Chapter 20

And herein I think I have uncovered the deeper reason for an early misunderstanding of great consequence. It seems as though in a certain--to be sure, not a very great or very influential--circle of our German fellow-citizens the opinion prevails that the German Empire should substitute its claims for world domination for those of England. Such a view cannot be too soon or too sharply rebuked.

The claim for world domination would set the German Empire for many years face to face with a long series of bloody wars, the issue of which cannot be in doubt a moment to any one familiar with history. The enforcement of this claim, moreover, would of itself be the surrender of the German spirit to the spirit of our present opponent in the war. The idea of world domination, imperialism in the true sense of the word, is not a product grown on German soil; it is imported from abroad. To maintain that view in all seriousness is treachery to the inmost spirit of the German soul.

Perhaps I am mistaken in taking it for granted that such thoughts are today haunting many minds. Perhaps it is merely a matter of misapplied use of a large sounding word. In that case, however, it is absolutely necessary to create clear thinking. I take it for granted that I am voicing the sentiments of the souls of the vast overwhelming majority of Germans when I say: "We shall wage the war, if need be, to the very end, against the English and Russian lust for world domination, and for Germany's world value (Weltgeltung.")

But forthwith there appears a further difference of opinion, to be taken not quite so seriously, which I shall endeavor to define as objectively as possible. The German conservative press seems to be of the opinion that the goal for the winning of which we are waging the great war, and concerning which we are all of one mind, will be definitely attained immediately upon the conclusion of the war.

I, on the other hand, am convinced that in order permanently to insure for ourselves the fruits of victory, even after a victorious conclusion of the war, we shall need long and well planned labors of peace....

In my essay I used the statement: "England's claim for the domination of the sea, and therein for the domination of the world, remains a great danger to the peace of the world." To this view I adhere firmly. Let us take it for granted that the most extravagant hopes of our most reckless dreamers are fulfilled, that England is crowded out of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and is involved in a long-lasting war with the native Indians. An impossibly large dose of political naïveté is needed in order to make us believe that England would take this loss quietly for all time.

We may differ on the question whether we should meet England's efforts for rehabilitation of her world dominion in warlike, or, as I take it, in peaceful ways; but it would be an unpardonable piece of stupidity for us to rock ourselves to sleep in the mad delusion that those efforts would not be exerted. Even were England forced to her knees, she would not immediately give up her claim for world domination. We must count upon that.

And, counting upon that, we must estimate our own forces very carefully; rather account them weaker than they really are, than the reverse. I did that in my essay, and that is why the conservative press was so wrought up over it. To be sure, it carefully avoided discussing my reasons.

I started from the conception of world power which is fairly well established in the present political literature. From a point of view taken also by conservative writers I demanded as a characteristic of world power, in addition to the size of territories and the number of population, above all, the economic independence that makes it possible for a State, in a case of need, to produce, without export or import, all foodstuffs, necessities, raw materials, and all the finished or half-finished products it needs for its consumers in normal times, as well as to insure the sale of its surplus.

It is patent that this economic independence is influenced by the geographical position of the fatherland and its colonies. Now, I defended the theory (and my opponents made no attempt to confute it) that even after a victorious war the German Empire would not have fully attained this economic independence; that, accordingly, after the conclusion of peace, we must exert every effort to insure this economic independence in one way or another.

As to the course which we must follow to attain this goal, there may be various opinions. I proposed the establishment of a union of Central European States. The conservative press characterized that as "utterly pretentious."...

If the course I have proposed is considered inadvisable, let another be proposed. But on what colonies, forsooth, do those gentlemen count, that could furnish us with cotton and ore, petroleum and tobacco, wood and silk, and whatever else we need, in the quantity and quality we need? What colonies that could offer us--do not forget that--markets for the sale of our exporting industries? Even after the war we shall be dependent upon exports to and imports from abroad.

And so there is no other way of safeguarding our economic independence against England and Russia than by an economic alliance with the States that are our allies in this war, or at least that do not make common cause with our enemies. Aside from the fact, which I shall not discuss here, that only such an alliance can insure a firm position for us on the Atlantic Ocean, which in the next decades is bound to be the area of competition for the world powers.

Politics are not a matter of emotion, but of calm, intelligent deliberation. Let us leave emotional politics to our enemies. It is the German method to envisage the goal steadily, and with it the roads that lead to that goal. Our goal is not world domination. Whoever tries to talk that belief into the mind of the German people may confuse some heads that are already not very clear; but he cannot succeed in substituting Napoleon I. for Bismarck as our master teacher.

Our goal can only be the establishing of our value in the world among world powers, with equal rights to the same opportunities. And in order to attain this goal we must, even after the conclusion of peace, exert all our forces. A people that thinks it can rest on its laurels after victory has been won runs the risk sooner or later of losing that for which its sons shed their blood on the field of battle. With the conclusion of peace there begins for us anew the unceasing peaceful competition and the maintenance and strengthening of the world value which we have won through the war. German imperialism is and will remain the work of peace.

TWO POOR LITTLE BELGIAN FLEDGLINGS

By PIERRE LOTI.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

At evening, in one of our southern towns, a train full of Belgian refugees ran into the station, and the poor martyrs, exhausted and bewildered, got out slowly, one by one, on the unfamiliar platform, where French people were waiting to receive them. Carrying a few possessions caught up at random, they had got into the carriages without even asking whither they were bound, urged by their anxiety to flee, to flee desperately from horror and death, from unspeakable mutilation and Sadic outrage--from things that seemed no longer possible in the world, but which, it seems, were lying dormant in pietistic German brains, and had suddenly belched forth upon their land and ours, like a belated manifestation of original barbarism. They no longer possessed a village, nor a home, nor a family; they arrived like jetsam cast up by the waters, and the eyes of all were full of terrified anguish. Many children, little girls whose parents had disappeared in the stress of fire and battle; and aged women, now alone in the world, who had fled, hardly knowing why, no longer caring for life, but moved by some obscure instinct of self-preservation.

Two little creatures, lost in the pitiable throng, held each other tightly by the hand, two little boys obviously brothers, the elder, who may have been five years old, protecting the younger, of about three. No one claimed them, no one knew them. How had they been able to understand, finding themselves alone, that they, too, must get into this train to escape death? Their clothes were decent, and their little stockings were thick and warm; clearly they belonged to humble but careful parents; they were, doubtless, the sons of one of those sublime Belgian soldiers who had fallen heroically on the battlefield, and whose last thought had perhaps been one of supreme tenderness for them. They were not even crying, so overcome were they by fatigue and sleepiness; they could scarcely stand. They could not answer when they were questioned, but they seemed intent, above all, upon keeping a tight hold of each other. Finally the elder, clasping the little one's hand closely, as if fearing to lose him, seemed to awake to a sense of his duty as protector, and, half asleep already, found strength to say, in a suppliant tone, to the Red Cross lady bending over him: "Madame, are they going to put us to bed soon?" For the moment this was all they were capable of wishing, all that they hoped for from human pity--to be put to bed.

They were put to bed at once, together, of course, still holding each other tightly by the hand; and, nestling one against the other, they fell at the same moment into the tranquil unconsciousness of childish slumber.

Once, long ago, in the China Sea, during the war, two little frightened birds, smaller even than our wrens, arrived, I know not how, on board our ironclad, in our Admiral's cabin, and all day long, though no one attempted to disturb them, they fluttered from side to side, perching on cornices and plants.

At nightfall, when I had forgotten them, the Admiral sent for me. It was to show me, now without emotion, the two little visitors who had gone to roost in his room, perched upon a slender silken cord above his bed. They nestled closely together, two little balls of feathers, touching and almost merged one in the other, and slept without the slightest fear, sure of our pity. And those little Belgians sleeping side by side made me think of the two little birds lost in the China Sea. There was the same confidence and the same innocent slumber--but a greater tenderness was about to watch over them.

What the Germans Desire

Not Conquest, but a New Economical System of Europe

By Gustaf Sioesteen

The subjoined letter from Berlin, published originally in the Swedish Goteborgs Handels-Tidnung of Oct. 26, 1914, was immediately translated by the British Legation in Stockholm--this is the official English translation--and sent by the legation to Sir Edward Grey. THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY is informed from a trustworthy source that the article is interpreted in London as expressing the real aims of Germany at the end of the war, should that power be successful. The founding of a commercial United States of Europe by means of an economical organization with new "buffer" States to be created between the German Empire and Russia, and with the other smaller European States, would be, according to this interpretation, the purpose of Germany at the conclusion of a victorious war. The passage in the Berlin correspondent's letter declaring that only such an enormous central European customs union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, "could hold the United States of North America at bay" in order that, after this present war, the "world would only have to take into account two first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America," is of peculiar interest to Americans.

BERLIN, Oct. 21.

Counting one's chickens before they are hatched is a pardonable failing with nations carrying on war with the feeling that their all is at stake. When sorrow is a guest of every household, when monetary losses cause depression, and the cry arises time after time, "What will be the outcome of all this?" then only the fairest illusions and the wildest flights of fancy can sustain the courage of the masses.

These illusions are not only egotistical but, curiously enough, altruistic, since mankind, even when bayoneting their fellow-creatures, want to persuade themselves and others that this is done merely for the benefit of their adversary. In accordance with this idea, in the opinion of all parties, the war will be brought to an end with an increase of power for their native country, as also a new Eden prevail throughout the whole civilized world.

The enemies of Germany, though they have hitherto suffered an almost unbroken series of reverses in the war, have already thoroughly thrashed out the subject as to what the world will look like when Germany is conquered. In German quarters the press has likewise painted the future, but the following lines are not intended to increase the row of fancy portraits, but merely to throw light on what is new in the demands conceived.

My representations are founded on special information, and I deem it best to make them now, when the most fantastic descriptions of the all-absorbing desire of conquest on the part of Germany have circulated in the press of the entire world.

Among other absurdities it has been declared that Germany intends to claim a fourth of France, making this dismembered country a vassal State, bound to the triumphal car of the conqueror by the very heaviest chains. It is incredible, but true, that such a statement has been made in the press by a Frenchman, formerly President of the Council.

In direct opposition to the fictitious demands of the Germans, I can advance a proposition which may sound paradoxical, viz., that the leading men in Germany, the Emperor and his advisers, after bringing the war to a victorious issue, will seriously seek expedients to _avoid_ conquests, so far as this is compatible with the indispensable demands of order and stability for Europe.

First, as regards France. The entire world, as also the Germans, are moved to pity by her fate. Germany has never entertained any other wish than to be at peace with her western frontier. A considerable portion of France is now laid waste, and in a few weeks millions of soldiers will have been poured into still wider portions of this beautiful country. On what are the inhabitants of these French provinces to exist when the German and French armies have requisitioned everything eatable? Germany cannot feed the inhabitants of the French provinces occupied, nor can the Belgians do so, I imagine, for the provisions of Germany are simply sufficient for their own needs, England preventing any new supply on any large scale.

This is a totally new state of things in comparison with 1870, when Germany was still an agrarian country and had, moreover, a free supply on all her frontiers.

Can the French Government allow a considerable portion of their own population actually to starve, or be obliged to emigrate to other parts of France, there to live the life of nomads at the expense of England, while the deserted provinces are given over to desolation?

The idea prevails here that the French will compel their Government to enter on and conclude a separate treaty of peace when the fatal consequences of the war begin to assume this awful guise. England does not appear to have considered that this would be the result of her system of blockade.

The German conditions of peace as regards France will be governed by two principal factors with respect to their chief issues.

The first is the complete unanimity of the Emperor and the Chancellor that _no population, not speaking German, will be incorporated in the German Empire, or obtain representation in the Diet_. Germany already has sufficient trouble with the foreign element now present in the Diet. Consequently there can be no question of any considerable acquisition of territory from France, but the demands of Germany simply extend to the _iron-ore fields of Lorraine_, which are certainly of considerable value. For France these mining fields are of far less consideration than for Germany, whose immense iron trade is far more in need of the iron mines.

The second factor is that the Germans, owing to the strong public opinion, _will never consent to Belgium regaining her liberty_. The Chancellor of the Empire has, as long as it was possible, been opposed to the annexation of Belgium, having preferred, even during hostilities, to have re-established the Belgian Kingdom. It is significant that the military authorities have prohibited the German press from discussing the question of the future of Belgium. It is evident that there has prevailed a wish to leave the question open in order to insure a solution offering various possibilities. But subsequent to the discovery of the Anglo-Belgian plot, as previously stated, all idea of reinstating Belgium has been discarded.

The annexation of Belgium, however, makes it possible to grant France less stringent conditions. So long as Belgium--under some form of self-government--is under German sway there is no hope of revenge of France, and the conviction prevails here that after this war France will abstain from her dreams of aggrandizement and become pacific. Germany can then make reductions in the burdens laid on her people for military service by land.

To arrange the position of Belgium in relation to Germany will be a very interesting problem for German policy.

It is obvious that the annexation of Belgium cannot be defended from the point of view of the principle of nationality. The Belgians--half of them French, half of them Flemish--undoubtedly deem themselves but one nation. As a mitigating circumstance in favor of the annexation it is urged--above and beyond the intrigues carried on by Belgium with the English--that Belgium, in days of yore, for a long time formed a portion of the German Empire, and that the inhabitants of the little country, to a considerable degree, gain their livelihood by its being a land of transit for German products. Nationally, the annexation is not to be defended, but geographically, economically, and from a military point of view it is comprehensible.

At the east front of the central powers very different conditions prevail. _Austria has no desire to make the conquest of any territory_; indeed, just the contrary, would probably be willing to cede a portion of Galicia in favor of new States. _Germany has not the slightest inclination to incorporate new portions of Slav or Lettish regions._ Both Germans and Austrians wish to establish free _buffer States_ between themselves and the great Russian Empire.

Not even the Baltic provinces, where Germans hold almost the same position as the Swedes in Finland, form an object for the German desire of conquest, but her wish is to make them, as also _Finland_, an independent State. Furthermore, the Kingdom of _Poland_ and a Kingdom of _Ukraine_ would be the outcome of decisive victories for the central powers.

What Germany would demand of these new States, whose very existence was the outcome of her success at arms, would simply be an _economical organization in common with the German Empire_, an enormous central European "Zollverein" ("Customs Union") with Germany at its heart. It is only such a union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, which could hold the United States of North America at bay, and after this present war, moreover, the world would only have to take into account _two_ first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America.

A commencement of this new economical connection is being made by the negotiations entered on by representatives of _Austria-Hungary_ and _Germany_ concerning the proposed formation of a _Customs Union_. Since this union would include 120,000,000 individuals, it must be evident what an immense attraction it must exert on the surrounding smaller nations. _Switzerland_ and _Holland_ can scarcely escape this attraction, and the _Scandinavian countries_, it is said, would probably find it to their advantage, together with a liberated _Finland_, to form a _Northern Customs Union_, which later, on an independent basis, could _enter in close union with the vast "Zollverein" of Central Europe_.

This "Zollverein" would then include about 175,000,000 individuals. The adhesion of _Italy_ to the vast union would not be inconceivable, and then the combination of the United States of Europe, founded on a voluntary commercial union, would be approaching its realization.

Such a commercial union, embracing various peoples, could only lead to moderation in foreign politics, and would be the best guarantee for the peace of the universe. A brisk interchange of commodities, a fruitful interchange of cultural ideas would result from such a union, connecting the polar seas with the Mediterranean, and the Netherlands with the Steppes of Southern Russia.

All States participating in this union would gain thereby. But one European country would be the loser, _Great Britain, the land of promise for the middleman_; that, according to German comprehension, at present gains a living by skimming the cream from the trade industry of other nations by facilitating the exchange of goods, and making profits by being the banking centre of the world.

The Germans declare that there is no reason for such a middleman's existence in our day. The banking system is now so developed in all civilized lands that, for example Sweden can remit direct to Australia or the Argentine for goods obtained thence, instead of making payment via London and there rate, by raising the exchange for sovereigns to an unnatural height, so that, as matter of fact, England levies a tax on all international interchange of commodities.

In opposition to this glorious vision of the days to come, which the Germans wish to realize by their victories in war, there is the alluring prospect of the Allies that by their victory they will deal a deathblow to _German militarism_. While the English, with their 200,000 troops, are good enough to promise no conquest of German territory--what says Russia to this?--at the close of the war, in the opinion of the Britons, there would still remain 65,000,000 Germans right in the centre of Europe, organized as a kingdom burdened with a war indemnity to a couple of tens of milliards in marks.

This nation, however, strengthened by 15,000,000 Germans in Austria, would be the greatest bearers of culture in the wide world--the nation with the best technical equipment of all others, glowing with ambition, with military training second to none, and gifted with an immense rate of increase as regards population. This nation would be forced to lay down her arms, lying as it does between the overbearing gigantic realm in the east and the warlike French to the west. The idea is incomprehensible. The universe would behold a competition in armaments such as it had never seen.

A victorious Germany, on the other hand, would become less and less military, since she _would not need_ to arm herself to such an extent as now. She is already chiefly an industrial country. Her desire is to be wealthy, and wealth invariably smothers military instincts. Germany has set up far greater ideals as regards social developments than other countries, and all she asks is to be left in peace calmly to carry out these plans in the future. _German militarism can only be conquered by the victory being on her side, since she has no thought of military supremacy, but simply of founding a new economical organization in Europe._

GUSTAF SIOESTEEN.

ADDRESS TO KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM

By EMIL VERHAEREN.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]