Chapter 7

Mr. Bryan's appeal directed chiefly to American citizens of German birth exhibits an astonishing lack of tact as well as lack of judgment. The former Secretary of State seems to be going on the presumption, like many other native Americans not actuated by a feeling of prejudice or race hatred, that German-Americans have left their hearts behind them in the old country and are, therefore, unable to feel as true American citizens should feel toward their country and everything involving its destiny.

Mr. Bryan's appeal, especially the one directed to German-Americans, will not, can not, and should not meet with the slightest response.

_From the Colorado Herold of Denver._

Bryan's appeal to the Germans, while it may be classed as patriotic, was unnecessary, and Dr. Dernburg, Germany's special envoy, practically voiced the same sentiments in his farewell address in New York Friday night. Bryan's well-known prohibition tendencies, however, preclude the idea that he was bidding for German-American votes.

_From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio._

Mr. Bryan might well have abstained from issuing his statement to the German-Americans. To make any impression he should have explained why he now thinks it the duty of neutrality to furnish contraband to England, when in 1914 he stated in his Commoner that the President had blazed a new way when he, without conference with other nations, committed this nation to the policy that furnishing the "contraband of money" was inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. What are the influences that have now changed his views? Mr. Bryan is neither frank nor consistent, hence not impressive.

A "SOFTENED" NOTE.

[The First and Second German Notes.]

Washington, June 12, 1915.

My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given:

The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands.

The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at least one was probable.

Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.

As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German Government or the German people desire war.

But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war.

No one would be happier than I if the President's plan results in a peaceful settlement, but no one was in position to say what effect our note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she, in anger, broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to assume the responsibility for the risks incurred--risks which no one could with any degree of accuracy measure--but I felt that, having done all I could in the Cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside the Cabinet, the work upon which I have entered.

I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the President during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake us, but I believe that the chances of war will be lessened in proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace--not "peace at any price"--but peace in preference to a war waged for the redress of such grievances as we have against Germany--at least against war until we have given to Germany the opportunity which we are pledged to give to Great Britain, France, and Russia--to have every difference of every character submitted to an international commission of investigation.

I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied at all I think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.

I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement, correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's paper. I appreciate his kindness.

It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was not, however, sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking permission to withdraw my resignation.

As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free to act independently after the international commission has concluded the investigation.

W.J. BRYAN.

STATEMENTS ON THE WAR IN EUROPE.

_Mr. Bryan on June 16 gave out the first of three statements about the present war, and in it he predicts that a conference will be held at the close of the conflict to revise the rules of international law. The present rules, in Mr. Bryan's opinion, "seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace."_

_The statement contains a hint to President Wilson in the concluding paragraph which says that "in all history no other peacemaker has ever been in position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced on our President when the time for mediation comes--as come it must." Its text follows:_

Washington, June 16, 1915.

I shall tomorrow discuss the origin of the war and the reasons which led the nations of Europe to march, as if blindfolded, into the bloody conflict which now rests like a pall over the fairest parts of the Old World; today let us consider the war as it is and the injury it is doing to the neutral nations.

The war is without a precedent in the populations represented, in the number of combatants in the field, in daily expenditures, in the effectiveness of the implements employed, in the lists of dead and wounded, in the widespread suffering caused and in the intensity of the hatreds aroused.

No class or condition is exempt from the burdens which this war imposes. The rich bear excessive taxation and the poor are sorely oppressed; the resources of today are devoured and the products of tomorrow are mortgaged. No age is immune. The first draft was upon the strong and vigorous, but the Governments are already calling for those above and below the ordinary enlistment zone.

The war's afflictions are visited upon women as well as upon men--upon wives who await in vain a husband's return, and upon mothers who must surrender up the sons whose support is the natural reliance of declining years. Even children are its victims--children innocent of wrong and incapable of doing harm. By war's dread decree babes come into the world fatherless at their birth, while the bodies of their sires are burned like worthless stubble in the fields over which the Grim Reaper has passed.

The most extreme illustrations collected from history to prove the loathsomeness of war are overshadowed by new indictments written daily; the most distressing pictures drawn by the imagination are surpassed by the realities of this indescribable contest. Surely we behold "the pestilence that walketh in darkness and the destruction that wasteth at noonday."

Neutral nations cannot look on with indifference--the ties that bind them together are too strong, the relationship too intimate. This is especially true of the United States. We have a composite population, every nation of Europe having contributed liberally to our citizenship. These our countrymen, themselves born abroad or immediately descended from foreign-born ancestors, cannot but take a likely interest in the conduct as well as in the results of the war, and a still larger circle shares the concern of those directly connected. Not a soldier falls on either side but the sorrow expressed in his home finds an echo at some fireside in the United States.

But, aside from sentimental considerations, neutral nations suffer serious disturbances because of the war. Duelists, when dueling was in fashion, were careful to select a place where they could settle their personal differences without harm to unoffending bystanders, but warring nations cannot, no matter how earnestly they try, avoid injury to neutrals. As the nauseous odors of a slaughterhouse, carried on the breeze, pollute the air in every direction, so the evil influences emanating from these wide-extended battlefields taint the atmosphere of the whole political world. War is an international nuisance. Nearly every neutral nation finds new domestic problems thrust upon it and old problems made more difficult.

No American citizen can note without deep concern the manner in which war questions have intruded themselves into our politics--overshadowing economic issues and stimulating agitation in favor of enlarged appropriations for military and naval purposes. Business is deranged and expensive readjustments made necessary, while commerce with foreign nations is seriously interrupted. Fluctuations in price abroad are reflected in the markets of the United States. A fall of one cent in the price of cotton means tens of millions of dollars to our producers and merchants. Added to this, freight rates and insurance premiums have been increased to cover the greater risks incident to war.

Scarcity of ships is one of the greatest commercial embarrassments caused by the war. We have depended largely upon foreign ships to carry our commerce, and we could not but suffer when the merchantmen of one side were driven from the sea and a part of the merchant fleet of the other side was withdrawn for Government use.

The neutral nations are put to a great expense to preserve neutrality and are constantly in danger of being embroiled in the war without intention or fault on their part.

The rules of international law seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace. It is almost impossible to alter these rules during the war, because any material change, affecting as it would the interests of belligerents, would be a seeming violation of neutrality. As soon as peace returns there will be a demand for an international conference on the subject. The presumption should then be given to peace, for peace, not war, is the normal condition. If nations are determined to fight they should, as far as possible, bear their burden themselves and not be permitted to transfer it to the nations which avoid war by resorting to reason instead of force.

Under the stress and strain of the titanic struggle in which they are engaged, each side has felt itself justified in encroaching upon the rights of neutrals. The ocean highways, the common property of all, have been to some extent appropriated for war purposes, and delicate diplomatic questions are forced upon the neutral nations. Just at this time, when these questions are most acute, the belligerent Governments are least able to deal with them with the calmness and poise which their great importance demands.

No wonder every neutral nation is increasingly anxious for the war to end; but of all the neutral nations ours has the most reason for the return of peace--most reason to set its face resolutely against participation in this war. This nation, the head of the neutral group and the sincere friend of all the belligerents, is in duty bound to set an example in patience and self-restraint.

In all history no such opportunity has ever come to any other nation as that which is destined to come to the United States. In all history no other peacemaker has ever been in a position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced upon our President when the time for mediation comes--as come it must.

W.J. BRYAN.

"PREPAREDNESS" AND WAR.

_That military preparedness provokes war is the conclusion drawn by Mr. Bryan in the second utterance in his series of three concerning the European conflict and war in general. It reads:_

Washington, June 17, 1915.

The conflict now raging in Europe has been described as "The Causeless War," but since no one would be bold enough to lay the blame for such an unholy situation upon an overruling Providence, it must find its origin in acts for which man, and man alone, is responsible.

It is not a race war; on the contrary, the races are quite inexplicably mixed. Latin joins with Saxon; the Frank is the ally of the Slav; while in the opposing ranks Teuton and Turk fight side by side.

Neither is it a religious war. On the Bosporus the Cross and the Crescent make common cause; Protestant Kaiser and Catholic Emperor have linked their fortunes together and hurl their veteran legions against an army in which are indiscriminately mingled communicants of the Greek Church, of the Church of Rome, and of the Church of England.

Nor yet is it a rivalry between families. The leading actors in this unprecedented tragedy are related by blood, but kinship seems to be a negligible factor--it explains neither friendships nor enmities.

No. Race, religion, and family, each with many wars to answer for, can plead not guilty in the present inquiry. So far as can be judged, there appears upon the surface no cause that by any known standard can be regarded as adequate for such a cataclysm as we are now witnessing.

The notes that passed from chancellery to chancellery were couched in most friendly language. These notes could not have been intended to deceive. Sovereigns visited each other and were received with every evidence of cordiality and good-will. This hospitality could not have been insincere.

Each ruler declared that he did not wish war; would they all say this if an adequate cause for war had actually existed? They have all denied responsibility for the war--would they have done so if they had regarded the war as either necessary or desirable?

But there is even better proof, aye, indisputable proof, that no sufficient cause existed, viz., the conclusion to be drawn from inaction.

Would not these rulers have busied themselves trying to save their subjects by the eradication of the cause had they known of the existence of such a cause? Would they have spent their time in social festivities and in exchanging compliments had they known that they were on the brink of war? It is inconceivable! It would be a gross libel on them, one and all, to charge such a wanton disregard of their sacred duty.

What, then, was the cause? If I have correctly analyzed the situation, the war is the natural result of a false philosophy. Theories of life are invisible, but they control for good or for evil. They enter our very being, and may be as deadly to the moral man as germs of disease, taken into the body, are deadly to the physical man. The fundamental precept of this false philosophy is that "might makes right." It is not proclaimed now as loudly as it once was, but it is often acted upon in particular cases by those who would be unwilling to indorse it as a general principle.

The individual makes this maxim his excuse for violating three commandments that stand in his way; this maxim also leads nations to violate these same three commandments for the same purpose, but on a larger scale.

Strange that men should fail to apply to nations the moral principles which are now so generally applied to the individual units of a nation!

The tendency is to condemn the violation of these commandments, not in proportion to the injury done, but rather in inverse proportion. No one will dispute the validity of the injunction against covetousness as long as the object coveted is of little value or not greatly desired, but the last and all-inclusive specifications, viz., "or anything that is thy neighbor's," is sometimes interpreted by nations to except a neighbor's vineyard or a neighbor's territory. Covetousness turns to might as the principle to be invoked, and the greater the unlawful desire the firmer the faith in the false principle.

Conquest is the word used to describe the means employed for securing the thing desired, if the force is employed by a nation, and conquest violates the commandments Thou Shalt Not Steal and Thou Shalt Not Kill.

By what sophistry can rulers convince themselves that, while petit larceny is criminal, grand larceny is patriotic; that, while it is reprehensible for one man to kill another for his money, it is glorious for one nation to put to the sword the inhabitants of another nation in order to extend boundaries?

It is a mockery of moral distinctions to hang one man for taking the life of another, either for money or in revenge, and then make a hero of another man who wades "through slaughter to a throne, and shut the doors of mercy on mankind."

As in the case of the individual, the violation of the commandments Thou Shall Not Covet, Thou Shalt Not Steal, and Thou Shalt Not Kill, are usually traceable to the violation of the first great commandment--Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me--that is, to the putting of self before service of the Creator.

The violation of these commandments by nations is not always, but usually, due to selfishness--the putting of supposed material advantages before obedience to the Divine Law.

War is occasionally altruistic in purpose and the soldier always exhibits unselfishness of high order, but, as a rule, conflicts are waged for selfish ends.

The individual finds that Jehovah's justice cannot be evaded; for wrongdoing works its own punishment on the wrongdoer in the form of perverted character when he escapes the penalties of human law. The nation is as powerless to repeal or to ignore with impunity the laws of God--"Though hand join in hand they shall not be unpunished."

If I have made it clear that the doctrine that might makes right is the most common cause of war, we may pass to the consideration of a maxim quite sure to be applied in war, namely, that "like cures like"--the theory upon which retaliation rests.

The two are so closely allied that it is almost inevitable that those who indorse the former will resort to the latter--one representing the spirit of will, the other its most familiar manifestation. Rivalry for rivalry in wrongdoing--a neck-and-neck race to the bottomless pit. And yet there are many believers in the gospel of force, who have brought themselves to think that cruelty can be cured by greater cruelty--that the only way to win an antagonist away from inhuman acts is to surpass him in inhumanities. Absurdity of absurdities!

But might must find a pretext for arming itself; and what is the pretext? There was a time when men openly advocated war as a thing to be desired; commended it to each generation as a sort of tonic to tone up the moral system and prevent degeneracy, but we have passed that day.

Now all join in the chorus for peace. And how, according to the jingoes, shall peace be insured? "By preparedness," say these sons of Mars. Prepare, all prepare; equip yourselves with the most modern implements of destruction; arm, drill, get ready, and then stand with fingers on a barrel of a musket and preserve peace--you preserve it until some one, by accident or design, gives the signal--then all fall upon each other with cries for blood. Preparedness is the kindling; opportunity is the match.

We dare not trust the peace of the world to those who spend their time in getting ready for wars that should never come. Half the energy employed in preparing for war would effectually prevent war if used in propagating the principles which make for peace.

Instead of preventing war, preparedness provokes war, because it is impossible to coerce the people into bearing the burdens incident to continuous and increasing preparation without cultivating hatred as if it were a national virtue. There must be some one to fear; some other preparing nation that must be represented as plotting for war.

Hate sets up sham standards of honor and converts every wound into a festering sore; hate misunderstands; hate misinterprets; hate maligns its supposed adversary, while every contractor, battleship builder, and manufacturer of munitions of war applauds.

How can preparedness prevent war, if all prepared? Each step taken by one nation toward more complete preparedness excites the other nations to additional purchases and new levies, until all have exhausted their productive industries and menaced their moral progress.

The doctrine that preparedness will prevent war will not stand the test of logic, and the conflagration in Europe shows that it fails when tested by experience.