Chapter 25

With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on, too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty. But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers which would insure England's position of power for another generation, answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England. In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a political testament this sentence would in all probability be contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has consistently maintained from his accession to the throne until the outbreak of the present war. He was a favorite of the old Queen, and the treaty signed on July 1, 1890, whereby we obtained possession of Heligoland by relinquishing our claims to Witu and Zanzibar, was an outward sign of an honest endeavor on the part of both nations to bring about closer mutual relations. The mutual limitation of spheres of interest in East and West Africa in the year 1893, and the friendly adjustment of the conflict which Article III. of the British Agreement with the Congo Free State of the year 1894 had threatened to bring about, might be considered additional symptoms of this general disposition or tendency.

The year 1896, however, brought disturbances; the telegram which Emperor William on Jan. 5 sent to President Kruger, after the predatory invasion of Dr. Jameson had been fortunately repelled, was received very unfavorably in England, and led to demonstrations on the part of the British fleet, which, although they had a very provocative character, remained finally without lasting effect. The impression was created, however, that public opinion in England was very easily excited; it saw itself disturbed in the execution of a thoroughly considered political plan, and, as it were, caught in flagranti. But the fact that there were still deeper reasons for a gradually increasing mistrust of Germany is brought to light by Wilson's book, published in 1896, which, under the title "Made in Germany," developed a program of battle against Germany's rapidly growing economic power. Since then all steps taken by Germany in the pursuit of its internal as well as its external policy have been viewed with extraordinary disapprobation on the part of England. The adoption of our Naval bill by the Reichstag on March 28, 1898, the foundation of the Naval League two days later, the new East-Asiatic policy of Germany, which in the leasing of Kiao-Chau was exemplified in a manner not at all to the liking of the English politicians, the Emperor's trip to the Orient, which led to friendly relations between Turkey and Germany--all this was looked upon with the more displeasure in view of the fact that Emperor William in the Summer of 1895 had emphatically rejected a plan, proposed to him by Lord Salisbury, to divide up Turkey. In August, 1898, nevertheless, when the Fashoda crisis had strained the relations of England and France to the utmost, and when, at the same time, English-Russian relations were becoming critical in the Far East, an understanding between Germany and England, which might perhaps have the character of an alliance, seemed to be quite possible. Secretary of State von Bülow and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, took up the matter very earnestly, but it was impossible to secure from England the assurance that the entire English Government and Parliament would sanction an alliance. Russia warded off the menacing danger of a war with England by means of the well-known proposal which on May 18, 1899, led to the holding of the Disarmament Conference in The Hague, and Delcassé on Jan. 20, 1899, began, with reference to the Fashoda affair, the policy of retreat, which excluded France from the Nile territory. Then came England's war against the Boers. It is well known how the German Government during this war scrupulously maintained its neutrality (not according to the English method) despite the fact that all the sympathies of the German people were with the Boers in their struggle for freedom. It is not so well known, on the other hand, that the Imperial Government rejected a Russian proposal to form an alliance against England. That, too, was a service for which England has not thanked us. Of the tragedy in South Africa it has retained in mind only one incident, the so-called "Kruger Message," which it regarded as an interference with its right to do violence to a weaker power, figuratively speaking, as a slap in the face.

In the course of the war the old Queen died, and Edward VII. entered upon his fateful reign. Emperor William had gone over to London to attend the funeral of his grandmother, and Prince Henry had accompanied him, so that the dynastic relationship was made most conspicuous. After that the political relations of the two States seemed about to shape themselves most propitiously. Of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded on Jan. 30, 1902, was directed against Russia, there was never for a moment any doubt; indeed it was Japan, not England, which took the initiative in bringing it about. On the other hand, the co-operation of English and German war vessels in adjusting the difficulties which both powers had with Venezuela was in complete harmony with the political wishes and convictions of Emperor William, who, like Bismarck at an earlier date, was of the opinion that the interests of the two nations could readily be reconciled. But in England that co-operation resulted in an excited anti-German campaign on the part of the press. The Times, The National Review, The Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, and other newspapers vehemently attacked the Government for acting conjointly with us, and there can be no doubt that in so doing they gave expression, not to the ideas of the Balfour Ministry, but to the sentiments which, as was well known in those journalistic circles, were held by King Edward. Balfour, in an address which he delivered in Liverpool on Feb. 13, 1903, had opposed with great emphasis the arousing of English public opinion against Germany. "We wish," he said, "to bear in mind an old ideal, namely, that all the nations which stand in the front ranks of civilization should learn to work together in the interest of the whole, and that nothing any longer stands in the way of the realization of this high ideal save those national bitternesses, jealousies, and hostilities.... As far as Venezuela is concerned, that is passing over ... but with respect to the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King, from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal point of English policy.

In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely, was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which, after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, who, on the basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the pénétration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with friends of the English-French combination.

The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence, nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations. In December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure, desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr. Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us similar to that which England had reached with France. This constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew, in Homburg vor der Höhe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy. On this point English and German views concurred, though from different motives. In the following September the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly, and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We now know--a fact which the Liberté also divulged at that time--that an English-French military convention had then been signed with reference to future possibilities. This fact was immediately denied, but it was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure, was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations" between the military authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name "Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany, societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which existed between the two nations; these were the so-called "Friendship Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany, representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany, English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement feelings of friendship by making personal observations and acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.

These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August, 1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in 1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy, however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by means of which it expected to put a stop to the "world policy" of Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially, but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i.e., in the policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agreement is very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some political effect, and it was very true that political effect was desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was displayed. THE NEW YORK TIMES judged the situation correctly when it said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history, has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of the German Emperor, who had given numerous proofs of his friendship, and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now, however, the guns of the two nations were, so to speak, pointed at each other.

Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment of the world against our Emperor and against the German policy. No means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover, appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties between Germany and France were also settled. On Feb. 9, 1909, the day on which King Edward made his first visit in Berlin, a German-French agreement regarding Morocco was signed, and in the latter part of May the Casablanca conflict was also adjusted by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both contestants.