Chapter 3

She cannot transport, because she does not care to contest the control of the sea with her enemies. Have we aught to do with that? To supplement her naval inferiority by denying to the Allies the fruits of their superiority would be equivalent to sharing in the war on the German side. Moreover, to assume and base action upon German naval inferiority in advance of any general trial of strength would be not only illegal, but even an insult to Germany. Notice that no complaints of our export of munitions have come from the German Government. To make such complaint would be to plead the baby act. Rather than risk her fleet by contesting the control of the sea, thus gaining her share of munitions imports, Germany has chosen to withdraw it behind fortifications, thus losing the munitions trade. Probably the decision is a sound one, but she must accept the results.

The opposition to the trade seems to come from two classes:

(1) German sympathizers who seek to minimize the advantage which sea power gives the Allies.

(2) Those who are governed by their emotions rather than by reason and respect for law. I would call the attention of both these classes to the usage, especially to the German usage, in other wars.

Professor Gregory, in an interesting article, gives statistics of the large German exports of arms to the British forces in the Boer war after the Boer trade had been cut off. In the Russo-Japanese war Krupp notoriously supplied both sides. In the Balkan war there was said to be competition between Krupp and Creusot in furnishing cannon. No state in the nature of things can satisfy its needs in war completely from its own resources. Every belligerent has bought, every neutral has allowed its citizens to sell, munitions since modern war began. England sympathized with the South in our civil war, yet sold to the North. She did the same in 1870 to France.

If the trade in munitions is to be forbidden, then every state must accumulate its own supply or greatly enlarge its arms manufacturing capacity, both wasteful processes. To say that a moderate trade is lawful which a big trade is not is like the excuse of the lady who thought her baby born out of wedlock did not matter because it was such a little one.

The critics of the munitions trade must note furthermore that in our own country that trade cannot be forbidden without explicit legislation.

At the outset of the Spanish war such legislation was passed, as a war measure, forbidding the export of coal or other war material at the discretion of the President. But by resolution of Congress of March 14, 1912, the 1898 resolution was so amended as to apply to American countries only. The reason for this distinction was, of course, to limit the danger of such exports of arms to our neighbor states, particularly to Mexico, as might endanger our own peace and safety. The general right to trade was left undisturbed.

But let us argue the question on ethical grounds alone. I can see no difference between a peace trade and a war trade from the humanitarian standpoint; between arming a neighbor by our exports in preparation for war and rearming him during war. In both cases we help him to kill. Now, if one regards all war as wrong, aid in waging war by trade in munitions, whether in peace time or war time, should be abhorrent to one's conscience. A Quaker gun is not only a paradox, but a sinful one.

Most of us, however, believe that a defensive war, against aggression threatening the life and liberties of a nation, is just and right. In the present war both parties claim to be fighting in self-defense. We are not their judge; we must take both at their word; what we owe both, ethically, is simply equality of treatment.

We help both alike in waging a just war. To do otherwise is to take part in their war. With the flux and flow of the contest which makes our trade valuable or worthless now to one side, now to the other, both ethically and legally we have nothing to do.

Armenian, Orduna, and Others

_The diplomatic significance of the sinking of the Leyland liner Armenian on June 28 off the northwest coast of Cornwall is thus dwelt upon in a Washington dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES, _dated July 2, 1915:_

The lessons to be derived from the destruction of the Leyland liner Armenian off the English coast are expected to have a most important bearing upon the diplomatic controversy between Germany and the United States over the safety of human life in the submarine warfare.

It is believed here that the Armenian affair demonstrates that it is possible for German submarines of the latest types, when equipped with outside rapid-fire guns, to comply with the demand of President Wilson that the belligerent right of visit and search must be complied with before merchantmen and passenger ships are torpedoed.

Whatever the facts as to minor detail, the outstanding lesson of the affair is that a merchantman tried to escape capture and was finally forced to halt and surrender by a pursuing submarine, and the destruction of the liner by torpedo was not attempted until after those on board who survived the chase had an opportunity to take to the boats. It is evident that if the Armenian's Captain had heeded the warning shots of the submarine and halted the steamer he could have submitted to visit and search and in all probability the destruction of the Armenian could have been effected without loss of life. All international law experts agree that a vessel that refuses to halt when challenged by warning shots from a properly commissioned belligerent war vessel proceeds at her own peril.

In its broader aspects, the Armenian incident presents the most important lesson that has come out of the German undersea campaign for consideration by those engaged in the diplomatic controversy over the various acts of the German submarines--and the lesson is considered extremely vital in its bearing on the pending negotiations, because, if it is at all possible for submarines to exercise the right of visit and search and they actually proceed in accordance with that rule, the Germans may proceed with their warfare against merchantmen carrying contraband without running counter to the expectations of the United States Government. Occasional merchantmen may try to escape capture or destruction by disregarding warning shots, but that will be their affair and the responsibility for loss of life due to efforts to elude submarines, and caused during the period of continued efforts to escape, would not then rest upon the submarines.

The effective use of rapid-fire guns mounted on submarines in bona fide efforts to halt merchant steamers for purpose of visit and search is the important factor in the situation. A submarine not so equipped would find it difficult, if not impossible, to apply the rule of visit and search. Without the outside guns such a submarine would possess no other effective weapon than the torpedo. The submarine that carried no exterior armament could not compel obedience to its mandate for the merchant Captain to stop without firing a torpedo and thus risking the destruction of life with the sinking of the steamer, and a submarine with no outside armament might run the risk, as frequently contended by the German Admiralty, of bomb attack from the rails of the merchant steamer when going alongside of such a vessel.

A submarine like the U-38, which sank the Armenian, carrying one or more outside guns, capable of discharging various kinds of shell, from blank shots to shrapnel, represents an important evolution in the development of marine warfare. Such a craft has the equipment to enable her to visit and search a passing merchantman, and to provide for the safe removal of officers, crew or passengers from a challenged steamer, before the destruction of the vessel. It is only necessary for such a submarine to fire her torpedoes as a last resort for the destruction of the steamer. With her exterior guns a submarine like the U-38, upon meeting a merchant vessel, may fire one or more warning shots, as Captain Trickey of the Armenian says the U-38 did.[1] The raider, he said, fired two warning shots, and when he turned away from her and put on speed, the submarine's guns opened fire on him with shrapnel.

[Footnote 1: Captain Trickey, describing the destruction of his vessel, through which several Americans lost their lives, said on July 1 in Liverpool:

"We sighted the submarine about 6.48 o'clock Monday night, June 28, when we were about twenty miles west of Trevose Head, on the northwest coast of Cornwall. We were then about four miles away. She drew closer. She fired two shots across our bows. I then turned my stern to her and ran for all I was worth. The submarine shelled us all the time, killing several of the crew and cutting away several of our boats. The boats had already been swung out, and some of the men had taken up positions in them ready for the order to lower away. In some cases the falls were cut by shrapnel, and several of the men fell into the sea.

"A stern chase ensued, lasting for about an hour, the German shelling us unceasingly. My steering gear was cut and knocked out of order. One shell came through the engine-room skylight, and another knocked the Marconi house away. Still another shell went down the funnel, disabling the stokehole and making it impossible to keep up a full head of steam. Thirteen of my crew were lying dead on the deck, and the ship was on fire in three places. Then I decided to surrender. It was the only thing I could do. By this time the submarine had decreased the distance between us to about a mile.

"From the moment we surrendered the Germans acted fairly toward us and gave us ample time to get out of the ship. They even rescued some of the men--three, I think--who had previously fallen from the boats and were still afloat aided by their lifebelts. When we had got away from the ship the submarine fired two torpedoes into her and she sank at 8.07 o'clock. We remained in the boats all night and were picked up the next morning by the Belgian steam trawler President Stevens."]

THE ANGLO-CALIFORNIAN

_Like the Armenian, the British merchantman Anglo-Californian refused to lie-to when signaled by a German submarine on July 2. Her crew of ninety-five included fifty Americans and Canadians. A Queenstown dispatch of July 5 gave the following account of the action:_

The Anglo-Californian left Montreal for the British Isles on June 24. The submarine was sighted at 8 o'clock last Sunday morning. Captain Parslow ordered full steam ahead and wireless calls for aid were sent out. The submarine on the surface proved to be a far speedier craft than the steamer and rapidly overhauled her, meanwhile deluging her with shells. One shot put the wireless apparatus on the Anglo-Californian out of action. Finding that he could not escape by running for it Captain Parslow devoted his attention to manoeuvring his ship so as to prevent the submarine from using torpedoes effectively.

"Our Captain was a brave man," said one of the narrators. "He kept at his post on the bridge, coolly giving orders as the submarine circled around us vainly seeking to get a position from which it could give us a death blow with a torpedo. All the while the under-water boat continued to rain, shot and shell upon us, and at times was so close that she was able to employ rifle fire effectively.

"At last one shell blew the Captain off the bridge, killing him outright and terribly mutilating him. Just before that he had given orders to launch the boats, but this was very difficult under the shell fire. Several men were struck down while working at the davits. Ultimately four boats were got overboard and were rowed away until picked up."

The son of Captain Parslow, serving as second mate, was standing by his father's side when the Captain was killed. The son was knocked down by the violence of the explosion. Springing to his feet, he seized the wheel, and, as ably as his father had done, continued dodging the submarine. Another shell burst alongside him, shattering one of the spokes of the wheel, but young Parslow retained his post.

The wireless SOS calls that had been sent out at the first alarm had reached those able to give more than passive assistance, however, and British destroyers appeared. On their approach the submarine abandoned the attack and submerged. Young Parslow was still at the wheel when the destroyers came up.

THE NORMANDY

_An Associated Press dispatch from Liverpool, dated July 13, 1915, reported:_

How an American ship is alleged to have been used as a shield by a German submarine for the sinking of another vessel is related by members of the crew of the American bark Normandy, which has arrived here from Gulfport, Miss.

The story is that the Normandy was stopped by a German submarine sixty miles southwest of Tuskar Rock, off the southeast coast of Ireland, Friday night. The captain was called aboard the submarine, whence his papers were examined and found to show that the ship was chartered by an American firm January 5.

The captain of the bark, it was asserted, was allowed to return to the Normandy, but under the threat that his ship would be destroyed unless he stood by and obeyed orders. These orders, it was stated, were that he was to act as a shield for the submarine, which lay around the side of the bark, hiding itself from an approaching vessel.

This vessel proved to be the Russian steamer Leo. Presently the submarine submerged and proceeded around the bow of the Normandy, so the story went, and ten minutes later the crew of the Normandy saw the Leo blown up.

Twenty-five persons were on board, of whom eleven were drowned, including three stewardesses. Those saved included three Americans, Walter Emery of North Carolina, Harry Clark of Sierra, and Harry Whitney of Camden, N.J. All these three men when interviewed corroborated the above story. They declared that no opportunity was given those on board the Leo for saving lives.

The Leo was bound from Philadelphia for Manchester with a general cargo.

The Captain of the Normandy told the survivors that he would have liked to signal their danger to them, but that he dared not do so, because his uninsured ship would then have been instantly sunk.

_In a Washington dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES, _sent July 13, appeared the following:_

The State Department received a short dispatch late this afternoon from Consul General Washington at Liverpool, confirming the report that three Americans were among those rescued by the American bark Normandy at the time of the sinking of the Russian merchant steamer Leo by a German submarine off the Irish coast Friday night. This is the case in which press dispatches asserted that the submarine commander forced the Captain of the Normandy to use his bark as a shield behind which the submarine hid before firing the torpedo which sank the Leo.

The cablegram from Consul General Washington makes no mention of this phase of the affair, and does not show whether the German submarine gave any warning to the commander of the Russian merchant ship before firing the shot which destroyed the latter vessel. The official message says that the Normandy was stopped by the submarine, that the Normandy's papers were examined, and that she was allowed to proceed. The message added that the Normandy rescued three American citizens who were members of the crew of the Leo, and names them as Walter Emery, seaman, of Swan Quarter, N.C.; Harry Whitney, steward, of Camden, N.J., and Harry Clark, fireman, of 113 East Fifty-second Street, Seattle, Wash.

THE ORDUNA

_This is the official statement of Captain Thomas M. Taylor of the Cunard liner Orduna, concerning the attack made on his vessel by a German submarine off Queenstown, westbound, on the morning of July 9:_

At 6.05 A.M., July 9, the lookout man on the after bridge rang the telegraph, at the same time pointing his hand downward and out on the port beam. The third officer was immediately sent aft to inquire what was seen. He returned quickly and reported both men had seen a torpedo pass across the stern from port to starboard, only ten feet clear of the rudder. In the meantime both the chief officer and myself distinctly saw the trail of the torpedo, extending from the stern to about 200 yards out on the port beam. About eight minutes afterwards the chief officer and I saw the submarine come to the surface about two points on the starboard quarter, a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, with five or six men on her deck, getting her guns ready.

I immediately ordered all possible steam, altered the course, and brought her right astern, when they began shelling us. The first shot struck the water abreast of the forecastle on the starboard side, about thirty feet off. The second dropped just under the bridge; third, abreast of No. 5 hatch, quite close alongside; fourth, under the stern, sending up a volume of water forty feet high; fifth and sixth and last shells all fell short. The firing then ceased, and the submarine was soon left far astern.

Marconi distress signals were sent out at once. We were thirty-seven miles south of Queenstown. I got a reply that assistance would be with us in an hour, but it was four hours before the small armored yacht Jennette appeared. I account for the torpedo missing the ship to their misjudging the speed, allowing fourteen knots instead of sixteen, which we were doing at the time. The torpedo passed only ten feet clear.

It was an ideal day for torpedo attack--light wind, slight ripple, clear weather. The periscope could only have been a few inches above water, for a very strict lookout was being kept at the time by chief and third officers and myself and four lookout men. However, we failed to see her before she fired the torpedo.

Not the least warning was given, and most or nearly all the passengers were asleep at the time. It was almost another case of brutal murder.

We had twenty-one American passengers on board.

_A Washington dispatch of July 20 to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _announced:_

The President and the Cabinet decided today to have an investigation made in the case of the British steamer Orduna, which was attacked by a German submarine on July 9 while on her way from Liverpool to New York. This action was taken following the receipt of a statement from W.O. Thompson, counsel of the Federal Industrial Commission, who was a passenger on the ship.

Mr. Thompson did not see any torpedo fired at the Orduna by the German submarine, and was unable to give first-hand testimony that the Orduna had been fired on without notice. It was determined, however, that the report of Mr. Thompson justified the Government in making an investigation.

Accordingly, Secretary Lansing wrote a letter to Secretary McAdoo, requesting that his department undertake the investigation, which will probably be intrusted to the Collector of Customs at New York.

At the State Department it was said that the attention of the German Government had not been called to the charge that the Orduna was fired on by a German submarine without warning. Any action of that sort, if taken, will follow the investigation which is now ordered.

NEBRASKAN'S CASE

_Ambassador Gerard on July 15 formally transmitted to Washington Germany's admission of liability and expression of regret for the attack by a German submarine on the American steamer Nebraskan._

_Secretary Lansing's announcement of the German memorandum follows:_

Ambassador Gerard has telegraphed to the Department of State the following memorandum from the German Foreign Office relative to the damaging of the American steamer Nebraskan by a German submarine:

"The German Government received from newspaper reports the intelligence that the American steamer Nebraskan had been damaged by a mine or torpedo on the southwest coast of Ireland. It therefore started a thorough investigation of the case without delay, and from the result of the investigation it has become convinced that the damage to the Nebraskan was caused by an attack by a submarine.

"On the evening of May 25 last the submarine met a steamer bound westward without a flag and no neutral markings on her freeboard, about 65 nautical miles west of Fastnet Rock. No appliance of any kind for the illumination of the flag or markings was to be seen. In the twilight, which had already set in, the name of the steamer was not visible from the submarine. Since the commander of the submarine was obliged to assume from his wide experience in the area of maritime war that only English steamers, and no neutral steamers, traversed the war area without flag and markings, he attacked the vessel with a torpedo, in the conviction that he had an enemy vessel before him. Some time after the shot the commander saw that the vessel had in the meantime hoisted the American flag. As a consequence, he, of course, refrained from any further attack. Since the vessel remained afloat, he had no occasion to concern himself further with the boats which had been launched.

"It results from this that without a doubt that attack on the steamer Nebraskan was not meant for the American flag, nor is it traceable to any fault on the part of the commander of the German submarine, but is to be considered an unfortunate accident. The German Government expresses its regret at the occurrence to the Government of the United States of America and declares its readiness to make compensation for the damage thereby sustained by American citizens."

Results of Submarine Warfare

LIVERPOOL'S EXPERIENCE

_A London cable dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES, _dated London, July 8, said:_

Nearly 20,000 vessels have entered or left the port of Liverpool since the German submarine blockade began. This, said Sir A. Norman Hill, Secretary of the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, speaking at Liverpool yesterday, showed that the Germans had failed in their attempt to blockade British ports.

On these 20,000 voyages the Germans had captured or destroyed only twenty-nine ships, he continued. What did that represent? Ships which had sailed in and out of Liverpool had completed in safety 998 out of every 1,000 voyages upon which they started. That was a magnificent record, he held, of perils faced and overcome.

FIRST WEEK WITH NO LOSS

_An Associated Press dispatch of July 22 from London remarked:_

So far as British vessels were concerned, the German submarines drew a blank during the week ended yesterday. Not a single British merchant ship or fishing craft was sunk.

It was the first week since the war began that some loss to British shipping had not been occasioned by German cruisers, mines, or submarines.

During the week 1,326 vessels of more than 300 tons each arrived at or departed from ports of the United Kingdom.

The German war-zone decree went into effect on February 18. Since then the weekly losses of ships and lives from torpedoes have been as follows: