Part 26

It is not too much to say that King Edward, in so far as he was able, did his best to bring about another outcome, and in England this was generally recognized. "There must be a definitive stopping of the King's interference in foreign politics," declared Mr. Sidebotham, M.P., in the Reform Club at Manchester during this crisis. His words were loudly approved by his hearers, but his voice, as well as the voice of other men in favor of establishing good relations with Germany, was drowned without effect under the influence of the panic which from the end of the year 1908 until well on into the Summer of 1909 kept all England in a state of excitement. Watchwords denoting the necessity of taking immediate action against the German fleet, as they were published in The Standard, The Morning Post, and in the great monthly periodicals, The Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, and The National Review, were echoed in the negotiations of Parliament, and they dominated the Maritime Law Conference held in London. The naval manoeuvres of July, 1909, brought together all three English fleets, and the plan was conceived of summoning the fleets of the larger colonies. A meeting of newspaper publishers, called in London, was designed to carry on propaganda for these ideas, and the Imperial Defense Conference, also held in London, proposed that England should be supported by its large colonies, though, to be sure, with certain reservations. In order to weaken the impression which Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had created, the Czar visited the English fleet at Spithead, and for the same reason, probably, the Russian Army manoeuvres in the Fall were considered a rehearsal of the measures that would be adopted to check the advance of an enemy toward St. Petersburg. Finally, on Oct. 23, agreements were made in Racconigi between Iswolski, who was accompanying the Czar on a new trip abroad, and Tittoni, which agreements were to make it possible for Russia, as a Russian newspaper put it, "to liberate itself from the necessity of friendly relations with Germany."

During this excitement in the political atmosphere the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to bring about a turn for the better by effecting an understanding with England, in whose attitude he correctly recognized the real cause of the political insecurity. At this point attention must be called to the fundamental difficulty with which all negotiations at that time, and subsequently, were confronted, and necessarily confronted. In Germany it was seen very clearly from the start that the probability of a combined French-Russian attack, for which influential political groups in St. Petersburg, as well as in Paris, were working, was very slight, so long as England's entrance into this anti-German combination could be left out of consideration. What we hoped to insure, therefore, was England's neutrality in the event of war, inasmuch as a German-English alliance, which might have definitely insured world peace, could not be effected. In order to win England over to the idea of neutrality, the Imperial Chancellor declared his willingness to decrease the rate at which our war vessels were being constructed. Both nations, moreover, were to give assurances that neither intended to attack the other, nor actually would make an attack. A second clause in the German proposal formulated the neutrality obligation. These negotiations continued until the Autumn of the year 1909, and were accompanied by the threatening chorus of the English anti-German press: "German dreadnoughts must not be built." [Black and White--"The Writing on the Wall."] The positive refusal on the part of Germany to abandon the naval program adopted by the Reichstag, and the fixed idea designedly fostered by the British Government that we were cherishing the intention of attacking France, gave England a pretext for rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcassé tendencies were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The hope could now be cherished, the leader of the anti-German policy of England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible to effect an understanding.

Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower house regarding the frustrated German-English negotiations. But he included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident, however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered into on the part of England. With the direct encouragement of England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam, and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations German-French negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed itself against us in August and September with might and main. This fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug. 19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had facilitated the conclusion of the French-German Morocco agreement, which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the "Open Letter on Foreign Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E.D.M. and F.W.H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W. Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable politicians:

"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers, which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful to our national interests, should be avoided."

Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber--when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him--with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn--that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances.

In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912, had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England which were calling with ever-increasing vigor for an understanding with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany, nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object." This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent discussions" engaged in by the English and French General Staffs--discussions which were always revived on occasion of every political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to enter into any general understanding.

This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that Poincaré, the French President, while the negotiations, commenced by Haldane, between Berlin and London were being carried on, had undertaken, in August, 1912, that trip to St. Petersburg, from which he brought back to France the system of three years' compulsory military service; and at the same time Hartwig, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, organized that Balkan Conference, the purpose of which was, first, to break the backbone of Turkey, and, secondly, to serve as a tool for the overthrow of Austria. The introduction and adoption of the German military program made it evident to all the world that we had recognized correctly, and betimes, the dangers which threatened the peace of the world, and in particular the peace of Germany. Furthermore, in a conversation with Prince Lichnowski, Lord Haldane said in so many words that England, in the event of a general war, would have to place itself on the side of France "in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful." We must not neglect to mention that during this critical year, as well as in the year 1913, negotiations were again entered into regarding the carrying out of the treaty concluded between England and Germany in the days of Caprivi with respect to an economic penetration of the Portuguese colonies in East and West Africa. The refusal of Sir Edward Grey to give these negotiations the secure form of a treaty, which could be laid before the English Parliament and the German Reichstag, here again shows that he was desirous of effecting only the appearance of an understanding. Both he and France were resolved to postpone their action against Germany until Russia, which was preparing itself with prodigious exertion, had finished its preparations, which in August, 1913, were critically inspected by General Joffre, and among which is to be included the construction of railways to run through Poland to the Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This consideration also accounts for England's attitude during the Balkan confusion of 1912 and 1913. At the London Conference we were able to co-operate with Sir Edward Grey in settling the great difficulties brought about by the war of the Balkan nations against Turkey, and subsequently their war inter se and the overthrow of Bulgaria. Under the impression created by this political co-operation the peace party in England also seemed to gain ground. On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit and assured me with great positiveness that England would under no circumstances wage war. A Ministry which undertook to make preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed. An inclination to bring about an understanding with Germany, he added, prevailed in all industrial circles. My impression that such was actually the case was confirmed during a sojourn in London in the months of March and April, 1914. On occasion of a political supper à deux with Lord Haldane the latter gave expression to the view that the present grouping of the powers offered the best guarantee of peace, that Sir Edward Grey was holding Russia in check and we were holding Austria-Hungary in check, in saying which he emphasized the fact that England had implicit confidence in the German Imperial Chancellor. I replied, saying that in consequence of the existing combination Paris and St. Petersburg would certainly count upon England's help in the event of a war, and would thus bring on the war. We then discussed the situation between England and Germany, and remarked how the present plan, adopted by both Governments, of fortifying both sides of the North Sea was detrimental to the real interests of both. The following letter, which I received from Lord Haldane in Berlin on April 17, is an echo of this conversation:

"It was a great pleasure to see you and have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is, like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation, which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer. Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will friction disappear and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."[5]

[Footnote 5: This passage from a letter of Lord Haldane is quoted in the original English by Professor Schiemann and is here copied verbatim.--TRANSLATOR.]

It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments here expressed, when we consider that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet and therefore must have known the secret chess-moves of Grey's policy. Furthermore, he did not resign, as did three other members of the Cabinet--Lord Morley, Burns, and Charles Trevelyan--when, on Aug. 4, Sir Edward's false game was shown up and when treaties grew out of those "conversations" and alliances out of those ententes, which had until then existed under counterfeit names. Even as late as June 13 Sir Edward Grey denied that he had entered into any binding obligations. Six weeks after that, however, England confronted Germany with the fait accompli of a life-and-death struggle. Grey had consciously uttered a falsehood before Parliament, and, as was ascertained from a Russian source, had not only accepted a Russian proposal to conclude a naval agreement, but had expressly given his approval that the deliberations regarding the effectuation of this agreement should be participated in by the Naval Staffs of both countries. In so doing he expressly counted upon a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and upon the complete alliance of England. England, at the proper time, was to send merchantmen to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea for the purpose of landing Russian troops in Pomerania, and to send as many ships to the Mediterranean Sea as seemed necessary to insure the ascendency of France. With the help of French money it was intended to overthrow the Ministry of Rodoslawow in Bulgaria and, with the assistance of the Russophile, Malinow, to win over that country to the combination, which was to attack Austria in the rear. All this, which took place before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was the political plan of battle adopted by the conspiring powers, which subsequently found an excuse for their behavior in the alleged coercion of Serbia. The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is without precedent. The palm rests, probably, on the friendly visit of the English squadron, under Admiral Beatty, in Kiel. Two days after the assassination of the Archduke the squadron started on its way home, through the Emperor William Canal, for the purpose of joining the concentration of the entire English fleet, which lay, ready for war, off Spithead. That England afterward made common cause with Russia and France for the murderers of the Archduke, and with moral indignation rose against the satisfaction demanded of Serbia by Austria, is all part of the system of the frivolous use of any pretext which might bring England closer to its longed-for goal--the deposition of Germany from her position in the world. Such was England's rôle in the preparation of this wantonly prearranged war.

Germany Free!

By BEATRICE BARRY.

Deeds that have startled the civilized world Blot her escutcheon, brand her with shame; But though the German flag there be unfurled, Do Germans know what is done in their name? If not, the final accounting may see-- Germany free!

Germany, free from the canker of self-- Free from the lusting for prestige and power; Purged of her passion for place and for pelf-- Shall she not rise to great heights in that hour? God speed its coming, for fain would we see-- Germany free!

Free from the militant few who have ruled Seventy millions with sabre of steel; Free from the doctrine in which they are schooled-- "Might shall prevail!" All the rancor we feel Strikes at that dogma, from which we would see-- Germany free!

Much in her national life we admire, Much we recoil from, or needs must dispute; Germany needs her baptism of fire, But you will find us the first to salute-- (God speed the "Day" the awakening shall be) Germany FREE!

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events from April 30, 1915, Up to and Including June 15, 1915.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

May 1--Germans advance in their invasion of the Russian Baltic provinces, a Russian force retreating toward Mitau; fighting is being renewed along the East Prussian frontier and in Central Poland; Russians gain ground in their campaign for the Uzsok Pass; Germans defeat Russians near Szawle, in Kovno; Austrians repulse Russian attacks against the heights of the Orawa and Opor Valleys.

May 2--A great battle is developing in the plain of Rawa, Central Poland; Russians are taking the offensive; Austrians have opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkowice.

May 3--German and Austrian armies, under General von Mackensen, win a victory in West Galicia, breaking the Russian centre for miles, and gaining ground across practically the whole western tip of Galicia, from near the Hungarian border to the junction of the River Dunajec with the Vistula; the Teutonic allies take 30,000 prisoners, 22 cannon, and 64 machine guns; the Austrians gain ground in the Beskid region, and repulse Russians north of Osmaloda; the German advance in the Russian Baltic provinces continues unchecked along a 100-mile front, extending from the Baltic Sea, near Libau, southeast to the northern tributaries of the River Niemen.

May 4--Russians claim that the Austro-German drive in West Galicia is being checked; Germans hold positions on the right bank of the Dunajec; a fierce battle is raging in the direction of Stry; Germans make further progress in the Russian Baltic provinces.

May 5--Russians are retreating at points along the Galician line from the Vistula to the Carpathians, and are in retreat from positions they occupied on the Hungarian slopes of the Carpathians; the third line of Russian fortifications has been pierced; Austro-German Army captures the town of Gorlice.

May 6--Austro-German armies continue to advance in West Galicia; the northern wing has captured Tarnow; southern wing has crossed the Wisloka River and Russians are retreating east of the Lupkow Pass; Austro-Germans take the last Russian positions on the heights east of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers; Jaslo and Dukla have been taken from the Russians; Russians admit partial retreat in West Galicia.

May 7--Austro-German army is pursuing retreating Russians in West Galicia; Austrians take more prisoners, stores, and guns; in the eastern sector of the Carpathian front Russian attacks are repulsed by Austrians; Russian attacks in Southeast Galicia are repulsed; in Poland there is severe fighting.

May 8--Germans capture Libau, taking 1,600 prisoners, 18 cannon, and much war material; severe fighting continues in West Galicia, where General von Mackensen's army is pursuing the Russians; a Russian division surrounded near Dukla cuts its way through the surrounding troops and gets to the main Russian lines; all the passes in the Beskid Mountains, except Lupkow, are in the hands of Austro-German forces; Russians take the offensive southwest of Mitau.

May 9--Russians are retreating in Galicia along a front of 124 miles, from the Uzsok Pass to the Vistula; Austro-German forces have passed the line of the Uzsok Pass, Komanoza, Krosno, Debica, and Szezucin; in Southeast Galicia violent battles are developing; Austrians are pursuing Russians across the Dniester; Vienna reports that Hungary is now clear of Russians; German advance northeast of Kovno; Russian attacks on German positions on the Pilica are repulsed; Russians make progress southwest of Mitau.

May 10--Russian Embassy at Washington says that the Russians have retreated thirty miles in Galicia, but that only one division has withdrawn from Hungary; the first stage of the battle in West Galicia has been practically concluded; General von Mackensen's army is reforming for a new offensive; Germans have met a severe check west of Mitau.

May 11--Austro-German troops are still advancing in West Galicia; Russians are attacking in East Galicia and along the eastern section of the Carpathians; Russians have success in Bukowina, taking prisoners and guns; Austrians force Russian south wing in Russian Poland to retreat; Austrians repulse Russian attacks near Baligrod; advance Austrian troops have crossed the San near Dvornik.