Chapter 11

This seems to be the opinion even among those in England who heretofore have been hopeful that the Russians would turn and deliver a counter-blow, and news of the evacuation of the Polish capital, followed by the triumphant entry of the Germans amid such scenes as were enacted at Przemysl and Lemberg, would come as no surprise.

The German official statement, beginning at the northern tip of the eastern battle line, records the progress of the German troops to within about fifty miles of Riga. Then, following the great battle arc southward, chronicles further successes in the sector northeast of Warsaw, culminating in the capture of Ostrolenka, one of the fortresses designed to shield the capital.

The acute peril to Warsaw is accentuated by the Russian official communication which says that German columns are within artillery range of the fortress of Novo Georgievsk, the key to the capital from the northwest, and only about twenty miles from it.

Immediately southwest of the city, seventeen miles from it, Blonie has fallen, and further south Grojec, twenty-six miles distant, while German cavalry have captured Radom, capital of the province of that name, on the railroad to the great fortress of Ivangorod. The Lublin-Chelm Railway is still in the hands of the Russians, so far as is known, but the Russian Commander-in-Chief has issued, through the Civil Governor, an order that in case of a retreat from the town of Lublin, the male population is to attach itself to the retiring troops.

The belief is expressed in Danish military circles, according to a Copenhagen dispatch to the Exchange Telegraph Company, that the Germans intend to use Windau and Tukum as bases for operations designed to result in the capture of Riga, which would be used as a new naval base after the Gulf of Riga had been cleared of mines.

OSTROLENKA FORT TAKEN

_From Berlin on July 20 came this report from the German War Office:_

Eastern theatre of war: In Courland the Russians were repulsed near Grosschmarden, east of Tukum, and near Gruendorf and Usingen. East of Kurshany the enemy also is retreating before our attack.

North of Novgorod, on the Narew, German troops captured enemy positions north of the confluence of the Skroda and Pissa rivers. Fresh Landsturm troops who were under fire for the first time especially distinguished themselves. North of the mouth of the Skwa we reached the Narew. The permanent fortifications of Ostrolenka, on the northwest bank of the river, were captured.

South of the Vistula our troops advanced into hostile positions to Blonie and Grojec. (Blonie is seventeen miles west of Warsaw, and Grojec twenty-six miles south of the city.) In rearguard fighting the Russians lost 560 prisoners and two machine guns.

Southeastern theatre of war: German Landwehr and reserve troops of the army of General von Woyrich repulsed superior forces of the enemy from their position at Ilzanka. All counter attacks made by Russian reserves, which were brought up quickly, were repulsed. We captured more than 5,000 prisoners. Our troops are closely pursuing the enemy. Our cavalry already has reached the railway line from Radom to Ivangorod.

Between the upper Vistula and the Bug we are following the retreating enemy.

_A bulletin, issued early on July 20, had announced the capture of the Baltic port of Windau, thus bringing the Germans within a few miles of Riga, seat of the Governor General of the Baltic Provinces. It read:_

German troops occupied Tukum and captured Windau. (Windau is a seaport in Courland on the Baltic Sea at the mouth of the Windau River, 100 miles northwest of Mitau.) Pursuing the enemy, who was defeated on the Aa River at Alt Autz, our troops yesterday undiminished energy, and at some points report that progress has been made.

They are operating, however, through country which the retiring troops have laid waste and in which what roads there are, are little suited for the movement of the heavy artillery which is necessary for the bombardment of the great fortresses that bar their way.

It is not expected, therefore, that decisive actions on any of the fronts will be fought for a few days yet, although the battle between the Vistula and the Bug Rivers, where the German Field Marshal von Mackensen's army is advancing toward the Lublin-Chelm Railroad, has about reached a climax. Here, according to the German official communication issued this afternoon, the Germans have succeeded in breaking the obstinate resistance of the Russians at several points and forced them to retreat.

Naval Losses During the War

The following diagram, compiled mainly from information given in a June number of the Naval and Military Record and appearing in the London Morning Post of July 8, 1915, shows the different causes of loss to each side in tonnage of capital ships, gunboats, destroyers, submarines, torpedo-boats, and armed merchantmen to the end of May. The diagram being drawn to scale the true proportion of each loss from each cause can be accurately gauged at a glance. It will be seen that the Triple Entente and Japan have had no loss from capture or internment, that the Entente's characteristic of fighting has been "above board," _i.e._, by gunfire, while that of the enemy has been by submarines and mines.

Battles in the West

Sir John French's Own Story

France's "Eyewitness" Reports and Germany's Offensive in the Argonne

Since June 15, 1915, the British army, reinforced by divisions of the "new" army now in France, has held practically the same position on the front to the north and south of Ypres. The subjoined report by Sir John French, Commanding-in-Chief the British forces in France, published July 12, covers the operations from April 5 down to June 15, and deals particularly with the great poison-gas attacks by the enemy, the capture and loss of Hill 60, the second battle of Ypres, and the battle of Festubert. It embodies the story by Sir Herbert Plumer of the terrible fighting that began May 5. France's official reports, following, tell of the battle of Hilgenfirst in the Vosges, the week's battle in the Fecht valley, the 120 days' struggle between Betlaine and Arras, and the battle of Fontenelle. The Crown Prince's "drive" in the Argonne resulting in German advantages is also dealt with.

FROM THE FIELD-MARSHAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, June 15, 1915.

My Lord,

I have the honor to report that since the date of my last dispatch (April 5, 1915) the Army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British Forces.

1. In the North the town and district of Ypres has once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery, which, not only in number, but also in weight and caliber, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the South a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens.

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of The Hague Convention.[2]

[Footnote 2: In a long statement seeking to justify the use of asphyxiating gases in warfare the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau asserted in German newspapers of June 25 that the Allies first used such gases against the Germans, and it cites French documents as proof that France in February, months before the German advance at Ypres, made extensive preparations for the application of gases and for counteracting their effects on the attacking troops.

After quoting the official German war report of April 16 that the French were making increased use of asphyxiating bombs, the statement says:

"For every one who has kept an unbiased judgment, these official assertions of the strictly accurate and truthful German military administration will be sufficient to prove the prior use of asphyxiating gases by our opponents. But let whoever still doubts consider the following instructions for the systematic preparation of this means of warfare by the French, issued by the French War Ministry, under date of Feb. 21, 1915:

Minister of War, Feb. 21, 1915.

Remarks concerning shells with stupefying gases:

The so-called shells with stupefying gases that are being manufactured by our central factories contain a fluid which streams forth after the explosion, in the form of vapors that irritate the eyes, nose, and throat. There are two kinds: hand grenades and cartridges.

Hand Grenades.--The grenades have the form of an egg; their diameter in the middle is six centimeters, their height twelve centimeters, their weight 400 grams. They are intended for short distances, and have an appliance for throwing by hand. They are equipped with an inscription giving directions for use. They are lighted with a small bit of material for friction pasted on the directions, after which they must be thrown away. The explosion follows seven seconds after lighting. A small cover of brass and a top screwed on protect the lighted matter. Their purpose is to make untenable the surroundings of the place where they burst. Their effect is often considerably impaired by a strong rising wind.

Cartridges.--The cartridges have a cylindrical form. Their diameter is twenty-eight millimeters, their height ten centimeters, their weight 200 grams. They are intended for use at longer distances than can be negotiated with the hand grenades. With an angle of twenty-five degrees at departure they will carry 230 meters. They have central lighting facilities and are fired with ignition bullet guns. The powder lights a little internal ignition mass by means of which the cartridges are caused to explode five seconds after leaving the rifle. The cartridges have the same purpose as the hand grenades but because of their very small amount of fluid they must be fired in great numbers at the same time.

Precautionary measures to be observed in attacks on trenches into which shells with asphyxiating gases have been thrown.--The vapors spread by means of the shells with asphyxiating gases are not deadly, at least when small quantities are used and their effect is only momentary. The duration of the effect depends upon the atmospheric conditions.

It is advisable therefore to attack the trenches into which such hand grenades have been thrown and which the enemy has nevertheless not evacuated before the vapors are completely dissipated. The attacking troops, moreover, must wear protective goggles and in addition be instructed that the unpleasant sensations in nose and throat are not dangerous and involve no lasting disturbance.

"Here we have a conclusive proof that the French in their State workshops manufactured shells with asphyxiating gases fully half a year ago at least," says the semi-official Telegraph Bureau. "The number must have been so large that the French War Ministry at last found itself obliged to issue written instructions concerning the use of this means of warfare. What hypocrisy when the same people grow 'indignant' because the Germans much later followed them on the path they had pointed out! Very characteristic is the twist of the French official direction: 'The vapors spread by the shells with asphyxiating gases are not deadly, at least not when used in small quantities.' It is precisely this limitation that contains the unequivocal confession that the French asphyxiating gases work with deadly effect when used in large quantities."]

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralyzed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favorable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighborhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theater, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harbored these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an Army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

BATTLE OF HILL 60

3. On the night of Saturday, April 17, a commanding hill which afforded the enemy excellent artillery observation toward the west and northwest was successfully mined and captured.

This hill, known as Hill 60, lies opposite the northern extremity of the line held by the 2d Corps.

The operation was planned and the mining commenced by Major-General Bulfin before the ground was handed over to the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson, under whose supervision the operation was carried out.

The mines were successfully fired at 7 P.M. on the 17th inst., and immediately afterwards the hill was attacked and gained, without difficulty, by the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment and the 2d Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. The attack was well supported by the Divisional Artillery, assisted by French and Belgian batteries.

During the night several of the enemy's counter-attacks were repulsed with heavy loss, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place; but on the early morning of the 18th the enemy succeeded in forcing back the troops holding the right of the hill to the reverse slope, where, however, they hung on throughout the day.

On the evening of the 18th these two battalions were relieved by the 2d Battalion West Riding Regiment and the 2d Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who again stormed the hill under cover of heavy artillery fire, and the enemy was driven off at the point of the bayonet.

In this operation fifty-three prisoners were captured, including four officers.

On the 20th and following days many unsuccessful attacks by the enemy were made on Hill 60, which was continually shelled by heavy artillery.

On May 1 another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas, which caused nearly all the men along a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes.

The splendid courage with which the leaders rallied their men and subdued the natural tendency to panic (which is inevitable on such occasions), combined with the prompt intervention of supports, once more drove the enemy back.

A second and more severe "gas" attack, under much more favorable weather conditions, enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5.

The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use of asphyxiating gas. It was only a few days later that the means, which have since proved so effective, of counteracting this method of making war were put into practice. Had it been otherwise, the enemy's attack on May 5 would most certainly have shared the fate of all the many previous attempts he had made.

SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

4. It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of April 22, referred to in paragraph 1 of his report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22d the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:

From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line southeast to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion of Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamernighe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 P.M., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 P.M. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for any one to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

THE CANADIANS' PART

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the East.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2d London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the 3d Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about ten o'clock on the morning of the 23d connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23d I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the North had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23d the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighborhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22d prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the 3d Corps, and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.