga, and the crews of both were saved.

WARFARE MODIFIED?

_A record reported to have been compiled chiefly from British Admiralty sources since the sinking of the Lusitania was published by The New York American on July 13, showing that out of 122 ships sunk by German submarines in the war zone, every passenger or sailor was saved on all but 14. Following is The American's summary:_

Total number of ships definitely reported sunk by German submarines in sixty-four days, since the Lusitania was torpedoed 122

Number of ships on which any loss of life occurred 14

[Note: Some of these fatalities occurred, according to British Admiralty reports, either from explosion of torpedoes or from upsetting of lifeboats, or from gunfire of submarines while the enemy ship was trying to escape.]

Total loss of life on 122 ships, from all causes 131

GERMAN ACCOUNTS

_In a Berlin dispatch of July 14, by wireless to Sayville, Long Island, the following was given out by the Overseas News Agency:_

During the month of June twenty-nine British, three French, one Belgian, and nine Russian merchantmen were sunk by German submarines.

The total loss of the Entente Allies by submarines, including fishing steamers, which mostly were armed patrol boats, aggregated 125,000 tons.

The loss of human life was remarkably small, the submarines using every precaution and giving ample warning and time for crews to leave their ships if no resistance was attempted.

_The total of losses in ships of the Allies' merchant marine around the English coast in the period between February 18 (the beginning of the German submarine war zone) and May 18, as compiled from German data, was published in the Frankfurter Zeitung of June 6. This publication, the first issue from German quarters, contains also a list of the various allied ships sunk, totaling 111, together with the nationality and tonnage of each, and a charted map of the British Isles showing where each ship was sunk._

_In describing the achievements of the German submarine against their foes--the neutral ships sunk are not included--the Frankfurter Zeitung's article says:_

In the period of three months since the 18th of February, a day memorable for history, our submarines have inflicted on the enemy merchant shipping, in the first place the English merchant marine, a total loss of 111 ships with a displacement of 234,239 tons. The figures may, perhaps, not seem especially large in comparison with the gigantic number of merchant ships flying the flag of the enemy. But in this method of warfare the percentage loss of ships of our opponent as compared with his total does not count, but rather the fact that through the regularity and inevitableness of the marine catastrophes the enemy shipping shall be disturbed as poignantly as possible, and that there should as a result of this disturbance appear in the economic life of England phenomena similar to those which the English plan of the isolation of Germany aims at without, however, having succeeded in getting any nearer to its goal, owing to the inherent strength and power of adaptation of German business.

The rise of prices now prevalent in England, and the paralyzing of great branches of trade which could not occur in an England that really ruled the sea, may be attributed in chief part to this war of the submarines. The advantage of the insular position of England has been greatly lessened, thanks to this excellent German weapon, even if it cannot be completely eliminated. But if one compares with the total voyages of the English merchant shipping the losses of the English merchant marine, amounting to more than 100 ships in a period of exactly ninety days, and a tonnage of 216,000 tons, (from the totals mentioned above there must be deducted the shares of France and Russia,) then we must consider only that part of the British merchant marine that entered ports of the island kingdom in this period or left them; and one must bear in mind further that a large number of those ships is contained several times in the English statistics, since they do coast service.

But as valuable booty for our submarines particularly those ships are to be regarded that import any kinds of commodities to England. And statistics will later be able to show on the basis of these figures the great success of the German submarine warfare, as indicated by figures.

A glance at the map that accompanies the list of losses suffices to show that mine fields as little as great distances are factors of decisive importance in the activities of our submarines. The closing of the English Channel and of the North Channel (between Ireland and Scotland) has not prevented our boats from penetrating wherever there was booty. Even on the northwest coast of Scotland and out in the west of Ireland the German submarines have carried on a successful hunt. The numbers in the little circles on the map represent the successive ships on the list.

_The Frankfurter Zeitung adds figures given by the British Admiralty on the same subject. These, it says, total 130 merchant ships with a registered tonnage of 457,000 tons, from the beginning of the war to May 26. Added to these, it says, are 83 fishing vessels with a tonnage of 13,585 tons, making a total of 213 ships with 470,585 tons. It says:_

These figures, however, are certainly incomplete, inasmuch as up to March 16 there had already been announced 145 ships with a total tonnage of 500,000 as lost, and the figures published by us above, based upon authentic material, concerning the victims of our submarines in three months, contradict beyond any power of dispute the euphemistic presentation of the British Admiralty. Even so, however, the English list still shows that since the beginning of the submarine warfare, although in that period there was little to speak of in the way of activities of the German cruisers abroad, the damage done to the English fleet has risen according to the confession of the Admiralty itself. Since Feb. 18, that is to say, since scarcely more than a quarter of a year, according to the English figures, no less than 56 British merchant ships with a tonnage of 187,000 tons (that is to say, more than 40 per cent. of the total number of merchant ships designated as lost) have been sunk. But if instead of these English figures the German compilation, which is indubitably correct, be accepted, then the entire picture changes considerably in our favor.

In Memoriam:

REGINALD WARNEFORD

[From Truth of London]

Young gallant soul, unversed in fear, Who swiftly flew aloft to fame, And made yourself a world-wide name, Ere scarce had dawned your brief career.

To glory some but slowly climb By painful inches of ascent, And some, hereon though sternly bent, Ne'er reach it all their life's long time.

But you--you soared as eagles soar; At one strong flight you flashed on high; The sudden chance came sudden nigh; You seized it; off its spoils you bore.

And now, while still the welkin rings With your unmatched heroic deed, To pæan elegies succeed, The mournful Muse your requiem sings.

A requiem, yet with triumph rife! How not, while men their souls would give To die your death, so they might live Your "crowded hour of glorious life"?

Great hour, that knows not time nor tide, Wild hour, that drinks an age's sweets, Brave hour, that throbs with breathless feats, Short hour, whose splendours long abide.

American Preparedness

By Theodore Roosevelt

_In an address at the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco, delivered on July 21, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt said:_

I have a very strong feeling about the Panama Exposition. It was my good fortune to take the action in 1903, failure to take which, in exactly the shape I took it, would have meant that no Panama Canal would have been built for half a century, and, therefore, that there would have been no exposition to celebrate the building of the canal. In everything we did in connection with the acquiring of the Panama Zone we acted in a way to do absolute justice to all other nations, to benefit all other nations, including especially the adjacent States, and to render the utmost service, from the standpoint alike of honor and of material interest, to the United States. I am glad that this is the case, for if there were the slightest taint upon our title or our conduct it would have been an improper and shameful thing to hold this exposition.

The building of the canal nearly doubles the potential efficiency of the United States Navy, as long as it is fortified and is in our hands; but if left unfortified it would at once become a menace to us.

What is true as to our proper attitude in regard to the canal is no less true as regards our proper attitude concerning the interests of the United States taken as a whole. The canal is to be a great agency for peace; it can be such only, and exactly in proportion as it increased our potential efficiency in war.

Those men who like myself believe that the highest duty of this nation is to prepare itself against war so that it may safely trust its honor and interest to its own strength are advocating merely that we do as a nation regarding our general interests what we have already done in Panama. If, instead of acting as this nation did in the Fall of 1903, we had confined ourselves to debates in Congress and diplomatic notes; if, in other words, we had treated elocution as a substitute for action, we would have done nobody any good, and for ourselves we would have earned the hearty derision of all other nations--the canal would not even have been begun at the present day, and there would have been a general consensus of international opinion to the effect that we were totally unfit to perform any of the duties of international life, especially in connection with the Western hemisphere.

Unfortunately in the last few years we have as regards pretty much everything not connected with the Isthmus of Panama so failed in our duty of national preparedness that I fear there actually is a general consensus of opinion to precisely this effect among the nations of the world as regards the United States at the present day. This is primarily due to our unpreparedness.

We have been culpably, well-nigh criminally, remiss as a nation in not preparing ourselves, and if, with the lessons taught the world by the dreadful tragedies of the last twelve months, we continue with soft complacency to stand helpless and naked before the world, we shall excite only contempt and derision if and when disaster ultimately overwhelms us.

Preparedness against war does not invariably avert war any more than a fire department in a city will invariably avert a fire; and there are well-meaning foolish people who point out this fact as offering an excuse for unpreparedness. It would be just as sensible if after the Chicago fire Chicago had announced that it would abolish its fire department as for our people to take the same view as regards military preparedness. Some years ago I was looking over some very old newspapers contemporaneous with the early establishment of paid fire departments in this country, and to my amusement I came across a letter which argued against a paid fire department upon the ground that the knowledge of its existence would tend to make householders careless, and therefore would encourage fires.

Greece was not prepared for war when she went to war with Turkey a score of years ago. But this fact did not stop the war. It merely made the war unsuccessful for Greece. China was not prepared for war with Japan twenty-odd years ago, nor for war with the Allies who marched to Peking fifteen years ago.

_Colonel Roosevelt then discussed in detail the cases of China and Belgium, comparing Belgium with Switzerland, and asserting that Switzerland would have met Belgium's fate if she had not been prepared to oppose invasion. Then taking up the case of China, he said:_

She has acted on the theory that the worst peace was better than the best war, and therefore she has suffered all the evils of the worst war and the worst peace. The average Chinaman took the view that China was too proud to fight and in practice made evident his hearty approval of the sentiments of that abject pacifist song: "I Didn't Raise My Boy to be a Soldier," a song which should have as a companion piece one entitled: "I Didn't Raise my Girl to be a Mother," approval of which of course deprives any men or women of all right of kinship with the soldiers and with the mothers and wives of the soldiers, whose valor and services we commemorate on the Fourth of July and on Decoration Day; a song, the singing of which seems incredible to every man and woman capable of being stirred to lofty and generous enthusiasm by the tremendous surge of Julia Ward Howe's "Battle Hymn of the Republic." China has steadily refused to prepare for war. Accordingly China has had province after province lopped off her, until one-half of her territory is now under Japanese, Russian, English and French control.

The professional pacifists, the peace-at-any-price, non-resistance, universal arbitration people are now seeking to Chinafy this country.

During the past year or so this nation has negotiated some thirty all-inclusive peace treaties by which it is agreed that if any issue arises, no matter of what kind, between itself and any other nation, it would take no final steps about it until a commission of investigation had discussed the matter for a year. This was an explicit promise in each case that if American women were raped and American men murdered, as has actually occurred in Mexico; or American men, women, and children drowned on the high seas, as in the case of the Gulflight and Lusitania; or if a foreign power secured and fortified Magdalena Bay or the Island of St. Thomas, we would appoint a commission and listen to a year's conversation on the subject before taking action.

England and France entered into these treaties with us, and we begged Germany to enter into one, and, although Germany refused, yet if we were right in entering into them with England and France, we deprived ourselves of moral justification in refusing to fulfill their spirit as regards Germany. Personally I believe that it was absolutely necessary when the concrete case arose to repudiate the principle to which we had thus committed ourselves. But it was a shameful thing to have put ourselves in such a position that it had to be repudiated, and it was inexcusable of us to decline to follow the principle in the case of the Lusitania without at the same time making frank confession of our error and misconduct by notifying all the powers with whom we had already made the treaties that they were withdrawn, because in practice we had found it impossible and improper to follow out the principle to which they committed us.

First Year of the War

Military Résumés of Operations on All Fronts--August, 1914 to August, 1915

By Lieutenant Walter E. Ives

_Formerly of the Royal Prussian Thirteenth Dragoons_

_and_

By An American Military Expert

One Year's War

By LIEUTENANT WALTER E. IVES

I.

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

The first year of the European war has drawn to a close. A résumé covering the military events it has produced brings to view two distinct phases of the campaign. The first phase comprises the period from Aug. 3 to Oct. 27, and consists of a tenacious effort to carry through the original plan of war of the German General Staff: to strike a crushing blow at France, and after putting her "hors de combat," to turn on the enemy in the East. The second phase comprises the time from Oct. 27 to the present, and consists in the pursuance of military aims forming the direct reversal of the original ones.

The campaign against France, in consequence of the German plan of strategy the first one to come into prominence, can, in its first phase, be divided into four periods.

The first period comprises the operations in Belgium, German Lorraine and Alsace, from Aug. 3 to Aug. 23, the day before the Battle for the Invasion of France, commonly, but incorrectly known as the battle of Mons.

The main blow at France was to come through Belgium. Five German armies out of eight were hurled against this gateway to Northern France. In Lorraine and Alsace the Germans were temporarily to remain on the defensive. The protection of Lorraine was intrusted to the Bavarian (Sixth) Army, that of Alsace to the remaining two armies.

The French plan of operation was to check the invasion of Belgium on the line Tongres-Liége-Longwy, where the Belgian Army, from a strictly military point of view, forming the advance guards of the French Army of the North, was holding strong positions, and with superior forces to strike at the German Army of Lorraine. The aim was, avoiding Metz, to reach the Moselle near Trier through the valley of the Saar, and to roll up the German Army of the North from its left wing. An invasion of Alsace was merely to satisfy political aspirations.

The German advance in Belgium, however, remained unchecked, and in Lorraine the battles of Dieuze and Saarbourg on Aug. 20 decided the issue in favor of the Bavarians. In Alsace the French were victorious over the Eighth Army and took Muelhausen, while further north, between Muenster and Shirmeck, the Seventh Army checked the French invasion.

Meanwhile the German avalanche in Belgium had reached the second line of defense, Brussels-Namur-Longwy, before the French Army of the North. The capture of Namur prompted the French staff to recall advance guards, which had reached the fortress just as it surrendered, and to accept battle in the line Mons-Charleroi-Givet-Longwy. The battle for the invasion of France and the retirement of the French armies in all the theatres of action which it caused opens the second period of the campaign against France.

The English contingent from Havre had joined the French Army just before the German onslaught began. The battle was lost by the Allies tactically and strategically through the defeat of their right wing at Longwy and Neufchateau, and through the encircling of their left wing at Mons. The direct result of the outcome was the German invasion of France; the indirect consequence (resulting from the necessity of drawing troops from the other fields of action to stem the German invasion) was the retirement of the French armies in Lorraine and Alsace to the line Verdun-Nancy-St. Die, and further south to the passes of the Vosges, which they have been holding ever since.

Sweeping on through Northern France, the German Army of the North was breaking up all resistance in its path, such as was attempted by the British at St. Quentin on Aug. 28, and was tearing with it all fortresses, such as Longwy, La Fère, Maubeuge, and others; but it was failing in its principal aim: to embrace the skillfully retreating enemy before he could reach the line Paris-Verdun, which he had selected and prepared for the next stand.

On Aug. 30 the German plan of strategy was changed, and it was resolved to break the centre of the enemy, throwing his left wing into Paris and on the Seine and his right wing into Verdun, Toul, and Epinal. The armies of the centre were pushed forward, while either wing held back. The Allies were established in the general line Paris-Verdun.

The battle ensuing on Sept. 5 and the retreat of the Germans to the Aisne are the events of the third period of this campaign, lasting from Sept. 5 to Sept. 28. On Sept. 8, while the German attacks had all but pierced the French centre, having already bent it back beyond the line Sezanne-Vitry, the German right wing found itself outflanked by a new allied army from Paris, which was rapidly moving northward and threatened to roll up the entire German battle front from the direction of Compiègne. The critical question, who would succeed first, the Allies in outflanking the German right or the Germans in piercing the French centre, was decided in favor of the Allies. Anglo-French strategy triumphed.

The tactical aspect of the situation, though, is best illustrated by the message sent to his commander-in-chief by General Foch, commanding the French Army of the Centre when he received the order to counter-attack: "My left has been forced back, my right is routed. I shall attack with the centre." When the counter-attack came it found but rear guards opposing it. The retreat of the Germans, their right flank constantly in danger of being rolled up, was a fine military achievement. On Sept. 12 it halted on the Aisne. In the regions northeast of Verdun the German left wing joined hands with the Sixth German Army, which had followed up the retirement of the French Army of Lorraine to the line Verdun-St. Die.

Thus resting on Metz with its left wing the German battle-front was strongly established on a line passing Verdun, to the east and northeast, extending from there in a general westerly direction to the valley of the Aisne as far as the region north of Compiègne, and from that point northward to the region west of Peronne and Cambrai.

The stability of this line, enabling a constant shifting of forces toward the right wing, and the arrival there of the army released from Maubeuge, made possible the extension of the battle-front to the region of Arras, and frustrated all flanking movements on the part of the Allies.

The situation was again safe, but the plan to put the French army hors de combat was far from having been realized. The German General Staff therefore decided on a new plan. Its purpose was to gain control of the northeast coast of France. A wedge should be driven between the two allied countries, and Pas-de-Calais made the base of further operations against both. The following out of this plan constitutes the fourth and last period of the first phase of the western campaign. It starts with the beginning of the siege of Antwerp on Sept. 28 and ends with the first battle of Ypres on Oct. 27.

The first step toward the accomplishment of the new aims was the capture of Antwerp. Antwerp in the hands of the Allies meant a constant menace to the German line of communication; in possession of the Germans it signified the key to Northern France. The fortress was taken on Oct. 9. The next point of strategic importance for the pursuance of the German plan was Lille, which was taken on Oct. 12.