Chapter 21

The lobbies of our New York hotels were filled with horsemen and would-be horsemen, some months ago, almost every State being represented as far west as California; also with manufacturers and manufacturers' agents, all eager to secure a "war contract," be it for horses, shrapnel, rifles, picric acid, guncotton, toluol, cartridges, boots, shoes, sweaters, blankets, machinery and materials, &c. The very atmosphere of Manhattan Island seems impregnated with "war contractitis." We breathe it, we think it, we see it, we talk it, on our way downtown, at our offices and places of business, at our clubs, on our way home at night, in our homes, and I have been told that some have even slept it, the disease taking the shape of a nightmare.

The day of the broker, if indeed he ever had one in this business, is passed. The original commissioners have been withdrawn, or those who have been kept here are now acting as inspectors and have been replaced by purchasing agents. The firm of J.P. Morgan & Co. has been acting as purchasing agent for the English Government for some months past, is now acting in like capacity for the French Government, and has also done considerable buying for the Russian Government.

In order properly to handle this vast volume of business, a separate department was created, known as the Export Department. Connected with this department are experts in all lines--men who are thoroughly familiar with the various Governments' requirements, who know what prices should be paid, who are in close touch with each market, and who understand fully the materials they are buying.

There are a few more concerns, among which are one or two banks, trust companies, and Wall Street houses, which also have formed separate organizations for the purpose of purchasing war supplies for the Allies. As all these concerns are in close touch with the manufacturers and will only deal directly with them, the brokers and middlemen have very little, if any, chance of doing business.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed from the Leading Reviews

While the armies and generals of the belligerents are trying to execute by force the policies of their respective Governments, their publicists are not less busy in the work of voicing the national aspirations. Moreover, such a critical examination of the status of each armed Power, from its own standpoint and in comparisons and contrasts with its opponents, has never been conducted before the peoples of the world. It is a time of national heart-searchings, both among the warring nations and of neutrals whose destinies are only less affected. Résumés of this great process as reflected in the world's leading reviews appear below, beginning with the British publications.

Germany's Long-Nourished Powers

That Germany has been preparing forty years for this war is flatly contradicted by J. Ellis Barker in his article entitled "The Secret of Germany's Strength," appearing in the Nineteenth Century and After for July.

Not forty years, but for 260 years, since Frederick William, the Great Elector, came to the Prussian throne, the slow-growing plants of German efficiency and thoroughness have steadily unfolded, Mr. Barker says, in the administrative, military, financial, and economic policy that make modern Germany. It was the Great Elector who "ruthlessly and tyrannously suppressed existing self-government in his possessions, and gave to his scattered and parochially minded subjects a strong sense of unity," thus clearing the way for his successors. Frederick William I. founded in the Prussia prepared by his grandfather "a perfectly organized modern State, a model administration, and created a perfectly equipped and ever ready army." Of him Mr. Barker says:

The German people are often praised for their thoroughness, industry, frugality, and thrift. These qualities are not natural to them. They received them from their rulers, and especially from Frederick William the First. He was an example to his people, and his son carried on the paternal tradition. Both Kings acted not only with thoroughness, industry, frugality, and economy, but they enforced these qualities upon their subjects. Both punished idlers of every rank of society, even of the most exalted. The regime of Thorough prevailed under these Kings who ruled during seventy-three years. These seventy-three years of hard training gave to the Prussian people those sterling qualities which are particularly their own, and by which they can easily be distinguished from the easy-going South Germans and Austrians who have not similarly been disciplined.

While the Great Elector prepared the ground, and King Frederick William I. firmly laid the foundations, "Frederick the Great erected thereon the edifice of modern Germany." Mr. Barker adds:

Among the many pupils of Frederick the Great was Bismarck. It is no exaggeration to say that the writings which Frederick the Great addressed to posterity are the _arcana imperii_ of modern Germany. Those who desire to learn the secret of Germany's strength, wealth, and efficiency, should therefore most carefully study the teachings of Frederick the Great.

Frederick's "Political Testament" of 1752 addressed to his successors begins with the significant words:

"The first duty of a citizen consists in serving his country. I have tried to fulfil that duty in all the different phases of my life."

Frederick William I. looked out for the education of his successors in his own militarist ideals. Instructing Major Borcke in 1751 on the tutoring of his grand-nephew, the Heir-Presumptive of Prussia, he wrote:

It is very important that he should love the Army. Therefore he must be told at all occasions and by all whom he meets that men of birth who are not soldiers are pitiful wretches. He must be taken to see the troops drilling as often as he likes. He ought to be shown the Cadets, and be given five or six of them to drill. That should be an amusement for him, not a duty. The great point is that he should become fond of military affairs, and the worst that could happen would be if he should become bored with them. He should be allowed to talk to all, to cadets, soldiers, citizens and officers, to increase his self-reliance.

A thorough monarchist, who noted that "when Sweden was turned into a republic it became weak," Frederick the Great preached a doctrine not different from that which inspires the speeches of Kaiser Wilhelm II. when he said in his "Political Testament" of 1752:

As Prussia is surrounded by powerful states my successors must be prepared for frequent wars. The soldiers must be given the highest positions in Prussia for the same reason for which they received them in ancient Rome when that State conquered the world. Honors and rewards stimulate and encourage talent and praise arouses men to a generous emulation. It encourages men to enter the army. It is paradoxical to treat officers contemptuously and call theirs an honored profession. The men who are the principal supports of the State must be encouraged and be preferred to the soft and insipid society men who can only grace an ante-chamber.

Mr. Barker comments on the fact that in 1776, thirteen years after the ruinous Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had accumulated financial resources sufficient to pay for another war lasting four years, and that he pursued the food policy of his fathers "which is still pursued by the Prusso-German Government." Moreover, he first exalted the German professor:

A hundred and fifty years ago Prussia was a land peopled by boors. Now it is a land peopled by professors, scientists, and artists. Frederick the Great was the first Prussian monarch to realize that science and art increase the strength and prestige of nations. Hence, he began cultivating the sciences and arts, and his successors followed his example. As science and art were found to be sources of national power, they were as thoroughly promoted as was the army itself, while in this country [England] education remained amateurish. Men toyed with science and the universities rather taught manners than efficiency.

The lesson of this centuries-old efficient governmental machine is a supreme one to democratic England, Mr. Barker thinks. Not that it is hopeless for a democracy to compete with a highly organized monarchy, for has not Switzerland shown that "a democracy may be efficient, business-like, provident, and ready for war?" England, on the other hand, has been a lover of luxury and ease. She must gird up her loins and fight or die. The Anglo-Saxon race is fighting for its existence, and delay is dangerous:

War is a one-man business. Every other consideration must be subordinated to that of achieving victory. When the United States fought for their life, they made President Lincoln virtually a Dictator. The freest and most unruly democracy allowed Habeas Corpus to be suspended and conscription to be introduced, to save itself. Great emergencies call for great measures. The War demands great sacrifices in every direction. However, if it leads to England's modernization, to the elimination of the weaknesses and vices of Anglo-Saxon democracy, if it leads to the unification and organization of the Empire, the purification of its institutions, and the recreation of the race, the gain may be greater than the loss, the colossal cost of the War notwithstanding. The British Empire and the United States, the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, have arrived at the turning point in their history. The next few months will confirm their greatness or mark the beginning of their fatal decline.

"To Avenge"

Stern is the denunciation of W.S. Lilly, in the same issue of The Nineteenth Century and After, upon the atrocities recounted in an article on German atrocities in France by Professor Morgan, appearing in the next preceding number. Mr. Lilly quotes Thomas Carlyle's sarcastic words about the "blind loquacious prurience of indiscriminate Philanthropism" that commands no revenge for great injustice. He says:

Apart from the "fierce and monstrous gladness," with which the German people have welcomed the hellish cruelty of their soldiery, they must be held responsible for its crimes. General von Bernhardi, indeed, assures them that "political morality differs from individual morality because there is no power above the State." And they have been given over to a strong delusion to believe this lie. Above the State is the Eternal Rule of Right and Wrong: above the State is the Supreme Moral Governor of the Universe; yes, above the State is God. Let us proclaim this august verity though in France Atheism has been triumphant; in England Agnosticism is fashionable; in Lutheran Germany--worst of all--evil has been enthroned in the place of good, and "devils to adore for deities" is the proper cult.

The resolution of the old Roman patriot that "Carthage must be destroyed" is quoted by this writer. He adds:

As stern a resolution is in the minds and on the lips of all true lovers of their country and of mankind, be they English or French, Russian, Italian, Japanese, and I do not hesitate to add American. German militarism must be utterly destroyed and the monstrous creation of blood and iron overthrown. Such is the plainest dictate of the instinct of self-preservation. It is also the plainest dictate of justice. Germany must be paid that she has deserved. When the triumphant Allies shall have made good their footing on her soil, they will not indeed rival her exploits or violating women and butchering children, of murdering prisoners and wounded, of slaying unoffending and peaceful peasants, of destroying shrines of religion and learning. But they will assuredly shoot or hang such of the chief perpetrators of these and the like atrocities as may fall into their hands. They will strip her of ill-gained territory. They will empty her arsenals and burn her war workshops. They will impose a colossal indemnity which will condemn her for long years to grinding poverty. They will confiscate her fleet. They will remove the treasures of her galleries and museums, and take toll of her libraries, to make compensation for her pillage and incendiarism in Belgium. The measure of punishment is always a matter of difficulty. But surely anything less than this would be wholly disproportionate to the rank offences of Germany. The reckoning, the retribution, the retaliation to be just must be most stern. The victorious Allies, who will be her judges, will not be moved by "mealymouthed philanthropies." "Justice shall strike and Mercy shall not hold her hands: she shall strike sore strokes, and Pity shall not break the blow."

The Pope, the Vatican, and Italy

In The Fortnightly Review for July E.J. Dillon is sweeping in his arraignment of the new Pope Benedict XV. and the Vatican, of the Pope because of his "neutrality in matters of public morality," and of the Vatican because of its hostility to the cause of Allies. Toward martyred Belgium and suffering France the Pope "has been generous in lip sympathy and promises of rewards in the life to come," Mr. Dillon says; but he has "found no word of blame for their executioners." Mr. Dillon personally offered Benedict XV. "some important information on the subject which seemed adequate to change his views or modify his action," but he "turned the conversation to other topics." In fairness he adds that "personally Benedict XV. had been careful to keep aloof from Buelow and his band," and has neither said nor done anything blameworthy with the sole exception of the interview and message which he was reported to have given "to an American-German champion of militarism at the instigation of his intimate counsellor, Monsignor Gerlach"--an interview, by the way, which the Pope has since expressly repudiated.

Monsignor Gerlach, Mr. Dillon says, is "one of the most compromising associates and dangerous mentors that any sovereign ever admitted to his privacy," and continues:

Years ago, the story runs, Gerlach made the acquaintance of a worldly minded papal Nuntius in the fashionable salons of gay Vienna, and, being men of similar tastes and proclivities, the two enjoyed life together, eking out the wherewithal for their costly amusements in speculations on the Exchange. When the Nuntius returned to Rome, donned the Cardinal's hat, and was appointed to the See of Albano as Cardinal Agliardi, he bestowed a canonry on the boon companion who had followed him to the eternal city. The friendship continued unabated, and was further cemented by the identity of their political opinions, which favored the Triple Alliance. Gerlach became Agliardi's tout and electioneering agent when that Cardinal set up as candidate for the papacy on the death of Leo XIII. But as his chances of election were slender, the pair worked together to defeat Rampolla, who was hated and feared by Germany and Austria. Their bitter opponent was Cardinal Richard, a witty French prelate who labored might and main for Rampolla, and told me some amusing stories about Agliardi. Some years ago Gerlach's name emerged above the surface of private life in Rome in connection with what the French term _un drame passionel_, which led to violent scenes in public and to a number of duels later on. That this man of violent Pan-German sentiments should be the Pope's mentor and guide through the labyrinth of international politics seems a curious anachronism.

Although Cardinal della Chiesa, shortly before he became Benedict XV., was spoken of as the inheritor of Rampolla's Francophile leanings, it is "now conjectured that at the Conclave this legend secured from his not only the votes of the Teutonic Cardinals, who knew what his sentiments really were, but also those of the French and Belgians, who erroneously fancied that they knew," Dr. Dillon says. He does not hesitate to believe that the Pope is "at heart a staunch friend of Austria and a warm admirer of Germany, whom he looks upon as the embodiment of the principle of authority and conservatism." For the Vatican his words are more unsparing:

The Vatican, as distinguished from the Pope, was and is systematically hostile to the Allies. Its press organs, inspired by an astute and influential Italian ecclesiastic named Tedeschini, by Koeppenberg, a rabid German convert, and by the Calabrian Daffina, organized a formidable campaign against the King's Government and their supposed interventionist leanings. Its agents, including the priest Boncampagni and the German Catholics Erzberger, Koeppenberg, and others, were wont to meet in the Hôtel de Russie to arrange their daily plan of campaign, and when at last the people rose up against Giolitti and his enormities, the Vatican had its mob in readiness to make counter-demonstrations, and was prevented from letting it loose only by the superhuman efforts of decent Catholics and orderly citizens. It is a fair thing to add that the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy throughout Italy has with some few exceptions been consistently patriotic. Even the bishops and archbishops of the provinces have deserved well of their King and country, while their flocks have left nothing to be desired on the score of loyalty and patriotism.

Buelow's mission to Italy and his relations with Giolitti, the defeated abettor of Austria in the business preceding Italy's declaration of war, when they encountered the statecraft of Sonnino and Salandra, are given in this version of Buelow's playing of his "trump card":

Although the die was cast and Italy's decision taken, he had the Austrian concessions greatly amplified, and he offered them, _not to the King's Government_, but to Giolitti, his secret ally, who was not in office, but was known to be the Dictator of Italy. And Giolitti accepted them on the condition, to be fulfilled after the Cabinet's fall, that the territory would be further enlarged and consigned to Italy before the end of the war. The increase of prestige which this concession would bestow on the tribune was to be his reward for co-operation with the German Ambassador. Giolitti having thus approved the offer, undertook to have it ratified by Parliament, _in spite of the engagements which the Cabinet had already entered into with the Allied Powers_. In this sense he spoke to the King, wrote a letter designed for the nation, and obtained the public adhesion of a majority of the Chamber which was not then sitting. Thereupon the Cabinet resigned and left the destinies of Italy in the hands of the King and the nation. On the part of the Cabinet this was a brilliant tactical move and a further proof of the praiseworthy moral courage which it had displayed throughout the crisis. Indeed, the firmness, perseverance, and dignified disregard of mild invective and more deliberate criticism manifested by Sonnino and Salandra, entitle these Ministers to the lasting gratitude of their country. For it should be borne in mind that they had against them not only the Senate, the Chamber, a section of the Press, the "cream" of the aristocracy, the puny sons and daughters of the leaders of the Risorgimento, but also, strange to say, the majority of Italian diplomatists in the capitals of the Great Powers, one of whom actually fell ill at the thought that Italy was about to fight shoulder to shoulder with the State to which he was accredited. It would be interesting to psychologists to learn how this diplomatist and one or two of his colleagues felt when a few days later they were serenaded by enthusiastic crowds whom they were constrained to address.

Are the Allies Winning?

In a Doubting Thomas article headed "Are We Winning?" the anonymous "Outis" in The Fortnightly Review concludes that "the Allies are winning, but very slowly. If their conquest is to be assured, Great Britain's task is to mobilize every soldier and every workman, in order to prove that whoever may fail, she at least does not intend to desist until the final triumph is won." Moreover, the conquest must be in the West "if anywhere," and he looks somewhat askance at the Dardanelles adventure:

A good many competent authorities have disliked the idea of the Dardanelles expedition, on the strength of a general principle applicable to all military operations. It is said that in every war there is one distinct objective, and that that should never be neglected for any subsidiary operations. Thus, in the present instance, our main effort is to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, and then to attack them in their own territory. Anything which interferes with this or throws it, however temporarily, into the background, is held to be unwise, because it leads to the most dangerous of results in warfare--the dissipation of forces, which, if united, would win the desired success, but if disunited will probably fail. Thus we are told that we must not fritter away our energies in enterprises which, however important in themselves, are not comparable with the one unique preoccupation of our minds--the conquest of Germany in Europe.

Selling Arms to the Allies

Horace White has no two opinions in his article in The North American Review for July as to the wisdom and justice of the practice of American manufacturers in selling munitions which the Allies are using to kill their Germanic enemies. Mr. White expresses it as the belief of the great majority of people in the United States that Germany's war is without sufficient cause, and that when she invaded Belgium she "made herself the outlaw of the nations--a country whom no agreements can bind." Therefore he can see why no limit should ever be put to the world's expenditure for armaments "while one incorrigible outlaw is at large." He adds:

It is the opinion of most Americans that the most incorrigible and dangerous outlaw and armed maniac now existing is Germany, and that the first and indispensable step toward a restriction of armaments and a quiet world is to throttle and disarm her, and that no price is too great to pay for such a consummation. Any result of the present war which falls short of this will be the preliminary to a new armament and another war on a wider scale than the present one, since the United States will make preparations for the next one and most probably take part in it.

Hence proceeds Mr. White's justification for this neutral nation's supplying the Allies with arms: