Chapter 12

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WHO IS TO BE VICTORIOUS?

An appeal to American friends

The American citizen who is now leaving Europe, which has been turned into an enormous military camp, may consider himself fortunate that he will soon be able to set foot in the New World, where he will be enabled again to take up his business pursuits. In the meantime old Europe is being torn asunder by a terrible war among its various peoples. It will make him happy again to greet mountain and valley, field and garden which are not threatened nor trampled down by armies or covered with blood; again to see cities in which business and traffic are not brought to a standstill by calling in all men capable of military service; and he may thank fortune that his people have been given room enough in which to expand and to permit them freely to unfold their power; that they are spared the great necessity of resisting the tightening ring of enemies in the east and west, on land and water, in a struggle for national existence.

But the American will feel the effects of the fate of the Old World. Even though he knows his own country is not directly involved, he will certainly realize that the great net of international traffic and the progress of his country are connected by many strong ties to the life and prosperity of European peoples. He will be affected by every victory and defeat, just as by the sun and rain in his own country. He will doubtless remember that of all European countries Germany is the best customer of the United States, from which she purchases yearly over 1,000,000,000 marks in cotton, food, metal, and technical products. If Germany is economically ruined, which is the wish of Russia, France, and England and all allied friends of wretched Servia, it would mean the loss of a heavy buyer to America, and thereby cause a serious loss to America which could not easily be made good. It would be a great blow to American export trade, of which Germany handles not less than 14 per cent. yearly.

The material loss is not the only feature. In the economic struggle in the world markets American and German commercial men have learned mutually to appreciate one another, to appreciate one another more highly than do any other two rivals. The time is long past when the American pictured the German as one of thousands, shut up in a room, surrounded by documents and parchments, speculating about the unknown outside world, and the same is true of the German's idea of the American--a money-hungry barbarian. Two nations in which so much kindred blood flows and which are connected by so many historical events understand each other better today than formerly. Above all, they have a mutual understanding regarding the ideal in commercial life: A man engaged in work not for the sake of the profit, but for the sake of the work he is doing; one who gives all his strength to his task, and who works for the general welfare of the people as a whole, considering his position as an office and his wealth as an obligation, not as the final aim, but as a basis for the realization of higher attainments. He places the value of character and the development of the creative powers of man higher than all economic success. Two nations united by such common inclinations [pg 272] and ideals, boldness of enterprise, far-sightedness, quickness of decision, and admiration for intellectual achievements, cannot help being exceedingly congenial to each other. What concerns one today concerns the other.

Does it sound like a paradox when I say Germany's struggle concerns not only her own destiny, but to a considerable extent that of America? Does the United States consider itself entirely immune from the warlike complications brought about by the Servian murder of Princes and Russia's breach of faith? In any event, it will be difficult for it to say: "What's Hecuba to me?" One thing should be clearly understood on the shores of the five oceans, that the cause of this most terrible war does not emanate from the dark Balkans, or from a Russian military group, but from envy and hate which healthy, young and striving Germany has aroused in her older rivals; not because this or that demand was made by one Cabinet and refused by another, but because it was believed there was finally an opportunity to destroy the hated opponent who threatened to put the older Western European powers in the shade, and for this reason England and France put their strength into the service of criminal and brutal Servia. The following statistics will, perhaps, throw some light on the development of the foreign trade of the principal countries from 1870 to 1913 (in billions of marks):

1870. 1913. Great Britain 9,180 23,280 France 4,540 12,300 Russia 2,000 5,580 Germany 4,240 20,440

In these forty-three years, which have been decisive in the development of international economy, England, France and Russia have not been able even to increase their foreign trade three times, while Germany and the United States have increased theirs five times. The trade of Germany and the United States has increased from 7.6 to 38 billion marks. If these figures show nothing else, they show on which side the American sympathy will be. This war, provoked by Russia because of an outrageous desire for revenge, supported by England and France, has no other motive than envy of Germany's position in economic life, and of her people, who are fighting for a place in the sun. "Right or wrong, Germany must not grow." That is the turning point of a policy which the French Republic drilled into the Muscovites. Let us consider the adversaries of Germany. Russia, the classic land of power and terrible exploitation of the people for the benefit of a degenerated aristocracy. France, a type of a nation in which there is not even enough enterprise to increase the productiveness of the country. England, which has so long felt its glory vanishing and in the meantime has remained far behind its younger rival in financial and economic equipment. One can easily imagine the feelings of these peoples when they observe the rapid and successful growth of Germany, and wonders if these same feelings will not one day be directed against the youthful North American giant. In this war it shall be decided which is the stronger--the organized inertia of the tired and envious, or the unfolding of power in the service of a strong and sacrificing life. To know that we have American friendship in this struggle will mean a great moral support for us in the coming trying days, for we know that the country of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln places itself only on the side of a just cause and one worthy of humanity's blessing.

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Speculations About Peace, September, 1914

Report by James W. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin, to President Wilson.

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17.--Germany has suggested informally that the United States should undertake to elicit from Great Britain, France, and Russia a statement of the terms under which the Allies would make peace.

The suggestion was made by the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin as a result of an inquiry sent by the American Government to learn whether Emperor William was desirous of discussing peace, as recently had been reported.

No reply was made by Emperor William himself, nor did the Imperial Chancellor indicate whether or not he spoke on behalf of the Emperor. Ambassador Gerard, in a cable dispatch to President Wilson, repeated the Chancellor's remarks from recollection, substantially as follows:

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace. Germany did not want war, but had it forced on her. Even if she defeats France, she must likewise vanquish both Great Britain and Russia, as all three have made an agreement not to make peace except by common consent. Similarly, England has announced through Premier Asquith and her diplomatists and the newspapers that she intends to fight to the limit of her endurance. In view of that determination on the part of Great Britain, the United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security.

The above is all that Ambassador Gerard communicated as to his conversation. He added only the brief comment that he, himself, thought the way might possibly be opened to mediation. President Wilson did not regard the message, however, as bringing anything tangible. He referred to the Chancellor's conversation as non-committal and incidental to the acknowledgment of the American Government's inquiry. The President indicated that he rather expected a reply to the inquiry to be sent eventually from the Emperor himself, although he realizes that the Imperial Chancellor may have consulted the Kaiser by telegraph before talking informally with the American Ambassador.

President Wilson took no action as a result of the message, waiting to hear from Ambassador Gerard whether anything of a more formal character could be obtained by him which the United States might communicate to Great Britain, France, and Russia. It was understood tonight that the British and French Ambassadors who are in Washington were not informed officially or unofficially by Secretary Bryan of the conversation between the Imperial German Chancellor and Ambassador Gerard.

Germany's position is that she will give her opinion on terms of peace when she has received a definite statement from the Allies of their proposals. The statement that Germany did not want war, but had it forced upon her, as well as the declaration that she wanted a lasting peace, is almost identical with the remarks which Sir Edward Grey made to Ambassador Page in London last week. The British Foreign Secretary said England wanted no temporary truce, but a permanent peace, and one that would safeguard her against sudden attacks such as Germany had made.

President's Future Course.

The general belief in well-informed circles tonight was that the President, after waiting a few days for more information from Berlin, probably would instruct the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd to communicate what the Imperial German Chancellor had said to Ambassador Gerard. It was believed the Ambassadors would be asked to reiterate the wish of the American Government to be of service in bringing about peace and to point out the readiness of the United States to communicate to Germany and Austria any statement of terms which the Allies might care to make.

Diplomatists are disposed to believe that through such informal conversations something definite in the way of peace terms may yet be obtained as a working basis. If a concord of opinion for the discussion of peace terms were reached President Wilson then would endeavor to obtain an acceptance by all the belligerents of the original tender of good offices. This would not mean a cessation of hostilities, unless the mediating power specifically made it a condition of mediation and all the belligerents agreed to it. An armistice would not hinder military movements or preparations, serving merely as a truce while peace was discussed.

President Wilson already has indicated that he believes that the final reckoning of the war should be made in a conference of the European powers, and it would be the function of the United States to preside at such a conference if its services as a mediator were accepted.

Various reports were current today that Germany had named several conditions under which she would make peace, that she had refused proposals to alter the territorial status of her empire and possessions, and would cede no territory or dismantle her fleet, but it was said authoritatively that nothing of this character was contained in any of the messages from Berlin to the American Government.

A statement made at the White House today was the first authoritative acknowledgment that any inquiry on the subject of Germany's attitude concerning peace had been made by the United States. Officials heretofore have maintained silence in regard to the effort made by the Government to get at the bottom of the expression in favor of peace reported to have been made by the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellor and mentioned in a private conversation in New York by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States.

What was said by Count von Bernstorff in that conversation brought Oscar S. Straus post-haste to Washington, and as a result of what he told Secretary Bryan instructions were sent to Ambassador Gerard to ascertain whether the remarks attributed to the Emperor were to be taken as an indication that the German Government would not be averse to the exercise of the good offices of the United States in an effort to end the hostilities in Europe.

The conversation at which the German Ambassador made the statement occurred at the house of James Speyer, the banker, in New York. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration at The Hague, was present. In the course of a discussion of the war in Europe and the prospects of peace Count von Bernstorff, it is understood, said that, while he had no advices from the Imperial Government since he had left Berlin, he recalled that the Imperial Chancellor had told him that he believed Emperor William would be willing to discuss a proposal of peace through mediation.

With the permission of Count von Bernstorff, Mr. Straus came to Washington and told Secretary Bryan of what the German Ambassador had said. On the following day Count von Bernstorff made a trip from New York to Washington and had an interview with Secretary Bryan.

It has been understood that Mr. Bryan, in an excess of caution, desired to ask Count von Bernstorff personally if he would consent to having Ambassador Gerard instructed to make inquiry of the German Government as to whether the conversation between the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor might be regarded as indicating that an offer of mediation of the United States would not be unwelcome to Germany. Count von Bernstorff is understood to have assented to Mr. Bryan's suggestion, and the instructions to Mr. Gerard followed.

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WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY?

CASE FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

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FIRST WARNINGS OF EUROPE'S PERIL.

Speeches by British Ministers.

Sir John Simon, British Attorney General, in Speech Before Altrincham Liberals, at Manchester, July 25.

We have been so filled with our own political development that some of us may not have noticed how serious a situation is threatening on the Continent of Europe. All I will say about it this afternoon is this--if times of anxiety are coming into relationships between different European powers, we in this country, and I think not only Liberals among us, have reason to be glad that our foreign administration is in the calm, cool hands of Sir Edward Grey.[06] [Cheers.] And let us all resolve that, whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations.

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[06] On the next day, July 26, Earl Grey addressed to The London Times the following appeal for national unity:

_To the Editor of The Times_:

Sir: The Lord Chancellor, in his speech on Friday, called on every Liberal to work for the peace of Europe, but to go forward unflinchingly to civil war at home.

It is obvious that the only hope of England's effective mediation lies in the unity and solidarity of the United Kingdom.

Is it not time that the common sense of the nation asserted itself and called upon our rulers to take steps which will enable a united nation to confront with confidence the perils which encompass us?

In moments of national peril every loyal citizen should not hesitate, however painful the process may be, to burst the fetters of party allegiance in order that he may devote his whole energies to an endeavor to safeguard the higher interests of the State.

What is the cause which is dividing a so-called United Kingdom into two hostile camps? It is the endeavor of a tyrannical House of Commons to force upon the acceptance of the people a bill which in the common belief they not only do not want but are strongly opposed to. I approach the consideration of the national crisis from no party standpoint, but from that of one who believes that the peace of Ireland, the honor of England, and the strength of the empire are all concerned in a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Irish question.

I believe that such a settlement is to be found in a measure which will give to the peoples of Ireland powers of local self-government similar to those enjoyed by the Provinces of Canada and South Africa.

It is because the Ministerial policy of home rule is based on a principle which would not be tolerated in any one of the Legislatures of Washington, Ottawa, or Melbourne that I am so strongly opposed to it. No party, no political group, however small, could be found in Canada, Australia, or the United States which would venture to propose that the Province of Quebec, or the State of Queensland or California, should be endowed by means of a measure like the Home Rule bill with separatist constitutional rights which could not be given to the other provinces and States.

I challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny this plain, unanswerable statement.

I further challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny that their home rule policy, if carried into effect, will make slaves of one part of Ireland or another.

If their bill for the better government of Ireland reaches the statute book without the amending bill it will make slaves of the Ulstermen. It will deprive them of half of the representation to which their population entitles them in the House of Commons, thus reducing them to a political inferiority, as compared with the peoples of Great Britain, which can hardly be distinguished from political slavery, and it will further compel them to accept the administration of a Dublin Parliament which they fear and detest in all matters relating to their local government. I have often wondered how any one rejoicing in the inheritance of old Liberal traditions could for a moment suppose that any group of free men would ever accept such dishonoring conditions.

Again, if the Home Rule bill is passed with the amending bill tacked on to it, the chains of slavery from which Ulster will be relieved will be riveted on the rest of Ireland. Ulster will have thirty-three representatives in the Imperial House of Commons, and the rest of Ireland twenty-seven! What germ of a settlement of the Irish question can any one discover in a policy which proposes that one-fourth of the people of Ireland should be able to outvote the other three-fourths in matters affecting their liberties and taxation?

No! The Ministerial bills of home rule are fundamentally bad and should be withdrawn, in order that a new attempt may be made to reach a settlement by general consent in accordance, as I believe, with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Is it not better to wait a little for a settlement by consent on lines which will conduce to permanent peace and prosperity than to try to force on the pages of the statute book a measure which must lead to bloodshed and civil war? If party considerations veto the withdrawal of the Ministerial measure of home rule without the aid of a general election, then let us have a general election without one moment's unnecessary delay.

The times are too perilous to allow us even to contemplate with any other feeling than that of horror and dismay the Lord Chancellor's appeal to go forward unflinchingly to civil war.

I have the honor to remain, Sir,

Yours respectfully,

GREY.

22 South Street, Park Lane, July 26.

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"A CLOUD OVER EUROPE."

London Times Report, July 27, of Speech by Under Secretary Acland.

F.D. Acland, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking at an open-air Liberal demonstration at Steyning, Sussex, on Saturday [July 25], said there was a cloud over Europe, the position there being far graver and more serious than the position in Ireland. No one could imagine the disasters which a war in which a great European power was involved might bring to the whole world. He hoped the power of accommodating the difficulties in the same way as in the Balkan trouble last year would be found effective. The whole of the influence of this country would be used in the interests of peace.

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AUSTRO-SERVIAN CRISIS.

Statement in House of Commons, July 27, by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The House will, of course, be aware from the public press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at the present moment. I think it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which his Majesty's Government have so far taken up. ["Hear, hear."] Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, which has appeared in the press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Servia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe--a matter that concerned us all.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four powers--Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain--who were not directly interested in the Servian question, should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four powers endeavored to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia I made, by telegraph yesterday afternoon, the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed: