Chapter VII on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.)

As if to indorse the methods by which this legislation was enacted, von Papen personally signed the Amnesty Decree of 21 March 1933, liberating all persons who had committed murder between 30 January and 21 March 1933 against anti-Nazi politicians, writers, and Reichstag Deputies (_2059-PS_).

Von Papen participated in this program notwithstanding the fact that he foresaw at that time the implications of granting to Hitler the complete powers conferred by the Enabling Act. He has so testified (in an interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 September 1945):

“Q. After Hitler became Chancellor, when for the first time did you have any doubts about the wisdom of having allowed him to become Chancellor?

“A. Well, that’s difficult to say. I mean the first doubt certainly I had when the Reichstag gave in to his request for the law, to enable him to rule the country without parliament.”

(4) _Von Papen not only participated in the seizure by the cabinet of supreme power for the Nazis, but as a member of the cabinet participated in the systematic elimination of all potential enemies of the Nazi conspiracy._ The Reichstag fire and the ensuing suppression of civil liberties marked the beginning of the destruction of all rival political parties. The immediate elimination of the legally elected Communist members from the Reichstag was merely the forerunner of the rapid and complete liquidation of all political parties other than the National Socialists (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_; _2058-PS_; _1388-PS_). By these measures the suppression of all democratic opposition became complete, within one year of the time when von Papen was warning his countrymen of the dangers of authoritarianism.

Having substituted the autocracy of the Hitler cabinet for the democratic force of the Reichstag, the cabinet proceeded immediately to enact a series of laws abolishing the states and coordinating them with the Reich (_2004-PS_; _2005-PS_; _2006-PS_). The enactment of these laws, which had been clearly indicated by point 25 of the Party program, removed all possible retarding influences which the German federal States might have exerted against the overwhelming centralization of power in Hitler’s Reich Cabinet.

The importance of this step, as well as the role played by Papen, is reflected in an exchange of letters between Reichs President Hindenburg, von Papen in his capacity as Reichskommissar for Prussia, and Reichs Minister Goering. The exchange occurred in connection with the recall of the Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post of Minister President of Prussia. In tendering his resignation, on 7 April 1933, von Papen wrote to Hitler:

“With the draft of the law for the coordination of the states with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor, legislative work has begun which will be of historical significance for the political development of the German state. The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the time, is now crowned by this new inter-locking of the Reich. You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister I ask you to inform the Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reichs Commissar for Prussia.” (_3357-PS_)

In transmitting this resignation request to President Hindenburg, Hitler stated:

“Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich and the states [_Laender_].

“On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of Reich governors [_Reichs-Statthalter_] was adopted, Herr von Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full time services in the Reich Government.

“Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, has rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States. His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the great help I shall thus receive.

“For profound reverence, “A.H.” (_3357-PS_)

The enactment of this legislation followed repeated declarations in which Papen had warned his countrymen of the dangers of the exaggerated degree of centralized authority which would result from abolition of the federal system. These warnings began before Hitler’s accession to power and continued by implication in the reassurances which Papen gave in February 1933 to Bavarian political leaders who expressed their fears of Nazi centralized authority (_Cuno Horkenbach, Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute._ (The German Reich from 1918 until today) (Berlin 1933), p. 44). As late as 3 March 1933, in an election speech at Stuttgart, von Papen warned that:

“Federalism saves us from centralism, that organizational form which concentrically draws all the vital forces of a people to one point, as a mirror will do with the rays of the sun. No people is less suited for being governed centralistically than the German people.” (_3313-PS_)

Less than one month after its seizure of the legislative power, the cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted the first of a series of laws aimed at establishing firm Nazi control over the entire civil service and judiciary (_2012-PS_; _1400-PS_; _1398-PS_). Having been a public servant himself, von Papen was aware of the far-reaching effect of these first legislative and administrative steps in attaining full totalitarian control over the entire governmental machinery of Germany.

The cabinet of which von Papen was a member embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews. The first organized act in this program was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April 1933, which was approved by the entire cabinet. This was followed by a series of laws beginning the systematic elimination of the Jews from public and professional life in Germany. (See Section 7 of Chapter VII on the Program for Persecution of Jews.)

All these suppressive measures were in line with long-standing basic objectives of the NSDAP to which von Papen had agreed in his January conference with Hitler and von Schroeder.

(5) _To complete its suppression of all rival influences, the Cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted a series of decrees which strengthened the Nazi movement by conferring upon it a para-governmental status._ Followers of the Party, through a decree signed personally by von Papen, were granted amnesty “for penal acts committed in the material revolution of the German People, in its preparation of the fight for the German soil” (_2059-PS_). The perpetrators of Nazi terrorism were thereby placed above the law, and a pattern was established for the subsequent handling of Nazi excesses.

This cabinet enacted measures which gave legal protection to the status and symbols of the Party and its formations (_1652-PS_; _2759-PS_).

This cabinet enacted a series of measures to assure the Nazi movement’s spiritual control over Germany (_2029-PS_; _2030-PS_; _2415-PS_; _2083-PS_; _2078-PS_; _2088-PS_).

Having first outlawed all political parties other than the NSDAP, the cabinet of which von Papen was a member formally decreed that:

“1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution, the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the concept of the German State and is inseparably the state.

“2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be determined by the Fuehrer.” (_1395-PS_).

Having granted para-governmental status to the Nazi party, and having assured legal unity of the Party’s Fuehrer and the Reich’s Chancellor, the Nazis next step was to combine in the same person the Presidency of the German Reich. This was accomplished by merging the offices of President and Chancellor, by means of a decree signed by von Papen (_2003-PS_). An important consequence of this law was to give to Hitler the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a perquisite of the Presidency (_2050-PS_).

(6) _Despite disagreements as to detail, von Papen fundamentally agreed with basic Nazi objectives and publicly endorsed the regime for which he shared responsibility as Vice Chancellor._ Von Papen’s basic political philosophy was not so divergent from Nazism as to preclude an easy bridging of the gap. In 1932, while still Chancellor, von Papen had been willing to head a government in which Nazism would be strongly represented. By January 1933 he found it possible—as a price for his restoration to a position of public prominence—to submerge his differences with Hitler and to direct his energies to the installation of a Nazi regime (see B above).

In addition to his participation as a cabinet member in the process of Nazifying Germany, von Papen’s devotion to the Nazi cause was repeatedly demonstrated throughout this period by public statements and acts both by himself and by Hitler. Thus, as noted above in connection with his role in the elimination of the _Laender_ as a political force, von Papen wrote Hitler in April 1933, that

“You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich,”

And Hitler on that occasion took notice of Papen’s services by declaring that

“His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the great help I shall thus receive.” (_3357-PS_).

And again on 2 November 1933, speaking from the same platform with Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for Reichstag election and the referendum on Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, von Papen declared:

“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the national socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of taking over the chancellorship have advocated to pave the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved field marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:

“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distress a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and weaknesses, through all crisis and moments of danger, with the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.”

* * * * * *

“Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that we believe in him and his work.” (_3375-PS_).

By this time as noted above, the cabinet of which Papen was a member had abolished the civil liberties which were a condition to any effective protest against Nazism, had sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Nazism’s seizure of power, had substituted itself for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-making authority, had destroyed all rival political parties, had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the political influence of the _Laender_, had provided the legislative basis for purging the civil service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, had embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews, had legislated Nazi influence into the cultural life of the German nation, and had taken its first steps toward conferring a para-governmental status upon the Nazi party and its principal formations.

Even after von Papen’s Marburg speech of June 1934, in which he again showed some understanding of the dangers of Nazism, he remained a pillar of Nazi policy and influence. Thus Hitler himself, in attempting to justify the Blood Purge of 30 June 1934, tacitly admitted that Papen was still considered a loyal member of the regime:

“The allegations [of foreign newspapers] that Vice-Chancellor von Papen, Reichsminister Seldte, or other gentlemen of the Reich Cabinet had entertained connections with the rebels is refuted by the fact that one of the first intentions of the rebels was to assassinate these men.” (_Hitler Reichstag_ address, 18 July 1934, as quoted in _Das Archiv_, Vol. IV, pp. 495, 507.)

The Fuehrer thus made a tacit bid for the continuing loyalty of von Papen. Von Papen’s subsequent career demonstrated that this was not a vain expectation. He left the vice-chancellorship only to assume the new task of special emissary of the Fuehrer to Austria. But before leaving, while still Vice Chancellor, von Papen signed the decree combining the positions of President and Reichs Chancellor on 1 August 1934, and on 5 August 1934 he delivered the document—the so-called Hindenburg Testament—which purported to confer the revered president’s dying blessing upon Hitler and the Nazi regime (_Notice concerning delivery of Hindenburg’s testament by Vice Chancellor von Papen, Das Archiv_, Vol. V, page 648).

D. _AS GERMANY’S MOST FAMOUS CATHOLIC LAYMAN AND AS NEGOTIATOR OF THE VATICAN CONCORDAT, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY AND IN NAZI PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION._

(1) _Immediately upon Nazi seizure of power within Germany, von Papen endeavored to weld German Catholicism into a powerful body of support for the Nazi state._ When Naziism seized control of Germany in January 1933, its relations with the church were at a low ebb. The period of the Reichstag elections of July and November 1932 was marked by certain widely circulated anti-Nazi pronouncements of the German bishops, especially in such Catholic papers as _Germania_, _Koelnische Volkszeitung_, and the _Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung_. These bishops discerned the fundamental incompatibility between the Church and the Nazis’ own declarations of State policy. They accordingly publicly stigmatized the Nazi movement as anti-Christian, forbade the Catholic clergy to participate in any ceremonies (such as funerals) in which the Nazi Party was officially represented, refused the sacraments to Party officials, and in several pastorals expressly warned the faithful against the danger to German Catholicism created by the Party (_3389-PS_).

Immediately upon seizure of power, the main concern of the new regime was to liquidate political opposition. Achievement of this objective was predicated upon the strategy of “divide and rule”. A first step in this strategy was to convince conservatives that the efforts of the government were being directed primarily against the Communists and other forces of the extreme Left, and that their own interests would remain safe in Nazi hands as long as they would consent to refrain from political activity. The result was a brief but active period of rapprochement between Church and Party. Von Papen was a leader in this strategy. The minutes of the Reich cabinet meeting of 15 March 1933 contain the following notation in connection with discussions on the Enabling Act:

“The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State of Prussia said it is of decisive importance to integrate into the new State the masses standing behind the Parties. He said that the question of coordination of political Catholicism into the new State is of special importance.” (_2962-PS_)

Eight days later, speaking at the second meeting of the Reichstag of 1933, on 23 March 1933, Hitler asked for adoption of the Enabling Act. In this speech he declared:

“While the government is determined to carry through the political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The government will treat all other denominations with equal objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded as license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and State.” (_3387-PS_).

The immediate effect of this assurance was action by the conference of German bishops, meeting in Fulda on 28 March 1933. This conference lifted restrictions imposed on members of the church adhering to the Nazi movement. In a cautious statement which placed full faith and credit in the Papen-inspired Hitler assurances, the bishops declared:

“The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their dutiful anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and protect the untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic Church have adopted, for profound reasons, during the last years, an oppositional attitude toward the National Socialist movement, through prohibitions and warnings, which was to be in effect as long and as far as those reasons remained valid.

“It must now be recognized that there are official and solemn declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich Government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the teachings of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and rights of the church, and which expressly assure the full value of the legal pacts concluded between the various German States and the Church.

“Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious and ethical errors implied in our previous measures, the Episcopate now believes it can entertain the confidence that those prescribed general prohibitions and warnings may not be regarded as necessary any more.” (_3389-PS_)

This action opened the door for mass Party adherence by practicing Catholics. All those German Catholics who were inclined to adopt Nazi political views and had hesitated only because of the anti-Nazi attitude of the hierarchy hastened now to join the victorious party of the “National Revolution”. This tendency was marked by a tremendous and sudden burst of activity by the so-called “bridge-builders,” who rushed to close the gap between the Church and the Nazi State. Von Papen, who only a short time before had been willing to use armed force to suppress the Nazis, was foremost among these “bridge-builders”, who not only claimed an ideological affinity between the Nazi system and the alleged anti-liberal character of Catholic politics, but affirmatively apologized for excesses of the State which even then had begun to shock the world.

Existing agencies were used for this purpose. Thus, the Union of Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), of which von Papen was president, insisted in its program that the church, like the Nazi movement itself, was guided by the leadership principle (Cuno Horkenbach, _Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute_ (The German Reich from 1918 Until Today) (Berlin 1935), pp. 436, 504). The same organization, in the course of the election campaign which preceded adoption of the Enabling Act, had bitterly criticized the Catholic political opposition to Marxism and urged that Catholics “by all means vote unanimously the National Socialist ticket”, because “We Catholics do not wish to be denied to march in the lead in this election campaign” (Election Appeal, _Voelkischer Beobachter_, 23 February 1933, p. 2). Later, on the eve of the Nazis’ first anti-Jewish boycott, this same organization played its part in the extensive campaign replying to foreign newspaper reports concerning atrocities committed against German Jews. On 1 April 1933 it published through the Prussian News Service, an “Appeal to all Christians”, viewing “with great indignation” this “irresponsible campaign against Germany” which “continues in spite of official German declarations and corrections”. This “Appeal” characterized the foreign reports as “intentional lies and falsifications” and “a reckless, crafty campaign of destruction conducted by the Jewish world alliance and moneyed powers against the right of self-determination of all peoples and against the entire Christian civilization”. It called upon “the Christians of all countries, irrespective of denominations, to form a world-wide front of defense against that Jewish conspiracy disturbing the true peace” (“_Appeal to All Christians_”, _Voelkischer Beobachter_ (People’s Observer), 30 March 1933, p. 2).

Notwithstanding the force of these activities, this Nazification by existing agencies was not deemed adequate to the task of organizing Catholic lay support. The result was the creation, in early April 1933, under the sponsorship of von Papen, of a new “Bund” of Catholic Germans called “Cross and Eagle” (“_Kreuz und Adler_”) which made it its task “to contribute enthusiastic devotion to the upbuilding of the future Reich” (Gerd Ruehle, _Das Dritte Reich_ (The Third Reich), p. 250).

This whole program of rapprochement between Church and Party manifests the Papen “touch”—the same quality of handiwork which had manifested itself in Hitler’s accession to power and which later was to reappear in Austria: First, gentle hints by Papen as to strategy, followed within eight days by reassurances in Hitler’s Reichstag speech. Next, again following merely by days, the formal lifting of the restrictions on Nazi membership by the leaders of the Church of which von Papen was the most famous lay member. Finally, again within a few days, the open campaign by which Papen-sponsored organizations endeavoured to align Church and Party. The close timing of these events was not a coincidence.

(2) _Having achieved initial successes in consolidating Catholic support within Germany, von Papen undertook international consolidation of Nazi-Church relationships by negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican._ The program of rapprochement and the public declarations bridging the gap between the Church and the Nazi movement were merely advertising media by which Nazi-minded Catholics were herded into the movement, and slogans by which the conspirators might placate the Catholic hierarchy. Throughout this period there continued an undercurrent of anti-Catholic activity. A thorough job was done in purging Reich, state, and municipal administrations of officials appointed for their adherence to the Centre or Bavarian People’s parties. Former leaders of those parties, including priests, joined Communists and Social Democrats in the concentration camps, and the campaign of hatred against the “black” was resumed. By April 1933 the bishops were making appeals for clemency toward former civil servants, who, they pointed out, were not able to join the celebration of national awakening because they had been dismissed from positions in which they had given their best to the community of the German people. And on 31 May 1933, a meeting of the Bavarian bishops adopted a solemn statement directed against the tendency of attributing to the State alone the right of educating, organizing, and leading ideologically the German youth (_Dismissal of Catholics_, Excerpts from _Voelkischer Beobachter_, February-March 1933; _Excerpt, Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 April 1933 (Munich ed.), p. 2).

By this maintenance of a certain amount of pressure against Catholic interests, the hierarchy was reminded of the dangers of not coming to a definite agreement with the Nazi State. The stage was thus set for von Papen’s negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican.

At the time of these activities, the government of which von Papen was Vice Chancellor had already launched its program to mold the state machinery into the Nazi image. The Enabling Act had become law, and the general outlines of the Nazi State were already manifest. Notwithstanding the doubts created in his mind by Hitler’s insistence upon the Enabling Act, von Papen undertook negotiations with the Vatican. In fact, he since has claimed that these fears gave rise to the negotiation of the Concordat (Interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 Sept. 1945):

“I became alarmed, you remember, somewhere in June when I went to Rome to negotiate a concordat because I certainly feared that the particular powers of the Hitler Party would create difficulties on the religious side. So that with the consent of Hitler I went to Rome to make that concordat.”

It is clear, however, that these alleged fears of the Enabling Act were not fears at all. They were merely an understanding of the threat they carried to all persons and instrumentalities antagonistic to the Nazi system. Von Papen understood the significance of these developments. What he actually feared was that the rest of the world would also understand Nazi methods and would erect barriers to the consummation of the plans of the conspirators. The situation plainly called for a neutralizing of these potential barriers to Nazi plans. One method of achieving this result at that time was the negotiation of solemn agreements whereby other powers would commit themselves to a policy of non-intervention by either armed or moral force.

When von Papen concluded the Concordat with the Vatican, the political objectives of furthering the purposes of the Nazi conspiracy were thus foremost in his mind. Even at that time, in the first half of 1933, von Papen had in mind, in concluding this Concordat, not only the consolidation of Catholicism behind the Nazi regime within Germany, but also the psychological build-up of the Austrians in preparation for Anschluss. Von Papen’s own words eloquently characterize these manoeuvres (monograph entitled “Austria” written at Nurnberg, 1945):

“Although the ‘_Heimwehr_’ movement [in Austria] had brought these patriotic elements together before this, and had fought with them to free the country from strong Socialistic pressure, yet they were armed only from the standpoint of domestic politics and remained aloof from all ambitions for a greater Germany. The cause lay mostly in the Catholic nature of the country, and in the strong influence of the clergy in political leadership. The Reich was considered a bulwark of Protestantism, despite its twenty million Catholics. The anti-clerical wave, which was dominant in the Reich under the leadership of Prussia, itself led by Socialists, appeared to have verified the fears of the Austrian clergy. For in spite of Catholics at the head of the Reich—Wirth, Marx, Bruening—the Centre Party had always put through its cultural demands by logrolling with the Socialists. There were at least two Socialist officials, university professors or teachers for every Catholic appointee. In contrast to the obviously badly functioning Weimar Constitution, there was an effort in Austria, under clerical leadership and with the strong support of the Vatican, to develop into a corporate state.

“Those were serious obstacles on both sides. When, after the seizure of power of the NSDAP in 1933, as the first remedy against a new ‘_Kulturkampf_’, I safely concluded the Concordat of the New Reich with the Holy See, my thoughts at the time were not focused only on the Reich. For a peaceful evolution of the German-Austrian question it was of the greatest importance that the doubts of the clergy on the Austrian side be completely eliminated.”

* * * * * *

“It was my first purpose in the diplomatic field to deprive the Austrian problem of its European character, and to develop it gradually into an exclusively internal problem between the Reich and Austria.

“It therefore had to be my primary aim to convince the Vatican that a union could not endanger the Vatican’s interests. A Concordat of the Reich with the Vatican had been my first attempt to prevent religious difficulties arising from Nazism’s revolutionary doctrine; the attempt had obviously failed. Under the growing influence of his Party, Hitler sabotaged the Concordat. Rome was deeply disappointed and in the greatest excitement.”

On 20 July 1933 the Reich Concordat with the Vatican was signed by von Papen as representative of the Nazi Government of Germany. This instrument was an international treaty which purported to give the church an official guarantee of all the church rights it had sought. In addition it purported to confer freedom for Catholic organizations, maintenance of parochial schools, and preservation of the general influence of the church on the education of the German Catholic youth. Among the 33 articles of the Concordat, 21 treated exclusively the rights and prerogatives accorded to the church. Reciprocation consisted only in a pledge of loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and a promise that Catholic religious instruction would emphasize the patriotic duties of the Christian citizen and insist on a loyal attitude toward the Fatherland. Since it had always been the practice of the Catholic church to abide by established governments and to promote patriotic convictions among the faithful, these stipulations of the Concordat were no more than legalizations of an existing custom. They were no more than a guarantee of goodwill betokening harmonious Church-State relations (_2655-PS_).

(3) _The signing of the Concordat was only an interlude in the church policy of the Nazi Conspirators, which was a policy of reassurances and repression._ The signing of the Concordat merely marked the beginning of evasions and violations of both its spirit and letter. The ink was hardly dry before it became necessary for the Vatican to complain about a false interpretation of the text, made by the Nazi government in its own favour. (See Section 6 of Chapter VII on Suppression of the Christian Churches.)

By action taken only ten days after the signing of the Concordat, and despite its provision for the continuance of the Catholic Youth Association, simultaneous membership in the Hitler Jugend and the Catholic Youth Association was forbidden, and the campaign to smash the latter organization thereby commenced (_2456-PS_).

These first steps were merely a foretaste of a long series of violations which were to commence almost immediately and eventually to result in papal denunciation and serious excesses committed against the clergy (_3280-PS_).

The continuing character of the conspirators’ church policy—and of von Papen’s participation in it—is further revealed by von Papen’s action of 19 September 1934, when, as president of the Union of Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), he ordered dissolution of this organization. By this time the Nazis were dropping all pretext that rival organizations might be permitted to exist, and were well along in their plans for the integration of all German institutions into the Nazi system. The official published announcement of dissolution is a revealing document:

“Since the Reich Party Leadership through its department for spiritual peace increasingly and immediately administers all cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.

“Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the Dissolution of this organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the attitude of the national socialist State toward the Christian and Catholic Church had been explained often and inequivocally through the leader and chancellor himself.” (_3376-PS_).

E. _AS ENVOY AT VIENNA, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND INFLUENCE DELIBERATELY TO WEAKEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA._

(1) _Von Papen accepted appointment as envoy at Vienna knowing he would “front” for a Nazi fifth column in Austria._ In July 1934, the Austrian policy of the Nazi government of Germany was in bad odor throughout the civilized world. The historical record of this period was written in the newspaper headlines of the day. A period of Nazi pressure and terror culminated on 25 July 1934 in an attempted revolutionary putsch, the murder of the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, in which the German Minister, Reith, was implicated. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) The situation was such as to call for removal of the German Minister, Reith, and for the prompt substitution of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods, but who could lend an aura of respectability to official German representation in Vienna. Hitler’s reaction was immediate. He chose von Papen as quickly as he heard the news of the Dollfuss murder. Writing of this event in 1945 after his arrest by Allied authorities, von Papen dramatically describes the Fuehrer’s response to the situation (monograph on “Austria” referred to above):

“Suddenly, at three o’clock in the morning, there was a loud ringing of my doorbell. SS men demanded admission. My son and I were of the opinion that I was going to be imprisoned. We went to the front door armed with pistols. Our suspicions were unfounded. The SS men declared that they had come from the Chancellery with the order to put through a telephone connection between Hitler and myself.

“Hitler was in Bayreuth and had been trying for hours without success to get in touch with me. The connection was made.

“Hitler started, ‘You know of course what has happened in Vienna. You must go there immediately and try to set things in order.’

“I replied, ‘I have no idea what has happened in Vienna. I have just returned from the country and I don’t understand what you want with me in Vienna. I am in the act of packing my trunk to leave Berlin once and for all.’

“Hitler, highly excited, gave thereupon a short description of the dramatic events in Vienna which led to the murder of Dollfuss, and continued, ‘You are the only person who can save the situation. I implore you to carry out my request.’”

As a result of this telephone call, von Papen flew immediately to join Hitler at Bayreuth. There it was clear that the Nazi leadership feared international repercussions from their Austrian policy and felt themselves in dire need of a respectable “front” man. Von Papen has described this meeting:

“There I found Hitler and his entire entourage, excited as an ant-hill. It was difficult to get anything approaching an exact picture of the Vienna ‘_Putsch_’ and the role of Hitler’s promoters. Even if one had come into this gathering in complete ignorance of the different circumstances involved, one could have gathered with one look that they had a very bad conscience and now were fearing the consequences. From the very first moment I was certain that the immoderate policy of the Austrian NSDAP under the leadership of Hitler’s condottiere, Habig, had led to this coup d’etat.

“This was, then, a few days after the 30 June, the second bloody excess of the Party which had promised to bring Germany by peaceful means to social tranquility, welfare, and respect. It was obvious that both events had made a deep impression on the entire world, and that the governmental methods of the Party must damage most seriously the political credit of the Reich”.

At this meeting it was Papen himself who drafted the letter of appointment. This letter was a masterpiece of deceit, calculated to conceal completely Hitler and Papen’s goal of annexation. It stated:

“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest to the Reichs-President the removal of the German Minister to Vienna, Dr. Reith, from his post, because he, at the suggestion of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels respectively consented to an agreement made by both these parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government. Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason.

“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly channels.

“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take over this important task, just because you have possessed and continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.

“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President that you, upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to me.

“Thanking once more for all that you have at a time done for the coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and since then together with us for Germany, I remain.” (_2799-PS_).

The actual mission of von Papen was stated more frankly, shortly after his arrival in Vienna, in the course of a private conversation with the American Minister, George S. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith has described this meeting:

“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation’. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.” (_1760-PS_)

(2) _Von Papen proceeded forthwith to accomplish his mission—the maintenance of an outward appearance of non-intervention while keeping appropriate contacts useful in the eventual overthrow of the Austrian government._ Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, von Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any appearance of intervention. His true mission was reaffirmed with clarity, several months after its commencement, when he was instructed by Berlin that “during the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties”. Every “appearance” of German interference in Austrian affairs “must be avoided” (_1760-PS_). As von Papen himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg, the Austrian Foreign Minister:

“Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer.” (_1760-PS_).

Throughout this period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength in Austria without openly-admitted German intervention, and Germany needed more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France (_L-150_).

Von Papen accordingly restricted his public activity to the normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in Austria and ingratiating himself in these circles—particularly if they were well-disposed (but not too obviously) to notions of Pan-Germanism. In these efforts he was particularly careful to exploit his background as a former professional officer and a Catholic (_1760-PS_).

Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Nazis continued illegal organization in anticipation of the possibility of securing their objectives by force if necessary. In these efforts they were aided by Germany, which permitted the outlawed Austrian Nazis to meet and perfect their plots within Germany and with German Nazi assistance; which harbored the Austrian Legion; which made funds available to National Socialists in Austria; and which established appropriate contact with them through the Reich Propaganda Ministry and through “respectable” Austrian “front” personalities (_1760-PS_; _812-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)

Von Papen was fully aware of the existence and activities of these groups, and of their potentialities in effecting an Anschluss. Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 27 July 1935, entitled “Reflections on the Anniversary of Dollfuss’ Death”, he reviewed the activities of these illegal groups and concluded that National Socialism could “certainly become the rallying point of all racially German units beyond the borders”. In this report he declared:

“The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this task.” (_2248-PS_).

These sentiments concerning the role of National Socialism were something more than idle speculation. Von Papen knew that the presence of the Austrian Legion in Germany in itself produced incidents, and that the Austrian Nazi movement was dependent on German support. He has so testified (at an interrogation in Nurnberg, 13 October 1945). In fact, despite his facade of strict non-intervention, he remained in contact with subversive and potentially subversive elements within Austria. Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935 he advised concerning the Austrian Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis (_2247-PS_). In subsequent statements he has revealed his _modus operandi_ in the use of his embassy staff. This method provided him with an opportunity to disclaim responsibility if these activities should be questioned. Thus, his military attache, Mutz, “maintained good relations with the Army circles which were inclined towards National Socialism”. Von Papen’s all-around contact man with the Austrian Nazis was a member of his staff, Baron von Kettler, who “had always maintained intimate contact with a group of young Austrian National Socialists who, as we both agreed, had a conservative coating and fought for a healthy development within the Party”. The practical effect of these contacts has been clarified in questioning of von Papen (at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945):

“* * * A. As I told you, I charged one of my younger people of the Embassy, von Kettler—he was made the go-between with these Nazi people, to smooth them down and talk with them. Personally I had not very much to do with them.

“Q. Well, I know that. That is what you always said. But the result of your time in Austria was that their interests were furthered through your office. Whether you did it personally or somebody working for you did it, I don’t think it is too important for what we have in mind here tonight; do you?

“A. No.

“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that their interests were furthered through your office, if not through you as an individual during those years that you were there?

“A. Yes, I wanted to know about their doings, you see. I must have been informed what was going on.”

(3) _Conclusion of the Agreement of 11 July 1936 merely constituted another step towards Anschluss._ Prior to 1936, sponsorship of political subversion was not the only pressure applied by Germany in its efforts to gain control of Austria. The German Government in addition had placed certain economic barriers against trade between German and Austrian subjects, the most serious of which was the 1000 mark law, which crippled the Austrian tourist traffic by levying a 1000 RM tax on any German citizen crossing the border into Austria. The effect of these pressures was to induce the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, to seek from Hitler an agreement to “lift the 1000 Mark barrier he had levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he had no political designs concerning our state, Austria” (_2994-PS_).

The result was the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria, which was negotiated by von Papen as Hitler’s representative. The published form of this agreement provided:

“Being convinced that they are making a valuable contribution towards the whole European development in the direction of maintaining peace, and in the belief that they are thereby best serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have resolved to return to relations of a normal and friendly character. In this connection it is declared—

“(1) The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of May 21, 1935.

“(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National-Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal concern of that country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.

“(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly follow in its policy in general, and in particular towards Germany, a line in conformity with leading principles corresponding to the fact that Austria regards herself as a German State.

“By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934 and their additions of 1936, nor the relationships of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected. Considering that the detente desired by both sides cannot become a reality unless certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled by the Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal Government and the German Government will pass a number of special measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state of affairs.” (_TC-22_).

More interesting was the secret part of this agreement, the most important provisions of which have been summarized by Mr. Messersmith:

“Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘National opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses.” (_1760-PS_)

Especially interesting was the manner in which this agreement contained German economic concessions and further solemn assurances regarding Austrian independence and integrity, on the one hand, alongside far-reaching political concessions to the Nazi movement (_2994-PS_). The effect was to place Austria completely at the mercy of German good faith. Von Papen has correctly described it (in an interrogation at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945) as “the first step” toward preparation for Anschluss, notwithstanding his clear understanding at the time that the Austrian government desired and intended to retain its independence.

The Germans lost no time in making the most of their new opportunities, solemn assurances notwithstanding. The agreement merely heralded a new era in “legitimizing” the German fifth column in Austria. Thus, the immediate amnesty to political prisoners in itself presented serious police problems. The freedom granted to political demonstrations and organization by German Nazis made it difficult to police the propagandizing of Austrians. And the agreement specifically gave the German Nazis an opening wedge to representation in the Austrian government. The terroristic activities and pressure of the illegal Nazis continued without interruption under German sponsorship, until their hand was strengthened to the point of openly asking for official recognition (_812-PS_; _1760-PS_; _2994-PS_).

The importance of this agreement to the Germans was underscored by the promotion of its negotiator from _Gesandter_ to _Botschafter_, at the time of its signing (Announcement, _Das Archiv_, XXVIII, p. 571).

Von Papen himself participated in this pressure game by maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to influence appointments to strategic cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official recognition of Nazi “front” organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly after conclusion of the 11 July 1936 agreement, he succinctly summarized his program for “normalizing” Austro-German relations under the regime of the new agreement:

“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances [_Finanzkontrolle_] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle [_Marschroute_] I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient psychological manipulations, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh) who conform completely with the concordat of July 11, I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the fatherland front [_Vaterlaendischen Front_] but nevertheless refraining from putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time being. However such positions are to be occupied only by personalities, having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.” (_2246-PS_).

This activity continued through 1937. In fact, by 14 January 1937 the negotiations with the Austrian Minister of Security and the development of “front” organizations had proceeded so far that “a very intensive crisis has arisen for the illegal party” with respect to its future program. In urging a patient attitude toward these problems, von Papen appeared less concerned with the legitimacy of their position under the 11 July 1936 agreement than with his fear that

“a too strong and far-reaching connection (with a proposed conservative ‘German Action’ front organization) would be understood neither in our own ranks nor could it be of use to the action itself.” (_2831-PS_)

On the other hand when an Austrian cabinet minister failed to show sufficient energy to suit von Papen’s purpose, he showed no hesitancy, under the terms of his 11 July 1936 agreement, to urge replacement by a more cooperative individual. Thus, von Papen has summarized his efforts to remove the Austrian Minister of the Interior (monograph “Austria”):

“I had tried to persuade Schuschnigg to appoint another minister to his cabinet beside Herr von Glaise, who was not very active. The new minister was to act as trusted liaison man between the two governments, able to work on innumerable problems directly without diplomatic intervention. This simplification would also bring the men on both sides of the fence closer together.”

By the beginning of 1938, the Nazi hand had been so strengthened in Austria, and the differences and misunderstandings regarding the agreement of 11 July had become so serious and frequent, that Chancellor Schuschnigg found it expedient to accept von Papen’s invitation to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, notwithstanding serious misgivings on the part of Schuschnigg (_2995-PS_). Von Papen showed no hesitancy in extending this invitation despite the fact that he knew Hitler’s “idea to swallow Austria”, despite his knowledge of Schuschnigg’s distrust of Hitler, and despite his own doubts concerning the value of Hitler’s word. Notwithstanding the situation, he found it possible even to urge Schuschnigg that Hitler was a man upon whom Schuschnigg could rely. And in making these representations, he was fully aware of the extent of German rearmament and of its possible use as a diplomatic pressure device (according to interrogations, Nurnberg, 19 September and 8 October 1945).

On 11 February 1938, Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden to meet Hitler. At this meeting the severest pressure was exerted to extort far-reaching concessions from Austria, including reorganization of the cabinet, appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior, and a general amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes (_2995-PS_; _2461-PS_; _1544-PS_; _1780-PS_).

It was at this meeting that Papen urged upon Hitler the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior (according to monograph “Austria”).

Thoroughly entrenched in the government, the Nazis were now able to seize upon Schuschnigg’s plebiscite as an excuse to seize power, and to call for military intervention by Germany (_812-PS_; _2996-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)

Thereafter it was only a matter of hours before Austria became a province of the Reich—by a law signed by von Papen’s man, Seyss-Inquart (_2307-PS_).

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FRANZ VON PAPEN

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │ │Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270 │ │ │ *812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │ │22 August 1939 and report from │ │ │Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │ │Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │ │events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │ │1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586 │ │ │ 1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │ │Property subversive to People and │ │ │State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962 │ │ │ 1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │ │Protection of the People and State, 28│ │ │February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968 │ │ │ *1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 252) │ III │ 978 │ │ │ 1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │ │Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979 │ │ │ 1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │ │restoration of the Professional Civil │ │ │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986 │ │ │ 1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │ │to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987 │ │ │ *1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, │ │ │on his parting visit with Chancellor │ │ │Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103 │ │ │ 1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │ │protection against treacherous attacks│ │ │on the government of the Nationalist │ │ │movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160 │ │ │ *1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │ │(USA 255, USA 324) │ IV │ 208 │ │ │ *1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │ │August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ 2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │ │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 │ │ │ 2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │ │the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639 │ │ │ 2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │ │of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │ │March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640 │ │ │ 2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │ │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641 │ │ │ 2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │ │Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642 │ │ │ 2012-PS │First regulation for administration of│ │ │the law for the restoration of │ │ │professional Civil Service, 11 April │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 195. │ IV │ 647 │ │ │ 2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │ │law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │ │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 341. │ IV │ 648 │ │ │ 2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │ │of Public Enlightenment and │ │ │Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652 │ │ │ 2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │ │Reich Ministry for Public │ │ │Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 449. │ IV │ 653 │ │ │ 2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, │ │ │11 August 1919. 1919 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662 │ │ │ 2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │ │Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699 │ │ │ 2059-PS │Decree of the Reich President relating│ │ │to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 134. │ IV │ 701 │ │ │ 2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │ │formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705 │ │ │ 2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │ │Ministry for Science, Education and │ │ │Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706 │ │ │ 2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │ │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │713. │ IV │ 709 │ │ │ 2088-PS │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs │ │ │Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934. │ │ │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │375. │ IV │ 718 │ │ │ *2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │ │September 1936, concerning Danube │ │ │situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930 │ │ │ *2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 │ │ │May 1935, concerning intention of │ │ │Austrian government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930 │ │ │ *2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July│ │ │1935, concerning National Socialism in│ │ │Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932 │ │ │ *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │ │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │ │133) │ IV │ 997 │ │ │ 2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │ │pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71 │ │ │ 2415-PS │First decree for the implementation of│ │ │law relating to The Reich Chamber of │ │ │Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 797. │ V │ 89 │ │ │ 2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │ │Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198 │ │ │ *2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │ │of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │ │1938, published in Documents of German│ │ │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │ │132) │ V │ 206 │ │ │ 2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court │ │ │for High Treason, published in │ │ │Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 September │ │ │1931. │ V │ 246 │ │ │ 2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285 │ │ │ 2633-PS │Extracts from Constitutional Law of │ │ │the Greater German Reich, 1939. │ V │ 344 │ │ │ 2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the│ │ │German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, pp. 679, │ │ │687-8. │ V │ 364 │ │ │ 2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │ │Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383 │ │ │ 2759-PS │Law for the protection of Nationalist │ │ │Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. │ V │ 394 │ │ │ 2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │ │Socialism, published by U. S. │ │ │Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417 │ │ │ **2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 │ │ │July 1934, published in Documents of │ │ │German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. │ │ │38. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 441 │ │ │ *2830-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 12 │ │ │May 1936, concerning May Rally of │ │ │Freedom Union. (GB 243) │ V │ 496 │ │ │ 2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary │ │ │and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of │ │ │German Government to Reich │ │ │Chancellery, inclosing report on │ │ │Political situation in Austria, 14 │ │ │January 1937. │ V │ 498 │ │ │ 2902-PS │Statement of von Papen, 13 November │ │ │1945, prepared by his defense lawyer. │ │ │(GB 233) │ V │ 569 │ │ │ *2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │ │15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669 │ │ │ *2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │ │20 March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670 │ │ │ **2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, │ │ │concerning Austrian-German Treaty of │ │ │11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to │ │ │admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 703 │ │ │ 2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, │ │ │concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden │ │ │on 12 February 1938. │ V │ 709 │ │ │ 2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, │ │ │concerning events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713 │ │ │ *3280-PS │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit │ │ │Brennender Sorge”, set forth in │ │ │Appendix II, p. 524, of “The │ │ │Persecution of the Catholic Church in │ │ │the Third Reich”. (USA 567) │ V │ 1079 │ │ │ *3313-PS │Von Papen, Appeal to the German │ │ │Conscience, Stuttgart speech of 3 │ │ │March 1933. (GB 240) │ VI │ 1 │ │ │ *3314-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 28 │ │ │August 1932, published in Frankfurter │ │ │Zeitung, 29 August 1932. (GB 234) │ VI │ 2 │ │ │ *3317-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 12 │ │ │October 1932, published in Frankfurter│ │ │Zeitung, 13 October 1932. (GB 235) │ VI │ 3 │ │ │ *3318-PS │Visit of von Papen as Chancellor in │ │ │Munich, 11 October 1932, published in │ │ │Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 October 1932. │ │ │(GB 241) │ VI │ 4 │ │ │ 3357-PS │Exchange of letters, │ │ │Papen-Hitler-Hindenburg, from │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │ │p. 158. (GB 239) │ VI │ 85 │ │ │ *3375-PS │Von Papen’s speech at Essen, 2 │ │ │November 1933, published in │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │ │German Edition, 4 November 1933. (GB │ │ │245) │ VI │ 101 │ │ │ *3376-PS │Dissolution of Union of Catholic │ │ │Germans, published in The Archives, │ │ │September 1934, Vol. VI, pp. 767-768. │ │ │(GB 244) │ VI │ 103 │ │ │ *3387-PS │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March │ │ │1933, asking for adoption of Enabling │ │ │Act, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │ │ │March 1933, p. 1. (USA 566) │ VI │ 104 │ │ │ *3389-PS │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, │ │ │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March │ │ │1933, p. 2. (USA 566) │ VI │ 105 │ │ │ 3463-PS │Extracts from Dates from the History │ │ │of the NSDAP by Dr. Hans Volz. │ VI │ 165 │ │ │ *D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │ │Minister, from International │ │ │Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │ │(GB 130) │ VII │ 59 │ │ │ *D-631 │Decree of Reichs president against │ │ │political excesses, 14 June 1932. 1932│ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │ │297-300. (GB 236) │ VII │ 101 │ │ │ *D-632 │Biography of Papen, from International│ │ │Biographical Archives, 26 October │ │ │1944. (GB 237) │ VII │ 102 │ │ │ D-633 │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 13 │ │ │November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 106 │ │ │ *D-634 │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 16 │ │ │November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 107 │ │ │ *D-635 │Radiogram from von Papen to Board of │ │ │Trade for German-American Commerce, 27│ │ │March 1933. (Translation published in │ │ │New York Times.) (GB 242) │ VII │ 111 │ │ │ *D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated│ │ │edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164 │ │ │ *L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │ │1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859 │ │ │ *L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ │Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │ │German Minister for Foreign Affairs, │ │ │18 May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890 │ │ │ *TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │ │Government and Government of Federal │ │ │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB │ │ │20) │ VIII │ 369

19. ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART

Within the Nazi conspiracy Seyss-Inquart became the expert manipulator and subjugator of countries to be invaded or already invaded by the Nazi conspirators, first of Austria, later of Poland and The Netherlands. For the benefit of the Nazi conspirators he enslaved these countries, making them vassals of the Nazi regime.

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART._

(1) _Positions Held by Artur Seyss-Inquart in the Order Set Forth in the Indictment._ (_a_) Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), 13 March 1938 to 8 May 1945. (_b_) General in the SS, 15 March 1938 to 8 May 1945. (_c_) State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 to 12 February 1938. (_d_) Minister of Interior and Security of Austria, 16 February 1938 to 11 March 1938. (_e_) Chancellor of Austria, 11 March 1938 to 15 March 1938. (_f_) Member of the Reichstag, April 1938 to 8 May 1945. (_g_) Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 to 1945. (_h_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 May 1939 to September 1939. (_i_) Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, early September 1939. (_j_) Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, 12 October 1939 to 18 May 1940. (_k_) Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands 18 May 1940 to 8 May 1945. (_2910-PS_)

(2) _Positions Held in Addition to Those Set Forth in the Indictment._ (_a_) Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 to 1 May 1939. (_2910-PS_) (_b_) President of the German Academy, Munich, 1943. (_3457-PS_)

(3) _Previous Occupations of Seyss-Inquart._ (_a_) Commissioned officer in a Tyrol-Kaiserjaeger Regiment of the Austrian Army in World War I, 1914-1918. (_b_) Lawyer in Vienna, Austria. (_3425-PS_)

B. _SEYSS-INQUART USED HIS POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE SO AS TO PROMOTE THE NAZI SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER AUSTRIA._

(1) _Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Nazi Party and held the rank of General in the SS._ Seyss-Inquart has admitted that he became a member of the Nazi Party on 13 March 1938; that he was made a General in the SS on 15 March 1938, and held both membership and rank until 8 May 1945. (_2910-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to Goering, on 14 July 1939, asserted that he had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1931. The following is an excerpt from that letter:

“Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly in whatever form paid my membership dues, the first one according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931.” (_2219-PS_)

In a voluntary statement signed by Seyss-Inquart, with the advice of his counsel, he discussed his affiliation with the Nazi Party as follows:

“I supported also the National Socialist Party as long as it was legal, because it declared itself with particular determination in favor of the Anschluss. From 1932 onward I made financial contributions to this Party, but I discontinued financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934.” (_3425-PS_)

In contrast with the foregoing assertions of the defendant, Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler on 19 August 1939 in which he confirmed the fact that he became a member of the Nazi Party in 1931 and also stated that he continued his membership in the Nazi Party even after it was declared illegal in Austria. The following is an excerpt from that letter:

“Concerning my membership in the Nazi Party, I want to state that I never was asked to enter the Nazi Party but I asked Dr. Kier in December 1931 to take care of my relation to the Party. At that time I saw the basis of the solution of the Austrian question only in the Party. I wrote this already in the year 1929 to Dr. Neubacher to adjust his hopes which he had put in the Austria-German Volksbund. After that, I paid my membership fees and, as I remember, direct to the Gau Wien. The payments were made even after the party was forbidden. Some time later, I got in direct touch with the _Ortsgruppe_ in Dornbach. The membership fees were paid by my wife but the Blockwart couldn’t possibly have any doubt that those payments were for my wife and myself since the amount of the fees, S 40 [40 Schillings] a month, was a sure indication of this fact and I was treated in every respect as a Party member. Besides that, I was, since 1932, a member of the _Steirischen Heimatschutzes Kammerhofer_. In this organization I made every effort to absorb the _Steirische Heimatschutz_ in the Party and mainly on account of my efforts, von Habicht declared that the members of the _Steirische Heimatschutz_ were members of the Party. That proves that I felt myself, in every respect, as a member of the Party and I was regarded as belonging to the Party and as I said before, already in December 1931.” (_3271-PS_)

(2) _Seyss-Inquart, even before he became a member of the Nazi Party, belonged to an organization conceived and founded upon principles which later became those of the Nazi Party._ Seyss-Inquart has stated in writing that he had been a member of a secret organization known as the “German Brotherhood” (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_). This is evidenced by the following excerpts from his letter to Himmler of 19 August 1939:

“It must be known to you that at the time of the Black-Red Coalition, there existed an extremely secret organization under the name of ‘German Community.’ Here met all sorts of Nationalists and Catholic elements who, at least at that time, were anti-Semitic and anti-Marxists. Dr. Doelter, who was my office chief, was one of the leaders of this association and through him I came into this movement. Dolfuss was also active here. He was of my age and was a very active anti-Semitic. It is through success of the activities of this organization that the Black-Red Coalition was broken and the Marxists never came back in the government. After the establishment of National Socialism, this organization was dissolved.” (_3271-PS_)

The secret organization, “German Brotherhood”, (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_), was organized to promote the anti-Semitic and anti-Free Mason doctrines later adopted by the Nazi Party. This fact is evidenced by Seyss-Inquart’s copy of the minutes of a meeting of this organization on 28 December 1918 and by its constitution and by-laws, a portion of which appear in the following quotation:

“The purpose of this organization is the liberation of the German people from Jewish influences, and combat against Jewry with all available means. The organization is secret. Since a contact of the organization with the public can’t be avoided it has to be done under pretense of unsuspicious purposes and without showing the actual set-up.” (_3400-PS_)

New members of this organization were required to make a sworn statement, i.e.:

“As a German man, I assure with my honor, as far as I know, there is no Jewish blood in my descendency. Furthermore, I am not connected by marriage with a wife or other companion of Jewish descendency, and I never will have relation with one of those. I am not a Free Mason, I assure to be forever a good member of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft and I will always represent the interest of the German people against the Jewish people and I am willing to fight the Jewish people with all my power, any place and at any time. I promise to obey all orders and decrees of the leadership of the organization and to preserve complete secrecy about their institution, about the persons of the organization, and the events within it, as long as I live.” (_3400-PS_)

New members were also asked the question: “In case you will be accepted, are you willing to employ only Aryan physicians, attorneys, and businessmen?” (_3400-PS_)

(3) _Seyss-Inquart, after the Austrian Nazi Party was declared illegal in July 1934, posed as a non-member of the Nazi Party but continued to support it in its activities, principles, and objectives in a subversive manner._

Seyss-Inquart has stated that:

“Before the Anschluss, I worked for the legal, political activities of the Austrian Socialists under the conditions laid down in the Austrian Constitution. * * * From 1932 onwards I made financial contributions to this party but I discontinued financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the welfare work Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards, I endeavored to help the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally to participate in the Austrian Government. * * * I was sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and corresponding influence because they were in favor of the Anschluss. * * * On 10 March 1938 I suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg, as a solution to the difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became in May 1937 State Councillor and then on 16-2-1938 Minister of Interior and Security.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart was an official in the Austrian Government, yet he rendered services, and physical and moral support to the illegal Austrian Nazi Party during those years, knowing that the radical elements engaged in terroristic acts.

“During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in July 1934, I knew that the radical element of the Party was engaged in terroristic activities, such as the attacks on railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg, although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle, were opposed to the Anschluss then because of the National Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the Anschluss. On the day of the unsuccessful ‘putsch,’ 25 July 1934, I was at my home in Stannern near Iglau, Czechoslovakia. I learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day was the outcome of a ‘putsch’ plan, in which SS circles were mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten days before this unsuccessful ‘putsch’ Chancellor Dolfuss sent for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler’s orders. I conjectured—later I found confirmation—that these terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich. Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I informed among others, also acquaintances, of this conversation whom I knew had influence among the Austrian National Socialists. About one week later Chancellor Dolfuss informed me that at the moment he had no time for further discussion.” (_3425-PS_)

(4) _Seyss-Inquart derived personal benefits and political power as the result of the subversive manipulations and terroristic activities of his fellow Nazi collaborators._ He was appointed State Councillor of Austria in May 1937, and Minister of the Interior and Security of that country as the direct result of Nazi manipulation. These facts he has admitted:

“My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an agreement between Austria and Germany on 11-7-1936. My appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12-2-1938.” (_3425-PS_)

Another result of the Berchtesgaden conference was that Austrian Nazis were thereafter allowed openly to demonstrate their conviction, an advantage which they exploited to the full.

“The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an indication of their right to activity. Still more, however, the outcome of the agreement of 12-2-1938 allowed them to demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more and more widespread demonstrations.” (_3425-PS_)

(5) _Seyss-Inquart used his affiliation with the Nazis to promote the absorption of Austria into the Greater German Reich, according to plan as conceived by his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Seyss-Inquart had had a continuous and constant interest in the union of Austria and Germany for twenty years, and during all that time worked, planned, and collaborated with others until the union became an accomplished fact.

“In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of Austria with Germany. From that year on I worked, planned, and collaborated with others of a like mind to bring about a union. * * * It was my desire to effect this union of the two countries—in an evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councillor Speiser, the University Professor Hugelmann, and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Professor Wettstein and others. Later, during the rise of National Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau, Major Klausner, Dr. Muehlmann, Globotschnigg, and others. * * * After I became State Councillor, I discussed several times with von Papen, the German Ambassador, the possibilities of an understanding between the Austrian government and the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of the Anschluss as an actual program. However, we were both of the opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the course of time the Anschluss by evolutionary means in some form. The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in Garmisch where I met him by chance.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart contributed his efforts to revive the Austrian Nazi Party after the unsuccessful “putsch” of July 25, 1934, and to provide relief for the families of arrested and condemned Nazis. He has described these activities in the following words:

“The effect of the ‘Putsch’ was a complete catastrophe to the National Socialist Camp. Not merely the leaders, but party members were arrested in so far as they did not escape; the confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which led to military actions in Steiriermark, Karnten and Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political management was seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most sinister looking situation was created in regard to foreign politics. In any case, the idea of a union had suffered a severe setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher, and it was our desire to assist easing the tension. Following this situation I felt urged to take up politics beyond the question of the ‘Anschluss.’ * * * The former National delegate to the ‘Langoth’ in Linz was working with Rheintaller. Dr. Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later did not play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer applicant from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to be an SS man. The main activities consisted in organizing an institution to succor the needy families of those arrested and condemned Nazis. * * * As matters calmed down, the Austrian National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal party, the organization was built up for better or worse according to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich were considered to be more ‘in the know’ and authoritative. The institution of succor, ‘Langoth,’ remained outside the party organization. But here were also men in the Nazi circles who considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as politically wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian National Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten belonged to those, and by his influence the future Gauleiter Klausner who is now dead; also Globotschnigg was in it, though I doubt he was sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a keener interest in political affairs and entered into relationship with the proper Party circles.” (_3254-PS_)

The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and Goering for their approval, and contacted other German Nazis.

“After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and plans to them, namely, the attainment of the legal activity for the Austrian National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party. Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things: he regretted that I was not one of the original ‘old fighters.’ I believe that at that time Goering had already established direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido Schmid. After my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security of Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived in Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my program. Himmler wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however, that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised hand—permissible after the agreement of 12-2—advised him, however, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans, namely: I was to be the living guaranty for Dr. Schuschnigg of the evolutionary way. The Austria National Socialists must only conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I would have, as Minister of Security, to oppose any kind of illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialist would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the closest cooperation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler, Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler’s office.” (_3425-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart’s fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his position as Councillor of State in the Austrian Government as most important to them, because he had a mandate from the German Nazis in power, which he was attempting to carry out. Because his negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg seemed to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of that fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled to return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss the matter before acting accordingly. Keppler immediately sought advice from Goering in a letter dated 6 January 1938. On that same day Goering’s secretary was instructed to telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received this telephone message on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January 1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart informing him of Goering’s instructions and relaying Goering’s request not to give up the mandate under any circumstances without discussing the matter with Goering. (_3473-PS_; _3397-PS_)

Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and indictment, to the effect that he desired a union of Austria and Germany in an evolutionary manner and by legal means, Seyss-Inquart has on other occasions made statements to the contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to Goering is particularly illuminating on this point:

“I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends have had to fight against the whole political church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my party comrades. I have followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude, even now, gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me.” (_2219-PS_)

Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light on this point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19 August 1939:

“On November 8, 1938, the Fuehrer invited several political leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to be next to him. We discussed the situation in Ostmark. I told him that in accordance with his order, we started to dissolve the competence of the Austrian government by giving the powers partly to the Gauen and partly to the central leaders. But there still would remain certain affairs which would be common for all Gauen.” (_3271-PS_)

Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:

“I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich had come at last after so many vain endeavors since 1918 because I was in favor of the Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under many conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the opinion that these two German countries belonged together and that the German people should solve their own internal affairs and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of the National aim—cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties and achievement of the right of self-determination—would in time be surmounted.” (_3425-PS_)

The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring about the absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich was described in detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading Austrian Nazi and a collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became one of Hitler’s Gauleiters, in a report prepared by him and forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this report accompanied by a letter of transmittal was later sent to Seyss-Inquart by Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the Nazi party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its efforts to force admission of its representatives into the Austrian government, and finally flowered into the unsuccessful “Putsch” of July 1934, which, in effect, destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful “Putsch”, Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle, and instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal relationships between the two countries. Accordingly, a new method of political penetration was adopted. The result was that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in touch with the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter originating from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the legal field and especially well established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the “Styrian Heimatschutz” and had become a Nazi party member when the entire “Styrian Heimatschutz” was incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-Inquart appears in the following excerpt from the covering letter which accompanied Dr. Rainer’s report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939:

“I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no position existed in the party which one might have presented oneself to the public, and that there was no man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public.” (_812-PS_)

Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a member of the Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared illegal in 1934.

Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that the defendant was in permanent contact with Captain Leopold, who became a member of the staff of Hess. After Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his successor as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Dr. Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. After the agreement between Germany and Austria on 11 July 1936, Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a mixed commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi Party in Austria. (_812-PS_)

(6) _The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi conspirators and collaborators forced the then Austrian government into a critical situation and a struggle for survival._ As the result of the plans, maneuvers, and disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria, Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary, Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a member of the Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the possibilities for military action by Germany against Austria were demonstrated to the Chancellor. The ultimate result was that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept the demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized; that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted for illegal activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed Minister of the Interior and Security in the Austrian cabinet, (_2995-PS_; _3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2469-PS_; _2464-PS_)

A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg, and immediately after his appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Seyss-Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. Upon arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler’s special delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After a short conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted to Hitler, to whom he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he had a conference lasting two hours and ten minutes. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler waited in the ante-chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first offered Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler salute, by saying: “I consider him as the Fuehrer of the German people who led us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties.” During the conference, he rendered a report to Hitler concerning the Austrian situation since June of 1934 and presented his own program for Hitler’s approval. Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told Seyss-Inquart that he doubted whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be willing to go so far. It seems clear that Hitler’s doubt concerning Schuschnigg’s approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred solely to Seyss-Inquart’s proposal to allow Austrian Nazis to “conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution and on those lines find their way to the Reich,” because all other portions of his plan had previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden Agreement. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2484-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna after his conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the content of his discussion and urged the Chancellor to make a decision about the Austrian National Socialist question. He then attended rallies of the Austrian National Socialists held in various places in Austria to inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler. Two of the principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). Considerable doubt is cast upon the truth of Seyss-Inquart’s assertions that he reported the contents of his conference with Hitler to Chancellor Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart to Himmler on 19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:

“I had a conversation of over two hours with the Fuehrer on February 17, 1938, in which I explained to him my point of view. I would only be able to make statements about the content of this conversation if the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I left this discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer.” (_3271-PS_)

(7) _Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before the people for a decision on the question of Austrian independence._ Chancellor Schuschnigg planned to hold a plebiscite on that precise question and fixed 13 March 1938 as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held. The Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and discussed the matter of the plebiscite with him. The Chancellor requested Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a secret until noon of the next day, and the defendant promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared a letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on constitutional grounds and alleging that the manner in which the plebiscite was to be held would not allow the Austrians to express their own desires. Seyss-Inquart admits that a copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler in Berlin by Globotschnigg. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)

On 9 March 1938, a meeting of the Austrian Nazis was held because they had learned, through an illegal information service, that a plebiscite was to be held. Dr. Rainer describes this meeting in the following language:

“The ‘_Landesleitung_’ received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services on 9 March 1938 at 10 a. m. At the session, which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this information only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the ‘_Landesleitung_’ from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globotschnigg, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” (_812-PS_).

Seyss-Inquart himself admits that he attended this meeting, which was held at the Regina Hotel, Vienna (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). The defendant was informed at this meeting that he would receive a letter from Hitler by messenger the next morning. (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).

Early on the morning of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart received Hitler’s letter. He describes it as having contained several erroneous statements and containing a demand that a decision should be arrived at before noon; that in case of rejection the Reich Government would denounce the agreement of 12 February 1938 and military action must be understood. According to Seyss-Inquart, Hitler also gave expression to his belief that there would be disturbances in Austria if Chancellor Schuschnigg would not relent and that the Reich would come to the help of Austria if Austria demanded so. Glaise-Horstenau arrived by plane in Vienna early that same morning with the information that Berlin was greatly excited and that military steps were in preparation. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)

(8) _Seyss-Inquart then proceeded to carry out Hitler’s orders and to fulfill the plans made by himself and his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Dr. Rainer in his report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, and in his covering letter dated 6 July 1939, related his version of the sequence of events during this period and described the precise role of Seyss-Inquart, as he viewed it. He complained about the fact that Hitler and the general public seemed to give Seyss-Inquart all the credit for the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following quotation from this letter and report is significant:

“Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler’s deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)

Dr. Rainer then proceeded to describe just what happened in those critical days, and outlined the final instructions given by him for Friday, 11 March 1938. He explained that three situations might develop within the following days:

“1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.

“2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

“3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.” (_812-PS_)

Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.

“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a. m. the ‘_Landesleitung_’ had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.

“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political, ‘Front’ men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.

“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.

“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p. m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p. m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers’ council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart ’phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered: ‘No.’ Rainer informed the ‘Reichskanzlei’ through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p. m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p. m. At 5:00 p. m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this errand.

“Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as ‘_Staatsrat_’ [councillor of State] in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called ‘satisfactory action’. Through all this a new and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to talks between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the ‘system apparates’ [Schuschnigg government] at a time when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.

“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guido Schmid, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the ‘Gruppenfuehrer’ Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p. m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

“Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fighting will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p. m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p. m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight ‘gaus’ of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

“With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party * * *.

“The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer.” (_812-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart’s own story of the events on 11 March 1938 is not fundamentally different, although he does show a marked tendency to minimize his role in the planning, precipitating, and accomplishment of the annexation of Austria by Germany, in a statement signed by him after his arrest and indictment:

“At 10 o’clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr. Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich. The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400 hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that the agreement of 12-2 had been cancelled, and demanded Dr. Schuschnigg’s resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and withdrew from the conference.

“In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as leader of the provisional Austrian Government, was to send to Hitler and in which I was to request sending of German troops to Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about the telegram. Around 6 p. m. I told him that he knew my standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as I have been able to confirm from records available, understood my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around 7:30 p. m. a frontier police post announced that German troops were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his well known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave directions that no resistance should be offered the German troops.

“As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again requested about 10 p. m. to give my sanction to another somewhat altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me Chancellor and a little while later he approved of my proposed ministers.” (_3425-PS_)

However, Seyss-Inquart displayed undue modesty in this statement. His letter to Himmler indicates how active he was on 11 March 1938, and reveals that he was not satisfied with making demands upon Chancellor Schuschnigg, but also handed an ultimatum to President Miklas:

“It is only possible that Buerckel made a statement that in the critical hours it was hard to find me. After I had handed an ultimatum to Miklas which was respited until 5:45 p. m. I took a recess of about a half hour to catch some fresh air. I conceded that I was, in a way, exhausted from the things which happened just a few hours before that and I tried to find recreation in the fresh air. Besides that I planned to take a look at the situation on the streets. Furthermore, I wanted to make a phone call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery, but from some other place. Phone calls from the Chancellery were always tapped whereas they were only sometimes tapped from other places. I was sure they didn’t need me until 5:30 p. m., because the men of the old system would not make a decision a second earlier than they had to.” (_3271-PS_)

A stenographic transcript of Goering’s telephone conversation with Seyss-Inquart confirms the fact that Seyss-Inquart was ordered to demand Chancellor Schuschnigg’s resignation and the appointment of himself as Chancellor. (_2949-PS_)

This stenographic record of Goering’s conversations also reveals that Seyss-Inquart had an agent keep in contact with Goering during the negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was given an order by Goering through this agent to report by 7:30 p. m., 11 March 1938, that he had formed a new government. He was informed that the foreign political aspect would be handled exclusively by Germany and that Hitler would talk with him about this matter at a future date. (_2949-PS_)

In addition the stenographic transcript of these telephone conversations show that the selection of individual members of the cabinet of the new government to be established by Seyss-Inquart was to be made by the Nazi conspirators in Berlin. (_2949-PS_)

At 1726 hours on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart reported to Goering by telephone as ordered. He reported that President Miklas had accepted the resignation of Chancellor Schuschnigg but wanted to appoint a man like Ender to the Chancellorship. He further reported his suggestion to the President that the Chancellorship be entrusted to him—Seyss-Inquart—and also reported that “We have ordered the SA and the SS to take over police duties.” Thereupon Goering ordered Seyss-Inquart to go with Lt. Gen. Muff to President Miklas and inform him that if the demands were not met immediately German troops, already advancing to the frontier, would invade Austria that night and Austria would cease to exist. An audience with the President was to be demanded. The invasion would be stopped only if President Miklas entrusted Seyss-Inquart with the Chancellorship. Seyss-Inquart was also instructed to call out the National Socialists of Austria all over the country, because Austrian Nazis should even then be in the streets. Seyss-Inquart was to report again at 7:30 p. m. (_2949-PS_)

The telegram, already prepared, asking Hitler to send German troops into Austria, over the defendant Seyss-Inquart’s signature, was transmitted as ordered and agreed upon. (_2463-PS_)

Even before Seyss-Inquart received his appointment as Chancellor of Austria he dispatched a telegram using that title. An affidavit of August Eigruber states as follows:

“On the evening of 11 March 1938 at between 8 and 9 o’clock p. m. he received two telegrams; one of which came from Dr. Seyss-Inquart, as Bundes Chancellor of Austria, and the other from one Dr. Rainer; that the telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart appointed the affiant as temporary _Landeshauptmann_ in Upper Austria; and that the telegram from Dr. Rainer appointed the affiant temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in Upper Austria.” (_2909-PS_)

Schuschnigg presented his resignation, which was accepted by President Miklas. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor came late on the evening of 11 March 1938. (_2465-PS_)

(9) _Having infiltrated into the Austrian Government of Chancellor Schuschnigg according to plan, Seyss-Inquart exploited his opportunities to carry out the plan to its ultimate conclusion, i.e. German annexation of Austria._ The first act of Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor of Austria was to hold a telephone conversation with Hitler early in the morning of 12 March 1938. He has described the substance of this telephone conversation as follows:

“During the morning of 12 March I held a telephone conversation with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day.” (_3425-PS_)

Thereafter, on 12 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall of Linz, Upper Austria. In his ensuing speech, Seyss-Inquart announced that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provided that “the independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations,” was no longer operative.

“I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall, and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now inoperative.” (_3425-PS_; _L-231_)

In his memorandum entitled “The Austrian Question” Seyss-Inquart describes his meeting with Hitler as follows:

“In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and drove then to meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the evening. I never saw such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no precedence. In my (welcome) speech I declared that Article 88 of the St. Germain Treaty was no longer binding.” (_3254-PS_; _2485-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart then drove back to Vienna on the morning of 13 March 1938. His Secretary of State for Security begged that he be allowed to resign, a decision he reached as a result of a conversation with Himmler, which had caused him to fear for his own personal welfare. Seyss-Inquart then nominated Kaltenbrunner for State Secretary for Security, and the nomination was accepted by President Miklas. About noon State Under Secretary Stuckart of the German Reich Ministry of the Interior brought a proposal for a reannexation act uniting Austria to Germany, and announced Hitler’s wish for prompt execution of it. Seyss-Inquart then called a meeting of his Council of Ministers, and on his proposal the council adopted the act. (_3254-PS_)

Seyss-Inquart, realizing that if the President of Austria resigned his office, then he, Seyss-Inquart, would be the successor, went to President Miklas with the information about the action of the Council of Ministers. Seyss-Inquart describes this meeting with President Miklas as follows:

“In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason, either have resigned his functions or be, for some time, impeded in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund Chancellor, I went to the Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The President told me that he did not know whether this development would be of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that all rights would come into my hands, according to the Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation were only slightly mentioned and recognized as inopportune in the prevailing situation.” (_3254-PS_)

President Miklas then resigned and Seyss-Inquart succeeded to his office. (_2466-PS_)

Thereafter Seyss-Inquart signed the Act uniting Austria with Germany and hurried back to Linz to report this news to Hitler:

“Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund President and myself, confirming our conversation and his retirement. Thereafter I drove to Linz, where I arrived around mid-night and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much impressed by it; for a while he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his cheeks. He said then that he was especially happy because his Motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any shedding of blood.” (_3254-PS_)

On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna. On 15 March 1938 there was a public demonstration in Vienna and Hitler introduced Seyss-Inquart as “Reich _Statthalter_ for Austria.” Hitler then put him in charge of the Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were assigned to Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, who shortly thereafter was made Reich Commissar for the Anschluss. (_3425-PS_)

(10) _Despite Seyss-Inquart’s modesty since arrest and indictment, his fellow Nazi conspirators recognized the importance of his part in the Austrian Anschluss._

Goering made a speech in Vienna on 26 March 1938 in which he said:

“At this moment [announcement of the plebiscite in Austria] it has been established that now the decision really came. A complete unanimity between the Fuehrer and the N. S. confidants inside of Austria existed. According to their opinion also the hour of action had come, but they thought they could not use any more democratic methods in negotiations and they took the law of action in their own strong hands and forced the others to retreat. If the N. S. rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the intelligent and decisive firmness of the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart and his confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the previous continued politics because if our confidants had not been in the government, this whole course of events would not have been possible.” (_3270-PS_)

According to Dr. Rainer, Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart credit for playing the leading role in the annexation of Austria by Germany. This is evidenced by the covering letter written by Dr. Rainer, dated 6 July 1939, to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:

“We had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more upon Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more exact, Hitler especially mentioned Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)

In his report to Reich Commissar Buerckel, Dr. Rainer said:

“But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement of the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit to Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. * * * The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government.

“The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other.” (_812-PS_)

Hans Frank recognized the importance of the services rendered by Seyss-Inquart to the Nazi cause in Austria. When Seyss-Inquart was about to leave Poland to become Reich commissar of the Occupied Netherlands Territories, Frank extolled him as follows:

“But your name without that is shining like a light through the history of the Third Reich, since you are the creator of the National Socialist Austria.” (_3465-PS_)

(11) _The Nazi conspirators within the German Reich evidenced their intentions of annexing Austria in many ways._ Hitler, on the first page of Chapter 1 of _Mein Kampf_, said:

“Today it seems to me providential that Fate should have chosen Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For this little town lies on the boundary between two German states which we of the younger generation at least have made it our life work to reunite by every means at our disposal.

“German-Austria must return to the great German Mother Country, and not because of any economic considerations. No, and again no: even if such a union were unimportant from an economic point of view; yes, even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take place. One blood demands one Reich. Never will the German Nation possess the moral right to engage in Colonial politics until, at least, it embraces its own sons within a single state. Only when the Reich borders include the very last German, but can no longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people. Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the daily bread of future generations will grow.”

Seyss-Inquart devoted his efforts to legalize the sale and circulation of _Mein Kampf_ in Austria. His letter to Keppler, German Secretary of State for Austrian Affairs, contained the following passage.

“The _Teinfaltstrasse_ is very well informed even if not in detail about my efforts regarding the re-permission of the book ‘Mein Kampf’.” (_3392-PS_)

Goering and Schacht both told an American diplomat that it was Germany’s determination to annex Austria and Sudetenland to the Reich. (_L-151)_

One of the missions of von Papen, as German Ambassador to Austria, was to effect a change in the personnel of the Austrian Cabinet headed by Chancellor von Schuschnigg and to eliminate anti-Nazi opposition, particularly in the Ministry of Interior and Security. (_2246-PS_)

The German Reich applied economic pressure upon Austria. One of the means adopted was the law of 24 March 1933, which required payment of 1,000 Reichs Marks by every German crossing the border into Austria (_3467-PS_). Kurt von Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, in his affidavit of 19 November 1945, described this economic pressure upon Austria by Germany in the following words:

“* * * During my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor of Austria, more particularly on the 11th day of July, 1936, I negotiated with the then existing government of the German Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, an Agreement more particularly known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.

“I further depose and say that prior to the consummation of the aforesaid Agreement, the German Government had placed certain economic barriers against trade between Germany and Austria such as—to-wit—the 1,000 mark barrier which said barrier provided that any German citizen who crosses the border of Germany into Austria is obliged to pay to the German Government the sum of 1,000 German Reichs Marks for the privilege thereof—Austria had been accustomed before this edict of the German Government to receive into Austria some one hundred thousand visitors from Germany annually.

“I further state that the aforesaid barrier placed against Austria was extremely injurious to Austrian agriculture and industrial interests.” (_2994-PS_)

Jodl stated in his diary that in 1938 the aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The will of resistance in both countries was undermined by pressure on the government as well as by propaganda and the fifth column. At the same time German military preparations for attack were worked out (_1780-PS_). (“Case Otto” was the code name for the Austrian campaign, and “Case Green” was the code name for the battle plans against Czechoslovakia.)

Jodl also stated in his diary that when Chancellor von Schuschnigg announced the proposed plebiscite for 13 March 1938, Hitler was determined to intervene. Goering, General Reichenau, and Minister Glaise-Horstenau were called before Hitler. “Case Otto” was to be prepared, and the mobilization of army units and air forces was ordered on 10 March 1938. The march into Austria took place on 11 March 1938. (_1780-PS_).

(12) _Hitler and the Nazi conspirators completed the annexation of Austria by decree._ On 11 March 1938 Hitler issued a directive regarding “Case Otto” addressed to the German armed forces, classified Top Secret, in which he stated that, if other measures proved useless, his intentions were to invade Austria with armed force. The directive prescribed operational duties and assigned objectives. It further provided that resistance was to be broken up ruthlessly with armed force. (_C-102_)

Later on that same day, at 8:45 p. m., Hitler issued a second directive, which stated in substance, that the demands of the German ultimatum to Austria had not been fulfilled, and for that reason the entry of German armed forces into Austria would commence at daybreak on 12 March 1938. He directed that all objectives were to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible. (_C-182_)

On 13 March 1938 Germany in violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, formally incorporated Austria into the Reich by decree and declared it to be a province of the German Reich. (_2307-PS_)

Officials of the Province of Austria were then required by decree to take an oath of personal obedience to Hitler. Jews were barred from taking this oath, and thus could not retain offices and positions previously held. (_2311-PS_)

Members of the Austrian Army were required to take an oath of personal allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. (_2936-PS_)

Compulsory military service was instituted in Austria by law, which provided the Greater German Reich with additional manpower for its armed forces. (_1660-PS_)

(13) _Seyss-Inquart participated in the execution of the plans for aggression against Czechoslovakia._ In an official report to Viscount Halifax, Basil Newton, an official of the British Government, related some of the “gangster methods employed by the Reich to obtain its ends in Czecho-Slovakia.” The part played by Seyss-Inquart was described in this report in the following words:

“On M. Sidor’s return to Bratislava, after he had been entrusted with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso, Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 pm on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)

Hitler expressed his intention to crush Czechoslovakia in the following language:

“‘At Munich I did not take Bohemia and Moravia into the German territorial sphere [“_Lebensraum_”]. I left the Czechs only another five months, but for the Slovaks I have some sympathy. I approved the Award of Vienna in the conviction that the Slovaks would separate themselves from the Czechs and declare their independence, which would be under German protection. That is why I have refused Hungarian demands in respect of Slovakia. As the Slovaks appear to be agreeing with the Czechs it looks as though they have not respected the spirit of the Vienna Award. This I cannot tolerate. To-morrow at mid-day I shall begin military action against the Czechs, which will be carried out by General Brauchitsch’ (who was present and to whom he pointed). ‘Germany,’ he said, ‘does not intend to take Slovakia into her “_Lebensraum_,” and that is why you must either immediately proclaim the independence of Slovakia or I will disinterest myself in her fate. To make your choice I give you until to-morrow mid-day, when the Czechs will be crushed by the German steam-roller.’” (_D-571_)

Ribbentrop and von Neurath also participated in the execution of the Nazi plot to obliterate Czechoslovakia as a nation. (_D-571_)

The use of pressure, fifth columnists, and propaganda to undermine resistance in Czechoslovakia, and the preparation of military plans for the attack upon that country were all noted by Jodl in his diary. (_1780-PS_)

Before the annexation of Austria by Germany Seyss-Inquart was in communication and contact with Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Nazis in Czechoslovakia. On 29 December 1937 Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Henlein in encouraging terms and extended his warmest sympathy and hope for the success of the Sudeten Germans (_3523-PS_). Henlein thereafter replied in a letter to Seyss-Inquart dated a few days after the German annexation of Austria had been accomplished. In this letter Henlein expressed his pride in the fact that Seyss-Inquart, born a Sudeten German, had fulfilled the task determined by the Fuehrer in the most decisive hour of German history. He also thanked Seyss-Inquart for the effect and influence the developments in Austria would have in the Sudetenland. (_3522-PS_)

C. _SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS FOR WARS OF AGGRESSION AND WARS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURANCES SET FORTH IN COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF THE INDICTMENT._

The German Reichstag came under the control of the Nazi conspirators with the advent of Hitler into the German Government and became a willing tool in the hands of Hitler and the conspirators. (See Sections 2, 3, and 4 of chapter VII on the acquisition and consolidation of totalitarian political control, and terrorization of political opponents.)

The members of the Reich Cabinet were the accomplices, aiders and abettors of Hitler and his closest Nazi lieutenants in the political planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (See section 3 of