Chapter 6

In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers.

MANY COLONELS PROMOTED.

This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war.

The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war.

The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders.

The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field.

It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements.

The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience.

2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT.

Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more.

In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength.

This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units.

At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men.

With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service.

DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS.

In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power.

The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health--largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat--is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter.

With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August.

The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October this branch was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry, and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable services.

The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable material, which is recognized by the Germans themselves.

_LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--Further installments of the French official review of the condition of the French Army after six months of war have been obtained by The Associated Press. The sixth installment deals with material, artillery, transport, and supplies, and the seventh takes up the situation of the German Army and makes an analysis of the German forces in the field and available for service._

_The first chapter of the seventh installment, headed "The German Effort," opens with a statement as to the German forces at the beginning of the campaign. The writer says:_

The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together.

The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field on the two theatres of operations: 1, as fighting troops, (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr,) sixty-one army corps; 2, as troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm.

In October six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors--in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insignificant increase, consisting of the division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting formations put into line by the German Army was therefore sixty-nine army corps, divided as follows:

Active corps, twenty-five and a half; reserve corps, twenty-one and a half; Ersatz brigades, six and a half; reserve corps of new formation, seven and a half, and corps of Landwehr, eight and a half.

GERMANY'S GREAT INITIAL EFFORT.

The immense effort thus made by Germany explains itself very well, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany desired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilization of all her forces--a mobilization which the three allied armies could not carry out so rapidly. Germany wished with the mass of troops to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the battle of Flanders, in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies.

Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally, it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that victory failed to be gained.

INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY.

From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save themselves. She had, in the words of the proverb, put all her eggs in one basket, and in spite of her large population she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers.

She was reduced to facing as best she could on both war fronts the unceasingly increasing forces of the Allies. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She had thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on increasing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied.

WASTAGE OF GERMAN EFFECTIVES.

_Chapter II. of this section of the review bears the headline "Wastage of German Effectives."_

The wastage of effectives is easy to establish, it says. We have for the purpose two sources--the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff and the notebooks, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men.

These figures are certainly less than the reality, because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men 500,000--this is the normal proportion--have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined.

It is certain that the majority of the German regiments have had to be completely renewed. What, then, is the situation created by these enormous losses?

_This question is answered by a statement headed "German troops available for 1915."_

The total of German formations known at the beginning of January, says the review, represented in round numbers 4,000,000 men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to 9,000,000. But from these 9,000,000 have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and industries--altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say 4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men.

GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED.

Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients.

The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just 2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute--and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon--the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited.

GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH.

When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months.

It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations, she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh.

Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental orders.

PRAISES FRENCH "SEVENTY-FIVES."

_In the sixth installment, beginning with the field gun, the famous "seventy-fives," the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon--its power, its rapidity of action, and its precision--points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which makes it an implement of war of the first order._

It may be stated without hesitation [says the review] that our "seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition today as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was completely overcome several weeks ago.

The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organized since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions, and an increasing rate of production is henceforth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide without particular effort for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, however long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the allied armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian armies. From the statements of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones.

FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR.

Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery.

The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.

With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.

_There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare._

Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.

_The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant._

_LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army."_

_The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units._

"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."

FRENCH CONDITIONS IN CONTRAST.

_The French report points out that on the other hand, all the French regiments have been constantly kept at a minimum figure of eighteen professional officers per regiment. At the same time it admits that the commanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps are officers by profession._

_The French report then addresses itself to the wastage of material. Discussing the wastage of guns, it says:_

It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On Dec. 28 the Sixty-sixth Regiment of Artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment.

The same facts have been ascertained as regards heavy artillery. On Dec. 21 and 22 seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery, which were no longer serviceable, were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign.