New York Times Current History The European War Vol 2 No 3 June
Chapter 2
solution of international disputes.
_This circular is understood to have been rather reassuring to high officials of the United States Government, although it does not cover the attitude of the German Government toward the treatment to be accorded to Americans and other neutral noncombatants, men, women, and children, on board vessels flying the flag of England, France, or Russia. The absence of any allusion to the principle involved in the Lusitania case is believed here to mean that the statement was prepared and was ready for promulgation before the destruction of the Lusitania on Friday. Several days usually have been required for messages to come to Washington from Ambassador Gerard, by roundabout cable relay route, and it is believed that this dispatch is no exception in this respect._
DR. DERNBURG'S DEFENSE.
_The sinking of the Lusitania as a man-of-war was justified by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, late German Colonial Secretary and recognized as quasi-official spokesman of the German Imperial Government in the United States, in a statement issued in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 8, 1915. The statement reads:_
Great Britain declared the North Sea a war zone in the Winter. No protest was made by the United States or any neutral. Great Britain held up all neutral ships carrying non-contraband goods, detaining them, buying or confiscating their cargoes.
Great Britain constantly changed the contraband lists, so no foodstuffs of any kind have actually reached Germany since the war began. International law says foodstuffs destined for the civil population must pass. It does not recognize any right to starve out a whole people.
As a consequence, and in retaliation, Germany declared the waters around England a war zone, and started a submarine warfare. It became known in February that British ships were flying the American flag as a protection.
Great Britain replied by officially declaring its purpose to starve 120,000,000 Germans and Austrians. The United States very thoughtfully tried to mediate, proposing that foodstuffs should be passed and submarine warfare be stopped.
Germany agreed; England turned the proposal down. Then, in order to protect American passengers, they were warned by public advertisement of the danger of sailing under the flag of a belligerent.
Vessels carrying contraband of war are liable to destruction unless they can be taken to a port of the country that captures them. The right of search need not be exercised if it is certain such ships carry contraband.
Oil is contraband, like war ammunition and all metals. The master of the Gulflight (an American oil tank steamer sunk recently) swore before customs officials to his cargo of oil for France.
The master of the Lusitania similarly swore to his manifest of cargo of metals and ammunition. Both the Gulflight and the Lusitania carried contraband when attacked, it is obvious.
The Lusitania's manifest showed she carried for Liverpool 260,000 pounds of brass; 60,000 pounds of copper; 189 cases of military goods; 1,271 cases of ammunition, and for London, 4,200 cases of cartridges.
Vessels of that kind can be seized and be destroyed under The Hague rules without any respect to a war zone. The Lusitania was a British auxiliary cruiser, a man-of-war. On the same day she sailed the Cameronia, another Cunarder, was commandeered in New York Harbor for military service.
The fact is that the Lusitania was a British war vessel under orders of the Admiralty to carry a cargo of contraband of war. The passengers had had full warning, first by the German note to England in February, second by advertisement.
Germany wants to do anything reasonable so as not to make the United States or its citizens suffer in any way. But she cannot do so unless Americans will take necessary precautions to protect themselves from dangers of which they are cognizant.
What Germany has done, she has done by way of retaliation after her offer through President Wilson, regarding submarine warfare, was turned down and after Britain declared the war was directed toward the 120,000,000 innocent noncombatants, women and children.
Americans can do their own thinking when the facts are laid before them. I have really no authority to speak. But my mission in the United States is to inform your people of the German attitude. The German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, can speak only in official phrases. I talk straight out, bluntly.
_Dr. Dernburg put much stress on the fact that the Cunard Line officials did not warn American passengers that the ship carried a large store of ammunition and other contraband of war. He continued:_
Did they issue a warning? I would like an answer. If that warning was not given, American passengers were being used as a cloak for England's war shipments.
It is not reasonable that such a vessel could not be sunk because there were American passengers on board. They had been warned by Germany of the danger.
England could hire one American to travel to and fro on each of her ships, carry on shipments of arms, and place her men-of-war anywhere, if American passengers can be used as shields.
_Asked whether he expected action by the United States because of the Lusitania's sinking, Dr. Dernburg said:_
That is a question I cannot discuss. I can only say that any ship flying the American flag and not carrying contraband of war is and will be as safe as a cradle. But any other ship, not so exempt, is as unsafe as a volcano--or as was the Lusitania.
_When he was told that the Transylvania, another Cunard liner, sailed from New York on May 7, to cover the same route as the Lusitania, Dr. Dernburg said:_
I can only say that the German warnings will reappear henceforth by advertisement. That is significant.
German Press Opinion
_Contrasting with the attitude of the German-American press since the issuance of President Wilson's note of May 13 to the German Imperial Government, the comment of the press in Germany has been in accordance with the German official statements put forth prior to the receipt of the American note. Under date of May 9, 1915, the following dispatch by The Associated Press was received from Berlin:_
_Commenting on the destruction Lusitania, the Berliner Tageblatt says:_
With deep emotion we learn of the destruction of the Lusitania, in which countless men lost their lives. We lament with sincere hearts their hard fate, but we know we are completely devoid of blame.
We may be sure that through the English telegrams communicated to the world indignation will again be raised against Germany, but we must hope that calm reflection will later pronounce the verdict of condemnation against the British Admiralty.
The many who are now sorrowing may raise complaint against Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, who, by conscienceless instructions which must bring him the curse of mankind, conjured up this cruel warfare....
The Lusitania was a warship on the list of English auxiliary cruisers and carried armament of twelve strongly mounted guns. She was more strongly mounted with guns than any German armored cruiser. As an auxiliary cruiser she must have been prepared for attack.
_Count von Reventlow, the naval expert, says, in the Tages Zeitung:_
The American Government probably will make the case the basis for diplomatic action, but it could have prevented the loss of American lives by appropriate instructions. It is the American Government's fault, therefore, if it did not take Germany's war zone declarations seriously enough.
_The writer declares, further, that Germany had full and trustworthy information that the Lusitania carried a cargo of war material, as she had on previous trips._
_The Lokal Anzeiger also assumes that the steamship was carrying munitions of war, and maintains that this and "the fact that she was a fully armed cruiser completely justifies her destruction under the laws of warfare."_
_The Kreuz Zeitung, after referring to the warning issued by Ambassador von Bernstorff, adds:_
If citizens of neutral States were lost with the sunken ship they must bear the full blame.
_Some papers further testify the sinking of the steamer because on a previous occasion she had resorted to the expedient of flying the American flag. Germania, the clerical organ, deprecates probable attempts by Germany's antagonists to make moral capital against her out of the sinking of the Lusitania and the loss of life. The paper says:_
We can look forward to such efforts with a clear conscience, for we have proceeded correctly. We can only answer to those who place their sympathies above justice, that war is war.
_An editorial article in the Frankfurter Zeitung was quoted in an Amsterdam dispatch to The London Times of May 10, as follows:_
The Lusitania has been sent to the bottom. That is the announcement which must arouse measureless horror among many thousands.
A giant ship of the British merchant fleet, a vessel of over 31,000 tons, one of the most famous of the fast steamers of the British-American passenger service, a ship full of people, who had little or nothing to do with the war, has been attacked and sunk by a German torpedo. This is the announcement which in a few words indicates a mighty catastrophe to a ship with 2,000 people aboard.
We always feel that it is tragic and all too hard when war inflicts wounds on those who do not carry its weapons.
We lament similarly the fate of the unfortunate villages and towns where war rages and the innocent victims of bombs who, far behind the trenches, and often without our being able to estimate the meaning of this murder, are snatched from the ranks of the unarmed.
Much more terrible is the fate of those who on the high sea, many hundreds in number, suddenly see death before their eyes.
A German war vessel has sunk the ship. It has done its duty.
For the German Navy the sinking of the Lusitania means an extraordinary success. Its destruction demolished the last fable with which the people of England consoled themselves; on which hostile shipping relied when it dared to defy the German warnings.
We do not need to seek grounds to justify the destruction of a British ship. She belonged to the enemy and brought us harm. She has fallen to our shots.
The enemy and the whole world were warned that he who ventured to trust himself within her staked his life.
_The London Daily Mail of May 16 quotes from Der Tag the following article by Herr von Rath, who is described as a favorite spokesman in the Wilhelmstrasse:_
President Wilson is very much troubled by the drowning of so many American citizens, and we Germans sincerely share his feelings, but we see in the Lusitania affair one of the many cruel necessities which the struggle for existence brings with it.
If, as English reports try to make us believe, Mr. Wilson is now meditating revenge, we will not disturb him in this occupation, but would only hope that his demands will be addressed to the right and not the wrong quarters.
The right address is England. On the German side, everything was done to warn American travelers from the impending peril, while British irresponsibility and arrogance nullified the effect of the German admonition.
Mr. Wilson is certainly in a precarious position. After showing himself so weak in the face of the long and ruthless British provocations, he has to play the strong man with Germany. Otherwise he will lose what prestige he has left, and he knows that in the background the pretender to the throne, Mr. Roosevelt, is lurking.
But what are the gallant shouters in the United States thinking about? Should the United States send troops to take part in the fighting in Flanders? The gigantic losses of their Canadian neighbors should not exactly encourage them, from a military standpoint. Moreover the United States are so weak that they have never even been able to impose their will on Mexico or to do anything to the still more unpleasant Japanese than to clench their fists in their pockets.
Should their superdreadnoughts cross the Atlantic Ocean? England has not even useful work for her own ironclads in this war. What would American warships do?
How about our Germanic brethren in the United States--the half million German and Austro-Hungarian reservists who are not permitted to take part in the defense of their home lands? Will they stand with folded arms and see their fatherlands attacked?
What the United States has already done to support our enemies is, apart from interference with private property, the worst which she could do to us. We have nothing more to expect or to fear. Therefore, the threats of our erstwhile friend Roosevelt leave us quite cold.
Let the United States also preserve up from warmed-up humanitarian platitudes, for her craven submission to England's will is promoting an outrageous scheme to deliver Germany's women and children to death by starvation.
_A wireless dispatch from Berlin to Sayville, L.I., on May 16 reported this outgiving by the Overseas News Agency:_
The whole German press, particularly the Cologne Gazette, the Frankfort Gazette and the Berliner Tageblatt, deeply regret the loss of American lives caused by the sinking of the Lusitania.
The Tages Zeitung and other newspapers state that the responsibility rests with the British Government, which, attempting to starve the peaceful civilian population of a big country, forced Germany in self-defense to declare British waters a war zone; with shipowners, who allowed passengers to embark on an armed steamer carrying war material, and neglected German warnings against entering the war zone, and, finally, with the English press.
Heartfelt sympathy is expressed by the German press and public for the victims of the catastrophe and their relatives.
_From The Hague, via London, on May 19 a special cable to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _reported that, acting apparently under official instructions, several leading German newspapers had on that day joined in a fierce attack on the United States, making a concerted demand that Germany refuse to yield to the American protest._
_Practically all these newspapers repeat the same arguments, declaring that neutrals entering the war zone do so at their own risk, and that the Americans aboard the Lusitania "were shielding contraband goods with their persons." The Berliner Tageblatt said:_
The demand of the Washington Government must be rejected. Indeed, the whole note hardly merits serious consideration. Its "firm tone" is only a cloak to hide America's consciousness of her own culpability. If American citizens, in spite of the warnings of the German Admiralty, intrusted themselves on the Lusitania, the blame for the consequences falls on themselves and their Government.
Can the United States affirm that there were no munitions aboard? If not, it has not the shadow of a right to protest.
GERMAN-AMERICAN PRESS COMMENTS.
_Under the heading "The President's Note," Herman Ridder, editor of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, one of the leading German-American newspapers, said in that publication on May 15:_
The attitude assumed by the President, in the note delivered yesterday to the German Government, toward the infringement of our rights on the seas is diplomatically correct and must compel the support of the entire American people.
We have suffered grievously at the hands of more than one of the belligerent nations, but for the moment we are dealing only with Germany. The note recites a series of events which the Government of the United States could not silently pass by, and demands reparation for American lives lost and American property already destroyed and a guarantee that the rights of the United States and its citizens shall be observed in the future. All this the German Government may well grant, frankly and unreservedly and without loss of honor or prestige. It would be incomprehensible if it did not do so.
The note admits, as most diplomatic documents do, of two interpretations. They will be applied to it variously, as the reader is inclined to pessimism or to optimism. It is a document in which lies the choice of war or peace evenly balanced. I prefer to read into it all the optimism which can be derived from the knowledge that two nations, historically like-minded and bound to one another by strong ties of friendship, seldom go to war over matters which can be settled without resort to the arbitrament of arms. There is no question outstanding today between the United States and Germany which cannot be settled through diplomatic channels. I am inclined all the more to this optimism by the temperament and character of the President of the United for the time being.
I see in the note great possibilities for good. The undersea activities of the German Navy in their effect upon the rights of the United States and its citizens form, properly, the burden of its argument. We are addressing Germany, and it is only over her submarine policy that our interests have clashed with hers. The note takes cognizance, however, of the inter-relation of Germany's submarine policy and the British policy of "starving out Germany." The President has opened an avenue to the full discussion of the rights and obligations of submarines in naval warfare, and when Germany has stated her case it is not only not impossible but it is highly probable that he will be asked to suggest a modus vivendi by which the objectionable features of both these policies may be removed.
The situation is basically triangular and it is difficult to see how the settlement of our difficulties with Germany can escape involving at the same time the rectification of Great Britain's methods of dealing with the trade between neutral countries and her adversaries. It is but a step from the position of mediator in a question of this sort to that of mediator in the larger questions which make for war or peace. I believe that the note contains the hopeful sign that these things may come to pass.
The possibilities are there and the President, I am confident, will overlook no possibility of advancing the cause of an early return of peace to Europe nor leave any unturned stone to free this country of the dangers and inconveniences which have become the concomitants of the European struggle. Out of the troubled waters of our present relations with Germany may thus come a great and, we may hope, a lasting good. Should this happily be the case, the wisdom of the President will have been confirmed and the thankfulness of the nation secured to him. On the other hand, should his pacific hand be forced by those who wax fat and wealthy on strife and the end should be disaster untold to the country, he will still have the consolation of having fought a good battle and of knowing that he was worsted only by the irresistible force of demagogy in this country or abroad.
The subject with which the note deals is one of the same paramount importance to Germany as it is to this country, and we must wait in patience for Germany's reply; and I, for one, shall wait in the confidence that when it is received it will be found to offer a basis for a friendly solution of the questions which exist between Germany and the United States and, not unlikely, for those further steps which I have intimated.
_Under the caption "A Word of Earnest Advice," the evening edition of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung on May 14 issued the following warning to Germans and German-Americans:_
The times are grave--even very grave.... A conflict between America and the old Fatherland is threatening. Such a conflict must rend the heart of every German-American who has acquired the rights of citizenship here, who has founded a new career for himself and brought up his children.
It is probably unnecessary to give any advice to the American citizens among our readers in regard to their conduct in this grave time. A series of years must pass before an immigrant can obtain his citizenship papers; nobody is forced to become a citizen. Of the man who has voluntarily become a citizen of the United States we may therefore expect that he knows the conditions here obtaining the institutions of the country of his adoption, as well as his rights and duties. But there are thousands upon thousands of our readers who are not citizens, and to them a serious word of advice shall now be addressed. In the grave time of the conflict let efforts be made to avoid every personal conflict. It is not necessarily cowardly to deny one's descent, but it is not necessary, either, to make demonstrations.
Where there is life there is hope. The hope still is entertained that the conflict will be eliminated, that the bond of friendship between Germany and America will not be torn. Through thoughtless Hotspurs, who allow themselves to be carried away by excitement and do not dam up the flood of their eloquence, much mischief can be done. Keeping away from the public places where the excited groups congregate and discuss the burning questions of the day must be urgently recommended. It was for many a sport to participate in these discussions, and with more or less skill, but always energetically to champion the German cause.
The American is in general very liberal in regard to expression of opinion. He likes to hear also the "other side," but it must not be forgotten that in times of conflict the "other side" may be regarded as the "enemy side." What has heretofore sounded harmless may now be interpreted as a criticism made against the United States. But the American as a rule repels a criticism made by strangers against the affairs of his own country. Through heated discussions and unwise demonstrations nothing is at present to be achieved but much can be spoiled.
Grave times!
Calmness is now the first duty of citizenship--for all non-citizens.
But whoever is a citizen--he would be doing well in any event to stay away from the streets and squares where the noisy ones congregate.
There are very many Germans whose motto here, too, is: "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world." But whoever bellows that into the ears of hundreds of persons of hostile mind in the public market place is either a fool or--weary of life.
In submarine warfare the Germans may be superior to the British, but in undermining the latter are superior to the former. They have now succeeded in undermining the friendship between Uncle Sam and the Deutsche Michel. Let us hope that the fuse can be extinguished before the explosion follows.
_Charles Neumeyer, editor of The Louisville (Ky.) Anzeiger, in a dispatch on May 14 to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES, _said of President Wilson's note:_
The American note to Berlin evidences the desire of the President to hold Germany to strict accountability for the loss of American lives in the Lusitania disaster. This proceeding on the part of the American Government is eminently just and proper. If the President had failed to hold Germany to strict accountability he would have failed of his official duty. The President's forceful action cannot be but of salutary effect in this country also. It gives the American people the assurance that the Government at Washington is prepared and ready for the protection of American citizens wherever they may chance to be.
There was a time when the Government did not resort to very vigorous measures in this respect. American citizens while traveling abroad were frequently subject to insult and violence, and the authorities at Washington seemingly paid little heed to complaints. The result was that the American citizen abroad was not held in that respect which emanates from the knowledge that his home Government is prepared to go to the length of its ability, if necessary, to accord him protection.
One or two of the demands formulated against Germany do not meet with our approval. The President demands a cessation of German submarine warfare on merchant vessels, but while the interruption of the starvation plan adopted by England against the civil population is urged upon the latter it will continue. The starvation plan is primarily being waged against the weak and helpless, and is, therefore, responsible. It is also in violation of the spirit if not the letter of international law. If the President can force a demand for the cessation of the submarine warfare, he ought also to have the right to demand the lifting of the starvation blockade. The tragedy was chiefly due to either stupidity or design on the part of the British Admiralty in failing to afford proper protection to the ship. While we do not agree with the President on some points in his note, we repose the fullest confidence in his patriotism as well as his deliberate judgment as giving assurance that, whatever the outcome, the case of the American people rests in trustworthy hands.
The people should by their action spare him unnecessary embarrassment and rely for a satisfactory solution of the grave questions confronting us on his patriotism and honesty.
_A dispatch on May 14 to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _from Max Burgheim, editor of the Freie Presse of Cincinnati, Ohio, reads:_
The part of the note referring to the Lusitania catastrophe had better been directed to London. England, not Germany, is responsible for the destruction of the Lusitania. England, through the violation of the rights of nations and the brutal threat to starve 70,000,000 Germans, has forced Germany to a policy against English commerce of which the Lusitania was a victim. Germany declared to our President her willingness to stop submarine warfare if England would allow the importation of food for the German civil population. England contemptuously cast aside the President's mediation.
It has not yet been proved that submarine warfare is not in keeping with international law. Distinguished authorities on international law have declared that Germany was not only justified but bound to adopt this method in the hour of need, because it is the only effective defense against England's warfare. Germany cannot cease this warfare unless she wishes to surrender with tied hands to a ruthless enemy. All we can justly ask of Germany is that neutral ships be not attacked, and that damages be paid in case of loss through mistakes. Germany has already agreed to this.
Falaba, Cushing, Gulflight
CASE OF THE FALABA.
_A Washington dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _on March 31, 1915, reported that the records of the State Department's Passport Bureau show that a passport was issued on June 1, 1911, to Leon Chester Thrasher, a passenger aboard the British African steamship Falaba, which was torpedoed by a German submarine in the "zone of naval warfare" on March 28. The American citizenship of Thrasher, who was drowned, has been established._
[Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
LONDON, Wednesday, March 31.--An American citizen, Leon Chester Thrasher, an engineer, was among the victims of the German submarine that sank the British steamer Falaba in St. George's Channel last Sunday with a loss of 111 lives. Mr. Thrasher's name is included in the official list of the missing. For the last year he had been employed on the Gold Coast, British West Africa, and it is presumed he was returning to his post when he met his death at the hands of the German sea raiders.
The Daily Mail says Mr. Thrasher was bound for Secondee, West Africa. Reference to the form which has to be filled out to satisfy the Board of Trade and customs requirements by every passenger embarking at a British port before tickets will be issued shows that Mr. Thrasher was a citizen of the United States. Here are the particulars:
Name, Leon Chester Thrasher; age, last birthday, 31; single; sex, male; profession, engineer; country of residence for last twelve months, Gold Coast Colony, West Africa; country of intended residence for next twelve months, the same; country of which citizen or subject, United States of America; present address, 29 Cartwright Gardens, St. Pancras, W.C.
When Mr. Thrasher went on board the Falaba he produced an American passport.
_The British Official Press Bureau on April 8 issued the following report on the destruction of the Falaba:_
It is not true that sufficient time was given the passengers and the crew of this vessel to escape. The German submarine closed in on the Falaba, ascertained her name, signaled her to stop, and gave those on board five minutes to take to the boats. It would have been nothing short of a miracle if all the passengers and crew of a big liner had been able to take to their boats within the time allotted.
While some of the boats were still on their davits the submarine fired a torpedo at short range. This action made it absolutely certain that there must be great loss of life and it must have been committed knowingly with the intention of producing that result.
The conduct of all on board the Falaba appears to have been excellent. There was no avoidable delay in getting out the boats. To accuse the Falaba's crew of negligence under the circumstances could not easily be paralleled.
THE GERMAN DEFENSE.
[By The Associated Press.]
_BERLIN, April 13, (via Amsterdam to London, April 14.)--A semi-official account of the sinking of the British steamer Falaba by a German submarine on March 28 was made public here today. It follows:_
On receiving the signal "Stop, or I fire," the Falaba steamed off and sent up rocket signals to summon help, and was only brought to a standstill after a chase of a quarter of an hour.
Despite the danger of an attack from the steamer or from other vessels hurrying up, the submarine did not immediately fire, but signaled that the steamer must be abandoned within ten minutes. The men of the Falaba quickly entered the boats, although the launching took place in an unseamanlike manner. They failed to give assistance, which was possible, to passengers struggling in the water.
From the time of the order to leave the ship until the torpedo was discharged not ten but twenty-three minutes elapsed, prior to which occurred the chase of the steamer, during which period time might have been used to get the boats ready.
The torpedo was fired only when the approach of suspicious-looking vessels, from which an attack was to be expected, compelled the commander of the submarine to take quick action. When the torpedo was discharged nobody was seen on board the ship except the Captain, who bravely stuck to his post.
Afterward some persons became visible who were busy about a boat.
Of the crew of the submarine, the only ones on deck were those serving the cannon or those necessary for signaling. It was impossible for them to engage in rescue work, because the submarine could not take on passengers.
Every word is superfluous in defending our men against malignant accusations. At the judicial proceedings in England no witness dared raise accusations. It is untrue that at any time the submarine displayed the English flag. The submarine throughout the affair showed as much consideration for the Falaba as was compatible with safety.
COMMANDER SCHMITZ'S STORY.
[From The New York Times, May 6, 1915.]
_J.J. Ryan, the American cotton broker who went to Germany on March 30 and sold 28,000 bales of cotton he had shipped to Bremen and Hamburg, returned yesterday on the Cunard liner Carpathia very well satisfied with the results of his trip. He said:_
While I was in Bremen I met Commander Schmitz of the German submarine U-28, which sank the British African liner Falaba off the English coast on March 28. He told me that he regretted having been compelled to torpedo the vessel, as she had passengers on board. In explanation, he said:
"I warned the Captain of the Falaba to dismantle his wireless apparatus and gave him ten minutes in which to do it and get his passengers off. Instead of acting upon my demand he continued to send messages out to torpedo destroyers that were less than twenty miles away, to come as quickly as possible to his assistance.
"At the expiration of the ten minutes I gave him a second warning about dismantling his wireless apparatus and waited twenty minutes, and then I torpedoed the ship, as the destroyers were getting close up and I knew they would go to the rescue of the passengers and crew."
I mentioned the fact to the commander that it had been reported by some of the survivors of the liner that while the men and women were struggling for their lives in the icy water his crew were standing on the deck of the submarine laughing. He looked very gravely at me and replied, "That is not true, and is most cruelly unjust to my men. They were crying, not laughing, when the boats were capsized and threw the people into the water."
CASE OF THE CUSHING.
[Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
_WASHINGTON, May 1.--Secretary Bryan today received from American Minister Henry van Dyke at The Hague a report on the attack by German aviators on the American steamship Cushing and said tonight that this report would be immediately cabled to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin for his information. Ambassador Gerard will bring the matter to the attention of the German Government. The report from Minister van Dyke was very brief, and read as follows:_
The American Consul at Rotterdam reports that the American steamship Cushing, Captain Herland, with petroleum from New York to Rotterdam, flying the American flag, was attacked by German aeroplanes near the North Hinder Lightship, afternoon April 29. Three bombs dropped, one struck ship, causing damage, but no life lost.
_The report of Captain Lars Larsen Herland, master of the American tank steamer Cushing, made upon his arrival in Philadelphia, Penn., on May 19, 1915, is as follows:_
The airmen swept in narrow circles over the tanker, trying to get directly over the funnel, with the idea, apparently, of dropping a bomb into it and wrecking the engine room.
When attacked the Cushing was about twenty-five miles from Antwerp and eight miles from the North Hinder Lightship. It was near 7 o'clock in the evening, but the sun had barely touched the horizon, and there was ample light for the pilot of the biplane to see the words, "Cushing, New York, United States of America," painted on each side of the vessel in letters eight feet high, and to note the Stars and Stripes at the masthead and the taffrail.
When the airship was first noted it was several thousand feet in the air, but dropped as it approached the ship, and soon was only about 500 feet up. Suddenly it swooped down to about 300 feet above the Cushing. Then there was a tremendous explosion, and a wave flooded the stern deck. A second bomb missed the port quarter by a foot or so, and sent another wave over the lower deck.
The biplane swung up into the wind, hung motionless for a second or so, then came the third bomb, which just grazed the starboard rail and shot into the sea.
The airship hung around for a few minutes, then headed toward the Dutch coast. She was flying a white flag, with a black cross in the centre, the pennant of the German air fleet.
CASE OF THE GULFLIGHT.
_Official confirmation of the attack on May 1, 1915, by a German submarine on the American oil tank steamer Gulflight off the Scilly Islands came to the State Department at Washington on May 3 in dispatches from Joseph G. Stephens, the United States Consul at Plymouth, England. Two members of the crew were drowned, the Captain died of heart failure, and thirty-four members of the crew were saved. Following is the sworn statement of Ralph E. Smith, late chief officer and now master of the Gulflight, received from Ambassador Page and published by the State Department at Washington on May 11:_
I am Ralph E. Smith, now master of the steamship Gulflight. At the commencement of the voyage I was chief officer. The ship left port at Port Arthur on the 10th day of April, 1915, about 4 P.M., laden with a tank cargo of gasoline and wooden barrels of lubricating oil. The voyage was uneventful.
When about half way across the Atlantic the wireless operator told me there was a British cruiser in our vicinity and that he had heard messages from this ship the whole time since leaving Port Arthur, but she made no direct communication with or to our ship. From the sound of the wireless messages given out by the British ship, she seemed to maintain the same distance from us until about three days before we reached the mouth of the English Channel.
On the first day of May, about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, we spoke two British patrol vessels named Iago and Filey. We were then about twenty-two miles west of the Bishop Lighthouse. The patrol vessels asked where we were bound. After informing them we were bound for Rouen, they ordered us to follow them to the Bishop. The Filey took up a position a half mile distant on our port bow, the Iago off our starboard quarter close to us. We steered as directed, and at about 12:22, the second officer, being on watch, sighted a submarine on our port bow--slightly on the port bow--steaming at right angles to our course. The submarine was in sight for about five minutes, when she submerged about right ahead of us. I saw her, but could not distinguish or see any flag flying on her.
The Gulflight was then steering about true east, steaming about eight miles an hour, flying a large American ensign, six feet by ten feet. The wind was about south, about eight miles an hour in force. I personally observed our flag was standing out well to the breeze.
Immediately after seeing the submarine I went aft and notified the crew and came back and went on the bridge and heard the Captain make the remark that that must be a British submarine, as the patrol boats took no notice of it.
About 12:50 an explosion took place in the Gulflight on the bluff of the starboard bow, sending vast quantities of water high in the air, coming down on the bridge and shutting everything off from our view. After the water cleared away our ship had sunk by the head so that the sea was washing over the foredeck, and the ship appeared to be sinking.
Immediately after I went aft to see to the boats. On my way I saw one man overboard on the starboard side. The water at that time was black with oil. The boats were lowered and the crew got into them without delay or damage. After ascertaining there was no one left on board the ship I got in my boat and we were picked up by the patrol vessel Iago and were advised by her crew to leave the scene. We proceeded toward St. Mary's, but the dense fog which then came on prevented us getting into the harbor that night.
About 2:30 in the morning following I saw Captain Gunter, master of the Gulflight, who had been sleeping in the room of the skipper of the Iago, standing in the room with a queer look in his face. I asked him what his trouble was, and he made no reply. Then he reached for the side of the berth with his hands, but did not take hold. I went in the room, but he fell before I reached him.
He was taken on deck, as the cabin was small and hot. After reaching the deck he seemed to revive and said: "I am cold." After that he had apparently two fainting attacks and then expired in a third one--this being about 3:40.
We arrived at St. Mary's, Scilly, about 10 o'clock on the morning of May 2. The Gulflight was towed to Crow Sound, Scilly, on May 2 by British patrol vessels, and Commander Oliver, senior naval officer of the Port of Scilly, sent for some one to come on board the Gulflight, and I went, and the ship was anchored about 6 P.M.
I again left the ship that evening--she being then in charge of the Admiralty. I visited the ship on Monday. I went out again on Tuesday, but it was too rough to get on board. To the best of my knowledge there was no examination of the vessel made by divers until Wednesday about 3 P.M., when members from the American Embassy were present. The divers at this time made an external examination only of the ship's bottom and left the ship with me at 5:40 P.M.
Aim of Submarine Warfare
[From The London Times, April 30, 1915.]
Dr. Flamm, Professor of Ship Construction at the Technical High School at Charlottenburg, publishes in the Vossische Zeitung an extraordinary article on the impending destruction of the British Empire by German submarines. Whatever Professor Flamm's professional opinion may be worth, he is evidently attacking his task with a passionate hatred of England that leaves nothing to be desired.
Professor Flamm begins by explaining how England has been protected for centuries by her insularity. He writes:
This country, whose dishonorable Government produced this terrible world war by the most contemptible means, and solely in selfish greed of gain, has always been able to enjoy the fruits of its unscrupulousness because it was reckoned as unassailable. But everything is subject to change, and that applies today to the security of England's position. Thank God, the time has now come when precisely its complete encirclement by the sea has become the greatest danger for the existence of the British Nation.
The writer explains that England cannot be self-supporting, and, strangely enough, admits that recognition of this fact justifies British naval policy. He proceeds:
The time, however, has passed in which even the strongest squadron of battleships or cruisers can protect England's frontiers and secure imports from oversea. Technical progress, in the shape of submarines, has put into the hands of all England's enemies the means at last to sever the vital nerve of the much-hated enemy, and to pull him down from his position of ruler of the world, which he has occupied for centuries with ever-increasing ruthlessness and selfishness. What science has once begun she continues, and for every shipbuilder in the whole world there is now no sphere which offers a stronger stimulus to progressive activity than the sphere of the submarines. Here an endless amount of work is being, and will be, done, because the reward which beckons on the horizon is an extraordinarily high one, an extraordinarily profitable one, a reward containing the most ideal blessings for humanity--the destruction of English world supremacy, the liberation of the seas. This exalted and noble aim has today come within reach, and it is German intellect and German work that have paved the way.
It will be noted that Professor Flamm, as other contemporary German writers, believes that submarines, like Shakespeare, are a German invention. He is also, notwithstanding the experience of two and a half months, confident that the German "submarine blockade" will both be successful and become popular with neutrals. Building upon the German myth that Captain Weddigen's submarine, U-29, was destroyed while saving life, Professor Flamm "expects" that the neutrals will stop all traffic with England, "in view of the cowardly and cunning method of fighting of the English."
Professor Flamm then discusses Germany's prospects, as follows:
Anybody who wants to fight England must not attempt it by striving to bring against England larger and more numerous battleships and cruisers. That would be not only unwise but also very costly. He must try another method, which makes England's great sea power completely illusory, and gives it practically no opportunity for activity. This method is the cutting-off of imports by submarine fleets. Let it not be said that the attainment of this end requires a very great deal of material. England, as can easily be seen from the map, possesses a fairly limited number of river mouths and ports for rapid development of her great oversea trade. Beginning in the northeast, those on the east coast are mainly the Firth of Forth, the mouths of the Tyne and Humber, and then the Thames; in the south, Portsmouth, Southampton, and Plymouth, with some neighboring harbors; in the west, the Bristol Channel, the Mersey, the Solway, and the Clyde. These are the entries that have to be blocked in order to cut off imports in a way that will produce the full impression. For this purpose 150 of the submarines of today fully suffice, so that the goal is within reach. Moreover, the development of this arm will enormously increase its value, and so, come what may, England must reckon with the fact that her world supremacy cannot much longer exist, and that the strongest navy can make no difference. When once the invisible necktie is round John Bull's neck, his breathing will soon cease, and the task of successfully putting this necktie on him is solely a question of technical progress and of time, which now moves so fast.
Professor Flamm ends with a passage about German submarine bases. It would be more intelligible if he had made up his mind whether Germany is going to take Calais or whether, according to another popular German theory, England is going to annex the north coast of France. He writes:
"The eyes of France also will one day be opened when, having been sufficiently weakened, she is compelled to leave the north coast of France, including Calais, to her friend of today. Precisely this coast which England has seized may be expected now to remain in English possession for the purpose of better and surer control of the Channel, for there can be no doubt that this control renders, and will render, difficult for the German submarines effective activity in the Irish Sea--an activity which will become all the easier as soon as Calais has been freed of the enemy, or is even in German possession.
"Thus before very long a world fate should befall England. The trees do not grow up to heaven. England, through her criminal Government, has stretched the bow too tight, and so it will snap."
THREE SPEECHES BY PRESIDENT WILSON
In New York at the annual luncheon of The Associated Press on April 20, 1915; at Philadelphia in Convention Hall on May 10, in an address to 4,000 newly naturalized citizens, and again at New York in his speech on the navy, May 17, delivered at the luncheon given for the President by the Mayor's Committee formed for the naval review, Mr. Wilson set forth the principles on which he would meet the crises of the European war as they affect the United States. The texts of the three speeches appear below.
I.
"AMERICA FIRST."
[_President Wilson's address on April 20, 1915, to the members of The Associated Press at their annual luncheon in New York:_]
I am deeply gratified by the generous reception you have accorded me. It makes me look back with a touch of regret to former occasions when I have stood in this place and enjoyed a greater liberty than is granted me today. There have been times when I stood in this spot and said what I really thought, and I pray God that those days of indulgence may be accorded me again. But I have come here today, of course, somewhat restrained by a sense of responsibility that I cannot escape.
For I take The Associated Press very seriously. I know the enormous part that you play in the affairs not only of this country, but the world. You deal in the raw material of opinion and, if my convictions have any validity, opinion ultimately governs the world.
It is, therefore, of very serious things that I think as I face this body of men. I do not think of you, however, as members of The Associated Press. I do not think of you as men of different parties or of different racial derivations or of different religious denominations, I want to talk to you as to my fellow-citizens of the United States. For there are serious things which as fellow-citizens we ought to consider.
The times behind us, gentlemen, have been difficult enough, the times before us are likely to be more difficult because, whatever may be said about the present condition of the world's affairs, it is clear that they are drawing rapidly to a climax, and at the climax the test will come, not only of the nations engaged in the present colossal struggle, it will come for them of course, but the test will come to us particularly.
Do you realize that, roughly speaking, we are the only great nation at present disengaged? I am not speaking, of course, with disparagement of the greater of those nations in Europe which are not parties to the present war, but I am thinking of their close neighborhood to it. I am thinking how their lives much more than ours touch the very heart and stuff of the business; whereas, we have rolling between us and those bitter days across the water three thousand miles of cool and silent ocean.
Our atmosphere is not yet charged with those disturbing elements which must be felt and must permeate every nation of Europe. Therefore, is it not likely that the nations of the world will some day turn to us for the cooler assessment of the elements engaged?
I am not now thinking so preposterous a thought as that we should sit in judgment upon them. No nation is fit to sit in judgment upon any other nation, but that we shall some day have to assist in reconstructing the processes of peace. Our resources are untouched; we are more and more becoming by the force of circumstances the mediating nation of the world in respect to its finances. We must make up our minds what are the best things to do and what are the best ways to do them.
We must put our money, our energy, our enthusiasm, our sympathy into these things; and we must have our judgments prepared and our spirits chastened against the coming of that day. So that I am not speaking in a selfish spirit when I say that our whole duty for the present, at any rate, is summed up in this motto, "America first." Let us think of America before we think of Europe, in order that America may be fit to be Europe's friend when the day of tested friendship comes. The test of friendship is not now sympathy with the one side or the other, but getting ready to help both sides when the struggle is over.
The basis of neutrality, gentlemen, is not indifference; it is not self-interest. The basis of neutrality is sympathy for mankind. It is fairness, it is good-will at bottom. It is impartiality of spirit and of judgment. I wish that all of our fellow-citizens could realize that.
There is in some quarters a disposition to create distempers in this body politic. Men are even uttering slanders against the United States as if to excite her. Men are saying that if we should go to war upon either side there will be a divided America--an abominable libel of ignorance. America is not all of it vocal just now. It is vocal in spots.
But I for one have a complete and abiding faith in that great silent body of Americans who are not standing up and shouting and expressing their opinions just now, but are waiting to find out and support the duty of America. I am just as sure of their solidity and of their loyalty and of their unanimity, if we act justly, as I am that the history of this country has at every crisis and turning point illustrated this great lesson.
We are the mediating nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarreling. I mean the word in a broader sense. We are compounded of the nations of the world. We mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things.
We are, therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly, as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating nation. The opinion of America, the action of America, is ready to turn and free to turn in any direction.
Did you ever reflect upon how almost all other nations, almost every other nation has through long centuries been headed in one direction? That is not true of the United States. The United States has no racial momentum. It has no history back of it which makes it run all its energies and all its ambitions in one particular direction; and America is particularly free in this, that she has no hampering ambitions as a world power.
If we have been obliged by circumstances or have considered ourselves to be obliged by circumstances, in the past to take territory which we otherwise would not have thought of taking, I believe I am right in saying that we have considered it our duty to administer that territory, not for ourselves, but for the people living in it, and to put this burden upon our consciences not to think that this thing is ours for our use, but to regard ourselves as trustees of the great business for those to whom it does really belong, trustees ready to hand over the cosmic trust at any time when the business seems to make that possible and feasible. That is what I mean by saying we have no hampering ambitions.
We do not want anything that does not belong to us. Isn't a nation in that position free to serve other nations, and isn't a nation like that ready to form some part of the assessing opinion of the world?
My interest in the neutrality of the United States is not the petty desire to keep out of trouble. To judge by my experience I have never been able to keep out of trouble. I have never looked for it, but I have always found it. I do not want to walk around trouble. If any man wants a scrap--that is, an interesting scrap and worth while--I am his man. I warn him that he is not going to draw me into the scrap for his advertisement, but if he is looking for trouble--that is, the trouble of men in general--and I can help a little, why, then, I am in for it. But I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight, because there is something, there is a distinction waiting for this nation that no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery.
Whom do you admire most among your friends? The irritable man? The man out of whom you can get a "rise" without trying? The man who will fight at the drop of the hat, whether he knows what the hat is dropped for or not?
Don't you admire and don't you fear, if you have to contest with him, the self-mastered man who watches you with calm eye and comes in only when you have carried the thing so far that you must be disposed of? That is the man you respect. That is the man who you know has at bottom a much more fundamental and terrible courage than the irritable, fighting man.
Now, I covet for America this splendid courage of reserve moral force, and I wanted to point out to you gentlemen simply this: There is news and news. There is what is called news from Turtle Bay, that turns out to be falsehood, at any rate in what it is said to signify, and which if you could get the nation to believe it true might disturb our equilibrium and our self-possession. We ought not to deal in stuff of that kind. We ought not to permit things of that sort to use up the electrical energy of the wires, because its energy is malign, its energy is not of the truth, its energy is of mischief.
It is possible to sift truth. I have known some things to go out on the wires as true when there was only one man or one group of men who could have told the originators of the report whether it was true or not, and they were not asked whether it was true or not for fear it might not be true. That sort of report ought not to go out over the wires.
There is generally, if not always, somebody who knows whether that thing is so or not, and in these days above all other days we ought to take particular pains to resort to the one small group of men or to the one man, if there be but one, who knows whether those things are true or not.
The world ought to know the truth, but the world ought not at this period of unstable equilibrium to be disturbed by rumor, ought not to be disturbed by imaginative combinations of circumstances or, rather, by circumstances stated in combination which do not belong in combination. For we are holding--not I, but you and gentlemen engaged like you--the balances in your hand. This unstable equilibrium rests upon scales that are in your hands. For the food of opinion, as I began by saying, is the news of the day. I have known many a man go off at a tangent on information that was not reliable. Indeed, that describes the majority of men. The world is held stable by the man who waits for the next day to find out whether the report was true or not.
We cannot afford, therefore, to let the rumors of irresponsible persons and origins get into the atmosphere of the United States. We are trustees for what I venture to say is the greatest heritage that any nation ever had, the love of justice and righteousness and human liberty. For fundamentally those are the things to which America is addicted and to which she is devoted.
There are groups of selfish men in the United States, there are coteries where sinister things are purposed, but the great heart of the American people is just as sound and true as it ever was. And it is a single heart; it is the heart of America. It is not a heart made up of sections selected out of other countries.
So that what I try to remind myself of every day when I am almost overcome by perplexities, what I try to remember, is what the people at home are thinking about. I try to put myself in the place of the man who does not know all the things that I know and ask myself what he would like the policy of this country to be. Not the talkative man, not the partisan man, not the man that remembers first that he is a Republican or Democrat, or that his parents were Germans or English, but who remembers first that the whole destiny of modern affairs centres largely upon his being an American first of all.
If I permitted myself to be a partisan in this present struggle I would be unworthy to represent you. If I permitted myself to forget the people who are not partisans I would be unworthy to represent you. I am not saying that I am worthy to represent you, but I do claim this degree of worthiness--that before everything else I love America.
II.
"HUMANITY FIRST."
[_President Wilson's speech in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Penn., May 10, 1915, before 4,000 newly naturalized citizens:_]
It warms my heart that you should give me such a reception, but it is not of myself that I wish to think tonight, but of those who have just become citizens of the United States. This is the only country in the world which experiences this constant and repeated rebirth. Other countries depend upon the multiplication of their own native people. This country is constantly drinking strength out of new sources by the voluntary association with it of great bodies of strong men and forward-looking women. And so by the gift of the free will of independent people it is constantly being renewed from generation to generation by the same process by which it was originally created. It is as if humanity had determined to see to it that this great nation, founded for the benefit of humanity, should not lack for the allegiance of the people of the world.
You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Of allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one, unless it be God. Certainly not of allegiance to those who temporarily represent this great Government. You have taken an oath of allegiance to a great ideal, to a great body of principles, to a great hope of the human race. You have said, "We are going to America," not only to earn a living, not only to seek the things which it was more difficult to obtain where you were born, but to help forward the great enterprises of the human spirit--to let men know that everywhere in the world there are men who will cross strange oceans and go where a speech is spoken which is alien to them, knowing that, whatever the speech, there is but one longing and utterance of the human heart, and that is for liberty and justice.
And while you bring all countries with you, you come with a purpose of leaving all other countries behind you--bringing what is best of their spirit, but not looking over your shoulders and seeking to perpetuate what you intended to leave in them. I certainly would not be one even to suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth and the nation of his origin--these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of our hearts--but it is one thing to love the place where you were born and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go. You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. American does not consist of groups. A man who thinks himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes.
My urgent advice to you would be not only always to think first of America, but always, also, to think first of humanity. You do not love humanity if you seek to divide humanity into jealous camps. Humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, by justice, not by jealousy and hatred. I am sorry for the man who seeks to make personal capital out of the passions of his fellow-men. He has lost the touch and ideal of America, for America was created to unite mankind by those passions which lift and not by the passions which separate and debase.
We came to America, either ourselves or in persons of our ancestors, to better the ideals of men, to make them see finer things than they had seen before, to get rid of things that divide, and to make sure of the things that unite. It was but a historical accident no doubt that this great country was called the "United States," and yet I am very thankful that it has the word "united" in its title; and the man who seeks to divide man from man, group from group, interest from interest, in the United States is striking at its very heart.
It is a very interesting circumstance to me, in thinking of those of you who have just sworn allegiance to this great Government, that you were drawn across the ocean by some beckoning finger of hope, by some belief, by some vision of a new kind of justice, by some expectation of a better kind of life.
No doubt you have been disappointed in some of us; some of us are very disappointing. No doubt you have found that justice in the United States goes only with a pure heart and a right purpose as it does everywhere else in the world. No doubt what you found here didn't seem touched for you, after all, with the complete beauty of the ideal which you had conceived beforehand.
But remember this, if we had grown at all poor in the ideal, you brought some of it with you. A man does not go out to seek the thing that is not in him. A man does not hope for the thing that he does not believe in, and if some of us have forgotten what America believed in, you, at any rate, imported in your own hearts a renewal of the belief. That is the reason that I, for one, make you welcome.
If I have in any degree forgotten what America was intended for, I will thank God if you will remind me.
I was born in America. You dreamed dreams of what America was to be, and I hope you brought the dreams with you. No man that does not see visions will ever realize any high hope or undertake any high enterprise.
Just because you brought dreams with you, America is more likely to realize the dreams such as you brought. You are enriching us if you came expecting us to be better than we are.
See, my friends, what that means. It means that Americans must have a consciousness different from the consciousness of every other nation in the world. I am not saying this with even the slightest thought of criticism of other nations. You know how it is with a family. A family gets centred on itself if it is not careful and is less interested in the neighbors than it is in its own members.
So a nation that is not constantly renewed out of new sources is apt to have the narrowness and prejudice of a family. Whereas, America must have this consciousness, that on all sides it touches elbows and touches hearts with all the nations of mankind.
The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not.
There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.
So, if you come into this great nation as you have come, voluntarily seeking something that we have to give, all that we have to give is this: We cannot exempt you from work. No man is exempt from work anywhere in the world. I sometimes think he is fortunate if he has to work only with his hands and not with his head. It is very easy to do what other people give you to do, but it is very difficult to give other people things to do. We cannot exempt you from work; we cannot exempt you from the strife and the heart-breaking burden of the struggle of the day--that is common to mankind everywhere. We cannot exempt you from the loads that you must carry; we can only make them light by the spirit in which they are carried. That is the spirit of hope, it is the spirit of liberty, it is the spirit of justice.
When I was asked, therefore, by the Mayor and the committee that accompanied him to come up from Washington to meet this great company of newly admitted citizens I could not decline the invitation. I ought not to be away from Washington, and yet I feel that it has renewed my spirit as an American.
In Washington men tell you so many things every day that are not so, and I like to come and stand in the presence of a great body of my fellow-citizens, whether they have been my fellow-citizens a long time or a short time, and drink, as it were, out of the common fountains with them and go back feeling that you have so generously given me the sense of your support and of the living vitality in your hearts, of its great ideals which made America the hope of the world.
III.
AMERICA FOR HUMANITY.
[_President Wilson's address to the Mayor's Committee in New York, May 17, 1915, on the occasion of the naval parade and review in the Hudson:_]
Mr. Mayor, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Fletcher, and Gentlemen of the Fleet: This is not an occasion upon which it seems to me that it would be wise for me to make many remarks, but I would deprive myself of a great gratification if I did not express my pleasure in being here, my gratitude for the splendid reception which has been accorded me as the representative of the nation, and my profound interest in the navy of the United States. That is an interest with which I was apparently born, for it began when I was a youngster and has ripened with my knowledge of the affairs and policies of the United States.
I think it is a natural, instinctive judgment of the people of the United States that they express their power appropriately in an efficient navy, and their interest is partly, I believe, because that navy somehow is expected to express their character, not within our own borders where that character is understood, but outside our borders, where it is hoped we may occasionally touch others with some slight vision of what America stands for.
But before I speak of the navy of the United States I want to take advantage of the first public opportunity I have had to speak of the Secretary of the Navy, to express my confidence and my admiration, and to say that he has my unqualified support, for I have counseled with him in intimate fashion. I know how sincerely he has it at heart that everything that the navy does and handles should be done and handled as the people of the United States wish them handled--because efficiency is something more than organization. Efficiency runs into every well-considered detail of personnel and method. Efficiency runs to the extent of lifting the ideals of a service above every personal interest. So that when I speak my support of the Secretary of the Navy I am merely speaking my support of what I know every true lover of the navy to desire and to purpose, for the navy of the United States is a body specially trusted with the ideal of America.
I like to image in my thought this ideal. These quiet ships lying in the river have no suggestion of bluster about them--no intimation of aggression. They are commanded by men thoughtful of the duty of citizens as well as the duty of officers--men acquainted with the traditions of the great service to which they belong--men who know by touch with the people of the United States what sort of purposes they ought to entertain and what sort of discretion they ought to exercise in order to use those engines of force as engines to promote the interests of humanity.
For the interesting and inspiring thing about America, gentlemen, is that she asks nothing for herself except what she has a right to ask for humanity itself. We want no nation's property; we wish to question no nation's honor; we wish to stand selfishly in the way of the development of no nation; we want nothing that we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspiration of our own example, and, standing for these things, it is not pretention on our part to say that we are privileged to stand for what every nation would wish to stand for, and speak for those things which all humanity must desire.
When I think of the flag that those ships carry, the only touch of color about them, the only thing that moves as if it had a settled spirit in it, in their solid structure, it seems to me I see alternate strips of parchment upon which are written the rights of liberty and justice and strips of blood spilt to vindicate those rights, and then, in the corner, a prediction of the blue serene into which every nation may swim which stands for these great things.
The mission of America is the only thing that a sailor or soldier should think about; he has nothing to do with the formulation of her policy; he is to support her policy, whatever it is--but he is to support her policy in the spirit of herself, and the strength of our policy is that we, who for the time being administer the affairs of this nation, do not originate her spirit; we attempt to embody it; we attempt to realize it in action we are dominated by it, we do not dictate it.
And so with every man in arms who serves the nation--he stands and waits to do the thing which the nation desires. America sometimes seems perhaps to forget her programs, or, rather, I would say that sometimes those who represent her seem to forget her programs, but the people never forget them. It is as startling as it is touching to see how whenever you touch a principle you touch the hearts of the people of the United States. They listen to your debates of policy, they determine which party they will prefer to power, they choose and prefer as ordinary men; but their real affection, their real force, their real irresistible momentum, is for the ideas which men embody.
I never go on the streets of a great city without feeling that somehow I do not confer elsewhere than on the streets with the great spirit of the people themselves, going about their business, attending to the things which concern them, and yet carrying a treasure at their hearts all the while, ready to be stirred not only as individuals, but as members of a great union of hearts that constitutes a patriotic people.
And so this sight in the river touches me merely as a symbol of that, and it quickens the pulse of every man who realizes these things to have anything to do with them. When a crisis occurs in this country, gentlemen, it is as if you put your hand on the pulse of a dynamo, it is as if the things which you were in connection with were spiritually bred. You had nothing to do with them except, if you listen truly, to speak the things that you hear. These things now brood over the river, this spirit now moves with the men who represent the nation in the navy, these things will move upon the waters in the manoeuvres; no threat lifted against any man, against any nation, against any interest, but just a great, solemn evidence that the force of America is the force of moral principle, that there is not anything else that she loves and that there is not anything else for which she will contend.
Two Ex-Presidents' Views
MR. ROOSEVELT SPEAKS.
[Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
_SYRACUSE, N.Y., May 7.--Ex-President Roosevelt, after learning details of the sinking of the Lusitania, made this statement late tonight:_
This represents not merely piracy, but piracy on a vaster scale of murder than old-time pirates ever practiced. This is the warfare which destroyed Louvain and Dinant and hundreds of men, women, and children in Belgium. It is a warfare against innocent men, women, and children traveling on the ocean, and our own fellow-countrymen and countrywomen, who are among the sufferers.
It seems inconceivable that we can refrain from taking action in this matter, for we owe it not only to humanity, but to our own national self-respect.
_On May 9 a Syracuse dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _conveyed this statement from Mr. Roosevelt:_
On the night of the day that the disaster occurred I called the attention of our people to the fact that the sinking of the Lusitania was not only an act of simple piracy, but that it represented piracy accompanied by murder on a vaster scale than any old-time pirate had ever practiced before being hanged for his misdeeds.
I called attention to the fact that this was merely the application on the high seas, and at our expense, of the principles which when applied on land had produced the innumerable hideous tragedies that have occurred in Belgium and in Northern France.
I said that not only our duty to humanity at large but our duty to preserve our own national self-respect demanded instant action on our part and forbade all delay.
I can do little more than reiterate what I then said.
When the German decree establishing the war zone was issued, and of course plainly threatened exactly the type of tragedy which has occurred, our Government notified Germany that in the event of any such wrongdoing at the expense of our citizens we would hold the German Government to "a strict accountability."
The use of this phrase, "strict accountability," of course, must mean, and can only mean, that action will be taken by us without an hour's unnecessary delay. It was eminently proper to use the exact phrase that was used, and, having used it, our own self-respect demands that we forthwith abide by it.
_On May 11, following the report of President Wilson's speech at Philadelphia, Mr. Roosevelt stated the course which he considered that this country should adopt, reported as follows in a Syracuse dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES:
Colonel Roosevelt announced today what action, in his opinion, this country should take toward Germany because of the sinking of the Lusitania. Colonel Roosevelt earnestly said that the time for deliberation was past and that within twenty-four hours this country could, and should, take effective action by declaring that all commerce with Germany forthwith be forbidden and that all commerce of every kind permitted and encouraged with France, England, and "the rest of the civilized world."
Colonel Roosevelt said that for America to take this step would not mean war, as the firm assertion of our rights could not be so construed, but he added that we would do well to remember that there were things worse than war.
The Colonel has been reading President Wilson's speech carefully, and what seemed to impress him more than anything else was this passage from it:
"There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."
Asked if he cared to make any comment upon the speech of the President, Mr. Roosevelt said:
"I think that China is entitled to draw all the comfort she can from this statement and it would be well for the United States to ponder seriously what the effect upon China has been of managing her foreign affairs during the last fifteen years on the theory thus enunciated.
"If the United States is satisfied with occupying some time in the future the precise international position that China now occupies, then the United States can afford to act on this theory. But it cannot act on this theory if it desires to retain or regain the position won for it by the men who fought under Washington and by the men who, in the days of Abraham Lincoln, wore the blue under Grant and the gray under Lee.
"I very earnestly hope that we will act promptly. The proper time for deliberation was prior to sending the message that our Government would hold Germany to a strict accountability if it did the things it has now actually done. The 150 babies drowned on the Lusitania the hundreds of women drowned with them, scores of these women and children being Americans, and the American ship, the Gulflight, which was torpedoed, offer an eloquent commentary on the actual working of the theory that force is not necessary to assert, and that a policy of blood and iron can with efficacy be met by a policy of milk and water.
"I see it stated in the press dispatches from Washington that Germany now offers to stop the practice on the high seas, committed in violation of the neutral rights that she is pledged to observe, if we will abandon further neutral rights, which by her treaty she has solemnly pledged herself to see that we exercise without molestation. Such a proposal is not even entitled to an answer. The manufacturing and shipment of arms and ammunition to any belligerent is moral or immoral according to the use to which the arms and munitions are to be put. If they are to be used to prevent the redress of the hideous wrongs inflicted on Belgium, then it is immoral to ship them. If they are to be used for the redress of those wrongs and the restoration of Belgium to her deeply wronged and unoffending people, then it is eminently moral to send them.
"Without twenty-four hours' delay this country could, and should, take effective action by declaring that in view of Germany's murderous offenses against the rights of neutrals, all commerce with Germany shall be forthwith forbidden, and all commerce of every kind permitted and encouraged with France, England, and the rest of the civilized world. This would not be a declaration of war. It would merely prevent munitions of war being sent to a power which by its conduct has shown willingness to use munitions to slaughter American men and women and children. I do not believe the assertion of our rights means war, but we will do well to remember there are things worse than war.
"Let us, as a nation, understand that peace is worthy only when it is the handmaiden of international righteousness and of national self-respect."
MR. TAFT SPEAKS.
[By The Associated Press.]
MILWAUKEE, May 8.--"The news of the sinking of the Lusitania as it comes this morning is most distressing," said former President Taft on his arrival from Madison today. "It presents a situation of the most difficult character, properly awakening great national concern.
"I do not wish to embarrass the President of the Administration by a discussion of the subject at this stage of the information, except to express confidence that the President will follow a wise and patriotic course."
_That it is possible for the United States to hold Germany "strictly accountable" for the destruction of American lives on the Lusitania without resort to war is Mr. Taft's opinion, reported in the following dispatch from Philadelphia to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _on May 11:_
"We must bear in mind that if we have a war it is the people, the men and women, fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, who must pay with lives and money the cost of it, and therefore they should not be hurried into the sacrifices until it is made clear that they wish it and know what they are doing when they wish it."
This was the keynote of a speech by ex-President Taft at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Union League's occupancy of the historic home which it occupies in this city.
"Is war the only method of making a nation accountable? Let us look into our own history. England connived at the fitting out of armed vessels, to prey on our commerce, to attack our navy, and to kill our sailors. We protested, and what did we do then? We held her strictly accountable in the Geneva Conference. Was not our honor as much preserved by this method as it would have been had we declared war?
"I agree that the inhumanity of the circumstances in the case now presses us on, but in the heat of even just indignation is this the best time to act, when action involves such momentous consequences and means untold loss of life and treasure? There are things worse than war, but delay, due to calm deliberation, cannot change the situation or minimize the effect of what we finally conclude to do.
"With the present condition of the war in Europe, our action, if it is to be extreme, will not lose efficiency by giving time to the people, whose war it will be, to know what they are facing.
"A demand for war that cannot survive the passion of the first days of public indignation and will not endure the test of delay and deliberation by all the people is not one that should be yielded to."
President Wilson's Note
By Ex-President William H. Taft.
_At the dinner of Methodist laymen in New York on May 14, 1915, following the publication of President Wilson's note to Germany, ex-President Taft said:_
"Admirable in tone, moderate in the judicial spirit that runs through the entire communication, dignified in the level that the writer takes with respect to international obligations, accurate in its statement of international law, he puts the case of the United States in a way that may well call for our earnest concurrence and confirmation."
Another View
By Beatrice Barry.
"When the torch is near the powder"--when a boat, f'r instance, sinks, And the "hyphens" raise a loud hurrah and blow themselves to drinks; When 'bout a hundred neutral lives are snuffed out like a torch, An' "hyphens" read the news an' smoke, a-settin' on the porch-- Well, it's then the native's kind o' apt to see a little red, An' it's hardly fair to criticise the burning things he sed. For since the eagle's not a bird that thrives within a cage, One kind o' hears with sympathy his screams of baffled rage.
There's something sort o' horrible, that catches at the breath, To visualize some two score babes most foully done to death; To see their fright, their struggles--to watch their lips turn blue-- There ain't no use denyin', it will raise the deuce with you. O yes, God bless the President--he's an awful row to hoe, An' God grant, too, that peace with honor hand in hand may go, But let's not call men "rotters," 'cause, while we are standing pat, They lose their calm serenity, an' can't see things like that!
In the Submarine War Zone
[By The Associated Press.]
LIVERPOOL, May 16.--The passengers on board the American Line steamer Philadelphia, which arrived here today from New York, the steamer docking at 1 P.M., experienced during the voyage much anxiety. On Friday afternoon, out in the Atlantic off the west coast of Ireland, a cruiser appeared and approached the liner. The chief topic of conversation during the voyage had been about the German submarine activities, and the sight of the warship caused some alarm. The cruiser approached near enough to the steamer to exchange signals with her.
A number of passengers spent last night on deck in their chairs with lifebelts beside them in case of danger. The boats of the Philadelphia were ready for use. The steamer kept a course much further out from the Irish coast than the Lusitania was traversing when she was torpedoed.
The port officials subjected the passengers of the Philadelphia to a careful examination to discover if there were any spies on board, but nobody was detained. By reason of this precaution it was more than an hour after the steamer arrived before her passengers began to debark.
American Shipments of Arms
By Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington
Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, made public on April 11, 1915, a memorandum addressed to the United States Government on April 4, complaining of its attitude toward the shipment of war munitions to the Allies and the non-shipment of foodstuffs to Germany. After picturing the foreign policy of the United States Government as one of futility, Count von Bernstorff's memorandum says it must be "assumed that the United States Government has accepted England's violations of international law." Its full text appears below, followed by that of the American State Department's reply.
The different British Orders in Council have altered the universally recognized rules of international law in such a one-sided manner that they arbitrarily suppress the trade of neutral countries with Germany. Already, prior to the last Order in Council, the shipment of conditional contraband, especially foodstuffs, to Germany was practically impossible. In fact, prior to the protest which the American Government made in London on Dec. 28, 1914, not a single shipment of such goods for Germany has been effected from the United States.
Also, after the lodging of the protest, and as far as is known to the German Embassy, only one such shipment has been attempted by an American skipper. Ship and cargo were immediately seized by the British, and are still detained at a British port. As a pretext for this unwarranted action the British Government referred to a decree of the German Federal Council concerning the wheat trade, although this decree only covered wheat and flour and no other foodstuffs, although imported foodstuffs were especially exempt from this decree, and although the German Government had given all necessary guarantees to the United States Government, and had even proposed a special organization in order to secure these foodstuffs for the exclusive consumption of the civilian population.
The seizure of an American ship under these circumstances was in contradiction with the recognized principles of international law. Nevertheless the United States Government has not yet obtained the release of the ship, nor has it after eight months of war succeeded in safeguarding the legitimate American trade with Germany. Such a delay, especially when the supply of foodstuffs is concerned, seems equivalent to complete failure. It is therefore to be assumed that the United States Government has accepted England's violations of international law.
Furthermore has to be considered the attitude of the Government of the United States concerning the question of the exportation of war material. The Imperial Embassy hopes to agree with the Government of the United States in assuming that, with regard to the question of neutrality, there is not only the formal side to be considered, but also the spirit in which neutrality is enforced.
Conditions in the present war are different from those in any former wars. For this reason it is not justified to point at the fact that perhaps in former wars Germany furnished belligerents with war material, because in those former cases the question was not whether any war material was to be furnished to the belligerents but merely which one of the competing countries would furnish it. In the present war, with the exception of the United States, all the countries capable of a noteworthy production of war material are either at war themselves or completing their armaments, and have accordingly prohibited the exportation of war material. Therefore the United States of America is the only country in a position to export war material. This fact ought to give a new meaning to the idea of neutrality, independent of the formal law.
Instead of that, and in contradiction with the real spirit of neutrality, an enormous new industry of war materials of every kind is being built up in the United States, inasmuch as not only the existing plants are kept busy and enlarged, but also new ones are continually founded.
The international agreements for the protection of the right of neutrals originate in the necessity of protecting the existing industries of the neutral countries. They were never intended to encourage the creation of entirely new industries in neutral States, as, for instance, the new war industry in the United States, which supplies only one party of the belligerents.
In reality the American industry is supplying only Germany's enemies. A fact which is in no way modified by the purely theoretical willingness to furnish Germany as well, if it were possible.
If the American people desire to observe true neutrality, they will find means to stop the exclusive exportation of arms to one side, or at least to use this export trade as a means to uphold the legitimate trade with Germany, especially the trade in foodstuffs. This spirit of neutrality should appear the more justified to the United States as it has been maintained toward Mexico.
According to the declaration of a Congressman, made in the House Committee for Foreign Relations Dec. 30, 1914, President Wilson is quoted as having said on Feb. 4, 1914, when the embargo on arms for Mexico was lifted:
"We should stand for genuine neutrality, considering the surrounding facts of the case." He then held in that case, because Carranza had no ports, while Huerta had them and was able to import these materials, that "it was our duty as a nation to treat them (Carranza and Huerta) upon an equality if we wished to observe the true spirit of neutrality as compared with a mere paper neutrality."
This conception of "the true spirit of neutrality," if applied to the present case, would lead to an embargo on arms.
The American Reply
_The following note, which contains a vigorous rebuke to the German Ambassador for the freedom of his remarks on the course taken by the United States toward the belligerent powers, was made public at Washington on April 21, 1916. It was then reported that the note was finally drafted by President Wilson himself and written by him on his own typewriter at the White House, although it is signed by Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State:_
I have given thoughtful consideration to your Excellency's note of the 4th of April, 1915, inclosing a memorandum of the same date, in which your Excellency discusses the action of this Government with regard to trade between the United States and Germany, and the attitude of this Government with regard to the exportation of arms from the United States to the nations now at war with Germany.
I must admit that I am somewhat at a loss how to interpret your Excellency's treatment of these matters. There are many circumstances connected with these important subjects to which I would have expected your Excellency to advert but of which you make no mention, and there are other circumstances to which you do refer which I would have supposed to be hardly appropriate for discussion between the Government of the United States and the Government of Germany.
I shall take the liberty, therefore, of regarding your Excellency's references to the course, pursued by the Government of the United States, with regard to interferences with trade from this country such as the Government of Great Britain have attempted, as intended merely to illustrate more fully the situation to which you desire to call our attention, and not as an invitation to discuss that course.
Your Excellency's long experience in international affairs will have suggested to you that these relations of the two Governments with one another cannot wisely be made a subject of discussion with a third Government, which cannot be fully informed as to the facts, and which cannot be fully cognizant of the reasons for the course pursued.
I believe, however, that I am justified in assuming that what you desire to call forth is a frank statement of the position of this Government in regard to its obligations as a neutral power.
The general attitude and course of policy of this Government in the maintenance of its neutrality I am particularly anxious that your Excellency should see in their true light. I had hoped that this Government's position in these respects had been made abundantly clear, but I am, of course, perfectly willing to state it again.
This seems to me the more necessary and desirable because, I regret to say, the language, which your Excellency employs in your memorandum, is susceptible of being construed as impugning the good faith of the United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral.
I take it for granted that no such implication was intended, but it is so evident that your Excellency is laboring under certain false impressions that I cannot be too explicit in setting forth the facts as they are, when fully reviewed and comprehended.
In the first place, this Government has at no time and in no manner yielded any one of its rights as a neutral to any one of the present belligerents.
It has acknowledged, as a matter of course, the right of visit and search and the right to apply the rules of contraband of war to articles of commerce. It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search as an absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels for vessels owned by any enemy and against mistaking legal cargoes for illegal. It has admitted also the right of blockade if actually exercised and effectively maintained.
These are merely the well-known limitations which war places upon neutral commerce on the high seas. But nothing beyond these has it conceded.
I call your Excellency's attention to this, notwithstanding it is already known to all the world as a consequence of the publication of our correspondence in regard to these matters with several of the belligerent nations, because I cannot assume that you have official cognizance of it.
In the second place, this Government attempted to secure from the German and British Governments mutual concessions with regard to the measures those Governments respectively adopted for the interruption of trade on the high seas. This it did, not of right, but merely as exercising the privileges of a sincere friend of both parties and as indicating its impartial good-will.
The attempt was unsuccessful, but I regret that your Excellency did not deem it worthy of mention in modification of the impressions you expressed. We had hoped that this act on our part had shown our spirit in these times of distressing war, as our diplomatic correspondence had shown our steadfast refusal to acknowledge the right of any belligerent to alter the accepted rules of war at sea in so far as they affect the rights and interests of neutrals.
In the third place, I note with sincere regret that in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, your Excellency seems to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany.
This Government holds, as I believe your Excellency is aware and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality, by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances, urged in your Excellency's memorandum, alters the principle involved.
The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to your Excellency that holding this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this Government to consider such a course.
I hope that your Excellency will realize the spirit in which I am drafting this reply. The friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Germany is so warm and of such long standing, the ties which bind them to one another in amity are so many and so strong, that this Government feels under a special compulsion to speak with perfect frankness, when any occasion arises which seems likely to create any misunderstanding, however slight or temporary, between those who represent the Governments of the two countries.
It will be a matter of gratification to me if I have removed from your Excellency's mind any misapprehension you may have been under regarding either the policy or the spirit and purposes of the Government of the United States.
Its neutrality is founded upon the firm basis of conscience and good-will.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
W.J. BRYAN.
Munitions From Neutrals
[Colloquy in the House of Commons, May 4, 1915.]
Sir E. Grey, in reply to Sir A. Markham, (L., Mansfield,) said: The United States Government have not at any time during the present war supplied any war material of any kind to his Majesty's Government, and I do not suppose that they have supplied any of the belligerents. It has always been a recognized legitimate practice, and wholly consistent with international law, for manufacturers in a neutral country to sell munitions of war to belligerents. They were supplied in this way from Germany to Russia during the Russo-Japanese war, and from Germany to Great Britain during the Boer war, and are no doubt being supplied in the same way from manufacturers in neutral countries to belligerents now.
Mr. MacNeill (N., South Donegal)--Has not the rule always been, before The Hague Conferences at all, that subjects of neutral nations are allowed to supply munitions of war at their own risk?
Sir E. Grey--It is wholly consistent with international law that that practice should go forward, and if there be any question of departure from neutrality I think it will be, not in permitting that practice, but in interfering with it. [Cheers.]
Germany and the Lusitania
By Charles W. Eliot
_President Emeritus of Harvard University._
That the sinking of the Lusitania was an act which outraged not only the existing conventions of the civilized world but the moral feelings of present civilized society is the view put forth in his letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, appearing May 15, 1915, by one of the most distinguished commentators on the war. Dr. Eliot counsels that America's part is to resist such a no-faith policy while keeping its neutral status.
Cambridge, Mass., May 13, 1915.
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
The sinking of a great merchant vessel, carrying 2,500 noncombatant men, women, and children, without giving them any chance to save their lives, was in violation of long-standing conventions among civilized nations, concerning the conduct of naval warfare. The pre-existing conventions gave to a German vessel of war the right to destroy the Lusitania and her cargo, if it were impossible to carry her into port as a prize; but not to drown her passengers and crew. The pre-existing conventions or agreements were, however, entered into by the civilized nations when captures at sea were made by war vessels competent to take a prize into some port, or to take off the passengers and crew of the captured vessel.
The German Government now alleges that submarines are today the only vessels it can employ effectively for attack on British commerce in the declared war zone about the British Isles, since the rest of the German Navy cannot keep the seas in face of the superior British Navy. Germany further alleges that the present British blockade of German ports is conducted in a new way--that is, by vessels which patrol the German coast at a greater distance from the actual harbors than was formerly the international practice; and hence, that Germany is justified in conducting her attack on British commerce in a novel way also. In short, Germany argues that her military necessities compel her to sink enemy commercial vessels without regard to the lives of passengers and crews, in spite of the fact that she was party to international agreements that no such act should be committed.
The lesson which the sinking of the Lusitania teaches is, therefore, this: Germany thinks it right to disregard on grounds of military necessity existing international conventions with regard to naval warfare, precisely as she disregarded the agreed-upon neutrality of Belgium on the ground of military necessity. As in the case of Belgium she had decided many years beforehand to violate the international neutrality agreement, and had made all her plans for reaching Paris in a few weeks by passing through Belgium, so on the sea she had decided months ago that the necessity of interfering as much as possible with British commerce and industries warrants her total disregard of the existing rules of naval warfare, and has deliberately contrived the sinking of merchant vessels without regard to the lives of the people on board.
Again, when Germany thought it necessary on her quick march toward Paris not only to crush the Belgian Army but to terrify the noncombatant population of Belgium into complete submission by bombarding and burning cities, towns, and villages, by plundering and shooting noncombatants, by imposing heavy fines and ransoms, and by holding noncombatants as hostages for the peaceable behavior of all Belgian citizens, she disregarded all the conventions made by the civilized nations within seventy years for mitigating the horrors of war, and justified her action on the ground that it was a military necessity, since in no other way could she immediately secure the safety of her communications as she rushed on Paris. The civilized world had supposed that each nation would make war only on the public forces and resources of its antagonist; but last August Germany made ferocious war on noncombatants and private property.
The sinking of the Lusitania is another demonstration that the present German Government will not abide by any international contracts, treaties, or agreements, if they, at a given moment, would interfere with any military or naval course of action which the Government deems necessary.
These demonstrated policies and purposes of the German Empire raise the fundamental question--how is the civilization of the white race to be carried forward? How are the real welfare of that race and the happiness of the individuals that compose it to be hereafter furthered? Since the revolutions in England, America, and France, it has been supposed that civilization was to be advanced by international agreements or treaties, by the co-operation of the civilized nations in the gradual improvement of these agreements, and by the increasing practical effect given to them by nations acting in co-operation; but now comes the German Empire with its military force, immense in numbers and efficient beyond all former experience through the intelligent use for destructive purposes of the new powers attained by applied science, saying not only in words, but in terrible acts: "We shall not abide by any international contracts or agreements into which we may have previously entered, if at the passing moment they interfere or conflict with the most advantageous immediate use of our military and naval force." If this doctrine shall now prevail in Europe, the foundations of modern civilization and of all friendly and beneficial commerce the world over will be undermined.
The sinking of the Lusitania, therefore, makes perfectly clear the nature of the problem with which the three Allies in Europe are now struggling. They are resisting with all the weapons of war a nation which declares that its promises are good only till it is, in its own judgment, under the military necessity of breaking them.
The neutral nations are looking on at this tremendous conflict between good-faith nations and no-faith nations with intense anxiety and sorrow, but no longer in any doubt as to the nature of the issue. The sinking of the Lusitania has removed every doubt; because that was a deliberate act in full sight of the world, and of a nature not to be obscured or confused by conflicting testimonies or questions about possible exaggeration of outrages or about official responsibility for them. The sinking of the Lusitania was an act which outraged not only the existing conventions of the civilized world in regard to naval warfare, but the moral feelings of present civilized society.
The neutral nations and some of the belligerent nations feel another strong objection to the present German way of conducting war on land and sea, namely that it brutalizes the soldier and the sailor to an unprecedented degree. English French, and Russian soldiers on the one side can contend with German, Austrian and Turkish soldiers on the other with the utmost fierceness from trenches or in the open, use new and old weapons of destruction, and kill and wound each other with equal ardor and resolution, and yet not be brutalized or degraded in their moral nature, if they fight from love of country or with self-sacrificing loyalty to its spiritual ideals; but neither soldiers nor sailors can attack defenseless noncombatants, systematically destroy towns and villages, and put to death captured men, women, and children without falling in their moral nature before the brutes. That he obeyed orders will not save from moral ruin the soldier or sailor who does such deeds. He should have refused to obey such orders and taken the consequences. This is true even of the privates, but more emphatically of the officers. The white race has often been proud of the way in which its soldiers and sailors have fought in many causes--good, bad, and indifferent; because they fought bravely took defeat resolutely, and showed humanity after victory. The German method of conducting war omits chivalry, mercy, and humanity, and thereby degrades the German Nation and any other nation which sympathizes with it or supports its methods. It is no answer to the world's objection to the sinking of the Lusitania that Great Britain uses its navy to cut off from Germany food and needed supplies for its industries, for that is a recognized and effective method of warfare; whereas the sinking of an occasional merchant ship with its passengers and crew is a method of warfare nowhere effective, and almost universally condemned. If war, with its inevitable stratagems, ambuscades, and lies must continue to be the arbiter in international disputes, it is certainly desirable that such magnanimity in war as the conventions of the last century made possible should not be lost because of Germany's behavior in the present European convulsion. It is also desirable to reaffirm with all possible emphasis that fidelity to international agreements is the taproot of human progress.
On the supposition that the people of the United States have learned the lesson of the Lusitania, so far as an understanding of the issues at stake in this gigantic war is concerned, can they also get from it any guidance in regard to their own relation to the fateful struggle? Apparently, not yet. With practical unanimity the American people will henceforth heartily desire the success of the Allies, and the decisive defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. With practical unanimity they will support whatever action the Administration at Washington shall decide to take in the immediate emergency; but at present they do not feel that they know whether they can best promote the defeat of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey by remaining neutral or by taking active part in the conflict. Unless a dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is brought about by Italy and Rumania or some other Balkan State entering the war on the side of the Allies, it now seems as if neither party would acknowledge defeat until exhausted or brought to a sudden moral collapse. Exhaustion in war can best be prevented by maintaining in activity the domestic industries and general productiveness of the nation involved in war and those of the neutral nations which are in position to feed it, and manufacture for it munitions, clothing, and the other supplies that war demands. While remaining strictly neutral, North and South America can be of great service to the Allies. To be sure, as a neutral the United States will be obliged to give some aid to Germany and her allies, such, for example, as harboring the interned commercial fleet of Germany; but this aid will be comparatively insignificant. The services which the American republics can thus render to the cause of liberty and civilization are probably more considerable than any they could render by direct contributions of military or naval force. Kept free from the drain of war, the republics will be better able to supply food, clothing, munitions, and money to the Allies both during the war and after the conclusion of peace.
On the whole, the wisest thing the neutral nations can do, which are remote from the theatres of war, and have no territorial advantages to seek at the coming of peace, is probably to defend vigorously and with the utmost sincerity and frankness all the existing rights of neutrals. By acting thus in the present case they will promote national righteousness and hinder national depravity, discourage, for the future, domination by any single great power in any part of the world, and help the cause of civilization by strengthening the just liberty and independence of many nations--large and small, and of different capacities and experiences--which may reasonably hope, if the Prussian terror can be abolished, to live together in peaceful co-operation for the common good.
Appeals for American Defense
Need of Further Protecting Neutral Rights Set Forth.
By GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
_Formerly United States Attorney General._
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
The destruction of the Lusitania by the Germans, and the wanton killing of American men, women, and children, without warning, brings sharply before the American people the question of how long the present sexless policy of the conduct of our affairs is to be continued. Germany has apparently decided to run amuck with civilization. It is now for the American people to decide whether this nation has any virility left, or if it is content to sink to the level of China.
A very clear course, it seems to me, is open for us to pursue: We should cancel all diplomatic relations with a country which has declared war upon civilization, recall our Ambassador from Berlin, and hand Count Bernstorff his passports. Congress should be summoned in extra session, and an appropriation of at least $250,000,000 asked to put us in a condition to protect our rights as a neutral civilized power. At the same time we should invite all neutral nations of the world to join us in a council of civilization to agree upon the steps to be taken to protect the interests of all neutral powers and their citizens from such wanton acts of destruction of life and property as those which Germany has been committing and which have culminated in the destruction of the Lusitania and of so many of her passengers.
Until now the National Administration has been proceeding not only on the basis of "safety first," but of safety first, last, and all the time. The time has arrived when we must remember the truth of what Lowell so well expressed, that
'Tis man's perdition to be safe, when for the truth he ought to die.
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE.
[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 11, 1915.]
_The army, navy, and coast defenses of the United States are declared to be inadequate in an open letter signed by Joseph H. Choate, Alton B. Parker, Henry L. Stimson, and S. Stanwood Menken, which was given out yesterday in support of the plans of the National Security League. This organization, which maintains offices at 31 Pine Street, has embarked on a national campaign for better war defenses, and its appeal for members and supporters is expressed by the catch-phrase, "a first defense army of 1,000,000 workers."_
_The letter of Messrs. Choate, Parker, Stimson, and Menken contains most of the arguments put forth by the league in asking public support and enrollment. Its text follows:_
Careful investigation by our committees who have looked into the question of national defense brings to light the following conditions of affairs:
According to official Government reports, there are barely 30,000 mobile troops in continental United States. These are distributed among fifty-two widely scattered posts, which would make it impossible to mobilize quickly at any given point. Even this small force is short of officers, ammunition, and equipment. Furthermore, it has no organized reserve.
Our National Guard, with negligible exceptions, is far below its paper strength in men, equipment, and efficiency.
Our coast defenses are inadequate, our fortifications insufficiently manned and without adequate organized reserves.
Our navy is neither adequate nor prepared for war. This, our first line of defense, is inadequately manned, short of ammunition, and has no organized reserve of trained men. Our submarine flotilla exists chiefly upon paper. Fast scout cruisers, battle cruisers, aeroplanes, mine layers, supply ships, and transports are lacking. Target practice has been neglected or altogether omitted.
In view of this condition of affairs, and since there is no assurance that the United States will not again become involved in war, "and since a peaceful policy even when supported by treaties, is not a sufficient guarantee against war, of which the subjugation of Belgium and the present coercion of China by a foreign power are noteworthy examples; and the United States cannot safely intrust the maintenance of its institutions and nationality to the mere negations of peace, and since we are not adequately prepared to maintain our national policies, and since the present defenseless condition of the nation is due to the failure of Congress not only to follow the carefully considered plans of our naval and military advisers, but also to provide any reasonable measure for gradually putting such plans into practice, it is manifest that until a workable plan for a world alliance has been evolved and agreed to by the principal nations, with proper guarantee of good faith, the United States must undertake adequate military preparations for its defense."
In the meantime the National Security League feels impelled to call public attention to our deplorable condition of unpreparedness. At the same time the league issues an appeal for public support in behalf of the following program for better national defense:
1. Legislation correcting present wasteful methods of military appropriations and disbursement.
2. Adoption of a definite military policy.
3. A stronger, better balanced navy.
4. An effective mobile army.
5. Larger and better equipped National Guard.
6. The creation of an organized reserve for each branch of our military service.
All those interested in the work of the league are invited to send their names and contributions to the National Security League, 31 Pine Street, New York City.
[The letter is addressed to "present and former members of the Cabinet, to members of Congress, to Governors of our States and Territories, to Mayors of all American cities, to Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade, to merchants' associations, to colleges and universities, to university clubs and alumni associations, to all patriotic organizations, to all women's clubs, and to all American citizens."
"Until a satisfactory plan of disarmament has been worked out and agreed upon by the nations of the world," says a statement, "the United States must be adequately prepared to defend itself against invasion. A military equipment sufficient for this purpose can be had without recourse to militarism. The league was formed as a preparation not for war, but against war."]
BY THE NAVY LEAGUE.
[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 1915.]
The Navy League of the United States, of which General Horace Porter is President and which includes in its membership Herbert L. Satterlee, George von L. Meyer, Beekman Winthrop, J. Pierpont Morgan, Governor Emmet O'Neal of Alabama, Senator James D. Phelan of California, Cardinal Gibbons, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Edward T. Stotesbury, Benjamin Ide Wheeler, Joseph H. Choate, George B. Cortelyou, C. Oliver Iselin, Seth Low, Myron T. Herrick, Alton B. Parker, and scores of other men prominent in the public and business life of the country, through its Executive Committee adopted a resolution yesterday calling upon President Wilson to call Congress in extra session to authorize a bond issue of $500,000,000, which sum, it is stated, is "needed to provide this country with adequate means of naval defense."
The resolution, which was adopted at a session at which members of the Executive Committee consulted by long-distance telephone, some of them being in Washington and others in New York at the Union League Club, read:
"In view of the crisis in our foreign relations, we, as representatives of the Navy League of the United States, express our emphatic belief that Congress should be immediately assembled and that measures should be taken at once to strengthen our national defense. Our most pacific country should, because of its supreme love of peace, possess preponderant naval strength and adequate military strength. A large bond issue of, if necessary, $500,000,000 should be authorized at once. These bonds would be rapidly absorbed by the American people for such a purpose. Equipped with a mighty fleet, American life and American rights would be scrupulously respected by all belligerents. In such case there would be no thought of our entering into war.
"GENERAL HORACE PORTER, President;
"ROBERT M. THOMPSON, Chairman Executive Committee;
"CHARLES A. FOWLER,
"PERRY BELMONT,
"JOHN C. O'LAUGHLIN,
"FRANK J. SYMES."
The Drowned Sailor
By MAURICE HEWLETT.
[From "Sing Songs of the War."]
Last night I saw my true love stand All shadowy by my bed. He had my locket in his hand; I knew that he was dead.
"Sweetheart, why stand you there so fast, Why stand you there so grave?" "I think," said he, "this hour's the last That you and I can have.
"You gave me this from your fair breast, It's never left me yet; And now it dares not seek the nest Because it is so wet.
"The cold gray sea has covered it, Deep in the sand it lies; While over me the long weeds flit And veil my staring eyes.
"And there are German sailors laid Beside me in the deep; We have no need of gun nor blade, United in our sleep."
"Dear heart, dear heart, come to my bed, My arms are warm and sweet!" "Alack for you, my love," he said, "My limbs would wet the sheet.
"Cold is the bed that I lie on And deep beneath the swell; No voice is left to make my moan And bid my love farewell."
Now I am widow that was wife-- Would God that they could prove What law should rule, without the strife That's robbed me of my love!
War With Poisonous Gases
The Gap at Ypres Made by German Chlorine Vapor Bombs
Reports by the Official "Eyewitness"
and
Dr. J.S. Haldane, F.R.S.
_Dr. John Scott Haldane, F.R.S., who has conducted the investigation for the British War Office, is a brother of Lord Haldane. He is a graduate in medicine of Edinburgh University and an M.A. of Oxford and an LL.D. of Birmingham. For many years he has been engaged in scientific investigation, and has contributed largely to the elucidation of the causes of death in colliery and mine explosions He is the author of a work on the physiology of respiration and air analysis._
_Professor Baker, F.R.S., who is carrying out chemical investigations into the nature of the gases, is Professor of Chemistry in the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London. He was a Scholar in Natural Science at Balliol. He has conducted important experiments into the nature of gases._
_Sir Wilmot Herringham, M.D. Oxon., is a physician to St. Bartholomew's Hospital and Vice Chancellor of the London University._
_Lieutenant McNee, M.B., M. Ch. Glasgow, a Carnegie Research Fellow, is assistant to the Professor of Pathology in Glasgow University and has conducted many investigations of an important character in pathology and chemical pathology._
General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force, April 27, 1915.
To Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.
My Lord: I have the honor to report that, as requested by you yesterday morning, I proceeded to France to investigate the nature and effects of the asphyxiating gas employed in the recent fighting by the German troops. After reporting myself at General Headquarters I proceeded to Bailleul with Sir Wilmot Herringham, Consulting Physician to the British Force, and examined with him several men from Canadian battalions who were at the No. 2 Casualty Clearing Station suffering from the effects of the gas.
These men were lying struggling for breath and blue in the face. On examining the blood with the spectroscope and by other means, I ascertained that the blueness was not due to the presence of any abnormal pigment. There was nothing to account for the blueness (cyanosis) and struggle for air but the one fact that they were suffering from acute bronchitis, such as is caused by inhalation of an irritant gas. Their statements were that when in the trenches they had been overwhelmed by an irritant gas produced in front of the German trenches and carried toward them by a gentle breeze.
One of them died shortly after our arrival. A post-mortem examination was conducted in our presence by Lieutenant McNee, a pathologist by profession, of Glasgow University. The examination showed that death was due to acute bronchitis and its secondary effects. There was no doubt that the bronchitis and accompanying slow asphyxiation were due to the irritant gas.
Lieutenant McNee had also examined yesterday the body of a Canadian Sergeant who had died in the clearing station from the effects of the gas. In this case, also, very acute bronchitis and oedema of the lungs caused death by asphyxiation.
A deposition by Captain Bertram, Eighth Canadian Battalion, was carefully taken down by Lieutenant McNee. Captain Bertram was then in the clearing station, suffering from the effects of the gas and from a wound. From a support trench, about 600 yards from the German lines, he had observed the gas. He saw, first of all, a white smoke arising from the German trenches to a height of about three feet. Then in front of the white smoke appeared a greenish cloud, which drifted along the ground to our trenches, not rising more than about seven feet from the ground when it reached our first trenches. Men in these trenches were obliged to leave, and a number of them were killed by the effects of the gas. We made a counter-attack about fifteen minutes after the gas came over, and saw twenty-four men lying dead from the effects of the gas on a small stretch of road leading from the advanced trenches to the supports. He was himself much affected by the gas still present, and felt as if he could not breathe.
The symptoms and the other facts so far ascertained point to the use by the German troops of chlorine or bromine for purposes of asphyxiation.
There are also facts pointing to the use in German shells of other irritant substances, though in some cases at least these agents are not of the same brutally barbarous character as the gas used in the attack on the Canadians. The effects are not those of any of the ordinary products of combustion of explosives. On this point the symptoms described left not the slightest doubt in my mind.
Professor H.B. Baker, F.R.S., who accompanied me, is making further inquiries from the chemical side.
I am, my Lord, your obedient servant,
J.S. HALDANE.
_The following announcement was issued by the British War Office on April 29, 1915:_
Thanks to the magnificent response already made to the appeal in the press for respirators for the troops, the War Office is in a position to announce that no further respirators need be made.
THE "EYEWITNESS" STORY.
_The following descriptive account was communicated by the British Official Eyewitness present with General Headquarters, supplementing his continuous narrative of the movements of the British force and the French armies in immediate touch with it:_
April 27, 1915.
Since the last summary there has been a sudden development in the situation on our front, and very heavy fighting has taken place to the north and northeast of Ypres, which can be said to have assumed the importance of a second battle for that town. With the aid of a method of warfare up to now never employed by nations sufficiently civilized to consider themselves bound by international agreements solemnly ratified by themselves, and favored by the atmospheric conditions, the Germans have put into effect an attack which they had evidently contemplated and prepared for some time.
Before the battle began our line in this quarter ran from the cross-roads at Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke on the Ypres-Moorslede Road to the cross-roads half a mile north of St. Julien, on the Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, roughly following the crest of what is known as the Grafenstafel Ridge. The French prolonged the line west of the Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, whence their trenches ran around the north of Langemarck to Steenstraate on the Yperlee Canal. The area covered by the initial attack is that between the canal and the Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, though it was afterward extended to the west of the canal and to the east of the road.
An effort on the part of the Germans in this direction was not unexpected, since movements of troops and transport behind their front line had been detected for some days. Its peculiar and novel nature, however, was a surprise which was largely responsible for the measure of success achieved. Taking advantage of the fact that at this season of the year the wind not infrequently blows from the north, they secretly brought up apparatus for emitting asphyxiating vapor or gas, and distributed it along the section of their front line opposite that of our allies, west of Langemarck, which faced almost due north. Their plan was to make a sudden onslaught southwestward, which, if successful, might enable them to gain the crossings on the canal south of Bixschoote and place them well behind the British left in a position to threaten Ypres.
The attack was originally fixed for Tuesday, the 20th, but since all chances of success depended on the action of the asphyxiating vapor it was postponed, the weather being unfavorable. On Thursday, the 22d, the wind blew steadily from the north, and that afternoon, all being ready, the Germans put their plan into execution. Since then events have moved so rapidly and the situation has moved so frequently that it is difficult to give a consecutive and clear story of what happened, but the following account represents as nearly as can be the general course of events. The details of the gas apparatus employed by them are given separately, as also those of the asphyxiating grenades, bombs, and shells of which they have been throwing hundreds.
At some time between 4 and 5 P.M. the Germans started operations by releasing gases with the result that a cloud of poisonous vapor rolled swiftly before the wind from their trenches toward those of the French west of Langemarck, held by a portion of the French Colonial Division. Allowing sufficient time for the fumes to take full effect on the troops facing them, the Germans charged forward over the practically unresisting enemy in their immediate front, and, penetrating through the gap thus created, pressed on silently and swiftly to the south and west. By their sudden irruption they were able to overrun and surprise a large proportion of the French troops billeted behind the front line in this area and to bring some of the French guns as well as our own under a hot rifle fire at close range.
The first intimation that all was not well to the north was conveyed to our troops holding the left of the British line between 5 and 6 P.M. by the withdrawal of some of the French Colonials and the sight of the wall of vapor following them. Our flank being thus exposed the troops were ordered to retire on St. Julien, with their left parallel to but to the west of the highroad. The splendid resistance of these troops, who saved the situation, has already been mentioned by the Commander in Chief.
Meanwhile, apparently waiting till their infantry had penetrated well behind the Allies' line, the Germans had opened a hot artillery fire upon the various tactical points to the north of Ypres, the bombardment being carried out with ordinary high-explosive shell and shrapnel of various calibres and also with projectiles containing asphyxiating gas. About this period our men in reserve near Ypres, seeing the shells bursting, had gathered in groups, discussing the situation and questioning some scattered bodies of Turcos who had appeared; suddenly a staff officer rode up shouting "Stand to your arms," and in a few minutes the troops had fallen in and were marching northward to the scene of the fight.
Nothing more impressive can be imagined than the sight of our men falling in quietly in perfect order on their alarm posts amid the scene of wild confusion caused by the panic-stricken refugees who swarmed along the roads.
In the meantime, to the north and northeast of the town, a confused fight was taking place, which gave proof not only of great gallantry and steadiness on the part of the troops referred to above, but of remarkable presence of mind on the part of their leaders. Behind the wall of vapor, which had swept across fields, through woods, and over hedgerows, came the German firing line, the men's mouths and noses, it is stated, protected by pads soaked in a solution of bicarbonate of soda. Closely following them again came the supports. These troops, hurrying forward with their formation somewhat broken up by the obstacles encountered in their path, looked like a huge mob bearing down upon the town. A battery of 4.7-inch guns a little beyond the left of our line was surprised and overwhelmed by them in a moment. Further to the rear and in a more easterly direction were several field batteries, and before they could come into action the Germans were within a few hundred yards. Not a gun, however, was lost.
One battery, taken in flank, swung around, fired on the enemy at point-blank range, and checked the rush. Another opened fire with the guns pointing in almost opposite directions, the enemy being on three sides of them. It was under the very heavy cannonade opened about this time by the Germans, and threatened by the advance of vastly superior numbers, that our infantry on our left steadily, and without any sign of confusion, slowly retired to St. Julien, fighting every step.
Help was not long in arriving, for some of our reserves near Ypres had stood to arms as soon as they were aware of the fact that the French line had been forced, and the officers on their own initiative, without waiting for orders, led them forward to meet the advancing enemy, who, by this time, were barely two miles from the town. These battalions attacked the Germans with the bayonet, and then ensued a mêlée, in which our men more than held their own, both sides losing very heavily.
One German battalion seems to have been especially severely handled, the Colonel being captured among several other prisoners. Other reinforcements were thrown in as they came up, and, when night fell, the fighting continued by moonlight, our troops driving back the enemy by repeated bayonet charges, in the course of which our heavy guns were recaptured.
By then the situation was somewhat restored in the area immediately north of Ypres. Further to the west, however, the enemy had forced their way over the canal, occupying Steenstraate and the crossing at Het Sast, about three-quarters of a mile south of the former place, and had established themselves at various points on the west bank. All night long the shelling continued, and about 1:30 A.M. two heavy attacks were made on our line in the neighborhood of Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke. These were both repulsed. The bombardment of Ypres itself and its neighborhood had by now redoubled in intensity and a part of the town was in flames.
In the early morning of Friday, the 23d, we delivered a strong counter-attack northward in co-operation with the French. Our advance progressed for some little distance, reaching the edge of the wood about half a mile west of St. Julien and penetrating it. Here our men got into the Germans with the bayonet, and the latter suffered heavily. The losses were also severe on our side, for the advance had to be carried out across the open. But in spite of this nothing could exceed the dash with which it was conducted. One man--and his case is typical of the spirit shown by the troops--who had had his rifle smashed by a bullet, continued to fight with an intrenching tool. Even many of the wounded made their way out of the fight with some article of German equipment as a memento.
About 11 A.M., not being able to progress further, our troops dug themselves in, the line then running from St. Julien practically due west for about a mile, whence it curved southwestward before turning north to the canal near Boesinghe. Broadly speaking, on the section of the front then occupied by us the result of the operations had been to remove to some extent the wedge which the Germans had driven into the allied line, and the immediate danger was over. During the afternoon our counter-attack made further progress south of Pilkem, thus straightening the line still more. Along the canal the fighting raged fiercely, our allies making some progress here and there. During the night, however, the Germans captured Lizerne, a village on the main road from Ypres to Steenstraate.
When the morning of the 24th came the situation remained much the same, but the enemy, who had thrown several bridges across the canal, continued to gain ground to the west. On our front the Germans, under cover of their gas, made a further attack between 3 and 4 A.M. to the east of St. Julien and forced back a portion of our line. Nothing else in particular occurred until about mid-day, when large bodies of the enemy were seen advancing down the Ypres-Poelcapelle road toward St. Julien. Soon after a very strong attack developed against that village and the section of the line east of it. Under the pressure of these fresh masses our troops were compelled to fall back, contesting every inch of ground and making repeated counter-attacks; but until late at night a gallant handful, some 200 to 300 strong, held out in St. Julien. During the night the line was re-established north of the hamlet of Fortuin, about 700 yards further to the rear. All this time the fighting along the canal continued, the enemy forcing their way across near Boesinghe, and holding Het Sast, Steenstraate, and Lizerne strongly. The French counter-attacked in the afternoon, captured fifty prisoners, and made some further progress toward Pilkem. The Germans, however, were still holding the west bank firmly, although the Belgian artillery had broken the bridge behind them at Steenstraate.
On the morning of Sunday, the fourth day of the battle, we made a strong counter-attack on St. Julien, which gained some ground but was checked in front of the village. To the west of it we reached a point a few hundred yards south of the wood which had been the objective on the 23d and which we had had to relinquish subsequently. In the afternoon the Germans made repeated assaults in great strength on our line near Broodseinde. These were backed up by a tremendous artillery bombardment and the throwing of asphyxiating bombs; but all were beaten off with great slaughter to the enemy, and forty-five prisoners fell into our hands. When night came the situation remained unchanged.
This determined offensive on the part of the enemy, although it has menaced Ypres itself, has not so far the appearance of a great effort to break through the line and capture the Channel ports, such as that made in October. Its initial success was gained by the surprise rendered possible by the use of a device which Germany pledged herself not to employ. The only result upon our troops has been to fill them with an even greater determination to punish the enemy and to make him pay tenfold for every act of "frightfulness" he has perpetrated.
Along the rest of the British front nothing of special importance has occurred.
WHAT THE GERMANS SAY.
_The comments of the German newspapers on the advance of the imperial army north of Ypres readily admitted and justified the use of asphyxiating gases. The leading Prussian military organ, the Kreuz Zeitung, said:_
The moral success of our victory is quite upon a level with its strategic value. It has again been proved that in the west also we are at any time in a position to take the offensive, and that, notwithstanding their most violent efforts, it is impossible for the English and the French to throw back or to break through our battle line.
_In another article the Kreuz Zeitung said:_
When the French report says that we used a large number of asphyxiating bombs, our enemies may infer from this that they always are making a mistake when by their behavior they cause us to have recourse to new technical weapons.
_Dealing with the same subject in a leading article, the Frankfurter Zeitung declared:_
It is quite possible that our bombs and shells made it impossible for the enemy to remain in his trenches and artillery positions, and it is even probable that missiles which emit poisonous gases have actually been used by us, since the German leaders have made it plain that, as an answer to the treacherous missiles which have been used by the English and the French for many weeks past, we, too, shall employ gas bombs or whatever they are called. The German leaders pointed out that considerably more effective materials were to be expected from German chemistry, and they were right.
But, however destructive these bombs and shells may have been, do the English and the other people think that it makes a serious difference whether hundreds of guns and howitzers throw hundreds of thousands of shells on a single tiny spot in order to destroy and break to atoms everything living there, and to make the German trenches into a terrible hell as was the case at Neuve Chapelle, or whether we throw a few shells which spread death in the air? These shells are not more deadly than the poison of English explosives, but they take effect over a wider area, produce a rapid end, and spare the torn bodies the tortures and pains of death.
_The Frankfurter Zeitung then compared the results achieved as follows:_
The shells of Neuve Chapelle cost the Germans a trench and a village, but on the edge of the ruin the German ring remained firm and strong. How was it at Ypres? The enemy was thrown back on a front of more than five and a half miles. Along this whole front we gained two miles. These figures would signify little in comparison with the distance to the sea, but our next goal is Ypres, and on the north we are now only a few kilometers from this stronghold.
_The Cologne Gazette referred to Sir John French's reports as follows:_
It is delightful to read the complaints about the use of shells containing asphyxiating gases. This sounds particularly well out of the mouth of the Commander in Chief of a nation which for centuries past has trodden every provision of international law under foot.
The Canadians at Ypres
[From the Canadian Record Officer.]
_The full narrative of the part played by the Canadians at Ypres is given in a communication from the Record Officer now serving with the Canadian Division at the front and published in the British press on May 1, 1915. The division was commanded by a distinguished English General, but these "amateur soldiers of Canada," as the narrator describes them, were officered largely by lawyers, college professors, and business men who before the war were neither disciplined nor trained. Many striking deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice were performed in the course of their brilliant charge and dogged resistance, which, in the words of Sir John French, "saved the situation" in the face of overwhelming odds._
On April 22 the Canadian Division held a line of, roughly, 5,000 yards, extending in a northwesterly direction from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to the Ypres-Poelcapelle road, and connecting at its terminus with the French troops. The division consisted of three infantry brigades in addition to the artillery brigades. Of the infantry brigades the First was in reserve, the Second was on the right, and the Third established contact with the Allies at the point indicated above.
The day was a peaceful one, warm and sunny, and except that the previous day had witnessed a further bombardment of the stricken town of Ypres, everything seemed quiet in front of the Canadian line. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon a plan, carefully prepared, was put into execution against our French allies on the left. Asphyxiating gas of great intensity was projected into their trenches, probably by means of force pumps and pipes laid out under the parapets. The fumes, aided by a favorable wind, floated backward, poisoning and disabling over an extended area those who fell under their effect.
The result was that the French were compelled to give ground for a considerable distance. The glory which the French Army has won in this war would make it impertinent to labor the compelling nature of the poisonous discharges under which the trenches were lost. The French did, as every one knew they would do, all that stout soldiers could do, and the Canadian Division, officers and men, look forward to many occasions in the future in which they will stand side by side with the brave armies of France.
The immediate consequences of this enforced withdrawal were, of course, extremely grave. The Third Brigade of the Canadian Division was without any left, or, in other words, its left was in the air. Rough diagrams may make the position clear.
It became imperatively necessary greatly to extend the Canadian lines to the left rear. It was not, of course, practicable to move the First Brigade from reserve at a moment's notice, and the line, extending from 5,000 to 9,000 yards, was naturally not the line that had been held by the Allies at 5 o'clock, and a gap still existed on its left. The new line, of which our recent point of contact with the French formed the apex, ran quite roughly as follows:
As shown above, it became necessary for Brig. Gen. Turner, commanding the Third Brigade, to throw back his left flank southward to protect his rear. In the course of the confusion which followed upon the readjustments of position, the enemy, who had advanced rapidly after his initial successes, took four British 4.7 guns in a small wood to the west of the village of St. Julien, two miles in the rear of the original French trenches.
The story of the second battle of Ypres is the story of how the Canadian Division, enormously outnumbered--for they had in front of them at least four divisions supported by immensely heavy artillery--with a gap still existing, though reduced, in their lines, and with dispositions made hurriedly under the stimulus of critical danger, fought through the day and through the night, and then through another day and night; fought under their officers until, as happened to so many, those perished gloriously, and then fought from the impulsion of sheer valor because they came from fighting stock.
The enemy, of course, was aware--whether fully or not may perhaps be doubted--of the advantage his breach in the line had given him, and immediately began to push a formidable series of attacks upon the whole of the newly-formed Canadian salient. If it is possible to distinguish when the attack was everywhere so fierce, it developed with particular intensity at this moment upon the apex of the newly formed line, running in the direction of St. Julien.
It has already been stated that four British guns were taken in a wood comparatively early in the evening of the 22d. In the course of that night, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire, this wood was assaulted by the Canadian Scottish, Sixteenth Battalion of the Third Brigade, and the Tenth Battalion of the Second Brigade, which was intercepted for this purpose on its way to a reserve trench. The battalions were respectively commanded by Lieut. Col. Leckie and Lieut. Col. Boyle, and after a most fierce struggle in the light of a misty moon they took the position at the point of the bayonet. At midnight the Second Battalion, under Colonel Watson, and the Toronto Regiment, Queen's Own, Third Battalion, under Lieut. Col. Rennie, both of the First Brigade, brought up much-needed reinforcement, and though not actually engaged in the assault were in reserve.
All through the following days and nights these battalions shared the fortunes and misfortunes of the Third Brigade. An officer who took part in the attack describes how the men about him fell under the fire of the machine guns, which, in his phrase, played upon them "like a watering pot." He added quite simply, "I wrote my own life off." But the line never wavered. When one man fell another took his place, and with a final shout the survivors of the two battalions flung themselves into the wood. The German garrison was completely demoralized, and the impetuous advance of the Canadians did not cease until they reached the far side of the wood and intrenched themselves there in the position so dearly gained. They had, however, the disappointment of finding that the guns had been blown up by the enemy, and later on in the same night a most formidable concentration of artillery fire, sweeping the wood as a tropical storm sweeps the leaves from a forest, made it impossible for them to hold the position for which they had sacrificed so much.
The fighting continued without intermission all through the night, and, to those who observed the indications that the attack was being pushed with ever-growing strength, it hardly seemed possible that the Canadians, fighting in positions so difficult to defend and so little the subject of deliberate choice, could maintain their resistance for any long period. At 6 A.M. on Friday it became apparent that the left was becoming more and more involved, and a powerful German attempt to outflank it developed rapidly. The consequences, if it had been broken or outflanked, need not be insisted upon. They were not merely local.
It was therefore decided, formidable as the attempt undoubtedly was, to try and give relief by a counter-attack upon the first line of German trenches, now far, far advanced from those originally occupied by the French. This was carried out by the Ontario First and Fourth Battalions of the First Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Mercer, acting in combination with a British brigade.
It is safe to say that the youngest private in the rank, as he set his teeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngest subaltern knew all that rested upon its success. It did not seem that any human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which began to play upon the advancing troops. They suffered terrible casualties. For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was pressed ever closer and closer.
The Fourth Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly withering fire. For a moment--not more--it wavered. Its most gallant commanding officer, Lieut. Col. Burchill, carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men and, at the very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of his battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward, (for, indeed, they loved him,) as if to avenge his death. The astonishing attack which followed--pushed home in the face of direct frontal fire made in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live for ever in the memories of soldiers--was carried to the first line of German trenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle the last German who resisted was bayoneted, and the trench was won.
The measure of this success may be taken when it is pointed out that this trench represented in the German advance the apex in the breach which the enemy had made in the original line of the Allies, and that it was two and a half miles south of that line. This charge, made by men who looked death indifferently in the face, (for no man who took part in it could think that he was likely to live,) saved, and that was much, the Canadian left. But it did more. Up to the point where the assailants conquered, or died, it secured and maintained during the most critical moment of all the integrity of the allied line. For the trench was not only taken, it was held thereafter against all comers, and in the teeth of every conceivable projectile, until the night of Sunday, the 25th, when all that remained of the war-broken but victorious battalions was relieved by fresh troops.
It is necessary now to return to the fortunes of the Third Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Turner, which, as we have seen, at 5 o'clock on Thursday was holding the Canadian left, and after the first attack assumed the defense of the new Canadian salient, at the same time sparing all the men it could to form an extemporized line between the wood and St. Julien. This brigade also was at the first moment of the German offensive, made the object of an attack by the discharge of poisonous gas. The discharge was followed by two enemy assaults. Although the fumes were extremely poisonous, they were not, perhaps having regard to the wind, so disabling as on the French lines, (which ran almost east to west,) and the brigade, though affected by the fumes, stoutly beat back the two German assaults.
Encouraged by this success, it rose to the supreme effort required by the assault on the wood, which has already been described. At 4 o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 23d, a fresh emission of gas was made both upon the Second Brigade, which held the line running northeast, and upon the Third Brigade, which, as has been fully explained, had continued the line up to the pivotal point, as defined above, and had then spread down in a southeasterly direction. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that two privates of the Forty-eighth Highlanders who found their way into the trenches commanded by Colonel Lipsett, Ninetieth Winnipeg Rifles, Eighth Battalion, perished in the fumes, and it was noticed that their faces became blue immediately after dissolution.
The Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and the Forty-eighth Highlanders, Fifteenth Battalion, were more especially affected by the discharge. The Royal Highlanders, though considerably shaken, remained immovable upon their ground. The Forty-eighth Highlanders, which, no doubt, received a more poisonous discharge, was for the moment dismayed, and, indeed, their trench, according to the testimony of very hardened soldiers, became intolerable. The battalion retired from the trench, but for a very short distance, and for an equally short time. In a few moments they were again their own men. They advanced upon and occupied the trenches which they had momentarily abandoned.
In the course of the same night the Third Brigade, which had already displayed a resource, a gallantry, and a tenacity for which no eulogy could be excessive, was exposed (and with it the whole allied case) to a peril still more formidable.
It has been explained, and, indeed, the fundamental situation made the peril clear, that several German divisions were attempting to crush or drive back this devoted brigade, and in any event to use their enormous numerical superiority to sweep around and overwhelm its left wing. At some point in the line which cannot be precisely determined the last attempt partially succeeded, and in the course of this critical struggle German troops in considerable though not in overwhelming numbers swung past the unsupported left of the brigade, and, slipping in between the wood and St. Julien, added to the torturing anxieties of the long-drawn struggle by the appearance, and indeed for the moment the reality, of isolation from the brigade base.
In the exertions made by the Third Brigade during this supreme crisis it is almost impossible to single out one battalion without injustice to others, but though the efforts of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, were only equal to those of the other battalions who did such heroic service, it so happened by chance that the fate of some of its officers attracted special attention.
Major Norsworth, already almost disabled by a bullet wound, was bayoneted and killed while he was rallying his men with easy cheerfulness. The case of Captain McCuaig, of the same battalion, was not less glorious, although his death can claim no witness. This most gallant officer was seriously wounded, in a hurriedly constructed trench, at a moment when it would have been possible to remove him to safety. He absolutely refused to move and continued in the discharge of his duty.
But the situation grew constantly worse, and peremptory orders were received for an immediate withdrawal. Those who were compelled to obey them were most insistent to carry with them, at whatever risk to their own mobility and safety, an officer to whom they were devotedly attached. But he, knowing, it may be, better than they, the exertions which still lay in front of them, and unwilling to inflict upon them the disabilities of a maimed man, very resolutely refused, and asked of them one thing only, that there should be given to him, as he lay alone in the trench, two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which lay in his right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolvers ready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life, wounded and racked with pain, in an abandoned trench.
On Friday afternoon the left of the Canadian line was strengthened by important reinforcements of British troops amounting to seven battalions. From this time forward the Canadians also continued to receive further assistance on the left from a series of French counter-attacks pushed in a northeasterly direction from the canal bank.
But the artillery fire of the enemy continually grew in intensity, and it became more and more evident that the Canadian salient could no longer be maintained against the overwhelming superiority of numbers by which it was assailed. Slowly, stubbornly, and contesting every yard, the defenders gave ground until the salient gradually receded from the apex, near the point where it had originally aligned with the French, and fell back upon St. Julien.
Soon it became evident that even St. Julien, exposed to fire from right and left, was no longer tenable in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority. The Third Brigade was therefore ordered to retreat further south, selling every yard of ground as dearly as it had done since 5 o'clock on Thursday. But it was found impossible, without hazarding far larger forces, to disentangle the detachment of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and of the Royal Montreal Regiment, Fourteenth Battalion. The brigade was ordered, and not a moment too soon, to move back. It left these units with hearts as heavy as those with which his comrades had said farewell to Captain McCuaig. The German tide rolled, indeed, over the deserted village, but for several hours after the enemy had become master of the village the sullen and persistent rifle fire which survived showed that they were not yet master of the Canadian rearguard. If they died, they died worthily of Canada.
The enforced retirement of the Third Brigade (and to have stayed longer would have been madness) reproduced for the Second Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Curry, in a singularly exact fashion, the position of the Third Brigade itself at the moment of the withdrawal of the French. The Second Brigade, it must be remembered, had retained the whole line of trenches, roughly 2,500 yards, which it was holding at 5 o'clock on Thursday afternoon, supported by the incomparable exertions of the Third Brigade, and by the highly hazardous deployment in which necessity had involved that brigade. The Second Brigade had maintained its lines.
It now devolved upon General Curry, commanding this brigade, to reproduce the tactical maneuvres with which, earlier in the fight, the Third Brigade had adapted itself to the flank movement of overwhelming numerical superiority. He flung his left flank around south, and his record is, that in the very crisis of this immense struggle he held his line of trenches from Thursday at 5 o'clock till Sunday afternoon. And on Sunday afternoon he had not abandoned his trenches. There were none left. They had been obliterated by artillery. He withdrew his undefeated troops from the fragments of his field fortifications, and the hearts of his men were as completely unbroken as the parapets of his trenches were completely broken. In such a brigade it is invidious to single out any battalion for special praise, but it is, perhaps, necessary to the story to point out that Lieut. Col. Lipsett, commanding the Ninetieth Winnipeg Rifles, Eighth Battalion of the Second Brigade, held the extreme left of the brigade position at the most critical moment.
The battalion was expelled from the trenches early on Friday morning by an emission of poisonous gas, but, recovering in three-quarters of an hour, it counter-attacked, retook the trenches it had abandoned, and bayoneted the enemy. And after the Third Brigade had been forced to retire Lieut. Col. Lipsett held his position, though his left was in the air, until two British regiments filled up the gap on Saturday night.
The individual fortunes of these two brigades have brought us to the events of Sunday afternoon, but it is necessary, to make the story complete, to recur for a moment to the events of the morning. After a very formidable attack the enemy succeeded in capturing the village of St. Julien, which has so often been referred to in describing the fortunes of the Canadian left. This success opened up a new and formidable line of advance, but by this time further reinforcements had arrived. Here, again, it became evident that the tactical necessities of the situation dictated an offensive movement as the surest method of arresting further progress.
General Alderson, who was in command of the reinforcements, accordingly directed that an advance should be made by a British brigade which had been brought up in support. The attack was thrust through the Canadian left and centre, and as the troops making it swept on, many of them going to certain death, they paused an instant, and, with deep-throated cheers for Canada, gave the first indication to the division of the warm admiration which their exertions had excited in the British Army.
The advance was indeed costly, but it could not be gainsaid. The story is one of which the brigade may be proud, but it does not belong to the special account of the fortunes of the Canadian contingent. It is sufficient for our purpose to notice that the attack succeeded in its object, and the German advance along the line, momentarily threatened, was arrested.
We had reached, in describing the events of the afternoon, the points at which the trenches of the Second Brigade had been completely destroyed. This brigade, the Third Brigade, and the considerable reinforcements which this time filled the gap between the two brigades, were gradually driven fighting every yard upon a line running, roughly, from Fortuin, south of St. Julien, in a northeasterly direction toward Passchendaele. Here the two brigades were relieved by two British brigades, after exertions as glorious, as fruitful, and, alas! as costly as soldiers have ever been called upon to make.
Monday morning broke bright and clear and found the Canadians behind the firing line. This day, too, was to bring its anxieties. The attack was still pressed, and it became necessary to ask Brig. Gen. Curry whether he could once more call upon his shrunken brigade. "The men are tired," this indomitable soldier replied, "but they are ready and glad to go again to the trenches." And so once more, a hero leading heroes, the General marched back the men of the Second Brigade, reduced to a quarter of its original strength, to the very apex of the line as it existed at that moment.
This position he held all day Monday; on Tuesday he was still occupying the reserve trenches, and on Wednesday was relieved and retired to billets in the rear.
Such, in the most general outline, is the story of a great and glorious feat of arms. A story told so soon after the event, while rendering bare justice to units whose doings fell under the eyes of particular observers, must do less than justice to others who played their part--and all did--as gloriously as those whose special activities it is possible, even at this stage, to describe. But the friends of men who fought in other battalions may be content in the knowledge that they, too, shall learn, when time allows the complete correlation of diaries, the exact part which each unit played in these unforgettable days. It is rather accident than special distinction which had made it possible to select individual battalions for mention.
It would not be right to close even this account without a word of tribute to the auxiliary services. The signalers were always cool and resourceful. The telegraph and telephone wires being constantly cut, many belonging to this service rendered up their lives in the discharge of their duty, carrying out repairs with the most complete calmness in exposed positions. The dispatch carriers, as usual, behaved with the greatest bravery. Theirs is a lonely life, and very often a lonely death. One cycle messenger lay upon the ground, badly wounded. He stopped a passing officer and delivered his message, together with some verbal instructions. These were coherently given, but he swooned almost before the words were out of his mouth.
The artillery never flagged in the sleepless struggle in which so much depended upon its exertions. Not a Canadian gun was lost in the long battle of retreat. And the nature of the position renders such a record very remarkable. One battery of four guns found itself in such a situation that it was compelled to turn two of its guns directly about and fire upon the enemy in positions almost diametrically opposite.
It is not possible in this account to attempt a description of the services rendered by the Canadian Engineers or the Medical Corps. Their members rivaled in coolness, endurance, and valor the Canadian infantry, whose comrades they were, and it is hoped in separate communications to do justice to both these brilliant services.
No attempt has been made in this description to explain the recent operations except in so far as they spring from, or are connected with, the fortunes of the Canadian Division. It is certain that the exertions of the troops who reinforced and later relieved the Canadians were not less glorious, but the long, drawn-out struggle is a lesson to the whole empire. "Arise, O Israel!" The empire is engaged in a struggle, without quarter and without compromise, against an enemy still superbly organized, still immensely powerful, still confident that its strength is the mate of its necessities. To arms, then, and still to arms! In Great Britain, in Canada, in Australia there is need, and there is need now, of a community organized alike in military and industrial co-operation.
That our countrymen in Canada, even while their hearts are still bleeding, will answer every call which is made upon them, we well know.
The graveyard of Canada in Flanders is large; it is very large. Those who lie there have left their mortal remains on alien soil. To Canada they have bequeathed their memories and their glory.
On Fame's eternal camping ground Their silent tents are spread, And Glory guards with solemn round The bivouac of the dead.
Vapor Warfare Resumed
SIR JOHN FRENCH'S REPORT.
_The British Press Bureau authorized the publication of the following report, dated May 3, by Field Marshal Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as weapons of warfare:_
The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells specially manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under cover of these gases were provided with specially designed respirators which were issued in sealed patent covers.
This all points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale. A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in their official _communiqué_ that we were making use of asphyxiating gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and shows that they recognized its illegality, and were anxious to forestall neutral and possibly domestic criticism.
Since the enemy has made use of this method of covering his advance with a cloud of poisoned air, he has repeated it both in offense and defense whenever the wind has been favorable. The effect of this poison is not merely disabling or even painlessly fatal as suggested in the German press. Those of its victims who do not succumb on the field and who can be brought into hospital suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a permanent character, and reduces them to a condition which points to their being invalids for life.
These facts must be well known to the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the military authorities who have sanctioned its use. I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless.
THE "EYEWITNESS" STORY.
_The following descriptive account, communicated by the British Eyewitness present with General Headquarters, continues and supplements the narrative published on April 29 of the movements of the British force and the French armies in immediate touch with it:_
April 30, 1915.
As will have been gathered from the last summary, assaults accompanied with gas were not made on every position of the front held by the British to the north of Ypres at the same time. At one point it was not until the early morning of Saturday, April 24, that the Germans brought this method into operation against a section of our line not far from our left flank.
Late on Thursday afternoon the men here saw portions of the French retiring some distance to the west, and observed the cloud of vapor rolling along the ground southward behind them. Our position was then shelled with high explosives until 8 P.M. On Friday also it was bombarded for some hours, the Germans firing poison shells for one hour. Their infantry, who were intrenched about 120 yards away, evidently expected some result from their use of the latter, for they put their heads above the parapets, as if to see what the effect had been on our men, and at intervals opened rapid rifle fire. The wind, however, was strong and dissipated the fumes quickly, our troops did not suffer seriously from their noxious effect, and the enemy did not attempt any advance.
On Saturday morning, just about dawn, an airship appeared in the sky to the east of our line at this point, and dropped four red stars, which floated downward slowly for some distance before they died out. When our men, whose eyes had not unnaturally been fixed on this display of pyrotechnics, again turned to their front it was to find the German trenches rendered invisible by a wall of greenish-yellow vapor, similar to that observed on the Thursday afternoon, which was bearing down on them on the breeze. Through this the Germans started shooting. During Saturday they employed stupefying gas on several occasions in this quarter, but did not press on very quickly. One reason for this, given by a German prisoner, is that many of the enemy's infantry were so affected by the fumes that they could not advance.
To continue the narrative from the night of Sunday, April 25. At 12:30 A.M., in face of repeated attacks, our infantry fell back from a part of the Grafenstafel Ridge, northwest of Zonnebeke, and the line then ran for some distance along the south bank of the little Haanebeek stream. The situation along the Yperlee Canal remained practically unchanged.
When the morning of the 26th dawned the Germans, who had been seen massing in St. Julien, and to the east of the village on the previous evening, made several assaults, which grew more and more fierce as the hours passed, but reinforcements were sent up and the position was secured. Further east, however, our line was pierced near Broodseinde, and a small body of the enemy established themselves in a portion of our trenches. In the afternoon a strong, combined counter-attack was delivered by the French and British along the whole front from Steenstraate to the east of St. Julien, accompanied by a violent bombardment. This moment, so far as can be judged at present, marked the turning point of the battle, for, although it effected no great change in the situation, it caused a definite check to the enemy's offensive, relieved the pressure, and gained a certain amount of ground.
During this counter-attack the guns concentrated by both sides on this comparatively narrow front poured in a great volume of fire. From the right came the roar of the British batteries, from the left the rolling thunder of the _soixante-quinze_, and every now and then above the turmoil rose a dull boom as a huge howitzer shell burst in the vicinity of Ypres. On the right our infantry stormed the German trenches close to St. Julien, and in the evening gained the southern outskirts of the village. In the centre they captured the trenches a little to the south of the Bois des Cuisinirs, west of St. Julien, and still further west more trenches were taken. This represented an advance of some 600 or 700 yards, but the gain in ground could not at all points be maintained. Opposite St. Julien we fell back from the village to a position just south of the place, and in front of the Bois des Cuisinirs and on the left of the line a similar retirement took place, the enemy making extensive use of his gas cylinders and of machine guns placed in farms at or other points of vantage. None the less, the situation at nightfall was more satisfactory than it had been. We were holding our own well all along the line and had made progress at some points. On the right the enemy's attacks on the front of the Grafenstafel Ridge had all been repulsed.
In the meantime the French had achieved some success, having retaken Lizerne and also the trenches round Het Sast, captured some 250 prisoners, and made progress all along the west bank of the canal. Heavy as our losses were during the day, there is little doubt that the enemy suffered terribly. Both sides were attacking at different points, the fighting was conducted very largely in the open, and the close formations of the Germans on several occasions presented excellent targets to our artillery, which did not fail to seize its opportunities.
Nothing in particular occurred during the night.
The morning of the 27th found our troops occupying the following positions: North of Zonnebeke the right of the line still held the eastern end of the Grafenstafel Ridge, but from here it bent southwestward behind the Haanebeek stream, which it followed to a point about half a mile east of St. Julien. Thence it curved back again to the Vamheule Farm, on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, running from here in a slight southerly curve to a point a little west of the Ypres-Langemarck road, where it joined the French. In the last mentioned quarter of the field it followed generally the line of a low ridge running from west to east. On the French front the Germans had been cleared from the west bank of the canal, except at one point, Steenstraate, where they continued to hold the bridgehead.
About 1 P.M. a counter-attack was made by us all along the line between the canal and the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, and for about an hour we continued to make progress. Then the right and centre were checked. A little later the left was also held up, and the situation remained very much as it had been on the previous day. The Germans were doubtless much encouraged by their initial success, and their previous boldness in attack was now matched by the stubborn manner in which they clung on to their positions. In the evening the French stormed some trenches east of the canal, but were again checked by the enemy's gas cylinders.
The night passed quietly, and was spent by us in reorganizing and consolidating our positions. The enemy did not interfere. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that by Tuesday evening they had been fighting for over five days. Their state of exhaustion is confirmed by the statements of the prisoners captured by the French, who also reported that the German losses had been very heavy.
On Wednesday, the 28th, there was a complete lull on this sector of our line, and the shelling was less severe. Some fighting, however, occurred along the canal, the French taking over 100 prisoners.
Nothing of any importance has occurred on other parts of the front. On the 27th, at the Railway Triangle opposite Guinchy, the south side of the embankment held by the Germans was blown up by our miners. On the 28th a hostile aeroplane was forced to descend by our anti-aircraft guns. On coming down in rear of the German lines, it was at once fired upon and destroyed by our field artillery. Another hostile machine was brought down by rifle fire near Zonnebeke.
Splendid work has been done during the past few days by our airmen, who have kept all the area behind the hostile lines under close observation. On the 26th they bombed the stations of Staden, Thielt, Courtrai, Roubaix, and other places, and located an armored train near Langemarck, which was subsequently shelled and forced to retire. There have been several successful conflicts in the air, on one occasion a pilot in a single seater chasing a German machine to Roulers, and forcing it to land.
The raid on Courtrai unfortunately cost the nation a very gallant life, but it will live as one of the most heroic episodes of the war. The airman started on the enterprise alone in a biplane. On arrival at Courtrai he glided down to a height of 300 feet and dropped a large bomb on the railway junction. While he did this he was the target of hundreds of rifles, of machine guns, and of anti-aircraft armament, and was severely wounded in the thigh. Though he might have saved his life by at once coming down in the enemy's lines, he decided to save his machine at all costs, and made for the British lines. Descending to a height of only 100 feet in order to increase his speed, he continued to fly and was again wounded, this time mortally. He still flew on, however, and without coming down at the nearest of our aerodromes went all the way back to his own base, where he executed a perfect landing and made his report. He died in hospital not long afterward.[A]
[Footnote A: The obituary columns of The Times of April 30 contained the following notice under "Died of Wounds":
RHODES-MOORHOUSE.--On Tuesday, the 27th April, of wounds received while dropping bombs on Courtrai the day before, WILLIAM BARNARD RHODES RHODES-MOORHOUSE, Second Lieutenant, Royal Flying Corps, aged 27, dear elder son of Mr. and Mrs. Edward Moorhouse of Parnham House, Dorset, and most loved husband of Linda Rhodes-Moorhouse.]
The outstanding feature of the action of the past week has been the steadiness of our troops on the extreme left; but of the deeds of individual gallantry and devotion which have been performed it would be impossible to narrate one-hundredth part. At one place in this quarter a machine gun was stationed in the angle of a trench when the German rush took place. One man after another of the detachment was shot, but the gun still continued in action, though five bodies lay around it. When the sixth man took the place of his fallen comrades, of whom one was his brother, the Germans were still pressing on. He waited until they were only a few yards away, and then poured a stream of bullets on to the advancing ranks, which broke and fell back, leaving rows of dead. He was then wounded himself.
Under the hot fire to which our batteries were subjected in the early part of the engagement telephone wires were repeatedly cut. The wire connecting one battery with its observing officer was severed on nine separate occasions, and on each occasion repaired by a Sergeant, who did the work out in the open under a perfect hail of shells.
_On May 5 the following account of the British Official Eyewitness, continuing the report of April 30, was published:_
About 5 P.M. a dense cloud of suffocating vapors was launched from their trenches along the whole front held by the French right and by our left from the Ypres-Langemarck road to a considerable distance east of St. Julien. The fumes did not carry much beyond our front trenches. But these were to a great extent rendered untenable, and a retirement from them was ordered.
No sooner had this started than the enemy opened a violent bombardment with asphyxiating shells and shrapnel on our trenches and on our infantry as they were withdrawing. Meanwhile our guns had not been idle. From a distance, perhaps owing to some peculiarity of the light, the gas on this occasion looked like a great reddish cloud, and the moment it was seen our batteries poured a concentrated fire on the German trenches.
Curious situations then arose between us and the enemy. The poison belt, the upper part shredding into thick wreaths of vapor as it was shaken by the wind, and the lower and denser part sinking into all inequalities of the ground, rolled slowly down the trenches. Shells would rend it for a moment, but it only settled down again as thickly as before.
Nevertheless, the German infantry faced it, and they faced a hail of shrapnel as well. In some cases where the gas had not reached our lines our troops held firm and shot through the cloud at the advancing Germans. In other cases the men holding the front line managed to move to the flank, where they were more or less beyond the affected area. Here they waited until the enemy came on and then bayoneted them when they reached our trenches.
On the extreme left our supports waited until the wall of vapor reached our trenches, when they charged through it and met the advancing Germans with the bayonet as they swarmed over the parapets.
South of St. Julien the denseness of the vapor compelled us to evacuate trenches, but reinforcements arrived who charged the enemy before they could establish themselves in position. In every case the assaults failed completely. Large numbers were mown down by our artillery. Men were seen falling and others scattering and running back to their own lines. Many who reached the gas cloud could not make their way through it, and in all probability a great number of the wounded perished from the fumes.
It is to that extent, from a military standpoint, a sign of weakness. Another sign of weakness is the adoption of illegal methods of fighting, such as spreading poisonous gas. It is a confession by the Germans that they have lost their former great superiority in artillery and are, in any cost, seeking another technical advantage over their enemy as a substitute.
Nevertheless, this spirit, this determination on the part of our enemies to stick at nothing must not be underestimated. Though it may not pay the Germans in the long run, it renders it all the more obvious that they are a foe that can be overcome only by the force of overwhelming numbers of men and guns.
Further to the east a similar attack was made about 7 P.M. which seems to have been attended with even less success, and the assaulting infantry was at once beaten back by our artillery fire.
It was not long before all our trenches were reoccupied and the whole line re-established in its original position. The attack on the French met with the same result.
_The Eyewitness then relates incidents showing the steadiness of the Indian troops, who, he says, "advanced under a murderous fire, their war cry swelling louder and louder above the din."_
Prisoners captured in the recent fighting, the narrative continues, stated that one German corps lost 80 per cent. of its men in the first week; that the losses from our artillery fire, even during days when no attacks were taking place, had been very heavy and that many of their own men had suffered from the effects of the gas.
_The writer concludes as follows:_
In regard to the recent fighting on our left, the German offensive, effected in the first instance by surprise, resulted in a considerable gain of ground for the enemy. Between all the earlier German efforts, the only difference was that on this latest occasion the attempt was carried out with the aid of poisonous gases.
There is no reason why we should not expect similar tactics in the future. They do not mean that the Allies have lost the initiative in the Western theatre, nor that they are likely to lose it. They do mean, however, and the fact has been repeatedly pointed out, that the enemy's defensive is an active one, that his confidence is still unshaken and that he still is able to strike in some strength where he sees the chance or where mere local advantage can be secured.
The true idea of the meaning of the operations of the Allies can be gained only by bearing in mind that it is their primary object to bring about the exhaustion of the enemy's resources in men.
In the form now assumed by this struggle--a war of attrition--the Germans are bound ultimately to lose, and it is the consciousness of this fact that inspires their present policy. This is to achieve as early as possible some success of sufficient magnitude to influence the neutrals, to discourage the Allies, to make them weary of the struggle and to induce the belief among the people ignorant of war that nothing has been gained by the past efforts of the Allies because the Germans have not yet been driven back. It is being undertaken with a political rather than a strategical object.
_The official British Eyewitness, under date of May 11, 1915, gives an account of the German attempts on the previous Saturday and Sunday to break the British lines around Ypres, and of the beginning of the Anglo-French offensive north of Arras. He said:_
The calm that prevailed Thursday and Friday proved to be only the lull before the storm. Early Saturday morning it became apparent that the Germans were preparing an attack in strength against our line running east and northeast from Ypres, for they were concentrating under cover of a violent artillery fire, and at about 10 o'clock the battle began in earnest.
At that hour the Germans attacked our line from the Ypres-Poelcappelle road to within a short distance of the Menin highroad, it being evidently their intention while engaging us closely on the whole of this sector to break our front in the vicinity of the Ypres-Roulers Railway, to the north and to the south of which their strongest and most determined assaults were delivered.
Under this pressure our front was penetrated at some points around Frezenberg, and at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon we made a counter-attack between the Zonnebeke road and the railway in order to recover the lost ground. Our offensive was conducted most gallantly, but was checked before long by the fire of machine guns.
Meanwhile, the enemy launched another attack through the woods south of the Menin road, and at the same time threatened our left to the north of Ypres with fresh masses. Most desperate fighting ensued, the German infantry coming on again and again and gradually forcing our troops back, though only for a short distance, in spite of repeated counter-attacks.
During the night the fighting continued to rage with ever-increasing fury. It is impossible to say at exactly what hour our line was broken at different points, but it is certain that at one time the enemy's infantry poured through along the Poelcappelle road, and even got as far as Wieltje at 9 P.M.
There was also a considerable gap in our front about Frezenberg, where hostile detachments had penetrated. At both points counter-attacks were organized without delay. To the east of the salient the Germans first were driven back to Frezenberg, but there they made a firm stand, and under pressure of fresh reinforcements we fell back again toward Verlorenhoek.
Northeast of the salient a counter-attack carried out by us about 1 A.M. was more successful. Our troops swept the enemy out of Wieltje at the bayonet's point, leaving the village strewn with German dead and, pushing on, regained most of the ground to the north of that point. And so the fight surged to and fro throughout the night. All around the scene of the conflict the sky was lit up by the flashes of the guns and the light of blazing villages and farms, while against this background of smoke and flame, looking out in the murky light over the crumbling ruins of the old town, rose the battered wreck of the cathedral town and the spires of Cloth Hall.
When Sunday dawned there came a short respite, and the firing for a time died down. The comparative lull enabled us to reorganize and consolidate our position on the new line we had taken up and to obtain some rest after the fatigue and strain of the night. It did not last long, however, and in the afternoon the climax of the battle was reached, for, under the cover of intense artillery fire, the Germans launched no less than five separate assaults against the east of the salient.
To the north and northeast their attacks were not at first pressed so hard as on the south of the Menin road, where the fighting was especially fierce. In the latter direction masses of infantry were hurled on with absolute desperation and were beaten off with corresponding slaughter.
At one point, north of the town, 500 of the enemy advanced from the wood, and it is affirmed by those present that not a single man of them escaped.
On the eastern face, at 6:30 P.M., an endeavor was made to storm the grounds of the Château Hooge, a little north of the Menin road, but the force attempting it broke and fell back under the hail of shrapnel poured upon them by our guns. It was on this side, where they had to face the concentrated fire of guns, Maxims and rifles again and again in their efforts to break their way through, that the Germans incurred their heaviest losses, and the ground was literally heaped with dead.
They evidently, for the time being at least, were unable to renew their efforts, and as night came on the fury of their offensive gradually slackened, the hours of darkness passing in quietness.
During the day our troops saw some of the enemy busily employed in stripping the British dead in our abandoned trenches, east of the Hooge Château, and several Germans afterward were noticed dressed in khaki.
So far as the Ypres region is concerned, this for us was a most successful day. Our line, which on the northeast of the salient had, after the previous day's fighting, been reconstituted a short distance behind the original front, remained intact. Our losses were comparatively slight, and, owing to the targets presented by the enemy, the action resolved itself on our part into pure killing.
The reason for this very determined effort to crush our left on the part of the Germans is not far to seek. It is probable that for some days previously they had been in possession of information which led them to suppose that we intended to apply pressure on the right of our line, and that their great attack upon Ypres on the 7th, 8th, and 9th was undertaken with a view to diverting us from our purpose.
In this the Germans were true to their principles, for they rightly hold that the best manner of meeting an expected hostile offensive is to forestall it by attacking in some other quarter. In this instance their leaders acted with the utmost determination and energy and their soldiers fought with the greatest courage.
The failure of their effort was due to the splendid endurance of our troops, who held the line around the salient under a fire which again and again blotted out whole lengths of the defenses and killed the defenders by scores. Time after time along those parts of the front selected for assault were parapets destroyed, and time after time did the thinning band of survivors build them up again and await the next onset as steadily as before.
Here, in May, in defense of the same historic town, have our incomparable infantry repeated the great deeds their comrades performed half a year ago and beaten back most desperate onslaughts of hostile hordes backed by terrific artillery support.
The services rendered by our troops in this quarter cannot at present be estimated, for their full significance will only be realized in the light of future events. But so far their devotion has indirectly contributed in no small measure to the striking success already achieved by our allies.
Further south, in the meantime, on Sunday another struggle had been in progress on that portion of the front covered by the right of our line and the left of the French, for when the firing around Ypres was temporarily subsiding during the early hours of the morning another and even more tremendous cannonade was suddenly started by the artillery of the Allies some twenty miles to the south.
The morning was calm, bright, and clear, and opposite our right, as the sun rose, the scene in front of our line was the most peaceful imaginable. Away to the right were Guinchy, with its brickfields and the ruins of Givenchy. To the north of them lay low ground, where, hidden by trees and hedgerows, ran the opposing lines that were about to become the scene of the conflict, and beyond, in the distance, rose the long ridge of Aubers, the villages crowning it standing out clear cut against the sky.
At 5 o'clock the bombardment began, slowly at first and then growing in volume until the whole air quivered with the rush of the larger shells and the earth shook with the concussion of guns. In a few minutes the whole distant landscape disappeared in smoke and dust, which hung for a while in the still air and then drifted slowly across the line of battle.
Shortly before 6 o'clock our infantry advanced along our front between the Bois Grenier and Festubert. On the left, north of Fromelles, we stormed the German first line trenches. Hand-to-hand fighting went on for some time with bayonet, rifle, and hand grenade, but we continued to hold on to this position throughout the day and caused the enemy very heavy loss, for not only were many Germans killed in the bombardment, but their repeated efforts to drive us from the captured positions proved most costly.
On the right, to the north of Festubert, our advance met with considerable opposition and was not pressed.
Meanwhile, the French, after a prolonged bombardment, had taken the German positions north of Arras on a front of nearly five miles, and had pushed forward from two to three miles, capturing 2,000 prisoners and six guns. This remarkable success was gained by our allies in the course of a few hours.
As may be supposed from the nature of the fighting which has been in progress, our losses have been heavy. On other parts of the front our action was confined to that of the artillery, but this proved most effective later, all the communications of the enemy being subjected to so heavy and accurate a fire that in some quarters all movement by daylight within range of our lines was rendered impracticable. At one place opposite our centre a convoy of ammunition was hit by a shell, which knocked out six motor lorries and caused two to blow up. Opposite our centre we fired two mines, which did considerable damage to the enemy's defenses.
During the day also our aeroplanes attacked several points of importance. One of our airmen, who was sent to bomb the canal bridge near Don, was wounded on his way there, but continued and fulfilled his mission. Near Wytschaete, one of our aviators pursued a German aeroplane and fired a whole belt from his machine gun at it. The Taube suddenly swerved, righted itself for a second, and then descended from a height of several thousand feet straight to the ground.
On the other hand, a British machine unfortunately was brought down over Lille by the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, but it is hoped that the aviator escaped.
_In regard to the German allegation, that the British used gas in their attacks on Hill 60, the Eyewitness says:_
No asphyxiating gases have been employed by us at any time, nor have they yet been brought into play by us.
To Certain German Professors of Chemics
[From Punch, May 5, 1915.]
When you observed how brightly other tutors Inspired the yearning heart of Youth; How from their lips, like Pilsen's foaming pewters, It sucked the fount of German Truth; There, in your Kaiserlich laboratory, "We, too," you said, "will find a task to do, And so contribute something to the glory Of God and William Two.
"Bring forth the stink-pots. Such a foul aroma By arts divine shall be evoked As will to leeward cause a state of coma And leave the enemy blind and choked; By gifts of culture we will work such ravages With our superbly patriotic smells As would confound with shame those half-baked savages, The poisoners of wells."
Good! You have more than matched the rival pastors That tute a credulous Fatherland; And we admit that you are proved our masters When there is dirty work in hand; But in your lore I notice one hiatus: Your Kaiser's scutcheon with its hideous blot-- You've no corrosive in your apparatus Can out that damnéd spot!
O.S.
Seven Days of War East and West
Fighting of the Second Week in May on French and Russian Fronts.
[By a Military Expert of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
The sinking of the Lusitania has, for the week ended May 15, so completely absorbed the attention of the press and the interest of the public that the military operations themselves have not received the notice that otherwise would have been awarded them. The sinking of this ship, with the delicate diplomatic situation between Germany and the United States which the act brought about, is not a military or naval operation as such, and comments on it have no place in this column. At the same time there is an indirect effect of the drowning of hundreds of British citizens which will have a very direct bearing on Britain's military strength and policy.
The British public is notably hard to stir, are slow to act, and almost always underrate their adversary. In almost every war, from 1775 down to and including the South African war, England, with a self-assurance that could only be based on ignorance of true conditions, has started with only a small force, and it has been only when this force has been defeated and used up that the realization of the true needs of the situation has dawned. Then, and then only, has recruiting been possible at a pace commensurate with the necessity.
In the Boer war, for example, every one in England, official and civilian, believed that 30,000 men would be more than enough to defeat the South African burghers. Yet ten times 30,000 British soldiers were operating in the Transvaal and Orange Free State before the war ended.
In the present conflict Lord Kitchener himself admits that there are many times the number of British soldiers in France than was thought would be necessary when war was declared. And even up to May 6 the British public was not thoroughly aroused. Many of the peasants in the back counties hardly believed the war was a reality. Recruiting was slow, there was but little enthusiasm, and Lord Haldane's thinly veiled hint that a draft might soon become necessary was almost unnoticed.
But the sinking of the Lusitania has brought the war home to England as nothing else has or could have done, and all England is aflame with a bitterness against Germany which is already increasing the flow of recruits and cannot but add to the fighting efficiency of the men now at the front. The effect will be far-reaching throughout the British Empire, and will do much to solve the problem which faced the organizers of Great Britain's forces of how to get sufficient volunteers to swell the volume of the French expeditionary force and to replace the casualties.
To turn to the direct military operations in the various theatres of war, no week since last Fall has witnessed more important activities or offensive movements conducted on such a scale. On both western and eastern fronts truly momentous actions involving great numbers of men have been under way, and though not yet concluded, have advanced so far as to give a reasonable basis for estimating the results.
ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
On the western front the principal scenes of action have been the front from Nieuport to Arras, the Champagne district, and the southern side of the German wedge from its apex at St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson. On the northern part of the Allies' line from Ypres to Nieuport the Germans have been the aggressors. They have selected as the principal points of attack the Belgian line back of the Yser just south of Nieuport and the point of juncture of the British with the Belgian lines.
Both attacks have the same general object--the bending back of the line between these two points with a vision, for the future, of Dunkirk and Calais. The attack along the Yser has not been pushed to any extent, and what advantage there is rests with the Belgians. In fact, the Belgians have advanced somewhat and have been able to throw a bridge across the Yser near St. George, just east of Nieuport, on the Nieuport-Bruges road.
Around Ypres the fighting has been more than usually fierce and desperate. Blow after blow has been struck, first by one side, then by the other. Both German and British have admittedly suffered enormous losses, but the positions of their respective lines are almost unchanged from those occupied a week ago. The German gains of last week in the vicinity of Steenstraate produced in the British lines around Ypres a sharp salient, and it is against the sides of this salient that the Germans have been hurling their forces.
The town of Ypres is now in complete ruins, and, although it would normally be of importance because of the fact that it is the point of crossing of a number of roads, this importance is destroyed by the fact that it is entirely dominated by the German artillery. As long as this state of affairs exists the town has practically no strategic value. All that the Germans can accomplish if they take Ypres will have been a flattening out of the British salient.
Germany cannot be content with occasional bending of the Allies' line. The process is too slow and too costly. Germany has almost, if not quite, reached her maximum strength, and the losses she now suffers will be difficult to replace. Viewing the situation entirely from the German standpoint, success can only mean breaking through and attacking the two exposed flanks at the point pierced. This would force a retreat as in the case of the Russian lines along the Dunajec, which will be taken up later on. No other form of action can be decisive, though it might permit a little more of Belgian or French territory to change hands. This would, of course, in case the war were declared a draw, give Germany an additional advantage in the discussion of terms of peace, especially if the rule of uti posseditis were applied as a basis from which to begin negotiations. But this contingency is too remote for present consideration.
As to the probability of German success around Ypres, it seems to grow less as time passes. After the first rush was over and the British lines had time to re-form Germany has accomplished nothing. Moreover, it is certain that in back of the short twenty-five miles of line held by the British troops there is a reserve of almost a half million men. No other portion of the battle line in either theatre has such great latent strength ready to be thrown in when the critical moment comes. Just why it has not been used so far is a mystery, the solution of which can be found only in the brain of Sir John French. But it is known to be in France and is there for a purpose.
From Loos to Arras the French have undertaken the most ambitious and the most successful offensive movement made in the west since Winter set in. The entire French line along this front of twenty-five miles, taking the Germans by surprise, has gone forward a distance varying from one-half to two and a half miles. The attack was launched at an extremely opportune moment. The Germans were, in the first place, extremely busy in the north at Ypres, and were making every effort to drive that attack home. The probabilities were, therefore, that the line in front of the Arras-Loos position was none too strong, and that such reserves as could be spared had been sent north. Then, again, it would tend to divert attention from the Ypres line, and so relieve somewhat the pressure on the British lines at that point.
The objective of the French attack seems to have been the town of Lens, which is the centre of the coal district of France. Loos, which is about three miles north of Lens, has been one of the centres of fighting. This indicates how close the French are to their objective. Lens is an important railroad centre, and is the point of junction of many roads which radiate in all directions. As yet the French advance is not sufficient to denote anything, but another step in the "nibbling" process by means of which the French have kept the Germans occupied for some months.
In the German angle, from Etain to St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson, the French achieved what will probably prove to be the greatest local success of the past week. That is, the complete occupation of the Le Prêtre woods. Sooner or later the continual French encroachments on the German area of occupation must cause the straightening out of this line and the retirement of the Germans to the supporting forts of Metz. The object of all the French moves against this angle has been the town of Thiancourt, on the German supply line from Metz. The capture of the last German line of trenches in the Prêtre Forest brings the French within six miles of this town. When the French reach the northern edge of this forest, and they must be very close to it now, it will be a simple matter to drop shells into Thiancourt and seriously endanger every train that comes in.
On the rest of the western front there have been a number of isolated actions, notably in the Champagne district, in the Argonne Forest and north of Flirey, between St. Mihiel and Pont-à-Mousson. They have been of no particular advantage however, and seem to have had no definite purpose beyond making additions to the casualty lists.
Considering the results of the week's operations in the west, therefore, it is safe to say that the advantage lies with the Allies. That part of the line which has been thrown on the defensive has more than held its own, while the French offense has resulted in a considerable advance over a wide front. If we may draw any comparison at all from this, it must be that the German line is not nearly so impenetrable as the British, and that when the Allies think the attempt will justify the losses that will be inevitably sustained, the German line can be broken even though the rupture may be quickly healed.
IN THE EASTERN THEATRE.
In the eastern theatre interest still centres in the battles in Galicia. In Western Galicia, between the Dunajec and the San, the Russian forces are steadily giving way before the attacks of the Germanic allies. Their retreat, which, during the past week, has been rapid, has been well protected by heavy rear guard actions, which have temporarily delayed the pursuing Austrians at various points. At the same time, however, but little respite was given to the Russians.
German and Austrian reports as to the number of prisoners and amount of booty will bear scrutiny, and, taken into consideration with recent disturbances in Italy, may safely be discounted. The surrender of such large bodies of troops, even in the Russian Army, cannot be forced when the lines of retreat are open or when sufficient notice is given that such lines are dangerously menaced. It is only when troops are surrounded or when a large hostile force is thrust in between units, as happened some months ago with the Tenth Russian Army in the Masurian Lakes district, that such surrenders occur.
This does not apply, of course, to the wounded, and in the present case the Russians, through the enforced rapidity of their retreat, must necessarily in many instances have left their wounded on the field of battle to fall into the hands of the pursuing enemy. Certainly the Russian losses were heavy. Equally certain is it that the battle for the Carpathian passes is now history.
This is evident from a brief review of the Russian position on the Carpathian front, with particular reference to the necessary lines of communications and an outline of the present Russian position as accurately as it can at present be determined. It must be stated at this point, however, that this position is a matter of doubt, as reports from Vienna and from Petrograd are greatly at variance as to what has been accomplished.
It was noted last week that the Russian line formed a huge crescent, the longer arc of which (and this was the Carpathian front) extended from Bartfeld north, then east along the Carpathian crests, north of Uzsok to a point on the Stryi River. This line is over 100 miles long. It was dependent for supplies on five roads, three of which were fairly good dirt roads, the other two railroads; of the latter one runs through Uzsok, and is so far east that only a small section of the line was reached by it.
The main line, however, has been supplied from the remaining four, all of which turn off either from the one lateral railroad from Przemysl to Jaslo or from the dirt road between Jaslo and Sanok, and run south to the various passes. As this latter road simply loops the railroad between these two points, the entire Russian Carpathian line may be considered to have been supplied by the lateral railroad from Sanok to Jaslo. In proportion to the number of troops that had to be fed and supplied, these lines were only too few, and the marvel is that Russia was able to keep up the necessary flow of food and ammunition throughout her effort against the Carpathian passes. The possession of all of these roads was the sine qua non of Russian success. The loss of any one of them would affect so many miles of her line that the whole line would have felt the influence.
The Austrian troops are said to have reached the lower San, but no particular point is mentioned. Nothing is said about the upper San or the stretch of Galicia between the two. It may, therefore, be assumed that the Russian left is on the Vistula, near the confluence of the San, and that the general line runs from there south, probably through Rzeszow along the valley of the Wistok River, occupying the wooded hills east of that river, and bending eastward slightly toward the upper San. This means that all of the lines of communication that supplied the Carpathian front except the line through Uzsok Pass are now in Austrian hands.
Russia still clings tenaciously to Uzsok, however, doubtless having under consideration the possibility that Italy may enter the war, and that another advance against the Carpathians may then be made. In such a contingency the Russian losses in the various engagements around Uzsok would not have been in vain.
Russia has answered the Austrian drive from the west by a vigorous offense against the defenses of Bukowina Province. The Austrian forces east of the San River are divided--one part which has been extremely active against the Russians being on the east bank of the Stryi, and the other, which has been quiescently defensive, along the Bistritza, the latter line running almost due east and west. This latter force the Russians struck, using large bodies of Cossack cavalry in a flanking movement from the north. The Austrian retreat has been more precipitate, and the losses greater in proportion than in the Russian retreat from the Dunajec.
If in addition the Rumanians came across Transylvania and caught the Austrians in the rear the defeat would almost offset that of the Russians in the west. Rumania's advent into the war is, however, still a matter of doubt, and any conclusions predicated on that assumption are entirely speculative.
The two known facts in regard to the Galician situation are that in Western Galicia the Russian Dunajec line is retreating, uncovering and therefore involving in its retreat the troops in the Carpathians, and in Eastern Galicia the Russians seem to have the greater measure of success. Of the two, however, the operations in Western Galicia are of infinitely greater importance. Eventually the Russian retreat will probably reach the general line of the San River north of Jaroslau, where there will be an opportunity to re-form on a much shorter line, and after recuperation of men and supplies preparations for a new offense may be begun.
Their defeat, however, has been a severe blow, and has cost Russia a terrible price in men and in guns, the latter of which she could less afford to lose. On the other hand, they have inflicted terrible punishment on the victors, so that the victory partakes of a Pyrrhian character.
In the meantime operations in the Dardanelles are being pressed, but are not reported with sufficient definiteness to give an idea as to the probable result.
Austro-German Success
By Major E. Moraht.
_Major E. Moraht, the military expert of the Berliner Tageblatt, discussed the operations on the eastern war front as follows in the Tageblatt of April 30:_
Austria-Hungary, through its latest decision to create a supplementary Landsturm service law, has given notice that it desires under any circumstances to be able to wage the war for a longer time, if conditions should compel it to do so. Thus are contradicted all the reports spread by ill-informed correspondents of foreign newspapers, who sought to create the impression that Austria-Hungary was tired and had not the energy to face the situation such as it is. Furthermore, the acceptance of the supplementary Landsturm service gave testimony, in the Hungarian Parliament, of the unanimity in which the Hungarian Nation unites as soon as it is a question of furthering the armed preparedness of the army.
The Landsturm law heretofore had two defects--it included in its scope only the once-trained men liable to Landsturm service up to the age of 42 years, and restricted the use of certain Landsturm troops to certain areas. Hereafter it will be possible to use the men capable of bearing arms up to the fiftieth year, though, to be sure, only in case the younger classes have in general already been exhausted. It will also be possible to draw Hungarian formations and Austrian Landsturm troops in such a manner that the area available will offer no more difficulties. Even though the new law will presumably hold good only during the present war, the impression created by the decision of the Austro-Hungarian Government on the enemy and on neutrals cannot be a slight one. We in Germany can only congratulate the peoples of our ally, so willing to make sacrifices, upon this resolve, and no one among us will be able to deny recognition thereof, the less because we ourselves, according to human calculations will not have to adopt such an extension of Landsturm service.
Our northeastern army has again been heard of. After a considerable time the situation has again changed, and that, too, in our favor. The battles northeast and east of Suwalki have again revived and have given into our hands the Russian trenches along a front of twenty kilometers. Between Kovno and Grodno, both situated on the Niemen, we must note in our battle line the towns of Mariampol, Kalwarya, and the territory east of Suwalki. This front has opposed to it the two Russian fortresses mentioned and between them the bridgeheads at Olita and Sereje. Owing to the brevity of the latest report, it cannot be told whether our attack found an end in the Russian positions. It may be that the attack went further and won territory at least twenty kilometers wide toward the Niemen. Moreover, we have learned that the Russians still held on north of Prasznysz, where on April 27 they lost prisoners and machine guns.
No answer is given by the sparse reports from the eastern army to the question of the entire foreign press: "Where has Hindenburg been keeping himself?" Wishes and speculations may thus busy themselves as much as they like with the answering of that question. In the Russian version of the war situation there is reference to advance guard skirmishes in the territory of Memel, a brief interruption of the quiet southeast of Augustowa and before Ossowicz. The Russians are clearly worried by the possibility of an undertaking of the navy against the Russian Baltic coast.
The territory of the fighting in the Carpathians still claims the chief interest--especially because everywhere where the general position and the weather conditions and topographical conditions permitted the Austro-Hungarian-German offensive has begun. As has been emphasized on previous occasions, the eagerness for undertaking actions on the part of our allies had never subsided at any point, in spite of the strenuous rigors of a stationary warfare. As early as April 14 an advance enlivened the territory northwest of the Uzsok Pass. The position on the heights of Tucholka has been won. The heights west and east of the Laborez valley are in the hands of the Austro-German allies, and each day furnishes new proofs of the forward pressure. Of especial importance is the capture of Russian points of support southeast of Koziouwa, east of the Orawa valley. The advance takes its course against the Galician town of Stryi. The progress which the Austro-German southern army made has so far been moving in the same direction, and one can understand why the Russians instituted the fiercest counter-attacks in order to force the allied troops to halt in this territory. The counter-attacks, however, ended with a collapse of the Russians, and the resultant pursuit was so vigorous that twenty-six more trenches were wrested from the foe. Daily our front is being advanced in a northeasterly direction, and there is little prospect for the Russians of being able to oppose successful resistance to our pressure. For it is not a matter of the success of a single fighting group that has been shoving forward like a wedge from the great line of attack, but of a strategic offensive led as a unit, and everywhere winning territory, the time for which seems to have arrived.
It is an important fact that the eastern group of the Austro-Hungarian army will clearly not be shattered. At Zaleszcyki a stand is being maintained, and at Boyan on the Pruth the Austrian mortars have driven the Russians out of their next-to-the-last positions before the Bessarabian frontier.
The speech of the Hungarian Minister of Defense of the Realm, Baron Hazai, who a few days ago discussed the military situation of the recent past in exhaustive fashion, is very interesting in many respects. It doubtless aimed to set in the right light the bravery of the Austro-Hungarian Army, for there have been persons who took little or no note of the achievements of that army. The Minister selected examples from the warfare of the eighteenth century, the time of the lukewarm campaigns, and the warfare of the nineteenth century, the era of logical and energetical battles. From this period of mobile wars, that were carried on under the principle of energy, he came to the preparations for the present war and estimated the number of soldiers which the belligerent parties had drawn to the colors at between 25,000,000 and 26,000,000 men. More than half of these are to be regarded as warriors, while the rest are doing service as reserves for the army or in the lines of support and communication outside the fighting zone. The highest number of fighters on a single theatre of the war included from six to seven million fighters on both sides. The long trench warfare, the Minister rightly pointed out, demands greater energy than was ever demanded at any time of the troops, and a loss of from 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. of the fighting force today no longer keeps back the leaders from executing far-going decisions. Today the fronts clash, not in one-day or several day battles, but for weeks and months at a time, so that many of the fighters even now have already taken part in 100 battles. These instructive and appreciative words from an authoritative station throw a bright light upon the strength of the nations which are sacrificing their forces in a sense of duty to their fatherland. But the lesson which the homeland should draw from such unprecedented self-sacrifice consists of this--always to stand as a firm protective wall behind the army, never to deny it recognition and encouraging approval, and to dissipate its cares for the present and for the future.
The Campaign in the Carpathians
Russian Victory Succeeded by Reverses and Defeat.
THE VICTORY IN APRIL.
[By the Correspondent of The London Times.]
Petrograd, April 18.
_A dispatch from the Headquarters Staff of the Commander in Chief says:_
At the beginning of March, (Old Style,) in the principal chain of the Carpathians, we only held the region of the Dukla Pass, where our lines formed an exterior angle. All the other passes--Lupkow and further east--were in the hands of the enemy.
In view of this situation, our armies were assigned the further task of developing, before the season of bad roads due to melting snows began, our positions in the Carpathians which dominated the outlets into the Hungarian plain. About the period indicated great Austrian forces, which had been concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl, were in position between the Lupkow and Uzsok Passes.
It was for this sector that our grand attack was planned. Our troops had to carry out a frontal attack under very difficult conditions of terrain. To facilitate their attack, therefore, an auxiliary attack was decided upon on a front in the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Lupkow. This secondary attack was opened on March 19 and was completely developed.
On the 23rd and 28th of March our troops had already begun their principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the enemy positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the east near the source of the San.
The enemy opposed the most desperate resistance to the offensive of our troops. They had brought up every available man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok Pass, including even German troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting on foot. His effectives on this front exceeded 300 battalions. Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural difficulties at every step.
Nevertheless, from April 5--that is, eighteen days after the beginning of our offensive--the valor of our troops enabled us to accomplish the task that had been set, and we captured the principal chain of the Carpathians on the front Reghetoff-Volosate, 110 versts (about 70 miles) long. The fighting latterly was in the nature of actions in detail with the object of consolidating the successes we had won.
To sum up: On the whole Carpathian front, between March 19 and April 12, the enemy, having suffered enormous losses, left in our hands, in prisoners only, at least 70,000 men, including about 900 officers. Further, we captured more than thirty guns and 200 machine guns.
On April 16 the actions in the Carpathians were concentrated in the direction of Rostoki. The enemy, notwithstanding the enormous losses he had suffered, delivered, in the course of that day, no fewer than sixteen attacks in great strength. These attacks, all of which were absolutely barren of result, were made against the heights which we had occupied further to the east of Telepovce.
Our troops, during the night of the 16th-17th, after a desperate fight, stormed and captured a height to the southeast of the village of Polen, where we took many prisoners. Three enemy counter-attacks on this height were repulsed.
In other sectors all along our front there is no change.
THE GRAND DUKE'S STRATEGY.
Petrograd, April 19.
Today's record of the brilliant feats of the Russian Army in the Carpathians during the past month, contained in the survey of the Grand Duke, presents only one aspect--the discomfiture of the Austro-German forces. The Neue Freie Presse gives some indication of the other aspect.
In a recent issue it stated that "the fortnight's battle around the Lupkow and Uzsok Passes has been one of the most obstinate in history. The Russians succeeded in forcing the Austrians out of their positions. The difficulties of the Austro-Hungarian Army are complicated by the weather and the lack of ammunition and food." The question naturally suggests itself, why did these difficulties not equally disturb the Russian operations? On our side the difficulties of transport were, if anything, greater. The enemy was backed by numerous railways, with supplies close at hand, and was fighting on his native soil, and these advantages undoubtedly compensated for the greater difficulties of commissariat for the larger numbers of Austro-Germans. But from the avowal of the Neue Freie Presse it is suggested here that the Austrians were disorganized. The causes of this disorganization are attributed by military observers to the mixing up of German with Austrian units, rendering the task of command and supply very difficult.
The Grand Duke is fully prepared to take the field as soon as the allied commanders decide that the time for a general action has come. Never has the spirit of the Russian Army been firmer.
The critics this morning comment on the official communiqué detailing a gigantic task brilliantly fulfilled by the Carpathian army during March. Our position in the region of the Dukla Pass early last month exposed us to pressure from two sides, and might have involved the necessity of evacuating the main range. Our army thus required to extend its positions commanding the outlets to the Hungarian plain, before the Spring thaws, in face of a large hostile concentration between Lupkow and Uzsok. The chief attack was directed against the latter section, and an auxiliary attack against the Bartfeld-Lupkow section. The auxiliary attack began on March 19 against the Austro-German left flank and reached its full development four days later. Mistaking the auxiliary for the principal attack, the enemy began an advance from the Bukowina, hoping to divert us from Uzsok, but, instead, the larger portion of our army assailed the enemy's flanks while a smaller body advanced against Rostoki, surmounting the immense difficulties of mountain warfare in Springtime.
By means of the envelopment of both his flanks the enemy was, by April 5, dislodged from the main range on the entire seventy-mile front from Regetow to Wolosate. Convinced that we were directing our chief efforts against his flanks, the enemy now strove to break our resistance in the Rostoki direction, but, after sixteen futile attacks, he was obliged to cede the commanding height of Telepovce, our occupation of which will probably compel him to evacuate his positions at Polen and Smolnik and withdraw to the valley of the Cziroka, a tributary of the Laborez.
DEFEAT IN EARLY MAY.
[By The Associated Press.]
_VIENNA, May 13, (via Amsterdam to London, May 14.)--An official statement issued here tonight after recalling that in November and December at Lodz and Limanowa the Austro-Germans compelled the Russians to draw back on a front to the extent of 400 kilometers, (about 249 miles,) thereby stopping the Russian advance into Germany, continues:_
From January to the middle of April the Russians vainly exerted themselves to break through to Hungary, but they completely failed with heavy losses. Thereupon the time had come to crush the enemy in a common attack with a full force of the combined troops of both empires.
A victory at Tarnow and Gorlice freed West Galicia from the enemy and caused the Russian fronts on the Nida and in the Carpathians to give way. In a ten days' battle the victorious troops beat the Russian Third and Eighth Armies to annihilation, and quickly covered the ground from the Dunajec and Beskids to the San River--130 kilometers (nearly 81 miles) of territory.
From May 2 to 12 the prisoners taken numbered 143,500, while 100 guns and 350 machine guns were captured, besides the booty already mentioned. We suppressed small detachments of the enemy scattered in the woods in the Carpathians.
Near Odvzechowa the entire staff of the Russian Forty-eighth Division of Infantry including General Korniloff, surrendered. The best indication of the confusion of the Russian Army is the fact that our Ninth Corps captured in the last few days Russians of fifty-one various regiments. The quantity of captured Russian war material is piled up and has not yet been enumerated.
North of the Vistula the Austro-Hungarian troops are advancing across Stopnica. The German troops have captured Kielce.
East of Uzsok Pass the German and Hungarian troops took several Russian positions on the heights and advanced to the south of Turka, capturing 4,000 prisoners. An attack is proceeding here and in the direction of Skole.
In Southeast Galicia strong hostile troops are attacking across Horodenka.
_BERLIN, (via London,) May 13.--The German War Office announced today that in the recent fighting in Galicia and Russian Poland 143,500 Russians had been captured. It also stated that 69 cannon and 255 machine guns had been taken from the Russians, and that the victorious Austrian and German forces, continuing their advance eastward in Galicia, were approaching the fortress of Przemysl. The statement follows:_
The army under General von Mackensen in the course of its pursuit of the Russians reached yesterday the neighborhood of Subiecko, on the lower Wisloka, and Kolbuezowa, northeast of Debica. Under the pressure of this advance the Russians also retreated from their positions north of the Vistula. In this section the troops under General von Woyrech, closely following the enemy, penetrated as far as the region northwest of Kielce.
In the Carpathians Austro-Hungarian and German troops under General von Linsingen conquered the hills east of the upper Stryi and took 3,650 men prisoners, as well as capturing six machine guns.
At the present moment, while the armies under General von Mackensen are approaching the Przemysl fortress and the lower San, it is possible to form an approximate idea of the booty taken. In the battles of Tarnow and Gorlice, and in the battles during the pursuit of these armies, we have so far taken 103,500 Russian prisoners, 69 cannon, and 255 machine guns. In these figures the booty taken by the allied troops fighting in the Carpathians and north of the Vistula is not included. This amounts to a further 40,000 prisoners.
Mr. Rockefeller and Serbia
[Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
LONDON, Thursday, May 13.--A Paris dispatch to the Exchange Telegraph Company, quoting the Cri de Paris, says:
"John D. Rockefeller has just sent 35,000,000 francs ($5,000,000) to Prince Alexis of Serbia, President of the Serbian Red Cross Society.
"Prince Alexis married last year an American woman, Mrs. Hugo Pratt, whose father loaned years ago £2,000 to Rockefeller when the oil king started in business."
Italy in the War
Her Move Against Austro-Hungary
Last Phase of Italian Neutrality and Causes of the Struggle
DECLARATION OF WAR.
[By The Associated Press.]
_VIENNA, May 23, (via Amsterdam and London, May 24.)--The Duke of Avarna, Italian Ambassador to Austria, presented this afternoon to Baron von Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, the following declaration of war:_
Vienna, May 23, 1915.
Conformably with the order of his Majesty the King, his august sovereign, the undersigned Ambassador of Italy has the honor to deliver to his Excellency, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, the following communication:
"Declaration has been made, as from the fourth of this month, to the Imperial and Royal Government of the grave motives for which Italy, confident in her good right, proclaimed annulled and henceforth without effect her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, which was violated by the Imperial and Royal Government, and resumed her liberty of action in this respect.
"The Government of the King, firmly resolved to provide by all means at its disposal for safeguarding Italian rights and interests, cannot fail in its duty to take against every existing and future menace measures which events impose upon it for the fulfillment of national aspirations.
"His Majesty the King declares that he considers himself from tomorrow in a state of war with Austria-Hungary."
The undersigned has the honor to make known at the same time to his Excellency the Foreign Minister, that passports will be placed this very day at the disposal of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador at Rome, and he will be obliged to his Excellency if he will kindly have his passports handed to him.
Avarna.
FRANCIS JOSEPH'S DEFIANCE.
[By The Associated Press.]
_LONDON, May 24, 5:45 A.M.--A Reuter dispatch from Amsterdam says the Vienna Zeitung publishes the following autograph letter from Emperor Francis Joseph to Count Karl Stuergkh:_
Dear Count Stuergkh: I request you to make public the attached manifesto to my troops:
"VIENNA, May 23.--Francis Joseph to his troops:
"The King of Italy has declared war on me. Perfidy whose like history does not know was committed by the Kingdom of Italy against both allies. After an alliance of more than thirty years' duration, during which it was able to increase its territorial possessions and develop itself to an unthought of flourishing condition, Italy abandoned us in our hour of danger and went over with flying colors into the camp of our enemies.
"We did not menace Italy; did not curtail her authority; did not attack her honor or interests. We always responded loyally to the duties of our alliance and afforded her our protection when she took the field. We have done more. When Italy directed covetous glances across our frontier we, in order to maintain peace and our alliance relation, were resolved on great and painful sacrifices which particularly grieved our paternal heart. But the covetousness of Italy, which believed the moment should be used, was not to be appeased, so fate must be accommodated.
"My armies have victoriously withstood mighty armies in the north in ten months of this gigantic conflict in most loyal comradeship of arms with our illustrious ally. A new and treacherous enemy in the south is to you no new enemy. Great memories of Novara, Mortaro, and Lissa, which constituted the pride of my youth; the spirit of Radetzky, Archduke Albrecht, and Tegetthoff, which continues to live in my land and sea forces, guarantee that in the south also we shall successfully defend the frontiers of the monarchy.
"I salute my battle-tried troops, who are inured to victory. I rely on them and their leaders. I rely on my people for whose unexampled spirit of sacrifice my most paternal thanks are due. I pray the Almighty to bless our colors and take under His gracious protection our just cause."
ITALY'S CABINET EMPOWERED.
[By The Associated Press.]
Rome, May 20.--Amid tremendous enthusiasm the Chamber of Deputies late today adopted, by a vote of 407 to 74, the bill conferring upon the Government full power to make war.
The bill is composed of a single article and reads as follows:
The Government is authorized in case of war and during the duration of war to make decisions with due authority of law, in every respect required, for the defense of the State, the guarantee of public order, and urgent economic national necessities. The provisions contained in Articles 243 to 251 of the Military Code continue in force. The Government is authorized also to have recourse until Dec. 31, 1915, to monthly provisional appropriations for balancing the budget. This law shall come into force the day it is passed.
All members of the Cabinet maintain absolute silence regarding what step will follow the action of the Chamber. Former Ministers and other men prominent in public affairs declare, however, that the action of Parliament virtually was a declaration of war.
When the Chamber reassembled this afternoon after its long recess there were present 482 Deputies out of 500, the absentees remaining away on account of illness. The Deputies especially applauded were those who wore military uniforms and who had asked permission for leave from their military duties to be present at the sitting.
All the tribunes were filled to overflowing. No representatives of Germany, Austria, or Turkey were to be seen in the diplomatic tribune. The first envoy to arrive was Thomas Nelson Page, the American Ambassador, who was accompanied by his staff. M. Barrère, Sir J. Bennell Rodd, and Michel de Giers, the French, British, and Russian Ambassadors, respectively, appeared a few minutes later and all were greeted with applause, which was shared by the Belgian, Greek, and Rumanian Ministers. George B. McClellan, former Mayor of New York, occupied a seat in the President's tribune.
A few minutes before the session began the poet, Gabriele d'Annunzio, one of the strongest advocates of war, appeared in the rear of the public tribune, which was so crowded that it seemed impossible to squeeze in anybody else. But the moment the people saw him they lifted him shoulder high and passed him over their heads to the first row. The entire Chamber and all those occupying the other tribunes rose and applauded for five minutes, crying, "Viva d'Annunzio!" Later thousands sent him their cards, and in return received his autograph, bearing the date of this eventful day.
Signor Marcora, President of the Chamber, took his place at 3 o'clock. All the members of the House and everybody in the galleries stood up to acclaim the old follower of Garibaldi.
Premier Salandra, followed by all the members of the Cabinet, entered shortly afterward. It was a solemn moment. Then a delirium of cries broke out. "Viva Salandra!" roared the Deputies, and the cheering lasted for five minutes. Premier Salandra appeared to be much moved by the demonstration.
After the formalities of the opening Premier Salandra arose and said:
"Gentlemen: I have the honor to present to you a bill to meet the eventual expenditures of a national war"--an announcement that was greeted by further prolonged applause.
The Premier began an exposition of the situation of Italy before the opening of hostilities in Europe. He declared that Italy had submitted to every humiliation from Austria-Hungary for the love of peace. By her ultimatum to Serbia Austria had annulled the equilibrium of the Balkans and prejudiced Italian interests there.
Notwithstanding this evident violation of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, Italy endeavored during long months to avoid a conflict, but these efforts were bound to have a limit in time and dignity. "This is why the Government felt itself forced to present its denunciation of the Triple Alliance on May 4," said Premier Salandra, who had difficulty in quieting the wild cheering that ensued. When he had succeeded in so doing he continued, amid frequent enthusiastic interruptions:
Italy must be united at this moment, when her destinies are being decided. We have confidence in our august chief, who is preparing to lead the army toward a glorious future. Let us gather around this well-beloved sovereign.
Since Italy's resurrection as a State she has asserted herself in the world of nations as a factor of moderation, concord, and peace, and she can proudly proclaim that she has accomplished this mission with a firmness which has not wavered before even the most painful sacrifices.
In the last period, extending over thirty years, she maintained her system of alliances and friendships chiefly with the object of thus assuring the European equilibrium, and, at the same time, peace. In view of the nobility of this aim Italy not only subordinated her most sacred aspiration, but has also been forced to look on, with sorrow, at the methodical attempts to suppress specifically the Italian characteristics which nature and history imprinted on those regions.
The ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Empire addressed last July to Serbia annulled at one blow the effects of a long-sustained effort by violating the pact which bound us to that State, violated the pact, in form, for it omitted to conclude a preliminary agreement with us or even give us notification, and violated it also in substance, for it sought to disturb, to our detriment, the delicate system of territorial possessions and spheres of influence which had been set up in the Balkan Peninsula.
But, more than any particular point, it was the whole spirit of the treaty which was wronged, and even suppressed, for by unloosing in the world a most terrible war, in direct contravention of our interests and sentiments, the balance which the Triple Alliance should have helped to assure was destroyed and the problem of Italy's national integrity was virtually and irresistibly revived.
Nevertheless, for long months, the Government has patiently striven to find a compromise, with the object of restoring to the agreement the reason for being which it had lost. These negotiations were, however, limited not only by time, but by our national dignity. Beyond these limits the interests both of our honor and of our country would have been compromised.
Signor Salandra was interrupted time and time again by rounds of applause from all sides, and the climax was reached when he made a reference to the army and navy. Then the cries seemed interminable, and those on the floor of the House and in the galleries turned to the Military Tribune, from which the officers answered by waving their hands and handkerchiefs. At the end of the Premier's speech there were deafening "vivas" for the King, war, and Italy.
Only thirty-four Intransigent Socialists refused to join in the cheers, even in the cry "Viva Italia!" and they were hooted and hissed.
After the presentation of the bill conferring full powers upon the Government the President of the Chamber submitted the question whether a committee of eighteen members should be elected. Out of the 421 Deputies who voted 367 cast their ballot in the affirmative. The other 54 were against. The opposition was composed of Socialists and some adherents of ex-Premier Giolitti.
Foreign Minister Sonnino then rose, and, taking a copy of the "Green Book" from his pocket, said: "I have the honor to present to the Chamber a book containing an account of all the pourparlers with Austria from the 9th of September to the 4th of May." He handed the book to Signor Marcora.
The Chamber then adjourned until 5 o'clock, when the committee reported in favor of the bill, and it was adopted.
ITALY'S JUSTIFICATION.
_The first complete official statement of the difficulties between Italy and Austria-Hungary, which forced the Italian declaration of war against the Dual Monarchy, was made public in Washington on May 25 by Count V. Macchi di Cellere, the Italian Ambassador. It took the form of a carefully prepared telegraphic statement to the Ambassador from Signor Sonnino, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with instructions that it be delivered in the form of a note to the Government of the United States. After presenting the communication to Secretary Bryan, Count Cellere made public the following translation of its full text:_
The Triple Alliance was essentially defensive and designed solely to preserve the status quo, or, in other words, the equilibrium, in Europe. That these were its only objects and purposes is established by the letter and spirit of the treaty as well as by the intentions clearly described and set forth in official acts of the Ministers who created the alliance and confirmed and renewed it in the interest of peace, which always has inspired Italian policy.
The treaty, as long as its intents and purposes had been loyally interpreted and regarded and as long as it had not been used as a pretext for aggression against others, greatly contributed to the elimination and settlement of causes of conflict, and for many years assured to Europe the inestimable benefits of peace.
But Austria-Hungary severed the treaty by her own hands. She rejected the response of Serbia, which gave to her all the satisfaction she could legitimately claim. She refused to listen to the conciliatory proposals presented by Italy in conjunction with other powers in the effort to spare Europe from a vast conflict certain to drench the Continent with blood and to reduce it to ruin beyond the conception of human imagination, and finally she provoked that conflict.
Article I. of the treaty embodied the usual and necessary obligation of such pacts--the pledge to exchange views upon any fact and economic questions of a general nature that might arise pursuant to its terms. None of the contracting parties had the right to undertake, without a previous agreement, any step the consequence of which might impose a duty upon the other signatories arising out of the Alliance, or which would in any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests. This article was violated by Austria-Hungary when she sent to Serbia her note dated July 23, 1914, an action taken without the previous assent of Italy.
Thus, Austria-Hungary violated beyond doubt one of the fundamental provisions of the treaty. The obligation of Austria-Hungary to come to a previous understanding with Italy was the greater because her obstinate policy against Serbia gave rise to a situation which directly tended to the provocation of a European war.
As far back as the beginning of July, 1914, the Italian Government, preoccupied by the prevailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid before the Austro-Hungarian Government a number of suggestions advising moderation, and warning it of the impending danger of a European outbreak. The course adopted by Austria-Hungary against Serbia constituted, moreover, a direct encroachment upon the general interests of Italy, both political and economical, in the Balkan Peninsula. Austria-Hungary could not for a moment imagine that Italy could remain indifferent while Serbian independence was being trodden upon.
On a number of occasions theretofore Italy gave Austria to understand, in friendly but clear terms, that the independence of Serbia was considered by Italy as essential to Balkan equilibrium. Austria-Hungary was further advised that Italy could never permit that equilibrium to be disturbed to her prejudice. This warning had been conveyed not only by her diplomats in private conversations with responsible Austro-Hungarian officials but was proclaimed publicly by Italian statesmen on the floors of Parliament.
Therefore when Austria-Hungary ignored the usual practices and menaced Serbia by sending her an ultimatum without in any way notifying the Italian Government of what she proposed to do, indeed leaving that Government to learn of her action through the press rather than through the usual channels of diplomacy, when Austria-Hungary took this unprecedented course she not only severed her alliance with Italy but committed an act inimical to Italy's interests.
The Italian Government had obtained trustworthy information that the complete program laid down by Austria-Hungary with reference to the Balkans was prompted by a desire to decrease Italy's economical and political influence in that section, and tended directly and indirectly to the subservience of Serbia to Austria-Hungary, the political and territorial isolation of Montenegro, and the isolation and political decadence of Rumania.
This attempted diminution of the influence of Italy in the Balkans would have been brought about by the Austro-Hungarian program, even though Austria-Hungary had no intention of making further territorial acquisitions. Furthermore attention should be called to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Government had assumed the solemn obligation of prior consultation of Italy as required by the special provisions of Article VII. of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, which, in addition to the obligation of previous agreements, recognized the right of compensation to the other contracting parties in case one should occupy temporarily or permanently any section of the Balkans.
To this end, the Italian Government approached the Austro-Hungarian Government immediately upon the inauguration of Austro-Hungarian hostilities against Serbia, and succeeded in obtaining reluctant acquiescence in the Italian representations. Conversations were initiated immediately after July 23, for the purpose of giving a new lease of life to the treaty which had been violated and thereby annulled by the act of Austria-Hungary.
This object could be attained only by the conclusion of new agreements. The conversations were renewed, with additional propositions as the basis, in December 1914. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna at that time received instructions to inform Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Italian Government considered it necessary to proceed without delay to an exchange of views and consequently to concrete negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the complex situation arising out of the conflict which that Government had provoked.
Count Berchtold at first refused. He declared that the time had not arrived for negotiations. Subsequently, upon our rejoinder, in which the German Government united, Count Berchtold agreed to exchange views as suggested. We promptly declared, as one of our fundamental objects, that the compensation on which the agreement should be based should relate to territories at the time under the dominion of Austria-Hungary.
The discussion continued for months, from the first days of December to March, and it was not until the end of March that Baron Burian offered a zone of territory comprised within a line extending from the existing boundary to a point just north of the City of Trent.
In exchange for this proposed cession the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded a number of pledges, including among them an assurance of entire liberty of action in the Balkans. Note should be made of the fact that the cession of the territory around Trent was not intended to be immediately effective as we demanded, but was to be made only upon the termination of the European war. We replied that the offer was not acceptable, and then presented the minimum concessions which could meet in part our national aspirations and strengthen in an equitable manner our strategic position in the Adriatic.
These demands comprised: The extension of the boundary in Trentino, a new boundary on the Isonzo, special provision for Trieste, the cession of certain islands of the Curzolari Archipelago, the abandonment of Austrian claims in Albania, and the recognition of our possession of Avlona and the islands of the Aegean Sea, which we occupied during our war with Turkey.
At first our demands were categorically rejected. It was not until another month of conversation that Austria-Hungary was induced to increase the zone of territory she was prepared to cede in the Trentino and then only as far as Mezzo Lombardo, thereby excluding the territory inhabited by people of the Italian race, such as the Valle del Noce, Val di Fasso, and Val di Ampezzo. Such a proposal would have given to Italy a boundary of no strategical value. In addition the Austro-Hungarian Government maintained its determination not to make the cession effective before the end of the war.
The repeated refusals of Austria-Hungary were expressly confirmed in a conversation between Baron Burian and the Italian Ambassador at Vienna on April 29. While admitting the possibility of recognizing some of our interests in Avlona and granting the above-mentioned territorial cession in the Trentino, the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted in its opposition to all our other demands, especially those regarding the boundary of the Isonzo, Trieste, and the islands.
The attitude assumed by Austria-Hungary from the beginning of December until the end of April made it evident that she was attempting to temporize without coming to a conclusion. Under such circumstances Italy was confronted by the danger of losing forever the opportunity of realizing her aspirations based upon tradition, nationality, and her desire for a safe position in the Adriatic, while other contingencies in the European conflict menaced her principal interests in other seas.
Hence Italy faced the necessity and duty of recovering that liberty of action to which she was entitled and of seeking protection for her interests, apart from the negotiations which had been dragging uselessly along for five months and without reference to the Treaty of Alliance which had virtually failed as a result of its annullment by the action of Austria-Hungary in July, 1914.
It would not be out of place to observe that the alliance having terminated and there existing no longer any reason for the Italian people to be bound by it, though they had loyally stood by it for so many years because of their desire for peace, there naturally revived in the public mind the grievances against Austria-Hungary which for so many years had been voluntarily repressed.
While the Treaty of Alliance contained no formal agreement for the use of the Italian language or the maintenance of Italian tradition and Italian civilization in the Italian provinces of Austria, nevertheless if the alliance was to be effective in preserving peace and harmony it was indisputably clear that Austria-Hungary, as our ally, should have taken into account the moral obligation of respecting what constituted some of the most vital interests of Italy.
Instead, the constant policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government was to destroy Italian nationality and Italian civilization all along the coast of the Adriatic. A brief statement of the facts and of the tendencies well known to all will suffice.
Substitution of officials of the Italian race by officials of other nationalities; artificial immigration of hundreds of families of a different nationality; replacement of Italian by other labor; exclusion from Trieste by the decree of Prince Hohenlohe of employes who were subjects of Italy; denationalization of the judicial administration; refusal of Austria to permit an Italian university in Trieste, which formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations; denationalization of navigation companies; encouragement of other nationalities to the detriment of the Italian, and, finally, the methodical and unjustifiable expulsion of Italians in ever-increasing numbers.
This deliberate and persistent policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government with reference to the Italian population was not only due to internal conditions brought about by the competition of the different nationalities within its territory, but was inspired in great part by a deep sentiment of hostility and aversion toward Italy, which prevailed particularly in the quarters closest to the Austro-Hungarian Government and influenced decisively its course of action.
Of the many instances which could be cited it is enough to say that in 1911, while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff prepared a campaign against us, and the military party prosecuted energetically a political intrigue designed to drag in other responsible elements of Austria. The mobilization of an army upon our frontier left us in no doubt of our neighbor's sentiment and intentions.
The crisis was settled pacifically through the influence, so far as known, of outside factors; but since that time we have been constantly under apprehension of a sudden attack whenever the party opposed to us should get the upper hand in Vienna. All of this was known in Italy, and it was only the sincere desire for peace prevailing among the Italian people which prevented a rupture.
After the European war broke out, Italy sought to come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary with a view to a settlement satisfactory to both parties which might avert existing and future trouble. Her efforts were in vain, notwithstanding the efforts of Germany, which for months endeavored to induce Austria-Hungary to comply with Italy's suggestions, thereby recognizing the propriety and legitimacy of the Italian attitude. Therefore Italy found herself compelled by the force of events to seek other solutions.
Inasmuch as the Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary had ceased virtually to exist and served only to prolong a state of continual friction and mutual suspicion, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Italian Government considered itself free from the ties arising out of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in so far as Austria-Hungary was concerned. This communication was delivered in Vienna on May 4.
Subsequently to this declaration, and after we had been obliged to take steps for the protection of our interests, the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted new concessions, which, however, were deemed insufficient and by no means met our minimum demands. These offers could not be considered under the circumstances.
The Italian Government, taking into consideration what has been stated above, and supported by the vote of Parliament and the solemn manifestation of the country, came to the decision that any further delay would be inadvisable. Therefore, on this day (May 23) it was declared in the name of the King to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome that, beginning tomorrow, May 24, it will consider itself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Orders to this effect were also telegraphed yesterday to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.
German Hatred of Italy
[By The Associated Press.]
AMSTERDAM, May 23.--The Frankfurter Zeitung today prints a telegram received from Vienna saying:
"The exasperation and contempt which Italy's treacherous surprise attack and her hypocritical justification arouse here (Vienna) are quite indescribable.
"Neither Serbia nor Russia, despite a long and costly war, is hated. Italy, however, or rather those Italian would-be politicians and business men who offer violence to the majority of peaceful Italian people, are so unutterably hated with the most profound honesty that this war can be terrible."
ITALY'S NEUTRALITY--THE LAST PHASE
The attitude of the Italian press since the character of its papers were defined in the May number of THE CURRENT HISTORY is here recorded. Since May 17, when the King, on account of the heated pro-intervention demonstrations held all over Italy, declined to accept the resignation of the Salandra Ministry, the Giolittian organ, the Stampa, of Turin, has dropped something of its feverish neutralistic propaganda, the Giolittian color has gradually faded from the Giornale d'Italia and the Tribuna, while ex-Premier Giolitti himself has left Rome, declaring that he had been misunderstood in having his declaration that Italy could obtain what she desired without fighting construed into meaning that he desired peace at all costs.
It is understood that in the middle of April Austria-Hungary became convinced that neutralistic sentiments might prevail in the peninsula, and consequently became less active in her negotiations with the Salandra Government. Thereupon Italy resumed negotiations with the Entente powers, and on April 14 acknowledged that Serbia should have an opening on the Adriatic Sea. This caused the Austro-Italian negotiations to be heatedly resumed, and on May 18 the German Imperial Chancellor read to the Reichstag the eleven Austro-Hungarian proposals. The text of these proposals, together with the Italian counter-proposals and the Italian exchange of claims in the Adriatic with the Entente powers, will be found outlined in the Italian official statement cabled by Minister Sonnino to the Italian Ambassador at Washington, presented on Page 494.
It must be borne in mind that the press comments are based upon an imperfect knowledge of the ultimate proposals and claims, and that the Italian attitude for rejecting the Austro-Hungarian proposals obviously rests on these grounds:
1. They are inadequate and might be rendered nought in case of the victory of the Entente powers.
2. They do not give Italy a defensive frontier in the north and east.
3. They do not materially improve Italy's commercial and military condition in the Adriatic.
4. They make no mention of Dalmatia and the Dalmatian Archipelago, with their deep harbors and natural fortifications--a curious contrast to the lowland harbors of the Italian coast opposite.
The Italian demands take into account the possible victory of the Entente powers.
In the circumstances, it is best to begin with an extract from a German paper, as there seems to be an impression abroad that Germany has not appreciated Italy's reasons for not joining with her allies at the beginning of the war and has conducted a propaganda discrediting her willingness to remain neutral provided the Austro-Hungarian concessions proved sufficient and were sufficiently guaranteed.
THE GERMAN VIEW.
_From the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 3._
Article VII. of the Austro-German-Italian Treaty, the terms of which have never before been made public, not only provides for the right of compensation in case one party to the contract enriches itself territorially in the Balkans, but also forbids either Austria or Italy to undertake anything in the Balkans without the consent of the other....
In the Tripoli war, when the energetic Duca degli Abruzzi made his advance in the Adriatic against Prevesa and wished to force the Porte to yield through a serious action in the Dardanelles, and when Italy wished to extend her occupation of the Aegean Islands, which lie as advance posts before the Dardanelles, she was obliged to forego her aims, and did loyally forego them, because Austria at that time did not yet desire a movement on the then still quiescent Balkan Peninsula. According to the Italian view, Austria, in determining to liquidate her matured account with Serbia without coming to an agreement in the matter with Italy, canceled the treaty in an important and essential part, irrespective of the assurance that she contemplated merely punishment of Serbia and not the acquisition of territory in the Balkans. The Italian policy considered itself from that moment free from every obligation, even if the speech of Premier Salandra in December could not be interpreted as a formal denunciation of the Dreibund....
We have today good grounds for assuming that much as we must reckon with the fact that the country is determined to go to war if nothing is granted to it, just so little would it support a Government bent on making war because it does not receive anything.
It will be as impossible to solve the Trentino question from the point of view of abstract right as to solve any other iridescent question in that way. The Trentino question, which was long a question of national, historical, and ethnological idealism, has now become a real question of power. The European war and its developments have placed Italy in a position to use her power in order to expand. This is not unusual in history....
But it should be carefully noted that only to an Italy remaining within the Triple Alliance can compensation be given, and, of course, only on the basis of complete reciprocity--(zug um zugleistung gegen leistung). To demand anything whatsoever Italy has no right. On the other hand, the ignoble exploitation of the needs of an ally fighting for her existence would correspond neither with the generosity of the Italian nature nor with her real interests.
The honest path for Italy, who finds herself unable to enter the war on the side of her allies in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance, is to preserve unconditional neutrality. A simple discussion between the leading statesmen of all the three powers will banish every shade of misunderstanding and clear the situation. Italy will spare her strength for the great task on the other side of the Mediterranean and for her correct and sensible attitude will receive, under the guarantee of her friend, (Germany,) the promise of the fulfillment of her comprehensible desire. Any other policy would be foolish and criminal.
ITALY AND ENGLAND.
_From the Giornale d'Italia, March 26._
It is known in London, we believe, that Italy is firmly resolved to assure her own future in whatever manner seems best. A seafaring, agricultural, industrial, mercantile, emigrant people like the Italian must for its very existence conquer its own place in the sun, cannot endure hegemonies of any kind, cannot suggest exclusions, oppressions, or prohibitions of any kind, but must defend at any cost its own liberty, not only political, but economic and maritime. Italy is resolved to defend à outrance that sum total of her rights in which the whole future is inclosed. A people does not spend for nothing in a few months $300,000,000 to complete its military preparations and does not intrust for nothing, with a great example of concord, the most ample powers to the Government.
_From the Messaggero, April 1._
As Prince von Bülow's negotiations have apparently failed, Italy naturally addresses herself to England. There is, however, this difficulty: England has already made arrangements with France and Russia for the solution of the questions of the Dardanelles and Asia Minor, whereas Italy wishes to have her say in these questions before giving her assistance to the Triple Entente. Moreover, there are Greek aspirations in the Levant and Serbian in the Adriatic to be reconciled with those of Italy. Consequently the situation is not easy.
_From the Stampa, April 11._
Not only must Italy have her natural frontiers on the east restored, not only must she have her legitimate supremacy in the Adriatic assured, not only must she safeguard her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire, but she must also see assured in the Western Mediterranean a greater guarantee for the safety of herself and her possessions and wider liberty of action than that of which she has recently had painful experience. These things must be guaranteed by an alliance with either Russia or with England....
Before having solved this difficulty any decision in favor of war would be a leap in the dark, an act of inconceivable political blindness. It would be, to adopt a rough, but inevitable, term, a veritable betrayal.
_From the Giornale d'Italia of April 12, in criticising the foregoing._
We absolutely fail to understand the motive which induced the Piedmontese journal to print matter so calculated to confuse public opinion. Indeed, the care with which our contemporary seeks to embarrass Italian diplomatic action seems somewhat strange and cannot escape the blame of all those who think it necessary not to hamper the liberty of action conceded to the Government almost unanimously by Parliament and by the people....
It seems almost as though the Piedmontese journal had no thought but to put insoluble problems to the Government, in the face of public opinion, so as to try to prejudice its action in advance. The Stampa's program practically means that to the diplomatic rupture with the Central Empires would be added another diplomatic rupture with the Triple Entente, thus insuring the isolation which the Stampa professes to fear so much.
_From the Corriere della Sera, April 12._
The article in the Stampa, which appears ultra-nationalist, is in reality purely neutralist. Italian aspirations must be kept within reasonable bounds. What would happen to Italy if demands were put forward which the Entente could not entertain? Quite apart from questions of direct interest and gain, other factors must be taken into account. There is the danger to Italy in case of the success of her late allies, which would mean the prostration of France, the annexation of Belgium to Germany, the arrival of Austria at Saloniki, British naval hegemony replaced by German, the revival of Turkey, and the consequent ambition to resume possession of lost territories.
ADRIATIC PROBLEM.
_From the Politika of Belgrade, March 30._
Italy is claiming not only Italian territories which are under Austro-Hungarian domination, but also a very considerable part of the most purely southern Slav regions. Italy will have to realize one simple fact. Until this war Serbia was closed in on all sides by Austria-Hungary. She therefore asked that Europe should secure for her from Austria-Hungary at least a free outlet to the Adriatic, the price of which she had already paid in blood.
The two Balkan wars were waged primarily for the same thing, since they were wars of liberation. Today it is no longer a question of the economic independence of Serbia, since Austria-Hungary is passing from the scene, but it is a matter of the liberation and of the union into a single State of our race as a whole. This is the idea which at this moment governs the masses of our people, and the numberless graves of our fallen heroes testify to the sacrifice which we have made for the sake of this idea. Whoever, therefore, opposes our national union is an enemy of our race.
Deeply as it would pain Serbia to uproot out of her heart the sympathy which she feels for Italy, she will none the less do so without fail if ever it should become manifest that Italy's present policy signifies that she desires not only to consolidate her legitimate interests, but also to encroach upon the Balkans by attacking Serbia.
_From the Giornale d'Italia, April 4._
No one in Italy has ever said or thought that in the event of a bouleversement in the Adriatic and the Balkans there should be denied to Serbia or any Slav State which might arise from the ruins of Austria-Hungary a wide outlet to the Adriatic. But, on the other hand, no one in Italy could ever permit that the reversion of Austria's strategic maritime position should fall into any hands but ours.
There are political and military considerations which are above any question of nationality whatever. It should be enough to cite the example of an England which holds a Spanish Gibraltar and an Italian Malta, besides a Greek Cyprus and the Egyptian Suez Canal. It should be enough to recall the claim made by all the press of Petrograd to establish Russia at Constantinople and on the banks of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, in spite of all the principles of nationality, Balkan or Turk.
Let the Serbians, in case of an Adriatic and Balkan upset, have an ample outlet to the Adriatic, but do not let them aspire to conquer a predominance in that sea. The Italian people is not, and can not be at this moment, either phil or phobe regarding any other people. The existence, or at least the future, of all the nations is at stake today, and whoever desires the friendship of Italy must begin by loyally recognizing her rights and interests.
_From the Giornale d'Italia of April 19._
We reject altogether the idea that Italy would be satisfied with the western portion of Istria, leaving the rest of the Eastern Adriatic shore to the Croatians and Serbians. While Italy would certainly gain by the possession of Trieste and Pola, the strategic position in the Adriatic would still be exceedingly disadvantageous, especially as the Slav claim advanced by certain Russian newspapers, (that Croatia become an autonomous State and divide Dalmatia with Serbia,) includes the right to maintain fortified naval bases on the eastern shore.
This would merely mean exchanging Austrian strategical predominance for Slavonic, and, consequently, Russian predominance nearly as threatening to Italian interests.
The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution once for all of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved only by one method--by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war fleet. Otherwise the existing most difficult situation in the Adriatic will be perpetuated and in time inevitably aggravated.
_From the Messaggero of April 21._
We understand that an Italian-Russian accord has been practically concluded. This accord refers both to the war, on which Italy will shortly embark, as well as to the peace which will be finally signed. The French and British Governments have taken an active part in facilitating this accord, as it deals with other questions besides that of the Adriatic.
_From Idea Nazionale, May 10._
Italy desires war:
1. In order to obtain Trent, Trieste, and Dalmatia. The country desires it. A nation which has the opportunity to free its land should do so as a matter of imperative necessity. If the Government and the institutions will not make war, they render themselves guilty of high treason toward the country.
2. We desire war in order to conquer for ourselves a good strategic frontier in the north and east in place of the treacherous one which we now have. When a nation can assure the protection of its domain it ought to do so, otherwise its future will have less. It is a necessary duty. There is no other alternative but this--either complete the work or betray what has already been done.
3. We desire war because today in the Adriatic, the Balkan Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and Asia Italy should have all the advantages it is possible for her to have and without which her political, economic, and moral power would diminish in proportion as that of others augmented. To this has the Hon. Salandra borne witness. If we should avoid war we desire less than his words most sacredly proclaimed to the nation in Parliament. If we would be a great power we must accept certain obligations; one of them is war in order to keep us a great power. If we do not want to be a great power any longer, we deliberately and vilely betray ourselves.
The foregoing are the three reasons for entering the war--reasons which are tangible, material, and comprehensive.
_From the Giornale d'Italia, May 12._
Italy is determined to realize her national aspirations, cost what it may. For this reason the Government has hastened its preparations for war which, when completed, caused Austria to offer compensations, thus tacitly acknowledging the claims of Italy.
When the Austro-Italian negotiations were begun Signor Giolitti most unfortunately obstructed their successful issue by his inopportune letter declaring that war was unnecessary. Nevertheless, owing to the firmness of the Government and the determination to resort to war, the conversations were resumed. However, Austria, aside from offering insufficient concessions, assumed a waiting policy and sought secretly to conclude a secret peace with Russia. Thereupon the Italian Government opened negotiations with the Allies, which had the effect of increasing the offers of Austria.
During the ultimate, delicate phase of the conversations, when those who advocate neutrality are causing great injury to the interests of the country and also helping its enemies, the Government, reposing in the support of the people, is determined to expose the intrigues and conspiracies intended to favor the Austrians and Germans.
Hence the Government will, if necessary, make an appeal to Parliament. Meanwhile, it will conserve its power and righteously defend the interests of the country.
ANNUNCIATION
By Ernst Lissauer.
_Ernst Lissauer, the author of the famous "Song of Hate Against England" has written a second poem entitled "Bread," and directed against the British policy of cutting off Germany's food supply. The poem was published in the Bonner Zeitung and reprinted in the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 26, 1915. Following is a translation:_
With arms they cannot overpower us, With hunger they would fain devour us; Foe beside foe in an iron ring. Has want crossed our borders, or hunger, or dearth? Listen: I chant the tidings of Spring: Our soil is our ally in this great thing; Already new bread is growing in the earth.
ADMONITION:
Save the food and guard and hoard! Bread is a sword.
PRAYER:
The peasants have sown the seed again. Now gather and pray the prayer of the grain: Earth of our land, With arms they cannot overpower us, With hunger they would fain devour us, Arise thou in thy harvest wrath! Thick grow thy grass, rich the reaper's path! Dearest soil of earth Our prayer hear: Show them of little worth, Shame them with blade and ear.
THE DARDANELLES
ALLIES' SECOND CAMPAIGN WITH FLEETS AND LAND FORCES.
The first campaign to force the passage of the Dardanelles by fleet operations alone was suddenly halted on March 19, 1915, when floating mines carried by the swift currents destroyed and sank three battleships. An appraisal of the real difficulties attendant upon reducing the forts and batteries lining the European and Asiatic shores, which determined the Allies upon their present joint operations by land and sea, is found in the subjoined dispatch, presented in part from E. Ashmead-Bartlett, appearing in The London Daily Telegraph of April 26. It is followed by full press reports from the Dardanelles describing the difficult landing and establishment of the Allied troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Eastern Mediterranean, April 12.
The days of the Turk in Europe are numbered, but no one will deny that he is dying hard and game. It came as a disagreeable shock to many to read on the morning of March 19 that two British battleships and one French had been sunk in the Dardanelles, while several others had been hit and damaged.
We were told that the outer forts had been completely destroyed and that the work of mine sweeping had made excellent progress. This news was given in perfect good faith and was also quite true, but we built up on it too great a structure of hope, but few realizing the immense difficulties the fleet has had to face--obstacles which do not really commence until the Narrows are approached. The combined advance of the allied fleet up the Dardanelles on March 18 was not an attempt to pass the Narrows. It was merely intended as a great demonstration against the forts, in order that the destroyers and sweepers might clear the minefield under cover of the guns of the ships.
This work was carried out in the most gallant manner and was perfectly successful, but unfortunately the further advance had to be abandoned, owing to the sudden and unexpected disasters to three vessels inflicted by drifting mines. But the price paid cannot be considered too high when one remembers the issues at stake and the vast bearing they may have on the future of the war. The Turks have always believed the Dardanelles to be impregnable, and this belief has been accepted as the truth by most lay minds until the navy started to put the issue to the test. Then, for some unknown reason, here came a quite unjustifiable wave of optimism, which swept over the country until the eyes of the public were opened by the events of March 18.
In the old days of sailing ships the Dardanelles were a most formidable obstacle which no Admiral would have faced with confidence.
It was almost impossible to overcome the obstacles in the early days of the nineteenth century. The difficulties and dangers of the passage have been increased tenfold now by long-range weapons, torpedoes, and mines. Nevertheless, the navy is of opinion that the Narrows can be forced, in spite of these obstacles, and this opinion has been strengthened and confirmed by the great trial of March 18. It might mean the loss of ships, but if the occasion justified the sacrifice the fleet would not hesitate to make the attempt.
But, unless there is a powerful army ready to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula the moment the fleet passed into the Sea of Marmora or made its way to Constantinople, the strait would immediately be closed behind it, and, supposing the Turks, backed up by German officers and German intrigues, decided to continue the war, it would have to fight its way out and again clear the minefield. It has long been an accepted axiom of naval warfare that ships are of no use against forts, or that they fight at such a disadvantage that it is not worth while employing them for such a purpose.
This axiom must now be modified, after the experience which the fleet has gained in the present operations against the Dardanelles. Any fort built of stone or concrete, however strong, can be put out of action by direct fire from guns, if only a clear view of it can be obtained, or provided aeroplanes are available to "spot" for the gunners, to signal back results, and correct the fire.
The Landing at Gallipoli
_The following series of dispatches sent by a special correspondent of The London Times at the Dardanelles describes the first phase of the operations resulting in the landing of the allied troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula:_
Dardanelles, April 24.
The great venture has at last been launched, and the entire fleet of warships and transports is now steaming toward the shores of Gallipoli.
Yesterday the weather showed signs of moderating, and about 5 o'clock in the afternoon the first of the transports slowly made its way through the maze of shipping toward the entrance of Mudros Bay. Immediately the patent apathy which has gradually overwhelmed every one changed to the utmost enthusiasm, and as the huge liners steamed through the fleet, their decks yellow with khaki, the crews of the warships cheered them on to victory, while the bands played them out with an unending variety of popular airs. The soldiers in the transports answered this last salutation from the navy with deafening cheers, and no more inspiring spectacle has ever been seen than this great expedition setting forth for better or for worse.
It required splendid organization and skilled leadership to get this huge fleet clear of the bay without confusion or accidents, but not one has occurred, and the majority are now safely on the high seas steaming toward their respective destinations.
The whole of the fleet and the transports have been divided up into five divisions and there will be three main landings. The Twenty-ninth Division will disembark off the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula near Sedd-el-Bahr, where its operations can be covered both from the Gulf of Saros and from the Dardanelles by the fire of the covering warships. The Australian and New Zealand contingent will disembark north of Gaba Tepe. Further north the Naval Division will make a demonstration.
The difficulties and dangers of the enterprise are enormous and are recognized by all.
Never before has the attempt been made to land so large a force in the face of an enemy who has innumerable guns, many thousands of trained infantry, and who has had months of warning in which to prepare his positions. Nevertheless, there is a great feeling of confidence throughout all ranks, and the men are delighted that at length the delays are over and the real work is about to begin.
Last night the transports were merely taking up their positions, and the real exit of the armada from Mudros commenced this afternoon at about 2 o'clock. The weather, which was threatening at an early hour, has now become perfectly calm, and if it only lasts the conditions will be ideal for a rapid disembarkation.
Throughout the morning transports steamed out to take up their respective positions in the open sea. The same enthusiastic scenes were witnessed as yesterday. The covering forces will be put ashore from certain battleships, while others will sweep the enemy's positions with their guns and endeavor to prevent them from shelling the troops while disembarking. It is generally considered that the critical period of the operations will be the first twenty-four hours, and the success or failure of the whole enterprise will depend on whether these covering parties are able to obtain a firm foothold and seize the positions which have been assigned to them. Every detail has been worked out and rehearsed, and every officer and man should now know the peculiar rôle which has been assigned to him.
The navy will have entire charge of the landing of these thousands of men. Beach parties will go ashore with the first of the troops, and officers from the ships will direct the movements of all the boats as they bring the troops ashore.
This battleship belongs to a division which will consist of the Australians, who are to land near Gaba Tepe. We are one of the landing ships, and this afternoon received on board 500 officers and men of the Australian contingent who are to form part of the covering force. They are a magnificent body of men, and full of enthusiasm for the honorable and dangerous rôle given to them.
At 2 o'clock the flagship of this division took up her position at the head of the line. We passed down through the long line of slowly moving transports amid tremendous cheering, and were played out of the bay by the French warships. No sight could have been finer than this spectacle of long lines of warships and transports, each making for its special rendezvous without any delay or confusion.
At 4 o'clock this afternoon the ship's company and the troops were assembled on the quarterdeck to hear the Captain read out Admiral de Robeck's proclamation to the combined forces. This was followed by a last service before battle, in which the chaplain uttered a prayer for victory and called for the Divine blessing on the expedition, while the whole of the ship's company and troops on board stood with uncovered and bowed heads. We are steaming slowly through this momentous night toward the coast and are due at our rendezvous at 3 A.M. tomorrow, (Sunday,) a day which has so often brought victory to the British flag.
THE SECOND DISPATCH.
Dardanelles, April 25.
Slowly through the night of April 24 our squadron, which was to land the covering force of the Australian contingent just north of Gaba Tepe, steamed toward its destination. The troops on board were the guests of the crews, and our generous sailors entertained them royally. At dusk all lights were extinguished, and very shortly afterward the troops retired for a last rest before their ordeal at dawn.
At 1 A.M. the ships arrived off their appointed rendezvous, five miles from the landing place, and stopped. The soldiers were aroused from their slumbers and were served with a last hot meal. A visit to the mess decks showed these Australians, the majority of whom were about to go into action for the first time under the most trying circumstances, possessed at 1 o'clock in the morning courage to be cheerful, quiet, and confident. There was no sign of nerves or undue excitement such as one might very reasonably have expected.
At 1:20 A.M. the signal was given from the flagship to lower the boats, which had been left swinging from the davits throughout the night. Our steam pinnaces were also lowered to take them in tow. The troops fell in in their assigned places on the quarterdeck, and the last rays of the waning moon lit up a scene which will ever be memorable in our history.
On the quarterdeck, backed by the great 12-inch guns, this splendid body of colonial troops were drawn up in serried ranks, fully equipped, and receiving their last instructions from their officers who, six months ago, like their men, were leading a peaceful civilian life in Australia and New Zealand 5,000 miles away. Now at the call of the empire they were about to disembark on a strange unknown shore, in a strange land, and attack an enemy of a different race. By the side of the soldiers the beach parties of our splendid bluejackets and marines were marshaled, arrayed in old white uniforms dyed khaki color and carrying the old rifle and old equipment.
These men were to take charge of the boats, steer them ashore, and row them to the beach when they were finally cast off by the towing pinnaces. Each boat was in charge of a young midshipman, many of whom have come straight from Dartmouth after a couple of terms and now found themselves called upon to play a most difficult and dangerous rôle like men. Commanders, Lieutenants, and special beach officers had charge of the whole of the towing parties and went ashore with the troops.
At 2:05 A.M. the signal was given for the troops to embark in the boats which were lying alongside, and this was carried out with great rapidity, in absolute silence, and without a hitch or an accident of any kind. Each one of the three ships which had embarked troops transferred them to four small boats apiece towed by a steam pinnace, and in this manner the men of the covering force were conveyed to the shore. More of the Australian Brigade were carried in destroyers, which were to go close in shore and land them from boats as soon as those towed by the pinnaces had reached the beach.
At 3 A.M. it was quite dark and all was ready for the start. The tows were cast off by the battleships and the ladders taken in and the decks cleared for action, the crews going to general quarters. Then we steamed slowly toward the shore, each of the battleships being closely followed by her tows, which looked exactly like huge snakes gliding relentlessly after their prey. I do not suppose the suppressed excitement of this last half hour will ever be forgotten by those who were present. No one could tell at the last minute what would happen. Would the enemy be surprised or would he be ready on the alert to pour a terrible fire on the boats as they approached the beach?
The whole operation had been timed to allow the pinnaces and boats to reach the beach just before daybreak so that the Turks, if they had been forewarned, would not be able to see to fire before the Australians had obtained a firm footing and, it was hoped, good cover on the foreshore.
Exactly at 4:10 A.M. the three battleships in line abreast four cables apart arrived about 2,500 yards from the shore, which was just discernible in the gloom. The engines were stopped, guns were manned, and the powerful searchlights made ready for use if required. The tows, which up to this time had followed astern, were ordered to advance to the shore. The battleships took up positions somewhat further out on either flank, for to them was assigned the duty of supporting the attack with their guns as soon as light allowed.
Very slowly the snakes of boats steamed past the battleships, the gunwales almost flush with the water, so crowded were they with khaki figures. Then each lot edged in toward one another so as to reach the beach four cables apart. So anxious were we on board the battleships that it seemed as if the loads were too heavy for the pinnaces, or that some mysterious power was holding them back, and that they would never reach the shore before daybreak and thus lose the chance of a surprise.
The distance between the battleships and the boats did not seem to diminish, but only for the reason that we steamed very slowly in after them until the water gradually shallowed. Every eye and every glass was fixed on that grim-looking line of hills in our front, so shapeless, yet so menacing, in the gloom.
At 4:50 A.M. the enemy suddenly showed an alarm light, which flashed for ten minutes and then disappeared. The next three minutes after its first appearance passed in breathless anxiety. We could just discern the dull outline of the boats which appeared to be almost on the beach. Just previously to this seven destroyers conveying the other men of the brigade glided noiselessly through the intervals between the battleships and followed the boats in shore.
At 4:53 A.M. there suddenly came a very sharp burst of rifle fire from the beach, and we knew our men were at last at grips with the enemy. This fire lasted only for a few minutes and then was drowned by a faint British cheer wafted to us over the waters. How comforting and inspiring was the sound at such a moment! It seemed like a message sent to tell us that the first position had been won and a firm hold obtained on the beach.
At 5:03 A.M. the fire intensified, and we could tell from the sound that our men were firing. It lasted until 5:28 and then died down somewhat. No one on board knew what was happening, although dawn was gradually breaking, because we were looking due east into the sun slowly rising behind the hills, which are almost flush with the foreshore, and there was also a haze. Astern at 5:26 we saw the outline of some of the transports, gradually growing bigger and bigger as they approached the coast. They were bringing up the remainder of the Austrians and New Zealanders.
The first authentic news we received came with the return of our boats. A steam pinnace came alongside with two recumbent forms on her deck and a small figure, pale but cheerful, and waving his hand astern. They were one of our midshipmen, just 16 years of age, shot through the stomach, but regarding his injury more as a fitting consummation to a glorious holiday ashore than a wound, and a chief stoker and petty officer, all three wounded by that first burst of musketry which caused many casualties in the boats just as they reached the beach.
From them we learned what had happened in those first wild moments. All the tows had almost reached the beach, when a party of Turks intrenched almost on the shore opened up a terrible fusillade from rifles and also from a Maxim. Fortunately most of the bullets went high, but, nevertheless, many men were hit as they sat huddled together 40 or 50 in a boat.
It was a trying moment, but the Australian volunteers rose as a man to the occasion. They waited neither for orders nor for the boats to reach the beach, but, springing out into the sea, they waded ashore and, forming some sort of a rough line, rushed straight on the flashes of the enemy's rifles. Their magazines were not even charged. So they just went in with cold steel, and I believe I am right in saying that the first Ottoman Turk since the last Crusade received an Anglo-Saxon bayonet in him at five minutes after 5 A.M. on April 25. It was over in a minute. The Turks in this first trench were bayoneted or ran away, and a Maxim gun was captured.
Then the Australians found themselves facing an almost perpendicular cliff of loose sandstone, covered with thick shrubbery, and somewhere half way up the enemy had a second trench strongly held, from which they poured a terrible fire on the troops below and the boats pulling back to the destroyers for the second landing party.
Here was a tough proposition to tackle in the darkness, but these colonials are practical above all else, and they went about it in a practical way. They stopped a few moments to pull themselves together and to get rid of their packs, which no troops should carry in an attack, and then charged their magazines. Then this race of athletes proceeded to scale the cliffs without responding to the enemy's fire. They lost some men, but did not worry, and in less than a quarter of an hour the Turks were out of their second position, either bayoneted or in full flight.
THE THIRD DISPATCH.
Dardanelles, April 26.
After the events I have previously described, the light gradually became better and we could see from the London what was happening on the beach. It was then discovered that the boats had landed rather further north of Gaba Tepe than was originally intended, at a point where the sandstone cliffs rise very sharply from the water's edge. As a matter of fact, this error probably turned out a blessing in disguise, because there was no glacis down which the enemy's infantry could fire, and the numerous bluffs, ridges, and broken ground afford good cover to troops once they have passed the forty or fifty yards of flat, sandy beach.
This ridge, under which the landing was made, stretches due north from Gaba Tepe and culminates in the height of Coja Chemen, which rises 950 feet above the sea level. The whole forms part of a confused triangle of hills, valleys, ridges, and bluffs which stretches right across the Gallipoli Peninsula to the Bay of Bassi Liman above the Narrows. The triangle is cut in two by the valley through which flows the stream known as Bokali Deresi.
It is indeed a formidable and forbidding land. To the sea it presents a steep front, broken up into innumerable ridges, bluffs, valleys, and sand pits, which rise to a height of several hundred feet. The surface is either a kind of bare and very soft yellow sandstone, which crumbles when you tread on it, or else it is covered with very thick shrubbery about six feet in height.
It is, in fact, an ideal country for irregular warfare, such as the Australians and New Zealanders were soon to find to their cost. You cannot see a yard in front of you, and so broken is the ground that the enemy's snipers were able to lie concealed within a few yards of the lines of infantry without it being possible to locate them. On the other hand, the Australians and New Zealanders have proved themselves adepts at this form of warfare, which requires the display of great endurance in climbing over the cliffs and offers scope for a display of that individuality which you find highly developed in these colonial volunteers. To organize anything like a regular attack on such ground is almost impossible, as the officers cannot see their men, who, the moment they move forward in open order, are lost among the thick scrub.
In the early part of the day very heavy casualties were suffered in the boats which conveyed the troops from the destroyers, tugs, and transports to the beach. As soon as it became light, the enemy's sharpshooters, hidden everywhere, simply concentrated their fire on the boats. Then they got close in. At least three boats, having broken away from their tows, drifted down the coast, under no control, and were sniped at the whole way, steadily losing men.
All praise is due to the splendid conduct of the officers, midshipmen, and men who formed the beach parties and whose duty it was to pass backward and forward under a terrible fusillade which it was impossible to check in the early part of the day.
The work of disembarking went on mechanically under this fire at almost point-blank range. You saw the crowded boats cast off from the pinnaces, tugs, and destroyers, and laboriously pulled ashore by six or eight seamen. The moment it reached the beach the troops jumped out and doubled for cover to the foot of the bluffs, over some forty yards of beach. But the gallant crews of the boats had then to pull them out under a dropping fire from a hundred points where the enemy's marksmen lay hidden amid the sand and shrubs.
Throughout the whole of April 25 the landing of troops, stores, and munitions had to be carried out under these conditions, but the gallant sailors never failed their equally gallant comrades ashore. Every one, from the youngest midshipman, straight from Dartmouth and under fire for the first time, to the senior officers in charge, did their duty nobly.
When it became light the covering warships endeavored to support the troops on shore by a heavy fire from their secondary armament, but at this time, the positions of the enemy being unknown, the support was necessarily more moral than real. When the sun was fully risen and the haze had disappeared we could see that the Australians had actually established themselves on the top of the ridge and were evidently trying to work their way northward along it. At 8:45 the fire from the hills became intense and lasted for about half an hour, when it gradually died down, but only for a short time. Then it reopened and lasted without cessation throughout the remainder of the day. The fighting was so confused and took place among such broken ground that it is extremely difficult to follow exactly what did happen throughout the morning and afternoon of April 25. The rôle assigned to the covering force was splendidly carried out up to a certain point, and a firm footing was obtained on the crest of the ridge which allowed the disembarkation of the remainder of the force to go on uninterruptedly, except for the never-ceasing sniping.
But then the Australians, whose blood was up, instead of intrenching themselves and waiting developments, pushed northward and eastward inland in search of fresh enemies to tackle with the bayonet. The ground is so broken and ill-defined that it was very difficult to select a position to intrench, especially as, after the troops imagined they had cleared a section, they were continually being sniped from all sides. Therefore, they preferred to continue the advance.
It is impossible for any army to defend a long beach in any force, especially when you do not know exactly where an attack will be made, and when your troops will come under the fire of the guns of warships. The Turks, therefore, only had a comparatively weak force actually holding the beach, and they seemed to have relied on the difficult nature of the ground and their scattered snipers to delay the advance until they would bring up reinforcements from the interior. Some of the Australians who had pushed inland were counter-attacked and almost outflanked by these on-coming reserves and had to fall back after suffering very heavy casualties.
It was then the turn of the Turks to counter-attack, and this they continued to do throughout the afternoon, but the Australians never yielded a foot of ground on the main ridge, and reinforcements were continually poured up from the beach as fresh troops were disembarked from the transports. The enemy's artillery fire, however, presented a very difficult problem. As soon as the light became good the Turks enfiladed the beach with two field guns from Gaba Tepe and with two others from the north. This shrapnel fire was incessant and deadly. In vain did the warships endeavor to put them out of action with their secondary armament. For some hours they could not be accurately located, or else were so well protected that our shells failed to do them any harm. The majority of the heavy casualties suffered during the day were from shrapnel, which swept the beach and the ridge on which the Australians and New Zealanders had established themselves.
Later in the day the two guns to the north were silenced or forced to withdraw to a fresh position, from which they could no longer enfilade the beach, and a cruiser, moving in close to the shore, so plastered Gaba Tepe with a hail of shell that the guns there were also silenced and have not attempted to reply since.
As the enemy brought up reinforcements toward dusk his attacks became more and more vigorous, and he was supported by a powerful artillery inland which the ships' guns were powerless to deal with. The pressure on the Australians and New Zealanders became heavier, and the line they were occupying had to be contracted for the night. General Birwood and his staff went ashore in the afternoon and devoted all their energies to securing the position, so as to hold firmly to it until the following morning, when it was hoped to get some field guns in position to deal with the enemy's artillery.
Some idea of the difficulty to be faced may be gathered when it is remembered that every round of ammunition, all water, and all supplies had to be landed on a narrow beach and then carried up pathless hills, valleys, and bluffs, several hundred feet high, to the firing line. The whole of this mass of troops, concentrated on a very small area, and unable to reply, were exposed to a relentless and incessant shrapnel fire, which swept every yard of the ground, although fortunately a great deal of it was badly aimed or burst too high. The reserves were engaged in road making and carrying supplies to the crests and in answering the calls for more ammunition.
A serious problem was getting away the wounded from the shore, where it was impossible to keep them. All those who were unable to hobble to the beach had to be carried down from the hills on stretchers, then hastily dressed, and carried to the boats. The boat and beach parties never stopped working throughout the entire day and night.
The courage displayed by these wounded Australians will never be forgotten. Hastily dressed and placed in trawlers, lighters, and ships' boats, they were towed to the ships. I saw some lighters full of bad cases. As they passed the battleship, some of those on board recognized her as the ship they had left that morning, whereupon, in spite of their sufferings and discomforts, they set up a cheer, which was answered by a deafening shout of encouragement from our crew.
I have, in fact, never seen the like of these wounded Australians in war before, for as they were towed among the ships, while accommodation was being found for them, although many were shot to bits and without hope of recovery, their cheers resounded through the night, and you could just see, amid a mass of suffering humanity, arms being waved in greeting to the crews of the warships. They were happy, because they knew they had been tried for the first time in the war and had not been found wanting. They had been told to occupy the heights and hold on, and this they had done for fifteen mortal hours under an incessant shell fire, without the moral and material support of a single gun ashore, and subjected the whole time to the violent counter-attacks of a brave enemy, led by skilled leaders, while his snipers, hidden in caves and thickets and among the dense scrub, made a deliberate practice of picking off every officer who endeavored to give a word of command or to lead his men forward.
No finer feat of arms has been performed during the war than this sudden landing in the dark, this storming of the heights, and, above all, the holding on to the position thus won while reinforcements were being poured from the transports. These raw colonial troops, in those desperate hours, proved themselves worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mons and the Aisne, Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle.
THE FOURTH DISPATCH.
Dardanelles, April 27.
Throughout the night of the 25th and the early morning of the 26th there was continual fighting, as the Turks made repeated attacks to endeavor to drive the Australians and New Zealanders from their positions. On several occasions parties of the colonials made local counter-attacks and drove the enemy off with the bayonet, which the Turks will never face.
On the morning of the 26th it became known that the enemy had been very largely reinforced during the night and was preparing for a big assault from the northeast. This movement began about 9:30 A.M. From the ships we could see large numbers of the enemy creeping along the top of the hills endeavoring to approach our positions under cover and then to annoy our troops with their incessant sniping. He had also brought up more guns during the night, and plastered the whole position once again with shrapnel.
The rifle and machine-gun fire became heavy and unceasing. But the enemy were not going to be allowed to have matters all their own way with their artillery. Seven warships had moved in close to the shore, while the Queen Elizabeth, further out, acted as a kind of chaperone to the lot. Each covered a section of the line, and when the signal was given opened up a bombardment of the heights and valleys beyond which can only be described as terrific.
Turkish infantry moved forward to the attack. They were met by every kind of shell which our warships carry, from 15-inch shrapnel from the Queen Elizabeth, each one of which contains 20,000 bullets, to 12-inch, 6-inch, and 12-pounders.
The noise, smoke, and concussion produced was unlike anything you can even imagine until you have seen it. The hills in front looked as if they had suddenly been transformed into smoking volcanoes, the common shell throwing up great chunks of ground and masses of black smoke, while the shrapnel formed a white canopy above. Sections of ground were covered by each ship all around our front trenches, and, the ranges being known, the shooting was excellent. Nevertheless, a great deal of the fire was, of necessity, indirect, and the ground affords such splendid cover that the Turks continued their advance in a most gallant manner, while their artillery not only plastered our positions on shore with shrapnel, but actually tried to drive the ships off the coast by firing at them, and their desperate snipers, in place of a better target, tried to pick off officers and men on the decks and bridges. We picked up many bullets on the deck afterward.
Some Turkish warship started to fire over the peninsula. The Triumph dropped two 10-inch shells within a few yards of her, whereupon she retired up the strait to a safer position, from which she occasionally dropped a few shells into space, but so far has done no damage.
The scene at the height of this engagement was sombre, magnificent, and unique. The day was perfectly clear, and you could see right down the coast as far as Sedd-ul-Bahr. There the warships of the first division were blazing away at Aki Baba and the hills around it, covering their summits with a great white cloud of bursting shells. Further out the giant forms of the transports which accompanied that division loomed up through the slight mist. Almost opposite Gaba Tepe a cruiser close in shore was covering the low ground with her guns and occasionally dropping shells right over into the straight on the far side. Opposite the hills in possession of the Australian and New Zealand troops an incessant fire was kept up from the ships. Beyond lay our transports which had moved further out to avoid the Turkish warships' shells and those of some battery which fires persistently.
Beyond all, the Queen Elizabeth, with her eight huge, monstrous 15-inch guns, all pointed shoreward, seemed to threaten immediate annihilation to any enemy who dared even to aim at the squadron under her charge.
On shore the rifle and machine-gun fire was incessant, and at times rose into a perfect storm as the Turks pressed forward their attack. The hills were ablaze with shells from the ships and the enemy's shrapnel, while on the beach masses of troops were waiting to take their places in the trenches, and the beach parties worked incessantly at landing stores, material, and ammunition.
This great attack lasted some two hours, and during this time we received encouraging messages from the beach. "Thanks for your assistance. Your guns are inflicting awful losses on the enemy." The Turks must, in fact, have suffered terribly from this concentrated fire from so many guns and from the infantry in the trenches.
The end came amid a flash of bayonets and a sudden charge of the colonials, before which the Turks broke and fled amid a perfect tornado of shells from the ships. They fell back sullen and checked, but not yet defeated, but for the remainder of the day no big attack was pressed home, and the colonials gained some ground by local counter-attacks, which enlarged and consolidated the position they were holding.
The Turks kept up their incessant shrapnel fire throughout the day, but the colonials were now dug in and could not be shaken by it in their trenches, while the reserves had also prepared shelter trenches and dug-outs on the slopes.
Some prisoners were captured, including an officer, who said that the Turks were becoming demoralized by the fire of the guns, and that the Germans now had difficulty in getting them forward to the attack. We are well intrenched and they will probably do likewise, and we shall see a repetition of the siege warfare out here.
THE FIFTH DISPATCH.
Dardanelles, April 30.
While Australians and New Zealanders were fighting so gallantly against heavy odds north of Gaba Tepe, British troops crowned themselves with equal laurels at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. A firm footing now has been obtained. The line stretches across the southern end of the entire peninsula, with both flanks secured by the fire of warships. The army holds many convenient landing places immune from the enemy's guns.
The problems British landing parties faced differed from those the Australians solved further north. Here the cliffs are not high and irregular, but rise about fifty feet from the water's edge, with stretches of beach at intervals. Five of these beaches were selected for disembarkation under the cover of warships. It was hoped the Turkish trenches would be rendered untenable and the barbed wire entanglements cut by the fire of the ships, but these expectations were not realized.
For example, the landing place between Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles was the scene of a desperate struggle which raged all day. The Turks held barbed wire protected trenches in force and their snipers covered the foreshore. After hours of bombardment the troops were taken ashore at daybreak. Part of the force scaled the cliffs and obtained a precarious footing on the edge of the cliffs, but boats which landed along the beach were confronted with a solid hedge of barbed wire and exposed to a terrible cross-fire. Every effort was made to cut the wire, but almost all those who landed here were shot down. Later the troops on the cliffs succeeded in driving back the Turks and clearing the beach.
The most terrible of all landings, however, was on the beach between Cape Helles and the Seddul Bahr. Here the broken valley runs inland enfiladed by hills on either flank, on which were built strong forts, which defended the entrance to the strait until they were knocked out by our guns. Although the guns and emplacements were shattered the bombproofs and ammunition chambers remained intact, and, running back, formed a perfect network of trenches and entanglements right around the semicircular valley. The Turks had mounted pompoms on the Cape Helles side and had the usual snipers concealed everywhere. The foreshore and valley also were protected by trenches and wire, rendering the position most formidable.
One novel expedient was running a liner full of troops deliberately ashore, thus allowing them to approach close in under cover without being exposed in open boats. Great doors had been cut in her sides to permit rapid disembarkation, and she was well provided with Maxims to sweep the shore while the troops were landing. Owing to her going ashore further east than was intended, however, it became necessary to bring up a lighter to facilitate the landing. The Turks directed a perfect tornado of rifle, Maxim, and pompom fire on 200 men who made a dash down the gangway. Only a few survived to gain shelter. All the others were killed on the gangway. Disembarkation, therefore, which meant almost certain death, was postponed until later in the morning, when another attempt also failed.
Then, while the liner, carrying 2,000 men, packed in like sardines, with the officers huddled on the protected bridge, lay all day on shore, with a hail of bullets rattling against her protected sides, the battleships Albion, Cornwallis, and Queen Elizabeth furiously bombarded Seddul Bahr and the encircling hills. Meanwhile the Turks on the Asiatic side tried to destroy the liner by howitzer fire, which was kept under only by the bombardment from covering ships in the strait. In spite of this covering fire, the vessel was pierced by four big shells, and it was decided to postpone any further movement until night, when the troops got ashore almost without the Turks firing a shot, as a result, perhaps, of troops landed on other beaches having pushed along and destroyed some Turkish positions.
END OF THE THIRD WEEK.
[Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]
IMBROS, (via Dedeaghatch, Turkey,) May 15, (Dispatch to The London Daily Chronicle.)--Operations in the Dardanelles have now been in full swing for just three weeks, and a glance from the mountaintop here at the far-spread region over which the war has been and is being waged shows instantly the material progress which has been made in that time.
When I first looked down on the fascinating and unique vision presented to my eyes from this point of vantage it was a sight truly marvelous. A fleet of transports stood at the entrance to the strait, and to the north of Gaba Tepe the warships were hammering away at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and at several points along the western coast of the peninsula one could see at different points on the land that severe battles were being fought. The heavy clouds of war hung over all, lit up grimly by the vivid flashes of the guns. At times the din was tremendous and went on night and day without cessation. Column after column of dense smoke betokened the falling of forts, and gradually the white puffs from our guns like long rollers on a broken coast advanced up the peninsula from the south and inland from the Gaba Tepe region.
Aeroplanes and dirigibles were always busy. Destroyers and huge transports churned up foam, and submarines left their faint trace on the wide extent of bluest ocean. The scene was one of war in all its picturesqueness and horror, for one could easily imagine awful scenes taking place under the far cloud of smoke and dust. It was war in all its force seen so for the first time.
Today the scene is strangely altered. Nearly all the transports have gone up the western coast of the peninsula, but a few battleships stand on sentry-go, as it were. All resistance in the region directly opposite has been fought down. The smoke coming from over the ridge in front shows that our warships have advanced far up to Kilid Bahr, while comparatively few ships stand at the entrance of the strait. From the inside the Asiatic coast is being bombarded, but the picturesque features of the scene have gone. It is a change which marks triumphant progress. The Turk is being slowly but surely pushed back, dying gamely.
Two days of thick mist were followed by a forty-eight hours' armistice granted to the Turks on Tuesday and Wednesday. It was impossible to see anything of the operations. Behind the veil of mist the fighting went sternly on and the big guns boomed incessantly. Wednesday night they were particularly active. Seldom in the past three weeks has the night sky been so brilliantly illuminated by the flashes of cannon. Serious work is evidently being done or completed. It was not until Thursday afternoon that the weather conditions made it possible to see the result of the warfare behind the screen of mist, and, as I have said, the whole aspect of the now familiar scene appears greatly changed when the coast of the peninsula is deserted by vessels, save for the few transports standing further out to sea than usual and half a dozen ships of war.
The peninsula beyond Gaba Tepe had apparently been cleared of the enemy. The tide of the struggle had passed away. On Thursday, too, I could see our guns flashing from a hill, firing probably at points northward or across the strait. Further north our artillery also appeared to be placed on a high ridge this side of Maidos. What a magic sight the southern part of the peninsula must present, where even at this distance the evidence of the havoc of three weeks' daily shell and lead is not hidden!
The point of the peninsula has become brown under the trampling of men and guns. Krithia lies a complete and pathetic ruin, and Tree Hill is scarred with trench and shell holes as far as I can see.
On Thursday the point of greatest activity was in the strait opposite the conquered portion of the peninsula. It stood out somewhat dim in the haze of battle, but the smoke and flash of the Allies' guns and the Turks' answering could be picked out without great difficulty. Added to this the air was still; the dull thud of the field guns at work there was different from the resounding boom of the naval guns, and the whirr of the machine guns could be plainly heard.
Hard work by land and water is going on along the front stretching away to the left from Erenkeui on the Asiatic side, and the difficulties of obtaining a substantial footing in that mountainous region had evidently been overcome. It was apparent that the enemy was putting up a stiff fight, and at times he must have run his batteries close to the water's edge.
Early in the afternoon the Turkish gunners managed to explode several shells on the land near Morto Bay on the European side. A little later they made the earth and stones of Tree Hill fly up in the air by a few well-placed shells, but such advances on the part of the enemy were brief. The warships in the strait instantly turned their guns on the daring batteries, and such diversions by the enemy were only of brief duration. Toward sunset a battleship was seen to send two shells against the cliff edge south of Suvla Bay.
Yesterday the thick smoke of battle still hung over all activities on the Asiatic side of the waterway. Nearly all the transports had gone, and most of the warships were engaged in the entrance and further up to near Kilid Bahr. Only one battleship that I could see was firing from off the western coast of the peninsula, standing well out off shore near Krithia. It was evidently firing long-range shells against the foe on the further side of the Dardanelles.
The land actions had another point of interest yesterday. In the afternoon very heavy fighting could be noticed far along the Sari Bair, (about sixteen miles north of the tip of the peninsula,) where the Australians are. Every now and again waves of smoke blotted out that part of the landscape. It would clear occasionally to show the hillsides dotted over with puffs of white. Often against the gray background spurts of flame would herald the thunder of heavily engaged artillery. Rifle fire at times, too, could be heard.
The supposition is that our forces in that region, who are forcing their way across the peninsula, must be near the completion of their task.
From what I have said it will be gathered, I think, that very substantial progress has been made since operations began three weeks ago. As one looks at the mountainous and rugged nature of the country beyond the strait it is evident that the enemy has there favorable ground for defensive fighting. That region now appears to be the main point of his struggle.
I learn that the Turkish losses amount to over 80,000 and that 50,000 wounded have been sent to Constantinople.
"War Babies"
[From The Suffragette of London, edited by Christabel Pankhurst, in its issue of May 7, 1915.]
"The children who are coming into the world must be welcomed and must be provided with greater, not smaller, advantages, because they are legally fatherless.
"Why should not these children be brought up under model conditions, so that they may be the equal in knowledge and general cultivation of any in the land?
"Every one of them must become a valuable asset to the nation. But that can only be if they are reared in a generous way. They are everybody's children, and have a claim on the community as a whole. The problem of the illegitimate child has been shirked since the beginning of time. Now it has to be faced!"
_--From The Suffragette of April 23._
The Women's Social and Political Union, in order to help in solving this problem, has in view the adoption of a number of "war babies," who will be reared under model conditions, and provided with a good general education followed by a training adapted to the natural ability and special gifts of each individual child.
The children will be brought up together in a home in which they will receive that loving care which is necessary for their happiness and full development.
Fuller details of the scheme will be given at a meeting to be addressed by Mrs. Pankhurst on Thursday afternoon, June 3, at the London Palladium. In the meantime those wishing to give their financial or other support are asked to write to Mrs. Pankhurst at Lincoln's Inn House, Kingsway, London, W.C.
THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS
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The Flight of the Eagle
[_--From The World, New York._
Personally Conducted.]
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What Is Our Duty?
By Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst
The position of the British suffragettes, who suspended their militant program and are zealously supporting the cause of the Allies, is stated in this speech by Mrs. Pankhurst, delivered in the Sun Hall, Liverpool, and reported in The Suffragette of April 23, 1915.
I think that throughout our agitation for the franchise for political emancipation, on platforms and on other places--even in prisons--we have talked about rights, and fought for rights; at the same time we have always coupled with the claim for rights clear statements as to duty. We have never lost sight of the fact that to possess rights puts upon human beings grave responsibilities and serious duties. We have fought for rights because, in order to perform your duty and fulfill your responsibilities properly, in time of peace, you must have certain citizen rights. When the State is in danger, when the very liberties in your possession are imperiled, is, above all, the time to think of duty. And so, when the war broke out, some of us who, convalescing after our fights, decided that one of the duties of the Women's Social and Political Union in war time was to talk to men about their duty to the nation--the duty of fighting to preserve the independence of our country, to preserve what our forefathers had won for us, and to protect the nation from foreign invasion.
There are people who say, "What right have women to talk to men about fighting for their country, since women are not, according to the custom of civilization, called upon to fight?" That used to be said to us in times of peace. Certainly women have the right to say to men, "Are you going to fight to defend your country and redeem your promise to women?"
Men have said to women, not only that they fight to defend their country, but that they protect women from all the dangers and difficulties of life, and they are proud to be in the position to do it. Why, then, we say to those men, "You are indeed now put to the test. The men of Belgium, the men of France, the men of Serbia, however willing they were to protect women from the things that are most horrible--and more horrible to women than death itself--have not been able to do it."
It is only by an accident, or a series of accidents, for which no man here has the right to take credit, that British women on British soil are not now enduring the horrors endured by the women of France, the women of Belgium, and the women of Serbia. The least that men can do is that every man of fighting age should prepare himself to redeem his word to women, and to make ready to do his best, to save the mothers, the wives, and the daughters of Great Britain from outrage too horrible even to think of.
We have the right to say to the men, "Fight for your country, defend the shores of this land of ours. Fight for your homes, for the women, and for the children." We have the right if that was the only reason, but in these days, when women are taking larger views of their duty to the State, we go further than that; we claim the right to hold recruiting meetings and ask men to fight for bigger reasons than are advanced ordinarily. We say to men, "In this war there are issues at stake bigger even than the safety of your homes and your own country. Your honor as a nation is at stake."
We have our duties in this war. First of all, this duty begins at home--this duty to our home, because I always feel that if we are not ready to do our duty to those nearest to us we are not fit to do our duty far away. And so the first duty is to ourselves and to our homes. Then there is the duty to protect those who, having made a gallant fight for self-defense--and by that I mean the country of Belgium--what we owe to Belgium we can never repay, because now the whole German plan of campaign is perfectly plain to all those who are not prejudiced, and who are not affected by pan-Germanism; and, unfortunately, in their methods of warfare--and their methods of warfare are many--they not only fight physically, but they fight mentally and morally as well, and in this country and in France, and in every country in Europe, long before the war broke out, in fact, ever since the year 1870, they have been preparing by subtle means to take possession of Europe, and I believe their ambitions are not limited by that, they want to rule the whole world. The whole thing is clear to any unprejudiced observer.
It is very difficult for your attacking bully to imagine that a small State--I mean small numerically, and weak physically--will ever have the courage to stand up and resist the bully when he prepares to attack. The Germans did not expect Belgium to keep them at bay while the other countries involved prepared, but there is absolutely no doubt that the plan was to press through Belgium, to take possession of Paris, and then, having humiliated and crippled France, to cross the Channel and defeat us. There is no doubt that was the plan; it is perfectly clear. And that being so, we owe--civilization owes--to Belgium a debt which it can never repay.
Then we have our duty to our ally, France. How much democracy owes to France! France is the mother of European democracy. There is no doubt about her claim to that. If there had been nothing else worth fighting for in this war, in my opinion that alone would have been worth fighting for, to preserve that spirit and that democracy--which France has given to the world, and which would perish if France were destroyed. The people of France are a people who never have been, and I believe never will be, corrupted in the sense of thinking that material things are of more value than spiritual things. The people of France have always been ready to sacrifice themselves for ideals. They have been ready to sacrifice life, they have been ready to sacrifice money, they have been ready to sacrifice everything for an ideal.
You know the old saying, that men should work and women should weep? That is not true, for it is for all of us to work and for all of us to weep when there is occasion to do so. Therefore, it is because in the French Nation you have splendid qualities combined in both sexes, because the history of the French Nation is so magnificent, because the French Nation has contributed so much to civilization, and so much in art, beauty, and in great qualities, it is our duty to stand by France, and to prevent her being crushed by the oversexed, that is to say, overmasculine, country of Germany.
It is our duty as women to do what we can to help our country in this war, because if the unthinkable thing happened, and Germany were to win, the women's movement, as we know it in Europe, would be put back fifty years at least; there is no doubt about it. Whether it ever could rise again is to my mind extremely doubtful. The ideal of women in Germany is the lowest in Europe. Infantile mortality is very high, immorality is widespread, and, in consequence, venereal disease is rampant. Notice, too, the miserable and niggardly pittance that is being paid to the wives and families of German soldiers, while nothing whatever is being paid to unmarried wives and their children. True security for women and children is for women to have control over their own destiny. And so it is a duty, a supreme duty, of women, first of all as human beings and as lovers of their country, to co-operate with men in this terrible crisis in which we find ourselves.
If all were trained to contribute something to the community, both in time of peace and in time of war, how much better it would be.
What bitterness there was in the hearts of many women when they saw work and business going on as usual, carried on by men who ought to be in the fighting line. There were thousands upon thousands of women willing, even if they were not trained, to do that work and release men, and we have urged the authorities to take into account the great reserve force of the nation, the women who are or might be quite capable to step into the shoes of the men when they were called up to fight.
The Board of Trade issued its appeal to women just before Easter to register their names as willing to do national service in any capacity during the course of the war. I want to tell you tonight that I am very proud of the women of the country. When the first recruiting appeals were made to men, the hoardings were covered with placards and appeals and they were making efforts by recruiting bands, in places of pleasure--everywhere in the columns of the newspapers there were recruiting appeals to men. Then the time came when the Board of Trade wished to know to what extent it could depend upon the services of the women of the country, and what was done in the case of women? There were no posters for us; there were no recruiting meetings for us; there were no appeals from great names to us; no attractive pictures, "Your King and Country Want You"--nothing of that kind. And yet, in spite of that, in one week 34,000 women sent in their names as volunteers for a national service. [Loud applause.]
And now, something about this talk of peace, and the terms of peace. Well, I consider it very sinister and very dangerous. Very dangerous, indeed, because nothing heartens the Kaiser and his advisers so much as weakness in any of the allied nations. It is no use expecting Germany to understand that the people who are talking about peace are animated by a genuine love for peace. I go further as regards peace movements. I think that in this country, and in America, and in all the neutral countries, there are a great many very well-meaning people who are genuine lovers of peace. What woman does not dread the effects of war? Germans are encouraging the call for peace. The Kaiser knows he is going to be beaten, and he wants to get out of it on as easy terms as possible, and so it is worth while for German-Americans to run a peace movement in America. They want America, which is a great neutral country, to intervene to try to force peace and to let the Germans down easily without having to pay for all that they have done in Belgium and in France. Similar tactics are being pursued in this country.
Only those who have been in close touch with people who know what goes on, and what has gone on, since the year 1870, after the Franco-German war, can realize how insidious this German influence is, and so I say to you who love peace (and who does not love peace?) if you take part in any of these peace movements you are playing the German game and helping Germany. [Loud applause.] They talk of peace, but consider the position of our allies. The Germans in possession of the North of France, devastating the country, even today driving thousands of innocent, helpless people at the point of the bayonet, outraging women, and burning homes! And people in this country--an allied nation--allowing themselves to talk about terms of peace.
It is for Germany to talk of peace, not for us. [Loud applause.] It is for us to show a strong and determined front, because if we do anything else we are misunderstood, and advantage is taken of the situation. Since some women have responded to an invitation to take part in a peace conference at The Hague, I feel bound to say that they do not represent the mass of Englishwomen. [Loud applause.] The mass of Englishwomen are whole-hearted in our support of our own Government in this matter and in the support of our allies--[loud applause]--and we are prepared to face all the necessary sacrifices to bring this war to a successful issue from our point of view, because we know, because we feel, that this terrible business, forced upon us, has to be properly finished to save us from the danger of another war perhaps in ten years' time. [Applause.]
We have clear consciences on this matter. We did not want this war. France did not want this war. Belgium did not want this war. I do not believe that Russia wanted this war. It has been forced upon us, and since Germany took up the sword, the sword must be held in the hands of the Allies until Germany has had enough of war and does not want any more of it. [Loud applause.] For us to talk about peace now, for us to weaken our side now, is to make the condition of those men who are laying down their lives for us in France more terrible than it already is. We have to support them, and to stand loyally by them, and to make our sacrifices and show our patriotism to them.
And, speaking of sacrifices, let us consider this drink question. What is our duty in that matter? Well, I think our duty is this, that, if the Government of this country seriously think it is necessary for our success in this war to stop drink altogether until the war is ended, it is our duty loyally to support and accept that decision. [Loud applause.]
At any rate, in time of war we should be ready to say, "Let us sacrifice a personal pleasure in order to get a great national good." Would not that be a something to lift up a nation and make it a wonderful and a great nation?
I believe that in this war we are fighting for things undying and great; we are fighting for liberty; we are fighting for honor; we are fighting to preserve the great inheritance won for us by our forefathers, and it is worth while to fight for those things, and it is worth while to die for them--to die a glorious death in defense of all that makes life worth having is better than to live unending years of inglorious life. And so, out of this great trial that has come upon us, I believe a wonderful transformation will come to the people of this country and we shall emerge from it stronger and better and nobler and more worthy of our great traditions than ever we should perhaps have been without it. [Loud and continued applause.]
The Soldiers Pass
By MAURICE HEWLETT.
[From "Sing Songs of the War."]
The soldiers pass at nightfall, A girl within each arm, And kisses quick and light fall On lips that take no harm. Lip language serves them better Who have no parts of speech: No syntax there to fetter The lore they love to teach.
What waist would shun th' indenture Of such a gallant squeeze? What girl's heart not dare venture The hot-and-cold disease? Nay, let them do their service Before the lads depart! That hand goes where the curve is That billows o'er the heart.
Who deems not how 'tis given, What knows he of its worth? 'Tis either fire of heaven Or earthiness of earth. And if the lips are fickle That kiss, they'll never know If tears begin to trickle Where they saw roses blow.
"The girl I left behind me," He'll sing, nor hear her moan, "The tears they come to blind me As I sit here alone." What else had you to offer, Poor spendthrift of the town? Lay out your unlockt coffer-- The Lord will know His own.
The Great End
By Arnold Bennett.
Fear that the British Government in its discussion of peace terms with Germany might defer to the policy of France and Russia of keeping important negotiations secret inspired the writing of this article, which appeared in The London Daily News of April 1, 1915, and is here published by the author's permission. Mr. Bennett points out that despite her alliance Great Britain is essentially a democracy subject to the mandates of her people.
The well-meant but ingenuous efforts of the Government to produce pessimism among the citizens have failed. The object of these efforts was clear; it has, I think, been attained by more direct and wiser means. Munitions of war are now being more satisfactorily manufactured, though the country still refuses to be gloomy. "Eyewitness" pretended to quake, but Przemysl fell. He tried again, but Sir John French announced that he did not believe in a protracted war. Since Sir John French said also that he believed in victory, it follows that he believes in a victory not long delayed. The incomparable and candid reports of the French War Office about the first stages of the war increased our confidence, and at the same time showed to us the inferiority of our own reports. Only victors could publish such revelations, and Britain, with her passion for forgetting mistakes and her hatred of the confessional, could never bring herself to publish them. These reports were confirmed and capped by the remarkable communications of General Joffre to a journalistic friend. The New York Stock Exchange began to gamble about the date of victory. The London Stock Exchange took on a new firmness. Not even the sinister losses at Neuve Chapelle, nor the rumors concerning the same, could disturb our confidence. Peace, therefore, in the general view, and certainty in the view of those who knew most, is decidedly nearer than when I wrote last about peace.
A short while ago Mr. Asquith referred with sarcasm and reproof to those who talk of peace. But, for once, his meaning was not clear. If he meant that to suggest peace to the enemy at this stage is both dangerous and ridiculous, he will be approved by the nation. But if he meant that terms of peace must not even be mentioned among ourselves, he will find people ready to disagree with him, and to support the weight of his sarcasm and his reproof. I am one of those people. Bellicose by disposition, I nevertheless like to know what I am fighting for. This is perhaps an idiosyncrasy, but many persons share it, and they are not to be ignored. It may be argued that Mr. Asquith has defined what we are fighting for. He has not. He has only defined part of what we are fighting for. His reference to the overthrow of Prussian militarism is futile, because it gives no indication of the method to be employed. The method of liberating and compensating Belgium and other small communities is clear; but how are you to overthrow an ideal? Prussian militarism will not be destroyed by a defeat in the field. Militarism cannot overthrow militarism; it can only breed militarism. The point is of the highest importance.
I do not assume that Mr. Asquith's notions about the right way to overthrow militarism are not sound notions. I assume that they are sound. I think that his common sense is massive. Though it is evident that he lets his Ministerial colleagues do practically what they choose in their own spheres, and though there are militarists in the Cabinet, I do not, like The Morning Post, consider that the Prime Minister exists in a stupor of negligence. On the contrary, I assume that at the end of the war, as at the beginning, Mr. Asquith will control the foolish, and that common sense will prevail in the Cabinet when a treaty is the subject of converse. Still further, I will assume that, contrary to nearly all precedent, the collective sagacity of the Ministry has not been impaired, and its self-conceit perilously tickled, by the long exercise of absolute power in face of a Parliament of poltroons. And, lastly, I will abandon my old argument that the discussion of peace terms might shorten the war, without any risk of prolonging it. And still I very strongly hold that peace terms ought to be discussed.
It appears to me that there is a desire--I will not say a conspiracy--on the part of the Government to bring this war to an end in the same manner as it will be brought to an end in Germany--that is to say, autocratically, without either the knowledge or the consent of the nation. The projected scheme, I imagine, is to sit tight and quiet, and in due course inform the nation of a fact accomplished. It can be done, and I think it will be done, unless the House of Commons administers to itself a tonic and acquires courage. Already colonial statesmen have been politely but firmly informed that they are not wanted in England this year! The specious excuse for keeping the nation in the dark is that we are allied to Russia, where the people are never under any circumstances consulted, and to France, where for the duration of the war the Government is as absolute in spirit and in conduct, as that of Russia; and that we must not pain those allied Governments by any exhibition of democracy in being. Secrecy and a complete autocratic control of the people are the watchwords of the allied Governments, and therefore they must be the watchwords of our Government.
This is very convenient for British autocrats, but the argument is not convincing. The surrender of ideals ought not to be so one-sided. We do not dream of suggesting to the Russian and the French Governments how they ought to conduct themselves toward their peoples; and similarly we should not allow them to influence the relations between our Government and ourselves.
The basis of peace negotiations must necessarily be settled in advance by representatives of all the allied Governments in conclave. The mandate of each Government in regard to the conclave is the affair of that Government, and it is the affair of no other Government. The mandate of our Government is, therefore, the affair of our Government, and the allied Governments are just as much entitled to criticise or object to it as we, for example, are entitled to suggest to the Czar how he ought to behave in Finland. Our Government, being a democratic Government, has no right to go into conclave without a mandate from the people who elected it. It possesses no mandate of the kind. It has a mandate, and a mighty one, to prosecute the war, and it is prosecuting the war to the satisfaction of the majority of the electorate. But a peace treaty is a different and an incomparably more important thing. Up to the present the mind of the nation has found no expression, and it probably will not find any expression unless the Government recognizes fairly that it is a representative Government and behaves with the deference which is due from a representative Government. As matters stand, the mandate of the British Government will come, not from Britain, but from Russia and France.
The great argument drawn from the Government's alleged duty to the allied Governments is, no doubt, reinforced, in the minds of Ministers and at Cabinet meetings, by two subsidiary arguments. The first of these rests in the traditional assumption that all international politics must be committed, perpetrated, and accomplished in secret. This strange traditional notion will die hard, but some time it will have to die, and at the moment of its death excellent and sincere persons will be convinced that the knell of the British Empire has sounded. The knell of the British Empire has frequently sounded. It sounded when capital punishment was abolished for sheep-stealing, when the great reform bill was passed, when purchase was abolished in the army, when the deceased wife's sister bill was passed, when the Parliament act became law; and it will positively sound again when the mediaeval Chinese traditions of the Diplomatic Service are cast aside. There are many important people alive today who are so obsessed by those traditions as to believe religiously that if the British people, and by consequence the German Government, were made aware of the peace terms, the German Army would in some mysterious way be strengthened and encouraged, and our own ultimate success imperiled. Such is the power of the dead hand, and against this power the new conviction that in a democratic and candid foreign policy lies the future safety of the world will have to fight hard.
The other subsidiary argument for ignoring the nation is that Ministers are wiser than the nation, and therefore that Ministers must save the nation from itself by making it impotent and acting over its head. This has always been the argument of autocrats, and even of tyrants. It is a ridiculous argument, and it was never more ridiculous than when applied to the British Government and the British Nation today. Throughout the war the Government has underestimated the qualities of the nation--courage, discipline, fortitude, and wisdom. It is still underestimating them. For myself, I have no doubt that in the making of peace the sagacity of the nation as a whole would be greater than the sagacity of the Government. But even if it were not, the right of the nation to govern itself in the gravest hour of its career remains unchallengeable. All arguments in favor of depriving the nation of that right amount to the argument of Germany in favor of taking Belgium--"We do it in your true interests, and in our own."
If the Government does not on its own initiative declare that it will consult--and effectively consult--Parliament concerning the peace terms, then it is the duty of Parliament, and especially of the House of Commons, to make itself unpleasant and to produce that appearance of internal discord which (we are told by all individuals who dislike being disturbed) is so enheartening to Germany. There have always been, and there still are, ample opportunities for raising questions of foreign policy in the House of Commons. If foreign policy has seldom or never been adequately handled by the House of Commons, the reason simply is that the House has not been interested in it. Not to the tyranny of Ministries, but to the supineness and the ignorance of the people's representatives, is the present state of affairs due. Hence the rank and file of Radicals should organize themselves. They would unquestionably receive adequate support in the press and at public meetings. And none but they can do anything worth doing. And among the rank and file of Radicals the plain common-sense men should make themselves heard. Foreign policy debates in the House are usually the playground of cranks of all varieties, and the plain common-sense man seems to shrink from being vocal in such company. It is a pity. The plain common-sense man should believe in himself a little more. The result would perhaps startle his modesty. And he should begin instantly on the resumption of Parliament. He will of course be told that he is premature. But no matter. When he gets up and makes a row he will be told that he is premature, until Sir Edward Grey is in a position to announce in the icy cold and impressive tones of omniscience and omnipotence and perfect wisdom that the deed is irrevocably done and only the formal ratification of the people is required. We have been through all that before, and we shall go through it again unless we start out immediately to be unpleasant.
I hope nobody will get the impression that I think we are a nation of angels under a Government of earthy and primeval creatures. I do not. We are not in a Christian mood, and we don't want to be in a Christian mood. When last week a foolish schoolmaster took advantage of his august position to advocate Christianity at the end of the war, we frightened the life out of him, and he had to say that he had been "woefully misunderstood." In spite of this, the nation, being cut off from direct communication with foreign autocracy and reaction, is in my view very likely to be less unwise than the Government at the supreme crisis. And even if it isn't, even at the worst, it is and should be the master and not the slave of the Government.
German Women Not Yet For Peace
By Gertrude Baumer, President of the Bund Deutscher Frauen.
_An emphatic refusal of German women to take part in the recent Women's Peace Conference at The Hague was issued by the Bund Deutscher Frauen (League of German Women) signed by Gertrude Baumer as President, and published by the Frankfurter Zeitung in its issue of April 29, 1915. The manifesto reads:_
On April 28 begins the Peace Congress to which women of Holland have invited the women of neutral and belligerent nations. The German woman's movement has declined to attend the congress, by unanimous resolution of its Executive Committee. If individual German women visit the congress it can be only such as have no responsible position in the organization of the German woman's movement and for whom the organization is, therefore, not responsible.
This decimation must not be understood to mean that the German women do not feel as keenly as the women of other countries the enormous sacrifices and sorrows which this war has caused, or that they refuse to recognize the good intentions that figure in the institution of this congress. None can yearn more eagerly than we for an end of these sacrifices and sorrows. But we realize that in our consciousness of the weight of these sacrifices we are one with our whole people and Government; we know that the blood of those who fall out there on the field cannot be dearer to us women than to the men who are responsible for the decisions of Germany. Because we know that, we must decline to represent special desires in an international congress. We have no other desires than those of our entire people: a peace consonant with the honor of our State and guaranteeing its safety in the future.
The resolutions that are to be laid before the women's congress at The Hague are of two kinds. One kind denounces war as such, and recommends peaceful settlement of international quarrels. The other offers suggestions for hastening the concluding of peace.
As concerns the first group of suggestions, there are in the German woman's movement women who are in principle very much in sympathy with the aims of the peace movement. But they, too, are convinced that negotiations about the means of avoiding future wars and conquering the mutual distrust of nations can be considered only after peace has again been concluded. But we must most vigorously reject the proposition of voting approval to a resolution in which the war is declared to be an "insanity" that was made possible only through a "mass psychosis." Shall the German women deny the moral force that is impelling their husbands and sons into death, that has led home countless German men, amid a thousand dangers, from foreign lands, to battle for their threatened Fatherland, by declaring in common with the women of hostile States that the national spirit of self-sacrifice of our men is insanity and a psychosis? Shall we psychologically attack in the rear the men who are defending our safety by scoffing at and deprecating the internal forces that are keeping them up? Whoever asks us to do that cannot have experienced what thousands of wives and mothers have experienced, who have seen their husbands and sons march away.
Just as in these fundamental questions the women of the belligerent States must feel differently from those of neutral States, so, too, there is naturally a difference of opinion among the women of the different belligerent States concerning the time of the conclusion of peace. Inasmuch as the prospects of the belligerent States depend upon the time of the conclusion of peace and therewith the future fate of the nations involved in the war, there can likewise be no international conformity of opinion on this question either.
Dear to us German women as well, are the relations that bind us to the women of foreign lands, and we sincerely desire that they may survive this time of hatred and enmity. But precisely for that reason international negotiations seem fraught with fate to us at a time when we belong exclusively to our people and when strict limits are set to the value of international exchange of views in the fact that we are citizens of our own country, to strengthen whose national power of resistance is our highest task.
Diagnosis of the Englishman
By John Galsworthy
This article originally appeared in the Amsterdaemer Revue, having been written during the lull of the war while England fitted her volunteer armies for the Spring campaign, and is here published by special permission of the author.
After six months of war search for the cause thereof borders on the academic. Comment on the physical facts of the situation does not come within the scope of one who, by disposition and training, is concerned with states of mind. Speculation on what the future may bring forth may be left to those with an aptitude for prophecy.
But there is one thought which rises supreme at this particular moment of these tremendous times: The period of surprise is over; the forces known; the issue fully joined. It is now a case of "Pull devil, pull baker," and a question of the fibre of the combatants. For this reason it may not be amiss to try to present to any whom it may concern as detached a picture as one can of the real nature of that combatant who is called the Englishman, especially since ignorance in Central Europe of his character was the chief cause of this war, and speculation as to the future is useless without right comprehension of this curious creature.
The Englishman is taken advisedly because he represents four-fifths of the population of the British Isles and eight-ninths of the character and sentiment therein.
And, first, let it be said that there is no more deceptive, unconsciously deceptive person on the face of the globe. The Englishman certainly does not know himself, and outside England he is but guessed at. Only a pure Englishman--and he must be an odd one--really knows the Englishman, just as, for inspired judgment of art, one must go to the inspired artist.
Racially, the Englishman is so complex and so old a blend that no one can say what he is. In character he is just as complex. Physically, there are two main types--one inclining to length of limb, narrowness of face and head, (you will see nowhere such long and narrow heads as in our islands,) and bony jaws; the other approximating more to the ordinary "John Bull." The first type is gaining on the second. There is little or no difference in the main character behind.
In attempting to understand the real nature of the Englishman certain salient facts must be borne in mind:
THE SEA.--To be surrounded generation after generation by the sea has developed in him a suppressed idealism, a peculiar impermeability, a turn for adventure, a faculty for wandering, and for being sufficient unto himself in far surroundings.
THE CLIMATE.--Whoso weathers for centuries a climate that, though healthy and never extreme, is perhaps the least reliable and one of the wettest in the world, must needs grow in himself a counterbalance of dry philosophy, a defiant humor, an enforced medium temperature of soul. The Englishman is no more given to extremes than is his climate; against its damp and perpetual changes he has become coated with a sort of bluntness.
THE POLITICAL AGE OF HIS COUNTRY.--This is by far the oldest settled Western power, politically speaking. For eight hundred and fifty years England has known no serious military disturbance from without; for over one hundred and fifty she has known no military disturbance, and no serious political turmoil within. This is partly the outcome of her isolation, partly the happy accident of her political constitution, partly the result of the Englishman's habit of looking before he leaps, which comes, no doubt, from the mixture in his blood and the mixture in his climate.
THE GREAT PREPONDERANCE FOR SEVERAL GENERATIONS OF TOWN OVER COUNTRY LIFE.--Taken in conjunction with centuries of political stability this is the main cause of a certain deeply ingrained humaneness of which, speaking generally, the Englishman appears to be rather ashamed than otherwise.
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.--This potent element in the formation of the modern Englishman, not only of the upper but of all classes, is something that one rather despairs of making understood--in countries that have no similar institution. But, imagine one hundred thousand youths of the wealthiest, healthiest, and most influential classes passed during each generation at the most impressionable age, into a sort of ethical mold, emerging therefrom stamped to the core with the impress of a uniform morality, uniform manners, uniform way of looking at life; remembering always that these youths fill seven-eighths of the important positions in the professional administration of their country and the conduct of its commercial enterprise; remembering, too, that through perpetual contact with every other class their standard of morality and way of looking at life filters down into the very toes of the land. This great character-forming machine is remarkable for an unself-consciousness which gives it enormous strength and elasticity. Not inspired by the State, it inspires the State. The characteristics of the philosophy it enjoins are mainly negative and, for that, the stronger. "Never show your feelings--to do so is not manly and bores your fellows. Don't cry out when you're hurt, making yourself a nuisance to other people. Tell no tales about your companions, and no lies about yourself. Avoid all 'swank,' 'side,' 'swagger,' braggadocio of speech or manner, on pain of being laughed at." (This maxim is carried to such a pitch that the Englishman, except in his press, habitually understates everything.) "Think little of money, and speak less of it. Play games hard, and keep the rules of them even when your blood is hot and you are tempted to disregard them. In three words, 'play the game,'" a little phrase which may be taken as the characteristic understatement of the modern Englishman's creed of honor in all classes. This great, unconscious machine has considerable defects. It tends to the formation of "caste"; it is a poor teacher of sheer learning, and, aesthetically, with its universal suppression of all interesting and queer individual traits of personality, it is almost horrid. But it imparts a remarkable incorruptibility to English life; it conserves vitality by suppressing all extremes, and it implants everywhere a kind of unassuming stoicism and respect for the rules of the great game--Life. Through its unconscious example and through its cult of games it has vastly influenced even the classes not directly under its control.
Three more main facts must be borne in mind:
THE ESSENTIAL DEMOCRACY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS.
ABSENCE OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE.
These, the outcome of the quiet and stable home life of an island people, have done more than anything to make the Englishman a deceptive personality to the outside eye. He has for centuries been permitted to grumble. There is no such confirmed grumbler--until he really has something to grumble at, and then no one who grumbles less. There is no such confirmed carper at the condition of his country, yet no one really so profoundly convinced of its perfection. A stranger might well think from his utterances that he was spoiled by the freedom of his life, unprepared to sacrifice anything for a land in such a condition. Threaten that country, and with it his liberty, and you will find that his grumbles have meant less than nothing. You will find, too, that behind the apparent slackness of every arrangement and every individual are powers of adaptability to facts, elasticity, practical genius, a latent spirit of competition and a determination that are staggering. Before this war began it was the fashion among a number of English to lament the decadence of the race. These very grumblers are now foremost in praising, and quite rightly, the spirit shown in every part of their country. Their lamentations, which plentifully deceived the outside ear, were just English grumbles, for if in truth England had been decadent there could have been no such universal display for them to be praising now. But all this democratic grumbling and habit of "going as you please" serve a deep purpose. Autocracy, censorship, compulsion destroy humor in a nation's blood and elasticity in its fibre; they cut at the very mainsprings of national vitality. Only free from these baneful controls can each man arrive in his own way at realization of what is or is not national necessity; only free from them will each man truly identify himself with a national ideal--not through deliberate instruction or by command of others, but by simple, natural conviction from within.
Two cautions are here given to the stranger trying to form an estimate of the Englishman: The creature must not be judged from his press, which, manned (with certain exceptions) by those who are not typically English, is too highly colored altogether to illustrate the true English spirit; nor can he be judged by such of his literature as is best known on the Continent. The Englishman proper is inexpressive, unexpressed. Further, he must be judged by the evidences of his wealth. England may be the richest country in the world per head of population, but not 5 per cent. of that population have any wealth to speak of, certainly not enough to have affected their hardihood, and, with inconsiderable exceptions, those who have enough are brought up to worship hardihood. For the vast proportion of young Englishmen active military service is merely a change from work as hard, and more monotonous.
From these main premises, then, we come to what the Englishman really is.
When, after months of travel, one returns to England one can taste, smell, feel the difference in the atmosphere, physical and moral--the curious, damp, blunt, good-humored, happy-go-lucky, old-established, slow-seeming formlessness of everything. You hail a porter, you tell him you have plenty of time; he muddles your things amiably, with an air of "It'll be all right," till you have only just time. But suppose you tell him you have no time; he will set himself to catch that train for you, and he will catch it faster than a porter of any other country. Let no stranger, however, experiment to prove the truth of this, for that porter--and a porter is very like any other Englishman--is incapable of taking the foreigner seriously and, quite friendly but a little pitying, will lose him the train, assuring the unfortunate gentleman that he really doesn't know what train he wants to catch--how should he?
The Englishman must have a thing brought under his nose before he will act; bring it there and he will go on acting after everybody else has stopped. He lives very much in the moment, because he is essentially a man of facts and not a man of imagination. Want of imagination makes him, philosophically speaking, rather ludicrous; in practical affairs it handicaps him at the start, but once he has "got going," as we say, it is of incalculable assistance to his stamina. The Englishman, partly through this lack of imagination and nervous sensibility, partly through his inbred dislike of extremes and habit of minimizing the expression of everything, is a perfect example of the conservation of energy. It is very difficult to come to the end of him. Add to this unimaginative, practical, tenacious moderation an inherent spirit of competition--not to say pugnacity--so strong that it will often show through the coating of his "Live and let live," half-surly, half-good-humored manner; add a peculiar, ironic, "don't care" sort of humor; an underground but inveterate humaneness, and an ashamed idealism--and you get some notion of the pudding of English character. Its main feature is a kind of terrible coolness, a rather awful level-headedness. The Englishman makes constant small blunders; but few, almost no, deep mistakes. He is a slow starter, but there is no stronger finisher because he has by temperament and training the faculty of getting through any job that he gives his mind to with a minimum expenditure of vital energy; nothing is wasted in expression, style, spread-eagleism; everything is instinctively kept as near to the practical heart of the matter as possible. He is--to the eye of an artist--distressingly matter-of-fact, a tempting mark for satire. And yet he is in truth an idealist, though it is his nature to snub, disguise, and mock his own inherent optimism. To admit enthusiasms is "bad form" if he is a "gentleman"; "swank" or mere waste of good heat if he is not a "gentleman." England produces more than its proper percentage of cranks and poets; it may be taken that this is Nature's way of redressing the balance in a country where feelings are not shown, sentiments not expressed, and extremes laughed at. Not that the Englishman lacks heart; he is not cold, as is generally supposed--on the contrary he is warm-hearted and feels very strongly; but just as peasants, for lack of words to express their feelings, become stolid, so it is with the Englishman from sheer lack of the habit of self-expression. Nor is the Englishman deliberately hypocritical; but his tenacity, combined with his powerlessness to express his feelings, often gives him the appearance of a hypocrite. He is inarticulate, has not the clear and fluent cynicism of expansive natures wherewith to confess exactly how he stands. It is the habit of men of all nations to want to have things both ways; the Englishman is unfortunately so unable to express himself, _even to himself_, that he has never realized this truth, much less confessed it--hence his appearance of hypocrisy.
He is quite wrongly credited with being attached to money. His island position, his early discoveries of coal, iron, and processes of manufacture have made him, of course, into a confirmed industrialist and trader; but he is more of an adventurer in wealth than a heaper-up of it. He is far from sitting on his money-bags--has absolutely no vein of proper avarice, and for national ends will spill out his money like water, when he is convinced of the necessity.
In everything it comes to that with the Englishman--he must be convinced, and he takes a lot of convincing. He absorbs ideas slowly, reluctantly; he would rather not imagine anything unless he is obliged, but in proportion to the slowness with which he can be moved is the slowness with which he can be removed! Hence the symbol of the bulldog. When he does see and seize a thing he seizes it with the whole of his weight, and wastes no breath in telling you that he has got hold. That is why his press is so untypical; it gives the impression that he does waste breath. And, while he has hold, he gets in more mischief in a shorter time than any other dog because of his capacity for concentrating on the present, without speculating on the past or future.
For the particular situation which the Englishman has now to face he is terribly well adapted. Because he has so little imagination, so little power of expression, he is saving nerve all the time. Because he never goes to extremes, he is saving energy of body and spirit. That the men of all nations are about equally endowed with courage and self-sacrifice has been proved in these last six months; it is to other qualities that one must look for final victory in a war of exhaustion. The Englishman does not look into himself; he does not brood; he sees no further forward than is necessary, and he must have his joke. These are fearful and wonderful advantages. Examine the letters and diaries of the various combatants and you will see how far less imaginative and reflecting, (though shrewd, practical, and humorous,) the English are than any others; you will gain, too, a profound, a deadly conviction that behind them is a fibre like rubber, that may be frayed, and bent a little this way and that, but can neither be permeated nor broken.
When this war began the Englishman rubbed his eyes steeped in peace; he is still rubbing them just a little, but less and less every day. A profound lover of peace by habit and tradition, he has actually realized by now that he is in for it up to the neck. To any one who really knows him--_c'est quelque chose_!
It shall be freely confessed that, from an aesthetic point of view, the Englishman, devoid of high lights and shadows, coated with drab, and super-humanly steady on his feet, is not too attractive. But for the wearing, tearing, slow, and dreadful business of this war, the Englishman--fighting of his own free will, unimaginative, humorous, competitive, practical, never in extremes, a dumb, inveterate optimist, and terribly tenacious--is undoubtedly equipped with Victory.
Bernard Shaw's Terms of Peace
_A letter written by G. Bernard Shaw to a friend in Vienna is published in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten and in the Frankfurter Zeitung of April 21, 1915. Mr. Shaw says:_
We are already on the way out of the first and worst phase. When reason began to bestir itself, I appeared each week in great open meetings in London; and when the newspapers discovered that I was not only not being torn to pieces, but that I was growing better and better liked, then the feeling that patriotism consists of insane lies began to give place to the discovery that the presentation of the truth is not so dangerous as every one had believed.
At that time scarcely one of the leading newspapers took heed of my insistence that this war was an imperialistic war and popular only in so far as all wars are for a time popular. But I need hardly assure you that if Grey had announced: "We have concluded a treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria and must wage war upon France and Russia," he would have evoked precisely the same patriotic fervor and exactly the same democratic anti-Prussianism, (with the omission of the P.) Then the German Kaiser would have been cheered as the cousin of our King and our old and faithful friend.
As concerns myself, I am not unqualifiedly what is called a pan-German; the Germans, besides, would not have a spark of respect left for me if now, when all questions of civilization are buried, I did not hold to my people. But neither am I an anti-German.
Militarism has just compelled me to pay about £1,000 as war tax, in order to help some "brave little Serbian" or other to cut your throat, or some Russian mujik to blow out your brains, although I would rather pay twice as much to save your life or to buy in Vienna some good picture for our National Gallery, and although I should mourn far less about the death of a hundred Serbs or mujiks than for your death.
I am, even aside from myself, sorry for your sake that my plays are no longer produced. Why does not the Burgtheater play the "Schlachtenlenker"? Napoleon's speech about English "Realpolitik" would prove an unprecedented success. If the English win, I shall call upon Sir Edward Grey to add to the treaty of peace a clause in which Berlin and Vienna shall be obliged each year to produce at least 100 performances of my plays for the next twenty-five years.
In London during August the usual cheap evening orchestra concerts, so-called promenade concerts, were announced in a patriotic manner, with the comment that no German musician would be represented on the program. Everybody applauded this announcement, but nobody attended the concerts. A week later a program of Beethoven, Wagner, and Richard Strauss was announced. Everybody was indignant, and everybody went to hear it. It was a complete and decisive German victory, without a single man being killed.
A Policy of Murder
By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
This article is taken from Conan Doyle's book "The German War," and is reproduced by permission of the author.
When one writes with a hot heart upon events which are still recent one is apt to lose one's sense of proportion. At every step one should check one's self by the reflection as to how this may appear ten years hence, and how far events which seem shocking and abnormal may prove themselves to be a necessary accompaniment of every condition of war. But a time has now come when in cold blood, with every possible restraint, one is justified in saying that since the most barbarous campaigns of Alva in the Lowlands, or the excesses of the Thirty Years' War, there has been no such deliberate policy of murder as has been adopted in this struggle by the German forces. This is the more terrible since these forces are not, like those of Alva, Parma, or Tilly, bands of turbulent and mercenary soldiers, but they are the nation itself, and their deeds are condoned or even applauded by the entire national press. It is not on the chiefs of the army that the whole guilt of this terrible crime must rest, but it is upon the whole German Nation, which for generations to come must stand condemned before the civilized world for this reversion to those barbarous practices from which Christianity, civilization, and chivalry had gradually rescued the human race. They may, and do, plead the excuse that they are "earnest" in war, but all nations are earnest in war, which is the most desperately earnest thing of which we have any knowledge. How earnest we are will be shown when the question of endurance begins to tell. But no earnestness can condone the crime of the nation which deliberately breaks those laws which have been indorsed by the common consent of humanity.
War may have a beautiful as well as a terrible side, and be full of touches of human sympathy and restraint which mitigate its unavoidable horror. Such have been the characteristics always of the secular wars between the British and the French. From the old glittering days of knighthood, with their high and gallant courtesy, through the eighteenth century campaigns where the debonair guards of France and England exchanged salutations before their volleys, down to the last great Napoleonic struggle, the tradition of chivalry has always survived. We read how in the Peninsula the pickets of the two armies, each of them as earnest as any Germans, would exchange courtesies, how they would shout warnings to each other to fall back when an advance in force was taking place, and how to prevent the destruction of an ancient bridge, the British promised not to use it on condition that the French would forgo its destruction--an agreement faithfully kept upon either side. Could one imagine Germans making war in such a spirit as this? Think of that old French bridge, and then think of the University of Louvain and the Cathedral of Rheims. What a gap between them--the gap that separates civilization from the savage!
Let us take a few of the points which, when focused together, show how the Germans have degraded warfare--a degradation which affects not only the Allies at present, but the whole future of the world, since if such examples were followed the entire human race would, each in turn, become the sufferers. Take the very first incident of the war, the mine laying by the Königin Luise. Here was a vessel, which was obviously made ready with freshly charged mines some time before there was any question of a general European war, which was sent forth in time of peace, and which, on receipt of a wireless message, began to spawn its hellish cargo across the North Sea at points fifty miles from land in the track of all neutral merchant shipping. There was the keynote of German tactics struck at the first possible instant. So promiscuous was the effect that it was a mere chance which prevented the vessel which bore the German Ambassador from being destroyed by a German mine. From first to last some hundreds of people have lost their lives on this tract of sea, some of them harmless British trawlers, but the greater number sailors of Danish and Dutch vessels pursuing their commerce as they had every right to do. It was the first move in a consistent policy of murder.
Leaving the sea, let us turn to the air. Can any possible term save a policy of murder be applied to the use of aircraft by the Germans? It has always been a principle of warfare that unfortified towns should not be bombarded. So closely has it been followed by the British that one of our aviators, flying over Cologne in search of a Zeppelin shed, refrained from dropping a bomb in an uncertain light, even though Cologne is a fortress, lest the innocent should suffer. What is to be said, then, for the continual use of bombs by the Germans which have usually been wasted in the destruction of cats or dogs, but which have occasionally torn to pieces some woman or child? If bombs were dropped on the forts of Paris as part of a scheme for reducing the place, then nothing could be said in objection, but how are we to describe the action of men who fly over a crowded city dropping bombs promiscuously which can have no military effect whatever, and are entirely aimed at the destruction of innocent civilians? These men have been obliging enough to drop their cards as well as their bombs on several occasions. I see no reason why these should not be used in evidence against them, or why they should not be hanged as murderers when they fall into the hands of the Allies. The policy is idiotic from a military point of view; one could conceive nothing which would stimulate and harden national resistance more surely than such petty irritations. But it is a murderous innovation in the laws of war, and unless it is sternly repressed it will establish a most sinister precedent for the future.
As to the treatment of Belgium, what has it been but murder, murder all the way? From the first days of Visé, when it was officially stated that an example of "frightfulness" was desired, until the present moment, when the terrified population has rushed from the country and thrown itself upon the charity and protection of its neighbors, there has been no break in the record. Compare the story with that of the occupation of the South of France by Wellington in 1813, when no one was injured, nothing was taken without full payment, and the villagers fraternized with the troops. What a relapse of civilization is here! From Visé to Louvain, Louvain to Aerschot, Aerschot to Malines and Termonde, the policy of murder never fails.
It is said that more civilians than soldiers have fallen in Belgium. Peruse the horrible accounts taken by the Belgian Commission, who took evidence in the most careful and conscientious fashion. Study the accounts of that dreadful night in Louvain which can only be equaled by the Spanish Fury of Antwerp. Read the account of the wife of the Burgomaster of Aerschot, with its heartrending description of how her lame son, aged sixteen, was kicked along to his death by an aide de camp. It is all so vile, so brutally murderous that one can hardly realize that one is reading the incidents of a modern campaign conducted by one of the leading nations in Europe.
Do you imagine that the thing has been exaggerated? Far from it--the volume of crime has not yet been appreciated. Have not many Germans unwittingly testified to what they have seen and done? Only last week we had the journal of one of them, an officer whose service had been almost entirely in France and removed from the crime centres of Belgium. Yet were ever such entries in the diary of a civilized soldier? "Our men behaved like regular Vandals." "We shot the whole lot," (these were villagers.) "They were drawn up in three ranks. The same shot did for three at a time." "In the evening we set fire to the village. The priest and some of the inhabitants were shot." "The villages all around were burning." "The villages were burned and the inhabitants shot." "At Leppe apparently two hundred men were shot. There must have been some innocent men among them." "In future we shall have to hold an inquiry into their guilt instead of merely shooting them." "The Vandals themselves could not have done more damage. The place is a disgrace to our army." So the journal runs on with its tale of infamy. It is an infamy so shameless that even in the German record the story is perpetuated of how a French lad was murdered because he refused to answer certain questions. To such a depth of degradation has Prussia brought the standard of warfare.
And now, as the appetite for blood grows ever stronger--and nothing waxes more fast--we have stories of the treatment of prisoners. Here is a point where our attention should be most concentrated and our action most prompt. It is the just duty which we owe to our own brave soldiers. At present the instances are isolated, and we will hope that they do not represent any general condition. But the stories come from sure sources. There is the account of the brutality which culminated in the death of the gallant motor cyclist Pearson, the son of Lord Cowdray. There is the horrible story in a responsible Dutch paper, told by an eyewitness, of the torture of three British wounded prisoners in Landen Station on Oct. 9.
The story carries conviction by its detail. Finally, there are the disquieting remarks of German soldiers, repeated by this same witness, as to the British prisoners whom they had shot. The whole lesson of history is that when troops are allowed to start murder one can never say how or when it will stop. It may no longer be part of a deliberate, calculated policy of murder by the German Government. But it has undoubtedly been so in the past, and we cannot say when it will end. Such incidents will, I fear, make peace an impossibility in our generation, for whatever statesmen may write upon paper can never affect the deep and bitter resentment which a war so conducted must leave behind it.
Other German characteristics we can ignore. The consistent, systematic lying of the German press, or the grotesque blasphemies of the Kaiser, can be met by us with contemptuous tolerance. After all, what is is, and neither falsehood nor bombast will alter it. But this policy of murder deeply affects not only ourselves but the whole framework of civilization, so slowly and painfully built upward by the human race.
The Soldier's Epitaph
"HE DIED FOR ENGLAND."
[Inscription on the tombstone of a private soldier, recently killed in action.]
These four short words his epitaph, Sublimely simple, nobly plain; Who adds to them but addeth chaff, Obscures with husks the golden grain. Not all the bards of other days, Not Homer in his loftiest vein, Not Milton's most majestic strain, Not the whole wealth of Pindar's lays, Could bring to that one simple phrase What were not rather loss than gain; That elegy so briefly fine, That epic writ in half a line, That little which so much conveys, Whose silence is a hymn of praise And throbs with harmonies divine.
The Will to Power
By Eden Phillpotts
A distinction between power as physical force and as expressed in terms of spiritual value is drawn by Mr. Phillpotts in his article, appearing in The Westminster Gazette of March 27, 1915, which is here reproduced.
It has not often happened in the world's history that any generation can speak with such assured confidence of future events as at present. When the living tongue is concerned with destiny it seldom does more than indicate the trend of things to come, examine tendencies and movements and predict, without any sure foreknowledge or conviction, what generations unborn may expect to find and the conditions they will create. Destiny for us, who speak of it, is an unknown sea whose waves, indeed, drive steadily onward before strong winds, but whose shore is still far distant. We know that we men of the hour can never see these billows break upon the sands of future time.
But today we may look forward to stupendous events; today there are mighty epiphanies quickening earth, not to be assigned to periods of future time, but at hand, so near that our living selves shall see their birth, and participate in their consequences. Nor can we stand as spectators of this worldwide hope; we must not only hear the evangel whose first mighty murmur is drifting to our ears from the future, we must take it up with heart and voice and help to sound and resound it. There is tremendous work lying ahead, not only for our children, but for us. Weighty deeds will presently have to be performed by all adult manhood and womanhood--deeds, perhaps, greater than any living man has been called to do--deeds that exalt the doer and make sacred for all history the hour in which they shall be done.
On Time's high canopy the years are as stars great and small, some of lesser magnitude, some forever bright with the splendor of supreme human achievements; and now there flashes out a year concerning which, indeed, no man can say as yet how great it will be; but all men know that it must be great. It is destined to drown all lesser years, even as sunrise dims the morning stars with day; it is a year bright with promise and bodeful with ill-tidings also; for in the world at this moment there exist stupendous differences that this year will go far to set at rest. This year must solve profound problems, determine the trend of human affairs for centuries, and influence the whole future history of civilization. This year may actually see the issue; at least it will serve to light the near future when that issue shall be accomplished.
There has risen, then, a year that is great with no less a thing than the future welfare of the whole earth. It must embrace the victory of one ideal over another, and include a decision which shall determine whether the sublime human hope of freedom and security for all mankind is to guide human progress henceforth, or the spirit of domination and slavery to win a new lease of life. On the one hand, this year of the first magnitude will shine with the glory of such a victory for democratic ideas as we have not seen, or expected to see, in our generation; on the other, its bale-fire will blaze upon the overthrow of all great ideals, the destruction of a weak nation by a powerful one, and the triumph of that policy of "blood and iron" from which every enlightened man of this age shrinks with horror. The situation cannot be stated in simpler terms; no words can make it less than tremendous; and it is demanded from us to make it personal--as personal to ourselves as it is to the King of England, the Emperor of Germany, or the Czar of all the Russias.
They live who, when this far-flung agony of war is ended, when the last hero has fallen and lies in his grave, when the final cannon has sounded its knell, must be called upon to make the great peace. They live who will weave a shroud of death for the exhausted world, or plant the tree of life upon her bosom; and since we, inspired by the splendor of our cause, are assured that the day-spring will be ours, we already feel and know that we shall see that tree of life planted. But do we also feel and know that we must help to plant it, that the labor and toil of each of us is vital, that none is so weak but that there is a part of that planting for which he was born, a part consecrated to his individual effort, a part that will go undone if he does not do it?
Look to yourself, man, woman, child, that with heart and soul and strength you perform your part in the great world work lying ahead; remember that not princes and rulers, not regiments of your kinsmen, not the armed might of nations can do your appointed task for you. Fail of it, and by so much will the life tree lack in her planting; succeed, and by so much will she be the more splendid and secure. Her name is Freedom and her fruits are for the weak and humble as well as the strong and great, for the foolish as well as the wise, for all subjects as well as for all States. Put out your power, then, for that most sacred tree; deny yourself no pang that she may flourish; labor according to your strength that her blossom shall win the worship of humanity and her fruit be worthy of the blood of heroes that has poured for her planting.
Much we hear of the Will to Power, and because that great impulse has lifted our enemies on the full flood tide of their might and manhood in one overwhelming torrent, Germany has been condemned. But not for her united effort and whole-hearted sacrifice should we condemn her--not for her patriotism and response to the call. Her reply is wholly magnificent, and it only stands condemned for the evil ends and ignoble ambitions toward which it is directed. The spectacle of a great nation at one, inspired by a single ideal and pouring its life, its wealth, its energy, with a single impulse in the name of the Fatherland can only be called sublime. The tragedy lies in the fact that this stupendous effort is not worthy of the cause; that for false hopes, false ambitions and mistaken sense of right and justice Germany has wasted her life and given her soul.
Who blames the Will to Power? Power is the mightiest weapon fate can forge for a nation--a treasure beyond the strength of commerce, or armies, or navies, or intellect of man to produce. But it is necessary that we define power in terms of spiritual value; and then, surely, it appears that Power and Force can never be the same. A Frederick I., or a Napoleon, may pretend to confound power with force, and believe that their might must be right. They possessed a giant's strength and used it like giants. But true Power is ever the attribute of Right and they who strive for it must cleanse their souls, see that their ambition is worthy of such a possession, and, before all else, strive to realize the awful responsibility that goes with Power.
Never was a moment more golden than the present for this nation to Will to Power. For once our hearts are single, our resolutions pure, our patriotism, as well as the objects that we seek to attain, sure set upon the line of human progress. In the sane and sacred name of Freedom, therefore, and at her ancient inspiration it becomes us now to strive by all that is highest and best in us to fulfill our noblest possibilities and give soul and strength that the united Will to Power of our nation may surmount that of her enemies, even as our goal and purpose surmount theirs.
It is for the victory that must crown this victory we should labor, and cease not while hand can toil, mind achieve, and heart sacrifice to make the vital issue assured.
Alleged German Atrocities
Report of the Committee Appointed by the British Government
and Presided Over by
The Right Hon. Viscount Bryce
_Formerly British Ambassador at Washington_
Proofs of alleged atrocities committed by the German armies in Belgium--proofs collected by men trained in the law and presented with unemotional directness after a careful inquiry--are presented in the report of the "Committee on Alleged German Atrocities" headed by Viscount Bryce, the English historian and formerly British Ambassador at Washington. The document was made public simultaneously in London and the United States on May 12, 1915, four days after the sinking of the Lusitania. It was pointed out at the time that this was a coincidence, as the report had been prepared several weeks before and forwarded by mail from England for publication on May 12.
WARRANT OF APPOINTMENT.
I hereby appoint--
The Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, O.M.;
The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bt., K.C.;
The Right Hon. Sir Edward Clarke, K.C.;
Sir Alfred Hopkinson, K.C.;
Mr. H.A.L. Fisher, Vice Chancellor of the University of Sheffield; and
Mr. Harold Cox;
to be a committee to consider and advise on the evidence collected on behalf of his Majesty's Government as to outrages alleged to have been committed by German troops during the present war, cases of alleged maltreatment of civilians in the invaded territories, and breaches of the laws and established usages of war; and to prepare a report for his Majesty's Government showing the conclusion at which they arrive on the evidence now available.
And I appoint Viscount Bryce to be Chairman, and Mr. E. Grimwood Mears and Mr. W.J.H. Brodrick, barristers at law, to be Joint Secretaries to the committee.
(Signed) H.H. ASQUITH. 15th December, 1914.
Sir Kenelm E. Digby, K.C., G.C.B., was appointed an additional member of the committee on 22d January, 1915.
To the Right Hon. H.H. Asquith, &c., &c., First Lord of H.M. Treasury.
The committee have the honor to present and transmit to you a report upon the evidence which has been submitted to them regarding outrages alleged to have been committed by the German troops in the present war.
By the terms of their appointment the committee were directed
"to consider and advise on the evidence collected on behalf of his Majesty's Government as to outrages alleged to have been committed by German troops during the present war, cases of alleged maltreatment of civilians in the invaded territories, and breaches of the laws and established usages of war; and to prepare a report for his Majesty's Government showing the conclusion at which they arrive on the evidence now available."
It may be convenient that before proceeding to state how we have dealt with the materials, and what are the conclusions we have reached, we should set out the manner in which the evidence came into being, and its nature.
In the month of September, 1914, a minute was, at the instance of the Prime Minister, drawn up and signed by the Home Secretary and the Attorney General. It stated the need that had arisen for investigating the accusations of inhumanity and outrage that had been brought against the German soldiers, and indicated the precautions to be taken in collecting evidence that would be needed to insure its accuracy. Pursuant to this minute steps were taken under the direction of the Home Office to collect evidence, and a great many persons who could give it were seen and examined.
For some three or four months before the appointment of the committee, the Home Office had been collecting a large body of evidence.[A] More than 1,200 depositions made by these witnesses have been submitted to and considered by the committee. Nearly all of these were obtained under the supervision of Sir Charles Mathews, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and of Mr. E. Grimwood Mears, barrister of the Inner Temple, while in addition Professor J.H. Morgan has collected a number of statements mainly from British soldiers, which have also been submitted to the committee.
[Footnote A: Taken from Belgian witnesses, some soldiers, but most of them civilians from those towns and villages through which the German Army passed, and from British officers and soldiers.]
The labor involved in securing, in a comparatively short time, so large a number of statements from witnesses scattered all over the United Kingdom, made it necessary to employ a good many examiners. The depositions were in all cases taken down in this country by gentlemen of legal knowledge and experience, though, of course, they had no authority to administer an oath. They were instructed not to "lead" the witnesses or make any suggestions to them, and also to impress upon them the necessity for care and precision in giving their evidence.
They were also directed to treat the evidence critically, and as far as possible satisfy themselves, by putting questions which arose out of the evidence, that the witnesses were speaking the truth. They were, in fact, to cross-examine them, so far as the testimony given provided materials for cross-examination.
We have seen and conversed with many of these gentlemen, and have been greatly impressed by their ability and by what we have gathered as to the fairness of spirit which they brought to their task. We feel certain that the instructions given have been scrupulously observed.
In many cases those who took the evidence have added their comments upon the intelligence and demeanor of the witnesses stating the impression which each witness made, and indicating any cases in which the story told appeared to them open to doubt or suspicion. In coming to a conclusion upon the evidence the committee have been greatly assisted by these expressions of opinion, and have uniformly rejected every deposition on which an opinion adverse to the witness has been recorded.
This seems to be a fitting place at which to put on record the invaluable help which we have received from our secretaries, Mr. E. Grimwood Mears and Mr. W.J.H. Brodrick, whose careful diligence and minute knowledge of the evidence have been of the utmost service. Without their skill, judgment, and untiring industry the labor of examining and appraising each part of so large a mass of testimony would have occupied us for six months instead of three.
The marginal references in this report indicate the particular deposition or depositions on which the statements made in the text are based.[A]
[Footnote A: Marginal references are omitted in this reproduction.--EDITOR.]
The depositions printed in the appendix themselves show that the stories were tested in detail, and in none of these have we been able to detect the trace of any desire to "make a case" against the German Army. Care was taken to impress upon the witness that the giving of evidence was a grave and serious matter, and every deposition submitted to us was signed by the witness in the presence of the examiner.
A noteworthy feature of many of the depositions is that, though taken at different places and on different dates, and by different lawyers from different witnesses, they often corroborate each other in a striking manner.
The evidence is all couched in the very words which the witnesses used, and where they spoke, as the Belgian witnesses did, in Flemish or French, pains were taken to have competent translators, and to make certain that the translation was exact.
Seldom did these Belgian witnesses show a desire to describe what they had seen or suffered. The lawyers who took the depositions were surprised to find how little vindictiveness, or indeed passion they showed, and how generally free from emotional excitement their narratives were. Many hesitated to speak lest what they said, if it should ever be published, might involve their friends or relatives at home in danger, and it was found necessary to give an absolute promise that names should not be disclosed.
For this reason names have been omitted.
A large number of depositions, and extracts from depositions, will be found in Appendix A, and to these your attention is directed.
In all cases these are given as nearly as possible (for abbreviation was sometimes inevitable) in the exact words of the witness, and wherever a statement has been made by a witness tending to exculpate the German troops, it has been given in full. Excisions have been made only where it has been felt necessary to conceal the identity of the deponent or to omit what are merely hearsay statements, or are palpably irrelevant. In every case the name and description of the witnesses are given in the original depositions and in copies which have been furnished to us by H.M. Government. The originals remain in the custody of the Home Department, where they will be available, in case of need, for reference after the conclusion of the war.
The committee have also had before them a number of diaries taken from the German dead.
It appears to be the custom in the German Army for soldiers to be encouraged to keep diaries and to record in them the chief events of each day. A good many of these diaries were collected on the field when British troops were advancing over ground which had been held by the enemy, were sent to headquarters in France, and dispatched thence to the War Office in England. They passed into the possession of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, and were handed by it to our secretaries. They have been translated with great care. We have inspected them and are absolutely satisfied of their authenticity. They have thrown important light upon the methods followed in the conduct of the war. In one respect, indeed, they are the most weighty part of the evidence, because they proceed from a hostile source and are not open to any such criticism on the ground of bias as might be applied to Belgian testimony. From time to time references to these diaries will be found in the text of the report. In Appendix B they are set out at greater length both in the German original and in an English translation, together with a few photographs of the more important entries.
In Appendix C are set out a number of German proclamations. Most of these are included in the Belgian Report No. VI., which has been furnished to us. Actual specimens of original proclamations issued by or at the bidding of the German military authorities, and posted in the Belgian and French towns mentioned, have been produced to us, and copies thereof are to be found in this appendix.
Appendix D contains the rules of The Hague Convention dealing with the conduct of war on land as adopted in 1907, Germany being one of the signatory powers.
In Appendix E will be found a selection of statements collected in France by Professor Morgan.
These five appendices are contained in a separate volume.
In dealing with the evidence we have recognized the importance of testing it severely, and so far as the conditions permit we have followed the principles which are recognized in the courts of England, the British overseas dominions, and the United States. We have also (as already noted) set aside the testimony of any witnesses who did not favorably impress the lawyers who took their depositions, and have rejected hearsay evidence except in cases where hearsay furnished an undersigned confirmation of facts with regard to which we already possessed direct testimony from some other source, or explained in a natural way facts imperfectly narrated or otherwise perplexing.[A]
[Footnote A: For instance, the dead body of a man is found lying on the doorstep, or a woman is seen who has the appearance of having been outraged. So far the facts are proved by the direct evidence of the person by whom they have been seen. Information is sought for by him as to the circumstances under which the death or outrages took place. The bystanders who saw the circumstances but who are not now accessible, relate what they saw, and this is reported by the witness to the examiner and is placed on record in the depositions. We have had no hesitation in taking such evidence into consideration.]
It is natural to ask whether much of the evidence given, especially by the Belgian witnesses, may not be due to excitement and overstrained emotions, and whether, apart from deliberate falsehood, persons who mean to speak the truth may not in a more or less hysterical condition have been imagining themselves to have seen the things which they say that they saw. Both the lawyers who took the depositions, and we when we came to examine them, fully recognized this possibility. The lawyers, as already observed, took pains to test each witness and either rejected, or appended a note of distrust to, the testimony of those who failed to impress them favorably. We have carried the sifting still further by also omitting from the depositions those in which we found something that seemed too exceptional to be accepted on the faith of one witness only, or too little supported by other evidence pointing to like facts. Many depositions have thus been omitted on which, though they are probably true, we think it safer not to place reliance.
Notwithstanding these precautions, we began the inquiry with doubts whether a positive result would be attained. But the further we went and the more evidence we examined so much the more was our skepticism reduced. There might be some exaggeration in one witness, possible delusion in another, inaccuracies in a third. When, however, we found that things which had at first seemed improbable were testified to by many witnesses coming from different places, having had no communication with one another, and knowing nothing of one another's statements, the points in which they all agreed became more and more evidently true. And when this concurrence of testimony, this convergence upon what were substantially the same broad facts, showed itself in hundreds of depositions, the truth of those broad facts stood out beyond question. The force of the evidence is cumulative. Its worth can be estimated only by perusing the testimony as a whole. If any further confirmation had been needed, we found it in the diaries in which German officers and private soldiers have recorded incidents just such as those to which the Belgian witnesses depose.
The experienced lawyers who took the depositions tell us that they passed from the same stage of doubt into the same stage of conviction. They also began their work in a skeptical spirit, expecting to find much of the evidence colored by passion, or prompted by an excited fancy. But they were impressed by the general moderation and matter-of-fact level-headedness of the witnesses. We have interrogated them, particularly regarding some of the most startling and shocking incidents which appear in the evidence laid before us, and where they expressed a doubt we have excluded the evidence, admitting it as regards the cases in which they stated that the witnesses seemed to them to be speaking the truth, and that they themselves believed the incidents referred to have happened. It is for this reason that we have inserted among the depositions printed in the appendix several cases which we might otherwise have deemed scarcely credible.
The committee has conducted its investigations and come to its conclusions independently of the reports issued by the French and Belgian commissions, but it has no reason to doubt that those conclusions are in substantial accord with the conclusions that have been reached by these two commissions.
ARRANGEMENT OF THE REPORT.
As respects the framework and arrangement of the report, it has been deemed desirable to present first of all what may be called a general historical account of the events which happened, and the conditions which prevailed in the parts of Belgium which lay along the line of the German march, and thereafter to set forth the evidence which bears upon particular classes of offenses against the usages of civilized warfare, evidence which shows to what extent the provisions of The Hague Convention have been disregarded.
This method, no doubt, involves a certain amount of overlapping, for some of the offenses belonging to the latter part of the report will have been already referred to in the earlier part which deals with the invasion of Belgium. But the importance of presenting a connected narrative of events seems to outweigh the disadvantage of occasional repetition. The report will therefore be found to consist of two parts, viz.:
(1) An analysis and summary of the evidence regarding the conduct of the German troops in Belgium toward the civilian population of that country during the first few weeks of the invasion.
(2) An examination of the evidence relating to breaches of the rules and usages of war and acts of inhumanity, committed by German soldiers or groups of soldiers, during the first four months of the war, whether in Belgium or in France.
This second part has again been subdivided into two sections:
a. Offenses committed against noncombatant civilians during the conduct of the war generally.
b. Offenses committed against combatants, whether in Belgium or in France.