Nazi conspiracy and aggression, Volume 02 (of 11)

Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews.)

Chapter 2172,635 wordsPublic domain

It was to the task of educating and poisoning the people with hate, and of producing murderers, that Streicher set himself. For 25 years he continued unrelentingly the perversion of the people and youth of Germany. He went on and on, as he saw the results of his work bearing fruit.

In the early days he was preaching persecution. As persecution took place he preached extermination and annihilation and, as millions of Jews were exterminated and annihilated, in the Ghettos of the East, he cried out for more and more.

The crime of Streicher is that he made these crimes possible, which they would never have been had it not been for him and for those like him. Without Streicher and his propaganda, the Kaltenbrunners, the Himmlers, the General Stroops would have had nobody to do their orders.

In its extent Streicher’s crime is probably greater and more far-reaching than that of any of the other defendants. The misery which they caused ceased with their capture. The effects of this man’s crime, of the poison that he has put into the minds of millions of young boys and girls goes on, for he concentrated upon the youth and childhood of Germany. He leaves behind him a legacy of almost a whole people poisoned with hate, sadism, and murder, and perverted by him. That people remain a problem and perhaps a menace to the rest of civilization for generations to come.

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LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JULIUS STREICHER

11. WALTER FUNK

A. _FUNK ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._

A recital of Funk’s positions and activities is set forth in a statement made by him (_3533-PS_). Although Funk signed this statement, he inserted several reservations and denials with respect to certain positions and activities. Funk’s submissions in this connection, which are indicated in his statement (_3533-PS_) should be evaluated in the light of the statements set forth in the collection of relevant excerpts from German publications (_3563-PS_).

An examination of these excerpts will reveal that the German publications directly contradict every contention which Funk has made with respect to his holding the positions and carrying on the activities listed in his statement (_3533-PS_). For example, in his comment concerning item (_b_) of his statement Funk denies that he was Hitler’s Personal Economic Adviser during the 1930’s. On the other hand, there are four German publications, each of which states unequivocally that Funk _was_ Hitler’s Personal Economic Adviser (_3563-PS_).

As is indicated by these documents, Funk, soon after he joined the Nazi Party in 1931, began to hold important positions in the Party and soon qualified as one of the Nazi inner circle. Thus, he promptly became not only Hitler’s Personal Economic Adviser, but also Chief of the Economic Division of the Central Nazi Party Directorate and Chairman of the Party’s Committee on Economic Policy (_3533-PS_). In these capacities, he advanced the Party’s drive for mass support by drafting its economic slogans. In 1932, for example, he wrote a pamphlet entitled “Economic Reconstruction Program of the NSDAP”, which, after its approval by Hitler, became the Party’s official pronouncement on economic matters (_3505-PS_).

Funk also served as the liaison man between the Nazi Party and the large industrialists, from whom he obtained financial and political support on Hitler’s behalf (_3505-PS_; _2828-PS_). Thus, for example, he was present at the meeting of approximately 25 leading industrialists held in Berlin on 20 February 1933 (_2828-PS_). In the course of this meeting, which was arranged by Goering and attended by Funk, among others, and which was designed to obtain the industrialists’ financial and political support for the Nazi program, Hitler and Goering announced some of the fundamental Nazi objectives: the destruction of the parliamentary system in Germany; the crushing of all internal opposition by force, the restoration of the power of the _Wehrmacht_. In addition, Hitler indicated that force was to be used in solving problems with other nations (_D-203_). The financial and political support for the Nazis which Funk secured from industry promoted the campaign of force and terror by which the Nazis seized and consolidated their control of Germany.

The importance of Funk’s general contribution to the conspirators’ accession to power has been described in a book published by the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party:

“No less important than Funk’s accomplishments in the programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity of that time as the Fuehrer’s liaison man to the leading men of the German economy in industry, trade, commerce and finance. On the basis of his past work, his personal relations to the German economic leaders were broad and extensive. He was now able to enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler, and not only to answer their questions authoritatively, but to convince them and win their backing for the Party. At that time, that was terribly important work. Every success achieved meant a moral, political, and economic strengthening of the fighting force of the Party and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.” (_3505-PS_)

After he had helped Hitler become Chancellor, Funk, as Reich Press Chief, participated in the early cabinet meetings, in the course of which the conspirators determined upon the means by which they would secure the passage of the Enabling Act and destroy parliamentary government in Germany (_2962-PS_; _2963-PS_). This law destroyed civil liberties in Germany and marked the conspirators’ seizure of political control over Germany.

B. _FUNK, BY VIRTUE OF HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE MINISTRY OF PROPAGANDA, ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ CONTROL OVER GERMANY._

The Nazis created a vast propaganda machine which they used to proclaim the doctrine of the master race, to inveigh against the Jews, to impose the leadership principle upon the German people, to glorify war as a noble activity, to create the social cohesion necessary for war, and to weaken the capacity and willingness of their intended victims to resist aggression. (See Section 9 of Chapter VII on Propaganda, Censorship and Supervision of Cultural Activities.)

The operation of this propaganda machine was principally the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. Funk played a significant role in the operations of that Ministry and in related agencies of the Nazi State. On 30 January 1933, the day on which Hitler became Reich Chancellor, Funk was appointed Press Chief of the Reich Government. In that capacity, and even after the establishment of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, he reported regularly to Hitler and President von Hindenburg (_3505-PS_; _3501-PS_).

On 13 March 1933, the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda was established with Goebbels as its Chief and Funk as its under-Secretary (_2029-PS_; _Voelkischer Beobachter_ 15 March 1933, p. 2. (South German Edition)). In an interview with a reporter from the _Voelkischer Beobachter_ on 30 March 1933, Funk made clear the importance which propaganda was to have in the Nazi State. He stated:

“Propaganda is the most modern instrument of power and fighting weapon of state policy. The establishing of the Propaganda Ministry is vital, for the national political policy of the new State Leadership is to be the general good of the whole people. Therefore, the total political, artistic, cultural and spiritual life of the nation, must be brought on to one level and directed from one central point.” (Voelkischer Beobachter, South German Edition, 31 March 1933).

In order to achieve this purpose, the Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda was organized so as to reach and control every medium of expression within Germany. In the language of the decree defining the duties of the Minister of Propaganda, he was to have

“* * * jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of the nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad; furthermore, he is in charge of all institutions serving these purposes.” (_2030-PS_).

Under this decree, the Ministry controlled propaganda abroad, propaganda within Germany, the press, music, the theater, films, art, literature, radio and all related institutions.

Funk discharged important responsibilities in the Ministry. As Undersecretary, he was Goebbels’ chief aide. In this capacity he appears to have been the primary organizer of the machine from which flowed Nazi propaganda. This is made clear by the following excerpt from an affidavit dated 19 December 1945, and signed by Max Amann, who held the position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the Reich Press Chamber.

“* * * In carrying out my duties and responsibilities, I became familiar with the operations and the organization of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment.

“Walther Funk was the practical Minister of the Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment and managed the Ministry. Funk was the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his ‘most effective man.’ Funk exercised comprehensive control over all the media of expression in Germany: over the press, the theater, radio and music. As Press Chief of the Reich Government and subsequently as Under Secretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with the Fuehrer and a daily press conference in the course of which he issued the directives governing the materials to be published by the German press”. (_3501-PS_).

A note for the files prepared by one Sigismund, an SS Scharfuehrer, also stresses the important role which Funk played in The Ministry of Propaganda (_3566-PS_). That note records a discussion between Sigismund and one Weinbrenner, an official of the Ministry of Propaganda, about the selection of a General Manager for the German Radio. The note states:

“Weinbrenner made the following statement: * * * it is almost impossible to determine whom the Minister would name General Manager, since Dr. Goebbels reaches most of the important decisions only by agreement with Under Secretary Funk.” (_3566-PS_).

In addition to his position as Undersecretary, Funk had many other important responsibilities in subordinate offices of the Ministry for Propaganda (_3533-PS_). In 1933, for example, he was appointed Vice President of the Reich Chamber of Culture, whose President was Goebbels (_3533-PS_; _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, I, p. 798).

Funk’s position as Vice President of the Reich Chamber of Culture was related to his position as Undersecretary of the Ministry, since the Chamber of Culture and the seven subordinate chambers were by law subject to the control of the Ministry of Propaganda (_2082-PS_). This control was insured in practice by placing officers of the Ministry of Propaganda in the highest positions of the Chambers. Thus, for example, Goebbels was its President and Funk its Vice President. By virtue of his dual position, Funk directly promoted two fundamental and related Nazi policies: (1) the regimentation of all creative activities in the interest of Nazi political and military objectives; (2) the elimination of Jews and dissidents from the so-called cultural professions.

The mechanics by which these policies were carried out have been described in Section 9 of Chapter VII on Propaganda, Censorship and Supervision of Cultural Activities. That description will be supplemented here only by reference to the second decree for the Execution of the Law of Reich Chamber of Culture, dated 9 November 1933 (_2872-PS_). This decree, which was signed by Funk, representing Goebbels, fixed the effective date for the entire scheme for the domination and purging of the cultural professions.

The control of the Ministry of Propaganda was based in part on the requirement that persons engaged in so-called “cultural activities” belong to the appropriate Chamber (_1933 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 797). Decrees were then passed which prescribed standards of admission to these Chambers, which automatically excluded Jews. For example, in the field of journalism, “only persons who were of Aryan descent and not married to a person of non-Aryan descent” were permitted to be so-called _Schriftleiter_, that is, to perform any work relating to the contents of a newspaper or a political magazine (_2083-PS_).

Similarly, newspaper publishers had to submit proof tracing their Aryan descent (and that of their spouses) as far back as the year 1800 (Decree 24 April 1935, issued by the President of the Reich Press Chamber, Article 1, 3 and Article II, 1(f) and 2, reprinted in Karl Friedrich Schrieber in “_Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 2, 1935, pp. 109-112; Decrees 15 April and 22 May 1936 issued by the President of Reich Press Chamber reprinted in Karl Friedrich Schrieber “_Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 4, 1936, pp. 101-102, 120-122; see also: Decree 17 September 1934 reprinted in Karl Friedrich Schrieber’s “_Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 2, 1935, p. 79).

In view of Funk’s official positions and the policies which he advanced, it is natural that Nazi writers have stressed his contribution to the perversion of German culture. Thus Oestreich’s biography of Funk states:

“Besides, Funk had a special duty from his Ministry received the task to take care of the cultural life. In this position he organized quietly a tremendous concern which represented an investment of many hundreds of millions. In close co-operation with the Reich Leader of the Press, Max Amann, the economic fundamentals of the German press were reconstructed according to the political necessities. The same took place in the film industry and in other cultural fields.” (_3505-PS_)

The reconstruction of “the economic fundamentals of the German press * * * and other cultural fields” was a biographer’s euphemism for the elimination of Jews and dissidents from the field of literature, music, theater, journalism, broadcasting, and the arts.

The completeness with which the policy of cultural extermination was carried out is made clear by a pamphlet entitled “The Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda”, by Georg Wilhelm Mueller, an official of the Ministry of Propaganda, which was published by the German Academy for Politics as part of a series on the organization of the Nazi Government. That pamphlet states:

“The Department Special Cultural Tasks (a department within the Ministry of Propaganda) serves mainly the purpose to remove the Jews from cultural professions. It reviews the political attitude of all artistic or cultural workers and cultural economic enterprises that are members of the seven individual chambers of the Reich Chamber of Culture (except the Reich Chamber of the Press), it has to supervise the removal of Jews in the entire field of the seven individual chambers and settles as highest authority all complaints and appeals of cultural workers whose membership was rejected by the Chamber because of lack of proof of Aryan descent. At the same time, it is the task of this department to supervise the activities of non-Aryans in the intellectual and entire cultural field, therefore, also the supervision of the only Jewish organization in the cultural field in the entire Reich territory, that is, the ‘Jewish _Kulturbund_’ (Jewish Cultural Association).

“In this way this department also cooperates with all other professional departments of the Ministry or the Chambers by consulting the local officials of the party, the State police offices, etc., and when supervising the Jewish ‘cultural work’ with the political police.

“It is mainly the merit of this department—to 1937 a department in the Managing Office of the Reich Chamber of Culture—that the purge of the entire German cultural life from Jewish or other non-German influences was completely accomplished according to the assignments of the Minister.” (_Das Reichsministerium fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_ (Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) pp. 30-31).

Funk contributed to the achievement of the Nazi propaganda program in other capacities. Thus, in 1933, Goebbels appointed him Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Reich Broadcasting Company (_3505-PS_). That company was the coordinating authority for all German radio broadcasting and supervised all German radio stations, with a view to insuring that radio serve the political purposes of the Nazi State (_Das Deutsche Fuehrerlexikon_, 1934-1935, p. 139; _3505-PS_). Moreover, in 1933, Funk was also appointed Vice-president of the _Filmkreditbank_. The _Filmkreditbank_ was a government-controlled financing corporation which influenced film production in the interests of the Nazi program by granting financial assistance in connection with only those films deemed desirable from the Nazi point of view (Seager, “_Der Film im Nationalsocialistischen Staat_” (“The Film in the National-Socialist State”), in Frank: “_Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch fuer Recht und Gesetzgebung_” (“National Socialist Handbook for Law and Legislation”), 1935, 2nd edition, p. 512). It is clear from the foregoing that Funk was from 1933 until the end of 1937 a versatile and key figure in the propaganda field. His activities ranged from daily conferences with the Fuehrer and the organization of a new large Ministry vital to the Nazi program, to depriving the most humble Jewish artist of his power to earn a livelihood. Funk appears to have been what Goebbels said he was: Goebbels’ “most effective man” (_3501-PS_).

C. _FUNK, AS MINISTER OF ECONOMICS, CONTINUED TO ADVANCE THE CONSPIRACY TO PERSECUTE THE JEWS BY ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE MEASURES WHICH ELIMINATED THE JEWS FROM THE GERMAN ECONOMY._

The systematic anti-Jewish program of the Nazi conspirators is discussed in Chapter XII. The evidence discussed below shows that Funk, by virtue of his activities as Minister of Economics, is responsible for the planning and execution of the program to exclude the Jews from the German economy.

The first record of Funk’s anti-Jewish activities as Minister of Economics consists of a series of decrees which he signed and which were designed to exclude the Jews from various occupations, such as real estate business, auctioneering, etc. Reference will be made to only a few of these decrees (Decree amending trade code of 6 July 1938, (_1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 832); decree concerning occupation of auctioneers, 12 February 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 202. Moreover, on 14 June 1938, Funk signed a decree providing for the registration of “Jewish enterprises” (_1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 627)). This decree was part of a system of economic persecution which obliterated Jewish ownership in all commercial, financial and industrial enterprises.

In 1938, the death of von Rath in Paris was exploited by the Nazis as a pretext for intensifying the persecution of the Jews. Their new anti-Jewish policy called for the complete elimination of Jews from the economic life of Germany. Funk took a significant part in both the formulation and execution of this policy.

Thus, he was present at the meeting of 12 November 1938, where, with Goering as the leading spirit, the basis for a more drastic policy against the Jews was established (_1816-PS_). Goering described the meeting as a decisive one, and demanded “that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved, one way or another.” (_1816-PS_). Funk came to the meeting with a draft law which he had prepared, and which he submitted with the following explanation:

“I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments, as well as independent artisan shops. They shall further be prohibited from keeping employees or offering any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January 1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser, as stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract, all claims of the employee, including all claims to maintenance become obliterated. That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of this law.” (_1816-PS_)

The substance of Funk’s draft law promptly found its way into the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. On 12 November 1938, Goering signed a decree entitled “For the Elimination of Jews from the German Economic Life” (_1662-PS_).

An examination of the provisions of the decree will reveal how well it deserved its title. Thus, Jews were forbidden to operate retail stores or mail order houses, or to engage independently in any handicraft, to offer goods or services at markets, or to take orders therefor (Section I): or to be “leaders” of any industrial enterprise. That decree also provided that any Jew in an executive position of an industrial enterprise was subject to notice of dismissal (Section 2), and that Jews should be excluded from membership in cooperative organizations (Section 3). Funk was expressly authorized in Section 4 of the decree to issue the regulations necessary for implementing its provisions (_1662-PS_).

Funk was also authorized to issue the regulations in connection with another anti-Jewish decree, also issued on 12 November 1938. This decree provided that all damage done to Jewish enterprises and apartments during the riots of 8, 9, and 10 November, was to be repaired by the Jewish owners out of their own pockets, and that claims by German Jews against insurance companies were to be confiscated in favor of the German Government (_1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1581).

Soon after the passage of the decree of 12 November, Funk, in a speech which he delivered on the Jewish question, made it clear that the program of economic persecution was a part of the larger program of extermination and boasted of the fact that the new program insured the complete elimination of the Jews from the German economy. In the course of this speech, Funk stated:

“The state and the economy constitute a unity. They must be directed according to the same principles. The best proof thereof has been rendered by the most recent development of the Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from the political life, but let them live and work in the economic sphere. The fact that the last violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German people, took place at a time when we were standing just before the termination of the economic measures for the elimination of the Jews from the German economy—this fact is a result of the other fact that in the last years we had not handled this problem sufficiently early and consistently. In any event, the basis of a complete elimination of the Jews also from the economy had already been laid by the decrees of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, General Field Marshal Goering, who was the first to undertake the solution of this problem. In the meantime, by means of Aryanization, performed under governmental supervision, the Jews had already been excluded completely from the stock exchanges and the banks and almost completely from the large businesses and all important industrial enterprises. According to estimates, of the net property of approximately 7 billion marks, determined pursuant to the decree for the registration of Jewish property, 2 billion marks have already been transferred into German possession.” (_3545-PS_).

On 3 December 1938, Funk again advanced the policy of economic extermination by signing a decree which carried out the promise of the more severe anti-Jewish policy implied in his above speech (_1409-PS_). This decree imposed additional and drastic economic disabilities upon Jews and subjected their property to confiscation and forced liquidation. It provided that: owners of Jewish enterprises could be ordered to sell or liquidate their enterprises (Section 1); trustees could be appointed for such enterprises, with the expenses of trusteeship borne by the owner of the enterprise (Section 2); Jews could be ordered to sell their property (real estate, etc.) (Section 6); Jews were prohibited from acquiring any real estate (Section 7); governmental consent was required for any disposition of real estate (Section 8); Jews were forced to deposit all stocks, mining shares, bonds, and other securities with specially designated banks, and accounts had to be marked “Jewish” (Section 11); Jews were forbidden to acquire, to give as security, or to sell objects made of gold, platinum, or silver, precious stones, or pearls, etc. (Section 14); and Jews could be required to make certain payments to the Reich before receiving the consent necessary for the transfer of their property (Section 15). (_1409-PS_).

In addition, many other decrees aiming at the economic ruin of the Jews were promulgated over the signature of the Minister of Economics. For example:

Decree, 23 November 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1642, signed by Brinkmann acting for Funk and containing detailed rules for the liquidation of Jewish retail stores, etc.;

Decree, 14 December 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1902, also signed by Brinkmann acting for Funk, and providing detailed rules for the elimination of Jews from industrial enterprises;

Decree, 8 May 1939, _1939 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 895, signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, excluding Jews from the occupation of travel agents;

Decree, 4 May 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 730, also signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, concerning registration of transfers of Jewish property;

Decree, 14 November 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1520, also signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, establishing a procedure for setting aside financial arrangements which Jews, discharged from executive positions of industrial enterprises prior to 12 November 1938, had made with their companies.

Extending certain of the above-described decrees to Austria, see, e.g.:

Decree, 22 August 1942, _1942 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 537, signed by von Hanneken, acting for Funk;

Decree, 4 December 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1564, signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk.

Funk had important responsibilities, not only in the formulation of anti-Jewish policy and in the drafting of anti-Jewish legislation, but also in the administration of the conspirators’ anti-Jewish measures. Funk was the person to whom appeals were made concerning action taken by subordinate officials in the administration of the anti-Jewish economic program. In fact, he was the paramount authority in this field; his decisions were final and conclusive. For example, he had the final voice in the administrative hierarchy set up for deciding whether an enterprise was a Jewish enterprise within the meaning of the decree requiring the registration of such enterprises (Decree of 14 June 1938, section 9, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 628; see also decree of 3 December 1938, section 19, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1711; decree, 14 November 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1520).

Nazi publications have recognized the significant contribution made by Funk to the anti-Jewish program. Thus Hans Quecke, an official of the German Ministry of Economics, in describing the work of the Ministry during Funk’s incumbency, stated:

“A task of special political significance and economic importance arose as an absolute necessity out of the National Socialist conception of state and economy, namely, _the eradication of Jewish influence from the economy_. In this connection, a wealth of legislative and administrative work, though temporary, was created for the Ministry. The steps of the work were as follows: definitions of the term ‘Jewish enterprise’, registration of Jewish property, securing the ‘deployment’ of such property in accordance with the interests of the German economy, exclusion of Jewish employees from executive positions, and, finally, re-examination of steps taken in the de-Judaization of enterprises with a view to ordering payments to the Reich for the unjust profits secured in the process of de-Judaization. That task can now be considered as practically completed in the field of the industrial economy.” (Building of the Third Reich (_Das Dritte Reich in Aufbau_) Vol. 5, pp. 318-319 (1941)).

Moreover, Funk himself, in the course of administering this program, emphasized the importance of his new role. For example, on 6 February 1939, he issued a circular in connection with the administration of the decree of 3 December 1938 which, as indicated, he himself signed. In that circular, which was published in the Ministerial Gazette of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior (“_Ministerialblatt des Reichs—und Preussischen Ministeriums des Innern_”), for 1939, No. 7, p. 265, Funk stressed (at p. 265) “the great political and economic importance” of the anti-Jewish program and stated with respect to the broad powers conferred by the decree of 3 December 1938, that:

“* * * The extent and speed with which they [the powers] will be utilized, is dependent upon _my_ orders, to be given under the general direction of Goering.”

In the same circular (at p. 265) Funk also emphasized the importance of the laws for de-Judaization, stating:

“The execution of the laws for the economic de-Judaization will, for a time, impose extraordinary burdens upon the administrative organization. However, it is expected that the officers charged with the execution, in view of the great political and economic importance of the tasks assigned to them, will bend all their efforts to assure a most rapid, efficient, and in every way faultless execution of the de-Judaization.”

Funk, in an interrogation dated 22 October 1945, admitted and deplored his responsibility for the economic persecution of the Jews:

“Q. All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were yours, were they not?

“A. * * * So far as my participation in this Jewish affair is concerned, that was my responsibility and I have regretted it later on that I ever did participate. The Party had always brought pressure to bear on me previously to make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish property, and I had refused repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and the force used against the Jews came into force, something legal had to be done to prevent the looting and confiscation of all Jewish property.

“Q. You know that the looting and all that was done at the instigation of the Party, don’t you?

“(_Here witness weeps_)

“A. Yes, most certainly. That is when I should have left in 1938, of that I am guilty, I am guilty. I admit that I am a guilty party here.” (_3544-PS_)

D. _FUNK WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ PLANS FOR AGGRESSION, ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN MOBILIZING THE GERMAN ECONOMY FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR: HE ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE WAGING OF AGGRESSIVE WARS AND WAS A MEMBER OF WAR PLANNING AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICIES AND ACTS CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF WAR._

Funk was vested with, and carried out, major responsibilities in connection with the planning and execution of the Nazi program of economic mobilization for aggression. Thus, in 1938 he succeeded Schacht as Minister of Economics (_3533-PS_).

Immediately before Funk actually took over the Reich Ministry of Economics there was a major reorganization of its functions, which integrated the Ministry with the Four Year Plan as the Supreme Command of the German military economy. The reorganization was accomplished by Goering, in his capacity as Commissar for the Four Year Plan, by a decree dated 4 February, 1938 (“The Four Year Plan” (_Der Vierjahresplan_) official monthly bulletin, issued by Goering, Vol. II, 1938, p. 105). Under this decree, the jurisdiction of the Economics Ministry was defined as covering the following fields of Germany’s economy: German raw and working materials, mining, iron industry, power industry, handicrafts, finance and credit, foreign trade, devisen, and exports. As a result of this decree, sectors of the German economy which were strategic in the organization of war and armaments economy were placed under the immediate control of Funk.

Furthermore, the Reich Office for Economic Development, charged by the decree, with “research, planning and execution of the Four Year Plan”, was incorporated into the Reich Ministry of Economics. Similarly, the Reich Office for Soil Research and the Office of the Reich Commissar for the exploitation of Scrap Materials were made subject to that Ministry. Thus, it is clear that the reorganization decree concentrated significant responsibilities in the hands of Funk and thereby made him one of the chief agents of economic mobilization during a decisive period.

Subsequently, Funk was, by a secret law, expressly charged with the task of mobilizing the German economy for war. On 4 September 1938, while the conspirators were engaged in intensive planning for aggression against Czechoslovakia, Hitler signed a revision of the so-called Reich Defense Law (_2194-PS_). This law conferred upon Funk substantially the same authority which had been vested in Schacht by the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (_2261-PS_). The law of 4 September 1938 provided in part:

“It is the task of the GBW [Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics] to put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation. To him are subordinate: the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture, the Reich Minister of Work, the Reich Chief of Forestry, the Reich Commissar for Price Control. He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich defense within the realm of the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reich Bank.

“The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry directed immediately by the OKW according to its demands. If the demands of the armed forces cannot be brought into accord with the affairs of economy, then the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor decides.

“The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws.” (_2194-PS_).

The law of 4 September 1938, which at the specific direction of Hitler was not made public, was signed by Hitler and by Funk, among others, as “Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics” (_2194-PS_).

Funk, in a speech which he delivered on 14 October 1939, explained how he, as Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics, had, for a year and a half prior to the launching of the aggression against Poland, advanced Germany’s economic preparation for war. He stated:

“Although all the economic and financial departments were harnessed in the tasks and work of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of _Generalfeldmarschall_ Goering, the war economic preparation of Germany has also been advanced in secret in another sector for well over a year, namely, by means of the formation of a national guiding apparatus for the special war economic tasks, which had to be mastered at that moment, when the condition of war became a fact. For this work as well all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, namely under the General Plenipotentiary for Economy, to which position the Fuehrer appointed me one and a half years ago.” (_3324-PS_)

In his dual capacity of Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics and Minister of Economics, Funk naturally was advised of the requirements which the conspirators’ program of aggression imposed on the economy. Thus, during a conference in the Reich Aviation Ministry on 14 October 1938 under the chairmanship of Goering, Goering referred to Hitler’s orders for an abnormal increase of armament, particularly weapons for attack, and directed the Ministry of Economics to submit suggestions on how to finance this rearmament by increasing exports. The report of Goering’s remarks states in part:

“General Field Marshal Goering opened the session by declaring that he intended to give directives about the work for the next months. Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks like and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which he will overcome with utmost energy and ruthlessness.

“The amount of foreign exchange has completely dwindled on account of the preparation for the Czech Enterprise and this makes it necessary that it should be strongly increased immediately. Furthermore, the foreign credits have been greatly overdrawn and thus the strongest export activity—stronger than up to now—is in the foreground. For the next weeks an increased export was first priority in order to improve the foreign exchange situation. The Reich Ministry for Economy should make a plan about raising the export activity by pushing aside the current difficulties which prevent export.

“These gains made through the export are to be used for increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the export activity. He received the order from the Fuehrer to increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority. Within the shortest time the air force is to be increased five fold, also the navy should get armed more rapidly and the army should procure large amounts of offensive weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go; especially fuel, powder and explosives are moved into the foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.” (_1301-PS_).

Goering’s words were the words of one already at war. And the emphasis on quintupling the Air Force and accelerating weapon manufacture for attack, were the words of a man waging aggressive war.

Funk actively participated in the planning of wartime financial measures (_1301-PS_). This was natural since Funk, after 1938, occupied three positions crucial to finance: Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank (to which he was appointed in January 1939), and Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics. Funk’s role in war financing is illustrated by a letter, dated 1 June 1939, from the Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics (Funk), signed on his behalf by Dr. Posse (_3562-PS_). This letter found in the captured files of the Reich Ministry of Economics, transmitted the minutes of a meeting concerning the financing of the war. This meeting had been held under the chairmanship of Dr. Landfried, Funk’s Undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics. The document bears a marginal note in the bottom left hand corner, dated 5 June, stating that the document was “to be shown to the Minister” [i.e., Funk]. Only eight copies were made of the Minutes, which were marked “Top Secret”. Four of these copies were sent to officials directly subordinate to Funk (two in the Reich Ministry of Economics, one in the Reichsbank, and one in the Office of the Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics). During the course of the meeting, which was attended by twelve officials, five of whom were directly responsible to Funk in his various capacities, the conferees discussed a memorandum regarding war finance which had been prepared by the Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics on May 9, 1939. The minutes of this meeting state:

“* * * Then a report was made of the contents of the ‘Notes on the Question of Internal Financing of War’, of 9 May of this year (appendix to GBW 8/2179/39 Top Secret), in which the figures given to me by the Reichs Minister of Finance are also discussed. It was pointed out that the General Plenipotentiary for the Economy is primarily interested to introduce into the legislation for war finance, the idea of financing war expenditures by anticipating future revenues, to be expected after the war. * * *

“Undersecretary Newman, first, submitted for discussion the question whether the production would be able to meet to the assumed extent, the demands of the Army, especially if the demands of the Army, as stated in the above report, would increase to approximately 14 billions in the first three months of war. He stated that, if the production potential of the present Reich territory is taken as a basis, he doubts the possibility of such a production increase.” (_3562-PS_).

During the course of the meeting one of the representatives of the High Command stated:

“The demands of the Army would probably be higher in the first three months of war than during the further course of the war.” (_3562-PS_).

In the files of the Reich Ministry of Economics there was also found, attached to the above letter and minutes, a Top Secret memorandum entitled “Notes Concerning Financing of War.” That memorandum reveals the plans to use the resources of countries to be occupied in the interest of the Nazi war machine. It states:

“* * * First, as concerns the scope of the total production, it is clear that the economic power of the Protectorate and of other territories, possibly to be acquired, must of course be completely exhausted for the purposes of the conduct of the war. It is, however, just as clear that these territories cannot obtain any compensation from the economy of Greater Germany for the products which they will have to give us during the war, because their power must be used fully for the war and for supplying the civilian home population.” (_3562-PS_).

It is plain that Funk exercised comprehensive authority over large areas of the German economy whose proper organization and direction were critical to effective war preparation. The once powerful German military machine, which rested on the foundation of thorough economic preparation, reflected the contribution which Funk had made to Nazi aggression.

Immediately before this machine was directed against Poland, the final preparatory steps were taken, and the previous appointment of Funk as Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics was made public. Thus on 27 August 1939, Funk, in this capacity, issued two decrees, one introducing general rationing of consumers’ goods, the other setting up regional economic authorities (_1939 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, pp. 1495 and 1498).

Finally, on 30 August 1939, Hitler, Goering, and Lammers signed a decree establishing the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, composed of Goering, Funk, and Hess, among others, to act as a War Cabinet (_1939 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1532).

Funk mobilized the German economy for war with full knowledge of the plans for military aggression. An irresistible inference of such knowledge arises from the combination of several factors: from Funk’s long and intimate association with the Nazi inner circle; from the very nature of his official functions; from the war-dominated setting of Nazi Germany; from the fact that force and the threat of force had become the open and primary instruments of Nazi policy; and finally from the fact that at the same time that Funk was making economic preparations, specific plans for aggression—later to be carried out—were being formulated, plans which could only be effective if they were synchronized with the complementary economic measures.

The inference of Funk’s knowledge and intent is reinforced beyond question by considering, in the light of the factors described above, the more specific evidence of Funk’s knowledge of aggressive plans. Thus, Funk, at the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, had stated that the absorption of Austria by Germany was a political and economic necessity, and that it would be achieved by whatever means were necessary (_1760-PS_).

Goering had issued instructions to the Ministry of Economics—in the language of a man waging aggressive war (_1301-PS_). Moreover, Funk and his subordinates in May 1939 were making detailed plans for financing the war, that is, a particular war, the war against Poland (_3562-PS_).

In connection with Funk’s economic planning for aggression, reference should be made to other evidence of the preparatory work which Funk carried on prior to the aggression against Poland. Shortly before the attack on Poland, in a letter to Hitler dated 25 August 1939, Funk expressed his gratification for his role in the “tremendous events” of these days, and his thanks for Hitler’s approval of his economic war measures. He concluded by giving Hitler his pledge in that hour (_699-PS_). The text of the letter is as follows:

“Reich Minister Walther Funk.

Berlin W. 8, August 25, 1939. Unter Den Linden 13.

“My Fuehrer:

“For the congratulations which you transmitted to me on my birthday, in such extremely friendly and kind fashion, I want to thank you from the depths of my heart. How happy and how grateful we must be to you to be favored to experience these colossal and world-moving times, and that we can contribute to the tremendous events of these days.

“General-Field-Marshal Goering informed me, that last night you—my Fuehrer—have approved in principle the measures prepared by me for financing the war, for setting up the wage and price systems and for carrying out the plan for an emergency contribution [_Notopfer_]. This news has made me deeply happy. I hereby most obediently report to you that I have succeeded, through the provisions made already during the last month, to make the German Reichsbank internally so strong and so safe against attack from without that even the most serious disturbances of the international currency and credit systems would be absolutely unable to affect us.

“In the meantime I have in a wholly inconspicuous manner converted into gold all assets of the Reichsbank and of the German economy abroad on which we could possibly lay hands. With the proposals worked out by me regarding a ruthless choking of any unessential consumption and any public expenditure and project not necessary for war we will be able to meet all financial and economic demands without any serious reverberations.

“In my capacity as General Plenipotentiary for Economics, appointed by you, my Fuehrer, I have regarded it as my duty to give you this report and this pledge in this hour.

“Heil, my Fuehrer “(signed) Walther Funk”. (_699-PS_).

Funk both personally and through duly designated representatives also participated in the planning which preceded the aggression against the USSR. Thus, in April 1941, Rosenberg, after he had been appointed deputy for centralized treatment of problems concerning the Eastern Territories, discussed with Funk the economic problems which would be raised when the plans for aggression in the East were carried out (_1039-PS_). At that time Funk appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his deputy to work with Rosenberg in connection with the exploitation of the Eastern Territories. Funk’s deputy met with Rosenberg almost daily.

E. _FUNK WAS A MEMBER OF WAR-PLANNING AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICIES AND ACTS CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF WAR._

After the launching of the Nazi aggression against Poland, Funk, in his capacities as Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics, and as a member of the Central Planning Board (to which he was appointed in September 1943), actively participated in the waging of aggressive war on the economic front. Moreover, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, which formulated and directed the execution of the program for the enslavement, exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, Funk shares special responsibility for the Nazi Slave Labor Program. (See Chapter X on the Slave Labor Program. This special aspect of Funk’s responsibility was left for development by the French prosecuting staff.)

F. _CONCLUSION._

It is clear that Funk was a central figure in the Nazi conspiracy and that, as a member of the Nazi inner circle, he helped formulate, was aware of, and promoted the realization of, the conspirators’ program. He knew, moreover, that this program envisaged the use of terror and force within and if necessary outside of Germany, and that it contemplated the use of criminal means. Funk, by promoting the conspirators’ accession to power and the realization of their program, signified his approval of such crimes.

The evidence has also established that, after the Nazi seizure of power, Funk promoted the achievement of the conspirators’ program by virtue of his activities in the Ministry of Propaganda, activities which fomented and carried out the persecution of Jews and dissidents; which psychologically mobilized the German people for aggressive war; and which reduced the willingness and capacity of the conspirators’ intended victims to resist aggression. Funk also participated, as Minister of Economics, in the formulation and execution of the policy for the complete elimination of the Jews from the German economy.

As Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics, Funk mobilized the German economy for aggressive war, with full knowledge of the conspirators’ plans for aggression. Moreover, in these capacities, and as a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense and the Central Planning Board, he also actively participated in the waging of aggressive wars. Finally, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, which formulated and directed the execution of the program for the enslavement, exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, he bears a special responsibility for the war crimes committed in the execution of that program.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WALTER FUNK

12. HJALMAR SCHACHT

The prosecution concedes, at the outset, that although Schacht believed that the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, he was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi Party’s program which involved the wholesale extermination of the Jews, and that he was, for that reason, attacked from time to time by the more extreme elements of the Nazi Party. It further concedes that Schacht, on occasion, gave aid and comfort to individual Jews who sought to escape the indignities generally inflicted upon Jews in Nazi Germany. Schacht’s attitude towards the Jews is exemplified by his speech at the German Eastern Fair, Koenigsberg, on 18 August 1935, wherein he said:

“The Jew must realize that their influence is gone for all times. We desire to keep our people and our culture pure and distinctive, just as the Jews have always demanded this of themselves since the time of the prophet Ezra. But the solution of these problems must be brought about under state leadership, and cannot be left to unregulated individual actions, which mean a disturbing influence on the national

The foregoing concessions should render it unnecessary for Schacht to produce evidence upon these matters.

The prosecution’s case against Schacht is that he planned and prepared for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, and that he knowingly and wilfully participated in the Nazi common plan or conspiracy to plan, prepare, initiate, and wage such wars. The evidence establishes that Schacht actively supported Hitler’s accession to power; that he was the chief architect of the financial plans and devices which made possible the huge program of rearmament in Germany; that he played a dominant role in the economic planning of, and preparation for, wars of aggression; and that he contributed his efforts willingly and with full knowledge of the fact that the leader of the conspiracy, Adolf Hitler, was determined upon attaining his objectives by launching aggressive wars.

A. _CHRONOLOGY OF SCHACHT’S OFFICIAL POSITIONS._

The chronology of Schacht’s official positions is as follows:

(1) Schacht was recalled by Hitler to the Presidency of the Reichsbank on 17 March 1933 (_3021-PS_).

(2) Schacht was appointed acting Minister of Economics by Hitler in August 1934 (_3021-PS_).

(3) By secret decree, Schacht was appointed General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in May 1935 (_2261-PS_).

(4) Schacht was awarded honorary membership in the Nazi Party and the Golden Swastika on 30 January 1937, “the highest honor the Third Reich has to offer” (_EC-500_).

(5) Schacht was re-appointed for one year as President of the Reichsbank on 16 March 1937 (_3021-PS_).

(6) Schacht resigned as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in November 1937 (_3021-PS_; _EC-494_).

(7) Hitler appointed Schacht Minister Without Portfolio at the same time (_3021-PS_).

(8) Schacht was re-appointed for a four year term as President of the Reichsbank on 9 March 1938 (_3021-PS_).

(9) Schacht was dismissed as President of the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. In connection therewith, Hitler expressed his deep gratitude for Schacht’s past services and his gratification that Schacht would remain to serve him as Minister Without Portfolio (_EC-397_).

(10) Schacht remained as Minister Without Portfolio until January 1943, when he was dismissed by Hitler. During the period from the time of his dismissal as President of the Reichsbank until the end of 1942, he continued to receive the full salary he had been paid as the President of the Reichsbank, and thereafter received a pension from the Reichsbank. As Minister Without Portfolio, he received a large salary from the Nazi Government and other emoluments of the office (_3724-PS_).

B. _PRIOR TO 1933, SCHACHT ACCEPTED THE NAZI PROGRAM AND HELPED HITLER TO POWER._

Schacht met Goering for the first time in December 1930, and Hitler early in January 1931, at Goering’s house. He thought that Hitler was “full of will and spirit” and a man “with whom one could cooperate”. Thereafter, he actively supported Hitler’s accession to power (_3725-PS_; _3729-PS_).

Schacht’s belief in the Nazi program and his undivided loyalty to Hitler are revealed in his letter to Hitler dated 29 August 1932, wherein he pledged continued support to Hitler after the latter’s poor showing in the July 1932 elections and proferred advice concerning electioneering tactics. The letter includes the following statements, _inter alia_:

“But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a word of most sincere sympathy. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long. * * *”

* * * * * *

“Wherever my work may take me in the near future even if you should see me one day within the fortress—you can always count on me as your reliable assistant.” (_EC-457_).

Subsequently, on 12 November 1932, he again wrote to Hitler, congratulating him upon his firm attitude and stating:

“I have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to your becoming chancellor. * * * I am quite confident that the present system is certainly doomed to disintegration.” (_EC-456_).

The fact that Schacht was in complete accord with Hitler’s program is further shown by the following entry of 21 November 1932, in Goebbels’ diary:

“In a conversation with Dr. Schacht, I assured myself that he absolutely represents our point of view. He is one of the few who accepts the Fuehrer’s position entirely.” (_2409-PS_).

Schacht has himself confirmed the correctness of Goebbels’ statement (_3729-PS_).

But Schacht’s contribution to Hitler before his accession to power did not consist merely of comforting him, giving advice, and expressing agreement with the Nazi program. He was an active participant in Hitler’s vigorous campaign to take over the German state. Thus, he openly lent the prestige of his name, which was widely known in banking, financial, and business circles, to Hitler’s cause (_3729-PS_). He actively undertook to induce business leaders to support Hitler. In his letter to Hitler of 12 November 1932, he wrote that:

“It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of signatures from business circles for this purpose (your becoming Chancellor) was not altogether in vain * * *.” (_EC-456_)

He organized the financial means for the decisive March 1933 election, at a meeting of Hitler with a group of German industrialists in Berlin. At this meeting, Hitler bluntly announced his plans to destroy the parliamentary system in Germany, to crush all internal opposition by force, to restore the power of the Wehrmacht, and to gain his objectives outside of Germany by the use of force. On this occasion, Schacht collected a campaign fund of several million Marks for Hitler’s use (_D-203_; _EC-439_).

In an eulogy of Schacht on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, the _Voelkischer Beobachter_, Hitler’s official organ, aptly described Schacht’s activity in the period before the 1933 election as follows:

“In this critical period, Schacht never failed to point at Adolf Hitler as the only possible leader of the Reich.”

* * * * * *

“The name of Dr. Schacht will remain linked with the transition of the German economy to the new National Socialist methods” (_EC-499_).

C. _SCHACHT PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF REARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR WAR._

Germany was virtually prostrate in the early part of 1933; she was faced with dwindling revenues from taxation and seemingly unable to raise money either through external or internal loans. Hitler entrusted to Schacht the task of wringing from the depressed German economy the tremendous material requirements of armed aggression, and endowed him with vast powers over every sector of German industry, commerce, and finance to carry out that task. Some of the devices which Schacht employed to fulfill his mission will now be examined.

Schacht’s program, as hereinafter outlined, was, by his own admissions, dedicated to the accomplishment of Hitler’s armament program. In a memorandum to Hitler dated 3 May 1935 concerning the financing of armament, Schacht wrote:

“The following comments are based on the assumption that the accomplishment of the armament program in regard to speed and extent, is _the_ task of German policy, and that therefore everything else must be subordinated to this aim, although the reaching of this main goal must not be imperiled by neglecting other questions. * * *”

* * * * * *

“* * * all expenditures which are not urgently needed in other matters, must stop and the entire, in itself small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated toward the one goal: to arm.” (_1168-PS_).

In a letter to General Thomas dated 29 December 1937, Schacht stated:

“I have always considered a rearmament of the German people as _conditio sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.” (_EC-257_).

Schacht’s vast achievements in furtherance of the conspirators’ program may conveniently be considered under four headings: (a) armament financing; (b) the “New Plan”; (c) control of production; and (d) plans and preparations for economic controls during war.

(1) _Armament Financing._

(_a_) _Mefo bills._ The financing of the conspirators’ huge rearmament program presented a twofold problem to Schacht. First, was the need of obtaining funds over and above the amount which could be obtained through taxation and public loans. Second, was the conspirators’ desire, in the early stages of rearmament, to conceal the extent of their feverish armament activities. Schacht’s answer to the problem was the “mefo” bills, a scheme which he devised for the exclusive use of armament financing (_EC-436_).

Transactions in “mefo” bills worked as follows: “mefo” bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited liability company called the _Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft_, m.b.H.(MEFO). This company was merely a dummy organization; it had a nominal capital of only one million Reichsmarks. “Mefo” bills ran for six months, but provision was made for extensions running consecutively for three months each. The drawer could present his “mefo” bills to any German bank for discount at any time, and these banks, in turn, could rediscount the bills at the Reichsbank at any time within the last three months of their earliest maturity. The amount of “mefo” bills outstanding was a guarded state secret (_EC-436_). The “mefo” bill system continued to be used until 1 April 1938, when 12 billion Reichsmarks of “mefo” bills were outstanding (_EC-436_). This method of financing enabled the Reich to obtain credit from the Reichsbank which, under existing statutes, it could not directly have obtained. Direct lending to the Government by the Reichsbank had been limited by statute to 100 million Reichsmarks (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1924, II, p. 241). Schacht has conceded that his “mefo” bill device “enabled the Reichsbank to lend by a subterfuge to the Government what it normally or legally could not do” (_3728-PS_).

In a speech delivered on 29 November 1938, Schacht glowingly described the credit policy of the Reichsbank of which he was the author as follows:

“It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetimes carried on such a daring credit policy at the Reichsbank since the seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none, and this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy.” (_EC-611_).

The “daring credit policy,” which made possible the creation of “an armament second to none,” obviously embraced the “mefo” bill financing which he had contrived.

(_b_) _Use of funds of opponents of Nazi regime._ In his efforts to draw upon every possible source of funds for the conspirators’ rearmament program, Schacht even used the blocked funds of foreigners’ deposits in the Reichsbank. In his memorandum to Hitler of 3 May 1935, Schacht boasted:

“The Reichsbank invested the major part of Reichsbank accounts owned by foreigners, and which were accessible to the Reichsbank, in armament drafts. Our armaments are, therefore, being financed partially with the assets of our political opponents.” (_1168-PS_).

(_c_) _Taxation and long term indebtedness._ “Mefo” bills and the funds of political opponents of the conspirators were, of course, not the only sources from which Schacht drew to finance the armament program. Funds for rearmament were likewise derived from taxation and an increase in public debt—channels through which part of national income is ordinarily diverted to public authorities. But what distinguished the conspirators’ program of public indebtedness was the fact that the German capital market was completely harnessed to the expanding needs of the Nazi war machine. By a series of controls, they reduced to the minimum consistent with their rearmament program, all private issues which might have competed with Government issues for the limited funds in the capital market. Thus, the capital market was, in effect, pre-empted for Government issues (_EC-497_; _EC-611_).

During the period from 31 December 1932 to 30 June 1938, the funded debt of the Reich rose from 10.4 billion Marks to 19 billion Marks (_EC-419_).

This large increase in funded debt was dedicated “as far as possible” to “the financing of armament and the Four-Year Plan” (_EC-611_).

(2) _The New Plan._ The conspirators’ grandiose armament plans obviously required huge quantities of raw materials. Schacht was a proponent of the view that as much of the requisite raw materials as possible should be produced within Germany. At the same time, however, he recognized that large imports of raw materials were indispensable to the success of the conspirators’ gigantic armament program. To that end, he fashioned an intricate system of controls and devices which he called the “New Plan” (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, I, pp. 816, 829, 864; _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, I, p. 105).

There were three main features of the “New Plan” as devised by Schacht: (1) restriction of the demand for such foreign exchange as would be used for purposes unrelated to the conspirators’ rearmament program; (2) increase of the supply of foreign exchange, as a means of paying for essential imports which could not otherwise be acquired; and (3) clearing agreements and other devices obviating the need for foreign exchange. Under the “New Plan”, economic transactions between Germany and the outside world were no longer governed by the autonomous price mechanism; they were determined by a number of Government agencies whose primary aim was to satisfy the needs of the conspirators’ military economy (_EC-437_).

Schacht accomplished the negative task of restricting the demand for foreign exchange

“by various measures suspending the service on Germany’s foreign indebtedness, by freezing other claims of foreigners on Germany, by a stringent system of export controls and by eliminating foreign travel and other unessential foreign expenditures.” (_EC-437_).

In order to increase the available supply of foreign exchange

“Schacht repeatedly requisitioned all existing foreign exchange reserves of German residents, required all foreign exchange arising out of current exports and other transactions to be sold to the Reichsbank, and by developing new export markets. Exports were encouraged by direct subsidies and by accepting partial payment in German foreign bonds or in restricted Marks which could be acquired by foreign importers at a substantial discount.” (_EC-437_).

A vast network of organizations was erected to effectuate these various measures. Suffice it for the present purposes to mention merely one of these organizations: the supervisory agencies (_Ueberwachungsstellen_). These agencies, which were under Schacht’s control as Minister of Economics, decided whether given imports and exports were desirable; whether the quantities, prices, credit terms, and countries involved were satisfactory; and, in short, whether any particular transaction advanced the conspirators’ armament program. The overriding military purpose of the series of controls instituted under the “New Plan” is plainly shown in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937 to Goering, wherein he said:

“* * * The very necessity of bringing our armament up to a certain level as rapidly as possible must place in the foreground the idea of as large returns as possible in foreign exchange and therewith the greatest possible assurance of raw material supplies, through exporting.” (_EC-497_)

There remains for consideration that aspect of the “New Plan” which involved extensive use of clearing agreements and other arrangements made by Schacht to obtain materials from abroad without the expenditure of foreign exchange. The principle of the clearing system is as follows: The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus, if trade between two countries is unequal, the clearing agency of one acquires a claim against the agency of the other. That claim, however, is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an offsetting claim.

This device was used by Schacht as a means of exploiting Germany’s position as Europe’s largest consumer in order to acquire essential raw materials from countries which, because of the world wide economic depression, were dependent upon the German market as an outlet for their surplus products. Speaking of his system of obtaining materials abroad without the use of foreign exchange, Schacht has stated:

“It has been shown that, in contrast to everything which classical national economy has hitherto taught, not the producer but the consumer is the ruling factor in economic life. And this thesis is somewhat connected with general social and political observations, because it establishes the fact that the number of consumers is considerably larger than the number of producers, a fact which exercises a not inconsiderable social and political pressure.” (_EC-611_)

Schacht’s clearing agreements were particularly effective in Southeastern Europe, where agricultural exports had been considerably curtailed by competition from the more extensive and efficient overseas agriculture. The success of Schacht’s ruthless use of Germany’s bargaining position is indicated by the fact that by August 1937, there had been imported into Germany approximately one half billion Reichsmarks of goods in excess of the amount delivered under the clearing arrangements. In his letter to Goering dated 5 August 1937, Schacht stated:

“* * * in clearing transactions with countries furnishing raw materials and food products we have bought in excess of the goods we were able to deliver to these countries (namely, Southeastern Europe and Turkey) roughly one half billion RM * * *.” (_EC-497_)

Thus, through this device, Schacht was able to extract huge loans from foreign countries which Germany could not have obtained through ordinary channels. The device as developed by Schacht was subsequently used during the war as a means of systematically exploiting the occupied countries of Western Europe.

In addition to the clearing agreements, Schacht devised the system which came to be known as the “aski” accounts. This scheme likewise obviated the need for free currency (i.e. Reichsmarks freely convertible into foreign currency at the official rate—U. S. dollars, pounds sterling, etc). The system worked as follows: The German foreign exchange control administration would authorize imports of goods in specified quantities and categories on the condition that the foreign sellers agreed to accept payment in the form of Mark credits to accounts of a special type held in German banks. These accounts were called “aski”, an abbreviation of _Auslander Sonderkonten fuer Inlandszahlungen_ (foreigners’ special accounts for inland payments). The so-called “aski” Marks in such an account could be used to purchase German goods only for export to the country of the holder of the account; they could not be converted into foreign currency at the official rates of exchange. Each group of “aski” accounts formed a separate “island of exchange” in which the German authorities, under Schacht’s leadership, could apply their control as the country’s bargaining position in each case seemed to warrant.

Schacht’s ingenious devices were eminently successful. They admirably served the conspirators’ need of obtaining materials which were necessary to create and maintain their war machine. On this point, Schacht has stated:

“The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was throttled by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102 and of rubber by 71 percent.”

* * * * * *

“These figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the execution of the armament program as well as to the securing of our food.” (_EC-611_)

(3) _Production Control._ As an additional means of assuring that the conspirators’ military needs would be met, Schacht adopted a host of controls over the productive mechanism of Germany, extending, _inter alia_, to the allocation of raw materials, regulation of productive capacity, use of abundant or synthetic substitutes in place of declining stocks of urgently needed materials, and the erection of new capacity for the production of essential commodities. The structure of regulation was built up out of thousands of decrees in which governmental agencies under Schacht’s control issued permits, prohibitions, and instructions. These decrees were the outgrowth of carefully laid plans of the Ministry of Economics, of which Schacht was the head, concerning “economic preparation for the conduct of war”, and in accordance with its view that “genuine positive economic mobilization” demanded that “exact instructions for every individual commercial undertaking are laid down by a central authority” (_EC-128_).

The plan to allocate raw materials was carried out through myriad “orders to produce” specifying that certain commodities must or must not be produced; “orders to process or use” prescribing the type and quantity of raw material which could or could not be used in the production of a given commodity; orders specifying that scarce raw materials could be used only as admixtures with more plentiful but inferior products; and other like measures. The precise details of these orders are unimportant for present purposes. Their significance lies in the fact that they were governed by a central purpose: preparation for war. In the above mentioned secret report issued in September 1934 by the Ministry of Economics it was said:

“Rules are to be initiated for the allotment of scarce raw materials etc.; and their use and processing for other than war, or otherwise absolutely vital, goods is prohibited.” (_EC-128_)

The military aspects of Schacht’s plans to increase the production of scarce raw materials within Germany, and thereby reduce Germany’s dependence upon foreign countries for materials needed in the rearmament program, are likewise revealed in the aforementioned report of the Ministry of Economics of September 1934:

“The investigations initiated by the Raw Materials Commission and the measures introduced for enlarging our raw materials basis through home production as well as for furthering the production of substitute materials will directly benefit war economy preparations.” (_EC-128_)

(4) _Plans and Preparations for Economic Controls During War._ Pursuant to the unpublished Reich Defense Law secretly enacted on 21 May 1935, Schacht was appointed General Plenipotentiary for War Economy by Hitler. Under this law, Schacht was placed in complete charge of economic planning and preparation for war in peacetime, except for the direct production of armaments which was entrusted to the Ministry of War; and upon the outbreak of war, Schacht was to be the virtual economic dictator of Germany. His task was “to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically”. In order to facilitate his task, the Ministers of Economy, Food and Agriculture, Labor, and Forestry were subordinated to him, and he was authorized “within his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing regulations”. The necessity for absolute secrecy was stressed (_2261-PS_).

Schacht appointed Wohlthat as his deputy General Plenipotentiary for War Economy and organized a staff to carry out his directives. Schacht has admitted that he must accept full responsibility for the actions of these subordinates (_3729-PS_).

Before his resignation in late 1937, Schacht had worked out in amazing detail his plans and preparations for the German economy in the forthcoming war. Recognizing that wartime controls, to be effective, must be based on adequate information, Schacht had directed the completion of comprehensive surveys of 180,000 industrial plants in Germany and had compiled statistics concerning

“* * * the composition of the labor force as to sex, age, and training, the consumption of raw and auxiliary material, fuels, power, the productive capacity, the domestic and foreign trade as well as the supply of material and products in the beginning and at the end of the year.” (_EC-258_)

On the basis of the statistical data thus collected, plans had been formulated by the end of 1937 wherein

“* * * the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian minimum needs in wartime are compared with the covering thereof by supplies and production.” (_EC-258_)

The supervisory boards, which were briefly described above in connection with the import and export controls, were charged with “preparing their orders for the regulation of war contracts and fees”, and were instructed to coordinate with various Reich manpower authorities to secure “their indispensable personnel” (_EC-258_).

Special measures were taken under Schacht’s direction, to maintain “mobilization stocks” of coal and to assure their distribution in accordance with the wartime needs of armament factories and large consumers. Large “gasoline storage places” were constructed for use of the Wehrmacht and “gasoline stations and gasoline stores” were designated “for the first equipment of the troops in case of mobilization”. Careful plans were also made for the allocation of power during war, and practice manoeuvers were held in order to determine “what measures have to be taken in case places of power generation should be eliminated” (_EC-258_).

Evacuation plans for the removal of war materials, agricultural products, skilled workers, and animals from military zones were worked out by the Office of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy with characteristic thoroughness. Thus, “the supplies and skilled workers in the evacuation zones” were “registered, earmarked for transportation into certain salvage areas and registered with the _Wehrkreiskommandos_ by the field offices of evacuation and salvaging plans” (_EC-258_).

Detailed plans for a system of rationing to become effective immediately upon mobilization had already been made by the end of 1937:

“The 80 million ration cards necessary for this purpose have already been printed and deposited with the Landrats, Chief Mayors, and corresponding authorities. The further distribution of the ration cards to the individual households is prepared by these authorities to take place within 24 hours after mobilization has been ordered.” (_EC-258_).

Trusted persons whose reliability had been attested to by the Secret State Police were installed in important enterprises and charged with the execution of “measures which guarantee the maintenance of production of their enterprises in the event of mobilization”. Their functions likewise extended, among other matters, to applying “for exemptions from military service” of “employees who are indispensable to their enterprise”, and seeking immunity from requisition by the Wehrmacht of all motor trucks which were needed in the enterprises to which they were assigned (_EC-258_).

Pursuant to directives issued by Schacht as Plenipotentiary, labor authorities of the Government ascertained “the available amount of manpower, the wartime requirements of manpower and measures for the covering of the wartime needs”. The wartime needs were to be met in part “by using reserve manpower (manpower theretofore used in non-essential enterprises, women, etc.)”, and by making “every change of working place and every hiring of workers dependent upon the consent of the Labor Office” (_EC-258_).

The foregoing measures, it should be noted, are merely representative; they are not exhaustive. But enough appears to make it abundantly clear that Schacht’s contribution, by any standard was an extraordinarily important one. Enough appears, moreover, to give particular emphasis to the following observations of the Honorable George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin from 1930 to 1934:

“It was his [Schacht’s] financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.

“The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht’s resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an Armed Force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war.” (_EC-451_).

D. _SCHACHT PARTICIPATED IN THE NAZI CONSPIRACY PURPOSELY, WILLINGLY, AND WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ITS ILLEGAL AIMS AND METHODS._

(1) _He was a faithful adherent of Hitler._ It has already been demonstrated that even before Hitler’s accession to power, Schacht aligned himself with Hitler and accepted his program. Schacht’s utterances after Hitler had entrenched himself in power clearly show that he remained a faithful servant of Hitler despite the series of outrages committed under Hitler’s direction.

At the opening of the Leipzig Fair on 4 March 1935, Schacht said:

“My so-called foreign friends don’t render any services to me or the cause, which they don’t want anyway, of course, but not even to themselves, if they try to construe a contrast between me and the allegedly impossible economic theories of National Socialism and represent me as a sort of guardian of economic reason. I assure you that all that I am doing and saying enjoys the absolute approval of the Fuehrer and that I would never do or say anything that does not have his approval. Not I but the Fuehrer is the guardian of economic reason.” (_EC-503_)

On the occasion of the unveiling of Hitler’s bust in the vestibule of the Reichsbank on 31 July 1935, Schacht said:

“Germany stays and falls with the success of the policy of Hitler.” (_EC-415_)

At a ceremony in connection with the creation of the Economic Chamber for Pomerania in Stettin on 19 January 1936, Schacht denied that there was any disagreement between Hitler and his collaborators, and went on to say:

“In Germany there is fortunately only one policy and one economic policy, namely that of Adolf Hitler; to work with him and for his goals is the highest satisfaction for every member of the people’s community.” (_EC-502_)

In May 1936, Schacht was attacked by some of the more radical elements of the Nazi Party because he had rejected their “partially irrational ideas” concerning armament financing. In repelling these attacks, Schacht emphasized at a secret meeting of the Ministers on 12 May 1936, that his program of financing armaments had meant “the commitment of the last reserve from the very beginning”; and he announced that despite the attacks, he would continue to work because he

“* * * stands with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he fully recognizes the basic idea of National Socialism and because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be considered irrelevant.” (_1301-PS_).

So far as appears, Schacht did not become a member of the Nazi Party until January 1937. Franz Reuter, whose biography of Schacht was officially published in Germany in 1937, has stated that Schacht’s becoming a regular Party member was only a question of secondary importance, and even part of a carefully planned policy, for,

“By not doing so—at least until the final assertion, and victory of the Party—he [Schacht] was able to assist it [the Party] much better than he would have been able to do had he become an official Party member.” (_EC-460_)

On 30 January 1937, Hitler bestowed the Golden Party Badge upon Schacht, in recognition of his “special services to Party and State.” Schacht accepted this hallmark of approval by the Fuehrer with effusive thanks and a pledge of continued support. In his speech of acceptance, Schacht stated:

“The presentation of the Golden Badge of the Movement is the highest honor the Third Reich has to offer. In honoring me as the head of the Reichsbank and the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics, it honors at the same time the two agencies which I am directing as well as the work of all those officials, employees and workers functioning in these two agencies.”

* * * * * *

“I thank all my colleagues among the ranks of officials, employees, and workers for their faithfulness in the performance of their work, and appeal to all of them further to devote, with all their hearts, their entire strength to the Fuehrer and the Reich. The German future lies in the hands of our Fuehrer.” (_EC-500_)

The depths of adulation were reached in a speech which Schacht delivered on the occasion of Hitler’s 48th birthday in April 1937. Schacht spoke as one of Hitler’s “closest collaborators,” who had seen at first hand the difficulties which beset the Fuehrer in the relentless march toward his goals. In his speech, Schacht stated:

“With the limitless passion of a burning heart and the infallible instinct of the born statesman, Adolf Hitler has won for himself the soul of the German people in a battle fought for 14 years with unswerving consequence.”

* * * * * *

“Only the closest collaborators of the Fuehrer know how difficult is the burden of this responsibility; how sorrowful are the hours during which decisions must be made which bear upon the well being and the fate of all of Germany.” (EC-501)

In November 1938, at a time Schacht now asserts he was plotting against Hitler, he stated in a speech:

“Instead of a weak and vacillating Government, a single, purposeful, energetic personality is ruling today. That is the great miracle which has actually happened in Germany and which has had its effects in all fields of life and not least in that of economy and finance. There is no German financial miracle. There is only the miracle of the reawakening of German national consciousness and German discipline, and we owe this miracle to our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler.” (_EC-611_)

(2) _Schacht favored the acquisition of additional territory for Germany—peacefully if possible, but by aggressive war, if necessary._ Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. As early as 1927, he spoke against the Versailles Treaty:

“The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic, but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong.” (_EC-415_)

He strongly favored the acquisition by Germany of both colonial territory and contiguous territory in Europe. At the Paris conference on 16 April 1929, he said:

“Germany can generally only pay if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession, and if besides somewhere on the earth colonial territory will be made available to Germany.” (_3726-PS_)

In a speech in Danzig in June 1935, Schacht ascribed the economic difficulties which confronted Danzig to “historical errors of the greatest extent which were beyond the control of the German people”. He sought to comfort his listeners with the assurance that

“We Germans in the Reich today are looking with fullest confidence upon our comrades in the Danzig Free State, and maintain our people’s fellowship with the interests, wishes and hopes of this territory which has unfortunately been separated from us.” (_EC-498_)

In January 1936, Schacht again publicly spoke against the Versailles Treaty, and impliedly threatened war unless its terms were revised in Germany’s favor. At that time, he stated:

“But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the people’s minds. That is because deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through renewed labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples, in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the people’s conscience. The spirit of the Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.” (_EC-415_)

Later in the same year, Schacht again publicly advocated “_Lebensraum_” for the German people in terms not unlike those employed by Hitler. In his speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, Schacht said:

“Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space, whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts the space does not suffice.” (_EC-415_)

Schacht had hoped, it is believed, that his desire for additional space for Germany would be realized without resort to war. In Austria, for example, he had authorized 200,000 Marks a month to be set aside for the National Socialists in Austria, hoping thereby to facilitate the absorption of Austria into Germany without war. But if Germany’s neighbors would not accede to the conspirators’ demands for additional space, Schacht was willing to go to war to fulfill those demands.

Thus, on 23 September 1935, Schacht told S. R. Fuller, Jr. at the American Embassy in Berlin:

“Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation if possible; but if not, we shall take them.” (_EC-450_)

In January 1937, Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, impliedly threatened a breach of the peace unless Germany’s demands for colonies were met. The conversation is related as follows in a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State:

“He [Schacht] stated the following: that the present condition of the Germany people was intolerable, desperate and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would (1) guarantee European peace; (2) secure present European international boundaries; (3) reduce armaments; (4) establish a new form of a workable League of Nations; (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, source for food stuffs, fats and raw material. * * *” (_L-111_)

The inference was clear: without a colonial cession, peace could not be guaranteed. Equally clear was the inference that it would be Germany in its search for “_Lebensraum_” that would disturb the peace.

On 21 December 1937, Schacht indicated to Ambassador Dodd that he desired the annexation of neighboring countries, without war if possible, but with war, if necessary. The pertinent portion of Ambassador Dodd’s notes on this conversation are as follows:

“Schacht meant what the Army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in six weeks; i.e., domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s dictatorship, he, as most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation—without war if possible, with war, if the United States will keep hands off.” (_EC-461_)

(3) _Schacht knew of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war and wilfully provided the means whereby such a war might successfully be waged._ Whether or not Schacht personally favored war, it is clear that he at least knew that Hitler planned military aggression and that he was providing Hitler with the instrument by which those plans could be executed. Even before Hitler’s accession to power, Schacht knew from a reading of _Mein Kampf_ that Hitler was bent upon expansion to the East by force of arms (_3727-PS_).

In the course of his frequent contacts with Mr. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin from 1930 to 1934, Schacht emphasized that the “Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war” (_EC-451_).

In September of 1934, Ambassador Dodd recorded in his diary a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin, wherein he stated that “Schacht had acknowledged to me the war purposes of the Nazi Party” (_EC-461_).

Schacht has admitted that in the course of his numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937, he formed the impression that “in order to make his hold on the Government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory” (_EC-458_).

These admissions by Schacht are fortified by other evidence which shows that Schacht knew that Hitler planned military aggression. After his appointment as Minister of Economics, Schacht became a permanent member of the secret Reich Defense Council. The function of that Council, as shown in other connections, was secretly to mobilize all of the human and material resources of Germany for war (_EC-177_).

Shortly after his appointment as the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy in May 1935, Schacht was entrusted by the Reich Defense Council with the “preparation of economic mobilization” in connection with the proposed re-occupation of the Rhineland. Schacht and those officials who were charged with the purely military aspects of the re-occupation were enjoined to proceed with the utmost secrecy because of assurances given by Hitler to the French that no military action was contemplated in the de-militarized zone of the Rhineland (_EC-405_).

At the 11th meeting of the Reich Defense Council, on 6 December 1935, which was attended by a number of representatives from Schacht’s office of Plenipotentiary of the War Economy, Keitel pointed out that

“According to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic leadership puts the increase of our armed might knowingly ahead of other requirements of the state. It is the task of all members of the Reich Defense Council to utilize the national property, made available, primarily for this purpose and economically in the framework of the entire situation, and request only such funds and raw materials which serve absolutely and exclusively the Reich Defense. * * *”

The singleness of purpose with which Schacht and the other conspirators were gearing the German economy for war is strikingly shown by the Top Secret minutes of the meeting of ministers dated 30 May 1936. This, it will be recalled, was little more than 10 weeks after German troops had occupied the Rhineland. At this meeting, Schacht pointed out that “it must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for the case of mobilization”; and also that “certain raw materials for war must be stocked.” Continuing the discussion, Goering emphasized that “all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.” Thereafter, Schacht advocated the introduction of price supervision and agreed that first priority should be given to the “specially urgent petroleum question” (_1301-PS_).

By Top Secret letter dated 31 August 1936, Schacht was advised by General von Blomberg that Hitler had ordered that “the setting up of all air force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937”. This accelerated program entailed the expenditure of large additional funds which Schacht and the Minister of Finance were called upon to supply. The sense of urgency with which Hitler pressed the completion of the German air force patently signified that the waging of war was a certainty (_1301-PS_).

Shortly after the receipt of this letter, and on 4 September 1936, Schacht attended a secret cabinet meeting where Goering stated:

“The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Col. General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution thereof.

“It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable.”

* * * * * *

“The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Fuehrer.”

* * * * * *

“If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken.”

* * * * * *

“All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” (_EC-416_).

There was no room for surmise in these utterances; Hitler was definitely and irrevocably committed to waging aggressive war. If Schacht ever had any doubts concerning Hitler’s firm resolve to carry out the program of aggressive war outlined in _Mein Kampf_; if, contrary to his statements to Mr. Messersmith and Ambassador Dodd, Schacht actually doubted in 1934 that the Nazis, whom he was faithfully serving, would inevitably plunge Europe into war; and if, despite the pressing sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war economy from the very outset, he had entertained lingering doubts concerning Hitler’s plans for armed aggression, all such doubts must have been removed by the clear and unequivocal pronouncements in the above-mentioned eventful meetings of 1936 in which he participated.

Yet, despite his knowledge of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war, despite the fact that he had grave technical doubts about the ability of the Reichsbank to finance further armaments through additional short term credits, and despite the fact that some directors of the Reichsbank had opposed further “mefo” financing, Schacht pledged another 3 billion Reichsmarks by the “mefo” bill method for further financing of armaments in March 1937 (_EC-438_).

The Hossbach notes, dated 10 November 1937, on the important conference of 5 November 1937 in the _Reichskanzlei_, reveal a further crystallization of Hitler’s program of absorption and conquest in Europe (_386-PS_). Definite plans were laid for the early acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and for their exploitation in preparation for further military operations. So far as appears, Schacht was not present at this particular meeting. But his awareness of what occurred at the meeting is shown by the fact that he told Ambassador Bullitt on 23 November 1937, that

“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his [Schacht’s] opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.” (_L-151_).

Although Schacht apparently sought to convey the impression to Ambassador Bullitt that he desired to stay Hitler’s hand but was powerless to do so, it is clear that he was actually in complete sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Despite the mounting tension which followed his conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, Schacht remained as President of the Reichsbank, and in that capacity established, in advance of the invasion of Austria, the rate of exchange between Marks and Austrian Schillings which was to prevail after the absorption of Austria (_EC-421_).

Moreover, under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, I, 254). His speech of 21 March 1938, to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank on the occasion of its obliteration as an independent institution, betrayed his true feelings. After inveighing against “the dictates of Versailles and St. Germain”, Schacht stated:

“Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought, he bolstered it up with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and he then finally gave the external form to the inner union between Germany and Austria.”

* * * * * *

“One person says he would have done it maybe in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it (hilarity), that IT WAS ONLY DONE BY OUR ADOLF HITLER (Long continued applause) and if there is still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should try to bring about those improvements from the German Reich and within the German community, but not to disturb it from without. (Lively agreement)”.

* * * * * *

“I ask you to raise your hands and to repeat after me:

I swear that: I will be faithful, and obedient to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, and will perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience takes the pledge with uplifted hands).

You have taken this pledge. A scoundrel he who breaks it. To our Fuehrer a triple ‘Sieg heil’.” (_EC-297-A_)

Schacht was likewise enthusiastic about the acquisition of the Sudetenland, and filled with pride over the contribution his credit policy as head of the Reichsbank had made thereto (_EC-611_).

In January 1939, when Hitler was ruthlessly exploiting his successes in Austria and the Sudetenland in preparation for his next aggressive move, Schacht again referred, with pride, to the fact that the _Wehrmacht_ which he had helped create by his ingenious and risky methods had made possible Hitler’s successes. Thus, he said:

“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to _finance_ the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity—which pushed all other considerations into the background—to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible.” (_EC-369_)

The foregoing proof establishes, it seems clear, that Schacht knew of Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, and wilfully created the means whereby those plans could be executed. But apart from this direct proof, it is submitted that to a man in Schacht’s position, the events of the period clearly bespoke Hitler’s intentions. Schacht was a key figure in the Nazi Government during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force.

During this period, the Reich debt trebled under the stress of mounting armaments (_EC-419_), and all the resources of Germany were being strained to the very limit for armament. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.

Certainly in this setting, Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Nazi Germany along the road towards armed aggression.

E. _SCHACHT’S LOSS OF POWER DID NOT IMPLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._

(1) _His resignation as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War Economy._ In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War Economy. At the same time, he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio, and continued as President of the Reichsbank. It is submitted that the evidence shows that Schacht’s resignations were merely the outgrowth of a clash between two power-seeking individuals, Goering and Schacht, over _methods_ of creating a war economy and over who should have final authority to direct the completion of the task. So far as appears, Schacht was in full accord with the other conspirators upon the _desirability_ of providing Hitler with the means by which he eventually could carry out his planned aggressions.

The basic differences between Schacht and Goering date from a period shortly after Goering became head of the Four-Year Plan Office. The latter office was created by Hitler in September 1936, and in connection therewith, Goering was “given far reaching powers to issue directives to all the highest offices of the State and Party”. Goering conceived of his function as head of the Four-Year Plan Office “within four years to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war” (_EC-408_).

Schacht was in agreement with the “aim and idea” of the Four-Year Plan. He promised Goering his complete support and cooperation, and urged that Goering draw upon Schacht’s long experience in economic affairs. Thus, in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937, to Goering, he said:

“The aim and the idea of the Four Year Plan were and remain entirely correct and necessary! It stands, essentially, for the application of increased energy to the efforts already undertaken by my ministry since 1934 with the results shown in the above statistics. As you will remember, I welcomed it when your energy, my dear Prime Minister, was recruited by the Fuehrer for these tasks, and from the very beginning I gave you my most loyal support and cooperation, with the particular plea that I be given a hearing from time to time, since I believed that my more than thirty years of experience in economic life, half of them in public service, could be of value to you.” (_EC-497_)

Goering, however, failed to avail himself of Schacht’s offer of his services. “I can only regret,” said Schacht in the aforementioned letter, “that you have made so little use of my offer” (_EC-497_). Instead, Goering began to encroach upon powers which had been delegated to Schacht, and they became embroiled in a bitter jurisdictional conflict. On 26 November 1936, Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production, whereby he undertook to assume control over large economic areas previously within Schacht’s province (_EC-243_).

Schacht did not supinely accept Goering’s intrusions upon his powers. Goering’s directive was countered by an abrupt order from Schacht to all supervisory offices to accept orders from him alone (_EC-376_).

The conflict reached such dimensions that it threatened to retard the pace of the conspirators’ armament program. The military sided with Schacht, who had provided the means for their rapid rearmament. They submitted proposals which would have assured to Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy the responsibility for “unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore” (_EC-408_; _EC-420_).

In January 1937, the German Military Weekly Gazette published an article warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. The timing of the article indicates that it was a further attempt by the military to tip the scales in Schacht’s favor. The article stated:

“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.” (_EC-383_)

Shortly thereafter, Schacht attempted to force a showdown with Goering by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. Schacht plainly was using his prime importance in the conspirators’ program of economic planning and preparation for war as a lever. In a letter to Hitler dated 22 February 1937, General von Blomberg, the Minister of War, suggested a settlement of the jurisdictional fight under which Schacht would fully retain his powers as General Plenipotentiary of War Economy, and concluded by stating:

“If you, my Fuehrer, agree with my view regarding these jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, whose cooperation as Plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance, to resume his former activity.” (_EC-244_)

As a further demonstration of the community of interest between Schacht and the top German military authorities, Schacht attended the secret “War Economy” games at Godesberg in the latter part of May 1937. The purpose of the games was to demonstrate “how the action of the soldiers in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy is completely dependent on military operations”. Schacht’s attendance was acclaimed at the games as

“renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.” (_EC-174_).

In June 1937, Keitel implored Hitler to accelerate a final agreement between Schacht and Goering. Speaking of arrangements concerning cooperation of these two key figures, Keitel said:

“I know that a necessary practical basis for it [the arrangement for cooperation between Schacht and Goering] has already been found, and only a formal agreement is needed in order to carry on the common work.”

* * * * * *

“* * * to waste time in our situation would be the greatest reproach that history could make upon us.

“May I beg, therefore, once more that the arrangement mentioned be expedited, and that I be notified accordingly.” (_EC-248_)

Finally, on 7 July 1937, Schacht and Goering signed an agreement of reconciliation in Berlin, wherein it was said that the tasks of Goering and Schacht “are being solved in closest mutual cooperation,” and that “no doubt exists about the fact that the Commissioner General for War Economy has the position of a supreme authority of the Reich” (_EC-384_).

Schacht resumed his duties as General Plenipotentiary with renewed vigor. On the day following his formal agreement with Goering, he wrote to General von Blomberg on “Measures for the preparation of the conduct of war,” pledging continued cooperation in their mutual endeavors:

“* * * by the direction of the supreme authority for the conduct of war, the coordination of the conduct of war will be assured in its execution through mutual agreement between you and me, which I look upon as a matter of course in the Central Authority and without which I cannot envisage any conduct of war. The direction of the economy by the plenipotentiary would in that event never ‘take place entirely independent from the rest of the war mechanism’ but would be aimed at the accomplishment of the political war purpose with the mustering of all economic forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to the Reich Defense Act [_Reichsverteidigungsgesetz_].” (_EC-252_)

However, Schacht and Goering were soon again in disagreement. After a sharp exchange of letters in which each sought to justify his particular economic program as the best means of making possible the attainment of Hitler’s objectives (_EC-497_; _EC-493_), Schacht suggested to Goering in a curt letter dated 26 August 1937, that he (Goering) assume sole charge of economic policies. In this letter, Schacht rationalized his precipitate action as follows:

“To me it does not seem to be of decisive importance to raise questions of competence and initiative, but it is of decisive importance that the Fuehrer’s economic policy should be carried out in a coherent manner, and with the least amount of friction.” (_EC-283_)

Despite the uncompromising tenor of the latter communication, Schacht was still amenable to an arrangement with Goering which would have permitted him a measure of autonomy in economic planning and preparation for war. On 1 November 1937, he attended a conference with Goering

“* * * which led in an entirely friendly manner to the working out of a series of proposals, which * * * Goering promised to have presented to me [Schacht] in writing on the following day * * * so that, after having reached an agreement we could present a mutually approved text to you, my Fuehrer.” (_EC-495_)

But the written agreement was not forthcoming as Goering had promised, and Schacht repeated his request to be relieved from the Ministry of Economics, “in the interest of a uniform government management” (_EC-495_). Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister Without Portfolio. Schacht’s resignation was also extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_EC-494_).

In subsequent interrogations, both Schacht and Goering have confirmed the fact that Schacht’s withdrawal was simply the result of a losing struggle with Goering to retain personal power (_3730-PS_; _3728-PS_).

There is nothing to indicate that Schacht’s withdrawal from the Ministry of Economics and the Office of Plenipotentiary for War Economy in any sense represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. He consented to retain his position as President of the Reichsbank, where he remained undisputed master, and accepted the post of Minister of[without] Portfolio, in order to be Hitler’s “personal adviser.” In the letter accepting Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics, Hitler said:

“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorium, you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring working strength. Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.” (_L-104_).

As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht continued to carry out Hitler’s policies. As previously shown, he participated in the planning of the invasion of Austria by fixing the conversion rate of the Austrian Schilling in advance of the invasion; and under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank. He publicly approved the absorption of Austria and the acquisition of the Sudetenland. He continued to finance armaments by “mefo” bill credits until April 1938, and thereafter, until his resignation in January 1939, authorized an increase of approximately 2.6 billion Reichsmarks in bank notes in order to discount commercial paper which was used in connection with the armament program. (_EC-438_)

(2) _Schacht’s dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank._ Schacht was dismissed from the Presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The evidence indicates that Schacht engineered his dismissal in order to escape personal responsibility for what he believed to be an impending financial crisis; he was not dismissed because of disagreement with the ultimate objectives of the conspiracy or common plan.

Schacht had always feared an inflation in Germany. As early as May 1936, he emphatically stated that he would “never be party to an inflation” (_1301-PS_). In January 1939, Schacht was convinced that ruinous inflation was, in fact, imminent (_EC-369_). There was, it appears, ample basis for his fear. The Finance Minister, von Krosigk, had already recognized the situation in September 1938, and had written to Hitler warning that

“* * * we are steering towards a serious financial crisis, the forebodings of which have led already abroad to detailed discussions of this weak side in our economic preparations and to an apprehensive loss of confidence domestically.” (_EC-419_)

Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis; he was even more fearful that he personally would be held responsible for it and his prestige would suffer a crushing blow. One of his associates at the Reichsbank has stated:

“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more anxious to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a long time the ‘leitmotif’ of Schacht’s conversations with the directors of the bank.” (_EC-438_)

In the end, Schacht deliberately stimulated his dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank by arbitrarily refusing an end-of-the-month loan in a relatively small amount to the Reich, contrary to well established practice (_3730-PS_; _3731-PS_).

Despite differences of opinion concerning the limits to which the German economy might be pushed without plunging the country into inflation, Schacht continued to enjoy Hitler’s confidence. In his letter to Schacht dated 19 January 1939, Hitler stated:

“On the occasion of your recall from Office as President of the Reichsbank Directory, I take the opportunity to express to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.” (_EC-397_).

On his side, Schacht evidenced his abiding faith in Hitler and his continued agreement with his aggressive policies, by remaining as Minister without Portfolio until January 1943. As such he received a large salary from the Nazi Government and enjoyed the emoluments of public office (_3724-PS_).

(3) _Conclusion._ Schacht’s assistance in the earlier phase of the conspiracy was an important factor in enabling the conspirators to seize the German state and thus pave the way for their later crimes. His work was indispensable to the rearmament of Germany and to the economic planning and preparation required to launch the German wars of aggression. As long as he remained in power, he worked as eagerly for the preparation of aggressive war as any of his co-conspirators. He personally was favorably disposed towards aggression, if “Lebensraum” for Germany could not otherwise be attained. He knew that Hitler intended to and would break the peace, and with this knowledge, he willingly and purposely contributed his efforts. His withdrawal from three of his four posts reflected no moral feeling against the use of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy; he withdrew for reasons wholly unrelated to Hitler’s program of illegal aggression. By the time of his withdrawal from these three positions, he had already provided his co-conspirators with the physical means and economic planning necessary to launch and maintain their wars of aggression; and he continued in his lucrative fourth position (Minister without Portfolio) until January 1943—until, in short, it became doubtful whether the conspirators could maintain the successes which they had gained in the wars they had illegally launched and were waging.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HJALMAR SCHACHT

13. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH[1]

A. _IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY, KRUPP CIRCUMVENTED THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ON THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY. AS THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD OF THE HUGE ARMAMENTS CONCERN, FRIED. KRUPP A.G., HE CONCEALED ITS ARMAMENT ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO DECEIVE THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSPIRACY BY THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS OF WAR ON A HUGE SCALE AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._

[1] Since the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was severed from the Nurnberg trial which commenced on 20 November 1945, the trial brief outlining the case against Krupp, which was prepared before his severance, was not presented to the Tribunal. Despite his personal absence from the prisoners’ dock, however, Krupp remained technically still under indictment and liable to prosecution in subsequent proceedings. Moreover, Krupp was still regarded by the prosecution as a member of the Nazi conspiracy. The following summary of evidence, adapted from the trial brief, is included here in order to show the role played by Krupp as co-conspirator.

In an article entitled “Manager and Armament Worker” written for the 1 March 1942 issue of the Krupp magazine, Krupp stated:

“* * * I knew German history well, and out of my experiences in the rest of the world I believed to know the German kind; therefore I never doubted that, although for the time being all indications were against it, one day a change would come. How, I never knew or asked, but I believed in it. But with this knowledge—and today I may speak about these things and for the first time I am doing this extensively and publicly—with this, as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the greatest importance had to be taken. If Germany should ever be reborn, if it should shake off the chains of Versailles one day, the Krupp concern had to be prepared again. * * *”

“* * * I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for I had to expect that many people would not understand me. * * *”

“Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and preparations were undertaken. Thus to the surprise of many people Krupp began to manufacture goods which really appeared to be far distant from the former work of an armament plant. Even the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and similar ‘small junk’ appeared really unsuspicious and even locomotives and automobiles made an entirely ‘civilian’ impression.

“After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler I had the satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupps stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the rearmament of the German people without any gaps of experience,—the blood of the comrades of KAR. Saturday 1923 had not been shed in vain. Since that time I was often permitted to accompany the Fuehrer through the old and new workshops and to experience how the workers of Krupp cheered him in gratitude. In the years after 1933 we worked with an incredible intensity and when the war did break out the speed and results were again increased. We are all proud of having thus contributed to the heretofore magnificent successes of our army.”

* * * * * *

“I have always considered it to be an honour as well as an obligation to be the head of an arms factory and I know that the employees of Krupp share these feelings. Thanks to the educational work of the National Socialist Government this is the case all over Germany. I know that the things I have said here about the armament worker in particular hold true for every German worker. With these men and women who work for the cause with all their hearts, with cool heads and skilled hands we will master every fate.” (_D-94_; see _D-64_).

In a memorandum of a conference held on 9 December 1942, concerning the proposed publication of a book dealing with Krupp’s armament activities, Von Bulow, confidential secretary to Krupp, wrote:

“For the period of transition from 1919 up to rearmament, A. K. [Krupp] had undertaken various tasks in order to keep up the Company’s activity in the field of artillery, in the sense of observing activities in that field in the rest of the world (relation: BOFORS) and then also for the production of artillery material, within and to a certain extent also beyond, the limitation established by the peace dictate.” (_D-249_).

B. _AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER, KRUPP LENT HIS INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR CONTROL OVER THE GERMAN STATE._

(1) With knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Nazi conspiracy, he sought to reorganize the Reich Association of German Industry, of which he was Chairman, so as to bring it into line with the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their policies.

(_a_) Upon the invitation of Goering (_D-201_), Krupp attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 1933, during which Hitler, in a speech to a select group of industrialists, announced the conspirators’ aims to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the _Wehrmacht_. In the course of this speech, Hitler stated:

“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of Democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality. * * * Life always tears up humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a Leader to find ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of individual personality. * * * If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.”

“* * * We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this, however, courage, and iron will and perseverance are essential.”

“* * * With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way. We have turned down the favour (benevolence) of the Catholic Centre Party [_Zentrum_] to tolerate us. Hugemberg has too small a movement. He has only considerably slowed down our development. We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other side completely. While still gaining power one should not start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further possible upward development, shall one strike. * * *”

“Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the election does not decide, the decision must be brought about even by other means. I have intervened in order to give the people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves. This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany won’t go to ruin. Today, as never before, everyone is under the obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make sacrifices has never been greater than now. For Economy I have the one wish that it go parallel with the internal structure to meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have gained internal strength through internal peace. * * * There are only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this election or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons, which may demand greater sacrifices. I would like to see them avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably even 100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to which I pledge myself with glowing energy.” (_D-203_).

At this same meeting, Goering declared that the impending election of 5 March 1933 would certainly be the last one for the next 10 years, and probably even for the next 100 years (_D-203_).

In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933 describing this meeting, Krupp wrote that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of approximately 25 industrialists present for the clear expression of his views and emphasized, on behalf of all present, that it was time to clarify the political situation in Germany (_D-204_).

(_b_) On 25 April 1933, Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry (_Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie_) submitted to Hitler his plan for the reorganization of German industry and in connection therewith, undertook to bring the Association into line with the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their policies.

_1._ In the letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that his plan of reorganization was characterized by the desire to coordinate “economic measures and political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer’s conception of the New German State” (_D-157_).

_2._ In the plan of reorganization itself Krupp stated:

“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I myself and the Board of Directors have cherished for a long time. I am convinced that, under the threat of the impoverishment of our people, the machinery of government must be simplified to the utmost. For the same reason I did not fail to recognize a long time ago the necessity of rationalizing our economic system.

“Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be missed to obtain the best for our economic system, I am employing the authority bestowed upon me by the Presiding Council to carry out a double task:—

1. In the negotiations with the Reichschancellor and his representatives I shall make it my goal to coordinate, in the field of organization of industrial associations, the economically reasonable with the politically necessary.

2. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government and at the same time to make it so rational and forceful that it can be an effective instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the relative importance of the industry.” (_D-157_)

(_c_) In a speech delivered on 18 October 1933, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Committee for Industrial and Social policy of the Reich Association of German Industry, Krupp reaffirmed his aim to bring the Association into complete accord with the political goals of the Nazi government and stated, _inter alia_:

“* * * To have united the purposes of an entire Nation, is the great historical achievement of the man in whose strong hands our President has placed the fate of our people. When Reichschancellor and Fuehrer Adolf Hitler called the General Council of Economy together for the first time on the 20th of September, I had the honor to thank him for the confidence which he had put in the men of the practical business world by calling them to the General Council. I pledged to him unrestrained support in his Government in its exceedingly difficult task from all branches and organizations of Economy.

“I may repeat now what I said then: ‘The unshakable faith of our Reichschancellor and Fuehrer in the future of our people gives also to the men of business the courage and the strength to put everything in the reconstruction of a healthy National Economy in a strong National State under National Socialist leadership’.

“You, too, gentlemen, if I am certain of your confidence, are bound to this pledge. It holds in itself, for all of us, the deeply felt obligation to be the guarantors for the unconditional execution of the Fuehrer’s will in all links and branches of Industry. May the spirit of devotion to duty which inspires us always dominate this Committee’s conferences!

“I ask you, gentlemen, to rise and to join me in the toast: To the venerable President of the German Reich, General Fieldmarshal Von Hindenburg and the German People’s Chancellor and Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler: ‘_Sieg Heil_’.” (_D-353_).

(2) Krupp organized, sponsored, and made substantial financial contributions to the Hitler Fund (_Hitler Spende_), with knowledge that the funds were to be used to further the objectives of the SA and SS.

(_a_) In a letter to Schacht dated 30 May 1933, Krupp wrote:

“As Dr. Hoettgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you yesterday, it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’, which would replace collections in many cases separately organized of the various NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm. It has been decided to appoint a management council for this central collection; I have accepted the chairmanship of the management council at the unanimous request of the principal federations, inspired by the wish to collaborate with my full strength in this task which is to be a symbol of gratitude to the Fuehrer of the nation.” (_D-151_)

(_b_) A circular written by Hess in August 1933, which was found among Krupp’s files, specifically states that one of the purposes of the Hitler Fund is “to put at the disposal of the Reich leadership the funds required for the unified execution of the tasks which fall to the lot of the SA, SS, ST, HJ, political organizations etc.” (_D-151_).

In a letter dated 15 August 1934, from Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA, which was found among Krupp’s papers, authority was granted, with the approval of the Deputy Fuehrer, to Gauleiter Terboven to use a special part of the year’s Hitler Fund in the interest of the SA in the Ruhr district (_D-368_).

(_c_) From the inception of the Hitler Fund until the collapse of Germany, the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen (main company in the Krupp organization) alone contributed 4,738,446 marks to that fund (_D-325_; the above figure is the total amount shown on the chart, not here reproduced[2]). This assistance to the Hitler Fund was supplemented by large contributions made by the other Krupp companies.

[2] This and subsequent similar charts have been omitted from this publication because of their length and complexity, and the relative unimportance of the issue for which they have been cited.

(3) Krupp, both privately and through the Krupp firm, made substantial contributions to the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.

(_a_) For contributions by Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen, see _D-325_.

(_b_) In June 1935, Krupp contributed 100,000 marks to the Nazi Party out of his personal account (_D-332_; _D-373_).

(4) In numerous public addresses, Krupp supported the measures adopted by the conspirators in the execution of their program.

(_a_) In a speech urging every German to approve Germany’s withdrawal from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, Krupp said:

“* * * Just as the 5th of March brought about the change from chaos to order, from disgrace to honor in domestic policy so, on November 12, the unanimous “Yes” of the German people concerning the foreign policy of the Reich Government, shall and must give ample proof to the entire world that every citizen who is worthy of the German name, stands unconditionally behind the Reich Government as led by the Reich Chancellor, and its foreign policy which is dictated by the commandment of self-respect.”

* * * * * *

“* * * When the radio broadcasts the results of the People’s Election on the evening of November 12, the entire world must know that: Germany stands in the camp of Adolf Hitler.” (_D-393_).

(_b_) In a speech delivered on 26 January 1934, Krupp expressed approval of the leadership principle in industrial relations, under which the entrepreneur became the leader and the workers became his followers. In the course of this speech he said:

“National-Socialism has liberated the German worker from the clutches of a doctrine which was basically hostile both for employer and employee. Adolf Hitler has returned the worker to his nation; he has made of him a disciplined soldier of labor and therefore our comrade. When, on the other hand, the new State awards to the enterpriser the role of leader in economy and labor, then we know that: Leadership has obligation!

“The enterpriser and his leading officers are the trustees for the material welfare of our people.” (_D-392_).

(_c_) In a speech delivered on 10 August 1934, in connection with the plebiscite to approve Hitler’s dual appointment as president and chancellor after Hindenburg’s death, Krupp said:

“Let us all follow him now also, our Leader, our Reich—and People’s Chancellor.

“In an exceptionally short time he has eliminated the quarrel between parties, has guaranteed unity to the Reich and has assured to every German pride to work, has brought the opportunity for work to the near future. On 19 August all our votes borne of deep trust and proven confidence shall go to the man acclaimed by those hearts of many thousands and millions who cannot, because of their age, go to the polls but who daily join us, who are permitted to vote, in the Cry:

Heil Hitler!” (_D-386_).

(_d_) In a speech dated 27 October 1935, Krupp stated:

“* * * Our thoughts fly therefore by themselves in this festive hour of our plant community, to the man whom we thank for the resurrection of our Nation: Adolf Hitler, the patron of German labour and German art. Unanimously we will confess and pledge ourselves to stand behind the Fuehrer and his movement today and forever and thereby to be of service to the idea of eternal Germany.” (_D-385_)

(_e_) In a speech dated 1 May 1936, after the Nazis had reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, Krupp stated:

“No greater recognition, no greater incentive to further common work accomplishment could have been given us than was done through the visit of our Fuehrer on March 27th of this year to our works and through his addresses from here. * * *”

“Never has a statesman fought for the soul of his people and for its well-being with such faith, such ardor, such endurance. We shall never forget how deeply we are indebted to him. * * * I only mention here the abolition of the parties and the unification of the people, the regaining of the sovereignty in the Rhineland, the extensive abolition of unemployment, the accomplishments of the labour service, the magnificent public buildings, the roads, bridges and canals. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The world will have to get used to the fact that the voice of the Fuehrer is the voice of the whole German people. * * *”

“Jubileers and co-workers! We shall be thankful to fate that we were and are permitted to be eye and action witnesses of the great turning point in our German history, and we shall thank especially the divine destiny that it has presented us with a man like Adolf Hitler. Let us then combine all that which moves our hearts upon mention of this name into the cry: Our people and fatherland and its great Fuehrer Adolf Hitler

_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-291_).

C. _UNDER KRUPP’S DIRECTION, THE KRUPP FIRM, BY DEVELOPING NEW INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND PRODUCING HUGE QUANTITIES OF WAR MATERIALS, FURTHERED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM TO CREATE A POWERFUL MILITARY POTENTIAL._

(1) In a speech prepared in January 1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin, Krupp stated:

“* * * I don’t see why this thought still flutters in many a head occasionally—that the production of war materials should be a sinister trade! No: war material is life-saving for one’s own people and whoever works and performs in these spheres can be proud of it; here enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of existence. This justification—I may inject this here—crystallized especially during that time of the ‘Interregnum’, between 1919 and 1933, when Germany was lying-down disarmed. * * * It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work, scientific and basic ground work was laid, in order to be ready again to work the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience.”

* * * * * *

“Only through this secret activity of German enterprise, together with the experience gained meanwhile through production of peace time goods was it possible after 1933, to fall into step with the new tasks arrived at restoring Germany’s military power, (only through all that) could the entirely new and various problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four Year’s Plan for German enterprise, be mastered. * * *” (_D-317_)

(2) Krupp played a leading role in the design and production of new weapons for the German armed forces.

(_a_) In a memorandum concerning a conference held at the Federal Ministry for National Defense in Vienna on 25 September 1936, Pfirsch, a Krupp official, wrote:

“* * * in spite of the obstacles put in our way by the Treaty of Versailles, we had never been inactive throughout the postwar period, but had drawn upon the experience of the war in the creation of new types, and that we had won the prizes for almost every type in the competitions organized by our War Ministry for the construction of new artillery weapons, so much so that the guns introduced into the German Army of to-day, such as the 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft, the 10.5 cm. field gun, the heavy field howitzer and beyond them the larger calibres have been made according to our pattern.” (_D-152_)

(_b_) In a memorandum dated 21 February 1944, Woelfert, a department chief in the Krupp concern, wrote:

“First a few facts about the development of tanks by Krupp. We are manufacturing tanks since 1928, which means before rearmament. We started studying on heavy tractors. Krupp built the first mass production tank, the Panzer I, which is also known as LaS. It was shown in public in 1935, the year when rearmament started, and made a great impression. We also originated the Panzer IV, or better the BW, which was especially at the beginning of the war one of the prime factors in our rapid advances into enemy country, so that today we are fighting on the Atlantic coast, in the South, and east and not on German soil. Even today we use the BW-base for many self-propelled guns, assault-guns, anti-aircraft guns etc.” (_D-96_).

(_c_) In a letter to Hitler dated 24 July 1942, Krupp wrote:

“My Fuehrer!

“The big weapon, whose manufacturing is to be thanked to your command, has now proved its effectiveness. * * *”

“True to an example set by Alfred Krupp in 1870, my wife and myself ask the favour that the Krupp works refrain from charging for this first finished product.

“To express my thanks to you, my Fuehrer, for the confidence shown in our plants and in us personally by entrusting such an order with us, is a pleasant duty for my wife and myself.

_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-375_).

(_d_) Krupp likewise made significant contributions to the production of Navy weapons and U-Boats (_D-88_; _D-287_).

(3) The rapid and progressive expansion in armament production by Krupp after the conspirators’ accession to power is plainly shown by a chart prepared by Krupp officials concerning the production of war materials at the _Krupp Gustahlfabrik_ in Essen (only one of the many companies in the Krupp organization). This chart shows that the production of war materials at that particular factory during the fiscal year, 1 October 1933 to 30 September 1934, was more than twice that of any previous year since 1929; that such production during the fiscal year, 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, was almost twice as great as the previous year; and that production of war materials continued thereafter at an accelerated rate with the result that during the fiscal year, 1 October 1938 to 30 September 1939, it was more than 10 times as great as it was during the period 1 October 1932 to 30 September 1933 (Chart entitled “Fried. Krupp Gustahlfabrik Essen, Turnover in War Material,” not reproduced here). It should be noted that this chart shows only direct sales by the Essen factory of war materials to the German Armed Forces Ordnance Supply Department and sales to foreign countries of war materials easily recognizable as such. It does not cover indirect sales, viz: the sale of products to other concerns which, in turn, used them to produce materials of war. (The chart entitled “Fried. Krupp and Branch Establishments, Inland Turnover,” not here reproduced, shows figures which include “indirect” sales of war materials by certain Krupp companies.)

D. _KRUPP GOVERNED THE EXPORTS OF HIS FIRM IN THE LIGHT OF THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS AND THE ACCEPTED AND DISCHARGED IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR._

(1) In a “strictly confidential” memorandum dated 25 March 1941, the following was reported:

“* * * The liberation of the Reich from the shackles of Versailles enabled Krupp to recommence the export of armaments. The German Government had, in fact, pressed for the matter. Military-political and Military-economic reasons were the cause. Krupp desired to come into the closest contact with the armament exports, so as to further the development of arms * * *”

* * * * * *

“* * * By using all the forces at his [Krupp’s] disposal and regardless of effort, costs and risk, considerable export contracts were secured, which served to obtain foreign currency or raw materials, and were, at the same time, politically desirable. * * *” (_D-191_)

In a memorandum dated 23 June 1937, concerning a Bulgarian order for armour plating which was discussed with German Army representatives, Reiff, a Krupp official, wrote:

“Major Olbrich showed himself aware quite evidently of the deeper reasons existing why Germany was anxious that this order should be booked. * * *” (_D-154_)

(2) At the request of the Inspector of War Production, Krupp became a Leader of War Production in 1937, and was charged with the responsibility of preparing and carrying out the mobilization of the armament industry and of directing it in time of war.

(_a_) In a “strictly confidential” letter dated 21 January 1937, the Inspector of War Production wrote to Krupp:

“The Reich Minister for War and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered that a Corps of Economic Leaders of War Production be recruited with immediate effect.

“The Economic Leaders of War Production in collaboration with the Armed Forces, are to be responsible for the preparing and carrying out of the mobilization of the armament industry and for directing it in time of war.”

* * * * * *

“A selected small circle of these persons is to act in an advisory capacity to the Armed Forces in all important economic questions both during peace and war.

“Subject to your approval, I intend to propose to the Reich Minister for War that you should be nominated as Economic Leader for War Production.” (_D-62_)

(_b_) In connection with his acceptance of the position of Leader of War Production, Krupp submitted a “secret” document entitled, “Declaration of Political Attitude,” dated 6 February 1937, in which he stated:

“I herewith declare that I stand by the National Socialist conception of the State without reserve and that I have not been active in any way against the interests of the people.”

* * * * * *

“I am aware that should I say or do anything which constitutes an attack against the National Socialist conception of the State, I must expect, in addition to legal proceedings, my dismissal from the post of Economic Leader of War Production.” (_D-63_).

E. _KRUPP SUPPORTED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROPAGANDA PROGRAM; LENT HIS ORGANIZATION TO THE DISSEMINATION OF NAZI PROPAGANDA ABROAD; AND USED HIS EMPLOYEES IN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY._

(1) In April 1933, Krupp contributed 20,000 marks to Rosenberg for the purpose of counteracting anti-Nazi propaganda abroad. In a letter to Krupp dated 26 April 1933, Rosenberg said:

“Once more my most cordial thanks for not having shunned the inconvenience of the journey in order to participate at yesterday’s intimate conference. I am glad to determine, on the basis of our discussion, that you too welcome the organization of an active counter-action abroad, in the interest of State and Economy, and express to you the highest thanks for the support of a monetary kind as well, which you have subscribed to our work. Very shortly a quantity of material will be sent to you promptly and will subsequently be distributed throughout the world in a comprehensive compilation.” (_D-158_; see also _D-208_ and _D-242_)

(2) In a memorandum dated 12 October 1939, entitled “Distribution of Official Propaganda Literature Abroad with the Help of our Foreign Connections,” concerning a visit by a Mr. Lackmann of Ribbentrop’s private foreign office, Von Raussendorff, a Krupp official, wrote:

“I informed Mr. L. that our Firm had put itself years ago at the disposal of official Bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the utmost. * * * Only by personal handling can our connections abroad be used and kept receptive to effective propaganda. With the present lively activity of the ‘Secret Service’ it must be avoided, not only in the interest of our Firm but also in the interest of Germany as a whole, that our agents in neutral foreign countries would come through improper handling to the attention of the ‘Secret Service’ and economically ruined by it within a short time.

“* * * If additional distributions of propaganda literature were desired, a propaganda-leaflet should be sent to us, and after examining it, we would advise the official Bureau what quantity of such printed matter could be mailed abroad through us, at our expense, as heretofore.” (_D-206_)

(3) In a memorandum dated 14 October 1937, concerning a visit by Menzel of the Intelligence Office of the Combined Services Ministry, Sonnenberg, a Krupp official, wrote:

“* * * Menzel asked for intelligence on foreign armaments (but not including matters published in newspapers) received by Krupp from their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed on to Combined Services Intelligence [Abwehrabteilung des RKM.]. * * *”

“On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined Ministry [RKM] as required.” (_D-167_)

The results of a later visit by Menzel, in the company of _Kapitaen zur See_ Globig, of the Information Department, Naval Armaments Branch, are reported in a memorandum dated 25 June 1939 by Dr. Conn, a Krupp official. In the course of this memorandum, which is entitled “Intelligence and Information,” Dr. Conn stated:

“1. _Kapitaen zur See_ Globig whom I had known for a long time, spoke to me quite frankly and openly. It is therefore impossible to embody parts of our discussion in this report.”

* * * * * *

“Similarly to Kapitaen zur See Globig he [Menzel] stressed the point that in view of the progressive disappearance of public and easily accessible sources of information, the information obtained through our representatives abroad was of increasing value. This method of obtaining intelligence would have to be followed up much more drastically than in the past.”

* * * * * *

“His [Menzel’s] third point was a request to utilize foreign visitors for obtaining intelligence. I replied that this was being done already, but that it was necessary to proceed very carefully, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the visitors.”

“I gave him to understand that we were slightly disappointed with the collaboration with Intelligence [_Abwehr Abteilung_] since we had supplied information, but had received none in return. Menzel explained that Intelligence was only a collating centre and that they were merely passing on information, the value of which they were unable to judge by themselves, to the departments concerned; any information for us would therefore have to come from those departments only. Exceptions were only made in the case of intelligence of universal importance such as e.g. the long range gun [_Ferngeschuetz_] some time ago.”

“This remark is important concerning the way in which we should present our information at Berlin. The departments receiving the information through Intelligence, must be able to see that it originates from Krupp, so that they might feel themselves under obligation to let us have some information in return.” (_D-167_)

In a memorandum marked “secret,” relating to foreign anti-aircraft guns, Sonnenberg wrote on 8 May 1939:

“I have gained the impression that from no other side do the respective Army departments get such far reaching support in their investigation of foreign armaments as from Fr. Krupp.” (_D-170_).

F. _KRUPP PUBLICLY APPROVED THE SUCCESSIVE CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE PERPETRATED BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._

(1) In a speech dated 6 April 1938, shortly after Schuschnigg had been compelled to capitulate to the Nazi conspirators’ threat of force, Krupp stated:

“At our family party, today as well, our first thought, our first glass, is raised in deep appreciation to our Fuehrer. We are still under the lasting impression of the mighty happenings of the last four weeks; so are those of us who until a short time ago were forced to wait impatiently for these developments outside our State frontiers. To the fulfillment of century-old dreams consciously arrived at, to the fulfillment of the life-long wish of Adolf Hitler—thanks to his faith, thanks to his determination, thanks to his heart, to him, our Fuehrer, a threefold, deeply thankful,

_Sieg Heil_.” (_D-391_).

(2) In a speech dated 7 April 1938, Krupp, in urging all Germans in the impending election of 10 April to approve Hitler’s invasion of Austria, stated:

“Three more days separate us from the day of the Plebiscite to which our Fuehrer calls us, from the Plebiscite concerning Greater Germany, at the same time a Plebiscite in which the proof of faith in our Fuehrer concerns every individual’s conscience.

“Full with thanks for what Adolf Hitler has bestowed and secured for the German people in little more than five years’ leadership through internal and external peace he is worthy of the deepest felt ‘Yes’ from everyone of us!

“To him, our Fuehrer and Chancellor a threefold

_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-387_)

(3) In a speech delivered on 13 October 1938, on the occasion of Hitler’s visit to the Krupp works after the Nazi occupation of the Sudetenland, Krupp said:

“My Fuehrer,

“To be able to greet you at the Krupp Works, in our home, in the name of my wife and my own, as well as in the name of those close to me and also in that of the greater plant family, so shortly after the world-shaking events of the last weeks, is a great honour and a heart-felt joy to me.

“Perhaps no plant and no home can feel more deeply and more gratefully than ours the changes in the last decades; none can be more proudly conscious to be allowed to participate in the mighty tasks set by you.

“Before us stands now the basic and undeniable world-encircling success, in its total extent perhaps not fully grasped, which your faith and strong will, your nerves and your initiative have achieved.

“May no German ever forget how deeply gratitude therefore put us under obligation, how proud we may be to be recognized once more in the world as a free, equal, great German People.

“With the thanks of my family, of our plants, of our entire Ruhr District filled with the urge to work, I must express united gratitude, springing from a full warm heart, from the Sudeten District which is now a part of the German Reich.”

* * * * * *

“_Heil_ to Thee, my Fuehrer.” (_D-304_)

(4) Shortly after the conspirators launched their aggression against Poland, Krupp stated to the workers in his plant:

“The Fuehrer has made his decision, not lightheartedly but in the consciousness of responsibility to his people, to the entire future of the German Nation—we have all heard that in his Reichstag speech last Friday.”

* * * * * *

“A hard struggle, perhaps hardly appreciated to its fullest extent, lies before us. The entire German Nation must face this test of fire in unshakable unity, young or old, man or woman, everyone must and will do his duty at his post, do more than just what his duty demands and devote his entire strength to the task assigned to him. Therefore let us also, as Krupp Members, remain determined. May God protect our Fuehrer and our people!” (_D-363_)

(5) In a speech dated 6 May 1941, commemorating the successes of the Nazi aggression in the West, Krupp stated:

“The one who, like myself, had the chance to visit and thoroughly inspect during the last weeks the fields where our superb troops made the breakthrough in the West—

“who could hear on that occasion the roar of our Airforce against England—

“who witnessed how our U-boats and speedboats distinguished themselves against the remains of England’s sea-might—

“such a person is bound to be thankfully proud to be able to contribute through his labours to assure to our fighters the weapons which they need for their battle—

“such a person is and remains devotedly and respectfully conscious that the nicest machines, the most effective instruments mean little, no, nothing, without the complete unselfish and trusting share of the individual, whose trust is assured through his knowledge of, and his faith in, the genius of his Fuehrer, who embodies the worth of the German people, their honour and might. To him, our Fuehrer, we direct also in this hour in the Spring month of May our thoughts, renew our solemn oath, present our heartiest wishes and give thanks to him.

“Adolf Hitler—_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-390_)

G. _KRUPP AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON PLAN TO EXPLOIT THE PEOPLE OF OCCUPIED COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPELLING PERSONS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR TO WORK AGAINST THEIR WILL AND WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IN THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS. THESE ACTS AND PRACTICES WERE CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 6 AND 52 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS, 1907, TO ARTICLE 31 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929), THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND TO ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE CHARTER._

(1) Charts marked “secret” have been found which show the number and nationalities of prisoners of war and foreign workers employed in each of the workshops in the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works at Essen, for the period from December 1940 to 1 February 1945. These charts, when read in conjunction with an affidavit by a Krupp official concerning the materials produced in the various Essen workshops, reveal that French and Russian prisoners of war and slave laborers from virtually every country occupied by Germany were used in the production of arms and munitions. Thus, they were compelled to work in departments engaged in the construction of turrets for tanks and carriages for heavy Army and Navy guns; the assembling of marine gun turrets, 10.5 cm. marine guns, and 15 cm. torpedo-boat guns; the manufacture of crankshafts for S-boats and aeroplanes, etc. (Charts and affidavit relating to production in the workshops of Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works by prisoners of war and foreign workers, not here reproduced.) Affidavits of workers in the Krupp workshops afford added proof that prisoners of war and foreign laborers were used by Krupp in the manufacture of arms and munitions (see _D-253_, _D-265_, _D-279_).

(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories did not voluntarily engage in the manufacture of arms and munitions; they were forced to do so. This fact is clearly shown by the following:

(_a_) Workers were brought to Essen from Poland and Russia in grossly overcrowded, unheated, and unsanitary cattle cars and upon debarking, were beaten, kicked, and otherwise inhumanely treated. An employee of the Reich Railway at Essen has described these conditions as follows:

“* * * In the middle of 1941 the first workers arrived from Poland, Galicia and Polish Ukraine. They came to Essen in goods wagons in which potatoes, building materials and also cattle have been transported; they were brought to perform work at Krupp. The cars were jammed full with people. * * * The people were squashed closely together and they had no room for free movement. The Krupp overseers laid special value on the speed the slave workers got in and out of the train. * * * the people were beaten and kicked and generally maltreated in a brutal manner. * * * I could see with my own eyes that sick people who could scarcely walk * * * were taken to work. One could see that it was sometimes difficult for them to move themselves. The same can be said for the Eastern workers and PWs who came to Essen in the middle of 1942.” (_D-321_; _D-367_).

(_b_) Foreign workers were compelled to go to work under guard and were closely watched. In a memorandum dated 7 April 1942, entitled “employment of foreign workers”, from the Ignitor workshop of the Krupp Essen plant, it is stated:

“In the course of last week, due to the fact that the foreign workers, especially Poles, could not be relied upon to appear at work, there was an extraordinary decrease in production; loss of money and fines did not obtain the desired results.

“Especially during short (bank) holidays we were not able to find a responsible person in the camp Seumannstrasse, to whom we could have referred. We ourselves are short of guards to fetch the Poles from their camp, and to guard them overnight.” (_D-270_; re compulsion exerted by guards in marching foreign workers to work, see also _D-253_).

(_c_) After working hours, foreign workers were confined in camps under barbed wire enclosures and were carefully guarded. Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in Krupp’s workers’ camps, has stated in an affidavit:

“The eastern workers and Poles who laboured in the Krupp works at Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Spenlestrasse, Grieperstrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Kramerplatz. * * * All these camps were surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.” (_D-288_)

H. _CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 4, 6, 7, AND 46 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS, 1907, ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929), THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE CHARTER, KRUPP, AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DENYING ADEQUATE FOOD, SHELTER, CLOTHING, AND MEDICAL CARE AND ATTENTION TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND WORKERS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED COUNTRIES, FOR FORCING THEM TO WORK UNDER INHUMANE CONDITIONS, AND FOR TORTURING THEM AND SUBJECTING THEM TO INDIGNITIES._

(1) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were undernourished and forced to work on a virtual starvation diet.

(_a_) In a memorandum upon Krupp stationery to Mr. Hupe, Director of the Krupp locomotive factory in Essen, dated 14 March 1942 and entitled “Employment of Russians”, it was said:

“During the last few days we have established that the food for the Russians employed here is so miserable, that the people are getting weaker from day to day.

“Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for turning into position for instance, because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist at all places of work where Russians are employed.” (_D-316_)

(_b_) In a memorandum dated 18 March 1942, the following was reported from the Krupp armoured car repair shop:

“I got the food this evening after Mr. Balz telephoned, but I had quite a struggle with the people responsible in the camp before I got anything at all. They always told me that the people had already received the day’s rations and there wasn’t any more. What the gentlemen understand under a day’s ration is a complete puzzle to me. The food as a whole was a puzzle too, because they ladled me out the thinnest of any already watery soup. It was literally water with a handful of turnips and it looked as if it were washing up water.

“Please tell Mr. Balz again definitely so that the matter is finally cleared up, that it cannot continue having people perish here at work.” (_D-310_)

(_c_) In a memorandum dated 20 March 1942 to Mr. Ihn, one of the Krupp Directors, Dinkelacker, a Krupp official, wrote:

“The Deputy Works Manager Mr. Mustin, who also employs a number of such Russian workers and who is quite satisfied with their performance, went to the camp in Kramerplatz on my inducement and had a talk with Mr. Welberg, the Camp Commandant. Mr. Hassel from the Works Police who was present at the time, butted in and declared that one should not believe what the people said. Also that one was dealing with Bolsheviks and they ought to have beatings substituted for food.” (_D-318_)

(_d_) In a memorandum dated 26 March 1942, to Mr. Hupe concerning the use of Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers, it was reported:

“The reason why the Russians are not capable of production is, in my opinion, that the food which they are given will never give them the strength for working which you hope for. The food one day, for instance, consisted of a watery soup with cabbage leaves and a few pieces of turnip. The punctual appearance of the food leaves a good deal to be desired too.” (_D-297_)

(_e_) In a memorandum dated 8 December 1942, Haller, a Krupp official, wrote:

“The complaints from our foreign workers about insufficient food have increased lately. * * *”

“We experienced a very forcible confirmation of these complaints the other day when we drew the food for the Eastern workers from the kitchen in Kramerplatz. On 5.12.42 the midday meal contained unpeeled, whole potatoes which were not even properly cooked; on 7.12.42, there was soup on which cabbage leaves floated, the sight of which made me feel sick.” (_D-366_)

(_f_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupps’ workers’ camps, has stated under oath that not only did the plan for food distribution to foreign workers call for a very small quantity of meat every week, but also that they received only contaminated meats rejected by the health authorities, such as horse or tuberculin infested meat (_D-288_).

(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were forced to live in grossly overcrowded hutted camps and otherwise were denied adequate shelter.

(_a_) In a sworn statement, Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor of the Krupp workers’ camps, has stated with respect to the Krupp camps at which the eastern workers and Poles were kept:

“Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad. The camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were over twice as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted.”

* * * * * *

“Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1,200 inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were also very few facilities for washing.” (_D-288_)

(_b_) Statistics upon the Krupp camps compiled by Krupp officials in 1942 for the Essen health authorities show that in the Krupp Seumannstrasse camp 1784 beds were compressed into a surface area of 7844 square meters; in the Krupp Bottroperstrasse camp 874 beds were crowded into a surface area of 3585 square meters; and that in other Krupp camps the congestion was even greater (_D-143_).

(_c_) In a memorandum dated 12 June 1944, Dr. Stinnesbeck, a doctor retained by the Krupp works, reported, with respect to the Krupp prisoner of war camp at Noggerathstrasse that:

“315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Grunerstrasse under the Essen-Mulheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories in Krupps works.” (_D-335_)

(_d_) In a special medical report marked “strictly confidential”, dated 2 September 1944, concerning the same prisoner of war camp, Dr. Jaeger wrote:

“The P. O. W. camp in the Noggerathstrasse is in a frightful condition. The people live in ash bins, dog kennels, old baking ovens and in self-made huts.” (_D-339_).

(3) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were denied adequate clothing.

(_a_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in Krupps’ workers’ camps, has stated under oath:

“The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of shoes, many workers were forced to go to work in their bare feet, even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes. Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue work suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.” (_D-288_)

(_b_) In a memorandum to Mr. Ihn, a Krupp director, dated 20 October 1942, Dr. Wiehle, head of the Krupp hospital in Essen, wrote:

“It has already been pointed out several times at conferences that the clothing for Eastern workers, men and women, is not sufficient. With regard to the cold weather, the camp physician today called our attention to the fact that the number of colds is going up because of the question of insufficient clothing.

“Many of the men and women still have to go barefooted. They have no underwear and it often happens that people who wear foot bandages because of injuries walk barefooted on these bandages.” (_D-271_; see also _D-355_, _D-312_)

(4) Prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were denied adequate medical care and treatment, and as a consequence, suffered severely from a multitude of diseases and ailments.

(_a_) In the above mentioned affidavit, Dr. Jaeger has stated:

“The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly widespread among the eastern workers. The T.B. rate among them was 4 times the normal rate (2% eastern workers, .5% Germans). At Dechenschule approximately 2½% of the workers suffered from open T.B. These were all active T.B. cases. The Tartars and Kirghiz suffered most; as soon as they were overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.

“These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice, the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, bugs and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food also caused many cases of Hunger-Odem, Nephritis and Shighakruse.

“It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily sick call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work despite illnesses.”

* * * * * *

“At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944,—I am not completely sure of the exact date—I obtained permission for the first time to visit the prisoner of war camps. My inspection revealed that conditions at these camps were even worse than those I had found at the camps of the eastern workers in 1942. Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the _Wehrmacht_ authorities whose duty it was to provide medical care for the prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to nothing. After visiting and pressing them over a period of two weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000 prisoners of war.” (_D-288_)

(_b_) In a memorandum dated 7 May 1943, prepared at the Krupp hospital, entitled “Deaths of Eastern Workers,” report was made of the death of 54 “eastern workers.” Of this number, 38 died of tuberculosis, 2 of undernourishment, and 2 of intestinal disease. (_D-283_)

(_c_) In his “strictly confidential” report concerning the prisoner of war camp at Noggerathstrasse, Dr. Jaeger reported:

“The food is barely sufficient. Krupp is responsible for housing and feeding. The supply of medicine and bandages is so extremely bad that proper medical treatment was not possible in many cases. This fact is detrimental to the P. W. camp. It is astonishing that the number of sick is not higher than it is and it moves between 9 and 10 percent.” (_D-339_; also _D-313_).

(_d_) In a special medical report dated 28 July 1944, Dr. Jaeger wrote:

“The sick barrack in Camp Rabenhorst is in such bad condition, one cannot speak of a sick barrack anymore. The rain leaks through in every corner. The housing of the ill is therefore impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover. * * *” (_D-338_)

(5) Russian juveniles were compelled to work at the Krupp factories, and prisoners of war and foreign workers were generally forced to work long hours, to and beyond the point of exhaustion.

(_a_) In a memorandum marked “secret”, dated 14 August 1942, Reiff, a Krupp official, wrote:

“* * * I am under the impression that the better Russian workers are first of all chosen for the works in Central and Eastern Germany. We really get the bad remainders only. Just now 600 Russians, consisting of 450 women and 150 juveniles, 14 years of age, arrived.” (_D-348_; similar proof is contained in _D-281_).

(_b_) In a memorandum from the Chief of the Krupp Camp Catering Department, it is stated:

“* * * It is to be considered that foreigners must work 12 hours on principle out of which, 1 hour counts as a break and consequently will not be paid.” (_D-233_; for evidence concerning complete exhaustion of foreign workers and prisoners of war, see _D-313_).

(6) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers used at the Krupp works were beaten, tortured, and subjected to inhuman indignities.

(_a_) In a sworn statement, Heinrich Buschhauer has stated:

“* * * I admit that I hit Russians. The Russians were very willing and attentive. The clothing of the Russians was very bad and torn. Their feet were wrapped in rags. The appearance of the people was bad, they were thin and pale. Their cheeks had fallen in completely. In spite of this, I was forced to ill-treat the people on the orders of works manager Theile. I have boxed the people’s ears and beaten them with a ¾ rubber tube and a wooden stick. * * * The more energetic I went against these people, the more the Works Manager liked it. I * * * had to drive and beat the Russians in order to get increased production from them. At times, I had up to two thousand foreigners under me. The Russians could not possibly work more than they did, because the food was too bad and too little. The Works management, however, wanted to get still higher performance from them. It often happened that the Russians, so utterly weakened, collapsed. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The conditions which I have described above continued the whole of the years I was in the boiler making department. On 20th February 1943, I was transferred from the boiler making shop to Nidia.” (_D-305_).

(_b_) Walter Thoene, a Krupp employee, likewise admitted in a sworn statement that he constantly beat foreign workers. He stated:

“I admit that I punched and beat Hungarian Jewesses who I had to supervise in No. 3 Steel Moulding Shop. I did not do this of my own free will but was ordered to do so by my works manager Reif, who was a Party Member like I was. Almost every day this unscrupulous man held me to it in no mistakable manner to driving on these Jewesses and getting better performances from them. He also always emphasized that I should not be trivial in the choice of means, and if necessary, hit them like hitting a piece of cold iron. As soon as I saw that these women were standing near the ovens, I had to drive them back to their work.” (_D-355_)

Comparable admission were made by August Kleinschmidt, another Krupp employee. (_D-306_)

(_c_) Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, a doctor in the Polish Army, who was taken a prisoner of war and in that capacity attended some Russian, Polish and French prisoners of war at the Krupp factories, has stated under oath:

“* * * Every day, at least 10 people were brought to me whose bodies were covered with bruises on account of the continual beatings with rubber tubes, steel switches or sticks. The people were often writhing with agony and it was impossible for me to give them even a little medical aid. * * * I could notice people daily who on account of hunger or ill-treatment, were slowly dying. Dead people often lay for 2 or 3 days on the pailliases until their bodies stank so badly that fellow prisoners took them outside and buried them somewhere. * * * I have seen with my own eyes the prisoners coming back from Krupps and how they collapsed on the march and had to be wheeled back on barrows or carried by their comrades. * * * The work which they had to perform was very heavy and dangerous and many cases happened where people had cut their fingers, hands or legs. These accidents were very serious and the people came to me and asked me for medical help. But it wasn’t even possible for me to keep them from work for a day or two, although I had been to the Krupp directorate and asked for permission to do so. At the end of 1941, 2 people died daily and in 1942 the deaths increased to 3-4 per day.” (_D-313_)

(_d_) A particular form of torture which was inflicted upon Russian workers was a steel cabinet specially manufactured by Krupp, into which workers were thrown after beatings. The cabinets are shown in photographs attached to a sworn statement wherein it is stated:

“Photograph ‘A’ shows an iron cupboard which was specially manufactured by the Firm of Krupp to torture Russian civilian workers to such an extent that it is impossible to describe. Men and women were often locked in one compartment of the cupboard, in which a man could scarcely stand, for long periods. The measurements of this compartment are height 1.52 meters, breadth and depth 40 to 50 cm. each. In fact, people were often kicked and pressed into one compartment in pairs. At the top of the cupboard, there were sieve-like air holes through which cold water was poured on the unfortunate victims during the ice-cold winter.” (_D-382_; for further evidence of constant beatings of foreign workers, see _D-253_, _D-312_, _D-354_, and _D-267_).

(_e_) Records found in the Krupp files plainly indicate that the practice of beating and torturing prisoners of war and foreign workers was deliberately prescribed by Krupp officials. Steel switches which were used to beat the workers were distributed pursuant to the instructions of Kupke, head of the Krupp camps for foreign workers (_D-230_). In a memorandum dated 19 March 1942, from the Krupp Works Catering Department, it was said:

“* * * With regards to the times ahead it seems desirable to us, to draw attention to the authorities concerned, with the necessary pressure, to the fact that only severest treatment of the French prisoners of war will ensure that they maintain their performance even with the present food position, which is the same for German workers.” (_D-278_).

As previously shown, Hassel, an official in the Krupp works police, stated that the Russians “ought to have beatings substituted for food” (_D-318_).

(7) The Krupp companies specifically requested and actively sought out the employment of prisoners of war and foreign laborers.

(_a_) In a memorandum dated 13 July 1942 by Weinhold, a Krupp official, complaint was registered over the fact that “the foreign laborers are only available two to three months after they have been asked for by us.” (_D-281_).

(_b_) In a letter to the Krupp firm dated 27 August 1942, Colonel Zimmerman of the _Oberkommando des Heeres_, said:

“According to our estimate, there ought to be enough workers in your ignitor workshops to reach the demanded production figure. This especially, as the 105 Russians, demanded by your firm at the Conference of the special committee M 111 on the 24.4.42, were assigned to your works at the beginning of June re-letter from Wa J Ru (Mun. 2). * * *

“Unfortunately, I found out at the sitting of the special committee M 111 on the 26.8.42 that the firm of Krupp asks for another 55 workers, including 25 skilled labourers, without having a corresponding raise in the production figures. I cannot judge from here, what the reasons for this are.” (_D-345_)

(_c_) In a memorandum dated 21 December 1942 concerning the possibility of the Krupp works obtaining additional conscripted French workers, Dr. Lehmann, a Krupp official, stated:

“* * * We discussed how far it would be possible for complete shifts of workers conscripted from French factories to be transferred to Essen. We are to collaborate as far as practicable in the splitting up of our requirements amongst individual military government offices and military police posts. So far as possible one of our representatives is to assist in the selection from amongst the conscripts.” (_D-196_; see also _D-280_)

(8) Concentration camp laborers, who were brought to the Krupp works at the request of Krupp officials, were subjected to persecution, degradation, despoilment, and torture in a manner similar to that of prisoners of war and slave laborers.

(_a_) Mr. Ihn, a director of the Krupp firm, has stated in a signed but unsworn statement, that the Krupp firm first asked for concentration camp labor on 22 September 1942, and that the first group of them arrived “in the summer or autumn of 1944” (_D-274_).

(_b_) The fact that concentration camp labor was requested by the Krupp works; that such persons were to be confined behind barbed wire enclosures; and that they were to be closely guarded by SS personnel is further shown in a memorandum entitled “Visit of the Director of Distribution of Workers of the Weimar-Buchenwald Concentration Camp; SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwarz on 26-7-44”, written by Trockel, a Krupp official. In the course of this memorandum, Trockel stated:

“Herr Schwarz came on behalf of his Commandant SS Standartenfuehrer Pister to talk over with us, the question of employment of K1 detainees. He pointed out that the employment of men could not be reckoned with for a considerable period. Our last request was for 700 women.”

* * * * * *

“As not less than 500 women would be assigned, we agreed that the figure should remain at 500 women in order that the assignment should not be endangered. * * *”

* * * * * *

“* * * The main things are the erection of a barbed wire fence in front of the hall which allows a small exit and the erection of a small barracks for the Commander of the guard and his duty office and for the German female guard personnel. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The SS are providing a guard consisting of guard commander and 10 men. For 520 women we have to name approx. 45 German women who will be sworn in to the SS, given 3 weeks training in the women’s camp at Ravensbrueck and then given full official supervision duties by the SS. * * *” (_D-238_)

(_c_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupp camps, has described conditions at the camp which the Krupp works maintained for concentration camp labor as follows:

“Camp Humboldtstrasse had been inhabited by Italian prisoners of war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldtstrasse, I found these females suffering from open festering wounds and other diseases.

“I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight. There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were no medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS guards.

“The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to 30 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this camp with a Mr. Grono on two occasions and both times we left the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to undertake the necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.” (_D-288_)

(_d_) The conditions under which the concentration camp workers existed at the Krupp camps and factories and the indignities and barbarities to which they were subjected are vividly described in affidavits by such workers (_D-256_; _D-277_; _D-272_). In general, the affidavits disclose that these concentration camp laborers slept on bare floors of damp, windowless and lightless cellars; that they had no water for drinking or cleansing purposes; that they were compelled to do work far beyond their strength; that they were mercilessly beaten; that they were given one wretched meal a day, consisting of a dirty watery soup with a thin slice of black bread; and that many of them died from starvation, tuberculosis and overexertion. A chart entitled “Fried. Krupp _Berthawerk, Markstaedt_ Breslau, Number of Occupied Foreigners, Prisoners of War and Concentration Camp Inmates” shows the use of concentration camp labor at that factory, as well as at the above-mentioned Krupp company in Essen (_D-298_).

(9) Charts prepared by Krupp officials show that in September 1943, the Krupp concerns employed 39,245 foreign workers and 11,224 prisoners of war, and that the number mounted steadily until September 1944, when 54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war were used (Chart entitled “Foreigners and Prisoners of War of the Krupp Concern”; chart entitled “Cast Steel Works, Number of Prisoners of War and Foreigners”, not here reproduced.) The majority of the foreign laborers consisted of Russians, French, Poles, and Dutch.

I. _AS REWARD FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM, KRUPP REAPED LARGE PROFITS, WAS PERMITTED TO EXPAND HIS INDUSTRIAL EMPIRE, AND RECEIVED HIGH HONORS AND SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM THE NAZI GOVERNMENT._

(1) Although the Krupp companies operated at a substantial loss in the years immediately preceding Hitler’s accession to power, the huge orders from the Nazi state enabled them to derive vast profits thereafter. In the fiscal year 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, the net profits of Fried. Krupp and subsidiaries, after the deduction of taxes, gifts and reserves recognized by the tax authorities, amounted to 57,216,392 marks. In the fiscal year 1937 to 1938 these net profits rose to 97,071,632 marks, and in the fiscal year 1941 they amounted to 111,555,216 marks (Chart entitled “Income and Loss of the Fried. Krupp Combine”; Graph entitled “Profits or Losses of Fried. Krupp and Subsidiaries as Reported to Tax Authorities,” not here reproduced.)

(2) Krupp was permitted, with the approval and at times connivance of Nazi officials, to extend in great measure his participation in other companies, both within and without Germany.

(_a_) On 1 October 1933 the participations of Fried. Krupp in other concerns had a book value of 75,962,000 marks. By 30 September 1942 the book value of the participations had grown to 132,944,000 marks. On 1 October 1942 the participation account was revalued and carried at a new figure of 187,924,621 marks. In the following year new acquisitions were made in the amount of 50,224,707 marks, so that the book value of the participations as of 1 October 1943 was 237,316,093 marks. Even this figure contains many going concerns in occupied countries which were arbitrarily assigned a book value of only 1 mark. Leaving out of account the revaluation of 1 October 1942, the participation account as of 1 October 1943 would have been 182,952,000 marks. The increment in the participation account is shown in a chart entitled, “Fried. Krupp Participations” (_D-341_). The expansion of the Krupp concern under the Nazi regime is likewise revealed by a comparison of charts showing the companies in the Krupp concern as of 30 September 1935 and 31 January 1944.

(_b_) Complete records of all acquisitions by Krupp have not been obtained because, according to Krupp officials, many records were lost or destroyed in air raids. Enough appears, however, to indicate that the Krupp firm did in fact call upon the Nazi authorities to facilitate or make possible the acquisition of property interests in occupied countries. Thus, when Mr. Erhard, the French custodian of Jewish property in France, resisted Krupp’s attempts to acquire a lease of a plant at Liancourt, France, the Krupp concern enlisted the support of the Army to gain its objective. Under threat of replacement by a German official, the French custodian of Jewish property acceded to Krupp’s demands. In a memorandum dated 29 July 1942, found in the Krupp files, it is stated:

“* * * M. Erhard delayed the negotiations to such an extent that finally the appropriate military authorities in Paris urged a settlement. This authority declared that if Mr. Erhard could not make up his mind to sell, at least he would have to give a three years’ lease to Krupp.

“The custodianship would be taken away from Mr. Erhard and a German Commissar would be appointed unless the lease were granted in a very short time.” (_D-526_).

(3) In recognition of his services to the Nazi State, Krupp was awarded the “Shield of the Eagle of the German Reich” with the inscription “To the German leader of Industry” (_D-66_).

(4) Because of his unique service to the military power of the Nazi State, Krupp was authorized by special decree of Hitler to transform Fried. Krupp A.G. into a private family concern in order to perpetuate control of the firm by a single member of the Krupp family.

(_a_) In a letter dated 11 November 1942 to Bormann, Krupp stated:

“* * * You have asked me to make proposals to you which would secure the future of the unified existence of the Krupp works more than this is feasible today. * * * On considering this question we have ascertained that under the present laws the principal solution of the question cannot be carried out. We had to find an entirely new way, therefore, which, just as the law regarding heritage of agricultural property, creates entirely new legislation.” (_D-99_)

(_b_) In reply to the above letter, Bormann wrote to Krupp that:

“I have reported the contents of your letters of the 11/11 to the Fuehrer today. He instructed me to inform you that he would be readily prepared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued existence of the works as a family enterprise; it would be the simplest to issue a ‘_Lex Krupp_’ to start with.” (_D-101_).

(_c_) Krupp’s recognition of the unusual character of his proposal is indicated in his letter of 24 February 1943 to Lammers, wherein he said:

“Without doubt, the matter, which is without precedent in economic life, will have to be discussed with the Reichs Minister of Justice and the Reichs Minister of Finance also. * * *” (_D-106_).

(_d_) On 12 November 1943 Hitler signed the decree making possible the preservation of the Krupp firm as a family enterprise in recognition of the fact that

“for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed strength of the German people.” (_D-120_)

In a letter dated 16 November 1943, Lammers wrote to Krupp:

“On 12 November the Fuehrer signed the decree regarding the family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp. * * * May I express my heartiest congratulations to you, your wife and the firm Fried. Krupp on the great honor which has been conferred on the merits of the firm Fried. Krupp with this recognition by the Fuehrer.” (_D-124_).

(_e_) As the final step in the proceeding, Hitler approved “the statute of the family enterprise Fried. Krupp” which gave effect to his decree of 12 November 1943 (_D-131_).

(_f_) In a letter of gratitude to Hitler dated 29 December 1943, Krupp stated:

“* * * By this, you have made a wish come true, which my wife and I had had for years, and thus relieved our hearts of great worry over the future of the Krupp works.”

* * * * * *

“My wife and I, as well as the whole family, are deeply grateful to you for this proof of your confidence. * * *”

“Our special thanks go to you, Mein Fuehrer, also for the great honour and recognition which you have awarded, in the introduction to your decree, to 130 years of the work of Krupps, the work of Krupps done by many generations of faithful followers, and steered and directed by 4 generations of the family Krupp.” (_D-135_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 64 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ D-62 │Letter from Inspector of War │ │ │Production to Krupp, 21 January 1937. │ VI │ 1028 │ │ │ D-63 │Declaration of political attitude by │ │ │Krupp, 6 February 1937. │ VI │ 1029 │ │ │ D-64 │Letter to Krupp, 3 December 1941, │ │ │enclosing extracts from draft of │ │ │article entitled “Works Leader and │ │ │Armaments Works”, 5 April 1941. │ VI │ 1030 │ │ │ D-66 │Presentation certificate, 7 August │ │ │1940, concerning granting to Krupp of │ │ │Shield of the Eagle of German Reich. │ VI │ 1034 │ │ │ D-88 │Correspondence between Krupp and │ │ │Raeder, 7 and 10 August 1935. │ VI │ 1042 │ │ │ D-94 │Article by Krupp, Manager and Armament│ │ │Worker, from 1 March 1942 issue of │ │ │Krupp magazine. │ VI │ 1043 │ │ │ D-96 │Memorandum on establishment of an │ │ │experimental Tank Factory by the │ │ │Grusonwerk, 21 February 1944. │ VI │ 1047 │ │ │ D-99 │Letter from Krupp to Bormann, 11 │ │ │November 1942. │ VI │ 1048 │ │ │ D-101 │Letter from Bormann to Krupp, 21 │ │ │November 1942. │ VI │ 1050 │ │ │ D-106 │Letter from Krupp to Lammers, 24 │ │ │February 1943. │ VI │ 1050 │ │ │ D-120 │Fuehrer decree on family enterprise of│ │ │the firm Friedrich Krupp. │ VI │ 1051 │ │ │ D-124 │Letter from Lammers to Krupp, 16 │ │ │November 1943. │ VI │ 1053 │ │ │ D-131 │Hitler decree of 21 December 1943, │ │ │approving family enterprise of Krupp. │ VI │ 1054 │ │ │ D-135 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 29 │ │ │December 1943. │ VI │ 1054 │ │ │ D-143 │List of barracks and beds in workers │ │ │Hostels and PW camps of Friedrich │ │ │Krupp A.G., and covering letter of 30 │ │ │June 1942. │ VI │ 1058 │ │ │ *D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │ │in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │ │256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060 │ │ │ D-152 │Memorandum by Pfirsrch on the │ │ │conference at Federal Ministry for │ │ │National Defense in Vienna, 28 │ │ │September 1936. │ VI │ 1062 │ │ │ D-154 │Memorandum, 23 June 1937, in files of │ │ │Friedrich Krupp A.G. concerning order │ │ │for armor plating from Bulgaria. │ VI │ 1062 │ │ │ *D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │ │1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063 │ │ │ D-158 │Letter from Rosenberg to Krupp, 26 │ │ │April 1933. │ VI │ 1066 │ │ │ *D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │ │concerning exchange of intelligence │ │ │involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069 │ │ │ D-170 │Notes of 8 May 1939 by Sonnenberg on │ │ │conference in Berlin concerning │ │ │foreign anti-aircraft guns. │ VI │ 1072 │ │ │ D-191 │Memorandum on reconstruction of │ │ │Krupp’s after war 1914-1918 with │ │ │special reference to armaments │ │ │exports, 25 March 1941. │ VI │ 1076 │ │ │ D-196 │Memoranda by Dr. Lehman concerning │ │ │recruiting of French workers. │ VI │ 1078 │ │ │ D-201 │Telegram from Goering to Krupp. │ VI │ 1080 │ │ │ *D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │ │industry before the election of March │ │ │1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080 │ │ │ *D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning │ │ │political organization of state and │ │ │economy, 22 February 1933. (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085 │ │ │ *D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │ │distribution of propaganda abroad │ │ │through foreign connections of Krupp │ │ │firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085 │ │ │ D-208 │Letter from Krupp to Springorum, 26 │ │ │April 1933. │ VI │ 1087 │ │ │ *D-230 │Instruction for issuing steel switches│ │ │to Krupp camps, 3 January 1945. (USA │ │ │898) │ VI │ 1094 │ │ │ D-233 │Memorandum, 17 October 1944, │ │ │concerning working hours for foreign │ │ │workers. │ VI │ 1095 │ │ │ D-238 │Memorandum by Trockel, 28 July 1944, │ │ │concerning assignation of detainees. │ VI │ 1095 │ │ │ D-242 │Letter from Springorum to Krupp │ │ │concerning contribution of 20,000 │ │ │marks to Rosenberg. │ VI │ 1097 │ │ │ D-249 │Von Bulow memorandum on notes of │ │ │conference with Grassmann, Fuss and │ │ │Kraft, held 9 December 1942, │ │ │concerning History of War Economy. │ VI │ 1098 │ │ │ D-253 │Affidavit of Peter Gutersohn, 3 │ │ │October 1945. │ VI │ 1105 │ │ │ D-256 │Affidavit of Rene Koenigsberg and │ │ │Agnes Koenigsberg, 20 September 1945. │ VI │ 1107 │ │ │ D-265 │Affidavit of Heinrich Ruhnau, 3 │ │ │October 1945. │ VI │ 1108 │ │ │ D-267 │Affidavit of Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl │ │ │Hanke, Johann Berek, 27 September │ │ │1945. │ VI │ 1109 │ │ │ D-270 │Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │ │employment of foreign workers. │ VI │ 1110 │ │ │ D-271 │Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 │ │ │October 1942. │ VI │ 1110 │ │ │ D-272 │Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin │ │ │Roth, 21 September 1945. │ VI │ 1111 │ │ │ D-274 │Statement by Ihn, 1 October 1945. │ VI │ 1112 │ │ │ D-277 │Affidavit of Rosa Katz, 21 September │ │ │1945. │ VI │ 1115 │ │ │ D-278 │Memorandum from Works Catering │ │ │Department to Dr. Lehmann, Employment │ │ │Office, 19 March 1942. │ VI │ 1116 │ │ │ D-279 │Affidavit of Alexander Haverkarte, 1 │ │ │October 1945. │ VI │ 1116 │ │ │ D-280 │Secret memorandum, 17 June 1942, │ │ │concerning need for and obtaining of │ │ │workers for cast steel works. │ VI │ 1117 │ │ │ D-281 │Memorandum by Winhold, 13 July 1942, │ │ │concerning urgent production A.Z. 23 │ │ │(Pr). │ VI │ 1119 │ │ │ *D-283 │Report by Krupp hospitals, 7 May 1943,│ │ │concerning deaths of Eastern Workers. │ │ │(USA 899) │ VII │ 1 │ │ │ D-287 │Letter from Krupp to Raeder, 30 │ │ │October 1942. │ VII │ 1 │ │ │ *D-288 │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 │ │ │October 1945. (USA 202) │ VII │ 2 │ │ │ D-291 │Speech by Krupp, 1 May 1936. │ VII │ 7 │ │ │ D-297 │Memorandum from Theile to Hupe, 26 │ │ │March 1942, concerning employment of │ │ │Russian PWs and civilians. │ VII │ 9 │ │ │ D-298 │Affidavit by Dr. Georg Wolff and │ │ │chart, “Fried. Krupp Berthawerk, │ │ │Markstaedt Breslau, Number of Occupied│ │ │Foreigners, Prisoners of War and │ │ │Concentration Camp Inmates”. │ VII │ 10 │ │ │ D-304 │Krupp speech, 13 October 1938. │ VII │ 12 │ │ │ D-305 │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 │ │ │October 1945. │ VII │ 13 │ │ │ D-306 │Affidavit of August Kleinschmidt, 11 │ │ │October 1945. │ VII │ 14 │ │ │ D-310 │Memorandum from Grollius to Kolsch, 18│ │ │March 1942. │ VII │ 15 │ │ │ D-312 │Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 │ │ │October 1945. │ VII │ 16 │ │ │ *D-313 │Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, │ │ │October 1945. (USA 901) │ VII │ 18 │ │ │ D-316 │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│ │ │concerning employment of Russians. │ │ │(USA 201) │ VII │ 20 │ │ │ *D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │ │Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944.│ │ │(USA 770) │ VII │ 21 │ │ │ D-318 │Memorandum from Diwkelaker to Ihn, 20 │ │ │March 1942. │ VII │ 24 │ │ │ *D-321 │Affidavit of Adam Schmidt, 12 October │ │ │1945. (USA 895) │ VII │ 25 │ │ │ D-325 │Affidavit of 17 October 1945 │ │ │concerning payments of Fried. Krupp │ │ │Cast Steel Works to Party and Party │ │ │Organizations. │ VII │ 26 │ │ │ D-332 │Letter from Janssen to NSDAP, 27 June │ │ │1935. │ VII │ 26 │ │ │ *D-335 │Memorandum from Stinnesbeck to Jaeger,│ │ │12 June 1944. (USA 900) │ VII │ 27 │ │ │ D-338 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │ │28 July 1944. │ VII │ 27 │ │ │ D-339 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │ │2 September 1944. │ VII │ 28 │ │ │ D-341 │Affidavit of Johannes Schroeder │ │ │concerning Fried. Krupp │ │ │Participations. │ VII │ 29 │ │ │ D-345 │Letter from Col. Zimmermann to Krupp │ │ │firm, 27 August 1942. │ VII │ 30 │ │ │ D-348 │Secret memo by Reiff concerning │ │ │conference in Berlin, 14 August 1942. │ VII │ 31 │ │ │ D-353 │Speech by Krupp, 18 October 1933, at │ │ │first meeting of Committee for │ │ │Industrial and Social Policy of Reich │ │ │Association of German Industry. │ VII │ 32 │ │ │ D-354 │Affidavit of Paul Lenz, Wilhelm Sill, │ │ │Hermann Rosskothen, Fritz Schink, Karl│ │ │Fortkamp, Wilhelm Piegeler, 5 October │ │ │1945. │ VII │ 34 │ │ │ D-355 │Affidavit of Walter Thoene, 8 October │ │ │1945. │ VII │ 36 │ │ │ D-363 │Krupp speech, 4 September 1939. │ VII │ 37 │ │ │ D-366 │Memorandum from Haller to Schuermeyer,│ │ │8 December 1942. │ VII │ 37 │ │ │ D-367 │Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 │ │ │October 1945. │ VII │ 38 │ │ │ D-368 │Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, │ │ │concerning use of Hitler Fund. │ VII │ 39 │ │ │ D-373 │Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June│ │ │1935, thanking Krupp for │ │ │contributions. │ VII │ 40 │ │ │ D-375 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 24 July │ │ │1942. │ VII │ 40 │ │ │ *D-382 │Affidavit of Raimund Becker, Aloys │ │ │Hoefer, Josef Dahm, 4 October 1945. │ │ │(USA 897) │ VII │ 41 │ │ │ D-385 │Speech by Krupp at first showing of │ │ │Krupp film on 27 October 1935. │ VII │ 42 │ │ │ D-386 │Speech by Krupp on election after │ │ │death of Hindenburg, on 10 August │ │ │1934. │ VII │ 43 │ │ │ D-387 │Speech by Krupp, 7 April 1938. │ VII │ 43 │ │ │ D-390 │Krupp speech to jubilees of plant on 6│ │ │May 1941. │ VII │ 43 │ │ │ D-391 │Speech by Krupp, 6 April 1938. │ VII │ 44 │ │ │ D-392 │Speech by Krupp, 26 January 1934. │ VII │ 45 │ │ │ D-393 │Speech by Krupp, “The Day of Fate of │ │ │the German People”. │ VII │ 47 │ │ │ D-526 │File memorandum, 29 July 1942, │ │ │concerning acquisition of Liancourt │ │ │lease. │ VII │ 71

14. KARL DOENITZ

A. _NAVAL AND POLITICAL CAREER._

After his appointment in 1935 as commander of the Weddigen U-boat flotilla—the first flotilla to be formed after the World War in 1918—Doenitz, who thus became in effect commander of U-boats, rose steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded until he became an admiral. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Grand Admiral and succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the U-boat arm. Then, on 1 May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as leader of Germany (_2887-PS_).

Doenitz was awarded the following decorations: On 18 September 1939 he received the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was followed on 21 April 1940 by the high award of the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, while on 7 April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd recipient.

Doenitz’s services in building up the German Navy, and in particular the offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, were outstanding. An extract from the official publication “_Das Archiv_” on the occasion of Doenitz’s promotion to vice-admiral, dated 27 September 1940, reads as follows:

“* * * In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the word uninterrupted work of training, he [Doenitz] succeeds in developing the young U-boat arm, personnel, and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than words of the services of this man.” (_D-436_)

An extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition (_1463-PS_) emphasizes Doenitz’s contribution. It describes in detail Doenitz’s work in building up the U-boat arm; his ceaseless work in training night and day to close the gap of seventeen years, during which no training had taken place; his responsibility for new improvements and for devising the “pack” tactics which were later to become famous. His position is summarized further as follows:

“* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program, the chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. * * * In spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.” (_1463-PS_)

It was not only, however, his ability as a naval officer which won Doenitz these high honors: his promotion to succeed Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the personal position he acquired as one of Hitler’s principal advisers; and finally, earlier candidates such as Goering having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honour of becoming Hitler’s successor. These he owed, to his fanatical adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his “masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war” (_1463-PS_), which may be regarded as synonymous with a capacity for utter ruthlessness.

B. _INDOCTRINATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY._

Doenitz’s attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances. In a speech—subsequently circulated by Doenitz as a Top Secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers only—at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on 17 December 1943, Doenitz stated (_D-443_):

“* * * I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives; he is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.

“We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism.

“Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them.” (_D-443_)

In a speech on the same subject by Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders in Chief on 15 February 1944, he had this to say:

“From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state; the idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense.” (_D-640_)

Doenitz’s position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944:

“German men and women!

“* * * What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries. * * *” (_2878-PS_) A speech by Doenitz to the Navy on 21 July 1944 shows his fanaticism:

“Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which was intended to have cost the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it otherwise—watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.” (_2878-PS_)

And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to the traitors.

The abolition of the German military salute and the adoption of the Nazi salute in the German forces was due to Doenitz along with Goering and Keitel (_2878-PS_).

When Adolf Hitler was reported dead, Doenitz spoke over the German radio announcing the Fuehrer’s death and his own succession. The German announcer made this statement:

“It has been reported from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters that our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last breath for Germany against Bolshevism.

“On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer’s successor will speak to the German nation.” (_D-444_)

Whereupon Doenitz spoke as follows:

“German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life.” (_D-444_)

Doenitz proceeded to issue an order of the day, to the same effect (_D-444_).

C. _PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSIVE WARS._

Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample evidence that Doenitz, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the planning and execution of the aggressive wars against Poland, Norway, and Denmark.

(1) _Poland._ The distribution list on a memorandum by Raeder, dated 16 May 1939, shows that the sixth copy went to the _Fuehrer der Unterseeboote_, who was Doenitz. This document was a directive for the invasion of Poland (_Fall Weiss_) (_C-126_). Another memorandum from Raeder’s headquarters, dated 2 August 1939, is addressed to the fleet, and The Flag Officer, U-boats—this is, Doenitz (_C-126_). This was merely a covering letter on operational directions for the precautionary employment of U-boats in the Atlantic in the event that the intention to carry out _Fall Weiss_ remained unchanged. The second sentence is significant:

“Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to SKL [_Seekriegsleitung_, the German Admiralty] by 12 August. A decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August.” (_C-126_)

Doenitz proceeded to give operational instructions to his U-boats for the operation _Fall Weiss_. These instructions, signed by him, are not dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that the date must have been before 16 July 1939 (_C-172_). These operational instructions gave effect to Raeder’s directive (_C-126_).

(2) _Norway and Denmark._ An extract from the War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (_C-122_). It states Doenitz’s views as follows:

“* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.” (_C-122_)

A communication from Doenitz as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the Supreme Command of the Navy (the Naval War Staff) dated 9 October 1939, sets out Doenitz’s views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as bases. Doenitz proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an alternative (_C-5_).

Doenitz then gave operation orders to his U-boats for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. This Top Secret order, dated 30 March 1940, under the code name “_Hartmut_,” provided:

“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.” (_C-151_)

(3) _England._ The preparations for war against England are perhaps best shown by the disposition of the U-boats under Doenitz’s command on 3 September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the _Athenia_, provide corroboration. These matters are contained in two charts prepared by the British Admiralty. The first chart sets out the disposition of German submarines on 3 September 1939. The certificate attached to this chart reads:

“This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939, and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939, and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the British Admiralty in London.”

It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a considerable time before. The location of the U-boat U-30 is particularly significant.

The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war. The attached certificate reads:

“This chart has been constructed from the official records of the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939.”

The location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ is significant.

D. _PARTICIPATION IN CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF WARFARE._

The course of the war waged against neutral and allied merchant shipping by German U-boats followed, under Doenitz’s direction, a course of consistently increasing ruthlessness.

(1) _Attacks on Merchant Shipping._ Doenitz displayed “his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war” (_1463-PS_). From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the crews or passengers of sunken merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the requirements of humanity.

The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come to hand. An official report of the British Foreign Office summarizes German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war (_D-641-A_). This report, made shortly after September 1940, states in part as follows:

“* * * During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons of Allied shipping, comprising 508 ships, have been lost by enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen have lost their lives in these ships.

“In the last war the practice of the Central Powers was so remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The rules laid down:

“(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subjected.

“(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

“At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however, provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article 73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the traditional British view but the important point is that, even in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event, however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for International Law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the protection of human life and property from arbitrary and ruthless attacks.” (_D-641-A_)

Two instances are then set out:

“On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship ‘_Vendia_’ bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signalled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the Norwegian ‘_Arne Kjode_’ was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.” (_D-641-A_)

And then, dealing with attacks on allied merchant vessels, certain figures are given:

“Ships sunk 241 “Recorded attacks 221 “Illegal attacks 112

“At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.” (_D-641-A_)

The report continues:

“By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators however, had made the position clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including contraband control harbours—thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a navicert from a British Consul in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but also that neither before nor after this German threat did the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels.” (_D-641-A_)

A similar report covering the next six months (_D-641-B_) makes these statements:

“On the 30th January 1941, Hitler proclaimed that ‘every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed.’ On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force.

“From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given time.”

* * * * * *

“The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade’.”

* * * * * *

“Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the ‘total blockade’ area.

“That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits of the war-zone.”

* * * * * *

“The sinking of the ‘_City of Benares_’ on the 17th September 1940 is a good example of this. The ‘_City of Benares_’ was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the ‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third 21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing.”

“There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ.” (_D-641-B_)

The total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) amounted to 2,775 British, Allied, and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons (_D-641-C_).

Another example of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by Doenitz’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinking are available, is the sinking of “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_.” The British report, which includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the U-boat’s log, states:

“The British ‘_S. S. Sheaf Mead_’ was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U-37. The following extract from his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour.” (_D-644_)

The relevant extract from the log, at 1554 hours, reads:

“Surface. Stern [referring to the ship which has been torpedoed] is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head—‘Nix Name.’ A young boy in the water calls ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons.” (_D-644_)

“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.

The report of the Chief Engineer of the “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_” contains this description of the situation:

“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name ‘_Gretaston_’ on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to ‘_Sheaf Mead_’ last January.”

* * * * * *

“She had cutaway bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat hooks to keep us off.

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any assistance whatever.” (_D-644_)

The U-boats log at 1444 hours contains a description of the sighting of the ship, the difficulty in identification, and then the sinking:

“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or something similar. Fire! I cannot miss.” (_D-644_)

The actual documents by which Doenitz and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of International Law indicate that the compiler of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the above reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the conspirators progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of International Law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial.

A memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939, (_C-191_) provides:

“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights. * * * In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights.” (_C-191_)

The War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty contains the following report by Ia (Staff Operations Officer on the Naval War Staff) on directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December 1939:

“According to this the Fuehrer, on report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, has decided:

“(_a_) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

“(_b_) In the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

“Both measures may be taken with immediate effect.” (_C-21_)

Another report by Ia, refers to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with “_Fall Gelb_”.

“In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which _mines can be employed_. In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.” (_C-21_)

A third extract from the Naval War Diary, dated 6 January 1940, states:

“* * * the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone.” (_C-21_)

Whereupon, the order is given to Flag Officer, Submarines, carrying out that decision (_C-21_).

The report for 18 January 1940 states:

“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following Directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.

“The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking without warning by U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended. U-Boats must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks.” (_C-21_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary (Doenitz’s War Diary) dated 18 July 1941, reveals a further extension of the above order so as to cut down the protected categories:

“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being, attacks on U. S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

“1. Attack on U. S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U. S. convoys or independently is authorized in the original operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U. S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U. S. to Iceland.” (_C-118_)

As these orders show, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be sunk, while those of another could not. The attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times, for Doenitz conducted the U-Boat war against neutrals with cynical opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not.

(2) _The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors._ A series of orders led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U-Boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance, but deliberately to annihilate them.

Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order Number 154, signed by Doenitz:

“Paragraph (_e_). Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.” (_D-642_)

In 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous ship-building capacity, the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats. Doenitz accordingly issued an order, which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.

The course of events is shown by the record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, (_D-423_) in the presence of Ribbentrop, on 3 January 1942:

“The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”

* * * * * *

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer’s comments, and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods.” (_D-423_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary of 16 September 1942 is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the annihilation order was issued. It records an attack on a U-boat, which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner “_Laconia_,” when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft (_D-446_).

A Top Secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from Doenitz’s headquarters, dated 17 September 1942, provided:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat.

“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.” (_D-630_)

The intentions of this carefully worded order are made clear by an extract from Doenitz’s War Diary which is personally signed by Doenitz. The War Diary entry for 17 September 1942 reads:

“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand.” (_D-630_).

In this connection, a telegram from the Commander of the U-boat “_Schacht_” to Doenitz’s headquarters, and the reply, are significant. “_Schacht_” had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the “_Laconia_.” The telegram from “_Schacht_,” dated 18 September 1942, reads:

“163 Italians handed over to ‘_Annamite_.’ Navigating Officer of ‘_Laconia_’ and another English Officer on board.” (_D-630_)

The telegram goes on to set out the position of English and Polish survivors in boats.

The reply from Doenitz’s headquarters was sent on the 20th:

“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles.” (_D-630_)

Such were Doenitz’s plans before the bombing incident ever occurred.

“Operation Order Atlantic No. 56,” dated 7 October 1943, contains the sailing orders of a U-boat (_D-663_). Although the date of this order is 7 October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued earlier, in the autumn of 1942. The following is an extract from this order:

“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks. These ships are, for the most part, equipped with a shipborne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly armed with depth-charge throwers, and very manoeuverable, so that they are often called U-Boat Traps by the commander. In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.” (_D-663_)

The Prosecution does not complain against attacks on rescue ships. They are not entitled to protection. But the point of the foregoing order to U-boats was that priority in attack should be given to rescue ships. This order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_): in view of the Allied shipbuilding program the German Navy had resolved to take all means to prevent Allied ships from being manned.

To summarize, it would appear from the War Diary entry of 17 September that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued. They have not, however, been captured. It may be that they were issued orally, and that Doenitz awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the “_Laconia_” afforded the opportunity, and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent is clear when it is considered in the light of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful, but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious: he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.

It may be contended that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and that the notorious action of U-Boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek steamer “_Peleus_” and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as Eck himself swore, on his own initiative.

In reply it may be said that if the intention of this order was to stop rescue attempts, in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154. Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy. Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended. Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently. And fifthly, if in fact—and the Prosecution does not accept it—Doenitz did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.

The instructions given by Admiral Doenitz with regard to the murder of shipwrecked Allied seamen are described in an affidavit by _Oberleutnant Zur See_ Peter Josef Heisig (_D-566_). (Heisig was called as a prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) In September 1942 Heisig was a Midshipman in a training course for U-boat officers of the watch. On the last day of the course Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief, U-boats, held an inspection tour and made a speech to the officers in training. Heisig describes the content of Doenitz’s speech as follows:

“* * * According to news received from America we were bound to reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping space would be brought into service monthly. This was more shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew. That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew, through the destruction of every means of saving life.

“I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz’s with the others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of escape, whether in boats, on rafts, or by any other means, must be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz’s authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the bombing.” (_D-566_)

Further light on the real meaning of the Top Secret radio message sent by the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to all U-boat and operational flotillas in September 1942 (_D-630_) is contained in the statement of _Korvettenkapitaen_ Karl Heinz Moehle (_382-PS_). (Moehle was called as a Prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) Concerning this order which was couched in terms of a prohibition against the rescue of survivors, Moehle states as follows:

“This W/T message was without any doubt, sent out at the instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been given without his knowledge.”

* * * * * *

“So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way.

“Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to cease and this order would have passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in commanding officers.”

* * * * * *

“To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their instruction.

“During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore unable to carry it out.” (_382-PS_)

Moehle graphically describes Doenitz’s incitement of his men to the murder of survivors:

“A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors.

“This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. It was stated that she would have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly probably that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a German U-boat.

“This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear to me.” (_382-PS_)

As senior officer of the Fifth U-boat Flotilla, it was Moehle’s duty to transmit orders from the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to commanding officers of U-boats. In this connection, Doenitz’s ambiguous order against the rescue of survivors caused difficulties.

“I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or less the following words:—‘I have now to inform you of a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following order in an ‘officers only’ signal (* * * the exact words of the order were then read out).’

“Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this point.

“Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat as follows:—

“‘I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this order, by reference to the following event:’ I then mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. I then went on to say, ‘Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with your own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain your prime consideration.’”

* * * * * *

“I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of September 1942 had been read said, ‘That is quite clear and unequivocal however hard it may be.’ Had this order been given to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at lift-boats).” (_382-PS_)

Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the notation of any actions in violation of International Law:

“There was an order—I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction—that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this should be so.

“Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.” (_382-PS_)

Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_) was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam trawler, the “_Noreen Mary_,” which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat shows that at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (_D-645_).

At 2055 hours the log reads:

“Surfaced.

“Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].

“Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes.” (_D-645_)

There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry:

“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.” (_D-645_)

The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:

“Recognized success: Fishing vessel ‘_Noreen Mary_’ sunk by flak.” (_D-645_)

An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the “_Noreen Mary_” at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and continues as follows:

“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north-westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs.”

* * * * * *

“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping the ship.

“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire.

“The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water.

“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour.” (_D-645_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues:

“Whilst on board the ‘_Lady Madeleine_’ the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½ inches long embedded in his body. * * * I had 14 shrapnel wounds.”

* * * * * *

“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers ‘_Sylvester_’ (mined) and ‘_New Seville_’ (torpedoed), and the Trawler ‘_Ocean Tide_’, which ran ashore.

“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured.” (_D-645_).

The next case is that of the ship “_Antonico_”, which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (_D-630_). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (_D-647_):

“* * * That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the ‘_Antonico_’ as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the ‘_Antonico_’ in order to avoid being dragged down by the same ‘_Antonico_’ and also because she was the aggressor’s target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the ‘_Antonico_’ lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves’ overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine.” (_D-647_)

The U-boat’s log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (_D-646-A_) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America.” (_D-646-A_)

This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (_2098-PS_).

An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (_D-648_). The certificate states:

“* * * I have compiled from them [captured documents] the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.”

Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy.

(3) _The Order to Kill Commandos._ An internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to the shooting of Commandos (_C-178_).

Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units.” (_C-178_)

Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder.

But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order, for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (_D-649_):

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of * * *” [there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist of the British Navy, prisoners of war.].

* * * * * *

“There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat.

“The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.

“On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitaen Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.

“The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD.” (_D-649_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows:

“It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above.” (_D-649_)

The date mentioned is important; it was time “in March or April, 1945,” for these men to put their affairs in order.

(4) _Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention._ The minutes of conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows:

“The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention * * *” [the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention].

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible.” (_C-158_)

Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a representative of Ribbentrop:

“* * * On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world.” (_C-158_)

An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and Hitler, on 1 July 1944,—the extract is signed by Doenitz—states:

“* * * Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings.” (_C-171_)

(5) _Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards._ In a memorandum signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force, Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes:

“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to shipbuilding.” (_C-195_)

In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say:

“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.” (_C-195_)

Item 2 of the summing-up reads:

“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to this)” (_C-195_).

It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.

They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.

(6) _Doenitz’s Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men._ The orders issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (_D-650_) show his fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to his country:

“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path.

“I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader.” (_D-650_)

In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted:

“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser ‘_Cormorau_’, in Austria, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader.” (_D-650_)

E. _CONCLUSION._

Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he—not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler—who was chosen to succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

There can be few countries which do not mourn for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callow brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO KARL DOENITZ

15. ERICH RAEDER

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RAEDER._

Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser _Koeln_. In 1928 he became an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General Admiral, a creation of Hitler’s, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937 he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In 1939 he was made Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was a kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943 Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy. (_2888-PS_)

B. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO PLAN AND WAGE WARS OF AGGRESSION._

During the years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy, from 1928 to 1943, he played a vital role in building up the Navy as an instrument of war, to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.

(1) _Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles._ In successive and secret steps, the small Navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder.

The story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles is told in a history of the fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937 (_C-156_). This history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own government, regarding the secret measures of rearmament ranging from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. Raeder’s role in these developments are described as follows:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.” (_C-156_)

An illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament is contained in his statement that:

“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-boat Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed them.” (_C-141_)

It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. An extract from the History of War Organization and of the Scheme for Mobilization (_C-135_) which is headed “All 850/38”, suggesting that the document was written in 1938, reads:

“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an ‘Establishment Order’ and ‘Instructions for Establishment,’ the forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.

“An ‘establishment organization’ and ‘adaptable instructions for establishment’ were drawn up for each A-year, the cover name for a mobilization year.

“As stated, the ‘Establishment Organizations’ of that time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided, nevertheless, a valuable foundation for the establishment of a War Organization as our ultimate aim.”

* * * * * *

“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.

“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on active service was to be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” (_C-135_)

The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is, by April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power. (_C-135_)

The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told Hitler that the German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore from 1936 on, the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British “_King George_” class of battleship. Raeder also went along with Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite (_C-189_). In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 RM. from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (_C-190_)

Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up the German Navy is the fact that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by twenty percent the displacement which the Nazis had reported to the British (_C-23_). In similar vein, it was ordered that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships O.” (_C-166_)

The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry illustrates Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs, and German armament manufacturers. (_C-29_)

A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. This letter was given extensive distribution; in fact there is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s, which is marked with both self-justification and apology, reads:

“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats.

“If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire naval building program has been wrongly directed, and that, from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon and, after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters:

“The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the high seas.

“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the assumption of power.” (_C-155_)

This letter shows no trace of reluctance in cooperating with the Nazi program. On the contrary, it is evident that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of the Nazi power.

(2) _Conversion of the Navy into a tool of the Nazi conspiracy._ Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement—an allegiance which Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on 2 August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when Raeder and all the men under him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland (_D-481_). The new oath ran as follows:

“I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.” (_D-481_)

For his fatherland, Raeder substituted the Fuehrer.

There is no need to elaborate upon the step by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. The facts of history—such as the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under which the German Fleet sailed, and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men—these facts speak for themselves.

The Nazis, for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” published a special article about him, which summed up Raeder’s contribution to Nazi development:

“It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.

“With the assumption of power through National Socialism began, too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German Fleet.

“The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him General Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936”.

* * * * * *

“As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved himself to be the Fuehrer’s first and foremost naval collaborator.” (_D-448_)

(3) _Raeder’s political activities and responsibilities._ Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi conspiracy arises from the fact that, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, he became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a member of the secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded, on 4 April 1933. Thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. These facts are contained in a document which contains the classic Nazi directive:

“Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” (_EC-177_)

On 4 February 1938, Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly formed Secret Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (_2031-PS_). Three weeks later, a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet (_2098-PS_). It is thus clear that Raeder’s responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938, and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was a member of the inner councils of the conspirators.

As an illustration, Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. The first of these was Hitler’s conference at the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937, concerning matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The minutes of this meeting establish conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their crimes against peace (_386-PS_). The second meeting which Raeder attended was Hitler’s conference on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_). This was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.

In addition to those two key conferences, Raeder was also present at many others, where he placed his knowledge and professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine. Raeder’s promotion of the military planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is discussed in Section 8 of Chapter IX.

(4) _The “Athenia Case”._ Once the war was underway, Raeder also showed himself to be a master of one of the conspirators’ favorite techniques—deceit on the grand scale. His handling of the case of the “_Athenia_” is a case in point.

The “_Athenia_” was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of 3 September 1939, when she was outward bound to America. About one hundred lives were lost.

On 23 October 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill sank the Athenia” (_3260-PS_). The scale on which this deliberate lie was perpetrated is indicated by the rest of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” for that day; on the front page, with large red underlining, were the words: “Now we indict Churchill” (_3260-PS_). An extract from the third page of this issue of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” refers to photograph of the ship and reads as follows:

“Churchill sank the ‘_Athenia_’. The above picture shows the proud ‘_Athenia_’, the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the ‘_Athenia_’ silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred people would have lost their lives if Churchill’s original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter, ‘_City of Flint_’, and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat ‘_Gibb_’ for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask the British people, ‘How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Britain’s history, be held by a murderer?’” (_3260-PS_)

Contrary to these Nazi allegations, the “_Athenia_” made repeated wireless distress signals, which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s ships “_Electra_” and “_Escort_,” as well as by the Norwegian steamship “_Knute Nelson_” and the Swedish yacht “_Southern Cross_.” In fact, the “_Athenia_” was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the “_Athenia_,” however, that the German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding the guilty secret. Meanwhile, the Nazi propagandists sought to shift the responsibility to the British. The Captain of U-boat 30, _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, was later killed in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have survived to tell the tale as prisoners of war. An affidavit by a member of the crew of the U-30 establishes the truth of this episode and reveals the Nazis’ attempt to conceal the true facts (_D-654_). The affidavit reads:

“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T,

“Do solemnly declare that:

“I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

“That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U-30.

“That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

“That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.

“That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

“That apart from myself, _Oberleutnant_ Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.

“That I observed that the ship was listing.

“That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

“That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed ship.

“That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

“That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.

“That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the Petty Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then had the Petty Officers’ quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.

“That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: ‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.’

“That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.

“That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the ‘_Athenia_,’ the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the ‘_Athenia_,’ especially since the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

“That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.

“That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oaths.” (_D-654_)

Doenitz’s part in the “_Athenia_” episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, in English (_D-638_). At the end of the affidavit four words are added in Doenitz’s handwriting, the significance of which will be adverted to shortly. Doenitz states:

“U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain, _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the ‘_Athenia_’ in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions, he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the ‘_Athenia_’ from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from _Kapitaen zur See_ Fricke [head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff] that:

“1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.

“2. The OKM considered that a court martial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.

“3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the ‘_Athenia_.’

“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law, before the occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity” [whereat Doenitz has added the words, “and too much time”]. (_D-638_)

Doenitz’s suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the “_Athenia_” in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of Doenitz’s order of 22 September 1939, that

“the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.” (_C-191_)

The U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. On that date another fraudulent entry was made in the War Diary of the Chief of U-boats:

“U-30 comes in. She had sunk: ‘S.S. _Blairlogie_’; ‘S.S. _Fanad Head_’.” (_D-659_)

There is no reference at all to the sinking of the “_Athenia_.”

Perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was made on the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the “_Athenia_” (_D-662_). The Prosecution submits that the first page of that log book is a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. It is clear on the original document that the first page of the text is a substitute for pages that have been removed: The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic-looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. (_D-662_)

Furthermore, all reference to the sinking of the “_Athenia_” on 3 September is omitted. The log book shows that at 1400 hours on 3 September 1939 the position of the U-30 is given as AL 0278, which is one of the few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was some 200 miles west of the position where the “_Athenia_” was sunk. The recorded course (due south) and the recorded speed (10 knots)—those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the “_Athenia’s_” position on 3 September. (_D-662_)

Finally, the original shows Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing with 3 September differs from his other signature in the text. The difference appears in the final letter of his name. The signature in question shows a Roman “p”, whereas on the other signatures there is a script “p.” The inference is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later, date. (_D-662_)

The story of the “_Athenia_” establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the “_Athenia_” (discussed in Section 14 on Doenitz) have shown the dishonesty of these announcements. The conclusion to be drawn is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” which was an attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save face with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine.

(5) _The Attack on Norway and Denmark._ Truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway or Denmark. Raeder’s proud comment upon the invasions of Denmark and Norway, in which he played a leading part, (see Section 9 of Chapter IX on aggression against Norway and Denmark), is contained in a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, which stated in part:

“The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war.” (_C-155_)

(6) _The Attack on the U.S.S.R._ With the occupation of Norway and much of Western Europe safely completed, Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Raeder was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. Raeder approached the problem with cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German Naval War Staff (_C-170_). The first entry, dated 26 September 1940, shows that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy, in which the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 14 November reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is still inclined to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is not in sight. According to the opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander, Russia will not press for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process of building up her Navy with Germany’s help—38 cm. turrets for battleships, etc.:—thus, during these years she continues to be dependent upon German assistance.” (_C-170_)

And again, the entry for 27 December states:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 18 February 1941 reads as follows:

“Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The 23 February entry reads:

“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 19 March 1941 shows that by March 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. The entry states:

“In case of ‘_Barbarossa_’, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult.” (_C-170_).

In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry for 30 May reads:

“[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; ‘This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’; Chief Naval Operations agrees completely.” (_C-170_)

Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at that stage:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.”

* * * * * *

“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the Near East with help from the United States of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly; demands, however, that the undertaking ‘_Barbarossa_’, which because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment, diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (_C-170_)

Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his Navy in the Nazi war plans.

Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for the Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:

“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.” (_C-170_)

Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this action in his letter dated 15 June 1941 (_C-38_):

“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea.

“To:

“High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL)

“Offensive action against submarine south of the line Memel—southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces.

“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.” (_C-38_).

This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until 22 June 1941.

(7) _Instigation of Japanese aggression._ In the meantime, Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. Raeder’s views at his audience with Hitler on 18 March were as follows:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (_C-152_)

By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder’s proposition to induce the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. The entry in the notes of the German Naval War Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, ‘that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’ Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore.” (_C-170_).

The real purpose of Hitler’s words to Matsuoka is revealed in another description of their conversation:

“* * * At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.” (_C-66_)

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This is typical of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

C. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._

(1) _Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare._ Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war started (_UK-65_). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing International Law; however measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing International Law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.

“The supreme War Council will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U. S. coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.” (_UK-65_)

Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the course of their wars.

(2) _The Navy’s Crimes at Sea._ Apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

(_a_) _Attacks on neutral shipping._ The minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:

“The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (_C-27_)

At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the OKW, and signed by Jodl (_C-12_). This directive reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M., the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:

“(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.” (_C-12_)

A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

“Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected protests are made must be possible.” (_C-12_)

Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 16 June 1942 (_1807-PS_). This extract reads as follows:

“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.” (_1807-PS_).

This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,” although war did not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August 1942.

Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by other conspirators. A single example will suffice.

(b) _The order to shoot commandos._ On 28 October 1942 the head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942 requiring the shooting of commandos. The effect of this order was to deny the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942 reads:

“Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.” (_C-179_).

It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than this, that Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler’s commando order.

One example will show that this order was executed by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.

A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The _Wehrmacht_ account of this incident states that six of the ten participants in that commando raid were arrested, and that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (_UK-57_). On this particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge of Western France (_C-176_). The entry for 10 December 1942 reads:

“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer-in-charge’s Flag Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.

“1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer’s headquarters to postpone the shooting for three days. Interrogations continued for the time being.” (_C-176_)

The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:

“Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit (strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in charge Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.” (_C-176_)

A note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry reads:

“Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag Officer in Charge in future cases.” (_C-176_)

This provision for “future cases” was in fact an order that commandos should be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.

It is therefore evident from Admiral Bachmann’s war diary (_C-176_) that the first two men to be shot from the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on 11 December 1942.

The Naval War Staff had this comment to make upon that shooting:

“The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered. Their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more information.

“According to a _Wehrmacht_ report, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” (_D-658_)

That last sentence shows clearly that the Naval High Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any question of moral principle or professional honor. The shooting of commandos was not an act of war, but simple murder.

D. _RAEDER’S ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSPIRACY THROUGH HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES._

Raeder was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders. Before the Nazis came to power he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He himself was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as any other defendant. He accepted membership in their main political advisory bodies.

He was well aware of the designs of the Nazis and assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all the conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is true that the extension of the war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi Armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

In a memorandum dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for the War by powers signatory to the Three Power Pact,” Raeder stated:

“It was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.

“In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages.” (_C-161_).

This memorandum shows how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. His further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943 he retired, and thereafter was a leader in name only.

The record, in Raeder’s handwriting, of his interview with Hitler on 6 January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement, states in part:

“If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to General Inspector, giving appropriate publicity in the press, etc. But a new C. in C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of General Inspector, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

“Hitler accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The General Inspector could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, etc. The name of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After C. in C. Navy had repeated his request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He would like to think over the details.” (_D-655_)

This was Raeder’s twilight, different from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on 12 March he spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day (_D-653_). In that speech, during the celebration of “freedom to rearm,” Raeder stated, in the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces:

“* * * National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion. The German people has had practical experience of National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many outside critics believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home, but also enables to make use of all the Nation’s creative powers.” (_D-653_).

After eulogies of Hitler, Raeder continued as follows:

“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people. Therefore, the alliance with all similar-minded Nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. * * * If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and its organization. The armed forces and the Party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit.”

* * * * * *

“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.” (_D-653_)

(The reference is to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.) After further panegyries on the Fuehrer and his leadership, Raeder hinted of what was to come:

“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that their blood will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.” (_D-653_)

That speech of Raeder’s illustrates his deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of the violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed forces and party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas, he became an active participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERICH RAEDER

16. BALDUR VON SCHIRACH

A. _SCHIRACH’S NSDAP MEMBERSHIP, NSDAP POSITIONS, AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS._

In an affidavit (_3302-PS_), Schirach has declared that he held the following positions:

_Positions in the Nazi Party_

(1) NSDAP member, 1925 to 1945.

(2) Leader of the National Socialist Students League, 1929-1931.

(3) Leader of the Hitler Youth organization, 1931-1940.

(4) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) on the Staff of the SA Supreme Command under Ernst Roehm, 1931-1932.

(5) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) of the NSDAP, 1931-1940; in 1932 Schirach became an independent Reich Leader (_Reichsleiter_), and no longer remained on the Staff of the SA Supreme Command.

(6) Gruppenfuehrer (Lt. General) of the SA, 1931-1941.

(7) Reich Leader (_Reichsleiter_) for Youth Education in the NSDAP, 1932-1945.

(8) Gau Leader (Gauleiter) of the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940-1945.

(9) Obergruppenfuehrer (General) of the SA, 1941-1945.

_Governmental Positions_

(1) Reich Youth Leader, 1933-1940.

(2) Reich Governor (_Reichsstatthalter_) of the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940-1945.

(3) Reich Defense Commission of Vienna, 1940-1945.

(4) Deputy to the Fuehrer for the Inspection of the Hitler Youth (_Beauftragter der Fuehrer fuer die Inspektion der Gesamten Hitler Jugend_), 1940-1945.

Schirach was also a member of the Reichstag from 1932 to 1945 (_2973-PS_).

B. _SCHIRACH WAS AN INTIMATE AND SLAVISH FOLLOWER OF HITLER SINCE 1925._

As early as 1925 Baldur von Schirach, then 18 years old, joined the Nazi conspirators. Upon special request of Hitler, he went to Munich in order to study Party affairs. After having joined the NSDAP in 1925, he became active in converting students to National Socialism (_3302-PS_). This was the start of Schirach’s conspiratorial activities, which he continued for two decades in the spirit of unbending loyalty to Hitler and to the principles of National Socialism. Schirach shows his slavish loyalty to Hitler in his principal book, “The Hitler Youth,” published in 1934:

“We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail, we simply believed. And when Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, was published it was our bible which we almost learned by heart in order to answer the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost everyone today who is leading youth in a responsible position joined us in those years.”

* * * * * *

“In my apartment on _Koenigin Strasse_, I was lucky enough to be able to express my apprehensions about Strasser to the Fuehrer, otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody with the exception of Julius Streicher.” (_1458-PS_).

C. _SCHIRACH WAS THE LEADING NAZI CONSPIRATOR IN DESTROYING INDEPENDENT YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND IN BUILDING THE NAZI YOUTH MOVEMENT._

(Reference is made at this point to section 8 of Chapter VII on “Reshaping of Education and Training of Youth”. See also _3054-PS_.)

It was Schirach’s task to perpetuate the Nazi regime through generations by poisoning the mind of youth, and thereby the mind of the German people, and to prepare the German nation for aggressive wars.

The basic law concerning the Hitler Youth, which under Schirach’s tutelage became an instrument of the Nazi State, declares:

“The future of the German Nation depends on its youth, and the German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties. * * *

“All German youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler Youth.

“The German youth besides being reared within the family and school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and the community, through the Hitler Youth.

“The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth is being entrusted to the Reich Leader of German Youth in the NSDAP. * * *” (_1392-PS_).

For the five years preceding the promulgation of this law Schirach had been leader of the Hitler Youth and Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP. He continued in these positions until the Nazis launched their aggressive wars. As late as 4 December 1945, Schirach declared his own feeling of responsibility for Nazi policies concerning youth:

“I feel myself responsible for the policy of the youth movement in the Party and later within the Reich.” (_3302-PS_).

(1) _Schirach actively promoted the NSDAP and its affiliated youth organizations before the Nazis seized power._ In 1929 Hitler appointed Schirach leader of the National Socialist German Students League and in 1931 leader of the Hitler Jugend. After 1931, Schirach devoted his full time to Party work (_3302-PS_). Before 1933, Schirach moved throughout Germany, leading demonstrations and summoning German youth to the Hitler Youth. When this organization and the wearing of its uniform were forbidden by law, Schirach continued by illegal means. Of this period he writes:

“Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or girl, risked everything. * * * With pistols in our belts we drove through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after us.” (_1458-PS_)

Schirach admits that Rosenberg and he were not successful before 1933 in efforts to reach “an understanding” with other youth organizations. Schirach states that he thereupon arrived at a conclusion which later was to spell the doom of independent youth groups:

“I realized at that time that an understanding with the leaders of the League would never be possible and devoted myself to the principle of the totality [_Totalitaet_] of the Hitler Youth which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their independent existence.” (_1458-PS_).

(2) _Schirach, on behalf of the Nazi conspirators, destroyed all independent youth organizations or caused them to be absorbed within the Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend)._ After the Nazi conspirators seized political control of Germany, Schirach was aggressive in bringing the entire German youth within the Nazi orbit of control and domination. Referring to the period immediately following 30 January 1933, Schirach declared:

“Now the problem was to apply the victory of the movement to the entire youth. Our cabinet ministers were overburdened with their new tasks and were working day and night. We could not wait until they could find time to solve the youth question by their own initiative. Therefore, we had to act ourselves. My co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me to occupy the Reichs Committee [_Reichsausschuss_] of the German Youth Leagues [_Jugendverbaende_]. I commissioned General [_Obergebietsfuehrer_] Nabersberg with 50 members of the Berlin HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reich Committee in the Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This was done and at noon the press had the report that the HJ [Hitler Youth] had taken over the leadership of the Reich Committee.” (_1458-PS_).

By a second surprise raid, Schirach took over the Youth Hostels. Of this Schirach writes in the same book:

“In the meantime I gained control over the Reich League for German Youth Hostels [_Reichsverband fuer deutsche Jugendherbergen_] in a similar manner to the one employed with the Reich Committee.” (_1458-PS_)

By using the records of the seized Reich Committee, Schirach states that he obtained knowledge of the strength and influential personalities of all the German youth groups.

“From this point I recognized the necessity of coming to grips with the Greater German Union [_Grossdeutscher Bund_].” (_1458-PS_)

In June 1933, Schirach was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich (_Jugendfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches_) in a solemn ceremony before Hitler. Concerning the period immediately following, Schirach writes in the same book:

“The first thing I did was to dissolve the Greater German Union [_Grossdeutscher Bund_]. Since I headed all German youth organizations and I had the right to decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take this step, which was for the Hitler Youth the elimination of an unbearable state of affairs.” (_1458-PS_)

The dissolution of this and other youth organizations was accomplished by orders issued by Schirach as Youth Leader of the German Reich. (_2229-PS_)

In this position Schirach also appointed deputies to the various German states (_Landesbeauftragte_) “to carry out my instructions, and I appointed district leaders [_Gebietsfuehrer_] to these positions in all of the states in execution of my right” (_1458-PS_). In this book Schirach also admits directing the further assimilation or destruction of other youth organizations:

“The Marxist youth as well as all political youth organizations I prohibited after the occupation of the Reich Committee. The one million members of the HJ which we had on 30 January 1933 had grown to a round 3,000,000. Only the two large professional groups, the Protestant and Catholic youth, were opposed to us.” (_1458-PS_)

Schirach proceeded to hold discussions with the Hitler-appointed Reich Bishop Ludwig Mueller,

“And in December 1933, the Reich Bishop and myself were able to inform the Fuehrer that incorporation of the Protestant youth into the HJ had become a reality.” (_1458-PS_)

When this book was written, Schirach had not yet accomplished the complete coordination of Catholic youth into the Hitler Youth, though he argued that:

“No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the necessity of the existence of Catholic youth organizations in their present form.” (_1458-PS_)

Schirach’s objective of forcing all German youth into the Hitler Youth was finally accomplished by a decree in December 1936. (_1392-PS_)

(3) _Schirach was mainly responsible for the indoctrination and training of German youth outside home and school._ The law making compulsory the organization of all German Youth within the Hitler Youth declared that:

“The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth is being entrusted to the Reich Youth Leader in the NSDAP.” (_1392-PS_)

To make Schirach’s sole competence even clearer, the first executive order concerning the basic youth law stated:

“The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all missions of the physical, ideological, and moral education of the entire German youth outside of the house of the parents and the school.” (_1462-PS_)

(4) _Schirach was the principal Nazi conspirator in applying the Leadership principle to German youth._ As a Reich Leader (_Reichsleiter_) in the NSDAP, Schirach was responsible only to Hitler or his deputy (_Stellvertreter_), Hess. In youth affairs he was at the top of the Nazi leadership pyramid, and under him German youth was directed by and completely subjected to the Leadership Principle. The Leadership Principle, one of the principal control-techniques of the Nazis was explained and glorified by Schirach as it applied to German youth:

“A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ leaders, that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit, is absolute, i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders because he bears the unlimited responsibility. He knows that the responsibility of the higher one comes before that of the lower ones. Therefore, he submits silently to the instructions of his leaders even if they are directed against him personally. To him as well as to all young Germany the history of the HJ is proof of the fact that a youth community also can only be successful if it unconditionally recognizes the authority of leadership. The success of National Socialism is a success of discipline. The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the time of persecution apply even more to the period of victory and power.” (_1458-PS_)

(5) _Schirach indoctrinated youth with the Nazi ideology._ Schirach states that:

“It was my task to educate the youth in the aims, ideology and directives of the NSDAP, and beyond this to direct and to shape them.” (_3302-PS_)

For this purpose the Hitler Youth had an elaborate propaganda apparatus which published numerous periodicals, ranging from a daily press service to monthly magazines. Through liaison agents the Hitler Youth Propaganda Office had permanent contact with Dr. Goebbels’ Propaganda Office of the NSDAP and with the Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda. (_3349-PS_).

Schirach, together with Dr. Robert Ley, established the Adolf Hitler Schools in January 1937. These schools, according to the joint statement of Reich Leaders (_Reichsleiter_) Schirach and Ley, were open to outstanding and proven members of the Youth Folk (_Jungvolk_), the junior section of the Hitler Youth organization. The Adolf Hitler Schools were destined to train youth free of charge for responsible positions in National Socialist Germany. These schools were units of and under the jurisdiction of the Hitler Youth. Schirach shared with Reich Organization Leader (_Reichsorganisationsleiter_) Ley the general supervision of the contents of the teaching, the curriculum, and the staff of the Adolf Hitler Schools (_2653-PS_). Schirach encouraged a close relation between members of the Hitler Youth and the German League for Germandom abroad _(Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland_, or “VDA”). An agreement between Schirach and the leaders of the VDA in 1933 states:

“(1) With a complete respect for the important racial-political task the Hitler Youth recommends to its members membership in collaboration with the VDA.”

* * * * * *

“(3) The school groups of the VDA (racial-German work cells) assist the Hitler Youth in their work.” (_L-360-H_)

Schirach thus subscribed to the “racial-political task” of the NSDAP and extended his jurisdiction even beyond the border of the German Reich. His encouragement and approval of anti-Jewish terror by youth is discussed below.

(6) _Through the Hitler Youth, Schirach assisted the Nazi conspirators in developing leaders and members of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations, including the SA and the SS._ Sometime before the launching of aggressive wars, the Hitler Youth had become the principal source of zealous members for the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations. Orders of the Party Chancellery concerned with “successor problems” of the Party emphasize constant attention to Hitler Youth members as future Nazi leaders, thus attempting the perpetuation of the Nazi regime and Nazi ideology for the immediate future and even into future generations. Only Hitler Youth members who distinguished themselves were to be admitted to the Party. Nazi leaders were instructed to use “properly qualified full-time Hitler Youth leaders * * * for the continuation of their political work in the Party service,” so that a necessary succession of full-time leaders in the Leader Corps (_Fuehrerkorps_) of the Party would be secured. (_3348-PS_)

The Party manual also discusses the Hitler Youth as a recruitment agency for future Nazi leaders and members of affiliated organizations of the NSDAP:

“To secure for the Party valuable and trained recruits for leadership, suitable Hitler Jugend boys of over 17 can be assigned for education and training to leaders from local unit leaders on upwards.”

* * * * * *

“Besides the above-mentioned conditions for selections in general, a process of elimination results from the fact that from youth on the German is cared for, guided, and educated by the Party. First they are assembled in the Young Folk [_Jungvolk_] from which the young people are transferred into the HJ. The boy of the HJ enters the SA, the SS, the NSKK or the NSFK or participates in the work of the affiliated organizations of the Party. After labor and army service, he returns for service to the Party and its affiliates, respectively.” (_2401-PS_)

Special arrangements existed between Himmler’s SS and Schirach’s Hitler Youth concerning the recruiting of members of the Hitler Jugend for later service in the SS. Within the Hitler Youth was a special group called the _Streifendienst_ (Patrol Service). Concerning this special group, an official handbook on youth laws states:

“Organization of the _Streifendienst_.

“1. Since the _Streifendienst_ in the HJ has to perform tasks similar to those of the SS for the whole movement, it is organized as a special unit for the purpose of securing recruits for the general SS; however, as much as possible, recruits for the SS special troops, for the SS Death Head Troops, and for the officer candidate schools should also be taken from these formations.”

* * * * * *

“4a. The selection of _Streifendienst_ members is made according to the principles of racial selection of the _Schutzstaffel_ [SS]; the competent officials of the SS, primarily unit leaders, race authorities, and SS physicians, will be consulted for the admission test.”

* * * * * *

“5. To insure from the beginning a good understanding between Reich youth leadership and Reich SS leadership, a liaison office will be ordered from the Reich youth leadership to the SS main office starting 1 October 1938. The appointment of other leaders to the SS sections is a subject for a future agreement.

“6. After the organization is completed, the SS takes its replacement primarily from these _Streifendienst_ members. Admission of youths of German blood who are not members of the HJ is then possible only after information and advice of the competent Bann leader.” (_2396-PS_)

Shortly afterwards, on 17 December 1938, Schirach and Himmler entered into and signed another agreement for recruiting SS members from the ranks of the Hitler Youth:

“To secure full success for the common effort of the SS and the Hitler Youth by strict cooperation, to stem the flight from the land, to build a new peasant class, to bring the best part of the people into contact with the earth of the homeland, the following arrangement has been made in connection with the agreement of 26 August 1938.

“1. The farm service of the Hitler Youth is according to education and aim, particularly well suited as a recruiting organization for the _Schutzstaffel_ (general SS and the armed sections of the SS; SS special troops and SS death head battalions).

“2. Boys who suit the special demands of the SS according to physical conditions and moral attitude are preferably admitted into the farm service of the Hitler Youth.”

* * * * * *

“5. All farm service members who pass the general admission test of the SS will be taken over into the general SS after leaving the farm service.” (_2567-PS_)

Thus, by the end of 1938, the Hitler Youth had become the main source for future SS members. (For the criminal activities of the SS formations for which Hitler Youth members were recruited, see Section 5 of Chapter XV of the _Schutzstaffeln_ (SS).)

(7) _Schirach actively engaged in militarizing the Hitler Youth._ In June 1933, under an agreement between Hitler and Franz Seldte, which was negotiated in the presence of the Reich Minister of War, the “Steel Helmet League of Front Line Soldiers” (_Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten_) was incorporated into the Nazi movement. The _Scharnhorst_, the youth organization of the _Stahlhelm_, was integrated into the Hitler Youth. (_2260-PS_)

The Hitler Youth was generally set up along military lines with uniforms, ranks, and titles. It contained divisions called Naval Hitler Youth, Motorized Hitler Youth, Hitler Youth Flyers, and Signal Hitler Youth. According to an official document published by the Reich Youth Leadership under Schirach, the object of these divisions within the Hitler Youth was to prepare boys, respectively, for the German merchant marine and Navy, the National Socialist Motorized Corps (NSKK), for civil and military aviation, and for service with signal troops. (_2654-PS_)

On or about 11 August 1939, just before the invasion of Poland, an agreement was entered into between Schirach and Wilhelm Keitel, then Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_, which was declared by _Das Archiv_ to represent “the result of close cooperation” between these two conspirators. The agreement itself stated:

“While it is exclusively the task of the Hitler Youth to attend to the training of their units in this direction, it is suitable in the sense of a uniform training corresponding to the demands of the _Wehrmacht_ to support the leadership of the Hitler Youth for their responsible task as trainers and educators in all fields of training for defense by special courses * * * A great number of courses are in progress.” (_2398-PS_)

The agreement stated that it “gives the possibility of roughly redoubling” the same 30,000 leaders in the Hitler Youth schools for directing shooting practice and field training. Under the agreement, specific arrangements were made for messing and billeting the Hitler Youth leaders at _Wehrmacht_ installations. Former Hitler Youth leaders in the _Wehrmacht_, who were specially selected volunteers, were to be assigned as liaison officers and deputies for carrying out this military training. (_2398-PS_)

Hitler, in a speech in February 1938, represented that thousands of German boys had received specialized training in naval, aviation, and motorized groups within the Hitler Youth, and that over 1 million Hitler Youth members had received instructions in rifle shooting from 7,000 instructors. (_2454-PS_)

D. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE ACCESSION TO POWER OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._

This allegation of the Indictment is born out by Schirach’s activities in converting students to National Socialism and by his Leadership of the Hitler Youth before the Nazis’ seizure of political power. These activities are described above.

E. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._

Schirach’s acts in accomplishing the Nazis’ complete control over German youth are described above. These acts were of notable assistance to the Nazi conspirators in acquiring complete control of Germany during the pre-war years. Schirach’s own words in 1938 leave no doubt as to his own feeling of personal responsibility in this connection:

“The struggle for the unification of the German youth is finished. I considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard and uncompromising manner. Many might not have realized why we went through so much trouble for the sake of the youth. And yet: The National Socialist German Workers’ Party, whose trustee I felt I always was and always will be, this Party considered the struggle for the youth as the decisive element for the future of the German nation.”

* * * * * *

“And I promise the German public that the youth of the German Reich, the youth of Adolf Hitler, will accomplish its duty in the spirit of the man to whom alone their lives belong.” (_2306-PS_)

F. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR AND THE MILITARIZATION OF NAZI-DOMINATED ORGANIZATIONS._

A general outline of Schirach’s acts bearing on this allegation of the Indictment appears above. By his own admission, Schirach was the principal Nazi responsible for driving the entire Nazi ideology into the minds of German youths, many of whom grew up to be fanatical Nazis like Schirach himself. From Hitler, in 1938, came boastings of the accomplishments of the Hitler Youth in military training. Through the vast propaganda network of the Reich Youth Leadership, through the Adolf Hitler Schools, through the minute regimentation of youth and its subjection to the Leadership Principle, and through the military training of German youth, Schirach fulfilled the edict of the basic law concerning the Hitler Youth:

“The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and the German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties”.

It has been demonstrated that the future duties of the youth entrusted to Schirach were participation in aggressive wars.

G. _SCHIRACH’S GENERAL FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADER IN THE REICHSGAU VIENNA._

(1) _Gau Leader_ (_Gauleiter_). Schirach was Gau Leader of the NSDAP for the Reichsgau Vienna from July 1940 to 1945. In common with all other Gau Leaders, Schirach was the highest representative of Hitler, the supreme Party Leader, in his Gau, and he was the bearer of sovereignty (_Hoheitstraeger_) of the Party for this regional division of the Party. As such, he possessed “sovereign political rights”; he represented the Party with his Gau; and he was “responsible for the entire political situation within” this Gau. (_1893-PS_)

The Party manual makes it mandatory that each Gau Leader meet at least once a month with leaders of the affiliated organizations of the NSDAP, including the SA and the SS, “for the purpose of mutual orientation”, and authorizes the Gau Leader to call upon SA leaders and SS leaders as “needed for the execution of a political mission.” As a Gau Leader Schirach was appointed by Hitler and was “directly subordinate” to him. He was responsible for coordinating activities of the NSDAP with various state authorities, including the police and the Gestapo. (_1893-PS_)

(2) _Reich Governor_ (_Reichsstatthalter_). Schirach was Reich Governor of the Reichsgau Vienna from July 1940 to 1945. After the _Anschluss_ the Nazi conspirators abolished the State of Austria as a sovereign state and divided Austria into seven Reich Gaus, the most important of which was the Reichsgau Vienna (_Reichsgau Wien_). Schirach, in his capacity as Reich Governor, was the lieutenant of the head of the German State, Hitler, in his Gau. As Reich Governor he was authorized to make decrees and issue orders within the limitations set by the supreme Reich authorities (_Oberste Reichsbehoerden_). He was especially under the administrative supervision of Frick, Reich Minister of Interior. The Reich Governor was also first mayor (_Erster Buergermeister_) of Vienna. (_3301-PS_)

Schirach was also Reich Defense Commissar of Vienna from 1940 to 1945. These government positions, along with his leadership of the Party in Vienna, made Schirach the most important representative of the Nazi conspirators in the Reichsgau Vienna. Schirach himself states that as Reich Governor his “field was the direction of the general administration” in Vienna. (_3302-PS_)

As the highest Party and State leader in the Reichsgau Vienna, Schirach was responsible for all the crimes of the Nazi conspirators in the Reichsgau Vienna on the ground that he either initiated, approved, executed, or abetted them. Specific examples, described below, demonstrate that in fact he was actively and personally engaged in Nazi crimes.

H. _SCHIRACH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, PARTICULARLY ANTI-SEMITIC MEASURES._

Schirach bears responsibility for providing many, if not most, of the Death Head (_Totenkopf_) members of the SS, who, in the main, administered the concentration camps. As particularized above, the SS, by agreement between Himmler and Schirach, took “its replacement primarily” from _Streifendienst_ members of the Hitler Youth and only upon special permission could a non-Hitler Youth become an SS man. Nor can Schirach escape responsibility for his assistance in implanting in youth the Nazi ideology, with its tenets of a master race, “sub-human” peoples, and world domination. For such notions were the psychological prerequisites for the instigation and toleration of the atrocities which zealous Nazis committed throughout Germany and the occupied countries.

(1) _Schirach directed and participated in the Nazi conspirators’ slave labor program._

(For a full discussion of the slave labor program see Chapter X.)

Vienna was one of the principal cities and an independent Reichsgau of Greater Germany. Schirach, as Gau Leader and Reich Governor, was delegated far-reaching responsibilities concerning the slave labor program and hence shares responsibility for crimes of slave labor. (_3352-PS_)

This document proves that the Gau Leaders were required to be the supreme integrating and coordinating agents of the Nazi conspirators in executing the entire manpower program. A circular of the Party Chancellery of 22 March 1942 states that Goering, upon the suggestion of Sauckel, had agreed that the Gau Leaders were to become active as Sauckel’s special Plenipotentiaries (_Bevollmaechtigte_) in order that—

“By the leadership of the Party in full appreciation of the competence of the corresponding Reich authorities, the highest efficiency in the field of manpower shall be guaranteed.” (_3352-PS_)

Goering gave Sauckel authority to issue orders to “the agencies of the Party, its member organizations and affiliated organizations” as well as to governmental authorities. By an order of 6 April 1942 Sauckel appointed the Gau Leaders as his “plenipotentiaries for manpower within their respective Gaus,” and charged them with the—

“* * * establishment of a harmonious cooperation of all agencies of the State, of the Party, of the Armed Forces, and of the Economy, charged with problems of manpower and thus to create agreement between the different conceptions and requirements to obtain the highest efficiency in the field of manpower.” (_3352-PS_).

To insure that the Gau Leaders could efficiently perform their manpower tasks, the entire staff of the Provincial Labor Offices were—

“* * * directed to be at the disposal of the Gau Leaders for information and advice and to fulfill the suggestions and demands of the Gau Leader for the purpose of improvements or manpower.” (_3352-PS_)

In this same order Sauckel said:

“By the above mentioned commission of the Gau Leaders of the NSDAP, I intend to lead manpower utilization to the greatest success.” (_3352-PS_)

Thus, Sauckel, himself an experienced Gau Leader, bears witness to the involvement after 1942 of the Gau Leaders, including Schirach, in the manpower utilization program of the Nazi conspirators.

Furthermore, a circular from the Party Chancellery of 4 August 1942, shows that “Bearers of Sovereignty” (_Hoheitstrager_) of the NSDAP (which included the Gau Leaders and hence Schirach) were to familiarize themselves with the execution of manpower directives on Eastern workers. One of the purposes of this directive was to prevent “inept Factory heads” from giving “too much consideration for the care of the Eastern Workers and thereby causing justified annoyance among the German workers” (_3352-PS_). What “consideration” was in fact meted out to Eastern Workers in the conspirators’ manpower utilization program is discussed in Chapter X.

(2) _Schirach participated in the conspiracy to persecute the Churches._ The activity of Schirach in persecuting churches by dissolving religious youth organizations or by incorporating them in the Hitler Youth has been set forth above.

Official letters of Martin Bormann and Hans Lammers, in March 1941, show that church properties in Austria had been confiscated for various pretexts after Schirach had become Gau Leader and Reich Governor of the Reichsgau Vienna. Upon a visit of Hitler to Vienna, Schirach and two other officials raised with him a complaint that the confiscations should be made in favor of Gaus rather than of the Reich. Thereafter all Gauleiters were notified that the decision had been made in favor of the position Schirach had taken before Hitler, namely in favor of the Gaus. (_R-146_)

(3) _Schirach participated in the conspiracy to persecute the Jews._ Even before assuming his Governmental functions in the Reichsgau Vienna, Schirach was responsible for encouraging anti-Jewish terror. Before 1939, at a meeting of Heidelberg students of the National Socialist German Students Bund (NSDStB), Schirach was chief speaker. After praising the students for devoting so much of their time to the affairs of the Party,

“* * * he declared that the most important phase of German University life in the Third Reich was the program of the NSDStB. He extolled various activities of the Bund. He reminded the boys of the service they had rendered during the Jewish purge. Dramatically he pointed across the river to the old University town of Heidelberg where several burnt-out synagogues were mute witnesses of the efficiency of Heidelberg students. Those skeleton buildings would remain there for centuries, as inspiration for future students, as warning to enemies of the State.” (_2441-PS_)

Immediately after becoming Gau Leader and Reich Governor of the Reichsgau Vienna, Schirach’s anti-Jewish measures assumed more formidable proportions. As early as 7 November 1940, one Dr. Fischer, “by order” of the Reich Governor Schirach, stated that—

“investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo, to find out how many able-bodied Jews are still available in order to make plans for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed that there are not many more Jews available. If some still should be available, however, the Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for the removal of the destroyed synagogues. SS Colonel Huber will report personally to the ‘_Regierungspraesident_’ in this matter.” (_1948-PS_)

The _Regierungspraesident_ was Reich Governor Schirach’s personal representative “within the governmental administration” (_in der staatlichen Verwaltung_) of the Reichsgau. (_3301-PS_)

The above letter indicates that Schirach and his immediate subordinates not only knew of the atrocities which had been committed against the Jews by the Nazi conspirators in the Reichsgau, but also that they endorsed further forced labor of Jews and worked intimately with the Gestapo and the SS in their measures of persecution. Within six months after Schirach became Gau Leader and Reich Governor of Vienna, Dr. Hans Lammers informed Schirach that—

“the Fuehrer has decided after receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews still residing in the Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported most rapidly, that is still during the war, to the General Government because of the housing shortage prevalent in Vienna.” (_1950-PS_)

Lammers’ letter, dated 3 December 1940, informed Schirach that the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, had been informed of the Fuehrer’s decision. (_1950-PS_)

Schirach’s guilt in this connection, by his own admission, however, runs even deeper. In a statement to the so-called European Youth League in Vienna in 1942, Schirach stated:

“Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply: I see in this an action contributing to European culture.” (_3048-PS_)

(4) _Conclusion._ Schirach bears responsibility for rendering significant aid to the Nazi conspirators in each major phase of the conspiracy; winning Nazi supporters before the seizure of power; consolidating the Nazis’ control of Germany after the seizure of power; preparing for aggressive wars; and conducting aggressive wars. From the beginning he held important policy-making and administrative positions. From 1931 to the Nazis’ downfall, he was one of the small group of Reich Leaders (_Reichsleiter_) of the NSDAP who consorted together, directly subordinate only to Hitler himself, and who provided the innermost leaven of the Leadership Corps of the Party. For nearly a decade he was fully in charge of perpetrating the Nazi regime by poisoning the minds of the young generation. Although his principal assistance to the conspiracy was given by his commission of German youth to the conspirators’ objectives, still he also conspired to wage crimes against humanity as a Party and governmental administrator of high standing after the conspiracy had reached its inevitable involvement in war of aggression.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO BALDUR VON SCHIRACH

17. MARTIN BORMANN

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY BORMANN._

(1) _Between 1925 and 1945 Bormann held the following positions_:

(_a_) Member of the Nazi Party 1925-1945.

(_b_) Member of the Reichstag, November 1933-1945.

(_c_) Member of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, 15 November 1928 to August 1930.

(_d_) Founder and head of _Hilfskasse der NSDAP_, August 1930 to July 1933.

(_e_) Reichsleiter, July 1933-1945.

(_f_) Chief of Staff, Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy, July 1933 to May 1941.

(_g_) Head of the Party Chancery, 12 May 1941-1945.

(_h_) Secretary of the Fuehrer, 12 April 1943-1945. (_2981-PS_)

(_i_) Member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, 29 May 1942-1945. (_2099-PS_)

(_j_) Political and organizational head of the Volkssturm. (_3018-PS_)

(_k_) General in the SS. (_3234-PS_)

(2) _During this period Bormann also held the following position_: Member of the Reich Cabinet, 29 May 1941 to 1945. (_2099-PS_)

B. _PROMOTION OF THE ACCESSION TO POWER OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS, ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OVER GERMANY, AND PREPARATION FOR WAR._

Within the conspiracy Martin Bormann had the managerial task of operating the Nazis’ Party as a center of control for the benefit of the conspirators. First as the executive chief of the Nazi Party under Hess, and since 1941 himself the head of the Party, subject only to Hitler’s supreme authority, Bormann was a key member of the Nazi conspiracy. The Party constituted the most powerful instrument of public control at the disposal of the conspirators. Through the Party the conspirators were able to gain and retain power in Germany. Through it they imposed their will on the German nation and obtained its support for their aggressive wars. Bormann is thus responsible for the crimes committed by the Party under the orders of the conspirators.

Bormann began his conspiratorial activities more than 20 years ago. In 1922, when only 22 years old, he joined the Organization Rossbach, one of the armed illegal groups which developed the aggressive traditions of the German Army and established a regime of terror against the small pacifist minority in Germany. While he was District Leader of the Organization for Mecklenburg, he was arrested and tried for his part in a political terror assassination. On 15 May 1924 he was found guilty by the State Tribunal for the Protection of the Republic and sentenced to one year in prison. (_2981-PS_; _3355-PS_)

Upon his release from jail in 1925, Bormann again took up his subversive activities. First, he joined the Militarist Organization Frontbann. Then, in the same year, he became a member of the reconstituted Nazi Party, and began his rise to one of the most influential positions in the conspiracy. In 1927 he became Press Chief for the Party Gau of Thuringia. On 1 April 1928 he was made a District Leader in Thuringia, and Business Manager for the entire Gau.

From 15 November 1928 to August 1930 he was on the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA. Thus he participated decisively in the development of these uniformed shock troops with which the conspirators terrorized and destroyed their opposition inside Germany. (See Section 4 of chapter XV on the SA.)

In August 1930 Bormann organized the Aid Fund (_Hilfskasse_) of the Nazi Party, of which he became the head. Through this Fund he collected large sums for the Party Treasury, allegedly for the purpose of aiding families of Party members who had been killed or imprisoned while “fighting” for the Party. (_3236-PS_)

On 30 January 1933 the conspirators and their Party took over the government of Germany. Shortly thereafter, in July 1933, Bormann was given the number-three post in the Party Organization, that of Chief of Staff to Rudolf Hess, then Hitler’s Deputy. At the same time he was made a member of the Party Directorate (_Reichsleiter_). In November 1933, he was made a member of the Reichstag. (_3236-PS_)

As Hess’ Chief of Staff, Bormann was responsible for channeling to him the demands of the Party in all the fields of government action. These demands were then imposed by Hess, through his participation in Cabinet meetings, on legislation, public administration, and appointments. (_Chart Number 15_; _1395-PS_; _2001-PS_; _D-138_; _3180-PS_)

Bormann also used the Party in order to strengthen the hold of the Gestapo and the SD over the German people. On 14 February 1935 Bormann ordered all Party officers to assist the SD in its work described as “benefiting principally the Party” (_3237-PS_). On 3 September 1935 Bormann ordered Party agencies to hand persons who criticize the Nazi Party or institutions over to the Gestapo. (_3239-PS_) An order of the Party Chancery issued on 14 December 1938, demanded closest cooperation between Party agencies and Gestapo (_1723-PS_).

After the flight of Hess to Scotland on 10 May 1941, Bormann succeeded him as head of the Party under Hitler, with the title of Chief of the Party Chancery. In that position he took over all offices and powers formerly held by Hess, especially his membership in the Cabinet and on the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich (_2099-PS_).

Only 8 months later, Hitler issued another Decree which extended Bormann’s powers even beyond those which had been granted to Hess. By that Decree Bormann was given extensive control over the preparation of all laws and directives of the Cabinet, the Fuehrer, and the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich, and over the appointment of all public officials (the latter, in Germany, included Judges and university teachers) (_2100-PS_). Under this legislation Bormann must be held at least jointly responsible for every law and order issued after 24 January 1942 by which the conspirators carried out their crimes.

This decisive participation of Bormann and the Party agencies under his direct control in the day-to-day administration of the German war program was buttressed by the Order of the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich, dated 1 December 1942, under which all Party Gau Leaders were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners and all Gaus became Reich Defense Districts (_3235-PS_). Under this Order the Gau leaders, who were Party functionaries under the orders of Bormann, became the Chief Administrators of the entire civilian war effort, not only in Germany proper but also in all incorporated territories.

This development constituted the culmination of the integration of Party and State which had begun almost ten years earlier. From then on, the Party, through Bormann, became a decisive factor in the initiation and execution of all German war policies, after having been charged in the preceding years with much of the political and pre-military preparation of the German people for the aggressive wars of the Conspirators. (_3242-PS_)

C. _DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AND PERSECUTION OF OPPOSITION._

Bormann participated actively in the execution of that part of the conspirators’ program relating to the persecution and destruction of independent groups which were opposed to the aims of the Conspiracy.

(1) _Persecution of the Churches._ Bormann was among the most relentless members of the conspirators in the persecution of the churches. In a secret order of 6 June 1941 he stated bluntly the aim of the conspirators—to destroy Christianity altogether:

“National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable * * *. No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in spite of his omnipotence leaves this to the efforts of the pastors. If, therefore, in the future our youth learns nothing more of this Christianity whose doctrines are far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself.” (_D-75_; see also _098-PS_)

In pursuance of this aim, Bormann’s first efforts in the conspiracy’s fight against religion were directed toward the elimination of churchmen and church influence from the Party itself. On 3 July 1938 a Bormann order prohibited clergymen from holding Party offices (_113-PS_). A Bormann circular of 3 June 1939 excluded Christian Scientists from Party membership (_838-PS_). Bormann Decrees of 9 February 1937 and 14 July 1939 excluded clergymen and theology students from membership in the Nazi Party (_840-PS_). And a Bormann directive of 17 June 1938, prohibited all religious activities by members of the Labor Service. (_107-PS_)

Bormann also opposed religious instruction in the schools. A letter from Bormann’s office to Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 reported success in reducing the holding of religious morning services in schools and proposed the substitution of National Socialist school services. (_070-PS_)

In order further to weaken the churches, Bormann enforced the elimination of numerous Catholic and Protestant Divinity Schools in Germany and Austria. In a letter to The Minister of Education, dated 24 January 1939, Bormann denied the scientific value of theological instruction and suggested a legal basis for the suppression and restriction of Divinity Schools (_116-PS_). This was followed by a report of The Ministry of Education, dated 6 April 1939, concerning the suppression and consolidation of Divinity Schools (_122-PS_). A confidential letter from Bormann to The Minister of Education, dated 23 June 1939, in reply to memorandum of 6 April 1939 (_122-PS_), reported the Party’s decision to order the suppression of numerous Divinity Schools (_123-PS_). In a letter to Rosenberg on 12 December 1939 Bormann agreed with the suggestion that the University Chairs belonging to the Divinity School in the University of Munich be used for instructors at the Nazi Academy (_Hohe Schule_). (_131-PS_)

Bormann also used his power and position in order to demand that other government departments deprive the churches of their property and subject them to a discriminatory legal regime. A Bormann letter to The Reich Minister of Finance in January 1940, demanded that church assessments for special war tax be greatly increased (_099-PS_). In a letter to Amann on 8 March 1940, Bormann demanded reduction in the paper allotment of church publications (_089-PS_). A Bormann letter to Rosenberg on 24 June 1940 submitted the draft of a discriminatory church law for Danzig and West Prussia (_066-PS_). Throughout 1940-1941 Bormann corresponded with numerous officials concerning confiscation of religious art treasures. (_1600-PS_)

Finally, as the war took an increasing part of Germany’s youth into the Armed Forces, Bormann insisted that soldiers be removed from all religious influence. In a letter to the Army High Command in January 1939, Bormann opposed the establishment of an Army Corps of Chaplains (_117-PS_). A Bormann letter to Rosenberg on 17 January 1940 suggested the publication of special Nazi literature for members of the _Wehrmacht_ in order to replace religious literature which the writer had as yet been unable to suppress completely (_101-PS_). In a letter to Rosenberg the next day (18 January 1940) Bormann stated that the publication of Nazi literature for Army recruits as a countermeasure to the circulation of religious writings was “the most essential demand of the hour.” (_100-PS_)

When the prosecution of this anti-Church program was turned over to the RSHA under Himmler, the “Church Specialists” of that organization received clear instructions as to the aims which the Conspirators wanted them to achieve, at a meeting of the “Church Specialists” called for that purpose on 26 September 1941:

“The immediate aim: the church must not regain one inch of the ground it has lost.

“The ultimate aim: destruction of the churches to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained through _Nachrichtendienst_ activities, which will, at a given time, be produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.” (_1815-PS_)

Five years earlier, Bormann had already issued an order to all Party members demanding that they turn priests who criticized the Party over to the Gestapo (_3246-PS_). Bormann thus bears responsibility for the mistreatment of priests in concentration camps throughout these years. (_3249-PS_)

(2) _Persecution of the Jews._ It was Bormann who was charged by Hitler with the transmission and implementation of the latter’s instructions for the “liquidation” of the Jewish population in Germany.

After the pogrom of 8-9 November 1938, Bormann, acting on orders of Hitler, instructed Goering to proceed to the “final settlement of the Jewish question” in Germany. (_1816-PS_)

As a result of this conference a series of anti-Jewish decrees were issued. A Bormann order of 17 January 1939 demanded compliance with new regulations under which Jews were denied access to housing, travel, and other facilities. (_069-PS_; see _1409-PS_)

Bormann also acted through other government agencies to wipe out the economic existence of a large part of the Jewish population. A Bormann order of 8 January 1937 communicated an order by Frick, issued at his instigation, that government employees who consult Jewish doctors, lawyers, etc., will be denied financial assistance. (_3240-PS_)

In addition to these purely economic measures Bormann, again acting on instructions from Hitler, caused Goering to issue a secret order severely restricting the living conditions of Jews in Germany. (_841-PS_)

After the outbreak of the war these anti-Jewish measures increased in intensity and brutality. Thus, Bormann participated in the issuance of rulings under which 60,000 Jewish inhabitants of Vienna were deported to the Government General of Poland, in cooperation with the SS and the Gestapo. (_1950-PS_)

After Bormann succeeded Hess as the executive head of the Party, he was one of the prime movers in the campaign of total spoliation, starvation, and extermination of the Jews living under the rule of the Conspirators. A Bormann order of 23 October 1942 announced a Ministry of Foods decree, issued at his instigation, depriving Jews of many essential food items, and of all special sickness and pregnancy rations, and ordering the confiscation of food parcels (_3243-PS_). On 9 October 1942 Bormann ordered that the problem of eliminating forever the millions of Jews from Greater German territory could no longer be solved by emigration but only by the application of “ruthless force” in special camps in the East (_3244-PS_). The Thirteenth Ordinance under The Reich Citizen Law of 1 July 1943 (RGBl, 1943, Part I, p. 372), signed by Bormann, completely excluded Jews from the ordinary courts and handed them over to the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler’s police. (_1422-PS_; see also _3085-PS_)

D. _THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._

Bormann’s broad powers over all political aspects of the war as a member of the Reich Cabinet and the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich, and as executive head of the Party, were buttressed by the creation of the post of Secretary of the Fuehrer, to which he was appointed on 12 April 1943 (_2981-PS_). In that position Bormann participated in all Hitler’s conferences and became involved in the planning of war crimes by his co-conspirators.

Even before April 1943, however, Bormann took part in planning the basic war policies of the conspiracy. Thus, on 16 July 1941, just three weeks after the invasion of USSR Territory, Bormann participated in a conference at Hitler’s field headquarters with Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel, and Reich Minister Lammers. This conference resulted in the adoption of detailed plans for the enslavement, depopulation, and annexation of extensive territories in Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe. In his report on this conference, Bormann included numerous suggestions of his own for the effective execution of these plans. (_L-221_)

During subsequent years, Bormann took a prominent part in the implementation of this conspiratorial program. A conference on Eastern Territories between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, and Bormann on 8 May 1942, concerned _inter alia_ the suppression of religious freedom, the forceable resettlement of Dutch peasants in Latvia, the extermination program in Russia, and the economic exploitation of Eastern Territories (_1520-PS_). Rosenberg and Bormann corresponded concerning the confiscation of property, especially art treasures, in the East (_072-PS_; _071-PS_). A secret Bormann letter of 11 January 1944 discussed large-scale organization for the withdrawal of commodities from occupied territories for the use of the bombed-out population in Germany. (_061-PS_; see also _327-PS_)

At the same time, Bormann issued a series of orders establishing Party jurisdiction over the treatment of prisoners of war, especially when employed as forced labor (_232-PS_). In the exercise of that jurisdiction, he called for excessively harsh and brutal treatment of Allied Prisoners of War. Bormann issued instructions on 5 November 1941 prohibiting decent burials with religious ceremonies for Russian Prisoners of War (_D-163_). A Bormann circular of 25 November 1943 demanded harsher treatment of prisoners of war and the fuller utilization of their man-power (_228-PS_). In a secret circular transmitting OKH instructions of 29 January 1943, Bormann provided for the enforcement of labor demands on Prisoners of War through the use of fire-arms and corporal punishment. (_656-PS_)

These instructions issued by Bormann culminated in the decree of September 30 1944, signed by him. This decree took jurisdiction over all prisoners of war out of the hands of the OKW, handed them over to the control of Himmler, and provided that all prisoner of war camp commanders should be under the orders of the local SS Commanders (_058-PS_). Through this order, Himmler was enabled to proceed with his program of extermination of Prisoners of War. Bormann also bears part of the responsibility for the organized lynching of Allied airmen. As early as March 1940 Hess had ordered all Party leaders to instruct the civilian population to “arrest or liquidate” all bailed-out allied fliers (_062-PS_). In order to assure the success of this scheme Bormann issued a secret circular prohibiting any police measures or criminal proceedings against civilians who had lynched British or American fliers (_057-PS_). For the execution of these decrees, regulations were issued to cover the systematic application of Lynch Law against captured Allied airmen (_735-PS_). That such lynchings actually took place has since been fully established in a series of American Military Commission proceedings, which resulted in the conviction of German civilians for the murder of Allied fliers. (_2559-PS_; _2560-PS_; _2561-PS_)

E. _THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._

Bormann played an important role in the administration of the forced labor program. A Bormann circular of 5 May 1943 contained detailed directions as to the treatment of foreign workers, stating especially that they were subject to SS control for all security matters and that differentiation between them and Germans was all-important (_205-PS_). At a conference held on 4 September 1942 it was decided that recruiting, mobilization, and treatment of 500,000 female domestic workers from the East would be handled exclusively by Sauckel, Himmler, and Bormann. (_025-PS_; see also _D-226_)

Bormann also imposed his views on the administration of the occupied areas and insisted on the ruthless exploitation of the subjected populations in the East. His views were stated in an official memorandum of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories, headed by Rosenberg, in which they were described as governing actual administrative practice in the East:

“The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don’t need them, they may die. Therefore compulsory vaccination and German health services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful stooges for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food they won’t get any more than is necessary. We are the masters, we come first.” (_R-36_)

A secret conference on 12 January 1943 discussed Bormann’s order of 12 August 1942 under which all Party agencies were placed at Himmler’s disposal for the latter’s program of forced resettlement and denationalization of occupied populations (_705-PS_). Correspondence from the Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy reveals Bormann’s demands that non-German populations of occupied territories be subjected to a special discriminatory legal regime (_R-139_). An agreement between Thierack and Himmler was made at Bormann’s suggestion, under which all Eastern populations are subjected to brutal police regime, and under which all disputes between the parties to the agreement are to be settled by Bormann. (_654-PS_)

In issuing these orders Bormann took a large part in the conspiracy to exterminate millions of people in the Eastern occupied areas.

F. _CONCLUSION._

Martin Bormann, only 45 years old at the time of Germany’s defeat, devoted his entire adult life to the Nazi conspiracy. When he joined the Nazi Party at the age of 25 he had already been active for several years in conspiratorial and terroristic organizations working secretly to prepare Germany for war, and had spent one year in jail for his participation in a political murder.

Bormann’s important contribution to the conspiracy remained throughout in the sphere of the Nazi Party. First, as Chief of Staff to Hess, the Fuehrer’s Deputy, then as Head of the Party Chancery, he managed the entire organization of the Party in the service of the conspiracy. He was responsible for channelling the Party’s demands concerning legislation, education, civil service, and all other fields of public and private life to Hess, who was a member of the Reich Cabinet, which was then Germany’s legislative, administrative, and judicial organ. Thus, Bormann advanced the Party’s conspiratorial program through the control of his co-conspirators over the German government machinery. He used this power for various criminal purposes, among them the persecution of the independent churches, demanding their complete elimination from German life on the ground that Christianity and National Socialism were irreconcilable.

After having acceded in 1941 to the highest position in the Nazi Party, directly under Hitler, Bormann exercised the broadest influence in the direction of Germany’s aggressive wars. Here he acted in two capacities:

(1) As executive head of the Party he commanded the Party Gauleaders who, as District Defense Commissioners, controlled all civilian and political war activities in German and the annexed territories. In that position he became responsible for the multiple war crimes committed by the German civilian population, especially the lynching of allied flying personnel, and the cruel mistreatment of forced laborers.

(2) As Secretary to the Fuehrer, Bormann took an active part in the policy-making conferences and discussions of Hitler and his political and military staffs. Here, Bormann became jointly responsible for the illegal annexation of Allied territories, the enslavement and spoliation of the civilian population in occupied countries, and the planned persecution and extermination of the populations in Eastern territories especially the Jews.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MARTIN BORMANN

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 60 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *025-PS │Conference report of 4 September 1942 │ │ │concerning the importation of domestic│ │ │workers from the East into the Reich. │ │ │(USA 698) │ III │ 67 │ │ │ 057-PS │Circular letter from Bormann to │ │ │Political Leaders, 30 May 1944, │ │ │concerning justice exercised by people│ │ │against Anglo-American murderers. (USA│ │ │329) │ III │ 102 │ │ │ *058-PS │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944 │ │ │concerning reorganization of the │ │ │concerns of prisoners of war. (USA │ │ │456) │ III │ 103 │ │ │ *061-PS │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January │ │ │1944, concerning large-scale │ │ │organization for withdrawal of │ │ │commodities from occupied territories │ │ │for use of bombed-out population in │ │ │Germany. (USA 692) │ III │ 105 │ │ │ *062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │ │1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │ │landings of enemy planes or │ │ │parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107 │ │ │ *066-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 24 June │ │ │1940, submitting draft for │ │ │discriminatory church law for Danzig │ │ │and West Prussia. (USA 689) │ III │ 112 │ │ │ *069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ │January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │ │December 1938, concerning decisions on│ │ │Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116 │ │ │ *070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │ │25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │ │National Socialist mottos for morning │ │ │prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118 │ │ │ *071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │ │1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │ │19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │ │371) │ III │ 119 │ │ │ *072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │ │1941, concerning confiscation of │ │ │property, especially of art treasures │ │ │in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122 │ │ │ 089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │ │March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │ │issue further newsprint to │ │ │confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147 │ │ │ *098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │ │February 1940, urging creation of │ │ │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │ │provide moral foundation for NS │ │ │religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152 │ │ │ *099-PS │Bormann letter to Reich Minister of │ │ │Finance, January 1940, demanding that │ │ │church assessments for the special war│ │ │tax be greatly increased. (USA 688) │ III │ 158 │ │ │ *100-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18 │ │ │January 1940, urging preparation of │ │ │National Socialist reading material to│ │ │replace Christian literature for │ │ │soldiers. (USA 691) │ III │ 160 │ │ │ *101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │ │Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │ │concerning undesirability of religious│ │ │literature for members of the │ │ │Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160 │ │ │ *107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │ │June 1938, enclosing directions │ │ │prohibiting participation of │ │ │Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │ │celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162 │ │ │ *113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │ │signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │ │clergymen ineligible for Party │ │ │offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164 │ │ │ *116-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, │ │ │enclosing copy of letter, 24 January │ │ │1939, to Minister of Education │ │ │requesting restriction or elimination │ │ │of theological faculties. (USA 685) │ III │ 165 │ │ │ 117-PS │Bormann letter to Army High Command, │ │ │28 January 1939, opposing the │ │ │establishment of an Army Corps of │ │ │Chaplains. │ III │ 167 │ │ │ *122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ │April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │ │of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │ │elimination of theological faculties │ │ │in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173 │ │ │ *123-PS │Confidential letter from Bormann to │ │ │Minister of Education, 23 June 1939, │ │ │in reply to memorandum of 6 April 1939│ │ │(122-PS) reporting the Party’s │ │ │decision to order the suppression of │ │ │numerous Divinity Schools. (USA 686) │ III │ 175 │ │ │ *131-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 12 │ │ │December 1939, agreeing with │ │ │suggestion that the University Chairs │ │ │belonging to the Divinity School in │ │ │the University of Munich be used for │ │ │instructors at the Nazi Academy (Hohe │ │ │Schule). (USA 687) │ III │ 184 │ │ │ 205-PS │Bormann Circular, 5 May 1943, │ │ │containing detailed directions as to │ │ │the treatment of foreign workers │ │ │employed within the Reich. │ III │ 218 │ │ │ *228-PS │Bormann Circular, 25 November 1943, │ │ │demanding harsher treatment of │ │ │Prisoners of War and the fuller │ │ │utilization of their manpower. (USA │ │ │695) │ III │ 225 │ │ │ *232-PS │Bormann Order of 13 September 1944 │ │ │establishing Party jurisdiction over │ │ │the use of Prisoners of War for forced│ │ │labor. (USA 693) │ III │ 229 │ │ │ 327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │ │October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │ │of property in Eastern Occupied │ │ │Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257 │ │ │ *654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │ │on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │ │delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │ │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467 │ │ │ *656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │ │Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │ │Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │ │January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │ │against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470 │ │ │ 705-PS │Secret conference, 12 January 1943, of│ │ │the SS-Committee for General Labor in │ │ │the German Zone. │ III │ 511 │ │ │ *735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │ │fix the cases in which the application│ │ │of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │ │would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533 │ │ │ *838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │ │Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │ │Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │ │precluded Christian Scientists from │ │ │joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605 │ │ │ *840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │ │clergy and theology students │ │ │ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │ │355) │ III │ 606 │ │ │ 841-PS │Secret Order of Goering, 28 December │ │ │1938, concerning Jewish problem. │ III │ 606 │ │ │ 1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 252) │ III │ 978 │ │ │ 1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish│ │ │property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1 │ │ │ 1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │ │Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14 │ │ │ *1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │ │between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │ │Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65 │ │ │ *1600-PS │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941, │ │ │concerning confiscation of religious │ │ │art treasures. (USA 690) │ IV │ 128 │ │ │ *1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │ │offices with the Secret State Police, │ │ │25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │ │Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │ │II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219 │ │ │ *1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │ │the study and treatment of church │ │ │politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415 │ │ │ *1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │ │The Jewish Question, under the │ │ │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │ │12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425 │ │ │ *1950-PS │Secret letter from Lammers to │ │ │defendant von Schirach, 3 December │ │ │1940, concerning deportation of Jews. │ │ │(USA 681) │ IV │ 592 │ │ │ 2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │ │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 │ │ │ 2099-PS │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of │ │ │Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 725 │ │ │ 2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │ │Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726 │ │ │ 2559-PS │Military Commission Order No. 2, │ │ │Headquarters Fifteenth U. S. Army, 25 │ │ │June 1945, concerning trial of German │ │ │civilian by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 294 │ │ │ 2560-PS │Military Commission Order No. 5, │ │ │Headquarters Third U. S. Army and │ │ │Eastern Military District, 18 October │ │ │1945, concerning trial of German │ │ │national by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 296 │ │ │ 2561-PS │Military Commission Order No. 3, │ │ │Headquarters Third U. S. Army, 4 │ │ │October 1945, concerning trial of four│ │ │German nationals by U. S. Military │ │ │Commission. │ V │ 298 │ │ │ 2981-PS │Biographical information on Martin │ │ │Bormann, published in The Greater │ │ │German Reichstag, 1943, p. 167. │ V │ 686 │ │ │ 3018-PS │Hitler decree of 18 October 1944 in │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, South German │ │ │Edition, 20 October 1944, p. 1. │ V │ 736 │ │ │ 3085-PS │Himmler’s ordinance of 3 July 1943 │ │ │charging Gestapo with execution of │ │ │Thirteenth Ordinance under Reich │ │ │Citizen Law. 1943 Ministerial Gazette │ │ │of Reich and Prussian Ministry of │ │ │Interior, p. 1085. │ V │ 892 │ │ │ 3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │ │of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │ │of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918 │ │ │ 3234-PS │Promotions in the SS, published in The│ │ │Archive, July 1940, p. 399. │ V │ 938 │ │ │ 3235-PS │Every Party Region Becomes a Reich │ │ │Defense District, from The Archive, │ │ │December 1942, p. 805. │ V │ 938 │ │ │ 3236-PS │Biographical material on Martin │ │ │Bormann, published in The German │ │ │Reichstag, 1936, p. 113. │ V │ 939 │ │ │ 3237-PS │Bormann Order of 14 February 1935, │ │ │demanding that all Party officers │ │ │assist the SD in its work, published │ │ │in Decrees of the Deputy of the │ │ │Fuehrer. │ V │ 939 │ │ │ 3239-PS │Bormann Order of 3 September 1935 │ │ │calling on Party agencies to hand │ │ │persons who criticize the Nazi Party │ │ │or institutions over to Gestapo, │ │ │published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │ │the Fuehrer. │ V │ 940 │ │ │ 3240-PS │Bormann Order of 8 January 1937 │ │ │concerning refusal of financial │ │ │assistance to patients who consult │ │ │Jewish Doctors, published in Decrees │ │ │of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │ V │ 941 │ │ │ 3242-PS │The Reich Offices of the NSDAP, │ │ │published in National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1944, pp. 181-182. │ V │ 941 │ │ │ 3243-PS │Food Supply of the Jews, published in │ │ │Decrees, Orders, Announcements, Vol. │ │ │II, pp. 147-150. │ V │ 944 │ │ │ 3244-PS │Preparatory Measures for the Solution │ │ │of the Jewish Problem in Europe, │ │ │published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │ │Announcements, Vol. 2, pp. 131-132. │ V │ 945 │ │ │ 3246-PS │Bormann Order of 7 January 1936, │ │ │published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │ │the Fuehrer. │ V │ 948 │ │ │ *3249-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 663) │ V │ 949 │ │ │ *3355-PS │Affidavit of Robert M. W. Kempner, 8 │ │ │December 1945. (USA 682) │ VI │ 85 │ │ │ 3569-PS │Private will and testament and │ │ │political will of Adolf Hitler, 29 │ │ │April 1945. │ VI │ 258 │ │ │ 3734-PS │Summary of Interrogation of Hanna │ │ │Reitsch, 8 October 1945. │ VI │ 551 │ │ │ 3735-PS │Testimony of Erich Kempka on the last │ │ │days of Hitler. │ VI │ 571 │ │ │ *D-75 │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12 │ │ │December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy │ │ │of secret decree signed by Bormann, │ │ │entitled Relationship of National │ │ │Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │ VI │ 1035 │ │ │ *D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │ │participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │ │the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │ │403) │ VI │ 1055 │ │ │ *D-163 │Bormann instructions, 5 November 1941,│ │ │prohibiting burials with religious │ │ │ceremonies for Russian Prisoners of │ │ │War. (USA 694) │ VI │ 1067 │ │ │ *D-226 │Speer circular of 10 November 1944, │ │ │distributing Himmler’s decree for │ │ │ensuring the discipline and output of │ │ │foreign workers. (USA 697) │ VI │ 1088 │ │ │ *D-753-A │Letter from Lammers to Bormann, 1 │ │ │January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 214 │ │ │ D-753-B │Letter from Bormann to Lammers, 5 │ │ │January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 219 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │ │Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │ │lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │ │November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │ │Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920 │ │ │ *L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │ │July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │ │Eastern populations and territories. │ │ │(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 │ │ │ *R-36 │Memorandum to Rosenberg, 19 August │ │ │1942, concerning Bormann letter of 23 │ │ │July 1942, prepared by an official in │ │ │the Rosenberg Ministry. (USA 699) │ VIII │ 52 │ │ │ R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │ │and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │ │civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770

18. FRANZ VON PAPEN

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY VON PAPEN._

(1) _Awarded the Golden Party Badge by Hitler, thereby becoming member of NSDAP_ (_2902-PS_; _Das Archiv_ vol. 48, p. 1614).

(2) _Member of Reichstag_, 1933-1945 (_2902-PS_).

(3) _Reich Chancellor, 1 June 1932 to 2 December 1932, acting pro-tem between 17 November and 2 December_ (_2902-PS_).

(4) _Vice Chancellor, 30 January 1933 to August 1934_ (?) (Papen admits holding office only to 30 June 1934; he also admits that decrees published on 1 and 2 August 1934 carry his signature as Vice-Chancellor, but claims this was either mistake or forgery) (_2902-PS_).

(5) _Special Plenipotentiary for the Saar_ (13 November 1933 to 30 June 1934) (_2902-PS_).

(6) _Negotiator of Concordat with Vatican_ (concluded 20 July 1933) (_2655-PS_).

(7) _German Ambassador at Vienna (26 July 1934 to 4 February 1938), continuing thereafter to arrange Berchtesgaden meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg and to participate in meeting itself_ (_2902-PS_).

B. _AS EX-REICH CHANCELLOR AND PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADER, VON PAPEN USED HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PROMOTE THE ACCESSION OF THE NAZIS TO POWER._

(1) _When von Papen began these efforts he was well aware of the Nazi program and Nazi methods._ The official NSDAP program was open and notorious. For many years it had been published and republished in the Yearbook of the NSDAP and elsewhere. The Nazis made no secret of their intention to make it the fundamental law of the State. The first three points of this program forecast a foreign policy predicated upon the absorption of “Germanic” populations outside the boundaries of the Reich, the abrogation of Versailles treaty limitations, and the acquisition of “_Lebensraum_.” Points 4 to 8 foretold the ruthless elimination of the Jews, and the 25th point demanded “unlimited authority” of the central regime over the entire Reich as a means “for the execution of all this” (_1708-PS_).

Hitler and the other leaders of the Party repeatedly reiterated these views before 1933. Hitler himself subsequently pointed out that there was no excuse for misinterpreting Nazi intentions:

“When I came to power in 1933, our path lay unmistakably before us. Our internal policy had been, exactly defined by our fifteen-year-old struggle. Our program, repeated a thousand times, obligated us to the German people. I should be a man without honor, worthy of being stoned, had I retracted a single step of the program I then enunciated * * *”

* * * * * *

“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish chatter of emigres, these gentlemen would have been wiser to read what I have written thousands of times.” (_2541-PS_)

Hitler and other Nazi leaders repeatedly made clear their willingness to use force if necessary to achieve their purposes. They glorified war. _Mein Kampf_ is replete with early evidence of such intentions, which subsequently were reaffirmed from time to time in the years preceding 1933 (_D-660_; _2771-PS_; _2512-PS_).

The Nazi leaders prior to 1933 had openly declared their intentions to subvert democratic processes as a means to achieve their purposes, and to this end to harass and embarrass democratic forces at every turn. Thus Hitler himself had declared that,

“We shall become members of all constitutional bodies, and in this manner make the Party the decisive factor. Of course, when we possess all constitutional rights we shall then mould the State into the form we consider to be the right one.” (_2512-PS_)

Frick, writing in the National Socialist Yearbook, declared:

“Our participation in the parliament does not indicate a support, but rather an undermining of the parliamentarian system. It does not indicate that we renounce our anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we are fighting the enemy with his own weapons and that we are fighting for our National Socialist goal from the parliamentary platform.” (_2742-PS_)

The practical application of these purposes was thus subsequently described by a leading Nazi constitutional authority, Ernst Rudolf Huber:

“It was necessary above all to make formal use of the possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system, which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of the opposition, incapable of action.” (_2633-PS_).

This practical application of Nazi purposes and methods was manifest at the time von Papen was a member of the Reichstag and Vice Chancellor. By this time the Nazi members of the Reichstag were engaging in tactics of disturbance which finally culminated in physical attacks upon members of the Reichstag and upon visitors, and were using terroristic measures to assure their election (_L-83_).

Von Papen not only had the opportunity to observe early manifestations of Nazi violence and irresponsibility. He fully understood the true character of the Nazi menace before 1933 and publicly condemned it.

At the time of the German elections in the summer of 1932, von Papen, President Hindenburg, and certain other German leaders were hoping that the rising Nazi menace would be dissipated by providing for National Socialist participation in a rightist-centrist government. Hitler refused all overtures inviting such participation, even when suggested by President Hindenburg himself, insisting upon assuming the chancellorship without obligation to other parties. Hitler’s refusal at this time to collaborate with Hindenburg and Papen marked the beginning of a series of public declarations in which von Papen revealed a clear understanding of Nazi methods and objections. Thus, on the occasion of his Munster speech of 28 August 1932 von Papen declared:

“The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of the National Socialist Movement does not comply very well with his claims to governmental power.”

* * * * * *

“I do not concede him the right to regard the mere minority following his banner solely as the German nation, and to treat all our fellow countrymen as ‘free game’.”

* * * * * *

“I am advocating the constitutional state, the community of the people, law and order in government. In doing so, it is I, and not he, who is carrying on the struggle against the domination of parties, against arbitrarianism and injustice, a struggle which millions of his supporters had been wholeheartedly longing for years to fight.”

* * * * * *

“I am firmly determined to stamp out the smouldering flame of civil war, to put an end to political unrest and political violence, which today is still such a great obstacle to the positive work representing the sole task of the State.” (_3314-PS_)

Writing in the September 1932 issue of the periodical “_Volk und Reich_,” von Papen declared:

“The present situation clearly shows that party domination and State leadership are concepts incompatible with one another. It is conceivable theoretically that a party might gain the majority in parliament and claims the government (State leadership) for itself. The NSDAP has proclaimed this theoretical possibility as its practical goal and has come very close to attaining it. It is to be hoped that the leaders of this movement will place the nation above the party and will thus lend a visible expression to the faith of millions looking for a way out of the spiritual and material distress of the nation provided also by the leadership of the State.”

* * * * * *

“* * * The hope in the hearts of millions of national socialists can be fulfilled only by an authoritarian government. The problem of forming a cabinet on the basis of a parliamentary coalition has again been brought into the field of public political discussion. If such negotiations, in the face of growing distress, are conducted with the motif of destroying the political opponent by the failure of his governmental activity, this is a dangerous game against which one cannot warn enough. In the last analysis such plans can mean nothing else but a tactics which counts on the possibility that matters get worse for the people and that the faith of millions will turn into the bitterest disappointment, if these tactics only result in the destruction of the political adversary. It is within the nature of such party-tactical maneuvers that they are veiled and will be disclaimed in public. That, however, cannot prevent me from warning publicly against such plans, about which it may be undecided who is the betrayer and who the betrayed one; plans, though, which will certainly cheat the German people out of their hope for improvement of their situation. Nothing can prove more urgently the necessity for an authoritarian government than such a prospect of maneuvers of a tactical game by the parties.” (Papen article quoted in “Frankfurter Zeitung”, 2 Sept. 1932, p. 2).

In his Munich speech on 13 October 1932 von Papen was especially clear:

“The essence of conservative ideology is its being anchored in the divine order of things. That too is its fundamental difference compared with the doctrine advocated by the NSDAP. The principle of ‘exclusiveness’ of a political ‘everything or nothing’ which the latter adheres to, its mythical Messiah-belief in the bombastic Fuehrer who alone is destined to direct fate, gives it the character of a political sect. And therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage between a conservative policy born of faith and a national-socialist creed as a matter of politics. It seems to me that today names and individuals are unimportant when Germany’s final fate is at stake. What the nation demands is this: it expects of a movement which has written upon its banner the internal and external national freedom that it will act, at all times and under all circumstances, as if it were the spiritual, social and political conscience of the nation. If it does not act that way; if this movement follows merely tactical points of view, democratic-parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation and means of proletarian class struggle—then it is not a movement any more, it has become a political party.

“And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the political parties. One simply cannot, on one side, despise mercilessly masses and majorities, as Herr Hitler is doing, and on the other hand surrender to parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the extent of adopting resolutions against one’s own government together with Bolshevists.”

* * * * * *

“In the interest of the entire nation we decline the claim to power by parties which want to own their followers body and soul, and which want to put themselves, as a party or a movement, over and above the whole nation.” (_3317-PS_)

In a series of interviews and speeches in the fall of 1932 von Papen castigated the Nazi party for its ambitions to achieve a total and centralized control of Germany. He contrasted its objectives and methods to his own “conservatism” and emphasized its incompatibility with the preservation of the “federalistic” type of government to which he was committed. His public pronouncements in this connection were clearly reflected in the contemporary press:

“Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the very beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for and with the various states [_Laender_]. The Reich government is taking a definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary centralism or unitarianism.”

* * * * * *

“Wherever one did hear von Papen express himself in public, one did hear a chancellor who took special care to be regarded as an unconditional federalist.” (_3318-PS_)

The Vice Chancellor’s campaign against the Nazis culminated finally in a radio speech to the German public on 4 November 1932, in which he severely criticized Nazi political methods. He damned the Nazis’ “pure party egoism” which resulted in methods described by him as “sabotage” and as “a crime against the nation.” He accused the Nazis of wanting complete and permanent power in Germany (_Deutsche Reichsgeshichte in Dokumenten IV_, p. 523 (Rundfunkrede des Reichkanzlers von Papen)).

Nor was von Papen content merely to make speeches against the Nazis. As late as November 1932, Papen was prepared to use all the forces at the command of the state in a supreme effort to suppress the rising Nazi menace. He was deterred from this purpose only by a failure to secure the support of his cabinet. The inner struggles of the German cabinet at this time are recounted by Otto Meissner (in a statement made at Nurnberg, 28 November 1945), Chief of the Chancery of Reichspresident Hindenburg.

“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg would have been probable if he had been prepared to take up an open fight against the National Socialists, which would have involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time of his resignation, Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by employing all the resources of the State and relying on Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed conflict. Other ministers, however, believed that such a course would lead to civil war.

“The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in earlier times had recommended energetic action against the National Socialists—even if this meant the use of police and army. Now, in the decisive cabinet meeting, he abandoned this idea and declared himself for an understanding with Hitler.

“The gist of Schleicher’s report—which was given partly by himself, partly by Major Ott, who adduced detailed statistical material—was that the weakened Reichswehr, which was dispersed over the whole Reich, even if supported by civilian volunteer formations, would not be equal to military operations on a large scale, and was not suited and trained for civil war. The police, in particular the Prussian police, had been undermined by propaganda and could not be considered as absolutely reliable. If the Nazis began an armed revolt, one must anticipate a revolt of the Communists and a general strike at the same time. The forces of these two adversaries were very strong. If such a ‘war against two fronts’ should take place, the forces of the State would undoubtedly be disrupted. The outcome of a civil war would be at the least most uncertain.

“In his, Schleicher’s view, it was impossible to take the risks implied in such a policy. In case of failure, which he believed likely, the consequences for Germany would be terrible. All present in the cabinet meeting were deeply impressed by Schleicher’s statement, and even those who had been in favor of energetic action against the National Socialists now changed their mind, so that Papen was isolated and felt himself to be isolated.

“In the interview which Papen had with Hindenburg after this meeting, on November 17th 1932 Papen did not conceal his deep disappointment over Schleicher’s altered position. Although Hindenburg asked him to make a new attempt to form a government, Papen stood on his decision to resign and Hindenburg gave in.”

(2) _Despite his appreciation of the Nazi menace, von Papen rigorously proceeded to conduct negotiations which resulted in placing Hitler and the Nazi regime in power._ Following his resignation as Chancellor on 17 November 1932 von Papen continued as Chancellor pro-tem until 2 December 1932, when General Schleicher was appointed to replace him (_2902-PS_).

Almost as soon as he vacated the Chancery, von Papen began plotting to unseat his arch-rival Schleicher. On about 10 December 1932—less than a month after he was willing to use force to suppress the Nazis—von Papen requested Kurt von Schroeder, the Cologne banker, to arrange a meeting between Hitler and von Papen (according to the statement of Schroeder, made at Nurnberg, 5 December 1945). Schroeder was one of a group of rightist industrial and financial leaders who had previously been organized by Hitler’s man, Wilhelm Keppler, to provide means of bolstering Nazi economic power.

Hitler himself at this time understood von Papen. He knew that Papen’s ideas were not too different from his own to preclude agreement. He knew that Papen’s personal rivalry with Schleicher would make Papen amenable to some agreement whereby Schleicher might be unhorsed and Papen restored to a position of public prominence. He accordingly asked Keppler to arrange for a meeting with Papen (reported in an affidavit of Wilhelm Keppler, executed at Nurnberg, 26 November 1945).

The result of these maneuvers was the now-famous meeting between Hitler and Papen at banker Schroeder’s Cologne home in January 1933. It was at this meeting that Hitler and Papen reached an understanding, subject only to the ironing out of minor details. It was at this meeting that Papen completely committed himself to go along with Nazi policy.

The events of this day have been described by Kurt von Schroeder (in a statement referred to above):

“On January 4, 1933, Hitler, von Papen, Hess, Himmler and Keppler came to my house in Cologne. Hitler, von Papen and I went to my den where we were closeted in a discussion lasting about two hours. Hess, Himmler and Keppler did not participate in this discussion but were in the next room. Keppler, who had helped arrange this meeting, came from Berlin; von Papen came alone from his home in the Saar; and Hitler brought Hess and Himmler with him, as they were traveling with him to Lippe in connection with the election campaign. The discussion was only between Hitler and Papen; I personally had nothing to say in the discussion. The meeting started about 11:30 A.M. and the first question was raised by Hitler as to why it was necessary to punish the two Nazis who had killed the Communist in Silesia. Von Papen explained to Hitler that it had been necessary to punish these two Nazis, although they had not been put to death, because the law was on the books and all political offenders under the law must have some punishment. He further explained to Hitler that it might be possible to get a pardon from President Hindenburg to give serious consideration to making Hitler the Chancellor at the time that Hindenburg met with Hitler and von Papen and that he had understood that Hindenburg was perfectly willing to discuss this matter with Hitler at that time. He said that it came as a great surprise and shock to him when Hindenburg was unwilling to do so and he felt that someone, probably von Schleicher, was responsible for the change in Hindenburg’s point of view. Next, von Papen told Hitler that it seemed to him the best thing to have the conservatives and nationalists who had supported him join with the Nazis to form a government. He proposed that this new government should, if possible, be headed by Hitler and von Papen on the same level. Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said if he were made Chancellor, it would be necessary for him to be head of the government but that supporters of Papen could go into his (Hitler’s) government as ministers when they were willing to go along with him in his policy of changing many things. These changes he outlined at this time included elimination of Social Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions in Germany and the restoration of order in public life. Von Papen and Hitler reached an agreement in principle so that many of the points which had brought them in conflict could be eliminated and they could find a way to get together. They agreed that further details would have to be worked out and that this could be done in Berlin or some other convenient place.

“I understand they met later with von Ribbentrop and worked out further details.

“The meeting broke up about 1:30 and the three of us joined Hess, Himmler and Keppler at lunch, during which there was general conversation which lasted until about four o’clock when they, all the guests, departed.”

Having reached an understanding with Hitler, von Papen directed his energy toward convincing President Hindenburg to allow Hitler to form a new government. In this task he had to overcome Hindenburg’s fears that this appointment would lead to domestic oppressions and risk of war (according to a statement of Otto Meissner, Nurnberg, 28 November 1945).

Von Papen himself subsequently admitted the important role he played in bringing Hitler to power. At Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, immediately after Hitler had forced Schuschnigg to sign the document which led to the Austrian Anschluss, Hitler turned to Papen and remarked:

“Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that.”

Papen replied:

“_Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer._” (_2995-PS_)

C. _AS VICE-CHANCELLOR, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY._

(1) _In the first critical year and a half of Nazi consolidation of control over Germany, von Papen was second only to Hitler in the Cabinet which established the legal basis for furtherance of the Nazi program._ As Vice-Chancellor, van Papen was the only member of the government empowered to act for the Fuehrer in his absence.

(2) _Von Papen actively participated in the general abolition of civil liberties by promoting legislation which paved the way for the Nazi police state._ At the first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet, there was intensive discussion concerning the possibility of securing passage of an Enabling Law which in practical effect would liquidate the Reichstag and make the Nazi Cabinet the supreme law-making power of the Reich. The conspirators, including von Papen, at this meeting clearly indicated that they did not at the time hold sufficient power to achieve this measure by normal constitutional methods (_351-PS_).

Seizing the Reichstag fire as a pretext, the Cabinet forthwith arranged for the suspension of those fundamental civil liberties (including freedom of speech, press, assembly and association) which would protect citizens who dared to oppose the plans of the conspirators. The suspension of civil liberties was accomplished by issuance of a Presidential decree, which presumably, according to German usage, was proposed to the Reich President by the Cabinet and countersigned by those Ministers whose departments were involved (_1390-PS_; _2050-PS_).

This basic law was only the first of a series which placed the individual dissenter at the mercy of the Nazi state. As if to underscore explicitly the basic policy behind this legislation, von Papen personally signed the decree which implemented this legislation by creating Special Courts to enforce its provisions. This decree abolished rights, including the right of appeal, which had previously characterized the administration of justice by the German judicial system. It thus constituted also the first legislative measure for the Nazification of the German judiciary (_2076-PS_).

The subsequent creation of the dreaded _Volksgericht_ and the wholesale Nazification of the German system of criminal law was merely the logical development of these earlier steps. This too was achieved by decree of the Cabinet in which von Papen was Vice-Chancellor (_2014-PS_).

(3) _Von Papen actively participated in substitution of the Nazi Cabinet for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-giving authority, notwithstanding his doubts as to the advisability of giving Hitler such extensive power._ Von Papen actively participated in the Cabinet deliberations concerning the proposed so-called Enabling Act, and concerning the means by which it might be made law (_351-PS_; _2962-PS_; _2963-PS_).

The enactment of this law deprived the Reichstag of its legislative functions, so that legislative as well as executive powers were concentrated in Hitler and his Cabinet (_2001-PS_).

Enactment of the law was made possible only by the application of Nazi pressure and terror against the potential opponents of this legislation, and by taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933, suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom. (See section 2 of