Nazi conspiracy and aggression, Volume 03 (of 11)
chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury).
11. _Administrative Directives_:
The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)
12. _Supply Installations_:
For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin. Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s
------------+---------+---------------+------------ | | | App Time of Army H.Q. | Tech Hq | To | Arrival ------------+---------+---------------+------------ 12 | 13 | LANDAU/ISAR | 10.1 2000 10 | 4 | PLAUEN | 10.2 2000 8 | 3 | GORLITZ | 10.1 2000 2 | 8 | LAMSDORF | 10.5 2000 | | (SW/OPPELN) | ------------+---------+---------------+------------
13. _Propaganda Companies_:
Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
DISTRIBUTION: III and Special Distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 41] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 Req. No: 266/38 Most Secret
Berlin 30.9.38 200 copies, 153rd copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.
MOST SECRET
Subject: _OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY_
1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (or case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the time being, remain at their present posts.
2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied, together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.
The Commander in Chief can exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.
3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:
_a. Reich Postal Ministry_:
Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.
Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).
Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.
_b. Propaganda Ministry_:
Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)
_c. Reichsbank_:
Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) Part XVIII, Nr 8031)
4. _Application of Laws_:
_a._ There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the _German Criminal Code_ into the occupied territory.
_b. The Army Compensation Law_ [Wehrleistungsgesetz] will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency).
5. _Economic Directives_:
Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions [Kredit Instituten] is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:
100 Czech kronen--10.00 RM (1 Czech krone--10 Pfg)
6. _Payment of the Armed Forces_:
For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.
7. _Customs Frontier Guard_:
After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.
The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.
Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.
8. _Administrative Directives_:
The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc.). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
(signed) Keitel
Distribution: Overleaf
DISTRIBUTION
The Fuehrer's deputy for the attention of SS-Oberfuehrer Knoblauch--1st copy
Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the attention of Reichminister Dr. Lammers--2nd copy
Foreign Office for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch--3rd copy
Reichminister of the Interior for the attention of Min. Div. Dr. Danckwerts--4th copy
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police--Reich Defence (RV) Section--for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri--5th copy
Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda for the attention of Major (Reserve) Wentscher--6th copy
Reich Minister of Justice for the attention of Min. Rat. Haastert--7th copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Geh. Rat. Dr. Bender--8th copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Mitze--9th copy
Reich Minister of Communications--Motor Transport Service, Shipping Hydraulic Structures--for the attention of Min. Rat. Pigge--10th copy
Reich Minister of Transport--Railroad Dept.--for the attention of Div. Dr. Ebeling--11th copy
Reich Minister for Science, Education--National Culture for the attention of Min. Div. Prof. Dr. Krummel--12th copy
Reich Postal Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Honold--13th copy
General Inspector for German Roadways for the attention of Reg. Baurat Schaeffler--14th copy
Minister President General Fieldmarshall Goering, Director of the Four Year Plan and the Prussian State Ministry for the attention of Min. Rat. Bergbohm--15th & 16th copy
Operational Staff G B for the attention of Ministerial Director Sarnow--17th & 18th copies
Reich Minister of Economies for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. Dr. Burandt--19th copy
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Dietrich--20th copy
Reich Labour Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder--21st copy
Directorate of the Reichsbank for the attention of the Reichsbank dir. Dr. Mueller--22nd copy
Reich Conservator of Forests for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister Hausmann--23rd copy
Reich Office for long range regional planning (Raunoreburg) for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Schepers--24th copy
President of the Secret Cabinet Council Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath--25th copy
Reich Minister Frank for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Buhler--26th copy
Head of Reich Labour Service for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuehrer Richter--27th copy
_OKH_ (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X)--28th-107th copy
_Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force_ (2nd Div. Air Force General Staff) (30X)--108th-137th copy
_OKM_ (A II) (15 x)--138th-152nd copy
_Adjutant to the Fuehrer_--153rd copy
OKW: Chief of OKW--154th copy
WZ--155th copy
Ausl/Abwehr (with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (5 X)--156th-160th copy
General Armed Forces Office (with NA for J. Pressegr. Vers.) (4X)--161st-164th copy
Armed Forces Staff (with NA for WWi, WRo, WRue) (4X)--165th-168th copy
Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X)--169th-170th copy
L (Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K)--171st-180th copy
WH--181st copy
WR--182nd copy
Special Staff W--183rd copy
Stock kept at L IV--184th-200th copy
* * * * *
[ITEM 42] [_Typescript_] 200 copies, 153rd copy Supreme Command of the Armed Forces L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IV A
_Subject_: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area.
Berlin, 30.9.38 [STAMP] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor Rec. 3 Oct 1938 Enclosures: Reg. No. 267138 Dispatched-- Clerk
1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.
For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.
2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 Reichmarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. _Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense._
3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
[Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41]
* * * * *
[ITEM 43 is seven pages of handwritten notes too illegible to translate.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 44] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa Top Secret
Berlin, 1st October 1938 150 copies, 18th copy [Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct. 3rd 1938, Encl. 2-30 Reg. No. 268338 Secret Dispatched-- Check--
SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3 to DIRECTIVE No. 1
_Parts of the Army Employed._
In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:
Command (Generalkommando) III 10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf. Div)
The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army By direction
Jodl
_Distribution_: III and special distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 45] [_Telegram_]
Army Teleprint Network Teleprint Office Notes Received from
HDZG Pass to Date Time Re. No. by 9.10 Dept 9.10 Schm. [?] Klimnisch [?]
Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304
TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT FUEHRER'S TRAIN (FUHRERZUG)
1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS * * *
2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA, FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS. FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 * * *
signed KEITEL
[Ink Notes:--] Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuehrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 46] [_Typewritten letter_] The C-in-C of the Army
Berlin, W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 10 October 1938 [Pencil notes] 11.10.38 1800 hours Schm.
My Fuehrer!
I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service [Grenzaufsichtsdienst] in the next few days.
It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me--that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.
Heil my Fuehrer,
VON BRAUCHITSCH
[Handwritten Note:] Submitted to Fuehrer 11 October. Agreed. Schm.
[ITEM 47] [_Telegram_]
Remarks of teleprint office Army Telegraph Network
Pass to Date Time R. No. by Schmundt's 10.10 1940 Schm. Dept.
Received from HOZ6, 10.10, 1930
* * * * *
Telegram SECRET HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.
TELEGRAM TO FUEHRER'S TRAIN, LT. COL. SCHMUNDT IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION
PRINCIPLE: 1 TO SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUEN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.
2 ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.
3 TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.
4 IN THE WEST--GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LIMES.
5 INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15
FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED OKW
[_Handwritten notes_] Fuehrer's decision:
1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen. Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed
NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
[in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[Next page contains illegible notes] [_Handwritten notes_]
10.10.38 _What is in the Zone?_
_5_ 1 (motorized) For special duties 1 mountain 1 (light) 3 div 1 armoured 1 truck transport regt. 1 mountain 1 div.
_4_ 3 motorized div _3_ 4 div 1 light Germania 1 armoured 2 div Liebstandarte
_1_ 1 armoured 13 div 3 div 4 div (motorized) 3 armoured 2 mountain 2 light ------------- 24 divisions
[notes in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of Telegraph Office Received from HOZG 11.10.10.45
Pass to Date Time R. No. by Lt. Col. 11.10 Schm. Schmundt
HBZG 008 1040
TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUEHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15 AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUEHRER HAS BEEN DISPATCHED.
OKH 6th Div. (Five) General Staff of the German Army 11.37/38
* * * * *
[ITEM 48] [_Ink note_]
1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.
2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.
[Rest of note impossible to decipher completely]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of the telegraph office Received from HBZC 11.10.1955.
Pass to Date Time R. No. by 1)4 Mot. Lt. Col. 11.10 2030 Joe Div. Schmundt 1 B'n ready to March [?] 1 Arm'd Brig. 24 +5 -- 29 [Undecipherable note]
TOP SECRET
HBZG 13 1930.11.10 Lt. Col. Schmundt
Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?
Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS:
ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing
ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.
ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division
B LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.
Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?
Answer: A Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)
B Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME
Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?
Answer: A Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.
B Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION--THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE--LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.
Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?
Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.
Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 HOURS.
(signed) KEITEL
* * * * *
[ITEM 49] [_Typewritten table_] LI a
Berlin, 12 October 1938 3 copies, 1st copy
REFLECTIONS Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area
---------------+-------------------------------------+ | Present Strength | |-------------------------------------| | | Div. Nos. Earmarked | Army Group | No. of Divs. | for | | | Withdrawal | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+ Army Group | 5 1/3 | 1/3 44, _2 Mtn_, | Command 5 | | _3 Mtn_, _29th_ | | | _Mot_, 4 light, _2nd| | | _Armoured_ | | | | Army Group | 4 1/3 plus | _1/3 5th_, _7th_, | Command for | 1 SS Regt | _9th_, _45th_, _1st_| Special Duties | | _Mtn._ | | | | Army Group | 7 (plus 1 | 10th, 24th, _2nd_ | Command | SS Regt) | _(Mot)_, _13th_ | 4 | | _(Mot)_, _20th_ | | | _(Mot)_, 1st | | | Light, 1st Armd. | | | | Army Group | 3 (plus 1 | 4th, _3rd_, _18th_ | Command | SS Regt) | | 3 | | | | | | Army Group | 4 | 8th, 28th, 30th, | Command | | _3rd_ Arm'd. | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+ TOTAL | 22 2/3 (Plus | | | 3 SS Regts) | | | | | | _Namely_: | | | 11 2/3 Inf. | | | Div | | | 3 Mtn Divs | | | 3 Mot Divs | | | 3 Light Divs | | | 3 Armd Divs | | | | | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+
---------------+-----------------+----------------- | | | No. of Div. | Strength | To be Withdrawn | After Withdrawal Army Group | | | | ---------------+-----------------+----------------- Army Group | 3 | 2 1/3 1 1/3 Command 5 | | | | | | | | Army Group | 1 1/3 | 3 1 Command for | | Special Duties | | | | Army Group | 2 | 4 2 Command | | 4 | | | | | | | | Army Group | 2 | 2 1 Command | | 3 | | | | Army Group | 1 | 3 2 Command | | ---------------+-----------------+----------------- TOTAL | 8 1/3 | 14 2/3 (Plus | | 3 SS Regts) | | | _Namely_: | _Namely_: | 3 1/3 Inf Divs | 8 2/3 Inf Div | 2 Mtn Divs | 1 Mtn Div | 1 Mot Div | 2 Mot Divs | 1 Light Div | 1 Light Div. | 1 Arm'd Div | 2 Arm'd Divs | | | | 7 1/3 ---------------+-----------------+----------------
[ITEM 50] [_Telegram_] REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET Received on 17.10 from kg at 1535 by [Indecipherable] MBZ O 61 Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525 Lt. Colonel Schmundt
OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14-1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October--this is necessary for the building up of the Army--and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div, 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div). Fuehrer's decision requested today.
Signed Keitel
[Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:] The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct. By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel, Section L, OKW.
Schmundt, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 51] [_Typescript_]
The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938 Despatched 19 X 39 M
TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.
Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3-1/2 millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.
The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.
Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.
(signed) Adolf Hitler Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938 (signed) Schmundt, Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.
The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
After Delivery:
To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces I request that publication in the press be initiated from there.
1st Draft.
To The C-in-C of the Army
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3-1/2 million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.
You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.
My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.
J.
[Handwritten note] The military SS (SS Verfuegungstruppe), the SS and SA
* * * * *
[ITEM 52] [_Typescript_]
Berlin, 18 October 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces _No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a_ 1300 hours [Stamp] 60 copies Copy
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938 Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret Despatch Clerk W
MOST SECRET Directive No. 4
The Fuehrer has ordered:
1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.
2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution: III
* * * * *
[ITEM 53] [_Telegram_]
REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET
Received at 1040 by [Indecipherable] Initials MBZ 066 Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030 LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:
(SECRET)--OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38
Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL [Handwritten:] Consent given, 21 Oct 38. Passed to Colonel Jodl's Ante-Room at 1400 Sch 22/10
* * * * *
[ITEM 54] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET TOP SECRET Only through officer _Conference Notes_
L I a Berlin, 27.9.38 4 copies, 1st copy
[Pencil note] Time of Attack "Gruen". (Z. v. A. Gruen)
COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY
As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.
The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615; it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.
If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.
If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force,--desirable as it may be,--may possibly have to be dispensed with.
_Thus it is Proposed_:
Attack by the Army--independent of the attack by the air force--at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before them, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
J. [Initialled by Jodl.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS
The Social Life of New Germany with Special Consideration of the German Labor Front [Das Sociale Leben in neuen Deutschland unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront] (Berlin, 1938) by Prof. Willy Mueller. Pages 51-54. [Prof. Mueller was Reich Indoctrination Administrator in the German Labor Front].
"The Supreme Directorate of the Political Organization--The Staff Director"
Munich, 21 April 1933
Circular Letter Nr. 6/33
On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action [Gleichschaltungsaktion] of the free trade unions begins.
The direction of the entire action lies in the hands of the Action Committee.
The Action Committee is composed as follows:
Dr. Robert Ley, Chairman.
Rudolf Schmeer, Deputy.
Schuhmann, Commissar of the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB].
Peppler, Commissar for the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA].
Muchow Organization.
Bank Director Muller, Commissar, Director of the Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials.
Brinckmann, Commissar Chief Cashier.
Biallas, Propaganda and Press.
All the commissar directors of the unions belong to the broader Action Committee.
The essential part of the action is to be directed against the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB] and the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA]. Anything beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade unions is left to the discretion of the Gauleiter's judgment.
The Gauleiters are responsible for the execution of the coordination action in the individual areas. Supporters of the action should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations [NSBO or National-Sozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation].
SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade union properties and for taking into protective custody personalities concerned.
The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of the closest understanding with competent regional factory cells directors [Gaubetriebszellenleiter].
The action in Berlin will be conducted by the Action Committee itself.
In the Reich the following will be occupied:
The directing offices of the unions;
The trade union houses and offices of the free trade unions, The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany insofar as trade unions are involved there;
The branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and officials, Inc.
The district committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The local committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The following are to be taken into protective custody:
All trade union chairmen [Verbandsvorsitzende];
The district Secretaries and the branch directors of the "Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc."
The Chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of unions are not to be taken into protective custody but are to be urged to continue their work.
Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gauleiter.
The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed in such a fashion that the workers and employees will not be given the feeling that this action is against them, but on the contrary, an action against a superannuated system which is not directed in conformity with the interests of the German nation.
The Provisional local direction of the General German Trade Union and of the General Independent Employees' Federations is to be taken over by a commissar of the National Socialist Factory Cells Organization [NSBO].
The dealings with the authorities and other organizations are to be handed over immediately to the newly installed commissars.
All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to be blocked immediately and remain thus until Thursday afternoon 1800 hours. Insofar as incumbent cashiers are permitted to remain in office they will be subject to the authority of the commissar. All payment receipts must be countersigned by a commissar.
After raising the blocking of funds the usual payments for the support of persons, etc. must be unconditionally assured in order not to create a feeling of uneasiness among the members of the trade unions.
As soon as possible mass assemblies are to be arranged for the free attendance by all trade union members. In these meetings the meaning of the action is to be set forth and it is to be explained that the rights of the workers and employees are being unequivocally guaranteed.
The following unions belong to the General German Trade Union Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 28 unions].
The following unions belong to the General Independent Employees Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 13 unions].
Up to the present time the following have been proposed for commissars: [Here follows an enumeration of 17 names as commissars for the most important arrangements of the General German Trade Union Federation].
For the rest, the newly installed commissars will be nominated by the Gauleiters in close cooperation with the Regional Factory Cells Office. [Gaubetriebszellenamt].
It is to be understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are responsible in this respect; they are to hold the direction of the action firmly in hand.
Heil Hitler! /s/ Dr. Robert Ley
* * * * *
The NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cells Organization) took over not only the administrative apparatus but the entire press of the "Free Trade Unions." The papers and magazines which had a pronounced party political [parteipolitisch] tendency had to stop their publication, while the other special publications continued. By all these measures Marxism was to be hit exclusively, but not the idea of trade unions as such, in which the right and defense of the German workers were embodied.
On 5 May 1933, the leader of the action committee reported to Hitler the success of the ordered action. Then, in a public mass demonstration, he reported about the events of 2 May to the workers of Berlin; at the same time, he unfolded before them his future plans which were to secure the maintenance of the financial efficiency of the trade unions in the interest of the worker.
Following the crushing of the free trade unions, the danger came, of course, that former functionaries would try to acquire money and other property items for themselves in an illegal manner. This, however, would have entailed damage to the members. To avoid these dangers on 12 May 1933, the Attorney General of the State confiscated the property of the free trade unions and of all of their affiliated unions and administrative agencies in order to secure an orderly disposition of the property of the German workers. Dr. Robert Ley was assigned as the attorney with the right to dispose of the confiscated property [vefuegungsberechtigter Pfleger der beschlagnahmten Vermoegen].
While the free trade unions were smashed [zertruemmert] in the action of 2 May, Dr. Ley granted the entire Union of the Christian Trade Unions with further full liberty of movement. For this purpose, he told it on the 6th of May 1933 that "nothing will be changed in the present situation until the return of the Saar to the Reich and that they (the Christian Trade Unions) should continue as before to represent and carry on the idea of the Christian Trade Unions and of Germandom as they see it". Therefore the Christian Trade Unions put on temporary constraint in their attitude toward the social political events of 2 May and participated in the Saar in forming the "German Trade Union Front" in order to help to secure the result of the Saar voting by achieving a unity of the people.
The former free trade union leaders behaved differently. These, with the assistance of their colleagues abroad and of the international union of the trade unions, tried to oppose the measures of the German government; this induced Dr. Ley to introduce the defense against sabotage by the legal authorities.
The hostile activities reached their peak at the International Workers Conference of Geneva which began on 8 June 1933. From the German side, Dr. Ley also took part in it; representatives of the Reich Cabinet and of the Christian Trade Unions were with him. The subjects for the meeting were labor mediation, work conditions in certain branches of industry, social insurance, provision for unemployed, and shortening of the working time. The participating states were to enter the basic rules, which were to be set up in an international agreement, into their social legislations. The Germans represented voiced the opinion that the situation of the working people could not be improved by international agreement but by providing work and bread for the workers. In spite of this opposite opinion, Germany took part at the conference; in this way the German government wanted to prove that it had no purpose whatever to smash the social achievements of the German labor but that, on the contrary, she endeavored to retain them and lead them further. However, she was not willing to approve of an international agreement by which the further development of the German social legislation could be hampered.
During the conference, a few foreign personalities opposed the German representatives in such a way that Dr. Ley was induced to reject the further participation of the German Delegation in the discussions.
The atmosphere of Geneva did not remain without influence upon the representatives of the Christian Trade Unions. As already mentioned, the Christian Trade Unions were first given opportunity to continue their social work without interference. They began to exploit this favor. Also formally they have asserted that they were subject to all governmental measures which have been already taken or were to be taken; but that they could not refrain in the course of time from striving for a special position, which was to protect them from being ideologically converted to the world of national socialistic ideas. This attitude, which was contrary to the general interests and was prone to bring again dissension in the ranks of labor, induced Dr. Ley on 24 June 1933 to order the complete incorporation of the Christian Trade Unions into the German Labor Front which had been founded in the meantime. It was again the NSBO to which this task was assigned. At the same time the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions lost their honorary positions which were granted to them by Dr. Ley in the new social order. Concerning this, Dr. Ley submitted the following statement:
I. With the formation of the German Labor Front the majority of workers' and capitalists' organizations should have an opposite orientation. Not only should the last refuge of Marxism be liquidated by this means, but also it should be possible to remove the unfortunate schism of the German laboring men. Petty and selfish persons do not wish to recognize this great and revolutionary fact and seek to weaken this work by imitations and self-help organizations. It is the will of the Fuehrer that outside of the German Labor Front no other organization (whether of worker or of employers) is to exist * * *
II. National Socialism is exercising the power in its strength most generously, however this proceeding is being interpreted here and there by its small opponents as weakness. This National Socialism believed that it could be generous in dealing with the Christian Trade Unions and other middle-class groups. This fact was answered by ingratitude and disloyalty. It turns out that the afore-mentioned unions have shown the greatest corruption in treasury matters and in economic affairs. Because of this knowledge I offer the following: All offices of the Christian Trade Unions and of employee unions are to be occupied by National Socialists * * *
(Signed) Dr. Robert LEY
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 404-PS
MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler German Edition, 1935
[Pages 456 to 457]
It is precisely our German people, that today, broken down, lies defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this _self-confidence has to be instilled_ into the young fellow-citizen from childhood on. His entire education and development has to be directed at giving him _the conviction of being absolutely superior to others_. With this physical force and skill he has again to win the belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once led the German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the individual and all in common had in their leaders. The confidence in _the possibility of regaining its freedom_ is what will restore the German people. But this conviction must be the final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals.
* * * * *
[Page 475]
The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a generation which, by a suitable education, will be ready for the final and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which enters first on this course will be the victorious one.
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler 41st Edition, 1933 Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, GMm. b.H. Muenchen.
[Page 607, line 37 to page 608, complete]
For this reason alone, The SA of the NSDAP could have nothing in common with a military organization. It was an instrument for defense and education of the National Socialist movement and its tasks lay in an entirely different province from that of the so-called combat leagues [Wehrverbaende]. But it could also constitute no secret organization. The aim of secret organizations can only be illegal. In this way, the scope of such an organization is automatically limited. It is not possible, especially in view of the talkativeness of the German people, to build up an organization of any size and at the same time to keep it outwardly secret or even to veil its aims. Any such intention would be thwarted a thousand times. Not only that our police authorities today have a staff of pimps and similar rabble at their disposal, who will betray anything they can find for the Juda's payment of thirty pieces of silver, and even invent things to betray, but the supporters themselves can never be brought to the silence, that is necessary in such a case. Only very small groups, by years of sifting, can assume the character of real secret organizations. But the very smallness of such organizations would remove their value for the National Socialist movement. _What we needed and still need were and are not a hundred or two hundred reckless conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of fanatical fighters for our philosophy of life [Weltanschauung]. We should not work in secret conventicles, but in mighty mass demonstrations, and it is not by dagger and poison or by pistol that the road can be cleared for the movement, but by the conquest of the streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future master of the streets is National Socialism, just as it will some day be the master of the state._
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF
Adolf Hitler
Munich, 1933, 39th Edition.
[Page 675]
The trade union in national-socialist interpretation, has not the mission to gradually transform into one class, through condensation, all the various individuals among the people, thereby to take up the fight against other similarly organized structures within the nation. On the whole we cannot assign this mission to the trade union, rather it was first conferred on it at the moment in which it became the weapon of Marxism. It is not that the trade union is imbued with the spirit of the class struggle, directly, on the contrary, Marxism has made of it an instrument for its class war. It created the economic weapon which the international world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic basis of free, independent national states, for the annihilation of their national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby for the enslavement of free peoples in the service of international world finance Jewry.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 405-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 285
Law concerning Trustees of Labor of 19 May 1933
The Reich Government has decided on the following law, which is hereby promulgated.
Section 1
1. The Reich Chancellor appoints trustees of labor for the larger economic areas upon the proposal of the competent provincial governments and in agreement with them.
2. The Reich Labor Minister will assign the trustees either to the participating provincial governments, if they agree, or to the provincial authorities.
Section 2
1. Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all persons and replaces the system founded on combinations of workers, of individual employers or of combinations of employers. The regulations concerning the general application (par 2 ff of the tariff accord decree in the publication of 1 March 1928, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p 47) remain unaffected.
2. Moreover, the trustees are also to look after the maintenance of the labor peace.
3. Furthermore, they are to be convoked for their cooperation in the preparation of a new social constitution.
Section 3
The trustees are empowered to request aid of the competent Reich and provincial authorities for the execution of their regulations. They should contact the provincial government or one of their designated authorities before executing their measures, even though the danger of delay exists.
Section 4
The trustees of labor are bound by the directives and decrees of the Reich Government.
Section 5
The Reich Minister of Labor in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics issues the necessary regulations for the implementation.
Berlin 19 May 1933.
The Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
The Reich Labor Minister Franz Seldte
The Reich Economics Minister and Agriculture Hugenberg
The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance Count Schwerin von Krosigk
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 406-PS
Contents Memorandum by Gauleiter
Party Member Julius Streicher
_Enclosure 1_: First memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.
_Enclosure 2_: Second memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.
_Appendix 1_: Case Sandreuter
_Appendix 2_: Case Ritter
_Appendix 3_: Case J.M. Lang
MEMORANDUM BY GAULEITER PARTY MEMBER JULIUS STREICHER
Action against the Jews on 9/10 November 1938.
I was no longer present at the traditional fellowship congregation in the old town-hall in Munich on the evening of 9 November 1938 when a speaker, who claimed to have higher authority, made it known that the party was launching an action against the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938. I was informed of this fact by the party members Obergruppenfuehrer von Obernitz and Obergruppenfuehrer Litzmann around midnight of 9 November 1938. I declared to both these party members that I myself did not approve of an action involving arson of synagogues and destruction of goods but that I would raise no objections, of course, if this action had been sanctioned by the party. _Therefore, what was done to the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938 happened without my direct or indirect assistance._
The consequences arising from the action against the Jews.
The action against the Jews of November 1938 was _not a spontaneous one_ emanating from the population, and therefore was incomprehensible to many party members also as to its effects. Units of the components of the Party had been ordered to carry out the action against the Jews. If there is evidence now that in isolated cases party members with immaculate police records have appropriated goods during this action it should not be over-looked in judging such incidents that _the appropriation was committed in an instant, where all goods were being destroyed in accordance with the orders given_.
April 14, 1939
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS
Telegram GBA 760/43 [in ink crossed out in red]
10 March 3.
To the Fuehrer Fuehrer headquarters
_With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the Fuehrer in person and decision._
_Subject_: Difficulties in recruiting of workers [Arbeitsdienstverpflichtung] in the former Soviet territories.
My Fuehrer:
You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out by me with fanatical determination, but also with care and consideration for the economical and technical, as well as human, necessities and occurrences.
The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the reinforcement of the armament program with newly needed workers can and will be supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had to be overcome in the last two winter months. 258,000 foreign workers could be supplied during January and February to war industry, although the transports in the East were almost completely lacking. The commitment of German men and women is in full force.
Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing more and more the transports from the East can be put into full operation again on account of preparations arranged by me. Although the report and commitment-results of German men and women is outstanding, in the heavy industrial labor the commitment of productive foreigners who are used to labor cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief [Oberbefehlshaber] in the East mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories, as I was told by Gauleiter Koch--for political reasons.
My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these orders. I think it impossible that the former Soviet people should experience a better consideration than our own German people, on whom I was forced to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible anymore, then the German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent.
I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time.
I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly be substituted by German women, not used to work even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of the eastern territories.
I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and housed well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now happening in the hardest of all wars by the German people.
Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report to me kindly, whether the concept of the mission presented here is still right.
I would ask to talk to you personally about different important points of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possibly Tuesday.
Yours, always thankful, sincere and obedient
Signed: Fritz Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V AND VI-PS
District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour.
Weimar 15 April 1943 Nr. 435/43 10:25 o'clock
To the Fuehrer, Obersalzberg.
23 June 1943 [stamped]
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers from the East for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfillment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
Counting the manpower which comes into question from Poland and the remaining areas, and which is in the neighborhood of about 150,000, it will become possible again to place 5- to 600,000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1 million workers at the disposal of the armaments industry and the rest of the war industries by the coming summer months.
I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also come into the Reich under conditions similar to those which applied to the last group. I have kept in touch with the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer.
1. After one year's activity as plenipotentiary for the direction of labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war will be employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801 Mining industry 163,632 Building 218,707 Communications 199,074 Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544 Other economic branches 480,298
Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German men and women workers were transferred, inside the German economic structure, to the German war economy proper by being switched from businesses unimportant to the war effort to important ones, or by retraining.
All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the natural fluctuations, for example, through death, sickness, expirations or breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into the Armed Forces and the shifting of industries into other regions and to facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, the establishment of new factories and the fulfillment of new programs.
3. The result of the registration action for men and women up to the 7 April is as follows:
On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men and women have registered. The results are not yet final.
The number of men amounts to 553,415 that of women to 2,696,328
Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) have been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux.
Up till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the direction of labor as the majority do not fit in with the requirements as a result of old age or sickness.
Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 7 April 732,489 women were put to work.
This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these women, however, work less than 48 hours per week because of their domestic circumstances. The basic armament industry has received from the women and men employed
20,670 men 341,100 women
It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture and the rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc.
4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs includes 74,644 persons, of this group, mostly over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 women, only a third could be directed to industry, 10,108 men, 17,929 women, of these the armament industry received 5,258 men, 8,621 women.
The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war importance and to the Armed Forces.
5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women workers and the allocations of these from December 1942 until the end of March 1943 give the following result:
_Demand_ _Allocation_ December 1942 } 250,000 January 1943 } total 335,000 172,000 February 1943 } 235,000 ------- total-- 657,000
March 1943 225,000 450,000 replacements for those drafted from the armaments industry. 240,000 ------- --------- 800,000 1,107,000
In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into account by the registration-action.
* * * * *
Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces on the 20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my most fervent good wishes to you, along with those of my district and my family.
You can be assured that the district of Thueringen and I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all strength.
The warmest desire is that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.
Your faithful and obedient, [signed] Fritz Sauckel
Passed on: Puttig.
Received: Weismann Oberg.
Officially received: 1130 o'clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Section Roem. 3.
The above telegram was also sent in letter form. [in ink] WE 15 Apl.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus) 17 May 1943 Tel: 12 65 71
To the Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellery Berlin W8
Gauleiter Sauckel requests that the following telegram be transmitted to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich.
By direction
Heil Hitler! [signature illegible]
* * * * *
_a._ To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters
_b._ To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Headquarters
to _a._ My Fuehrer!
to _b._ Most respected Reich Marshal!
In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organization Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following figures:
In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. The total number of laborers employed by the OT amounted to 270,969 at the end of March 1942 and 696,003 at the end of March 1943.
In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated the OT in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the Atlantic Wall and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. This is all the more remarkable because:
1. In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the German war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied with labor in any case;
2. Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of the German economy within the Reich itself.
In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the west was raised from 66,701 at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 at the end of March 1943.
Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.
to _a_ Heil Hitler! Your obedient and faithful Fritz Sauckel to _b_ Your continually obliged Fritz Saukel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, 3 June 1943
1751/43 [pencilled] ab 6/4/43 To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany The Fuehrer's Hq My Fuehrer!
I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943.
For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry:
January 1943 --120,085 February 1943 --138,354 March 1943 --257,382 April 1943 --160,535 May 1943 --170,155 -------- Total --846,511
I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only after greatest difficulties were overcome which had not existed during the previous year; all those who have worked for the Arbeitseinsatz, particularly in the occupied territories, did so with the greatest fanaticism and devotion.
Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees were victims of murders and attacks by partisans.
Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied territories through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as through the OT and the factories working in the East and the West for the German war industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht received a large number of laborers as well as labor volunteers.
Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requiring everybody to register, the following numbers of men and women were made available:
_Men_ _Women_ _Total_ February 14,594 163,012 177,606 March 45,606 494,931 540,537 April 19,315 269,374 288,689 May 11,405 186,683 198,168 ------ --------- --------- Total 91,000 1,114,000 1,205,000
Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.
Altogether, German war industry during the first 5 months of 1943 recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers.
Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regulations on the following points: Wage control and increased production in the various European territories especially in France, which enabled us to keep wages in the occupied European territories on a reasonable level, to stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers working for Germany in spite of the difficult conditions of war, to increase production by means of wage control in these territories. These measures were carried out in agreement with industrial and farming authorities as well as with the Commissioner of the Reich for the control of prices.
Heil! Your obedient and faithful Signed: Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS
[Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Poland, dated 19 June 1943--Pages 10 and 11.]
In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences of the German rule have led to a substantial _deterioration of the attitude_ of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernment. These measures have affected either individual professions or the entire population and frequently also--often with crushing severity--the fate of individuals.
Among these are in particular:
1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is working for German interests.
Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus of the former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the part of their former political leadership.
2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Polish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German settlements.
3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and trade and in the field of private property.
4. Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who applied the system of collective responsibility.
5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.
6. The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.
7. The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universities.
8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish influence from all spheres of State administration.
9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its extensive influence--an undoubtedly necessary move--and, in addition, until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, schools and charitable institutions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS
Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939 The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter) Department L (I)
8 Copies, Copy
Chief matter By officers only
TOP SECRET
Directive No. 8, for the conduct of the war.
1. The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be maintained, for the time being. Only this will make it possible to exploit favorable weather conditions immediately.
The various components of the Armed Forces will make arrangements enabling them to stop the attack even if the order for such action is received by the High Command as late as D-1 at 2300 hours. The keyword
"Rhein" (--start attack) or "Elbe" (--withhold attack)
will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this time.
The High Commands of the Army and the Air Forces are requested after having determined the day for attack, to notify Department L of the High Command of the Armed Forces immediately with regard to the mutually agreed hour of the commencement of the attack.
2. Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against the Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at the start of the general attack.
The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. The entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly occupation wherever no opposition is encountered.
3. The _Land-operations_ are to be carried out on the basis of the assemble directive of 29 October. The following is added to complete this directive:
_a._ All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if greater and quicker successes than at Army Group B should be obtained there as the present disposition of enemy's forces that would indicate.
_b._ The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands, without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice.
4. _The Navy_ is authorized to take blockage measures for submarines against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, also against Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before the attack and from the time of the start of the blockade activities and the time of the land attack must also be kept as short as possible in the case of the use of submarines.
Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, if they adopt a hostile attitude.
The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the coastal regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. Preparations have to be made accordingly.
5. The tasks of the _Air Force_ remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fuehrer, concerning the landing from the air and the support of the army by the seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht.
The 7th _Air_-borne Division will only be committed for landing activities from the air after the seizure of bridges across the Albert Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission of this message between the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Air Force must be guaranteed.
Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg area, without (urgent) military reasons.
6. _The closing of the frontiers._ _a._ The border and news traffic across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be kept at its present volume _until the beginning of the attack_ in the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities are not to participate in the preparations for the closing of the border until the start of the attack.
_b._ The Reich-Border is to be _closed_ towards the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news traffic _at the start of the attack_. The Commander-in-Chief issues the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities concerned. The Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be informed by the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) at the beginning of the attack that the measures for the closing of the borders will be issued immediately by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside of the operational territory.
_c._ At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders towards the neutral countries. Further prepared measures for the surveillance of personal and news traffic will be taken, if necessary.
By order Distribution: Signed: Keitel
High Command of the Army--1st Copy.
High Command of the Navy--2nd Copy.
R. d. L. [Reichs-Ministry of the Air] and the High Command of the Air Force--3rd Copy.
attested: von Trotha [?] Captain
_High Command of the Armed Forces:_ Chief WFA--4th Copy. L--5-8th Copy. _Distribution:_ _Copies_ K 1st Copy IV 2nd Copy II 2nd Copy for information [in handwriting] Acknowledged 21 October [initials illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 442-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 Top Secret The Fuehrer's hq. 16 July 1940 7 copies, 4th copy
TOP SECRET
Transmit by officer courier only
General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation against England.
Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.
The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a basis for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if it should become necessary to occupy it completely;
To this end I order the following:
1. The _Landing_ must be carried out in the form of a surprise crossing on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle of Wight, in which air force units will take the roll of artillery, and units of the navy the roll of the engineers. Whether it is practical to undertake subordinate actions, such as the occupation of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, before the general landing is to be determined from the standpoint of every branch of the armed forces and the result is to be reported to me. I reserve the decision for myself. The preparations for the entire operation must be completed by _mid-August_.
2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those conditions which make a landing in England possible.
_a._ The English air-force must morally and actually be so far overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack.
_b._ Mine-free channels must be created.
_c._ By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the straight of Dover on both _Flanks_ as well as the western entrance to the channel in the approximate line Aldemey-Portland must be sealed off.
_d._ The area in front of the coast must be dominated and given artillery protection by strong coastal artillery.
_e._ Tying down of the English naval forces in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) is desired, whereby it must now be attempted that the English naval forces which are in the homeland be damaged by air and torpedo attack in strength.
3. Organization of the leadership and of the preparations;
Under my command and according to my general directions the supreme commanders will lead the forces to be used from their branches of service. The command-staffs of the supreme commander of the army, the supreme commander of the Navy, and the supreme commander of the air-force must from 1 August on be located within a radius of at least 50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg). Lodging the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the army and navy together at Giessen appears practical to me.
Hence for the leadership of the landing armies the supreme commander of the army will have to employ an army group hq.
The project bears the code-name "Seeloewe" [Sea-lion].
In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the following tasks fall to the various branches:
_a._ _Army_: will draw up the operational plan and the transport plan for all units of the 1st wave to embark. The AA artillery to be transported with the 1st wave will at the same time be attached to the army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time as a division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops protection of the ports of debarkation and protection of the aerial strong points to be occupied can be carried out. The Army furthermore distributes the means of transport to the individual crossing groups and establishes the embarkation and landing points in agreement with the Navy.
_b._ _Navy_: will secure the means of transport and will bring them corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to the requirements of seamanship into the individual embarkation areas. Insofar as possible ships of the defeated enemy states are to be procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the necessary naval staff for advice on matters of seamanship with escort vessels and security forces. It will protect, along with the air forces employed to guard the movement, the entire crossing of the channel on both flanks. An order will follow on the regulation of the command relationship during the crossing. It is further the task of the navy to regulate, in a uniform manner, the building up of the coastal artillery, that is, all batteries which can be used for firing against sea targets of the Army as well as of the Navy, and to organize the fire control of the whole. As great an amount of _very heavy artillery_ as possible is to be employed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and to protect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available captured pieces) without the batteries (Ks and K12) provided for firing on targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up and emplaced by use of railway turntables.
Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries are to be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under concrete that they can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks and thereby dominate the Straits of Dover under any circumstances in the long run, within their effective range.
The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organization.
_c._ _Mission of the Air Force is_: To hinder interference from the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to the landing positions, to break the first resistance of enemy troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up. For this mission closest cooperation of individual units of the air force with the crossing units is necessary. Furthermore, to destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points. I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider troops. In this regard it is to be determined if it is worth-while here to hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a reserve to be quickly committed in case of emergency.
4. The armed forces chief of signals will carry out the necessary preparations for signal connections from France to the English mainland. The installation of the remaining 80km East Prussian cables is to be provided for in conjunction with the Navy.
5. I request the supreme commanders to submit to me as soon as possible:
_a._ The intentions of the Navy and Air Force for achieving the necessary conditions for the crossing of the channel (see figure 2).
_b._ The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy).
_c._ A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of getting it ready and fitting it out. Participation of civilian agencies? (Navy).
_d._ The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas for troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Air Force).
_e._ The crossing and operations plan of the army, composition and equipment of the first crossing wave.
_f._ Organization and measures of the Navy and the Air Force for carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, and support of the landing.
_g._ Proposals for the committment of parachute and glider troops, as well as for the attachment and command of anti-aircraft, after an extensive gain of territory on English soil has been made (Air Force).
_h._ Proposal for the location of the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the Army and of the Navy.
_i._ The position of army, navy, and air force on the question whether and what subsidiary actions _before_ the general landing are considered practical.
_k._ Proposal of army and navy on the overall command during the crossing.
A. Hitler [Initialled] J [Jodl] K [Keitel]
_Distribution_: Supreme Cmdr of the Army--1st copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Navy--2nd copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Air Force--3rd copy. Armed Forces Command Section [?]--4th copy. (WFA) Section L--5th and 7th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs Only by officer
_Directive No. 18_
Fuehrer's Headquarters 12 November 40 2F/408 10 copies, 4th copy 55
The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:--
1. _Relations with France._ The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power"--she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.
For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on--apart from the current work of the armistice commission--entirely by the foreign office [Auswartiges Amt] in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW].
More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.
2. _Spain and Portugal._ Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of _German_ intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:
_a._ Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
_b._ The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.
The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:
_Section I_
_a._ Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.
_b._ Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.
_c._ The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French-Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).
With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.
_Section II_
_a._ Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.
_b._ Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.
_Section III_
_a._ Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.
_b._ Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.
_Section IV_
Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.
As for the _strength_ of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:
_Army._ The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.
Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominately of a mobile nature.
_Air Force._ Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.
For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.
Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.
_Navy._ Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.
To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of _single_ coastal batteries.
An Italian participation is not envisaged.
As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the _Atlantic Islands_ (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.
I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.
3. _Italian Offensive against Egypt._ If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.
The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:
_Army._ Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).
_Navy._ Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.
_Air Force._ Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.
4. _Balkans._ The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.
In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.
So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.
_The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.
The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.
Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment.
5. _Russia._ Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.
6. _Landing in England._ Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seeloewe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.
7. I shall expect _the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions_ of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.
Signed: Adolf Hitler J [initialled: Jodl]
_Distribution_: Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.)--1st Copy. Ob.d.M (l.Skl.)--2nd Copy. Ob.d.L. (LwFueSt.Ia)--3rd Copy. O.K.W. SFSt--4th Copy. Abt. L.--5th-10th Copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs. SECRET The Fuehrer's Headquarters 18 December 40 (only through officer) 9 copies, 4th copy
_Directive Nr. 21_
_Case Barbarossa_
The German Armed Forces must be prepared _to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign_ before the end of the war against England (case Barbarossa).
For this purpose the _Army_ will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
For the Eastern campaign the _Airforce_ will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.
Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.
If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are--if this has not yet been done--to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.
The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:
I. _General Purpose_:
The mass of the Russian _Army_ in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian _Airforce_ is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.
II. _Probable Allies and their tasks._
* * * * *
[_Page 4_, _par. II_]
2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.
* * * * *
[_Page 8_, _par. IV_]
IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are _precautionary measures_, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.
V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.
[signed] Hitler [initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.]
_Distribution_: Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)--1. copy Ob. d. M. (Skl.)--2. copy Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)--3. copy _OKW_: _WFSt_.--_4. copy_ Abt.--5-9. copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
TOP SECRET
Top Secret Only thru officer
OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff Section L (IV/Qu) 44125/41 Top Secret
Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941 5 copies, 4th copy
_Subject_: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940 Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)
I. Area of operations and executive power
1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations _within the armed forces_ shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in _East Prussia_ and in the _General Gouvernement_ at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.
It is not contemplated to _declare_ East Prussia and the General Gouvernement _an area of operations_. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.
2. _The Russian territory_ which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with _governments of their own_, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:
_a._ _The area of operations_, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.
_b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_ is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for the preparation of the _political administration_, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own _political_ administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into _North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_ (_White Russia_) _and_ _South_ (_Ukraine_). In these territories _the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich_ who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, _commanding officers_ who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the Armed Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the _military sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial Commander_ and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).
_c._ Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
_d._ Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
_e._ Traffic regulations.
_f._ Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.
The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the _civilian_ agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.
Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.
_The time for the assumption of command_ by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.
4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the _Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt"_ with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rue Amt.
5. The majority of the _Police Forces_ shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense.
6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the _military courts_ shall be separately regulated, and commanded.
II. _Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic_:
7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary _before the beginning of operations_ for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.
8. _As soon as operations begin_, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.
The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.
Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.
III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland._
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.
10. _Police measures_ for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.
11. _Special orders shall be issued at a later date_ for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:
Procurement of food and feed. Housing and machinery. Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. Procurement of funds and wage-control. Salaries. Request for indemnity-payments. Postal and telegraph services. Traffic. Jurisdiction.
_Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW_ from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be _submitted_ to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.
IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._
12. Since Sweden _can_ only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Signed: KEITEL
_Distribution_: OKH--1st copy. OKM--2nd copy. R.d.L.u.O.K.L.--3rd copy. Armed Forces Operational Staff--4th copy. Section L--5th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs F.H.Q. 11th Jan 44 TOP SECRET 13 copies, 4th copy.
Order No. 22
Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.
The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.
Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.
I order therefore, the following:
1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli (starting approximately 20 February).
2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranean. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.
The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" [Sperrgebiet] in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.
3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.
The duty of the German forces will be:
_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;
_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:
To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,
To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.
4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.
5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.
Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
Distribution:
OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating--1st cy. OKM/Skl--2nd cy. Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a--3rd cy. OKW WFST--4th cy. --------L--5th to 9th cy. WNV--10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy. Armed Forces, Transport Chief--12th cy. German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
* * * * *
F.H.Q. 29th Jan 41
High Command of the Armed Forces WFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz.
13 copies, 4th copy.
Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW /WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th Jan. 41
The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:
Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume" Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
By order
(Signed) Warlimont
Distribution:
OKH/general staff of Army, operations--1st cy. OKM/SKL--2nd cy. Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest--3rd cy.
_OKW_: WFST--4th cy. Section L--5th to 9th cy. WNV--10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy. Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.--12th cy. German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt
Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942 12 copies, 12th copy.
1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.
2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.
5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.
6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
_Distribution_: Copy No.
O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / General Staff of the Army). 1 O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy / Naval War Staff). 2 Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air Force Operational Staff). 3 W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, Norway) 4 W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander, Southeast) 5 Ob. West (C in C, West) 6 Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7 Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8 Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9 Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police). 10 OKW /WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces / Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS
Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942 No 32704 B Nr 40/42
TOP SECRET
To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:] Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers. R/29/5 Pradel n.R b/R
[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6
The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_) _stop completely in rainy weather_. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.
I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.
The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.
Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.------ is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.
The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.
Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached with further news.
Signed: Dr. Becker SS Untersturmfuehrer
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office Message Center
1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:] Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel Message No 152452 R 16/6 Wiederhausen
Riga 7082--15-6-42--1855--BE To Reichs Security Main Office--Roem. 2D3A--Berlin
TOP SECRET
_Subject_: S-Vans
A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.
The commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service "Ostland" Roem IT-126/42 GRS Stamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer No 240/42 II D 3a 16 June 42 Procedure: [handwritten] 1. When can we count on having another S-van ready? 2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered? 3. Request answer.
R 16/6
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
II D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945
TOP SECRET
Stamped: Message Nr 107903 Sent by message center 2016, 22 June 42
1. FS [?] To the Commandant of the Security Police and Security Service Ostland Riga
_Subject_: S-Van
The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle of next month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main Office for repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 meters of hose will be supplied.
By order of
[signature as in heading]
2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9) By direction
Rauff
* * * * *
Handwritten note:
Berlin, 13 July 1942
II D 3a (9)
_Nr I.Z. Widderhausen_ [?] for further action and attention to the note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. For the reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, can be supplied me.
By direction
[signature illegible]
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
Stamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942
handwritten: After return immediate repair
II D 3a No 964/42
10 June 1942
R 10/6 Notify about repair ND. Nr 144702 Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950--SOM
To: Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A--Z. HD. V. Major Pradel--Berlin.
Subject: Special-van-Saurer Preceding messages: None
The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled their special mission and could be ordered back with the van mentioned above. In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transportation cannot be made by car.
Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back to Berlin by railroad.
Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers Goetz and Meyer will escort the vehicle.
The commandant of Security Police and Security Service Belgrad--Roem I--BNR 3985/42. Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
* * * * *
[Handwritten note back page]
II D 3a (2) T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKEL
Berlin, 11 June 1942
For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to be informed about arrival of vans.
By direction:
signed: Just Berlin, 16 June 1942.
II D 3a (9)
_Note_
The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough cleaning the repairs will start immediately.
By direction
signed: [?] Berlin, 13 July 1942.
II D 3a 9
1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready.
2. Sent to the _motor-pool management T.F. Niederhausen_ for its information and further action.
By direction
signed: [?]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS
TOP SECRET
B 101 Enclosures 2 Berlin, 17 July 1941
Office IV
Regulations (directives) for the commandos of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, which are to be activated in Stalags.
The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure I). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limits of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the defense officers assigned to him.
The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further "treatment"
_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable elements among them.
_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.
For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be put at the disposal of the commandos. The "Deutsche Fahndungsbuch", the "Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste" and the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" will prove to be useful in only a small number of cases; the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" is not sufficient, because it contains only a small part of Soviet-Russians considered to be dangerous.
Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and ability and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. Therefore, they will be able to start carrying out their mission only when they have gathered together appropriate material.
The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.
Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.
By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos must learn for themselves, in every case by means of short questioning of the informers and eventual questioning of other prisoners.
The information of _one_ informer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a suspect, without further proof; it must be confirmed in some way if possible.
Above all, the following must be discovered:
All important functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries.
Functionaries of the Komintern.
All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.
All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.
All former Political commissars in the Red Army.
Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.
All Jews.
All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.
It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all those persons who could be used for the reconstruction, administration and management of the conquered Russian territories.
Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed for the completion of further investigation, regardless if they are police investigations or other investigations, and for explanations of questions of general interest. Among them are all those especially, who because of their position and their knowledge are able to give information about measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian State, of the communist party or of the Komintern.
In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity in all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando will give every week a short report by telephone or an express-letter to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing:
1. _Short_ description of their activities in the past week.
2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons. (report of number sufficient)
3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of the Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Commissars, leading personalities and Political commissars.
4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, with a short description of their position.
_A._ Prisoners-of-war.
_B._ Civilians.
On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main-Office will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. For the measures to be applied on the basis of this successive directive the commandos are to demand the surrender of the prisoners involved from the camp command.
The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see enclosure I).
Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory.
Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, then the leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp commander for it.
The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments carried out and must contain:
Current number. Family name and first name. Time and place of birth. Military rank. Profession. Last residence. Reason for special treatment. Day and place of special treatment (card file).
In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories.
Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior during and after duty, the best cooperation with the camp-commanders, and careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and members of the Einsatz-Kommando.
The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly impressed with the special importance of the missions entrusted to them.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
Top Secret
High Command of the Armed Forces. No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/Qu F.H. Qu., 19 October 1942
Top Secret By officer only 22 copies, 21st copy
Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands._
_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus._
The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
By order of
Jodl
1 enclosure (distribution list--over) _Distribution list_:
General Staff of the Army--1st copy.
Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army--2nd copy.
High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary--3rd copy.
High Command of the Air Force command staff--4th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway--5th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands--6th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the South-east--7th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Eastern Territory (Ostland)--8th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine--9th copy.
High Command West--10th copy.
High Command 20th Mountain army}--11th copy. (GEB.) AOH 20) }
Commanding Officer of German } troops in Denmark }--12th copy. (Bfh. d. dt. Tr. in Denmark }
High Command South--13th copy.
Tank Army--Africa--14th copy.
German General in Headquarters of Italian Armed Forces--15th copy.
Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main Bureau for Security Police--16th and 17th copies.
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Foreign Counter Intelligence--18th copy.
Armed Forces legal section (WR)--19th copy.
Armed Forces propaganda section (PR)--20th copy.
_Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy_--_21st copy_.
War Diary (KtC)--22nd copy.
* * * * *
Top Secret
By officer only
The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
18 K
I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.
As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.
In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps [Organization Todt], the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days, the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible, as well as wily, sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front thereby the entire conduct of the war.
It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organize special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.
Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.
_In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part._
As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.
Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the activities of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:
1. to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,
2. to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,
3. to undertake sabotage activities which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.
Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.
The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.
England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.
If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.
This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.
The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.
I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances--when there is danger in delay--to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.
These are the reason for the issuance of this decree.
If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.
(signed) A. Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS
Draft
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1) Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos
Fuehrer Headquarters, 22 June 1944
TOP SECRET
2 copies--1st copy
Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V--of
17 June 1944
Subject: Enemy agents--Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW /WFSt of 18 October 42
To: W R
WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Judge Advocate of the Army group with the Supreme Commander South-west of 20 May 44 (Br. B Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.
By direction
initialled: W 3 inclosures [Warlimont]
* * * * *
[Following is an attached handwritten note]
Qu 2 W
All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration.
[initial illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
TOP SECRET
WFSt/Op (L)
Fuehrer's Headquarters November 21, 1942 5 copies, 5th copy
Subject: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. [Illegible signature] 2/40/43
Note
Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42.
Air Force 5, G-2 Capt. S. Lilienskjold reports 21 Nov. by telephone to inquiry:
1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers in the night of November 11:
_a._ No firing on the part of German defense.
_b._ The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.
2. In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November 21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on the North shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Floerly (supplies Stavanger).
The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been initiated by the service district.
The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.
[signed] W Went out Nov. 11, 42
_Distribution_: Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone report). Asst. Chief (Ktb). Operations (Army). Operations (Navy). Operations (Air Force).
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
F. Amt. Ausl./Abw Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef F XVI, E 1/e
Berlin, 4 December, 1942 3 copies, 1st copy
To: WFSt For: Information From: Abw III.
Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy sabotage troops.
Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway counter intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military commander of Norway.
It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order.
By direction
[Illegible signature] [Warlimont's initials] 8/12
* * * * *
Copy
TOP SECRET
1. Teletype to: O K W/Abw III F _Subject_: Commando Raid.
On November 20, 1942, at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely the others slightly wounded.
All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skiis and radio, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns, and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund.
A second plane has crashed 5 km East of Helleland. It had a 6-man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider.
The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The competent commander's staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42
* * * * *
TOP SECRET III F
2. Teletype to: OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F _Reference_: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42. Subject: Commando Raid.
Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:
Besides the 17 member crew, extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th inf. div. ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks, and serial numbers.
The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the commander's staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 km East of Stavanger, 8 km East of the electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight gilder is supposed to have a 16-man crew. It is possible that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider found 15 km North East of Egersund. The armed forces commander of Norway was notified. Refer. at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.
In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the armed forces commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of no. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS.
Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS
TOP SECRET
Telegraph Office: GWNOL
Date: 7 Nov. 1943
SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ
To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/Roem I c GKDOS (TOP SECRET).
Subject: British Commando--Operation in Northwest. Pescara, 2 Nov. 43.
3 commandos--special treatment--remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital.
OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS
TOP SECRET
SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400--OKW/WFSt
According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Two man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, armed forces commander referred to above mentioned last sentence of the Fuehrer order (liquidation only after short interrogation).
The Red Cross and the BDS protested after the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer order in the case of Egersund and intend for their part to bring up the whole question as a matter of principle.
WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS
TOP SECRET
14 December 1942 SSD--Telegram [illegible pencil remarks]
To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign Department.
For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway Supreme Command Armed Forces Counter Intelligence Service.
Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 1942. (Commander Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 Top Secret of 13 December 1942).
Subject: Commando Operations.
It is reported that the armed forces commander Norway intends to spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have them interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last paragraph of the order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret _CHEFS_ of 19th October 1942.
OKW/WFSt/Qu (III) Number 004872/42 Top Secret W [Initialled Warlimont]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 526-PS
_WFSt/Qu (III)_ Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord.
10. 5. 1943
TOP SECRET
Notice
On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.
_Armament_: 2 Colt--MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 sub-machine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.
_Captain of the Cutter_: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.
_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strongpoints, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.
_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.
Fuehrer order executed by S.D. [Security Service].
_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:
In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS
Armed Forces Operational Staff Qm (Adm. 1) No. 006688/44 Top Secret
Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944
TOP SECRET
3 copies--1st copy
Reference: Fuehrer Order No. 003832/42/OKW/WFSt of 18 Oct 42.
Subject: Treatment of Commando Men.
Conference memorandum
Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:
The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command West is as follows:
A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5.
B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive maneuvers etc. The German combat soldier will not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already carried out or still being carried out.
C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to, which dates from more than 1-1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents become known.
D. The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_ penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Security Service) in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. _Supreme Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be applied in the whole occupied Western area._
_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:_
1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.
2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.
3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the commando order is to be applied or not.
4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explanation.
Proposal: Attached teletype message. signed: WARLIMONT
Distribution:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces--1 copy through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.
Ktb, 2 copies.
Qu--Draft, 3 copies.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 532-PS
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
24 June 1944
TOP SECRET
5 copies, 1st copy
SSD--Telegram.
To 1. Supreme Command West.
By mail to 2. Chief of General Staff, Army.
By mail to 3. Supreme Command of the Air Force/Air Force Staff Headquarters.
By mail to 4. Supreme Command Navy/1 Skl. By mail to 5. Reichsfuehrer SS Command Staff. By mail to 6. Military Commander, France. By mail to 7. Supreme Command of Armed Forces/WR.
Authority: 1. Order of the Fuehrer no. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 42/OKW/WFSt.
2. Telegram Supreme Command West no. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44.
Subject: Treatment of Commandos.
1. Standard operating procedure to (1) will be fully maintained.
2. Numeral (5) refers to enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in open combat by own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone of the beachhead or who surrender. "Own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone" applies in this sense to those of combat divisions on line as well as reserves up to and including general staffs.
3. In cases of doubt enemy personnel falling into our hands alive will be turned over to the SD, which will be responsible for the examination as to whether the order concerning commandos is applicable or not.
4. Accordingly, the paratroop saboteurs dropped by the enemy over Britanny will be treated as commando personnel, since this area is not at present an immediate combat zone. It is immaterial in this case whether the paratroopers dropped wear uniform or civilian clothes. The number of paratroopers captured in Britanny will be included in the daily report currently. In this respect an annex to the armed forces report of 7 October 1942 has already been published to the effect that such criminal elements should be massacred in combat.
(_Remark_: Enclosures of the order of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1942 as well as the further order regarding the treatment of Commando personnel of 25 June 1944 are attached. The latter mentions also paratroopers under number (2).)
_Distribution_: [signature illegible]
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces through Chief of the WFSt Qu (Entw.).
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS
Draft
The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 30 July 1944
_The High Command of the Wehrmacht_ 009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)
TOP SECRET
re: _Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans._
In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as stipulated in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer's order the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).
This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being read.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
KEITEL
_Distribution_:
High Comd S/E--1st copy. High Comd S/W--2nd copy. General Staff of the Army--3rd copy. OKM/SKl.--4th copy. OKL/Lw.Fu.Stb.--5th copy.
Reichsfuehrer--and Chief of the German Police--Staff RF--Attention Major General and Major General of the Waffen SS Rhode, also for RSH--6th copy.
OKW/AWA--7th copy. /Chief PWs--8th copy. WR--9th copy. WFSt/W.Pr.--10th copy.
Op. (H-L-M)--11th copy. Org.--12th copy. Ktb.--13th copy. Qu. (Draft)--14th copy. Reserve--15-25 copies.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1)
Chef OKW--[in pencil]
of
[initial] J
26 June 1944
TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp]
5 copies--1st copy Checked before Release } Chef WFSt } [in pencil] Remark 1 } _OB._ _WFSt_ } [in pencil]
_KR_--_Teletype_ To 1. Supreme Commander West. 2. Chief of Army General Staff. 3. OKL/Lw Fu Stab. 4. OKM/1.Skl. 5. Reichsfuehrer SS--Command Staff. 6. Military Commander, France. 7. Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France. 8. Armed forces Commander, Netherlands. 9. OKW/WR. 10. Supreme Commander Southwest [in pencil].
_Reference_: 1. Fuehrer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt.
2. Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).
_Subject_: Treatment of Kommando Participants.
1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force.
Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands, according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain exempted.
2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.
3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives issued for it.
4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the armed forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same manner.
[Initial] W [Warlimont] [signature] Keitel _OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1)_ Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret
_Addition for Supreme Commander_ } _Southwest_ } Similar action is to be taken in the} [Written by hand] Italian theater of war. } [initial] J [Jodl]
_After forwarding_: Qu (Verw. 1) Simultaneously teletype--1st copy. Op (H)--2nd copy. Op (M)/(L)/Ktb.--3rd copy. VO Foreign--4th copy. VO W Pr--5th copy.
Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 553-PS
Memo secret 7/4 (Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.l Page 7 current 1910.4) High Command of the armed forces WFSt. (Org.1) amt. AUSL.ABW/ABT ABW.III Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (IIIb 2) Berlin, 4 August 1942
SECRET
_Combatting of single parachutists_, 4 Aug. 1942. Unaltered reprint 1943 Reference: OKW/WFSt/ABt.L (II) Nr. 1858 geh.v. 10.8.40
I. In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made between:
A. Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to fighting activities.
B. _Single_ parachutists and small groups of parachutists who are dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, terror or disruption.
to _a_ The combatting of enemy airborne forces is the exclusive mission of the armed forces according to the reference orders. to _b_ For combatting _single parachutists_. In alteration of fig. 7 v.a. the following is decreed:
1. In territories (Reich territories and occupied territories) the combatting of _single parachutists_ is the mission of those agencies of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service [SD] designated as executive; in this matter it is immaterial whether the parachutists are in uniform or civilian clothes.
2. To what extent armed forces and agencies of the armed forces should be committed for these missions is to be decided directly by the district commanders [Wehrkreisbefehslhaber] or by territorial commanders [territorialen Befehlshaber] endowed with the powers of district commander with the competent agencies of security police and SD.
3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of the armed forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simultaneously reports must be made to the competent intelligence agency. The same procedure is also valid for combat action directed against parachute troops or airborne-landing troops, in case the troops realize that they have to do with saboteurs or spies. If it should be discovered that the parachutists brought to security police by armed forces, or captured directly by members of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and Chief of the German Police will take care that they will be transferred to the competent air forces agencies after the completion of the necessary inquiry.
4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be submitted without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of Security Police and of the SD, simultaneously informing the counter intelligence agency in charge which immediately has to forward the report to district command headquarters commander as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in principle fig. 4 of the reference order is applicable.
5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1, present regulations remain valid (transfer to secret field police).
II. With regard to the use of objects captured or discarded, in the case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage materials, or radio equipment, a supplementary order to fig. 9 v. a. is decreed:
1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest security police agency and SD.
The army will dispose of sabotage material captured by troops in the Eastern theater. With regard to further utilization of sabotage material delivered or reverting to the Security Police, agreements made between the Chief of Security Police and SD and foreign section of counter intelligence remain valid.
2. Captured radio equipment, including the directions for operations, code-material, voice material (Sprach-Material) in plain and in code text, are to be delivered immediately via local counter intelligence agencies to OKW (Ag WNV Fu III) for use. The agencies concerned will be informed of results. After a completion of investigations the captured radio equipment will again be at disposal, if needed. If further use of captured radio equipment is considered by either counter intelligence or Security Police, then the delivery of the equipment might be omitted, upon agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this case photostatic copies of the directions for use, the code keys, etc., as well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be forwarded quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III.
The Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces KEITEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-2-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht Fuehrer Hq September 8, 1942
The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers should be committed and should give the fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA [Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz] in agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.
A Hitler [initialled] K [Keitel]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-13-PS
Note for the files
1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 P.M. Minister Speer telephones from the Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the Fuehrer's decision, it is no longer necessary to give special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed with emphasis and sharpened measures.
2. Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in Holland just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P.M. and explains that on the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must achieve more recruiting in Holland.
3. He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regarding the endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due to labor shortage.
I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms.
He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will take the appropriate action.
For Information
(signed) SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 579-PS
Weimar, 5 January 1943 The District Commissar in Riga--Employment Office Section [Fachgebiet] 2 (Commitment of work) Riga, 6 July 1942
File note
_Subject_: Commitment of Jews.
here: cooperation with the administration offices of the armed forces.
For the last 10 days Jews have been picked up almost daily for commitment in the peat industry by units of the armed forces. While doing so, very considerable difficulties arose because the members of the armed forces who get the Jews from the ghetto daily do not want to comply with the regulations which are issued by the man responsible for work commitment.
It is agreed that the soldiers take over the Jews in columns at the exit of the ghetto. Actually, however, several soldiers enter the fenced-in ghetto and pick up the Jews in question without any permission. During the last week, government inspector Rottenberger and the undersigned were present, at an early hour, during the dispatching of the Jews. Some soldiers also did not follow the instructions of the Reich German workers, entered the ghetto, and themselves got the men who had worked so far for the units in question. It was pointed out to them that manpower had to be committed for specially urgent measures. These instructions were not followed by the soldiers, but they shouted around in the presence of more than 1000 Jews, and simply took the men away in spite of the order forbidding it. In one instance a soldier arrived the next morning in a steel helmet and again did not follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower. A German police sergeant was charged with banishing the soldiers from the ghetto. The sergeant had hardly turned around when the soldier entered the ghetto again and again got Jews whom he was not supposed to get, and took them away. In another case, the undersigned was just in time to prevent a pfc. of the air force from beating a Jewish policeman. The Jewish policeman beat a Jew who did not want to report for a certain work. The Jewish police is doing well with the daily commitment of about 4000 Jews. Therefore it must be prevented that Germans attack Jewish policemen in the presence of thousands of Jews.
As soon as German soldiers who pick up the Jewish manpower daily from the ghetto, follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower and, above all, keep discipline, it will be possible to get the Jewish manpower ready for work considerably faster every day. According to my opinion it is at least necessary that one German policeman who can prevent the illegal seizures by the German soldiers, be placed at the entrance of the ghetto daily from 0530 to 0800 hours.
For information:
signed Lippmann.
* * * * *
The District Commissar in Riga The Chief of The Employment Office Riga Azsargu Iela 29/31
Riga, 10 February 1942
Department File No.
To the Reich Commissar for the Baltic states
Work policies and social administration
_Riga_, _through_ the Commissar general in Riga.
_Subject_: Transport of Jews from Kauen. _Ref._: Your letter of 6 February 1942.
The transport of Jews from Kauen arrived here on 8 February 1942. However, instead of the requested 500 males only,
222 males and 137 females
were sent.
Due to the fact that there exists a considerable need of Jewish manpower for transport and construction work, I am requesting an additional 1000 Jewish males from Kauen.
I was informed by the transport leader that the Jews in Kauen, as far as their commitment for work is concerned, are not under the jurisdiction of the employment office, but that the Jewish manpower is distributed by the German police.
For:
[signature illegible] (Oberregierungsrat)
[ink note:] To the Commissar General [Initials illegible]
* * * * *
Command of Economic Affairs [Wirtschaftskommando] for the Territory of the former Latvia Department of Work
Riga, 21 July 1941
_Subject_: Work commitment of _Jews_.
File note
According to the Group Agriculture there is a considerable shortage of workers for farming in Latvia, which endangers especially the beet harvest. According to my findings and also those of the economy office North (Wi.-In. Nord) no prisoners of war are at present available for farming. It should be examined, therefore, to which extent and under which conditions other possibilities of commitment are available.
To clarify the possibility of committing Jews, a conference took place today between the economy office North and the chief war administration advisor (O.K.V.R.) Ellroth, from the department of work. Together with Mr. Ellroth we went to the _SS_ and conferred with the leader of the _SD_, Sturmbannfuehrer Batz, as well as his deputy, Hauptsturmfuehrer Kirsten. Our proposal to earmark the Jews, to put them together in a ghetto, then to establish a council for Jews, and to effect with it the extensive commitment of Jews for work, was favorably accepted. It was also agreed upon that the commitment of Jews for work should be effected _only_ through the special offices for commitment to be created by the employment office resp. offices, in order to make sure of leadership according to the necessities for war and state policies. The SS reserves only the right of the decision of political problems and the execution of political tasks. The ear-marking of the Jews and their collection in a ghetto is being done. It was furthermore announced that conferences had already taken place between the SS-SD on the one hand and the military administration headquarters (Feldkommandatur) on the other hand, with the result that a registration of the Jews at the police precincts, a daily report of the Jews there, and the establishment of a special office should be instituted for the execution of the commitment of Jews for work through the military administration headquarters.
After that a conference with the war administration council [Kriegsverwaltungsrat] Nachtigall took also place at the _military administration headquarters_, which had the same result. The military administration headquarters (Fk.) agrees also that the commitment of Jews for work is done by the employment office after the registration of the Jews. While registering, a special index card can be put aside for this commitment of work.
The discussions at the Fk. resulted furthermore in the issuing by the commander of the rear army district of a decree on _ceiling prices and wages_, already last Wednesday, because it is his opinion that he alone can issue official decrees with effective penalties. Furthermore, the locally customary prices and wages are already established.
[signature illegible] O.K.V.R.
Distribution: Wi.-In. Nord, Dept. for work Commandant SS.-SD. Fk.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 614-PS
"DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE REVOLUTION 1933", compiled by Dr. Axel Friedrichs (Berlin 1935, pages 151-3), [which is Volume I of the documentary collection entitled "DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK", published by the Director of the Hochschule fuer Politik.]
Proclamation of the Action Committee for the Protection of the German Labor 2 May 1933
German workers and employees! Working people in the town and country! The bells have tolled to honor work. The entire German people have sung the high psalm about the working man with a strength and enthusiasm which never before existed and thus has honored itself and the creative spirit. The wheels stopped, the anvil did not more resound, the miner came out of his mine: everywhere a holiday.
What trade unions of all shades, red and black, Christian and "free", have not even come close to accomplishing, what has been only a shadow even in the best years of Marxism, a puny miserable copy compared to the gigantic thing of yesterday, NATIONAL SOCIALISM achieves in its first effort.
It puts the worker and the peasant, the artisan and the employee, briefly all working people, into the center of the State and renders the grabbing and despotic ones harmless. Who was that servant of capitalism, who was the reactionary who intended to oppress you and bereave you of all rights? Those red criminals who have abused you, well meaning, honest and decent German workers for decades, in order to deprive you and thus the entire people of its rights and heritage, or we, who amidst unutterable sacrifices and suffering, fought against these insane and distorted ideas of devilish Jews and the associates of the Jews? Already three months of National Socialistic government prove to you: Adolf Hitler is your friend! Adolf Hitler struggles for your liberty! Adolf Hitter gives you bread!
Today we are entering into the second chapter of the National Socialistic Revolution. You may say, what else do you want, you have the absolute power. True, we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we do not have you workers a hundred percent, and it is you whom we want; we will not let you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine acknowledgment. You shall also be freed of the last Marxian manacles, so that you may find your way to your people.
For we know that without the German worker there is no German nation! And before everything else we must protect you, so that your enemy Marxism and its satellites cannot attack you from the back again.
Even though the Marxist Party such as the K.P.D. has been completely destroyed, or find themselves in complete dissolution as the S.P.D., even if the party leaders have fled in miserable cowardice or have deserted everything and everyone; and have forsaken you, workers, cowardly and miserably as never before, we know that it is all pretense. Marxism pretends to be dead in order to resurrect itself anew with favorable opportunity and again to plunge the Judas dagger into your back. Just as in 1914! Even at that time it sponsored the war debts and spread itself internationally in order to betray you to the imperialism of our enemies in 1918, and to sell you thereby to world capital.
The sly fox doesn't deceive us. Rather we will give him one last fatal shot so that we shall never again suffer with his resurrection. The Leiperts and Grossmaenner may pretend ever so much fidelity to Hitler, but it is better that they should be in protective custody. Therefore we shall strike the main weapon out of the hands of the Marxist group and thereby take from it its last possibility of renewed strengthening. The devilish teaching of the Jew Mardochai shall be destroyed wretchedly on the battlefield of the National Socialistic Revolution.
It is not as if we wanted to disrupt and destroy the unions. On the contrary, we have never disturbed anything which has, in any way, value for our people and we shall never do so in the future; that is a National Socialistic rule. This certainly goes for the unions which serve with hard work and were built up by the pennies taken from the mouths of the worker. No workers--your institutions are sacred and unimpeachable to us National Socialists. I myself am a poor peasant's son and understand poverty. I myself was 7 years in one of the biggest industries of Germany and I know the exploitation of anonymous capital, and I know, above everything else, of its stingy commercial methods, for, on account of my opinion I was fired from my occupation in 1928.
Workers, I swear to you we will not only keep everything which exists, we will build up the protection and rights of the worker even further, so that he can enter into the new National Socialistic State as a completely worthwhile and respected member of the nation.
Workers and peasants on a broad front together with the free occupations and skilled labor,--thus we shall build a new Reich of well being, honor and freedom. Forward with Hitler for Germany.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 615-PS
The Bishop of Limburg Limburg/Lahn, Aug 13, 1941 To the Reich Minister of Justice _Berlin_
[Various stamps and pencilled remarks appear on original]
Regarding the report submitted on July 16 (Sub IV, pp 6-7) by the Chairman of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Dr. Bertram, I consider it my duty to present the following as a concrete illustration of destruction of so-called "useless life."
About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of Hadamar, on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution which had formerly served various purposes and of late had been used as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and furnished as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the above mentioned euthanasia has been systematically practiced for months--approximately since February 1941. The fact has become known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, because death certificates from a Registry Hadamar-Moenchberg are sent to the home communities. (Moenchberg is the name of this institution because it was a Franciscan monastery prior to its secularization in 1803.)
Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a considerable number of such victims. School children of the vicinity know this vehicle and say: "There comes the murder-box again." After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured with the ever-present thought of the miserable victims, especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the direction of the wind.
The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call each other names and say, "You're crazy; you'll be sent to the baking oven in Hadamar." Those who do not want to marry, or find no opportunity, say, "Marry, never! Bring children into the world so they can be put into the bottling machine!" You hear old folks say, "Don't send me to a state hospital! After the feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters whose turn will come are the old people."
All God-fearing men consider this destruction of helpless beings as crass injustice. And if anybody says that Germany cannot win the war, if there is yet a just God, these expressions are not the result of a lack of love of fatherland but of a deep concern for our people. The population cannot grasp that systematic actions are carried out which in accordance with Par. 211 of the German criminal code are punishable with death! High authority as a moral concept has suffered a severe shock as a result of these happenings. The official notice that N.N. had died of a contagious disease and that for that reason his body has to be burned, no longer finds credence, and such official notices which are no longer believed have further undermined the ethical value of the concept of authority.
Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of severe threats. In the interest of public peace, this may be well intended. But the knowledge and the conviction and the indignation of the population cannot be changed by it; the conviction will be increased with the bitter realization that discussion is prohibited with threats but that the actions themselves are not prosecuted under penal law.
Facta loquuntur.
I beg you most humbly, Herr Reich Minister, in the sense of the report of the Episcopate of July 16 of this year, to prevent further transgressions of the Fifth Commandment of God.
[Signed] Dr. Hilfrich
I am submitting copies of this letter to the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister for Church Affairs.
[initialled by the above]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 621-PS
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Berlin, W.8, 2 October 1940 Voss Street 6
SECRET REICH MATTER
_Rk. 665 B gRs_ To the Reichsminister of Justice, Dr. Guertner
Dear Dr. Guertner:
I herewith acknowledge your letters of 26 August and 25 September forwarding to me further material about the death of inmates of nursing homes. I forwarded the enclosed reports of the Chief Prosecutors to Stuttgart and Naumburg to the Reichsminister of the Interior--Reichs Health Leader--for further action.
Heil Hitler! Sincerely yours [signed] Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 630-PS
[On letterhead A. Hitler] Berlin 1 Sept 1939 Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D.
are charged with the responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians to be designated by name in such a manner that persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy death.
signed: A. HITLER [Handwritten note] Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940 signed: Dr. Guertner III a 3/41 g Rs /
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 638-PS
Copy
M 5/42 SECRET
From the Reich Marshall's Plans of 24.9.42.
I. The Reich Marshall is looking for daring fellows, who will be employed in the East as Sonderkommandos [Special Purpose] and who will be able to carry out the task of creating confusion behind the lines. They are to be formed into bands under leadership and with interpreters allotted to them. For this purpose, the Reich Marshall is considering convicts who are first offenders, who have committed not particularly heinous offenses, for which there is human understanding.
The Reich Marshall first of all mentioned persons convicted of poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsfuehrer SS had picked out the so-called poachers and they were already in his hands. He requests, however, that the question be reexamined. The only suitable men are those with a passion for hunting, who have poached for love of the trophy, not men who have laid snares and traps. The Reich Marshall also mentioned fanatical members of smuggling gangs, who take part in gun-battles on the frontiers and whose passion it is to outwit the customs at the risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to bring articles over the frontier in an express train or by similar means.
The Reich Marshall leaves it to us to consider whether still other categories of convicts can be assigned to these bands or pursuit commandos.
In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands, whose first task should be to destroy the communications of the partisan groups, could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they would once again come under strict supervision. * * *
(signed) Dr. Joel, 24.9.42
* * * * *
Berlin, 6 October 1942
Staff of MD IV, V
The attached extract from the minutes of Cabinet Councillor Dr. Joel are submitted for the preparation of the report on Friday 9.10.
Copy to State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger for his attention.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 641-PS
File No. 927/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 District Attorney at the District Court Munich II (Tel: Local 5791, Long Distance 57801)
to the
Public Prosecutor "Generalstaatsanwalt"
at the
State Supreme Court MUNICH
Subject: Death of the prisoner in protective custody Dr. Alfred Strauss in the concentration camp Dachau
N-12432 in one copy submitted to the State Ministry of Justice Munich, 2 June 1933
The Public Prosecutor at the State Supreme Court
On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single attorney at law Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2 pistol shots by SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk prescribed to him by the camp doctor, outside of the fenced part of the camp.
Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.
On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head. Besides the body showed several black and blue spots and also open wounds. Coroner's inquest was ordered; it took place on 26 May 1933. According to the expert's opinion death was caused by cerebral paralysis due to one bullet penetrating and one bullet lodging in the right portion of the cerebrum. Older scars were found at the right hip and seat, as well as hemorrhages of the left abdominal wall. The direction of the firing channels further revealed that the bullets had been fired from low behind and upwards to the right. The distance from which they were fired could not be established by the autopsy; for this purpose chemical and microscopical examinations are necessary.
I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made application for opening and execution of the judicial preliminary investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest against him.
The District Court Public Prosecutor Attorney WINTERSBERGER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 642-PS
File No: G 866/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 State Prosecution at the State Court [Landgericht] Munich Local Telephone: 5791 Long Distance: 57801.
To the Prosecutor General at The Supreme State Court [Oberlandesgericht] Munich.
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody, Leonhard Hausmann in the Dachau concentration camp.
No. 12431 with one copy submitted to the State Minister for Justice, Munich, 2 June 1933
The Prosecutor General at the Supreme State Court.
[signature illegible]
On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old, married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS staff sergeant Karl Ehmann. According to the account of the latter, Hausmann was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was supervised by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him anymore. Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw him running away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, called "Halt" several times, once also "Stop", but in vain. Whereupon Ehmann raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming; Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a distance of 10 to 12 meters.
The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 33 with the assistance of the state court physician. It was found that death was due to a shot through the left side of the chest. According to the autopsy protocol, the shot was fired from a distance less than 1 meter. Meanwhile the legal-medical institute ascertained that the distance was less than 30 cm.
Today I have preferred public charges against Ehmann and have requested to begin and to carry out a preliminary court investigation and to issue an arrest warrant against him for danger of escape and of prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the course of the process.
The Supreme State Prosecutor [signed] Wintersberger
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 644-PS
File No. G 851/33 Munich, 22 May 1933 (Postoffice 35) Prosecution at the State Court Munich II (Telephone: Local 5791 long distance 57801)
To the Prosecutor General of the State Court [Oberlandesgericht]
Munich,
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss in the Dachau concentration camp.
_Annexes_:
1 copy of an autopsy protocol, 3 photos. W.V. 28923/33
In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau informed the state prosecution that an inmate of the concentration camp Dachau, the merchant Louis Schloss, from Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1880, has hanged himself in solitary confinement. At the request of the state prosecution, on the same day the legal inspection was performed with the assistance of the state court physician with the state court Munich II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous whip marks and as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an autopsy was carried out on 17 May 33. According to a preliminary certificate of the participating physicians, the autopsy did not prove death by hanging. The extensive destruction of the adipose tissue found in the corpse was considered to be adequate to cause death through autointoxication and fat embolism. We refer to the attached copy of the autopsy protocol. 3 photographic pictures of the corpse were taken before autopsy, of which prints are enclosed.
The investigation has not yet been concluded.
No. 11374
Supreme State prosecution: 22 May 33 [Signed]: Wintersberger
Submitted with 1 annex and 3 photos to the State Ministry for Justice Munich, 22 May 1933
The Prosecutor General of the Supreme State Court
* * * * *
File No. G 851, 924 ff/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 (Post office 35) Prosecution at the State Court Munich II (Telephone: Local 5791 Long distance: 57801)
* * * * *
To the prosecutor general with the Supreme State Court Munich.
No. 12430 with 1 extra copy.
[Stamp] Submitted to the State Ministry for Justice Munich, 2 June 1933 The prosecutor general with the Supreme State Court
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss in the Dachau concentration camp.
To my report of 22 May 1933.
In the above case I have today publicly indicted unknown culprits for injuries leading to death and the commandant of the camp, Waeckerle, the camp physician, Dr. Neurnbergk, as well as the first secretary of the chancellery, Mutzbauer, as accessories after the facts, and I requested that a preliminary court investigation should be started and carried out, furthermore that a warrant of arrest should be issued against above accused for danger of prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the progress of the proceedings.
The State prosecutor [Signed]: Wintersberger
* * * * *
Copy
Dachau, 17 May 1933
Protocol
_Subject_: Investigation and autopsy of Schloss, Louis, merchant from Nurnberg, deceased here by hanging.
_Present_: Court Counsellor [Amtsgerichtsrat] Dr. Guntz, State court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm, Instructor [Privatdozent] Dr. Mueller, Secretary of Justice Bruecklmeier.
Above court committee went today at 3 P.M. to the autopsy room in the cemetery of the village of Dachau. There was the corpse of the widowed merchant Louis Schloss, who was found hanged in the concentration camp Dachau, Prittlbach community, on 16 May 1933 and whose corpse is known to the state court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm from the cadaver inspection which has taken place on 16 May 1933 in the concentration camp.
The participating police sergeant Frey of the police station Pasing took three photographs of the deceased and these will be explained as part of this copy. The photographs will be sent directly from the photographic office Pasing to the state prosecutor Munich II.
* * * * *
Preliminary opinion
I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.
II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found, particularly on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as well as on both legs, abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In the region of the buttocks and the shoulders extensive destruction of adipose tissue was found together with the blood suffusions. This is adequate to explain death through autointoxication and fat embolism.
III. The proof has to be brought forth by microscopic examination of the parts of organs.
IV. Following were preserved: the organs of the neck and thorax, parts of the brain, the spleen, liver and kidneys, as well as the strangulation mark on the neck and blood for bacteriological examination.
Finished at 18.10 hours. Signed Dr. Flamm Signed: Dr. P. Mueller. The Court Commission of the Court Dachau Signed: Dr. Guntz, Court Counsellor Signed: Bruecklmeier, Secretary of Justice.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 645-PS
Reference Nr. G 928 ff/33 Munich, June 1, 1933 Office of the State Attorney of the Superior Court Munich II (tel. local 5791 long distance 57801). To: Attorney General of the Main Superior Court Munich.
SUBJECT: Death of prisoner Sebastian Nefzger in the Concentration Camp Dachau.
[written in ink]
No. 12434 with 1 part and 6 photos Presented to the State Ministry of Justice Munich, } June 2, 1933 } [Stamps] The Attorney General of the Main Superior Court } Sotier [? signature]
On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the lower court Dachau:
"Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933 to the Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the prisoner Nefzger, Sebastian, merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse 17/0, born: 1/10/1900 in Munich, religion Catholic, marital status: married--showed that death through the action of third persons must be excluded. Death was indubitably caused by excessive bleeding resulting from an opened artery of the left hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician."
Neither the lower court Dachau nor the state attorney Munich II had up to that time been informed of Nefzger's death reported in the letter in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in the night of the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The lower court Dachau informed the state attorney, Munich II of this letter. A coroner's inquest was ordered, which took place as late as May 27, 1933. Since the physician appointed by the superior court doubted that death had occurred due to excessive bleeding and identified marks of strings on the victim's neck, a judicial autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29, 1933. The resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I. the autopsy discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm must be excluded as a cause of death; II. the cut on the left wrist reveals three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are lacking. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the wound has been self-inflicted; III. It must be assumed that the cause of death was suffocation. As a cause for suffocation, strangulation and throttling must be considered. The characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree with those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by hanging.
6 photos were made of the corpse before the autopsy; one print is enclosed of each.
I have issued a public indictment, on the basis of murder, of the unknown perpetrators, and of camp commander Waeckerly, camp physician Dr. Nuernbergk, and chief secretary of the office Mutzbauer for having aided in the crime; and I have ordered the opening and execution of preliminary court proceedings, as well as the issuance of an arrest warrant for the said accused.
I shall make reports about the developments of the process.
The Chief State Attorney Wintersberger
_Deaths of the prisoners in protective custody_:
_Schloss, Louis_, merchant from Nurnberg (found hung on 5/16/1933).
_Hausmann, Leonhard_, unskilled worker from Augsburg, (shot by Scharfuehrer _Karl Ehmann_ on 5/17/33).
_Dr. Strauss, Alfred_, lawyer from Munich, (shot on 5/24/33).
_Kantschuster, Johann_, SS man for murder.
_Nefzger, Sebastian_, merchant from Munich, (died 5/25 to 5/26/33).
Indictment of _unknown_ perpetrators for murder and of _Waeckerle_, camp commander; Dr. _Nuernbergk_, camp physician; _Mutzbauer_, chief secretary of the office, for aiding in the crime.
_Lehrburger, Karl_, merchant from Nurnberg, (shot on 5/25/33) by SS man _Hans Steinbrenner_.
Z.d.A.: "Important Occurrences in the Concentration Camp Dachau."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 647-PS
(100 [crossed out, on top of it] "ten" [in pencil] photo copies copy [in ink])
Control number _Enclosure to number 1164/38 top secret WFA/L II_
Draft of June 3rd with changes Reichsfuehrer SS of June 10, 1938 and additions concerning signal corps unit.
[in ink] 1st Copy 3 copies 1st copy
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Reich's Chancellor. Berlin, 17 August 1938
[in ink]
10
[Signature illegible]
By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police in the ministry of the interior on June 17th 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 487), I have created the basis for the unification and reorganization of the German police.
With this step, the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP which were under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police even up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of the German police.
In order to regulate these tasks and in order to delineate the common tasks of the SS and of the Wehrmacht, I hereby order the following inclusively and basically:
[the above written in pencil]
I. General
1. Being a political organization of the NSDAP, the SS as such does not need any military set-up and training for its political obligations. It carries no weapons.
2. For special inner-political tasks for the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, tasks which I might have to assign to him from time to time, or for the mobile use within the wartime army (SS-Verfuegungstruppe). The following SS units which either already exist, or will be set up in case of mobilization, are exempted from the regulations of number 1:
The SS-Verfuegungstruppe. The SS-Junkerschulen. The SS-Totenkopfverbaende. The SS-reinforcement Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
In peacetime they are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, who, with the exception mentioned in paragraph II, _alone_ has the responsibility for the organization, training, arming, and full use in regard to inner-political tasks given him from me.
In peacetime, no organizational connection with the Wehrmacht exists in this regard. (See orders in II and III for the case of mobilization.)
Arms, ammunition, tools, equipment, and military handbooks for the armed SS units will be procured through the Wehrmacht, upon payment.
II. The armed units of the SS
A. _The SS-Verfuegungstruppe_
1. The SS Verfuegungstruppe is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit, exclusively at my disposal. As such, and as a unit of the NSDAP its members are to be selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the ideological and political standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln. Its members are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers from those who are subject to serve in the army who have finished their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period for volunteers is 4 years. It may be prolonged for SS-Unterfuehrer. Special regulations are in force for SS leaders. The regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount of time in the SS Verfuegungstruppe.
The SS Verfuegungstruppe receives its financial resources through the Ministry of the Interior. Its budget requires a check-up by the high command of the Wehrmacht.
2. The SS Verfuegungstruppe falls into the following parts:
1 headquarters staff. (Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler) motorized [in ink].
3 regiments 2 motorcycle battalions under a Standarte Staff. 1 engineer battalion motorized [in ink]. 1 signal battalion motorized [in ink]. 1 medical unit.
The complete strength, the organization, the arming, and the equipment of the SS Verfuegungstruppe depend on the task allocated in peace time and in case of mobilization.
In case of mobilization, the Standarten and independent Sturmbanne are organized like the corresponding units of an infantry division respectively of a motorized infantry division of the army [illegible remark in ink].
The engineer unit is fully motorized.
The signal unit (motorized) is organized like an infantry division signal unit (motorized).
The peacetime strength and equipment of the army are the pattern for the strength and equipment of the staffs and units of the SS Verfuegungstruppe. Personnel and material necessary above the peacetime strength and the table of equipment will be determined in cooperation with the high command of the Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
For use in the interior, the Standarten are reinforced by the following special formation:
(Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler)
reinforced by:
1 armored reconnaissance platoon. [Panzerspaehzug; the word "zug" is added in ink]. 1 motorcycle platoon. 1 motorized engineer platoon.
_the other Standarten_
by: _each_ 1 armored reconnaissance platoon. 1 light infantry motorcycle platoon.
and by additional telephone and radio units for the signal platoons.
_the non-motorized units_
by: 1 trucking platoon each.
The signal unit (motorized) with additional means of communication in order to safeguard the communication system of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police. The necessary personnel and material will be determined in cooperation with the high command of the Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
The final aim is the complete mobilization of all Standarten and independent units; in the case of mobilization, the skeleton corps of the reinforcement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to whom in peacetime the short training of replacements for the SS Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to be devoted to the task of insuring replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe (see C 2).
The supreme commander of the army prepares the SS Verfuegungstruppe for their use within the wartime army. He issues the necessary orders, regulates their working with reserve army authorities, supports the training and makes inspections. He is authorized to transfer these powers to lower echelon offices and to report to me about the state of combat training, after prior consultation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
A timely exchange of officers, respectively leaders between the army and the SS Verfuegungstruppe is to be carried out in mutual agreement as soon as the officer situation permits it.
Any changes in the organization, the strength and the arming of the SS Verfuegungstruppe have to be approved by me.
3. _Orders for the case of mobilization._
A. The employment of the SS Verfuegungstruppe in case of mobilization is a double one:
1. By the supreme commander of the army within the wartime army. In that case, it comes completely under military laws and regulation, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.
2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders. In that case, it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
In case of mobilization, I myself will make the decision about the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the SS Verfuegungstruppe into the wartime army; these things will depend on the inner political situation at that time.
During the war, the skeleton corps of the reinforcement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to whom in peacetime the short training of replacements for the SS Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to be devoted to the task of insuring a reserve which should meet the ideologic and political spirit of the Verfuegungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, all members of the SS who did their compulsory military duty in the SS Verfuegungstruppe are generally to be used to reinforce the SS Verfuegungstruppe. Older classes of the SS Verfuengungstruppe also may be used to fill up the ranks of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende police reinforcement which will be set-up in case of mobilization in so far as they are not needed as replacements for the SS Verfuengungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, the replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe also may be used to fill up the ranks of young, untrained draftees.
B. _The SS Junker Schools._
1. The SS Junker schools including the SS medical Junker school educate the officer replacements for the armed parts of the SS and for the German police.
2. The Junkers who have served at least one year of front line duty in the SS Verfuegungstruppe and have completed the SS Junker schools and subsequently the non-commissioned officer school successfully, and who have accordingly served more than two years under arms (see par. 8 of the military law), have fulfilled their compulsory military duty.
Leaders and leader aspirants who have successfully finished the non-commissioned officer school in service that is incorporated into the Wehrmacht, will be given a rank which corresponds to their rank, in the armed parts of the SS, or in the police.
3. The budgets of the SS Verfuegungstruppe, the SS Totenkopfverbaende, and the German police will bear the partial costs of the schools for that number of Junkers which corresponds to their calculated need for leaders.
4. These orders about the SS Junker schools are in force retroactive to March 15, 1935.
C. _The SS Totenkopfverbaende._
1. The SS Totenkopfverbaende are neither a part of the army nor of the police. They are a standing armed unit of the SS to clear up special tasks of police nature. I reserve the right to assign duties from time to time.
As such, as a unit of the NSDAP, they are to be selected and trained according to the ideological and political directives which I have issued for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln; they are to be replaced by the use of volunteers _capable of serving the SS_, who as a rule have served their compulsory military duty in the army. The army must give its agreement for special cases of exception. These units are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who is responsible to me for their organization, training, arming, and full readiness for action.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police is entitled to recruit suitable volunteers of the army before their discharge in cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
The service period for non-commissioned officers and men is 12 years. Service time in the army is to be counted. The necessary question of the pension will be taken up at a later date.
The SS Totenkopfverbaende receive their financial means through the ministry of the Interior.
Starting April 1st, 1938, the SS Totenkopfverbaende are organized as follows:
Directorate staff with signal unit,
4 Standarten with 3 Sturmbanne each with 3 infantry companies (each 148 men strong).
1 machine gun company (150 men strong).
1 medical unit.
1 medical group necessary for the medical care of those camp prisoners who work outside.
Besides, each Standarte:
1 motorcycle group (crossed out).
1 group with weapons suited for street fights to be set up in 1939 (crossed out).
1 trucking unit.
1 Signal platoon.
Besides 1 signal platoon for each Sturmbann to be set up in 1939 (crossed out).
2. Replacement units for the short time training for the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement). Strength corresponding to the reinforcement battalion of the army. All units of the SS Totenkopferbaende are to be motorized temporarily with 3-ton Opel-Blitz cars.
3. The strength and organization of the units will be determined by the extent of their special tasks of police nature (see fig. 1) and will be determined by me according to requirements upon suggestions of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
4. The armament and equipment of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depends on their special tasks (see fig. 1); both are to be suggested to me by the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, after he has discussed them with the supreme command of the army.
5. _Regulations for the case of the mobilization._
The SS Totenkopfverbaende form the skeleton corps for the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement) and will be replaced in the guarding of the concentration camps by members of the General SS who are over 45 years of age and had military training.
The skeleton corps which, up to now, were units of the two replacement units for the short time training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende will be transferred to the SS Verfuegungstruppe as skeleton crews of the replacement units for that unit.
D. Reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
1. The reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende is a police unit which will be set up and armed automatically in the case of mobilization, in an emergency, at my command.
2. The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police will decide its strength within the total strength of all police units which I shall determine for the territory of the Reich.
3. The organization, distribution of units, armament, and training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depend entirely on the police tasks they will have to handle.
The responsibility for the full readiness for action in that respect rests with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who will have to make suitable suggestions to me concerning armament and equipment, after prior consultation with the supreme command of the army.
4. The training of the reinforcements of the SS Totenkopfverbaende who are provided for the use of war and are between 25 and 35 years of age will be undertaken in peacetime by the replacement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (compare with C 2).
5. The ministry of the interior will request the financial resources for the training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende from the supreme command of the army, as R.V. special resources.
III. The General SS (Allgemeine SS)
All other members, not mentioned in I or II of the general SS (Allgemeine SS) which is unarmed, are at the disposal of the army in case of war (according to the regulations of the military law).
However, considering the special inner-political tasks which the SS has to solve in close connection with the German police in case of mobilization, I hereby order the following:
1. The staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, the staffs of the three main offices (SS, Sd, and RuS main officer, the SS Oberabschnittsstaebe and SS Abschnittstaebe) remain in case of war for tasks of police nature. The Reichsfuehrer SS regulates their strength which will be cut down to a minimum size for that purpose, SS members provided for those staffs are to be deferred from service in the army in case of war.
2. All clothing and equipment, motor cars, arms, ammunition and other equipment owned by the SS are regulated by the legal orders in case of mobilization; this, provided they are not necessary for the setting up of the armed SS units and staffs mentioned under I and II.
IV. Decrees of execution
The supreme command of the army issues the decrees of execution necessary to paragraph II in all questions concerning the army and the case of mobilization in cooperation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police issues the decrees of execution concerning the police and inner political measures in cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
/s/ Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 651-PS
Reich Minister of Justice
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 65 31 January 1938
Telephone: 110044
_4611--I a [7=] 194/38_ To the Presidents of the High Courts.
Subject: Representation by Counsel of Inmates of Concentration Camps.
VERY CONFIDENTIAL
In preparing a decision of Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police whether individual attorneys can be allowed in general to take over the representation of inmates in Concentration Camps, I ask you to scrutinize at once if and what attorneys in your district could be considered for this purpose. Representation of inmates of Concentration Camps requires a special measure of suitability and dependability. Severe scrutiny is to be exercised in making the selection. Membership in the NSDAP, in so far as it was not acquired until after January 30, 1933, will not of itself warrant the necessary dependability as a rule; on the other hand this prerequisite is not to be denied because the attorney is not a member of the Party. Consideration can only be given attorneys whose attitude leaves no doubt that their views coincide wholly with the political aspirations of the State and the ideology aims of the movement. Moreover, it can be assumed that attorneys whose field of activity does not extend to taking over the defense in criminal affairs, will as a rule not accept representation of inmates of Concentration Camps.
Attorneys suitable for representation of inmates of Concentration Camps who should, if possible, reside in different localities of your district, should be listed in sufficient number according to Offices of the State Police. With reference to the necessity of very confidential treatment, I beg therefore to consult as an expert the president of the Chamber of Counsel about their qualifications. A consultation of offices not within the Administration of Justice is to be avoided. I ask that two copies of the list be presented after receiving the advice of the President of the Chamber of Counsel. With regard to the attorneys names, proof of personal and professional qualification is to be submitted. Besides stating the attorney's characteristic and political attitude and especially his manner of practicing his profession as defense counsel in penal matters, it is also to be investigated, if possible, if reason exists to assume that the attorney has the confidence of the Office of State Police.
An eventual notice of non-compliance is required.
Deputy, sig. Schlegelberger [stamped:] Reich Ministry of Justice Office of the Ministry Certified sig. Schlichting Secretary of the Office of the Ministry
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 654-PS
U I _b_
Discussion with Reich Fuehrer of SS Himmler on 18.9.42 in his Field Headquarters in the presence of State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger, SS Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender.
1. Correction [2 illegible pencilled words] by special treatment at the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough. On the suggestion of Reichsleiter Bormann, the following agreement was reached between the Reich Fuehrer of SS and myself:
_a._ In principle the Fuehrer's time is no longer to be burdened with these matters.
_b._ The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
_c._ The Reich Fuehrer of SS will send the reports, which he sent hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for Justice.
_d._ If the views of the Reich Fuehrer of SS and those of the Reich Minister for Justice agree, the final decision on the case will rest with them.
_e._ If their views are not in agreement, the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on the case, and he will possibly inform the Fuehrer.
_f._ In cases where the Fuehrer's decision on a mild sentence is sought through other channels (such as by a letter from a Gauleiter) Reichsleiter Bormann will forward the report to the Reich Minister for Justice. The case will then be decided as already described by the Reich Fuehrer of SS and the Reich Minister for Justice.
2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann.
3. Administration of justice by the people. This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible, first of all in the villages and the small towns of up to about 20,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to carry it out in large towns. I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this scheme by an article in the Hoheitstrager (NSDAP publication). It is evident that jurisdiction may not lie in the hands of the Party. [Marginal note in pencil: according to the permanency of the courts (?)]
4. Orders regarding the police and justice are, in future, to be tempered, for example, not prosecuting unmarried mothers if they attempt to procure abortion.
5. The Reich Fuehrer of SS is agreed that the cancellation of sentence, even for members of the police, will rest, as in Article 8 of the law relating to the cancellation of sentence, with the Reich Minister for Justice.
6. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has given full consent to the ruling I have planned on the corporal punishment ordered by the Fuehrer.
7. I shall refer to the Common Law relating to Aliens and will give notification of the claims of Justice, e.g. in the identification of young people as anti-social elements and their arrest. Also, it seems to me that the actual circumstances which serve to stamp a person as anti-social are not laid down in the law with sufficient clarity. The Reich Fuehrer of SS is waiting for our opinion, and until then will not carry out the text of the law.
8. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has agreed to a clause for the Juvenile Court Law, whereby the age of discretion can be reduced to 12 years and the reduced age of discretion can be extended to over 18 years. [Marginal note in pencil: "by which he has made clear that a reduction in the age limit of full age of discretion is meant."]
9. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender, of the Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS, is appointed by the Reich Fuehrer of SS as liaison officer for matters which appear to necessitate direct liaison with the Reich Fuehrer of SS. He can be contacted any time by tele-printer in the Field Headquarters of the Reich Fuehrer of SS, and will come once every month to Berlin to report to me here. Hauptsturmfuehrer Wanniger is appointed as liaison officer for other matters, and he will be at Security Headquarters (Sicherheitsharuptamt).
10. The Reich Fuehrer of SS declared that, in the infliction of punishment, special establishments should be set up, on the principle that confirmed criminals should be confined separately and that those capable of improvement should be separated according to the nature of their crimes (e.g. impostors, thieves and those who have committed acts of violence). This was recognized as correct.
11. The Reich Fuehrer of SS demands that the penal register should be kept by the police. Arguments against this are to be examined (cancellation and tightening up of the Penal Register Bill and additions made to it). The question is to be further discussed with Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach.
12. The Reich Fuehrer of SS pointed out as reliable SS--Obersturmfuehrer Reichsgerichtsrat _Altstetter_, at present on active service as a Major, and also Landgerichtspraesident _Stepp_; he designated as unreliable Generalstaatstanwalt _Jung_ in Dresden.
13. Finally, the Reich Fuehrer of SS broached the subject of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and its transfer to the police. I rejected it flatly. There was no further discussion of this subject.
14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial Lists.
Signed Th.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 656-PS
National Socialist German Workers' Party Party Chancellory
The Chief of the Party Chancellory
Fuehrer's Headquarters SECRET
[Stamp]
Circular No. 12/43g.
SECRET
Subject: Law of Self-Defense against P.O.W.'s
I acknowledge the copy of the annexed order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.
(s) M. BORMANN
F.d.R. Hilegardt _1 copy_ Distrb. Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Verbaendefuehrer.
index cards: Prisoners of War/Guard Personnel/Self-Defense/ Physical Punishment.
* * * * *
Copy
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht Berlin 29.1.1943 Az 2f 24.74 AWA/Prisoners of War. General (IA) No. 3868 142g
SECRET
Subject: Self Defense against Prisoners of War. Reference: None.
The question of the treatment of Prisoners of War is continually being brought up and discussed by Wehrmacht and Party bureaus, namely that the possibilities of punishment provided in the agreement of 1929 (M. Dr.-38/2) are not sufficient. Primarily neither the military punishment law nor the discipline law, which has been eliminated for German military personnel, offers a punishment which can be used with satisfactory success in case of an insubordinate and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War. The following is hereby fundamentally affirmed:
1. The M.Dr. 38/2 (Agreement 1929) article 46, states that Prisoners of War cannot receive any other punishments than those meted out to German military personnel. That applies to all Prisoners of War with the exception of Soviet Prisoners of War. For Soviet Prisoners of War the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 2 f 24.73 AWA/Prisoners of War, General (IA) No. 389/42g of the 24.3.1942 Article A, fourth paragraph is applicable.
2. Improper and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War toward German guard personnel as well as toward German contractors and workers forces and justifies this being enacted for the preservation of their own dignity and of national esteem. German law has an application for this; in the case of self-defense ST GB Art 53 is applicable. According to the existing law, self-defense occurs not only in the case of present actual attacks but also present attacks on one's honor, on one's property, etc. The law of self-defense concerns not only the party attacked, it applies also to the protection of a third party from attack. Third, in the sense of the N Art 53 a.a. G, are not only persons, but also the persons of the public and private law, as for instance the State, the municipality, society etc. The party attacked can use for protection any means that the situation requires and the use of which does not contradict healthy national interest [Gesunden Volksempfinden]. A _subsequent_ punishment of a prisoner of war for an improper and provoking attitude of _physical chastisement_ is not permissible since self-defense is no longer present.
3. In case of the diminishing of the effort to work only the guard and the assistant guard (for example among the farmers there is very often a personal union between assistant-guard and contractor) can interfere as the military superior of the Prisoners of War. In this he is not only authorized but also obliged by duty (see Order of the OKW A2 2f 2417a Chief of Prisoners of War/General (I)/Org (IIIb) No. 2916/42 of the 26.6.1942). Should the prisoners of war not fulfill his order, _then he has in the case of the most pressing need and danger,--the right to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means_. He can use the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal. If the assistant guard is not armed, then, he is authorized in forcing obedience by other applicable means.
4. The military personnel, officials, and assisting guard personnel who are charged with the duty of guarding prisoners of war are to be instructed accordingly. It is to be made clear to them what means the law puts at their disposal, in order that they may be able to combat insubordinations, provocative attitudes and abatement of the will to work on the part of the prisoners of war, and what also the limits are to which they can go.
Distribution: * * * D.d.R.d.A.: Weber Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht /s/ Reinecke F.d.R. /s/ v. Graevenitz Majorgeneral.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 661-PS
[Secret Thesis from the Academy of German Law on Resettlement, January 1940]
Resettlement, mixed settlement, emigration, national biological power [biologische Volkstumskraft]
Short consideration of the prerequisites for a political legal system of the peoples. [Volkspolitische Rechtsgestaltung]
1 _a._ _Resettlement_ (pages 6-8).
For the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the increase of agricultural production, the Governmental-General can at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already over-populated. * * * By further absorption of 1.6 million resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of already existing rural over-population and lack of industry would result in a double over-population.
This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from the Reich:
The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether over 1 million).
The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in the past, and potential political leaders.
The leading economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates, industrialists and businessmen, etc.
The peasant population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry out by strips of German settlements the encirclement of Polish territories in the East.
6 to 7 million Poles (not including the majority of the Wasserpolen, Schlonsaken, Kaschuben) would therefore remain for an extended period of time in the liberated East, and it will be possible to accept only a small fraction of them into German folksdom. * * * A resettlement of many millions can only be undertaken after victory and only in connection with an overwhelming reorganization of the East, which would create space for the surplus Poles, be it in Siberia, or be it in the bordering territories, for example after the resettlement eastwards of the White Russians. A resettlement of several million Jews, perhaps in Madagascar, could also create space.
* * * * *
_c._ In regard to internal colonization of the East of the Reich, it might be expedient to envisage the carrying out of a planned encirclement of the districts with a Polish majority by wide strips of German settlements. Also, a concentration of the remaining Poles in order to create space can be considered.
_d._ In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should remove cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands, employ them for a few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into the old Reich must be prevented.)
If 1.5 million people are to be transferred in short order (in about 4 years, i.e., 1000 daily) from the East of the Reich and are to be absorbed by the Government-General, if among them there are barely 1 million Poles and the rest Jews, then 7 million Poles would remain in the Reich, including Poles in Germany proper and Austria, but not including prisoners of war, seasonal workers from the Government-General and for the time being also Kaschuben, and of course Masurians and other Slavic Germanic tribes. There would be 1 Pole for every 12 Germans in the Reich excluding the Government-General.
The figure of 7 million comprises for example the following peoples: Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians; it is double the number of Sudeten-Germans in former Czechoslovakia.
It is terrifyingly high and cannot be decreased considerably by emigration assimilation, or additional future transfer to the Government-General.
This mass of Poles is a great inconvenience, an obstacle to the Germanization of the country, and under certain circumstances a danger. It can be reduced by enlarging the Government-General.
In renouncing an area with a population of 1 million, it would be possible not only to get rid of this number of Poles but about 1.2 million, since the areas in question are sufficiently fertile to absorb 15 to 20% additional resettlers. For example, the territory of the former district of Lodz (19,000 square kilometers) had a population of 2.86 million (1938). One could take 150,000 Germans from their area and put over 3 million Poles into it. Or by giving up the Cracow Ural district (Olkusz) and the Zickenau district one could get rid of about 1.5 million Poles, including additional settlers from the Reich. The further deliberations presuppose that no areas of the Eastern districts (Ostgaue) will be renounced in favor of the Government-General. Therefore a major part of this Polish mass, which is much too large, could emigrate only to areas East of the Government-General. A prerequisite would be a thorough reorganization of the entire East and many of its numerous peoples, under the determining influence of the Reich (a memorandum is necessary). The total emigration of over 3 million Jews (possibly to Madagascar) would also create space for Polish resettlement.
About 1 million Poles could be taken out of their settlements, but not from the Reich, and used as agricultural and industrial itinerant labor. This would doubtless result in considerable relief, particularly from the biological viewpoint.
* * * * *
Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda and official correspondence which contains instructions detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in Paris or the USA.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 666-PS
SECRET
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
DIRECTIVES
for the prosecution of offences against the Reich or against the occupation authorities in the occupied territories.
7 December 1941
With the beginning of the Russian campaign, communist elements and other anti-German circles increased their attacks on the Reich and the occupation authorities in the occupied territories. The extent and the danger of these activities compel to most severe measures against the guilty for the purpose of intimidation.
For the time being the following directions shall be observed:
I
In regard to offences committed by non-German civilians in the occupied territories against the Reich or the occupation authorities which endanger their security or efficiency, the death sentence is adequate as a matter of principle.
II
The offences referred to in section I are to be tried in the occupied territories only if it is likely that the guilty persons, at least the main offenders, will be sentenced to death and if the proceedings and the execution of the death sentences can be carried out quickly. Otherwise the offenders, at least the main offenders, are to be brought to Germany.
III
Guilty persons who are brought to Germany are to be subject to court-martial proceedings there only if specific military interests make it necessary. German or foreign authorities making inquiries are to be told that the guilty persons had been arrested and that the state of the proceedings did not permit to give further information.
IV
The commanders in the occupied territories and the legal representatives are personally responsible for the execution of this decree within the framework of their competence.
VI
The chief of the high command of the armed forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized to explain, to make provisions for the execution of the decree and to supplement it. The Reich minister of justice issues the provisions for the execution of the law for his district.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces By order (I.A.) (signed) KEITEL
_DISTRIBUTION_:
Foreign Office
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Reich leader SS and Chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of Interior.
High Command of the Army (Chef H. Ruest u. BDE--HR) with 7 N.A.
High Command of the Navy (MR) with 1 N.A.
Reich Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air force (ZAR) with 1 N.A.
President of the Reich Court-Martial
Commander Southeast with 4 N.A.
Commander Norway
Commander Netherlands
Commander Eastland
Commander Ukraine
Plenipotentiary of the armed forces with the Reich Protector Bohemia and Moravia
Armistice Commission Wiesbaden
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Chief West Abt. L with 8 N.A. W Pr Amt Aus 1/Abw. (ZR) Abt. Ausl. Abw. III
AWA
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 668-PS
Copy
Chief of the Security Police and the SD--IV D 4--103/42 g--Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht Street 8, 24 June 1942
SECRET
To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for the attention of the Oberregierungsrat DOWALDT or his acting deputy.
Berlin W 35, at Tirpitzufer 72--76
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in occupied territories.
_Reference_: Circular dated 16 April 1942--14 n 16.18 WR (I 3/4) Nr 242/42 g.
By virtue of the above-named edict a considerable number of persons who were arrested in the occupied district of France have been transferred to camp Hinzert at Trier, pending commencement of the main proceedings before the competent special court in Cologne.
The 67-year old Frenchman, Louis Adolf Rousseau, died here recently of a stroke.
Thus the question has arisen--which has not been settled until now--as to what steps are to be taken in such cases of death.
It is the intent of the general directions of the Fuehrer and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht concerning prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in occupied territories, dated 7 December 1941, to create, for deterrent purposes, uncertainty about the fate of prisoners among their relatives and acquaintances, through the deportation into Reich territory of persons arrested in occupied areas on account of anti-German activity. This goal would be forfeited if the relatives were to be notified in cases of death. Surrender of the body for burial at home is inadvisable for the same reason, and also because the place of burial could be misused for demonstration purposes.
I therefore propose that the following general rule be decided upon for cases of death:
_a._ Notification of relatives is not to take place.
_b._ The body is buried at the place of death, in the Reich.
_c._ The place of burial is not made known for the time being.
In the case of the deceased Frenchman Rousseau, I have given orders which accord with the above proposal and I will do likewise in the future pending a decision by you.
pp. [signature illegible]
* * * * *
SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72--76, July 13, 1942 14 m 16.18 WR (I 3/4), No. 562/42 g To the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service Berlin SW11, Prinz Albrecht Str. 8 [Pencil alteration]
[Pencil note--] E46 E8/46 38/42 Reich Ministry of Justice 16th July 1942 Section
By way of information to:
Supreme Command of the Army
Supreme Command of the Navy
Reich Minister of Air Transportation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces
President of the Reich Court Martial
Reich Minister of Justice
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Headquarters
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in the occupied territories.
_Reference_:--IV D 4--103/42 g--of June 24, 1942. 1 enclosure.
The supreme command of the armed forces agrees to the suggested treatment of cases of death. The decree of April 16, 1942, will in due course be supplemented accordingly.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Per: Dr. Lehmann
[Handwritten note--largely undecipherable]
(Stamp of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) Checked: Bachmann, Justizoberinspektor d.Lw. IV a 863/42 g [Handwritten note]
1. _Note_: Procedure in cases of death has already been laid down by IX para. 5 of the draft of a second order for the carrying out of the general directions * * * of decree of the OKW dated 16.4.42.--
In my opinion the case of death quoted in the letter of the Reichfuehrer-SS dated 24.6.42 precludes the necessity of a supplement to the draft, mentioned.
2. Submit to me 3.8.
RM 29.7.
Submitted to OBGK (?) Dr. V. Ammon 3.8.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 674-PS
_1st copy_
President of the High District Court and Chief Public Prosecutor
Kattowitz, 3 December 1941
Nikolai Str. 1, Entrance Wilhemsplatz Tel.: 34608 and 34610
VS 4 E-1. 51 secret _file nr. 229_
[illegible notations]
"SECRET" only
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Attention: Chief Councillor to the Government Stadermann or Representative in Office.
Berlin
_Re_: Executions by the Police and Expediting of Penal Procedure Without Order.
Inclosure: 1 copy of report
About 3 weeks ago 6 chief agents (partially German) were hanged by the police in connection with the destruction of a treasonable organization of 350 members in Tarnowitz without notification of the ministry of justice. Such execution of criminal agents in the Bielitz district have already been made before also without the knowledge of the proper authority for criminal persecution. On 2 December 1941 the head of the state police at Kattowitz, chief councillor to the government Mildner, reported orally to the undersigned that he had ordered as necessary immediate action, with authority from the Reich-leader of the SS these executions by public hanging at the place of the crime; and that deterring measures would also have to be continued in the future until the criminal and actively anti-German powers in the occupied Eastern territories have been destroyed, or until other immediate actions, perhaps also by the courts, would guarantee equal frightening effect. Accordingly, 6 leaders of another Polish organization guilty of high treason in the district in and around Sosnowitz were to be hanged publicly today as an example.
About this procedure the undersigned expressed considerable doubts.
Besides the fact that such measures have been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are contradictory to the laws not put out of effect, a justified emergency for the exceptional proceedings by the police alone cannot, in our opinion, be lawfully recognized.
The penal justice in our district within the limits of our jurisdiction is quite capable of fulfilling its duty of immediate penal retribution by means of a special form of special judicial activity (establishment of a so-called rapid special court). Indictment and proceeding could be speeded up in such a way that between turning the case over to the public prosecutor and execution no more than 3 days would elapse if the practice of pardoning is simplified and if the decision, if necessary, can be obtained by long distance call. This was expressed yesterday to the head of the state police at Kattowitz by the undersigned.
We cannot believe that execution by the police of criminals, especially German criminals, can be considered more effective through shattering the sense of justice of many German countrymen. In the long run they might, in spite of public terrorizing, lead even more to further brutality of minds, which is contrary to the intended purpose of pacifying. These deliberations, however, do not apply to future lawful competence of a drumhead court-martial for Poles and Jews.
According to a recent report of the head of the Kattowitz state police to the district leader [Gauleiter] Bracht, the cases of 540 persons accused of high treason from the Kattowitz district have already been forwarded in December 1940 by the police to the board of arraignment of the people's court in Berlin without any sentences having been passed there as yet. This situation, which became known in the various branches of interested party circles and administration departments, injures the reputation of justice in general as well as the concept of the effectiveness of justice in the occupied Eastern territories especially because, with the exception of the court, the exclusive competence of the people's court for the sentencing of matters of high treason is not sufficiently known.
We are not informed as to how far the described situation of non-settlement is true.
As far as the proceedings of treasonable cases by the chief Reich prosecutor at the people's court in Berlin are concerned which were forwarded for prosecution to the co-undersigned public prosecutor (proceedings per par. 5 section 2 of the law about the competence of criminal courts dated 21 Feb. 40--RGBl I, p. 405--in connection with the AV of Reich justice ministry dated 7 June 45--German law, page 683) we should like to point out the following:
From July 1941 until today, the cases of 235 accused were forwarded by the chief Reich prosecutor; 122 of the accused have already been sentenced, indicted, or proceedings were suspended or transferred.
The co-undersigned president of the supreme country court has taken steps to expedite prosecution further by personally supplementing the criminal court for high treason. If it should become necessary in the future, a second court could be appointed for the prosecution of matters of high treason by putting aside less important work. All organizations charged with prosecuting and sentencing of high treason and also with other severe crimes have been impressed by the undersigned that a speedy treatment is essential for war and nation.
With these organizational measures intended and already partially introduced by us of creating a "Rapid Special Court" which should also be technically equipped with everything necessary, and with the likely establishment at any time of a second court for matters of high treason in Kattowitz, the executions by the police still remain necessary as immediate actions against traitors, according to the chief councillor to the government Mildner, for the anti-German treasonal activity is supposed to have increased to such an extent that comparisons with the situation in 1917 and 1918 are already permissible, and that the criminals draw courage and power from the drawn-out legal trials of the traitors. The situation in the Kattowitz district is supposed to be especially difficult because there are 1-1/2 million Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 7,000 Jews among the 3 million population whose anti-German attitude is being joined in a remarkable way by more and more Germans in the last months. A further worsening of the situation is to be counted on if the war should last longer; for the Poles are said to be fanatically convinced of the victory of the Western countries and of a resurrection of their country, and, without inhibition, risk everything which does not seem to be punishable by death. The terrorist activity of the last few months does not appear to leave the Reich Germans in the Eastern occupied districts unimperilled. The slightest military set-back could result in immediate danger due to the growing and immediate terrorist readiness of the anti-German organizations. These are the reasons why the head of the state police considers as necessary immediate measures also in the field of high treason. If such steps could be taken by judicial means, this would seem also to him the best solution since the state police is already overburdened and suffering from considerable personnel shortage.
After this discourse we cannot help but have the impression that the situation, especially with respect to high treason (terrorist) activity has grown serious since the spring of 1941 and that special measures have to be taken to subdue same effectively. We pointed out to the head of the state police our insufficient competence in this field, but have informed him that we would report this matter to the Reich minister of justice.
In view of the great judicial importance of the mentioned problems for the district of the Kattowitz high county court, we deem an early personal discussion at Kattowitz necessary, and that the chief councillor to the government Mildner and perhaps a representative of the people's court and of the chief Reich prosecutor at the people's court should be taken into consultation.
(signed) Dr. Heimer
[illegible notes showing that the conference had taken place]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 675-PS
SECRET
Nationalsocialist German Workers Party Berlin--Wilhelm Str. 64 Munich, Brown House The Deputy of the Fuehrer
To the Reichminister for Justice, Attn: Ministerial office director Stadermann or his deputy
[Rubber stamp] Reichministry for Justice 25 August 1938,
Dept V Gst a, 16 Aug 1938, III D--Es, 3315/0/31--3604 Secret Berlin W 8 Wilhelmstrasse 65
_Subject_: Austrian Concordat Your letter of 23 May 1938--Va 146/38 Secret
I have purposely not taken a hand in the letters, which I have received from various Reichministers as well as from the Reichfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, since the Fuehrer's decision on that was known to me already in connection with a lecture by the Reichcommissioner for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich. I therefore have refrained to take a standpoint again to the questions, mentioned in your letter, and have requested the Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory in a letter of 29 June 1938, to inform you about the Fuehrer's decision. Therefore, the questions, as far as they concern the validity of the Austrian Concordat, are taken care of by the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory of 12 July 1938--Rk 276 B Secret.
However, in order to be able to take into account the general political considerations in the measures, probably planned for Austria for the execution of this decision of the Fuehrer, and to keep to the church-political line of the Fuehrer, I request from you, to get into contact at the proper time before taking action in these measures besides with the Reich Commissioner for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich, also with the Reich Minister for church affairs and with the Fuehrer's deputy.
Heil Hitler! By order /s/ BORMANN (M. BORMANN)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 680-PS
SECRET
The Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior
Berlin, 5 May 1938 NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6
Phone: Dept Z, I, II, V, VIII 11 00 27, IV, VI, VII (Unter den Linden 70--72) 12 00 34
Cable address: Reichsinnenminister Nr I 176/38, 1014 g
Urgent
To:
_a._ The Reich- and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, attention: Government Councillor [Regierungsrat] URLAUCH or his deputy in office.
_b._ The Foreign Office, attention: Councillor [AMTS- and HOFRAT] SCHIMPKE or his deputy in office.
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice, attention: Ministerial Office Director STADERMANN or his deputy in office.
_d._ The Reich Minister for Education, attention: Government Councillor [Regierungsrat] JAEHNERT or his deputy in office.
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer, attention: SS-Inspector KNOBLAUCH or his deputy in office.
_f._ The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German Police attention: SS 2nd Lt, Government Councillor Dr. TANZMANN or his deputy in office.
SUBJECT: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
The question of further validity of the Austrian Concordat (Konkordat) which has already been brought up by the Reich- and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs in his letters to the Foreign Office of 22 March 1938--II 1563/38--and of 26 March 1938--G II 1596/38--, is one of fundamental importance for a number of matters to be worked out by the central office for the execution of the reunion of Austria with the German Reich as well as other offices of the Reich and Austria concerned with it. This question has to be brought to a conclusive clarification immediately.
I deem the following conceptions possible:
The Concordat will not be considered as binding already for the reason that it has not at all been reached _within the framework of the constitution_.
The more detailed reasons for that are evident from the following:
1. The negotiations for conclusion of the Concordat had come to an end already on 5 June 1933, on which day the Concordat had been initialed in Vatican City.
Regardless of that, the Concordat was not submitted for further constitutional processing by the federal government of Austria for almost a whole year, because the National Council of Austria was considered suspended in accordance with the so-called "self-elimination" thesis represented by the federal government due to the resignation of all its three presidents, and beyond that, the acceptance of the Concordat could not be expected because of the majority relationships as they existed at that time within the National Council.
The constitutional processing, in accordance with article 50 of the federal constitutional law as provided for in the version of 1929 (RGBl Nr 1/1930), would have had to consist of the fact that the Concordat, being a political and law-changing treaty of the State, would have to be presented to the National Council for approval in order to attain its validity, in which connection the respective decision regarding the character of this State treaty, which simultaneously changes the constitution, can only be made in the presence of at least half of the members of the National Council with a majority of two thirds of the votes cast; besides, the decision of the National Council would have had to be submitted to further prescribed procedure (presentation to the Federal Council).
The Concordat was processed further only in conjunction with the development which led to the constitution of 1934, and that in the following manner:
While, up to that date, the repeatedly uttered request for another session of the National Council had always been opposed on the ground that it was impossible to convoke it because of the so-called "self-elimination program" and whilst, on the basis of this claim, one had governed by means of the enabling act for war economy which had originally been passed for certain exclusively economic purposes (RGBl. No. 307/1917), now all of a sudden, also based on this act, by a decree dated 24 April 1934 (RGBl. I No. 238/1934), the federal act concerning the rules of procedure of the National Council was amended to the effect that, although a president did not exist, the National Council was in a position to reassemble.
This procedure was absolutely unconstitutional. The Federal Government prevented through police power the attempt of the last-retired president of the National Council to revive this body by summoning the National Council anew in his capacity as the last president. On the other hand, the Federal Government had also constantly refused to use the possibility given by article 18, paragraph 3-5 of the Federal constitutional Law of 1929, to set the National Council going again through an emergency decree of the Federal president. Instead of this, in the meantime, all possible legal measures were based upon the enabling act for war economy, which was entirely contrary to the realm of authorization of this law and entirely against the constitution. An especially notorious abuse of the enabling act for war economy was the employment of the enabling act for war economy for the issuance of the aforementioned decree with which the rules of procedure of the National Council were changed.
As it turned out, the National Council summoned on this basis no longer had the composition with which it had emerged from the last elections; on the contrary it was only a rump-parliament, because all mandates of the Social Democratic Labor Party in the meantime were also declared void by a decree of February 16, 1934 (RGBl. I Nr 100/1934) also based upon the before-mentioned enabling act for war economy.
This rump-parliament assembled on 30 April 1934 for a conference in which solemn declarations were made by the Gross Deutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund--the two parties with outspoken National character--in which the constitutional legality of the whole procedure was expressly disputed, after which all delegates of the two named parties left the conference, with the exception of one delegate of the Landbund who at the same time was holding a public office, so that for the further discussions and resolutions only the before-mentioned one delegate of the Landbund and the delegates of the Christian-Social-Party and the Heimatschutz remained who together comprised only 76 delegates.
These 76 delegates now passed the so called Federal Constitutional Law concerning extraordinary measures within the jurisdiction of the constitution (RGBl. I Nr. 255/1934). Through Art. I of which the above mentioned decrees of Art. 50 of the Federal Constitutional Law of 1929 concerning the co-operation of the National Council in National treaties were cancelled. This constituted, in addition to the unconstitutional manner of the summons, a further very substantial violation of the constitution, in that--as has been mentioned already in the beginning--according to Art. 44, section 1, of the Federal Constitutional Law in the version of 1929, constitutional laws could only be passed in the presence of at least one half of the members of the National Council with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, but the National Council consisted, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the election rules of 165 delegates and therefore the presence of at least 83 delegates would have been required in order to pass upon a resolution changing the constitution.
After the federal constitutional law of 30 April 1934 had also been presented to the Federal Council which for the same reasons as the National Council, held sessions as a rump body, and it had issued no protest, it was announced yet on 30 April 1934, causing the day of its taking effect to be 1 May 1934.
Already during the night of 30 April to 1 May 1934, the exchange of ratifications prepared with the Papal Nuntio took place and already on the 1 May 1934 the concordat was made public in the federal gazette.
From the preceding explanation it is evident, that the Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria has been concluded under circumstances which offer the possibility to represent, with reasons which cannot be contradicted, the point of view that the conclusion of the Concordat was completely in violation of the constitution and therefore no legal validity can be attributed to the Concordat. In this respect it has to be noted that the fact that the Concordat was concluded in violation of the constitution was regarded as a fact already at that time in all serious judicial circles in Austria. (Compare in this respect particularly also the remarks referring to the Concordat made in the work of Guerke on "The Austrian Constitution of 1934" in the archive of public law, new edition, volume 25, page 178 pp.).
This point of view would open up the following additional path:
The Reich government declares to the Holy See on the basis of these facts that, after examining the legal angle, it had come to the conclusion that for the reason stated it could not recognize the Concordat any longer and is combining with that also with the effect "ex nunc" and with simultaneous legal settlement of the questions remaining unclarified through the abrogation of the Concordat, the abolition of the Austrian legal regulations referring to the Concordat (Federal law RGBl II, Nr. 8/1934 in the version of RGBl Nr. 134/1935 and decree RGBl II Nr. 13/1934).
2. The Concordat has expired automatically, through the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, because Austria has vanished as independent state, has obtained the constitutional position of a German state and therefore lost the position as a subject of international law. This point of view which by reason of logic can surely only be taken _retroactive to 13 March 1938_, would be based more exactly on the following:
Within the international legal sphere there is no general legal succession of the territorial successor into the rights and duties of the territorial predecessor. It rather has to be scrutinized in each case separately, whether a legal succession in accordance with international law occurs. With the fall of the territorial predecessor, the bilateral state treaties concluded by him are as a rule void. However some exceptions to this principle are recognized: National practice has shown that state treaties will be renewed tacitly by the territorial successor simply by administering them further. But a new state may also be forced, in order to obtain desired recognition, to take over certain state treaties. A general _duty in accordance with international law_ for the fulfillment of obligations resulting from treaties made by the territorial predecessor, exists, however, only in the following cases: As a rule, state treaties which concern the territory of the state taken over as such, that is, so-called "ratifizierte" treaties (border treaties, treaties on rivers and roads of communication), will also fall to the territorial successor. Furthermore, those Concordats which have in accordance with customary law found recognition beyond the sphere of the partners of the treaty, will also be valid for the territorial successor. Lastly, rules can be established through a collective treaty which determines a certain order for a group of states. Those norms also remain in effect in case of territorial changes within that group and therefore also fall to the territorial successor. (Compare Verdross, international law 1937, Page 71.)
The following additional consequences would be combined with the conceptions mentioned above:
To 1: The establishment of the unconstitutional conclusion of the Concordat would first of all represent a strong moral verdict against the whole past system connected with the names Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, which could be politically very desirable for various reasons.
The attitude of the Reich government toward the other bilateral State treaties signed by Austria would not be prejudiced as no other state treaty of more importance was signed under the same circumstances as the Concordat. One would prefer this procedure in the expected discussions with other countries, some of which (Jugoslavia, Poland, England) have already referred to their stipulated rights in Austria.
The declaration that the Concordat will not be acknowledged on the grounds of unconstitutionality and the repeal of the connected Austrian legal provisions with "ex nunc" effect would not influence the validity of the legal acts based on the Concordat (especially on the field of matrimonial law as to states rights). An express legalization of the past is therefore not required.
Furthermore one could arrive at the point where the conception could be maintained that former Austrian territory, in contrast to remaining Reich territory, had become entirely free of the Concordat, an interpretation which would be especially unwelcome to the Holy See for various reasons, and would force open the entire question of the future relationship between the Reich and the Holy See with all the resulting consequences in favor of the Reich in eventual further conferences with the Holy See.
To 2: On a former occasion the church adopted this point of view, as the Reich- and Prussian Minister for church affairs has already pointed out in his letter to the Foreign Office of 22 March 1938.
Thus in a statement to the secret consistory of 21 November 1921 Pope Benedict XV discussed the question of the validity and tenure of the Concordats, since retroactive effects had arisen from the changes in state territories and organizations produced by the world war. Therein the Pope distinguished between countries which were newly created, countries with considerable territorial expansion, and countries which have changed so completely that they could not be considered the same "moral person". According to Pope Benedict XV opinion all these three classes of countries have "lost their privileges granted in former Concordats". It is quite evident, that Austria, after it became a part of the German Reich since March 13, 1938, cannot be considered the "same moral person" as before.
It has not yet been decided how the bilateral Austrian state Treaties of noneconomical nature which have been listed in the letter of the Foreign Office of April 6, 1938--R VII. 38 will be handled. One cannot yet perceive whether the Reich will take over one or the other of these treaties. This would no doubt be made use of by the Holy See to insist on the succession of the Reich as to the Austrian Concordat. On the other hand application of the theory of international law relating to succession of states as discussed above may lead to unnecessary suspicions in other cases, in which the Reich intends to bring about a peaceful solution with the other partner to the agreement.
If one is of the opinion that the Austrian Concordat is abolished by the actual reunion of Austria with the Reich then the question comes up whether, on account of the same fact of territorial expansion, the Concordat of the Reich logically would have to be regarded as applying to Austria too.
The Reich Concordat was, as far as I know, not expressly extended to the Saar-District, after the reembodiment of the latter into Germany; there can be no doubt, however, that the Reich Concordat has formal validity in the Saar-District today. Even though the Saar-District unlike the Federal State of Austria--had not concluded a Concordat of its own with the Holy See prior to its reembodiment, there can be no doubt as to the former independent legal competence in accordance with international law of the Saar-District. In view of a comparison with the Saar-District and the possible conclusion to be drawn with regard to Austria it seems advisable not to claim the expiration of the Concordat on the grounds that the Austrian independent state has ceased to exist.
The Austrian Concordat however, has established very incisive regulations in the sphere of matrimonial law as pointed out by the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, according to which the Canon Law alone is competent for marriages of Catholics; this law has the validity of a civil law; the publishing of bans and the laying down of obstacles to matrimony are stipulated according to Canon Law; Catholic Church authorities and law courts are competent for matrimonial affairs; the parson is a registrar at the same time. Should the Concordat therefore be considered as having expired as of March 13, 1938 a number of most complicated legal questions would arise; in particular the question as to what legal validity should be given to catholic matrimonies concluded in Austria after March 13, 1938 and which other legal consequences are to be considered as connected with such matrimonies. It would be regrettable should one have to draw the conclusion that legal acts based on the expired Concordat had subsequently to be sanctioned by the state.
On weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the two conceptions both of which can be supported by good legal arguments I should like to speak in favour of the conception explained under 1.
I shall be glad if you will inform me of your opinion about the question raised by May 15, 1938. I am quite aware of the fact that in view of its great political importance the decision can only be made by the Fuehrer and Reich chancellor.
After receipt of your communication I reserve the right to summon a conference.
Signed: Frick
* * * * *
SECRET
D. RM.d.J. Berlin, May 13, 1938 _Special Delivery_
To The REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR c/o Ministerialrat Dr. Hoche
_Subject_: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
_Re_: Communication of the 5th of this month TO THE OFFICE May 14, 1938 signed: Templev(?)5/14/
Nr. 1-176/38 1014 g; Despatched May 14, 1938 signed: Templev [?] Not later than today
Your communication, as per description on the margin was received here on the 9th of May. Considering the importance a proper handling of this matter carries for the official business under my jurisdiction I shall be unable to announce a final statement before the 15th of this month.
I therefore request that the time allotted me for a reply to the communication be tacitly extended to May 25.
for the office 5/14/38, 10 o'clock I.V.
EK.
(S) [Illegible] Final regulation of 5/23/38 with V a 146/38 g page 13 V a 138/38 g
* * * * *
V a 138/38 g
1. _Note_: Of the 4 spare copies which were procured I have given one to Ministerialrat Ficker and at the same time one to KGR Kaulbach because of the question of canonical law and at the same time for the minister.
Ministerialrat Ruppert, who has already offered a preliminary opinion, wants to express his conclusive opinion at a later date, since, he will presumably not be present by the end of the week, because of his vacation.
The report on the matter will probably be made to Secretary of State, Dr. Schlegelberger's, on Saturday the 21st, the report to the minister's on the 23rd of May. The matter should be fully prepared by that time.
2. The office is requested to refer on Monday May 16 the occurrences, including any opinions of the Ministries concerned to Min-Rat Dr. Kriege who is handling the matter.
Berlin, May 14, 1938
Presented upon arrival from the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs on May 11, 1938.
The 4 duplicates have been placed in the file of papers to be destroyed.
* * * * *
To: Mr. Kriege, Counsellor of the Ministry of Interior, respectfully submitted:
Mr. Thees has asked me to give my opinion on the letter of the Ministry of Interior, dated 5.5, regarding the Austrian Concordat, insofar as the letter pertains to my sphere.
With regard to the reform work in the field of matrimonial law and, in close connection with it, the creation of a uniform matrimonial law for Greater Germany, two points are of decisive importance:
_a._ The Concordat must not offer any impediment as soon as this matrimonial law comes into force.
_b._ The legislation for the execution of the Concordat, namely the law of 4.5.1934, has to remain in force until this time.
This result, decisive for any further action, cannot be achieved, in my opinion, on the basis of the first proposal of the Ministry of Interior. If the Concordat were null and void on account of unconstitutionality, then the same would apply to the legislation for its execution; the marriages based on the law of 4.5.1934 would be void and would have to be sanctioned with retroactive force. It is not clear to me how, on the basis of this reasoning, the Ministry of Interior can achieve a non-retroactive result in the nullification (p. 5).
There remains, therefore, the second solution proposed by the Ministry of Interior. If the Concordat excludes state succession, it seems to me, nevertheless, that the expiration of the law of 4.5.1934 does not result with effective date of 13.3.38. Even if an international pact expires, it seems to me that the legislation for the execution would bind the subjects until it was abrogated by an act of the state. The statements on page 9 of the letter are inaccurate insofar as the marriages which were contracted after 13.3 were not contracted by virtue of the expired Concordat, but by virtue of the law of 4.5.1934. Accordingly, it seems to me that continuing effect of the law of 4.5.1934 can be achieved in this way.
/S/ Ficker 18/5
* * * * *
SECRET
Reich and Prussian Ministry for Church Affairs Berlin W.8., 3, Leipzigerstrasse, 11th May 1938 [stamp] Reich Ministry of Justice, 13th May 1938. Sect. V. Re: Austrian Concordat. Communication of the Reich Minister of the Interior, May 5, 1938 I 176/38 1014 g Va 138/38g (Contents noted for the Minister)
The question whether the Austrian Concordat should be considered by the Reich Government as having been illegal and invalid from the very start, or as having been abolished by the revolution or whether it should be expressly cancelled can not be decided from a legal point of view but has to be decided from a political point of view.
This political decision can only be taken by the Fuehrer. Suggestions to this effect will be made to him by the Ministers competent in questions of foreign policy and of church affairs, i.e., by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Minister for Church Affairs, who have already contacted each other for this purpose.
Also the question of the Reich Concordats to Austria (which, by the way, is utterly unbearable) is not a legal but a political matter. The question of the continuation of the Reich Concordat and of the "state"--Concordats is connected with this problem. Here, too, the decision rests with the Fuehrer.
With regard to the execution of the necessary laws in Austria, resp. to the introduction of Reich laws in Austria the only decisive factor is the political interest of the Reich, whereby the Austrian Concordat will be considered as non-existent.
Signed: KERRL.
To:
_a._ The Reich Minister of the Interior
_b._ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice
_d._ The Reich Minister of Education
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer
_f._ The Reich Leader of SS troops and Chief of the German Police
_g._ The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery
(In connection with a 146/38g) Va- 139/38g
* * * * *
SECRET
The Reich and Prussian Minister of Education, etc. Berlin W8, May 17, 1938 Z II a Nr. 10074 Geh/38 Reich Ministry of Justice May 18, 1938 Dept. V Off. a
In reference to the communication of May 5, 1938--I 176/38, 1014 g, V a 138/38 g, re: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
I agree with your conception in the final analyses.
The Austrian concordat did not--according to your arguments--enter into a due constitutional existence and is therefore without legal effect. However, in contradistinction to your arguments, I believe it correct to assume that the treaty was void from the beginning (ab initio) and not from now on. Therefore all legal acts which have taken place up to the day of establishment of invalidity of the Austrian concordat would have to be sanctioned retroactively.
Looking at both possibilities, as presented by you, the Austrian concordat is void ab initio, in the first case as represented by you and also by me from the very beginning, in the second case from March 13, 1938 on. For legal considerations, in both cases, the subsequent sanctioning of any legal acts, carried out meanwhile, is absolutely required.
By registered mail.
1. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Attention: Min. Buerodirektor Stoppel or acting deputy.
2a. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister for Church Affairs, Attention Regierungsrat Urlacher or acting deputy.
b. The Foreign Deputy Office, Attention Amts- and Hofrat Schimpke or acting deputy.
c. Reich Minister of Justice, Attention Min. Buerodirektor Stadermann or acting deputy.