Part 3 of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows:

“In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to control European Russia.” (_D-656_)

In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:

“‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?’

“Ribbentrop: ‘We would like to end this war during next year [1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on to the following year.

‘Should Japan become engaged in war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point.’” (_D-656_)

Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way, with the aggression by Japan against the United States.

Another intercepted diplomatic message from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin states (_D-657_):

“At 1 p. m. today [8 December 1941] I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.

“It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.” (_D-657_)

Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the German declaration of war.

Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States.

Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union. In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union (_2911-PS_; _2954-PS_). The report of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima reads:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:

“The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the object of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.” (_2954-PS_)

Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack:

“However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one part must fight alone.” (_2954-PS_)

Ribbentrop’s pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in another report of Japanese-German discussions on 18 April 1943 (_2929-PS_):

“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment * * *.” (_2929-PS_)

C. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._

(The following discussion concerns only the planning of these crimes. The execution of the crimes was left to the French and Soviet prosecuting staffs for proof.)

(1) _The Killing of Allied Aviators._ With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated the point of view that Ribbentrop had been urging (_735-PS_). The meeting took place at the Fuehrer’s headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded in part as follows:

“_Obergruppenfuehrer_ Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of WFSt in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshal [Goering], the Reich Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop], and the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police.” (_735-PS_)

That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen who crash-landed should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd.

The minutes of the conference report further as follows:

“Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that apart from lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until they are received into the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment.” (_735-PS_)

The sense of this seems to be that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would be subject to the protecting power’s intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed.

The conference reached a decision on what would be regarded as justifying lynch law:

“At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law:

“Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.

“Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.” (_735-PS_)

These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had suggested, the case of the bombing of a city.

In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious comment from Keitel:

“If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules!

“Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work out.” (_735-PS_)

That is signed by Keitel.

The remarks of Jodl then appear:

“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

“1. What do we consider as murder? “Is RR in agreement with point 3_b_? “2. How should the procedure be carried out? “_a._ By the people? “_b._ By the authorities? “3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators? “4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?

“(Signed) Jodl” (_735-PS_).

It is important to note that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office were fully involved in these breaches of the laws and usages of war. The clarity with which the Foreign Office perceived that there were such violations is indicated by a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials, Ritter (_728-PS_). The approval of Ribbentrop is specifically stated in a memorandum of 30 June 1944 (_740-PS_). The Foreign Office document reads:

“In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.

“In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the Security Service, SD.

“1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.

“2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D., including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if Germany, on this occasion, simultaneously would openly repudiate the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.

“The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War, and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.

“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners of War but criminals; that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel.

“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing treaties, and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case.”

* * * * * *

“It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit ‘the deterrence of enemy aviators’, is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore.” (_728-PS_).

Those words show clearly Ribbentrop’s point of view:

“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft.” (_740-PS_)

Thus, on the treatment of aviators, Ribbentrop furthered the deliberate adoption of a procedure evading International Law.

(2) _The Destruction of the Peoples in Europe._ With regard to Poland, the affidavit of Lahousen reports Ribbentrop participation in a discussion on 12 September 1939 on the Fuehrer’s train concerning the extermination of Poles and Jews (_Affidavit A_).

With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (_TC-51_). The effect of that decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of supreme power over Bohemia and Moravia, subordinate only to the Fuehrer. Article 5 of that decree provides:

“* * * 2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich.

“3. The members of the government of the Protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.

“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the government of the Protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich, and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest.” (_TC-51_)

It is further provided that the promulgation of laws and the execution of certain judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an objection (_TC-51_).

In part as a result of the sweeping terms of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were able to commit numerous violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity. (Discussion of these matters was assumed as the responsibility of the Soviet prosecuting staff.)

Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands, on 18 May 1940 a decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands was signed by Ribbentrop. Section 1 of that decree provided (_D-639_):

“The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands territories * * * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.

“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.” (_D-639_)

On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, promulgated such orders as that of 4 July 1940, confiscating the property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich (_2921-PS_). Tentative arrangements were also made for the resettlement of the Dutch population (_1520-PS_). (This part of the proof was assumed as the responsibility of the French prosecuting staff.)

With regard to Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against Ribbentrop is laying the basis and erecting the governmental structure under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed and facilitated.

(3) _Persecution of the Jews._ In December 1938 Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department as follows (_L-205_):

“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in fact nothing that it could or would do.” (_L-205_)

That succinct statement of Ribbentrop’s views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office (_3358-PS_). This document, entitled “The Jewish Question As A Factor In German Foreign Policy in the year 1938” contains the following:

“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater Germany’, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938.”

* * * * * *

“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living in Reich territory.”

* * * * * *

“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German _lebensraum_, which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations.” (_3358-PS_)

This document was widely circulated by Ribbentrop’s ministry, to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous other people on 25 January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop’s anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc. in order to give an international aspect to the Congress. However, the military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the Congress, which had lost its significance by virtue of the Allied landing in Normandy (_1752-PS_).

It is clear that Ribbentrop supported and encouraged the Nazi program against the Jews, which resulted in their transportation to concentration camps, where things went on which he, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government must have known about. As one who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority, Ribbentrop cannot suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out.

D. _CONCLUSION_

Hitler summed up Ribbentrop’s contribution to the Nazi conspiracy for aggression, as follows:

“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all problems of foreign policy.”

During the course of the war, Ribbentrop was in close liaison with the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, through his foreign embassies and legations abroad, information which was required. He at times participated in the planning of war crimes and crimes against humanity. His guilt is clear.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │ │Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │ │on the Political Preparation of the │ │ │Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ *728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │ │Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │ │June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │ │enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526 │ │ │ *735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │ │fix the cases in which the application│ │ │of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │ │would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533 │ │ │ *740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │ │aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537 │ │ │ *957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │ │February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641 │ │ │ *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │ │(USA 30) │ III │ 665 │ │ │ 1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 │ │ │ *1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │ │provisional directions for partition │ │ │of Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838 │ │ │ *1337-PS │Hitler’s decree electing Ribbentrop │ │ │member of Secret Cabinet Council, 4 │ │ │February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 112. (GB 129) │ III │ 913 │ │ │ *1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │ │and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 │ │ │March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. │ │ │1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │606. (GB 135) │ IV │ 18 │ │ │ *1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │ │between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │ │Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │ │Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │ │speech by Hitler to German High │ │ │Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │ │March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │ │Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ *1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │ │Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │ │(GB 159) │ IV │ 280 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ *1834-PS │Report on conference between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February │ │ │1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 │ │ │ 1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in│ │ │Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477 │ │ │ *1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │ │Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │ │1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499 │ │ │ *1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12│ │ │August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508 │ │ │ *1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and│ │ │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │ │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522 │ │ │ *1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop│ │ │and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │ │(USA 153) │ IV │ 526 │ │ │ *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │ │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │ │133) │ IV │ 997 │ │ │ *2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │ │February 1938, published in Documents │ │ │of German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. │ │ │50-52. (GB 30) │ IV │ 1099 │ │ │ *2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │ │January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January│ │ │1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101 │ │ │ *2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │ │Minister of Yugoslavia, as published │ │ │in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │ │Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186 │ │ │ *2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │ │of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │ │1938, published in Documents of German│ │ │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │ │132) │ V │ 206 │ │ │ 2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │ │Communist International, 25 November │ │ │1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents │ │ │of German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242 │ │ │ *2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │ │January 1939, published in Voelkischer│ │ │Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267 │ │ │ *2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power │ │ │Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,│ │ │27 September 1940, signed by │ │ │Ribbentrop for Germany. 1940 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 41, p.│ │ │279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355 │ │ │ *2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419 │ │ │ *2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │ │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │ │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │ │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422 │ │ │ *2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │ │Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424 │ │ │ *2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop,│ │ │Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │ │(USA 110) │ V │ 425 │ │ │ *2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │ │Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │ │August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426 │ │ │ *2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │ │Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426 │ │ │ *2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │ │conversations between Hitler, │ │ │Ribbentrop and von Weizsacker and the │ │ │Hungarian Ministers Imredy and von │ │ │Kanya, 23 August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430 │ │ │ 2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │ │conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │ │von Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432 │ │ │ *2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │ │meeting between Hitler and President │ │ │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │ │1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433 │ │ │ *2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │ │conversation with Attolico, the │ │ │Italian Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA│ │ │85) │ V │ 442 │ │ │ *2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ │conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │ │Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │ │Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443 │ │ │ *2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German│ │ │Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. │ │ │(USA 116) │ V │ 451 │ │ │ *2829-PS │Affidavit of von Ribbentrop, 9 │ │ │November 1945, concerning positions │ │ │held by him. (USA 5) │ V │ 496 │ │ │ *2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │ │German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521 │ │ │ *2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │ │German Legation in Prague, 17 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521 │ │ │ *2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │ │German Legation in Prague, 16 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522 │ │ │ 2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │ │German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522 │ │ │ *2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │ │German Legation in Prague, 19 │ │ │September 1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523 │ │ │ *2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │ │Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July │ (USA │ │1941. │ 155) │ V │ │ │ *2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │ │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July │ │ │1941. (USA 156) │ V │ 566 │ │ │ *2911-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July 1942. │ │ │(USA 157) │ V │ 580 │ │ │ *2921-PS │Decree of Reich Commissar for Occupied│ │ │Dutch Territories concerning │ │ │confiscation of property, 4 July 1940.│ │ │(GB 155) │ V │ 590 │ │ │ *2929-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 18 April 1943. │ │ │(USA 159) │ V │ 603 │ │ │ *2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │ │Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │ │76) │ V │ 628 │ │ │ *2952-PS │Memorandum, 19 July 1939, signed │ │ │Doertenbach. (GB 137) │ V │ 655 │ │ │ *2953-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 29│ │ │June 1939, with enclosure. (GB 136) │ V │ 657 │ │ │ *2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │ │(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658 │ │ │ *2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │ │166) │ V │ 689 │ │ │ 3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │ │train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │ │execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │ │entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │ │(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │ │in evidence.) │ V │ 766 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │ │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │ │Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │ │1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855 │ │ │ *3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in │ │ │Prague to Foreign Office in Berlin │ │ │about policy arrangements with │ │ │Henlein, 16 March 1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856 │ │ │ *3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │ │Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │ │Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │ │(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857 │ │ │ *3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,│ │ │28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100 │ │ │ *3319-PS │Foreign Office Correspondence and │ │ │reports on anti-Jewish action in │ │ │foreign countries. (GB 287) │ VI │ 4 │ │ │ *3358-PS │German Foreign Office circular, 31 │ │ │January 1939, “The Jewish Question as │ │ │a factor in German Foreign Policy in │ │ │the year 1938”. (GB 158) │ VI │ 87 │ │ │ 3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │ │1938, concerning his conversation with│ │ │Ciano about the Polish demands made on│ │ │Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400 │ │ │ 3688-PS │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24 │ │ │September 1942, concerning evacuation │ │ │of Jews from Occupied Territories. │ VI │ 403 │ │ │ *3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │ │Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │ │(USA 790) │ VI │ 752 │ │ │ *C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │ │International Law and proposed counter│ │ │propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │ │1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799 │ │ │ *C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command │ │ │to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB│ │ │146) │ VI │ 908 │ │ │ *C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │ │for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │ │Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916 │ │ │ *C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │ │on conference between German and │ │ │Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │ │subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │ │January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939 │ │ │ *C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │ │to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │ │(GB 33) │ VI │ 949 │ │ │ *D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │ │Minister, from International │ │ │Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │ │(GB 130) │ VII │ 59 │ │ │ *D-490 │Interrogation of Ribbentrop, 20 │ │ │September 1945. (GB 138) │ VII │ 66 │ │ │ *D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │ │April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99 │ │ │ *D-636 │Extract from “Examination of Descent │ │ │of SS Leaders”, concerning von │ │ │Ribbentrop. (GB 131) │ VII │ 114 │ │ │ D-639 │Decree of the Fuehrer concerning │ │ │exercise of Governmental Authority in │ │ │Netherlands, 18 May 1940. 1940 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 778. (GB│ │ │154) │ VII │ 115 │ │ │ *D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │ │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │ │by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │ │and 8 December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160 │ │ │ *D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │ │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │ │by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │ │and 8 December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163 │ │ │ D-734 │Note of conversation between Reich │ │ │Foreign Minister and Duce in presence │ │ │of von Mackenson, Alfieri and │ │ │Bastianini, 25 February 1943. │ VII │ 188 │ │ │ *D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │ │German Foreign Minister and Count │ │ │Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │ │Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │ │(GB 295) │ VII │ 190 │ │ │ *D-736 │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer │ │ │and Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283) │ VII │ 190 │ │ │ *D-737 │Memorandum on reception of Hungarian │ │ │Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by│ │ │German Foreign Minister on 29 April │ │ │1939. (GB 289) │ VII │ 192 │ │ │ *D-738 │Memorandum on second conference │ │ │between German Foreign Minister with │ │ │Hungarian Prime and Foreign Minister │ │ │on 1 May 1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193 │ │ │ *D-740 │Minutes of conference between German │ │ │Foreign Minister and Secretary of │ │ │State Bastianini on 8 April 1943. (GB │ │ │297) │ VII │ 194 │ │ │ D-741 │Memorandum on conference between │ │ │German Foreign Minister and Ambassador│ │ │Alfieri on 21 February 1943 in Berlin.│ │ │(GB 296) │ VII │ 196 │ │ │ *D-744-A │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │ │personal record of SS │ │ │Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │ │294) │ VII │ 197 │ │ │ *D-744-B │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │ │personal record of SS │ │ │Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │ │294) │ VII │ 204 │ │ │ *D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232 │ │ │ *D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │ │June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │ │Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233 │ │ │ *D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234 │ │ │ *D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │ │treatment of Anglo-American │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │ │Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │ │June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236 │ │ │ *D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │ │Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │ │315) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │ │signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │ │(GB 319) │ VII │ 242 │ │ │ EC-265 │German Foreign Office telegram, 1 │ │ │October 1940, concerning the Jews in │ │ │Occupied French Territory. │ VII │ 375 │ │ │ L-74 │Letter from Ribbentrop to Churchill │ │ │with covering letter addressed to │ │ │Field Marshal Montgomery. │ VII │ 839 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ L-202 │State Department dispatch from D. H. │ │ │Buffum, American Consul at Leipzig, 21│ │ │November 1938, concerning Anti-Semitic│ │ │Onslaught in Germany as seen from │ │ │Leipzig. │ VII │ 1037 │ │ │ *L-205 │Telegram from Kennedy to Department of│ │ │State, 8 December 1938. (GB 157) │ VII │ 1041 │ │ │ *M-158 │Telegram, 23 October 1939, regarding │ │ │location of Nazi organizations in │ │ │Madrid. (GB 285) │ VIII │ 51 │ │ │ *TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │ │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 │ │ │September 1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370 │ │ │ *TC-24 │Treaty of non-aggression between │ │ │German Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, │ │ │31 May 1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373 │ │ │ *TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │ │and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │ │September 1939 relating to it. (GB │ │ │145) │ VIII │ 375 │ │ │ TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate │ │ │of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ │ │(GB 8) │ VIII │ 404 │ │ │ *TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │ │incorporation of Memel with German │ │ │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents │ │ │of German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. │ │ │(GB 4) │ VIII │ 408 │ │ │ TC-73 │No. 37 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │ │Reichstag speech, 20 February 1938. │ VIII │ 481 │ │ │ TC-73 │No. 40 Polish White Book. Lipski and │ │ │Ribbentrop, 10 September 1938. │ VIII │ 481 │ │ │ TC-73 │No. 42 Polish White Book. Extracts │ │ │from speech by Hitler at Sportz │ │ │Palast, 26 September 1938. │ VIII │ 482 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 44 Polish White Book. Lipski, │ │ │Ribbentrop luncheon, conversation, 24 │ │ │October 1938. (GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 45 Polish White Book. Beck’s │ │ │instructions to Lipski, 31 October │ │ │1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 48 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │ │Hitler conversation, 5 January 1939. │ │ │(GB 34) │ VIII │ 486 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 49 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │ │Ribbentrop conversation, 6 January │ │ │1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 57 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │ │Reichstag speech, 30 January 1939. (GB│ │ │37) │ VIII │ 488 │ │ │ *TC-73 │No. 61 Polish White Book. Ribbentrop │ │ │and Lipski conversation, 21 March │ │ │1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489 │ │ │ TC-73 │No. 147 Polish White Book. Final │ │ │report of former Polish Ambassador in │ │ │Berlin, 10 October 1939. │ VIII │ 499 │ │ │ *TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August │ │ │1938. (GB 31) │ VIII │ 515 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │ │December 1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770

4. WILHELM KEITEL

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY KEITEL._

Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reichs Ministry of War (_Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerium_), 1 October 1935 to 4 February 1938. (_3019-PS_)

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chief of OKW), equal in rank to a Reichs Minister. (_1915-PS_)

Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938 to 1945. (_2031-PS_)

Member of Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich, 30 August 1939 to 1945. (_2018-PS_)

Member of Reichs Defense Council, 4 September 1938 to 1945. (_2194-PS_)

Field Marshal, July 1940 to 1945. (_3020-PS_)

B. _FUNCTIONS OF KEITEL._

As Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ in the Ministry of War, Keitel was Chief of Staff for von Blomberg, who was both Minister of War and Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

On 4 February 1938 Hitler abolished the Ministry of War, assumed direct command of the Armed Forces himself, and created the OKW (_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_). The OKW advised Hitler on the most important military questions, and prepared and transmitted directives to the Armed Forces. Thus it exercised great influence on the formation of the German military policy and the conduct of military affairs.

Keitel was made Chief of the OKW, with rank equal to that of Reichsminister. He was also given authorities of the former Minister of War, and continued to perform the administrative duties of that position. (_1915-PS_; _1954-PS_; _3704-PS_)

In addition to its ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the commanders and chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the respective military authorities. (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).

C. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._

Keitel’s conspiratorial activities started immediately after the Nazis came to power. As early as in May 1933, when Germany was still a member of the League of Nations, Keitel gave directives for deceiving “Geneva” in rearmament matters.

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense on 22 May 1933, Colonel Keitel emphasized that the supreme consideration guiding the work of the committee was to be secrecy. “No document”, he said, “ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into the hands of the enemy’s intelligence service. Orally transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” He requested that written documents not be sent through the mails, or, if it was absolutely necessary to do so, that they be addressed, not to a government agency or office (where they might be opened by the mail clerks) but to the recipient personally. (_EC-177_)

The fact that Keitel was a member of the Nazi conspiracy in good standing is apparent from his statement that he held the Golden Party Badge, and that consequently the Party considered him a member as from the autumn of 1944, when the law against military personnel being members of the Party was changed (1944 RGBl. I, 317). His political convictions were those of National Socialism, and he was a loyal follower of Hitler. (_1954-PS_)

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933, the chairman, Colonel Keitel, pointed out the necessity and desirability for the creation of the Reich Defense Council which had been determined on by a cabinet decision of 4 April 1933. He said that a general program for the creation of a war economy had already been completed, but that it would take a long time to carry out the program. He explained that it was the purpose and objective of the Working Committee of the new Defense Council to overcome these difficulties. (_EC-177_)

On 6 December 1935 General Major Keitel, chairman of the eleventh meeting of the Reich Defense Council, pointed out that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following year. For the first time, a “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies” was to be issued on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the extent possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of military capacity above all other national tasks. Keitel emphasized that it was the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials as were absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich.

In the presence of Keitel, Colonel Jodl said that the “Mobilization Book for the Civilian Agencies” constituted the unified basis for the carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army. (_EC-406_)

The twelfth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, held on 14 May 1936, was opened by Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister and Supreme Army Commander. He stressed the necessity for a total mobilization, including the drafting of the necessary laws, preparations in the re-militarized Rhineland zone, financing and rearmament. Lt. General Keitel, in his capacity as chairman of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, again stressed the necessity for secrecy. Ministerial Director Wohlthat pointed out that, in order to guarantee rearmament and an adequate food supply, an increase in production and utmost economy were necessary, a postulate that had led to the special mandate given by the Fuehrer to Minister President Goering. (_EC-407_)

Keitel participated also in the activities of the conspirators to re-militarize the Rhineland. At that time he was Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ under von Blomberg and signed, on the latter’s behalf, the order for naval participation in the operation. (_C-194_)

Keitel also took part in the war-planning activities of the Reich Cabinet, of which he was a member. The cabinet consulted by meetings, and by the circulation of decrees among its members for their approval or disapproval. (See generally Section 3 of Chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.) Keitel was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council, which has been described as “a select committee” of the cabinet for deliberation on foreign affairs. (_1774-PS_)

A Reich Defense Council was established by the ordinary cabinet in 1933. It was a war-planning group, and Keitel took part in the meetings of its working committee. (_EC-177_; _EC-406_; _EC-407_)

On 4 December 1938 a Secret Defense Law was passed, which defined the duties of the Reich Defense Council. As Chief of OKW, Keitel was a member of the council, and he also presided over the Council’s Working Committee (_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_). (_2194-PS_)

The Secret Defense Law of 1938 provided for a Plenipotentiary for Economy, whose task was to “put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation”, and for a Plenipotentiary for Administration, whose duties were to take over “the uniform leadership of the non-military administration with exception of the economic administration” upon the declaration of a “state of defense”. Certain ministries were, in peace-time, bound by the directives of the plenipotentiaries. The latter were bound, in turn, under certain conditions, together with the ministries subordinate to them, to take directions from the Chief of OKW. Keitel could also, in a state of defense, issue orders to the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Posts. In addition, he presided over the Council’s Working Committee, which prepared the Council’s decisions, saw that they were executed, and obtained collaboration between the armed forces, the chief Reich offices, and the Party. Keitel regulated the activities of this committee and issued directions to the plenipotentiaries and certain Reich ministries to assure uniform execution of the council’s decisions. (_2194-PS_)

The two plenipotentiaries and the OKW formed what was known as a “Three Man College” (_2608-PS_). This system of a three man college functioned as follows, from a legislative point of view: The Plenipotentiary for Economy was empowered by paragraph 4 of the Secret Defense Law of 4 September 1938 to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Administration, which differed from existing laws. Similarly, the Plenipotentiary for Administration was empowered by paragraph 3 of the same law to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Economy, which differed from existing laws.

In the spheres of the Reich Minister of Posts, the Reich Minister of Transport and of the General Inspector for German roads (_Generalinspektor fuer die Strassenwesen_), the Chief of the OKW had the right, under paragraph 5 of the same law, to issue laws, in agreement with the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and Economy, which differed from existing laws. (_2194-PS_)

The legislative function of the three man college, prior to 9 September 1939 was one of drafting decrees to be used in time of war.

The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was established by a decree of Hitler on 30 August 1939. It was formed out of the Reich Defense Council, and included among its members the two plenipotentiaries of the council and the Chief of OKW. (_2018-PS_)

The Council had the power to pass decrees with the force of law, and to legislate for the occupied Eastern Territories (1939 RGBl, I, 2077). Decrees of the council were circulated, before enactment, among all the members by written communication from Dr. Lammers, who was also on the Council. (_2231-PS_)

Frick has referred to the Council of Ministers as “the highest permanent organ of the Reich with comprehensive jurisdiction, responsible only to the Fuehrer”. “The composition of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich”, he added, “shows the real concentration of power in it”. He said also that Keitel was liaison between the council and the armed forces, it being primarily his duty to coordinate the measures for civilian defense in the area of administration and economy with the genuine military measures for the defense of the Reich. (_2608-PS_)

Keitel also took an active part in collaborating with and in instigating the Japanese to enter the war. Nazi policy with regard to Japan was expressed in an order signed by Keitel on 5 March 1941. This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKL, and also to Jodl. It stated that Japan must be drawn actively into the war, and that the taking of Singapore would mean a decisive success for the three powers. (_C-75_)

At about the time this order was issued, a meeting was held with Hitler, in which Raeder urged that Japan be induced to attack Singapore. Keitel and Jodl were both present at this meeting. (_C-152_)

Keitel may have known of a report from the Military Attache in Tokyo that preparations were continuing for a sudden attack on Singapore and Manila. (_1538-PS_)

D. _KEITEL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._

(_See “F” 1 through 7, infra, where the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for these activities is discussed._)

E. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._

(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory and on the high seas._ Keitel committed many crimes of this nature, by ordering such criminal activities.

On 13 May 1941 Keitel, as Chief of OKW, signed an order from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters providing that Russian civilians suspected of offenses against German troops should be shot or ruthlessly punished without a military trial, and that prosecution of German soldiers for offenses against Russian civilians was not required (_C-50_). On 27 July 1941 he ordered that all copies of this decree should be destroyed, but without affecting its validity. (_C-51_)

On 23 July 1941 Keitel signed an order concerning the administration of occupied Russia. This order provided that legal punishments were inadequate in so great an area, and that troops should use terrorism in crushing the population’s will to resist. (_C-52_)

Keitel signed one of the so-called _Nacht und Nebel_ decrees on 7 December 1941. It provided that in occupied territories of the west civilians would be tried for offenses against the German state only if the death sentence was likely to be carried out within a few days of arrest. Otherwise the accused would be taken to Germany, and no information would be given about them in reply to any inquiries. (_666-PS_)

By a first ordinance of 7 December 1941 Keitel made the provisions of the foregoing directive applicable to the following offenses; attacks against life or bodily health, espionage, sabotage, communistic conspiracy, offenses likely to create disturbances, assistance to the enemy, and illicit possession of arms. His ordinance also provided that the offenses mentioned were to be tried in the occupied countries only if it were likely that the death sentence would be pronounced, and if it were possible to complete trial and execution within a very short time, as a rule within a week after arrest. In case of trial in Germany, it was provided that alien witnesses could be heard only with the consent of the High Command of the Armed Forces and that the public would not be admitted to the proceedings. (_L-90_)

In a communication issued by him in his capacity as Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Keitel on 12 December 1941 stated with respect to the aforementioned directive and ordinance:

“Efficient and enduring terrorization can be achieved only either by capital punishment or by measures to keep the relatives of the criminal and the population in the dark as to the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved by transferring the criminal to Germany.” (_L-90_)

In pursuance of Keitel’s _Nacht und Nebel_ decree, Admiral Canaris on 2 February 1942 issued instructions to the _Abwehr_ to punish crimes against the _Wehrmacht_ accordingly. At first the order was to apply only to Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. (_833-PS_)

The Chief of the SIPO and SD reported to OKW on 24 June 1942 that a Frenchman had died while awaiting trial in Germany, and that, in order to create anxiety in accordance with the decree, his family had not been notified. Keitel’s OKW approved of this procedure, which had been established for such cases by an OKW order of 16 April 1942. (_668-PS_)

When, on 20 April 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories,” Keitel was asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with Rosenberg. Keitel designated Jodl as his representative and Warlimont as deputy. (_865-PS_)

Thus Keitel and Jodl share the responsibility for crimes committed by Rosenberg’s administration. In this connection reference is made to section 7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.

Among the decrees issued by the Council of Ministers, of which Keitel was a member, are two which connect him with harsh treatment of inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories. (_2746-PS_; _2039-PS_)

(2) _Deportation of civilian populations in occupied territories for slave labor and other purposes._ Keitel’s connection with the forced labor program began at a meeting with Hitler on 23 May 1939, when it was announced that Poland would be invaded, and also that non-German populations would be available as a source of labor. (_L-79_)

Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use Russian prisoners of war in German war industries, and stated that OKW (AWA) would furnish to the Secretary of Labor information on the use of such labor, and provide the labor force. (_EC-194_)

Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Manpower by a decree of 21 March 1942, signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. (_1666-PS_)

On 8 September 1942 Keitel initialled a Hitler order requiring citizens of France, Holland, and Belgium to work on the “Atlantic Wall”. The order was to be enforced by the withdrawal of food and clothing ration cards (_556-2-PS_). Keitel was informed of the quotas of foreign laborers which Sauckel and his agents were to fill. Sauckel requested the assistance of the Army, and asked that pressure be used to obtain the quotas, if necessary. (_3012-PS_)

At a conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, at which Keitel was present, it was determined that Sauckel should obtain 4,000,000 new workers from occupied territories. (_1292-PS_)

(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members of the armed forces of the countries with which Germany was at war, and of persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender (_498-PS_). An order regulating the treatment of paratroopers had been issued by Keitel about a month earlier. It provided that captured paratroopers were to be turned over to the SD. (_553-PS_)

A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are known in which the order was carried out (_508-PS_; _509-PS_). Three specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C-in-C, Norway, where captured members of sabotage units were executed after interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred at Glomfjord, Drontheim, and Stavanger. (_512-PS_)

On 23 June 1944 the Supreme Command West requested instructions redefining the scope of the commando order. In view of the extensive landings in Normandy, it had become difficult to decide which paratroops should be considered sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and which should be considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The question was answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was signed by Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order (_531-PS_; _551-PS_). Keitel extended the application of the commando order to members of Anglo-American and Russian “military missions” taken in the fighting against the partisans in the southeast and southwest. (_537-PS_)

When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror”. Whether or not the order was ever issued is immaterial, for it is certain that Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to prevent them, and in fact considered giving them official justification.

(_See also “F”, 8, infra, in which the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for the lynching of Allied airmen is discussed._)

Keitel’s criminal activities against Soviet prisoners of war are shown by the following. On 8 September 1941 Keitel’s OKW issued a regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. It stated that Russian soldiers would fight by any methods for the idea of Bolshevism and that consequently they had lost any claim to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Stern measures were to be employed against them, including the free use of weapons. The politically undesirable prisoners were to be segregated from the others and turned over to “special purpose units” of the Security Police and the Security Service. There was to be the closest cooperation between the military commanders and these police units. (_1519-PS_)

Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr considered this order in such direct violation of the general principles of International Law that he addressed a memorandum of protest to Keitel on 15 September 1941. He pointed out that, while the Geneva Convention was not binding between Germany and the USSR, the usual rules of International Law should be observed; that such instructions, particularly those concerning the use of weapons, would result in arbitrary killings; and that the disposition of politically undesirable prisoners would be decided by the SIPO and the SD according to principles of which the _Wehrmacht_ was ignorant. (As to this argument, Keitel wrote in the margin “Very efficient” and “Not at all.”) Keitel received and considered this memorandum, for on its first page there is the following comment in his handwriting, dated 23 September and initialled “K”:

“The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I approve and back the measures.” (_EC-338_)

The regulations which Canaris had protested were restated on 24 March 1942, but their essential provisions were unchanged. (_695-PS_)

An order of Keitel’s OKW dated 29 January 1943, signed by Reinecke, contains a broad interpretation of the guards’ right of self-defense against prisoners. For example, self-defense includes not only the guard’s person, but his honor and property, and third parties, such as the State. (_656-PS_)

That Keitel knew of the appalling treatment of Russian prisoners of war, and the high death rate among them, appears from the statements in a letter sent to him by Rosenberg on 28 February 1942. The letter stressed the need for better treatment of the Russians, so that they would be well impressed by the Germans. (_081-PS_)

An order of Keitel’s OKW provided that escaped officers and non-working non-commissioned officers other than Americans and British were to be turned over to the SIPO and SD upon recapture. The SIPO and SD, upon instructions from their chief, would then transport the men to the Mauthausen concentration camp under operation “Kugel” (_L-158_). Such prisoners were executed at Mauthausen upon arrival (_2285-PS_). Americans and British who were recaptured might be turned over to the SIPO and SD, upon decision of the “W.Kdos” from the OKW/o.i.c. (_L-158_)

(4) _Killing of Hostages._ Keitel’s criminal activities are shown by the following two documents. On 16 December 1941 he signed an order stating that uprisings among German troops in occupied territories must be considered as inspired by a communist conspiracy, and that the death of one German soldier must mean death for fifty or one hundred communists. (_829-PS_)

Keitel also signed an order (received by the OKH on 1 October 1941) specifying that hostages should be well known, and that they should come from Nationalist, Democrat, or Communist political factions. After each act of sabotage hostages belonging to the saboteur’s group should be shot. (_1590-PS_)

(5) _Plunder of public and private property._ The looting of cultural property was carried on chiefly under Rosenberg by the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, an organization established for that purpose. In the West he was to act in his capacity as Reichsleiter, and in the East in his capacity as Reichsminister. Keitel’s OKW cooperated with Rosenberg, and directions for carrying out the order were to be issued by the Chief of the OKW in agreement with Rosenberg (_149-PS_). Keitel ordered the military authorities to cooperate in this program (_137-PS_; _138-PS_). A memorandum of 17 May 1944 in the Rosenberg Ministry states that the _Wehrmacht_ was one of the principal agencies engaged in removing treasures from Russia. (_1107-PS_)

Keitel was also responsible for the removal of machine tools, foodstuffs, and other materials from occupied territories. (_1161-PS_; _743-PS_)

(6) _The exaction of collective penalties._ Collective penalties were exacted from the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be held responsible. Keitel advocated such measures. This appears from correspondence on acts of sabotage in the shipbuilding yards. (_C-48_; _870-PS_; _871-PS_)

(7) _Germanization of Occupied Territories._ On 16 July 1941 Keitel was present at a meeting with Hitler where the policy was announced of exploiting occupied Russian territory and making it part of the Reich. (_L-221_)

In order to promote a racially valuable German heritage an order signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel provides for payment of subsidies to Norwegian or Dutch women who had borne children of German soldiers. The Chief of OKW was authorized to extend its application to other occupied territories. (_2926-PS_)

(8) _Persecution of minorities._ Keitel’s responsibility for the persecution of minorities in Germany appears from the fact that, with Hitler, Goering, and Lammers, he signed a decree on 7 October 1939 which provided that the harmful influence of foreigners must be eliminated from Germany; that Germans could be resettled by the Reichsfuehrer SS; and that the Reichsfuehrer SS could perform “all necessary general and administrative measures” to discharge this duty. (_686-PS_)

Keitel’s responsibility for the criminal treatment of Jews is apparent from his own statement that the struggle against Bolshevism necessitated a ruthless proceeding against the Jews; the _Wehrmacht_ was not to use them for any service, but they could be placed in labor columns under German supervision. (_878-PS_)

F. _JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF KEITEL AND JODL FOR PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION, AND FOR THE LYNCHING OF ALLIED AIRMEN._

(1) _Aggression against Austria._ In June of 1937 von Blomberg ordered preparations for “Case Otto”—armed intervention in Austria in event of a Hapsburg restoration (_C-175_). New plans were made in 1938 under the same name. German policy in 1938 was to eliminate Austria and Czechoslovakia, and there was a campaign to undermine Austria’s will to resist, by pressure on the government, by propaganda, and by fifth column activity. (_1780-PS_)

Keitel was present at Berchtesgaden when Schuschnigg visited Hitler there in February 1938. Schuschnigg was subjected to political and military pressure, which resulted in such concessions to the Nazis as the reorganization of the Austrian cabinet (_1780-PS_). Keitel and Jodl and Canaris were instructed to keep up the military pressure against Austria by simulating military measures until 15 February. (_1780-PS_) The OKW submitted proposals to Hitler regarding the Austrian campaign; these included suggestions of false rumors and broadcasts. A note in Jodl’s handwriting states that Hitler approved the memorandum by telephone and that Canaris was informed. (_1775-PS_)

Hitler ordered preparation of “Case Otto”—mobilization of army units and air forces (_1780-PS_). Hitler’s directive for “Case Otto” was initialled by Keitel and Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions (_C-102_; _C-103_). Jodl initialled Hitler’s order for the invasion of Austria. (_C-182_)

(2) _The Execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia._ On 21 April 1938 Hitler and Keitel met and discussed plans for the taking of Czechoslovakia. They considered a military attack after a period of diplomatic friction, or as the result of a created incident, such as the assassination of the German ambassador at Prague. (_388-PS_)

After the invasion of Austria, _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted to “Case Green,” the operation against Czechoslovakia (_1780-PS_). Case Green was first drafted in 1937, when it was thought that a “probable warlike eventuality” would be “war on two fronts with the center of gravity in the southeast.” A surprise attack on Czechoslovakia was considered possible (_C-175_). Through the late spring and summer of 1938 Case Green was revised and modified. The memoranda and correspondence are frequently signed or initialled by Keitel, and it is clear that he knew of Hitler’s intention to use force against Czechoslovakia and made the plans to carry out that intention. (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _2353-PS_)

There were many meetings on Case Green in September 1938, some with Hitler, some with Keitel and Jodl. The timing of troop movements was discussed; the question of advance notice to OKH; preparations of railroads and fortifications; even propaganda to counteract the anticipated violations of International Law which the invasion would entail (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _C-2_). Assistance was given by OKH to the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization which operated under Henlein to create disorder in Czechoslovakia. (_1780-PS_; _388-PS_)

In October 1938 Hitler addressed to the OKW four specific questions about the time and the forces that would be required to break Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia, and Keitel submitted the answers prepared by the OKH and Luftwaffe (_388-PS_). On 21 October 1938 Hitler signed an order (and Keitel initialled it) requiring the _Wehrmacht_ to make preparations to take the remainder of Czechoslovakia. (_C-136_)

Two months later Keitel issued a supplement to this order, stating that on the order of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were to continue, and stressing the importance of having the attack well camouflaged and unwarlike in appearance. (_C-138_)

Keitel was present at the interview between Hitler and Hacha at the Reich Chancellery on 15 March 1939, when the Czech representatives delivered their country to Hitler, after hours of duress, which included the threat of immediate bombing of Prague. (_2798-PS_; _2943-PS_)

(3) _Aggression against Poland._ On 25 March 1939—four days after Ribbentrop pressed new demands for Danzig on the Polish Ambassador—Hitler told von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-chief of the Army, that he did not intend to solve the Polish question by force for the time being but requested that plans for that operation be developed. (_R-100_)

On 3 April 1939 Keitel, as Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, reissued over his signature the directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40. The directive, noting that the basic principles for the sections on “Frontier Defense” and “Danzig” remained unaltered, stated that Hitler had added the following directives to “Fall Weiss”:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from _1.9.39_ onwards.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for “Fall Weiss” and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the Armed Forces.

“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.” (_C-120_)

It is noteworthy that, even in April of 1939, the tentative timetable called for the invasion of Poland to be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.

About a week later, an order signed by Hitler was circulated to the highest commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This confirmed Keitel’s directive to prepare for three eventualities: “Frontier Defense”, “Fall Weiss”, and the Annexation of Danzig. Annex II contained further instructions for “Fall Weiss”. In the first paragraph, headed “Political Hypotheses and Aims”, it was stated that should Poland adopt a threatening attitude toward Germany, a “final settlement” would be necessary _notwithstanding the pact with Poland_. “The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength . . .”

It was further stated that the Free State of Danzig would be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest. The directive continued: “Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British restraint as a result of this.”

The general political background against which the Armed Forces were to work having thus been set down, the later paragraphs outlined the tasks and operational objectives of the three branches of the Armed Forces. It was also decreed that a “camouflaged or open (‘general’ added in ink) mobilization will not be ordered before D-Day 1 at the latest possible moment”, and further that the “preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way that—without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilized units—positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops.” (_C-120_)

On 10 May an order signed by Hitler promulgated his instructions for the seizure of economic installations in Poland and directed the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces to report by 1 August 1939 on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions. (_C-120_)

On 23 May 1939 Hitler called a meeting of his military leaders at the Reich Chancellery. Keitel was at the meeting; Jodl was not, but Warlimont (also from the Planning Department of OKW) was. Hitler announced the necessity of a war against Poland, not over Danzig, but in order to acquire living space in the East. He recognized the possibility that this would provoke a war against France and England, but the _Wehrmacht_ was instructed to prepare detailed plans. (_L-79_)

A directive dated 22 June 1939, signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW, indicates an advanced stage of preparation. On the basis of particulars already available from the Navy, Army, and Air Force, he stated, he had submitted to Hitler a “preliminary timetable” for “Fall Weiss.” The Fuehrer was reported to be in substantial agreement with the intentions submitted by the three branches; he had also made suggestions with regard to the need to camouflage the scheduled maneuvers “in order not to disquiet the population,” and had commented on the disposition of an SS Artillery Regiment. (_C-126_)

Two days later, Keitel issued instructions for further study on two specific problems: the capture, in undamaged condition, of bridges over the Vistula; and the possible adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig Bay on the element of surprise in the Army’s attack against the bridge at Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (_C-120_)

On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg the Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the lower ranking Commanding Generals (_Oberbefehlshaber_), and announced his decision to attack Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this meeting. (_L-3_; _798-PS_; _1014-PS_)

Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered: the text of one, _L-3_, overlaps the contents of the other two, _798-PS_ and _1014-PS_; the latter two appear to be complementary, _798-PS_ being a record of a morning speech, and _1014-PS_ of an afternoon speech. Violent and abusive language appears in both _L-3_ and _798-PS_. That Hitler made, at a minimum, the following points, appears from all of them:

1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (_L-3_; _798-PS_)

2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish armed forces, rather than to reach a fixed line. (_L-3_; _1014-PS_)

3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August (_L-3_; _1014-PS_)

4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by German propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it is plausible or not. The world will not question the victor (_L-3_; _1014-PS_). The text in _L-3_ further describes the pretext to be used to start the war: “I’ll let a couple of companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an assault in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”

A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief of the Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the time for the attack on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26 August 1939. (_1780-PS_)

(4) _Aggression against Norway and Denmark._ On or about 12 September 1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations for the occupation of Norwegian bases early in 1940. (_1546-PS_)

The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler on 12 December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl were present. Hitler agreed with Raeder’s suggestion that, if he was favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should be authorized to prepare for the occupation either with Quisling’s assistance, or by force. (_C-64_)

In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate barges for the invasion, and further preparations were to be conducted under the code name “_Weserubung_” (_C-63_). The general directive for the invasion was issued by Hitler on 1 March 1940. (_C-174_; _1809-PS_)

(5) _Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ At a conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it was determined that the occupation of the Low Countries was necessary to the successful conduct of the war against England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW with responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and complete secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (_L-79_)

On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for the conduct of the war in the West that the invasion should be started soon, in order to protect the Ruhr and to provide air bases for use against England. A copy of this directive was distributed to OKW. (_L-52_)

In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders was issued concerning the invasion of the Low Countries—“Fall Gelb”. Questions of how far the troops should advance under the plan were clarified (_C-62_; _440-PS_). Instructions were issued concerning the deployment of troops, communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the administration and pacification of the countries to be taken (_2329-PS_). Provisions were made for special operations by the 7th Flieger Division near the Belgian-French border. (_C-10_)

Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were issued setting and postponing the day for starting operations. These delays were caused by the weather. One of the orders, dated 11 January 1940, shows that all the others were concerned with the action against the Low Countries, and that the 7th Flieger Division (see _C-10_) was involved. All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (_C-72_)

The development of the plans, and the various questions which came up for consideration are shown in the entries in Jodl’s diary. At one point the Foreign Office did not regard the prepared justification for the attack as satisfactory, but Jodl thought it was sufficient. His diary shows the existence of the plan against the Low Countries and the steps taken to put it into execution. (_1809-PS_)

(6) _Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia._ On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the occupation of the Greek mainland (_444-PS_). On 13 December 1940 a Hitler order stated that the invasion of Greece was planned and would start as soon as the weather became favorable. The composition of combat teams and their routes of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded, the mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a new task. This order was distributed to the OKW, as well as to the three armed services. (_1541-PS_)

On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed intervention in Albania, to assist the Italians against Greece. The order was initialled by Keitel and Jodl (_448-PS_). On 20 January 1941 Jodl reported, in notes of a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against Greece. This was four months prior to the attack. (_C-134_)

On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave decisions for carrying out the Greek campaign, providing that pontoon building would commence on 26 February, and that the Danube would be crossed on 2 March. (_C-59_)

On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, asked for confirmation that the whole of Greece would have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement, and Hitler replied that complete occupation was a prerequisite to any settlement. (_C-167_)

At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and Jodl, Hitler outlined the proposed operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. The actual plan for military operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the same day. (_1746-PS_)

(7) _Aggression against the U.S.S.R._ On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued a directive in which, among other things, it was stated that preparations for the East already verbally ordered should be continued, regardless of the outcome of current political discussions for the clarification of Russia’s attitude. The directive was initialled by Jodl. (_444-PS_)

The original directive for preparation of the attack on Russia—case “Barbarossa”—was signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940 and initialled by Keitel and Jodl (_446-PS_). On 3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to discuss the intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present (_872-PS_). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the intended division of occupied Russian territory. The distribution list shows that Keitel and Jodl received copies. (_1642-PS_)

In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give him detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming invasion. The letter was initialled by Jodl. (_874-PS_)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to Hitler’s Barbarossa order (_446-PS_). This order defined the area of operations and established the relationship between political and military officers in those areas (_447-PS_). On 1 June 1941 there was issued, with Hitler’s approval, a timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was signed by Keitel (_C-39_). On 14 June 1941 an order was issued for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders. (_C-78_)

While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning for the production of armaments and supplies was being conducted by one of Keitel’s subordinates, General Thomas, Chief of the _Wirtschaft Ruestungsamt_ in OKW. (_2353-PS_)

By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was appointed “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories”. Jodl and Warlimont were appointed Keitel’s representatives with the Rosenberg office (_865-PS_). A preliminary report by Rosenberg on his work up to the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as having consulted and worked with him in those preparations. (_1039-PS_)

A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June 1941 states that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s policy on raw materials—that it took less manpower to seize territories containing raw materials, than it did to make synthetic substitutes. (_1456-PS_)

(8) _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;—Crimes against Military Personnel—Lynching of Allied Airmen._ On 21 May 1944 Keitel received a note from WFSt to the effect that Hitler had decided that enemy fliers who had been forced down should be shot without court-martial, if they had engaged in “acts of terror”. Keitel wrote on the note “Please arrange for order to be drafted. K”. (_731-PS_)

By 4 June 1944 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead with formulating the plans. Goering was to be asked what actions of enemy fliers should be punishable by death; the Airmen’s Reception Camp at Oberursel was to be told which fliers should be delivered to the SD; and the Foreign Office was to be kept advised. (_737-PS_)

At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised questions about the difficulty of establishing general rules in such a matter. The “Acts of Terror” were:

1. Low level attacks on civilians.

2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.

3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.

4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (_735-PS_)

On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask their approval of the proposed measure and the agreed definition of “Acts of Terror” (_730-PS_). On the same day Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his approval of the definitions of “Acts of Terror”, and also to ask that he give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel to hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD. Both Keitel and Jodl initialled this letter (_729-PS_). Goering replied that fliers not guilty of acts of terror must be protected, and suggested that such matters be handled by the courts. (_732-PS_)

A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944 expresses misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and concern about the publicity that would be involved. (_728-PS_)

On 26 June 1944 Goering’s adjutant telephoned the WFSt to say that Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (_733-PS_)

On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had approved the Foreign Office draft (_728-PS_), but wished to obtain Hitler’s approval before communicating his own final written approval to Keitel. (_740-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WILHELM KEITEL

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 081-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Keitel, 28 │ │ │February 1942, concerning mistreatment│ │ │of Soviet prisoners of war. │ III │ 126 │ │ │ *137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │ │Commanding General of Netherlands, 5 │ │ │July 1940, to cooperate with the │ │ │Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 379) │ III │ 185 │ │ │ 138-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │ │Commanding General of France, 17 │ │ │September 1940, to cooperate with the │ │ │Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 186 │ │ │ *149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, │ │ │establishing authority of Einsatzstab │ │ │Rosenberg. (USA 369) │ III │ 190 │ │ │ *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │ │1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ 440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │ │November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │ │war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397 │ │ │ *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │ │Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │ │Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │ │November 1940, concerning plans for │ │ │prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │ │Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │ │116) │ III │ 403 │ │ │ *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │ │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │ │1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │ │Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 │ │ │ *447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │ │1941, concerning Directives for │ │ │special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409 │ │ │ *448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │ │Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │ │concerning participation of German │ │ │Forces in the Fighting in the │ │ │Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │ │(GB 118) │ III │ 413 │ │ │ *498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │ │of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │ │501) │ III │ 416 │ │ │ *503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │ │1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │ │of his commando order of the day │ │ │before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426 │ │ │ *508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │ │about shooting of British glider │ │ │troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430 │ │ │ 509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │ │reporting “special treatment” for │ │ │three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ *512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │ │Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │ │interrogation of saboteurs before │ │ │shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │ │OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ *531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │ │inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │ │about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │ │550) │ III │ 435 │ │ │ *537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of members of │ │ │foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │ │together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439 │ │ │ *551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Commando │ │ │participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440 │ │ │ *553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │ │regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │ │(USA 500) │ III │ 441 │ │ │ *556-2-PS │Order initialled by Keitel, 8 │ │ │September 1942, for civilians to work │ │ │on “West Wall”. (USA 194) │ III │ 443 │ │ │ *656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │ │Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │ │Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │ │January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │ │against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470 │ │ │ 666-PS │Directives issued by the Fuehrer and │ │ │Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces │ │ │signed by Keitel, 7 December 1941, for│ │ │prosecution of offenses against the │ │ │Reich. │ III │ 474 │ │ │ 668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │ │and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of punishable │ │ │offenses against the Reich or │ │ │occupation forces in occupied │ │ │territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476 │ │ │ *686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor to strengthen German │ │ │Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │ │Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │ │(USA 305) │ III │ 496 │ │ │ 695-PS │OKW Order signed by Reinecke, 24 March│ │ │1942, concerning treatment of Soviet │ │ │prisoners of war. │ III │ 498 │ │ │ *728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │ │Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │ │June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │ │enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526 │ │ │ 729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │ │June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │ │enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529 │ │ │ 730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │ │attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │ │1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 530 │ │ │ 731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │ │concerning measures to be taken │ │ │against Anglo-American air crews in │ │ │special instances. │ III │ 531 │ │ │ 732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │ │1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │ │terror aviators. │ III │ 532 │ │ │ 733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of terror │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 533 │ │ │ 735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │ │fix the cases in which the application│ │ │of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │ │would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533 │ │ │ 737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 536 │ │ │ *740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │ │aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537 │ │ │ 743-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 8 September │ │ │1944, instructing the Armed Forces to │ │ │support Koch in the exploitation and │ │ │evacuation of Baltic territories. │ III │ 539 │ │ │ *795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │ │concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │ │Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │ │22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ 829-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 16 December │ │ │1941, for ruthless suppression of │ │ │uprisings in occupied territories. │ III │ 597 │ │ │ 833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │ │of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of crimes │ │ │against the Reich or occupying forces │ │ │in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600 │ │ │ *865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │ │Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │ │concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │ │Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │ │Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621 │ │ │ 870-PS │Report of December 1944 from Terboven │ │ │to Hitler concerning sabotage in Oslo,│ │ │with marginal comment by Keitel │ │ │approving suggestion to shoot │ │ │relatives of saboteurs. │ III │ 623 │ │ │ *871-PS │Teletype from Keitel to Lammers, 6 │ │ │December 1944, agreeing that reprisals│ │ │must be ruthless. (GB 322) │ III │ 626 │ │ │ *872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │ │Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │ │“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │ │(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626 │ │ │ 874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │ │and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │ │Deception measures. │ III │ 634 │ │ │ 878-PS │Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12 │ │ │September 1941, providing that Jews │ │ │may be put in labor-columns. │ III │ 636 │ │ │ *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │ │(USA 30) │ III │ 665 │ │ │ *1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 │ │ │ 1107-PS │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in │ │ │Rosenberg Ministry concerning the │ │ │Wehrmacht’s function in removing │ │ │treasures from the USSR. │ III │ 789 │ │ │ 1161-PS │OKW, 31 May 1940, setting up economic │ │ │reconnaissance teams to procure all │ │ │important stocks of raw materials, │ │ │machinery, etc. in Belgium, Holland │ │ │and Northern France. │ III │ 816 │ │ │ 1292-PS │Memorandum of conference with Hitler, │ │ │4 January 1944, concerning allocation │ │ │of labor, 1944. (USA 225) │ III │ 866 │ │ │ *1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel│ │ │consulted about resources of USSR. │ │ │(USA 148) │ IV │ 21 │ │ │ *1519-PS │Circular from Bormann, 30 September │ │ │1941, containing text of OKW of 8 │ │ │September 1941 on treatment of Soviet │ │ │prisoners of war. (GB 525) │ IV │ 58 │ │ │ *1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in│ │ │Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, │ │ │24 May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100 │ │ │ *1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │ │December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101 │ │ │ 1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │ │concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104 │ │ │ 1590-PS │Order received by OKH signed by │ │ │Keitel, 1 October 1941, containing │ │ │regulations for the shooting of │ │ │hostages. │ IV │ 127 │ │ │ 1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │ │secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154 │ │ │ *1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │ │Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │ │1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │ │certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │ │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │ │Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │ │speech by Hitler to German High │ │ │Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │ │March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │ │Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ 1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │ │the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │ │Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349 │ │ │ *1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │ │February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │ │1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ 1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │ │Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552 │ │ │ 1954-PS │Deposition of Keitel, 3 August 1945, │ │ │on his official functions and relation│ │ │to Nazi Party. │ IV │ 592 │ │ │ *2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │ │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │ │30 August 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │ │(GB 250) │ IV │ 650 │ │ │ *2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │ │Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │ │217) │ IV │ 654 │ │ │ 2039-PS │Decree concerning the conditions of │ │ │employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│ │ │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 419. │ IV │ 655 │ │ │ *2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │ │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │ │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │ │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843 │ │ │ 2231-PS │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die │ │ │Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34. │ IV │ 873 │ │ │ *2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │ │officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │ │at Mauthausen, (USA 490) │ IV │ 991 │ │ │ *2329-PS │Order by Commander in Chief of the │ │ │Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105) │ IV │ 1037 │ │ │ *2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ │Facts for History of German War and │ │ │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 │ │ │ *2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │ │Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327 │ │ │ 2746-PS │Decree concerning organization of │ │ │Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles │ │ │and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │ │ │4 December 1941. 1941 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │ │759-761. │ V │ 386 │ │ │ *2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │ │meeting between Hitler and President │ │ │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │ │1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433 │ │ │ 2926-PS │Decree concerning the care of children│ │ │begotten by members of the Wehrmacht │ │ │Personnel in Occupied Territories, 28 │ │ │July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 488. │ V │ 592 │ │ │ *2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │ │73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow │ │ │Book. Excerpts from eight dispatches │ │ │from M. Coulondre, the French │ │ │Ambassador in Berlin, to the French │ │ │Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 │ │ │March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608 │ │ │ 3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │ │1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │ │Service, and record of telephone │ │ │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │ │1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731 │ │ │ 3019-PS │Announcement of Keitel as Chief of │ │ │Wehrmacht, published in The Archives, │ │ │Vol. 18, p. 860. │ V │ 737 │ │ │ 3020-PS │Fuehrer’s speech in Reichstag on 19 │ │ │July 1940, published in The Archives, │ │ │Vol. 76, p. 386. │ V │ 737 │ │ │ **3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │ │train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │ │execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │ │entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │ │(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │ │in evidence.) │ V │ 766 │ │ │ *3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411 │ │ │ *3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │ │Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414 │ │ │ *3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │ │Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │ │535) │ VI │ 415 │ │ │ *3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419 │ │ │ *3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │ │in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │ │January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655 │ │ │ *C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │ │International Law and proposed counter│ │ │propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │ │1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799 │ │ │ C-6 │Order by Keitel for intensified sea │ │ │and air measures in connection with │ │ │Fall “Gelb”, 30 December 1939. │ VI │ 816 │ │ │ *C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, │ │ │signed by Keitel, subject: Employment │ │ │of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817 │ │ │ *C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │ │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857 │ │ │ C-48 │Order signed by Keitel, 30 November │ │ │1944, concerning sabotage in Norway │ │ │and Denmark. │ VI │ 870 │ │ │ *C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │ │1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │ │treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │ │offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │ │GB 162) │ VI │ 871 │ │ │ C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │ │for destruction of all copies of Order│ │ │of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without│ │ │effecting its validity. │ VI │ 875 │ │ │ *C-52 │Order signed by Keitel, 23 July 1941, │ │ │to abandon legal prosecution and │ │ │punishment in USSR and use terrorism │ │ │instead. (GB 485) │ VI │ 876 │ │ │ *C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │ │execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │ │February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879 │ │ │ *C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,│ │ │signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │ │directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 │ │ │on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880 │ │ │ *C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │ │87) │ VI │ 883 │ │ │ C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │ │(GB 86) │ VI │ 884 │ │ │ *C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │ │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893 │ │ │ *C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │ │signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │ │concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │ │(USA 151) │ VI │ 906 │ │ │ *C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │ │convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │ │14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909 │ │ │ *C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │ │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │ │74) │ VI │ 911 │ │ │ *C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │ │1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │ │Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913 │ │ │ *C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │ │for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │ │Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916 │ │ │ *C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │ │Weiss” and directions for secret │ │ │mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932 │ │ │ *C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │ │on conference between German and │ │ │Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │ │subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │ │January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939 │ │ │ *C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │ │October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │ │initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947 │ │ │ *C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │ │to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │ │(GB 33) │ VI │ 949 │ │ │ C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │ │by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │ │OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950 │ │ │ *C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │ │subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961 │ │ │ *C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │ │March 1941, concerning audience of │ │ │C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │ │1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966 │ │ │ *C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │ │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977 │ │ │ *C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003 │ │ │ *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ │for War 1937-1938, with covering │ │ │letter from von Blomberg, 24 June │ │ │1937. (USA 69) │ VI │ 1006 │ │ │ *C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │ │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017 │ │ │ *C-194 │Orders by Keitel and │ │ │Commander-in-Chief of Navy, 6 March │ │ │1936, for Navy cooperation in │ │ │Rhineland occupation. (USA 55) │ VI │ 1019 │ │ │ *D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │ │against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023 │ │ │ *D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │ │SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │ │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │ │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │ │1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │ │relative to procedure in cases of │ │ │unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │ │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74 │ │ │ D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177 │ │ │ *D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183 │ │ │ *D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │ │German Foreign Minister and Count │ │ │Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │ │Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │ │(GB 295) │ VII │ 190 │ │ │ *D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │ │regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │ │non-German civilians in Occupied │ │ │Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222 │ │ │ *D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │ │concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │ │and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │ │Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │ │thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223 │ │ │ *D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │ │regarding offenses by non-German │ │ │civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │ │302) │ VII │ 225 │ │ │ *D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │ │regarding offenses by non-German │ │ │civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │ │301) │ VII │ 226 │ │ │ *D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │ │offenses by non-German civilians in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228 │ │ │ *D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │ │21 September 1940, relative to │ │ │application of capital punishment in │ │ │connection with Railway strike in │ │ │Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229 │ │ │ D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │ │offenses of non-German civilians in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229 │ │ │ *D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │ │Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │ │treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers│ │ │14 June 1944. (GB 307) │ VII │ 231 │ │ │ *D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232 │ │ │ *D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │ │June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │ │Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233 │ │ │ *D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234 │ │ │ *D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │ │OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │ │Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │ │June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236 │ │ │ *D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ *D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │ │Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │ │315) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │ │June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │ │“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │ │signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │ │“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241 │ │ │ *D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │ │(GB 319) │ VII │ 242 │ │ │ *EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │ │Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │ │26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328 │ │ │ *EC-194 │Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning│ │ │use of prisoners of war in the war │ │ │industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214) │ VII │ 336 │ │ │ *EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ │Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │ │price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380 │ │ │ EC-338 │Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from │ │ │Canaris to Keitel concerning an OKW │ │ │Order regulating the treatment of │ │ │Soviet prisoners of war. │ VII │ 411 │ │ │ *EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │ │Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │ │772) │ VII │ 455 │ │ │ *EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │ │Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462 │ │ │ L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │ │Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │ │Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)│ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ VII │ 752 │ │ │ *L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │ │of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │ │(USA 540) │ VII │ 800 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │ │Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │ │signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │ │directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │ │1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871 │ │ │ *L-158 │Circular letter from SIPO and SD │ │ │Commander of Radom District, 28 March │ │ │1944, concerning measures to be taken │ │ │against escaped officers and │ │ │non-commissioned officer PWs. (USA │ │ │514) │ VII │ 906 │ │ │ L-179 │Letter from RSHA to police officials, │ │ │5 November 1942, concerning criminal │ │ │procedure against Poles and members of│ │ │Eastern people. │ VII │ 976 │ │ │ *L-211 │OKW circular entitled Direction of War│ │ │as Problem of Organization, 19 April │ │ │1938. (GB 161) │ VII │ 1043 │ │ │ *L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │ │July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │ │Eastern populations and territories. │ │ │(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 │ │ │ *R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by │ │ │Hitler to General von Brauchitsch on │ │ │25 March 1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83 │ │ │ UK-20 │Keitel Order on treatment of │ │ │supporters of De Gaulle who fight for │ │ │Russians, 26 May 1943. (GB 163) │ VIII │ 538 │ │ │ *UK-57 │Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and │ │ │21 April 1944, concerning │ │ │counteraction to Kharkov show trial. │ │ │(GB 164) │ VIII │ 539 │ │ │ *UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │ │of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │ │reprisals for partisan activity in │ │ │Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │ │December 1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │ │January 1946. │ VIII │ 647 │ │ │ Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │ │Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, │ │ │by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │ │September 1945. │ VIII │ 669 │ │ │ Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │ │of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │ │Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672 │ │ │ Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │ │Armed Forces During the War and in │ │ │Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │ │Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678 │ │ │ Statement VI │The Relationship Between Canaris and │ │ │Keitel, by Erwin Lahousen, Nurnberg, │ │ │23 October 1945. │ VIII │ 682 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ **Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │ │1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776

5. ALFRED JODL

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY JODL._

Operations Department of the Army (_Heer_), 1932-35.

Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Armed Forces (_Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW_), 1935-Oct. 1938.

Artillery Commander (“_Artillerie Kommandeur_”) of the 44th Division. Vienna and Brno, Oct 1938-27 Aug. 1939.

Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (_Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_), August 1939-1945.

Dates of Promotion:

1932—Major and Oberstleutnant 1936—Oberst 1939—Generalmajor 1940—General der Artillerie 1944—Generaloberst (2865-PS).

B. _FUNCTIONS OF JODL’S POSITIONS._

Jodl’s most important office was that of Chief of the Operations Staff (_Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab_) in OKW. In this capacity he was directly subordinate to Keitel and equal in status to other departmental chiefs in OKW. However, insofar as the planning and conduct of military affairs are concerned, Jodl and his staff were more influential than the other departments.

The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the “National Defense” section, of which Warlimont was chief. He was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff. (_3707-PS_)

Jodl drafted many directives for Hitler to sign, for the preparation of military operations and plans of deployment, and for the possible initiation and commencement of military measures relating to matters of organization, operations, or “war-economics.” While in a theater of operations, Jodl would report twice daily to Hitler about operations, and then prepare the Fuehrer directives. There was direct contact between Hitler and Jodl, though Keitel was kept informed of what passed between them.

In addition to certain ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the appropriate military authorities (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).

C. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._

Jodl’s loyalty to the Nazi party doctrine is evident in a speech he delivered on 7 November 1943. He spoke of the National Socialist Movement and its struggle for internal power as the preparation for liberation from the Treaty of Versailles. (_L-172) _ He also stated, in a speech on the occasion of the attempted assassination of Hitler, that his aims had been in general agreement with the aims of the party. (_1808-PS_)

At the sixth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council on 7 February 1934 Jodl pointed out that the practical execution of the preparations for mobilization, which had been ordered by the Army and the highest Reich authorities, were making a considerable enlargement of personnel necessary. He suggested, however, that this enlargement of personnel ought not to result in “the disquieting of foreign countries through conspicuous mobilization measures.” (_EC-405_)

In the presence of Jodl, Generalmajor Keitel pointed out at the eleventh meeting that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following year. A “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies” was to be issued for the first time on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the extent possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of military capacity deliberately above all other national tasks. It was the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council, he emphasized, to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials that were absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich. Colonel Jodl said that the Mobilization Book for the Civilian Departments constituted the unified basis for the carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army (_EC-406_).

D. _JODL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._

(_See “F,” 1 through 7, in Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for these activities is discussed._)

E. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._

(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian population in occupied, territories and on the high seas._ Jodl ordered the forcible evacuation of all persons in a northern district of Norway, and the burning of all their dwellings. This was to be done so that the inhabitants of that area could not help the Russians (_754-PS_). Shortly thereafter an evacuation took place in Finnmark County in northern Norway, in the course of which 30,000 houses were damaged. (_1800-PS_)

Jodl was aware that in 1942 there were continual arrests in Belgrade, and that from fifteen to thirty followers of Mihalovic were shot every day. (_1383-PS_)

Jodl initialled an order signed for Hitler by Keitel, which provided that enemy civilians guilty of offenses against German troops should be killed without a military trial, and that punishment could be waived in the case of German soldiers who committed offenses against enemy civilians. (_886-PS_)

Rosenberg was appointed by Hitler on 20 April 1941 “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories.” The highest Reich authorities were to cooperate fully, and Keitel was asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with Rosenberg. Jodl was appointed as Keitel’s representative with Warlimont as his deputy, and Keitel wrote to Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 that Jodl and Warlimont would be the OKW representatives. (_865-PS_)

Responsibility for crimes committed under Rosenberg’s authority thus attach to Jodl as well. In this connection reference is made to Section 7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.

(2) _Deportation of civilian populations of and in Occupied Territories for slave labor and for other purposes._ Jodl knew of the deportation of workers, for he once told Hitler that the military commander of France had reported that over 220,000 workers had been deported into the Reich in the past six months. (_1383-PS_)

(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members of the Armed Forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war and of persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender. This order was issued by Jodl’s department. (_498-PS_)

A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are known in which the order was carried out. (_508-PS_; _509-PS_)

Three specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C in C, Norway, where captured members of sabotage units were executed after interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred at Gloafjord, Drontheim, and at Stavanger. (_512-PS_)

On 23 June 1944 C in C West requested instructions re-defining the scope of the commando order. In view of the extensive landings in Normandy, it had become difficult to decide which paratroops should be considered sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and which should be considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The question was answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was signed by Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order. (_531-PS_; _551-PS_)

When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror.” It is not certain that the order was ever issued, but it is certain that Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to prevent them and in fact considered giving them official justification.

(_See also “F” at the end of Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for the lynching of Allied airmen is discussed._)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALFRED JODL

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ 444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │ │Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │ │Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │ │November 1940, concerning plans for │ │ │prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │ │Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │ │116) │ III │ 403 │ │ │ *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │ │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │ │1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │ │Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 │ │ │ *448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │ │Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │ │concerning participation of German │ │ │Forces in the Fighting in the │ │ │Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │ │(GB 118) │ III │ 413 │ │ │ *498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │ │of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │ │501) │ III │ 416 │ │ │ *503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │ │1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │ │of his commando order of the day │ │ │before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426 │ │ │ *508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │ │about shooting of British glider │ │ │troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430 │ │ │ *509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │ │reporting “special treatment” for │ │ │three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ *512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │ │Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │ │interrogation of saboteurs before │ │ │shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │ │OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ 531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │ │inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │ │about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │ │550) │ III │ 435 │ │ │ *551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Commando │ │ │participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440 │ │ │ *754-PS │Teletype Order signed by Jodl, 28 │ │ │October 1944, for evacuation of │ │ │Norwegians and burning of houses. (GB │ │ │490) │ III │ 544 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │ │Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │ │concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │ │Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │ │Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621 │ │ │ 874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │ │and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │ │Deception measures. │ III │ 634 │ │ │ 886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │ │courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │ │civilians in the district │ │ │“Barbarossa”, signed by Keitel for │ │ │Hitler, and initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637 │ │ │ *1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 │ │ │ 1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German │ │ │Intelligence Service in the East, │ │ │signed by Jodl, 6 September 1940. (USA│ │ │130) │ III │ 849 │ │ │ *1383-PS │Extract from transcription of │ │ │stenographic report on discussion of │ │ │current military situation, 12 │ │ │December 1942. (GB 489) │ III │ 958 │ │ │ *1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │ │December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101 │ │ │ 1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │ │secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │ │Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │ │speech by Hitler to German High │ │ │Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │ │March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │ │Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ *1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │ │February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ 1800-PS │Preliminary report on Germany’s crimes│ │ │against Norway, prepared by the Royal │ │ │Norwegian Government. │ IV │ 375 │ │ │ *1808-PS │Excerpt of speech by Jodl to Officers │ │ │and officials of Armed Forces │ │ │Operations Staff, 24 July 1944. (GB │ │ │493) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │ │1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *2865-PS │Statement by Jodl, showing positions │ │ │held by him. (USA 16) │ V │ 526 │ │ │ *3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411 │ │ │ 3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │ │Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │ │535) │ VI │ 415 │ │ │ *3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419 │ │ │ *3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │ │in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │ │January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655 │ │ │ *C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │ │International Law and proposed counter│ │ │propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │ │1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799 │ │ │ *C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │ │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857 │ │ │ *C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │ │execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │ │February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879 │ │ │ *C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │ │(GB 86) │ VI │ 884 │ │ │ *C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │ │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893 │ │ │ *C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │ │signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │ │concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │ │(USA 151) │ VI │ 906 │ │ │ *C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │ │convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │ │14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909 │ │ │ *C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │ │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │ │74) │ VI │ 911 │ │ │ *C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │ │1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │ │Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913 │ │ │ C-123 │Jodl Order on capitulation of │ │ │Leningrad, 7 October 1941. │ VI │ 929 │ │ │ *C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │ │on conference between German and │ │ │Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │ │subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │ │January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939 │ │ │ *C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │ │March 1941, concerning audience of │ │ │C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │ │1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966 │ │ │ *C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │ │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977 │ │ │ *C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │ │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017 │ │ │ *D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234 │ │ │ *D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │ │OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │ │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │ │26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450 │ │ │ *EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │ │Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │ │772) │ VII │ 455 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │ │Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │ │lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │ │November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │ │Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920 │ │ │ Statement II │A Short Historical Consideration of │ │ │German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, │ │ │Nurnberg, 6 September 1945. │ VIII │ 662 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ **Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │ │1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776

6. ERNST KALTENBRUNNER

A. _KALTENBRUNNER ENTERED THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN ITS EARLY STAGES, AND SUPPORTED IT, AND WAS A LEADER IN IT UNTIL THE END._

Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born on 4 October 1903 at Ried on Inn (near Braunau) Austria. He spent his youth in Hitler’s native district. Later he moved to Linz, where he attended the State _Realgymnasium_. He studied law and obtained a law degree in 1926. He spent the first year as apprentice lawyer at Linze-on-Danube and then worked as a lawyer-candidate, first at Salzburg and after 1928 at Linz (_2938-PS_).

Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932. Prior to 1933 he was the District speaker (_Gauredner_) and legal counsellor (_Rechtsberater_) of the SS division (_Abschnitt_) VIII. After 1933 he was the fuehrer of regiment (_Standarte_) 37 and later of the SS division VIII (_2892-PS_).

In January 1934 Kaltenbrunner was jailed by the Dollfuss government on account of his Nazi views, and sent with other leading National Socialists into the concentration camp Kaisersteinbruch. He is said to have started and led a hunger strike of the prisoners and thereby to have forced the government to dismiss 490 National Socialist prisoners. In the following year he was jailed again because of suspicion of High Treason and committed to the military court at Wels (Upper Danube). After an investigation of many months the accusation of High Treason was dropped, but he was condemned to six months’ imprisonment for conspiracy. His right to practice law was suspended because of his Nazi activities (_2938-PS_).

After the Spring of 1935 Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian SS. In the magazine of the SIPO and SD, issue of 15 May 1943, it is stated:

“It redounds to his credit that in this important position he succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity of the Austrian SS, which he had built up, in spite of all persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the right moment. After the annexation, in which the SS was a decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National-Socialist cabinet of Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a. m., as the first National Socialist leader, that the Movement had achieved a complete victory and that ‘The SS is in formation and awaiting further orders.’” (_2938-PS_)

Hitler promoted Kaltenbrunner on the date of the Anschluss to the rank of SS Brigadefuehrer and leader of the SS _Oberabschnitt_ Donau. On 11 September 1938 he was promoted to the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer. During the liquidation of the Austrian national government and the reorganization of Austria into Alps and Danube Districts, he was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader to the governors of Vienna, Lower Danube, and Upper Danube, in Corps Area (_Wehrkreis_) XVII, and in April 1941 was promoted to Major General of the Police (_2938-PS_).

On 30 January 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA), succeeding Heydrich, who had been assassinated in Prague in June 1942. Kaltenbrunner held this position until the end of the war (_2644-PS_).

On 4 October 1943 at Pozen, Poland, in a speech delivered to Gruppenfuehrers of the SS, Himmler made special reference to “our comrade Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, who has succeeded our fallen friend Heydrich” (_1919-PS_).

On 9 December 1944 the decoration known as the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit, Cross with Swords, was given to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security Police and the SD (_2770-PS_).

In addition he held the Golden insignia of Honor and the _Blutorden_. He was a member of the Reichstag after the 9th election period 1938 (_2892-PS_).

Toward the end of the war, Kaltenbrunner’s power increased greatly, especially after the attack on Hitler of 20 July 1944. He gained direct access to Hitler. He was very friendly with Fegelein and his wife, who was the sister of Eva Braun. So powerful had Kaltenbrunner become toward the end that even Himmler feared him. On 13 April 1945 the chief of the German foreign intelligence service, Schellenberg, asked Himmler to receive the representative of the Jewish World Congress, Mr. Storsch, from Stockholm, and Himmler said,

“But how am I going to do that in regard to Kaltenbrunner? I shall then be completely at his mercy!” (_2990-PS_).

B. _DURING KALTENBRUNNER’S TERM IN OFFICE AS CHIEF OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND SD, NUMEROUS AND VAST CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY THE SIPO AND SD IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES._

As Chief of the Security Police after 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner was the head of the RSHA and the regional offices of the Gestapo, SD, and Kripo. Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the Chiefs of the main offices of the RSHA, including Amt III (the SD), Amt IV (the Gestapo), Amt V (the Kripo), and Amt VI (the SD in foreign intelligence) (_L-219_).

Kaltenbrunner had direct responsibility over the offices of the RSHA. All important matters had to be referred to him or had to be handled under general or special authority granted by him to office chiefs.

“All decisions of principal character are signed by the Chief of the Security Police personally. An office chief has only the authority to sign ‘acting for’ and a chairman ‘by order of’ if the subjects treated in the respective decrees fit into the general laid-down principles according to the plan of distribution of authority. In case of doubt it was the duty to get the question cleared up by reporting it to the Chief of Security Police and SD.” (_L-34_)

“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign in any principal affairs of particular political significance without consent of the Chief of the Security Police—not even during his temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore declare that the chief of Amt IV, Mueller, particularly was very hesitant in signing documents concerning questions of general nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the Chief of the Security Police, whereby often much time was lost.” (_L-50_).

Schellenberg, the Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, has stated:

“I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the office and control over the Amts * * * He made it very clear in his official relations with all of us who were his _Amt_ Chiefs that he was the head of the office exercising full executive powers and deciding all matters of policy. He permitted us to issue directives within the organization in our own names pursuant to fixed policies established by him, but all important matters had to be submitted to him whether he signed them or we signed them. He was constantly informed of all matters of importance which went on in the entire organization. (_2939-PS_)

During Kaltenbrunner’s term in office as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the following crimes were committed by the SIPO and SD pursuant to policy established by the RSHA or orders issued out of the RSHA for all of which he was responsible by virtue of his office.

(1) _Mass murders of civilians of occupied countries by Einsatz Groups._ A general discussion of this and the following twelve crimes of the _Gestapo_ and SD appears in Section 6 of Chapter XV. That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _3012-PS_; _2752-PS_; _2890-PS_.

(2) _Screenings of prisoner of war camps and executing racial and political undesirables._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _2622-PS_.

(3) _The taking of recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps, where in some cases they were executed._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1650-PS_; _L-158_; _1514-PS_.

(4) _Establishing concentration camps and committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder._ That this crime continued after January of 1943 is shown by the following documents: _D-50_; _D-46_; _L-41_; _701-PS_.

(5) _Deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and disciplining of forced labor._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _3012-PS_; _1063-B-PS_.

(6) _The execution of captured commandos and paratroopers and protection of civilians who lynched Allied fliers._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1276-PS_; _532-PS_; _526-PS_; _R-110_; _745-PS_.

(7) _The taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _835-PS_.

(8) _Punishment of citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary methods._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-5_.

(9) _The execution and confinement of persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-37_.

(10) _Seizure and spoliation of public and private property._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _2620-PS_; _L-18_.

(11) _Murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-53_.

(12) _Persecution of Jews._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _L-18_; _1061-PS_; _2375-PS_; _2605-PS_.

(13) _Persecution of the churches._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _1815-PS_.

C. _KALTENBRUNNER HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMISSION OF MANY SPECIFIC CRIMES._

(1) _Kaltenbrunner was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration camps and of the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor and mass murder._ Mauthausen concentration camp was established in Austria while Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for Austria, and was frequently visited by Kaltenbrunner before he was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (_L-51_). On the occasion of one such visit in 1942, Kaltenbrunner personally observed the gas chamber in operation (_2753-PS_). After he became Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen concentration camp but with less frequency (_L-51_). On one occasion he made an inspection of the camp grounds with Himmler and had his photograph taken during the course of the inspection (_2641-PS_). After a visit to Mauthausen in 1944 Kaltenbrunner reported to his _Amt_ Chiefs with pride that he had helped to build up Mauthausen when he was Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria and that the camp was engaged in valuable armament work (_2990-PS_). Mauthausen concentration camp was classified by Heydrich in January 1941 in category III, a camp for the most heavily accused prisoners and for asocial prisoners who were considered incapable of being reformed (_1063-A-PS_).

There were frequent conferences between the RSHA and executives of the SS _Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ who had charge of the internal administration of concentration camps. The affidavit of Rudolf Mildner states with respect to these conferences:

“SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner attended personally conferences with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, Chief of the SS _Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ and Chief of the concentration camps. Due to these conferences and through talks with the Chief of Office Gruppenfuehrer Mueller of _Amt_ IV and Gruppenfuehrer Nebe of _Amt_ V, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, must have known the state of affairs in the concentration camps.” (_L-35_)

(2) _With full knowledge of conditions in and the purpose of concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or permitted to be ordered in his name the commitment of persons to concentration camps._ All orders for protective custody other than short-term confinements were issued in the name of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD and bore the facsimile stamp of his signature (_2477-PS_).

The commandant of Buchenwald concentration camp in his affidavit states:

“With the exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the concentration camps of occupied territories, all prisoners were sent to the concentration camp Buchenwald on orders of the _Reichssicherheitschauptamt_, Berlin. These preventive arrest orders (red blanks) were in most cases signed with the name Kaltenbrunner. The few other preventive arrest orders were signed with ‘Foerster.’” (_L-38_)

On 7 July 1943 an order for protective custody was issued by the Gestapo (_Amt_ IV C 2, RSHA) bearing the facsimile signature of Kaltenbrunner, to be sent in the form of a telegram to the Gestapo office in Koeslin in the case of a woman whose offense was stated to be failure to work, work sabotage, and asocial conduct. She was ordered to be confined in the concentration camp at Ravensbrueck (_2745-PS_).

On 19 January 1944 a warrant for protective custody was issued by the Gestapo (_Amt_ IV C 2 of the RSHA) certified as signed by Kaltenbrunner, to a British subject, C. S. James, on the grounds that he had been proven guilty of activities to the detriment of the German Reich, and that there was reason to expect that he would, if released, commit acts prejudicial to the Reich (_1574-PS_).

Other instances of commitments to various concentration camps on orders, signed by Kaltenbrunner, are contained in the dossiers of 25 Luxembourgers committed to concentration camps by the _Einsatzkommando_ of the Sipo and SD in Luxembourg during the year 1944. The concentration camps to which the persons were committed included Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald. Among the grounds were: “strongly suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich;” “spiteful statements inimical to Germany as well as aspersions and threats against persons active in the National Socialist movement;” “strongly suspected of aiding desertion;” “as relative of a deserter expected to take advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich.” (_L-215_).

Further orders for commitments to concentration camps are contained in file of 42 telegrams, all issued by the RSHA, _Amt_ IV A 6, Prague, to the Gestapo Office at Darmstadt, and all signed by Kaltenbrunner, during the period from 20 September 1944 to 2 February 1945. The concentration camps to which people were sent included Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrueck, Buchenwald, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenburg, and Theresienstadt. Nationalities included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican, Lithuanian, Greek, and Jew. Grounds included “refusal to work;” “religious propaganda;” “sex relations with PWs;” “communist statements;” “loafing on job;” “working against the Reich;” “spreading of rumors detrimental to morale;” “_Aktion Gitter_;” “breach of work contracts;” “statements against Germany;” “assault of foreman;” “defeatist statements;” “theft and escape from jail.” (_2239-PS_).

(3) _Kaltenbrunner authorized executions in concentration camps._ Adolf Zutter, the adjutant of Mauthausen concentration camp, avers that, until the assassination of Heydrich, orders for executions at Mauthausen were signed by Heydrich or his substitute, and that after Kaltenbrunner became Chief of the Security Police and SD they were signed either by Kaltenbrunner or by his substitute, Mueller. Zutter mentions a specific instance in which Kaltenbrunner ordered the execution of a group of 12 to 15 uniformed members of an American military mission (_L-51_).

(4) _Kaltenbrunner had knowledge of the commitment of thousands of Warsaw Poles to concentration camps and refused to release them._ During the suppression of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, about 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw were sent to concentration camps. As a result of entreaties by Hans Frank to Himmler the deportation was stopped. Frank and Buehler, his State Secretary, requested Kaltenbrunner to release the persons who had been committed. Kaltenbrunner refused to release them on the grounds they were employed in making secret weapons for the Reich and declared that the number transported into concentration camps in the Reich was small. Buehler verified the fact that the number of persons so placed in concentration camps for forced labor was 50,000 to 69,999 (_2476-PS_).

(5) _Kaltenbrunner controlled the deportation of Poles, Jews, and other non-Germans from Poland._ Otto Hofmann, former Chief of the SS Main Office for Race and Settlement Matters, stated:

“The execution of all so-called resettlement actions, that is, the sending away of Polish, Jewish, and people of non-German blood, inhabitants of a territory in Poland destined for Germanization was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA, Heydrich, and, since the end of 1942, Kaltenbrunner.” (_L-49_).

(6) _Kaltenbrunner ordered the deportation of Jews from Denmark._ In September 1943 Himmler ordered the Danish Jews arrested and shipped to Stettin and from there to Theresienstadt concentration camp. Mildner, the Chief of the Sipo and SD, telegraphed the RSHA to request that the Jewish persecutions be stopped. In reply he received an order from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Shortly thereafter Mildner flew to Berlin to speak to Kaltenbrunner personally about the matter. In Kaltenbrunner’s absence he spoke to Mueller. After his return to Copenhagen, Mildner received a direct order from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish actions immediately (_2375-PS_).

(7) _Kaltenbrunner personally exercised punitive authority over foreign workers._ By order of Kaltenbrunner Labor Reformatory Camps were established under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Police (_1063-B-PS_).

In addition to sending workers to Labor Reformatory Camps, Kaltenbrunner, through orders for protective custody signed by him or by facsimile of his signature, committed workers to concentration camps. On 9 February 1945 a French citizen was sent to Buchenwald by order of Kaltenbrunner for shirking work and insubordinate behavior. On 18 June 1943 a Pole was sent to Natzweiler “to be used as a skilled worker” by order of Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a citizen of the Netherlands was taken into protective custody “for work sabotage” by order of Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a French citizen was taken into protective custody for “work sabotage and insubmissive” (_2582-PS_; _2580-PS_).

(8) _Kaltenbrunner personally attended to matters against Jews and political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate._ A memorandum found among Kaltenbrunner’s personal effects states in part:

“Radio message to Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein Hq. of the Fuehrer through Sturmbannfuehrer Sansoni, Berlin.

“Please report to RF SS and to the Fuehrer that all arrangements against Jews, political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate have been taken care of by me personally today” (_2519-PS_).

(9) _Kaltenbrunner personally ordered the Sipo and SD to encourage the populace to lynch American and English flyers._ In 1944 at a conference of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:

“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be informed that pogroms of the populace against English and American terror-fliers were not to be interfered with; on the contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered” (_2990-PS_).

(10) _Kaltenbrunner personally worked out the form of justification to be submitted to cover up the execution of prisoners of war._ In connection with the shooting of some 50 recaptured prisoners of war who had escaped from a prisoner of war camp near Breslau, Kaltenbrunner worked out with Mueller and Nebe the false reasons which were to be given to the Red Cross, that is, that they had been killed by bomb attacks, or shot while escaping or resisting arrest (_2990-PS_).

D. _CONCLUSION._

Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a leading role in the betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss he supervised and had knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. He had much to do with developing Mauthausen concentration camp and visited it frequently. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in action. With this knowledge and background he accepted in January 1943 appointment as chief of the very agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to high prominence in the conspiracy, receiving honors from Hitler and gaining Hitler’s personal confidence.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERNST KALTENBRUNNER

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 59 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │ │concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │ │in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434 │ │ │ 532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437 │ │ │ *701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │ │Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │ │Poles and Jews who are released from │ │ │Penal institutions of Department of │ │ │Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510 │ │ │ 745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │ │June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │ │who have been shot down. │ III │ 543 │ │ │ *835-PS │Letter from OKW to the German │ │ │Armistice Commission, 2 September │ │ │1944, concerning the status of │ │ │political prisoners. (USA 527) │ III │ 602 │ │ │ *1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │ │Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │ │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │ │(USA 275) │ III │ 718 │ │ │ *1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │ │January 1941, concerning │ │ │classification of concentration camps.│ │ │(USA 492) │ III │ 775 │ │ │ 1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │ │July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │ │Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777 │ │ │ *1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │ │enclosing copies of report concerning │ │ │anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783 │ │ │ *1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │ │and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │ │concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │ │525) │ III │ 855 │ │ │ *1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │ │Area Command concerning delivery of │ │ │prisoners of war to secret state │ │ │police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53 │ │ │ 1574-PS │Warrant, 19 January 1944, for │ │ │protective custody. │ IV │ 114 │ │ │ *1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │ │from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │ │4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │ │escaped PWs except British and │ │ │American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158 │ │ │ *1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │ │the study and treatment of church │ │ │politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415 │ │ │ *1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │ │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │ │170) │ IV │ 558 │ │ │ *2239-PS │File of orders sent by AMT IV, RSHA, │ │ │Prague, to Gestapo office Darmstadt, │ │ │signed Kaltenbrunner. (USA 520) │ IV │ 920 │ │ │ 2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │ │November 1945, concerning activities │ │ │of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2 │ │ │ 2476-PS │Affidavit of Josef Buehler, 4 November│ │ │1945. │ V │ 228 │ │ │ *2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229 │ │ │ *2519-PS │Undated memorandum for radio message │ │ │from Kaltenbrunner to Fegelein, │ │ │concerning arrangements against Jews. │ │ │(USA 530) │ V │ 256 │ │ │ *2580-PS │Protective custody decrees signed │ │ │Kaltenbrunner. (USA 524) │ V │ 305 │ │ │ *2582-PS │Telegrams ordering protective custody │ │ │signed by Kaltenbrunner. (USA 523) │ V │ 307 │ │ │ *2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │ │former President of the Hungarian │ │ │Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │ │1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313 │ │ │ *2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341 │ │ │ 2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 343 │ │ │ *2641-PS │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl in │ │ │connection with photographs of │ │ │Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, and others at │ │ │Mauthausen concentration camp. (USA │ │ │516) │ V │ 354 │ │ │ 2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 357 │ │ │ *2745-PS │Order for commitment to concentration │ │ │camp, 7 July 1943, Kaltenbrunner’s │ │ │signature. (USA 519) │ V │ 383 │ │ │ 2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 392 │ │ │ *2753-PS │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 7 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 515) │ V │ 393 │ │ │ 2770-PS │War Decorations, published in Order │ │ │Gazette of the Chief of Security │ │ │Police and SD, Edition A, 5th year, 9 │ │ │December 1944, No. 51. │ V │ 417 │ │ │ 2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the Sipo│ │ │and SD. │ V │ 557 │ │ │ 2892-PS │Biographical information on Ernst │ │ │Kaltenbrunner, published in the │ │ │Greater German Reichstag, 1938. │ V │ 561 │ │ │ *2938-PS │Article in The German Police, Number │ │ │10, Berlin, 15 May 1943, p. 193, │ │ │concerning Kaltenbrunner. (USA 511) │ V │ 605 │ │ │ *2939-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 17 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 513) │ V │ 606 │ │ │ *2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694 │ │ │ *2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │ │494) │ V │ 696 │ │ │ *3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │ │1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │ │Service, and record of telephone │ │ │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │ │1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731 │ │ │ 3361-PS │Message to all Commanders of Security │ │ │Police from Kaltenbrunner regarding │ │ │arrest of Plant Directors. │ VI │ 96 │ │ │ *3427-PS │Announcement of Kaltenbrunner │ │ │appointed Chief of Security Police and│ │ │SD, in German Police, 15 February │ │ │1943. (USA 512) │ VI │ 130 │ │ │ *3462-PS │Interrogation of Bertus Gerdes, 20 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 528) │ VI │ 161 │ │ │ *3723-PS │Testimony of Gottlieb Berger, 20 │ │ │September 1945. (USA 529) │ VI │ 460 │ │ │ *3762-PS │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8│ │ │March 1946, concerning the │ │ │responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for │ │ │concentration camp executions. (USA │ │ │798) │ VI │ 645 │ │ │ *3803-PS │Covering letter enclosing a letter │ │ │from Kaltenbrunner dated 30 June 1944,│ │ │concerning forced labor of Jews in │ │ │Vienna. (USA 802) │ VI │ 737 │ │ │ 3838-PS │Statement of Martin Sandberger, 19 │ │ │November 1945, concerning │ │ │Kaltenbrunner’s treatment of │ │ │prisoners. (USA 800) │ VI │ 773 │ │ │ *3839-PS │Statement of Josef Spacil, 9 November │ │ │1945, concerning the meaning of │ │ │“resettlement” and “special │ │ │treatment”. (USA 799) │ VI │ 774 │ │ │ *3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │ │1946, concerning the elimination of │ │ │the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775 │ │ │ *3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │ │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │ │concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │ │Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776 │ │ │ *3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │ │1946, concerning the activities of │ │ │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation │ │ │for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA│ │ │805) │ VI │ 778 │ │ │ *3844-PS │Statement of Josef Niedermayer, 7 │ │ │March 1946, concerning Kaltenbrunner’s│ │ │part in “bullet” orders at Mauthausen │ │ │concentration camp. (USA 801) │ VI │ 782 │ │ │ *3846-PS │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30 │ │ │November 1945, concerning crematorium │ │ │at Mauthausen and the activities of │ │ │Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796) │ VI │ 783 │ │ │ *3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ │819) │ VI │ 787 │ │ │ *3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │ │1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │ │Concentration Camp and dying statement│ │ │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│ │ │797) │ VI │ 790 │ │ │ D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │ │concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025 │ │ │ D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │ │at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027 │ │ │ *D-473 │Letter from Kaltenbrunner to Criminal │ │ │Public Offices, 4 December 1944, │ │ │concerning combatting of crime among │ │ │Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian │ │ │laborers. (USA 522) │ VII │ 64 │ │ │ L-5 │Order of Military Commander Southeast,│ │ │3 September 1944. │ VII │ 755 │ │ │ *L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │ │of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │ │concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │ │Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755 │ │ │ L-31 │Communique of the Polish-Soviet │ │ │Extraordinary Commission for │ │ │Investigating the Crimes committed by │ │ │the Germans in the Majdanek │ │ │Extermination Camp in Lublin. │ VII │ 772 │ │ │ L-34 │Affidavits of Edmund Trinkl, Chairman │ │ │of Amt I A 6 of the RSHA, 2 August │ │ │1945. │ VII │ 774 │ │ │ L-35 │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 1 August │ │ │1945. │ VII │ 780 │ │ │ *L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │ │and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │ │July 1944, concerning collective │ │ │responsibility of members of families │ │ │of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782 │ │ │ *L-38 │Affidavit of Hermann Pister, 1 August │ │ │1945. (USA 517) │ VII │ 783 │ │ │ L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │ │Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │ │1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │ │to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784 │ │ │ *L-49 │Affidavit of Otto Hoffman, Chief of SS│ │ │Main Office for Race and Settlement, 4│ │ │August 1945. (USA 473) │ VII │ 795 │ │ │ *L-50 │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, Director of │ │ │Office for Criminal affairs in RSHA, 2│ │ │August 1945. (USA 793) │ VII │ 796 │ │ │ *L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │ │1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798 │ │ │ *L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │ │SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │ │Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │ │clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814 │ │ │ *L-158 │Circular letter from SIPO and SD │ │ │Commander of Radom District, 28 March │ │ │1944, concerning measures to be taken │ │ │against escaped officers and │ │ │non-commissioned officer PWs. (USA │ │ │514) │ VII │ 906 │ │ │ *L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │ │Luxembourgers committed to │ │ │concentration camps at various times │ │ │in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045 │ │ │ *L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │ │October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053 │ │ │ *L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │ │Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107 │ │ │ *R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │ │Senior Executive SS and Police │ │ │officers. (USA 333) │ VII │ 1107 │ │ │ *R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ │reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │ │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 │ │ │ Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596 │ │ │ Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606 │ │ │ Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622 │ │ │ Affidavit E │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 22 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 630 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ *Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772 │ │ │ *Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │ │Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │ │System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774 │ │ │ *Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │ │(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │ │1943-1945. (2346-PS; USA 480) │ End of VIII

7. ALFRED ROSENBERG

A. _THE POLITICAL CAREER OF ROSENBERG._

The political career of Alfred Rosenberg embraced the entire history of National Socialism and permeated nearly every phase of the conspiracy. In order to obtain a full conception of his influence upon and participation in the conspiracy, it is necessary to review his political history and to consider each of his political activities in their relation to the thread of the conspiracy, which stretches from the inception of the party in 1919 to the defeat of Germany in 1945.

It is interesting to note that for Rosenberg the 30th of November 1918 marked the

“Beginning of political activities with a lecture about the ‘Jewish Problem’”. (_2886-PS_)

An official German pamphlet entitled, “Dates in the History of the NSDAP”, discloses that Rosenberg was a member of the German Labor Party (afterwards the National Socialist German Workers Party) in January 1919, and that Hitler joined forces with Rosenberg and his colleagues in October of the same year (_3557-PS_). Thus, Rosenberg was a member of the National Socialist movement even before Hitler himself.

An extract from “_Das Deutsche Fuehrer Lexikon_”, 1934/35 (_3530-PS_) completes the biographical data on Rosenberg:

“From 1921 until the present, editor of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_; editor of the ‘N.S. Monatshefte’; 1930, Reichstag deputy and representative of the foreign policy of the movement; since April 1933, leader of the foreign political office of the NSDAP; then designated as Reichsleiter; January 1934, deputized by the Fuehrer for the spiritual and philosophical education of the NSDAP, the German labor front and all related organizations” (_3530-PS_).

In July 1941 Rosenberg was appointed Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. (_2886-PS_)

B. _ROSENBERG’S PART, AS OFFICIAL NAZI IDEOLOGIST, IN PREPARING FOR THE SEIZURE OF POWER AND THE LAUNCHING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._

Rosenberg was the official National Socialist ideologist. Through the ideological tenets which he expounded he exerted an influence upon the unification of German thought, a unification which was an essential part of the conspirator’s program for seizure of power and preparation for aggressive war.

Rosenberg wrote extensively on, and actively participated in, virtually every aspect of the National Socialist program. His first publication was the “Nature, Basic Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP”, which appeared in 1922. Rosenberg spoke of this book in the following terms:

“During this time (that is, during the early phase of the party) a short thesis was written, which nevertheless is significant in the history of the NSDAP. It was always being asked what points of program the NSDAP had and how they each were to be interpreted. Therefore, I wrote the principal program and aims of the NSDAP, and this writing made the first permanent connection between Munich and local organizations being organized and friends within the Reich.” (_3054-PS_)

Thus, the original draftsman of and spokesman for the party program was Rosenberg.

Without attempting to survey the entire ideological program advanced by Rosenberg in his various writings and speeches, certain of his statements may be considered as indicating the nature and scope of the ideological program which he championed. There was not a single basic tenet of the Nazi philosophy which was not given authoritative expression by Rosenberg.

(1) _The theory of racism._ Rosenberg wrote the “Myth of the Twentieth Century”, published in 1930. At page 479 of this work (_3553-PS_), Rosenberg expressed the following views on the race question:

“The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the awakening of the racial types, not in Europe alone but on the whole planet. This awakening is the organic counter movement against the last chaotic remnants of liberal economic imperialism, whose object of exploitation out of desperation has fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to complete what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial and national consciousness.” (_3553-PS_)

(2) “_Lebensraum_.” Rosenberg expounded the “_Lebensraum_” idea, which was utilized as the dynamic impulse behind Germany’s waging of aggressive war. In his journal, the “National Socialist _Monatshefte_” for May 1932, he wrote:

“The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to perish in the truest sense of the word, needs ground and soil for itself and its future generations, and the second sober perception that this soil can no more be conquered in Africa, but in Europe and first of all in the East—these organically determine the German foreign policy for centuries.” (_2777-PS_)

(3) _Persecution of Christian Churches._ Rosenberg expressed his theory as to the place of religion in the National Socialist State in the “Myth of the Twentieth Century”, additional excerpts from which are cited in (_2891-PS_):

“We now realize that the central supreme values of the Roman and the Protestant Churches, being a negative Christianity, do not respond to our soul, that they hinder the organic powers of the peoples determined by their Nordic race, that they must give way to them, that they will have to be remodeled to conform to a Germanic Christendom. Therein lies the meaning of the present religious search.” (_2891-PS_)

In the place of traditional Christianity, Rosenberg sought to implant the neo-pagan myth of the blood. At page 114 in the “Myth of the Twentieth Century” (_2891-PS_) he stated:

“Today, a new faith is awakening—the Myth of the Blood, the belief that the divine being of mankind generally is to be defended with the blood. The faith embodied by the fullest realization, that the Nordic blood constitutes that mystery which has supplanted and overwhelmed the old sacraments.”

Rosenberg’s attitudes on religion were accepted as the only philosophy compatible with National Socialism. In 1940 Bormann, in writing to Rosenberg, made this statement:

“The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between National Socialism and Christian teachings, but only through a new ideology whose coming you yourself have announced in your writings.” (_098-PS_)

Rosenberg actively participated in the program for elimination of church influence. Bormann frequently wrote Rosenberg in this regard, furnishing him information as to proposed action to be instituted against the churches and, where necessary, requesting that action be taken by Rosenberg’s department. See _070-PS_ dealing with the abolition of religious services in the schools; _072-PS_ dealing with the confiscation of religious property; _064-PS_ dealing with the inadequacy of anti-religious material circulated to the soldiers; _089-PS_ dealing with the curtailment of the publication of Protestant periodicals; and _122-PS_ dealing with the closing of theological faculties.

(4) _Persecution of the Jews._ Rosenberg was particularly zealous in his pursuit of the “Jewish Question”. On 28 March 1941, on the occasion of the opening of the Institute for the Exploration of the Jewish Question, he set the keynote for its activities and indicated the direction which the exploration was to take. He spoke in part as follows:

“For Germany the Jewish Question is only then solved when the Last Jew has left the Greater German space.

“Since Germany with its blood and its nationalism has now broken for always this Jewish dictatorship for all Europe and has seen to it that Europe as a whole will become free from the Jewish parasitism once more, we may, I believe, also say for all Europeans: For Europe the Jewish question is only then solved when the last Jew has left the European continent.” (_2889-PS_)

Rosenberg had called an Anti-Jewish Congress in June 1944, but the Congress was cancelled due to military events. (_1752-PS_)

Rosenberg did not overlook any opportunity to put these anti-Semitic beliefs into practice. He recommended for instance that instead of executing 100 Frenchmen as retaliation for attempts on lives of members of the _Wehrmacht_, there be executed 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. (_001-PS_). The recommendation was made with the avowed purpose of awakening the anti-Jewish sentiment.

(5) _Abolition of Versailles Treaty._ In the realm of foreign policy, in addition to demanding “_Lebensraum_,” Rosenberg called for elimination of the Treaty of Versailles, and cast aside any thought of revision of that treaty. In his book, “Nature, Principles and Aims of the NSDAP”, Rosenberg wrote:

“The National Socialists reject the popular phrase of the ‘Revision of the Peace of Versailles’ as such a revision might perhaps bring a few numerical reductions in the so-called ‘obligations,’ but the entire German people would still be, just as before, the slave of other nations.”

* * * * * *

“‘We demand equality for the German people with other nations, the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.’” (_2433-PS_)

(6) _Foreign Nazi Penetration._ Rosenberg conceived of the spread of National Socialism throughout the world and, as will be subsequently shown, took an active part in promoting the infection of other nations with his creed. In the “Nature, Principles and Aims of the NSDAP”, he stated:

“But National Socialism still believes that its principles and ideology though in individually different suitable ways of fight according to racial-national conditions—will be directives far beyond the borders of Germany for the inevitable fights for power in other countries of Europe and America. There too a decision of ideas must take place, and the racial-nationalistic fight against the ever similar loan-capitalistic and Marxist internationalism must be taken up. National Socialism believes that once the great world battle is concluded, after the defeat of the present epoch, there will be a time when the swastika will be woven into the different banners of the Germanic peoples as the Aryan symbol of rejuvenation.” (_2433-PS_)

Thus, Rosenberg gave authoritative expression to the basic tenets upon which National Socialism was founded, and through the exploitation of which the conspiracy was crystallized in action.

(7) _Ideological training and education._ Rosenberg’s value to the conspiratorial program found official recognition in his appointment in 1934 as the Fuehrer’s Delegate for the Entire Spiritual and Philosophical Education and Supervision of the NSDAP. His activities in this capacity were many and varied. The National Socialist Year Book for the year 1938, at page 180, describes as follows the functions of Rosenberg’s office as the Fuehrer’s delegate:

“The sphere of activity of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for all spiritual and ideological instruction and education of the movement, its organization, including the ‘Strength through Joy’, extends to the detailed execution of all the educational work of the Party and of the affiliated bodies. The office, set up by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, has the task of preparing the ideological educational material, of carrying out the teaching programme, and is responsible for the education of those teachers suited to this educational and instructional work.” (_3531-PS_)

As the Fuehrer’s delegate, Rosenberg thus supervised all ideological education and training in the Party.

It was Rosenberg’s belief that upon the performance of his new functions as ideological delegate depended the future of National Socialism. An excerpt from an article by Rosenberg appearing on page 9 of the March 1934 issue of “The Educational Letter” states:

“The focus of all our educational work from now on is the service for this ideology, and it depends on the result of these efforts, whether National Socialism will be buried with our fighting ancestors or whether, as we believe, it really represents the beginning of a new era.” (_3532-PS_)

In his capacity as the Fuehrer’s Delegate for Spiritual and Ideological Training, Rosenberg assisted in the preparation of the curriculum for the Adolf Hitler schools. These schools selected the most suitable candidates from the Hitler Jugend and trained them for leadership within the Party. They were the elite schools of National Socialism. An excerpt from “Documents of German Politics” reads as follows:

“_Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 January 1937.—‘As stated by Dr. Ley, _Reichsorganisationsleiter_, on 23 November 1937 at Ordensburg Sonthofen, these Adolf Hitler Schools, as the first step of the principle of selecting a special elite, form an important branch in the educational system of the National Socialist training of future leaders [_Fuehrernachwuchs_]’

“_Voelkischer Beobachter_ dated 24 November 1937.—* * * The curriculum has been laid down by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, together with the _Reichsorganisationsleiter_ and the Reich Youth Leader.” (_3529-PS_)

Rosenberg exercised further influence in the education of Party members through the establishment of community schools for all organizations of the Party. The following statement is taken from the 1934 edition of “_Das Dritte Reich_”:

“We support the request of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for the supervision of the whole spiritual and ideological training and instruction of the NSDAP, Party member Alfred Rosenberg, to organize _community schools_ of all organizations of the NSDAP twice a year, in order to show by this common effort the ideological and political unity of the NSDAP and the steadfastness of the National Socialist will.” (_3528-PS_)

Rosenberg’s program was endorsed by Schirach as well as by Himmler, Ley, and others.

Virtually every phase of National Socialist training came under Rosenberg’s influence, and unified ideological concepts were inculcated in every echelon of the party due to his influence. The 1936 edition of “_Das Dritte Reich_”, under the heading “Education in the Ordensburg” states:

“Those Party members, selected for training in leadership in accordance with such points of view (who must have completed their labor service and their military service satisfactorily) are to be taught in the Ordensburgen by the best teachers in history and science of race, philosophy and culture, economics and specialized training, etc. To determine the ideological direction of this education, to choose suitable teachers and to train them, is one of the tasks of the Senior School of the Party [_Hohe Schule der Partei_] which is to be established in the near future and will be placed under the direction of the Reich Leader Party member Alfred Rosenberg in his capacity as Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of the Entire Spiritual and Ideological Teaching and Education of the NSDAP.” (_3552-PS_)

(8) _Plunder of art treasures._ In his capacity as the Fuehrer’s delegate, Rosenberg established the Institute for the Exploration of the Jewish Question, in Frankfort on Main. (This institute, commonly known as the “_Hohe Schule_”, has been referred to in the discussion of the Plunder of Art Treasures in Chapter XIV.) Into its library there flowed books, documents, and manuscripts which were looted from virtually every country of occupied Europe. As Ideological Delegate Rosenberg conducted the fabulous art looting activities of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, activities which extended to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, the Occupied Eastern Territories, Hungary, and Greece. The extent of the plunder is indicated in document _1015-B-PS_ which contains a detailed account of the seizure of over 21,000 valuable objects of art, and in document _L-188_ in which the looting of the contents of over 71,000 Jewish homes is described.

The importance of Rosenberg’s activities as official ideologist of the Nazi party was not overlooked. The Hart biography of Rosenberg, entitled, “The Man and His Work” (_3559-PS_), states that Rosenberg won the German National prize in 1937. The creation of this prize was the Nazis’ petulant reply to the award of the Nobel prize to Carlin Assietsky, an inmate of a German concentration camp. The citation which accompanied the award to Rosenberg read as follows:

“Alfred Rosenberg has helped with his publications to lay the scientific and intuitive foundation and to strengthen the philosophy of the National Socialist in the most excellent way. His indefatigable struggle to keep National Socialist philosophy clean was especially meritorious. Only future times will be able to fully estimate the depth of the influence of this man on the philosophical foundation of the National Socialist Reich. The National Socialist movement, and beyond that, the entire German people, will be deeply gratified that the Fuehrer has distinguished Alfred Rosenberg as one of his oldest and most faithful fighting comrades by awarding him the German National Prize.” (_3559-PS_)

The contribution which Rosenberg’s book, “The Myth of the Twentieth Century,” made to Nazi ideological propaganda was appraised in the November 1942 edition of the official National Socialist book review publication, “_Bucher Kunde_”, as follows:

“Next to the Fuehrer’s book it has contributed to a unique extent to the rise and the spiritual and physical development of this people. Twelve years after Alfred Rosenberg’s ‘Mythus’ first appeared, a million copies of the book have been published and circulated.”

* * * * * *

“It must therefore be stated that the phrases coined by Alfred Rosenberg have passed into the consciousness of the whole people, and it is just today that they are proving pillars of an ideological building whose completion is the purpose of the fight being waged not least today.” (_3554-PS_)

The significance of ideological training in promoting the aims of the conspiracy is emphasized in a brief statement which Hitler made to his supreme commanders on 23 November 1939. On that occasion, Hitler said:

“The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological education of the German people by the Party.” (_789-PS_)

The contribution which Rosenberg made through formulation and dissemination of National Socialist ideology was fundamental to the conspiracy. As apostle of neo-paganism, exponent of the drive for “_Lebensraum_,” glorifier of the myth of nordic superiority, and as one of the oldest and most energetic Nazi proponents of anti-Semitism, he contributed materially to unification of the German people behind the swastika. He provided the impetus and philosophy of National Socialism.

C. _ROSENBERG’S ACTIVITIES ABROAD, THROUGH THE APA, IN PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR._

Rosenberg also actively contributed toward the preparation for aggressive war through the international activities of the APA (The Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP). Rosenberg became a _Reichsleiter_, the highest level of rank in the Leadership Corps, and was made chief of the Foreign Political Office of the NSDAP in April 1933 (_3530-PS_). The Organizational Manual of the NSDAP (_2319-PS_) describes the functions of the APA as including the influencing of public opinion abroad so as to convince foreign nations that Nazi Germany desires peace. The following excerpt indicates the far-flung activities of the APA:

“* * * II. 1. The APA is divided into three main offices:

“A. Office for Foreign Referats with the Main Offices.

_a._ England and Far East _b._ Near East _c._ South East _d._ North _e._ Old Orient _f._ Controls, personnel questions, etc.

“B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service.

“C. Office of Foreign Commerce.

“2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press service and an educational office.” (_2319-PS_)

The Press activities of the APA, designed to influence world opinion in such a manner as to conceal the conspirators’ true purposes and thus facilitate the preparation for waging aggressive war, were conducted on an ambitious scale. “A Short Report on the Activities of the APA of the NSDAP” describes the press activities as follows:

“* * * _The Press_: The Press Division of the APA is comprised of persons who together master all the languages that are in use. Daily they examine approximately 300 newspapers and deliver to the Fuehrer, the deputy Fuehrer, and all other interested offices the condensations of the important trends of the entire world press. I know that these press reports are highly praised by all who constantly follow them. The Press Division furthermore conducts an exact archives on the attitudes of the most important papers of the world and an exact archives on the most important journalists of the world. Many embarrassments during conferences in Germany could have been avoided had one consulted these archives (case of Leumas, Nurnberg, 1934; case of Dorothy Thompson; and others). Further, the Press Division was able to arrange a host of interviews as well as conducting a great number of friendly foreign journalists to the various official representatives of Germany.” (_003-PS_)

The nature and extent of the activities of the APA are amply disclosed in a “Report on the Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party from 1933 to 1943,” signed by Rosenberg (_007-PS_). This report contains a recital of widespread activities in foreign countries. These activities range from the promotion of economic penetration, to fomentation of anti-Semitism; from cultural and political infiltration to the instigation of treason. Activities were carried on throughout the world and extended to such widely separated points as the Middle East and Brazil. (_007-PS_)

(1) _Activities in Hungary, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg._ Much of the APA’s achievements were brought about through the subtle exploitation of personal relationship. Activities in Hungary proceeded as follows:

“* * * _The first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau._ Julius Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian Premier’s chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection with him.” (_007-PS_)

The APA endeavored to strengthen the War Economy by shifting the source of food imports to the Balkans:

“Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated _the transfer of raw material purchases from overseas_ to the areas accessible by overland traffic routes, i.e., primarily _in the Balkans_, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed was paid to the Bureau in these endeavors, but it later secured the active support especially of the Food Estate [_Naeurstand_]. Through its cooperation, e.g., on the subject of fruit and vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source of imports was attained, particularly through the currently initiated cooperation with Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives as well as with commercial associations all over the Balkans.” (_007-PS_)

Activities in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg were confined to “observation of existing conditions” and “to the establishment of relations, especially of a commercial nature.” (_007-PS_)

(2) _Activities in Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq._ In Iran the APA achieved a high degree of economic penetration, in addition to promoting cultural relations:

“The Bureau’s initiative in developing, with the help of commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily favorable way, in reciprocal trade relations.

“Naturally in Germany, too, this initiative at first encountered a completely negative attitude and resistance on the part of the competent state authorities, an attitude that had first to be overcome.

“In the course of a few years the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in 1939 Iran’s trade turnover with Germany had attained first place. Even Soviet Russia, the competitor who had been biggest and most dreaded previously, had been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with activation of commercial relations, the Bureau had also intensified cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing commercial influence and in closest collaboration with the Iranian Government, created a series of cultural institutions headed and directed by Germans.” (_007-PS_)

Rosenberg further reports on APA activities in other parts of the world:

“Afghanistan’s neutral position today is largely due to the Bureau’s activity.”

* * * * * *

“The _Arab question_, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. In spite of England’s tutelage of _Iraq_ the Bureau established a series of connections to a number of leading personalities of the Arab world, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia.” (_007-PS_)

In view of the numerous “personal connections” maintained by the Bureau in many different countries, it is not difficult to surmise what Rosenberg meant when he stated at the conclusion of his report:

“The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically feasible projects. With the outbreak of war it [the APA] was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many _personal_ connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.

“(Signed) Rosenberg” (_007-PS_)

(3) _Activities in Rumania._ Annex Two of the report deals with activities in Rumania. Here the APA’s intrigue was more insidious, its interference in the internal affairs of a foreign nation more pronounced. After describing the failure of what Rosenberg terms a “basically sound anti-Semitic tendency”, due to dynastic squabbles and party fights, Rosenberg describes the APA’s influence in the unification of conflicting elements:

“What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political personality. After manifold groping trials the Bureau believed to have found such a personality—the former Minister and poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania, though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with the future of the National-Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for Rumania’s renascence internally, and her _Anschluss_ with Germany externally. Through the Bureau’s initiative both parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga’s leadership and with Cuza as Honorary President.” (_007-PS, Annex II_)

Rosenberg’s man, Goga, was supported by two “splinter parties” which had not joined the anti-Semitic trend of these two parties. Rosenberg has this to say:

“_Through intermediaries_, the Bureau _maintained constant contact_ with both tendencies, just as it constantly consulted with Goga, through Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickendanz, about tactics to be followed.” (_007-PS, Annex II_)

Goga was appointed Prime Minister by the King in December 1937. The influence of Rosenberg’s ideology had achieved a major triumph, for he states:

“_Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event had been considered completely impossible._” (_007-PS, Annex II_)

Rosenberg’s intrigues made a significant contribution to Nazi preparations for aggressive war, and the benefit to Germany’s position in the Balkans was great. Rosenberg reports that upon Goga’s resignation he left a personal heir in Marshal Antonescu, who was appointed by Goga as Minister of War against the wishes of the King. Of Antonescu Rosenberg says:

“After Goga’s resignation, Antonescu still remained in the king’s cabinet at Goga’s wish. He also maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby the possibility of eliminating the king was at hand—and was exploited. Antonescu today appears in practice as executor of the heritage bequested to him by Goga, who had led him from political insignificance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany’s liking had become possible in Rumania.

“(Signed) Rosenberg.” (_007-PS_)

It will be recalled that on 5 September 1940 Antonescu became President of the Rumanian Council of Ministers and immediately suspended the Rumanian constitution. King Carol abdicated on the following day, and Rumania existed as a German satellite throughout the war. Rosenberg’s aims had been achieved.

The substantial contribution which Rosenberg had thus made to Germany’s strategic plans for aggressive war is evident from a brief review of the military action which followed in the wake of his political maneuvers. Shortly after King Carol’s abdication Antonescu “invited” German troops to “protect” the Rumanian oil fields. When Hungary subscribed to the Axis pact a few weeks later, Germany acquired a continuous land bridge to the Black Sea, through Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. When Bulgaria subscribed to the Pact in March 1941, a German thrust southward through Yugoslavia and Greece became feasible, for with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria secure, the entire German eastern flank was safe from attack. A month later, Yugoslavia and Greece were invaded. Only when they were overcome was Germany free to attack the Soviet Union. Seven weeks after the fall of Crete, Germany launched her war on the U.S.S.R. Thus, Rosenberg’s intrigue in Rumania provided a vital link in the chain of the German strategy of aggression.

(4) _Relations with Quisling in Norway._ Rosenberg also played a leading role in the development of fifth-column activities in Norway. He fostered the development of close relations between Germany and Quisling, procured financial backing for Quisling’s activities, and brought him into contact with Raeder and Hitler. Rosenberg kept the Reich informed as to internal developments in Norway through his contacts with Hagelin, Quisling’s deputy, and took an active part in the development of plans for a Quisling coup in Norway. The record is clear that Rosenberg provided the inspiration and the means for the betrayal of Norway by Quisling and Hagelin—treason for which the Norwegian Government has tried, condemned, and executed them. (_007-PS_; _C-64_; _C-65_; _C-66_; _004-PS_; _957-PS_)

D. _ROSENBERG’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES._

Rosenberg participated in the conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the areas of the Occupied East which he administered for over three years. This area included the Baltic States, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine, and the Eastern portion of Poland.

(The mass murder and mistreatment of the Eastern peoples, and the spoliation of their territories is discussed in Chapter X on Forced Labor, Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation, Chapter XI on Concentration Camps, Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews, Section 5 of Chapter XV on the SS, and Section 6 of Chapter XV on the Gestapo and SD.) Rosenberg bears personal responsibility for these crimes.

Rosenberg may contend that some of these crimes were committed against his wishes. There is, indeed, some evidence that he protested on occasion, not out of humanitarian reasons, but on the ground of political expediency. Rosenberg may also attempt to place the blame for these crimes on other agencies and other defendants. The documents prove, however, that he himself formulated the harsh policies in the execution of which the crimes were committed; that the crimes were committed for the most part by persons and agencies within his jurisdiction and control; that the other agencies which participated in the commission of these crimes were invited by him to cooperate in the administration of the East, although the brutal methods customarily employed by them were common knowledge; and that his Ministry lent full cooperation to their activities despite the criminal methods that were employed.

(1). _Activities as “Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East European Region.”_ Rosenberg was actively participating in the affairs of the East as early as 20 April 1941, two months prior to the German attack upon the Soviet Union. On that date he was designated by Hitler as “Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions connected with the East European Region” (_865-PS_). The initial preparations undertaken by Rosenberg for fulfillment of his new task indicate the extent to which he cooperated in promoting the military plans for aggression. They also show that he understood his task as requiring the assistance of a multitude of Reich agencies and that he invited their cooperation.

Shortly after his appointment by Hitler, Rosenberg conducted a series of conferences with representatives of various Reich agencies (_1039-PS_). Cooperation of the following agencies in the administration of the Eastern Territories was contemplated and solicited by Rosenberg:

OKW OKH OKM Ministry of Economy Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Ministry of the Interior Reich Youth Leadership German Labor Front Ministry of Labor The SS and the SA—(as well as several others). (_1039-PS_)

These arrangements, it should be noted, were made by Rosenberg in his capacity as Commissioner on Eastern Questions—before the attack on the Soviet Union, before Rosenberg was appointed Minister of the Occupied East, and before there was any Occupied Eastern Territory for Germany to administer.

(_a_) _“Solution” of the Jewish Problem._ Emphasis must be placed on Rosenberg’s basic attitudes regarding his new task, and the directives he knew he would be expected to follow. On 29 April 1941 he stated:

“A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.)” (_1024-PS_)

On 8 May 1941, instructions were prepared for all Reich Commissars in the Occupied Eastern Territories (_1030-PS_). The last paragraph of these instructions reads as follows:

“From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is in a position to promote and direct national culture and science in many fields. It will be necessary that in some territories an uprooting and resettlement of various racial stocks [_Voelkerschaften_] will have to be effected.” (_1030-PS_)

In his “Instructions for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia” (officially referred to together as the “Ostland”), Rosenberg directs that the Ostland be transformed into a part of the Greater German Reich by Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable elements. (_1029-PS_)

In a speech delivered by Rosenberg on 20 June 1941 he stated that the job of feeding Germans was the top of Germany’s claim on the East; that there was no obligation to feed also the Russian peoples; that this was a harsh necessity bare of any feeling; that a very extensive evacuation would be necessary; and that the future would hold many hard years in store for the Russians. (_1058-PS_).

On 22 June 1941 the German armies invaded the U.S.S.R.

(_b_) _Deportation of Prisoners of War for Labor in the Reich._ On 4 July 1941 a representative of the Rosenberg Bureau attended a conference on the subject of mobilization of labor and utilization of Soviet prisoners of war. A memorandum of this conference (_1199-PS_) states that among the participants were representatives of the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, of the Reich Labor Ministry, of the Reich Food Ministry, and of the Rosenberg Bureau. The conference proceeded as follows:

“After an introduction by Lt. Col. Dr. Krull, Lt. Col. Breyer of the P.W. department explained that actually there was in effect a prohibition by the Fuehrer against bringing Russian P.W.’s into the Reich for mobilization of labor [_Arbeitseinsatz_]; but that one might count on this prohibition being relaxed a little.”

* * * * * *

“The chairman summarized the results of the discussion as indicating that all the interested bureaus unqualifiedly advocated and supported the demand for utilization of P.W.’s because of manpower needs [_Arbeitseinsatz_] in the Reich. The War Economy and Armament office will approach the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan with a request for relaxation of the restrictive regulations and express to the Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces its point of view, accordingly.” (_1199-PS_)

(_c_) _Germanization._ On 16 July 1941, the day before Rosenberg’s appointment as Minister of the Occupied East, he attended a conference at the Fuehrer’s Headquarters. At that time Hitler stated that

“The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans alone.” (_L-221_)

Hitler further stated that Germany’s objectives in the East were three-fold, first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; third, to exploit it. (_L-221_)

Thus, the character of the administration contemplated for the Occupied East was well established before Rosenberg took office as Minister of the Occupied East. He knew of these plans and was in accord with them. Persecution of the Jews, forced labor of prisoners of war, Germanization and exploitation were basic points of policy at the time he assumed office.

(2) _Activities as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories._ On 17 July 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, territories which included nearly all the area seized by Germany from the U. S. S. R. (_1997-PS_)

(_a_) _Rosenberg’s complete control over, knowledge of, and responsibility for all non-military German activities and policies in the occupied Eastern Territories._ The organizational structure and chain of responsibility within the Ministry for the Occupied East emphasizes Rosenberg’s responsibility.

A treatise entitled “The Organization of the Administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories” (_1056-PS_) is undated and unsigned, but further information regarding it may be obtained by reference to document _EC-347_, Goering’s “Green Folder.” Part II, subsection of _EC-347_ is entitled,

“Excerpts from the Directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the Civilian Administration. (Brown Folder, Pt. I, pp. 25-30).” (_EC-347_)

The two paragraphs which follow are identical to two paragraphs found in document _1056-PS_. Thus, _1056-PS_ is identified as being a reproduction of Part I of the Brown Folder which was mentioned in the “Green Folder,” and was issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

The directives issued by the Rosenberg Ministry itself (_1056-PS_) prove the extent of Rosenberg’s authority: he was the Supreme civilian authority in the Eastern Territories. There was a continuous chain of command from Rosenberg down to regional administrative officials, extending even to the local prison warden (_1056-PS_). The relationship which existed between the Rosenberg Ministry and other German agencies varied from full control by Rosenberg, to close cooperation with them made mandatory by his directives and by Hitler’s orders. Finally, the various subdivisions of the Ministry, were required to submit period-reports of the situation within their jurisdiction—so that the numerous reports of brutality which Rosenberg received were submitted to him pursuant to his orders. (_1056-PS_)

The treatise on the organization of Rosenberg’s ministry states as follows:

“The newly occupied Eastern Territories are subordinated to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. By directions of the Fuehrer he establishes a civil administration there upon withdrawal of the military administration. He heads and supervises the entire administration of this area and represents the sovereignty of the Reich in the occupied Eastern Territories.”

* * * * * *

“To the Reich Ministry is assigned a deputy of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.” (_1056-PS_)

The responsibility of the Reich Commissars is described as follows:

“In the Reich Commissariats, Reich Commissars are responsible for the entire civil administration under the supreme authority of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. According to the instructions of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories the Reich Commissar, as a functionary of the Reich, heads and supervises, within his precincts, the entire civil administration. Within the scope of these instructions he acts on his own responsibility.

“Subordinate offices of the Reich Commissar are:

“General Commissariats,

“Main Commissariats,

“District Commissariats.” (_1056-PS_)

The SS was placed under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction and control:

“The Higher SS- and Police Leader is directly subordinated to the Reich Commissar. However, the Chief of Staff has the general right to secure information from him also. His official title is:

‘The Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territory The Higher SS- and Police Leader.’

“Great stress is to be placed on close cooperation between him, the Chief of Staff, and the other Main Department Heads of the office of the Reich Commissar, particularly with the one for Policies.” (_1056-PS_)

The scope of Rosenberg’s control over the SS in the Occupied Eastern Territories is revealed in a decree signed by Rosenberg, dated 17 July 1941, and found in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the Reich Minister for the Occupied East, 1942 #2, pages 7 and 8. This decree provides for the creation of summary courts-martial to punish crimes committed by non-Germans in the East, as determined by the Reich Commissar. The courts are to be presided over by a police officer or an SS leader, who have authority to order the death sentence and confiscation of property, and whose decisions are not subject to appeal. The General Commissar is given the right to reject a summary Courts’ decision. Thus, the determination of the SS is subordinated to the authority of Rosenberg’s Ministry.

The position of the General Commissar is defined as follows in the organizational treatise:

“The General Commissar forms the administrative office of intermediate appeal. Within his jurisdiction he heads the administration according to the general directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the prescriptions of the Reich Commissar.”

* * * * * *

“The SS- and _Police Leader_ assigned to the General Commissar is directly subordinated to him; however, the Chief of Staff has the general right of requiring information from him.” (_1056-PS_)

Regional Commissars are described as follows:

“The Regional Commissar heads the entire administration of the lower administrative office in the Circuit District [_Kreisgebiet_] in accordance with the instructions of the General Commissar and the superior offices * * *. The leader of the police unit assigned to him is directly subordinated to him.” (_1056-PS_)

Main Commissars are described in these terms:

“Upon recommendation by the Reich Commissar the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories appoints Main Commissars for Main Districts formed by the consolidation of several Circuit Districts.” (_1056-PS_)

The order of superiority in the service among these various officials is stated as follows:

“The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories is the service superior of the Reich Commissar and the officials and the employees subordinate to them. The Reich Commissar is the superior of all officials and employees of his office and of the offices subordinate to him. The General Commissar is the superior of the officials and employees of his office and of the officials and employees of the offices of the Main and Regional Commissars. The Main Commissar and the Regional Commissar are the superior of the officials and employees of their offices.” (_1056-PS_)

Thus, there is a continuous chain of command and of accountability from the Reich Minister, Rosenberg, down through each subdivision of the Ministry.

Furthermore, Rosenberg had authority to legislate for the entire area, and the jurisdiction of his Ministry was exclusive, aside from that of the military. The organizational treatise states:

“The Reich Commissars, General Commissars, Main Commissars and Regional Commissars (City Commissars) are—aside from the military agencies—the only Reich authorities [_Reichsbehoerden_] in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Other Reich authorities may not be established alongside them. They handle all questions of administration of the area which is subordinate to their sovereignty and all affairs which concern the organization and activity of the administration including those of the Police in the supervision of the native [_landeseigenen_] agencies and organizations, and of the population.

“The Reich Minister governs the occupied Eastern Territories by order of the Fuehrer. He can make the law for all the territories.” (_1056-PS_)

The following passage shows that the economic exploitation of the territory was undertaken in fullest cooperation with the Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan:

“The Fuehrer has entrusted Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, with the supervision of the tasks of the war economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories. The economic inspectorates and economic commands are active there as his representatives [_Organe_] [see Green Folio]. These economic inspectorates and economic commands will be substantially absorbed in the agencies of the civil administration after the establishment of the civil administration.” (_1056-PS_)

Careful provision was made for channeling to Rosenberg complete and accurate information as to the situation throughout the territory governed by him:

“The Reich and General Commissars will determine the periods at which the subordinate agencies are to report regularly about the general situation without prejudice to the duty to provide individual reports and special delivery reports (at first, at short intervals which can be later lengthened). At first the Reich Commissars will give the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories a comprehensive report on the situation in brief form twice a month, on the first and fifteenth of each month. The Reich Minister is to be given a report by the Reich Commissar immediately about incidents of an especially important nature. The General Commissars and Regional Commissars must report directly to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories by the quickest means particularly important incidents, as, for example, widespread unrest, more important acts of sabotage and strikes, great natural catastrophes and the like, and at the same time report them to the next superior agency.” (_1056-PS_)

The Second Section of this organizational treatise, entitled “Working directives for the Civil Administration,” contains this statement:

“* * * the Hague Rules of Land Warfare which deal with the administration of a country occupied by a foreign armed power are not valid.” (_1056-PS_; _EC-347_)

The document continues as follows:

“The handling of cases of sabotage is the concern of the Senior SS- and Police Leader, of the SS- and Police Leader and/or the police leaders of the lower echelon. Insofar, however, as collective measures against the population of a definite region appear appropriate, the decision about them rests with the competent Commissar on the proposal of the Police Leader. The calling of the population for the tasks of guarding can be ordered by the Regional Commissar.

“The assessment of fines of money or goods, as well as the ordering of the seizure of hostages and the shooting of inhabitants of the territory in which the acts of sabotage have taken place, can only be by the General Commissar, insofar as the Reich Commissar himself does not intervene.”

* * * * * *

“The District Commissar is responsible for the supervision of all prisons, insofar as the Reich Commissar does not decree otherwise.” (_1056-PS_; _EC-347_)

(_b_) _Rosenberg’s Use of His Authority and Power for Criminal Purposes._ The manner in which Rosenberg’s authority and power were wielded is illustrated in other sections of this volume, which show that in the Eastern Territories millions of Jews were exterminated; that millions of slave laborers were pressed into service under indescribable conditions; that the populace was degraded, starved, beaten, and murdered; and that the country was stripped of its resources. However, in order to illustrate the manner in which Rosenberg participated in the criminal activities conducted within his jurisdiction, four examples may be mentioned.

_1. Seizure of Jewish Property._ The first illustration is contained in the decree signed by Lohse, Reichscommissar for the Ostland, which is published in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the Reichscommissar for the Ostland, 1942, No. 38, pages 158 and 159. This decree provides for the seizure of the entire property of the Jewish population in the Ostland, including the claims of Jews against third parties. The seizure was made retroactive to the day of the occupation of the territory by the German troops. This sweeping decree was issued and published by Rosenberg’s immediate subordinate, and it must be assumed that Rosenberg knew of it and acquiesced in it. The power to enact such a decree, as previously outlined, arose by virtue of delegation of that power by Rosenberg to the Reichscommissar.

_2. Extermination of Jews._ The second illustration is the report of the prison warden of Minsk that 516 German and Russian Jews had been killed. The warden called attention to the fact that valuable gold had been lost due to the failure to knock out the tooth-fillings of the victims before they were done away with (_R-135_).

_3. Deportations for Forced Labor._ The third illustration is a letter which Rosenberg wrote to Sauckel on 21 December 1942 in the following terms:

“I thank you very much for your report on the execution of the great task given to you, and I am glad to hear that in carrying out your mission you have always found the necessary support, even on the part of the civilian authorities in the occupied Eastern territories. For myself and the officials under my command this collaboration was and is self-evident, especially since both you and I have, with regard to the solution of the labor problem in the East, represented the same view-points from the beginning.” (_018-PS_)

As late as 11 July 1944 the Rosenberg Ministry was actively concerned with the continuation of the forced labor program in spite of the retreat from the East. A letter from Alfred Meyer, Rosenberg’s deputy, addressed to Sauckel, dated 11 July 1944 shows that this time it is Rosenberg’s Ministry that is urging action:

“1. * * * The war employment command [_Kriegseinsatzkommando_] formerly stationed in Minsk must continue under all circumstances the calling in of your white Ruthenian and Russian manpower for military employment in the Reich. In addition, the command has the mission to bring young boys of 10-14 years of age to the Reich.” (_199-PS_)

_4. Economic Exploitation._ The final illustration of Rosenberg’s criminal responsibility is contained in a secret letter from Rosenberg to Bormann dated 17 October 1944 (_327-PS_). It furnishes a graphic account of Rosenberg’s activities in the economic exploitation of the Occupied East. The first paragraph reads:

“In order not to delay the liquidation of companies under my supervision, I beg to point out that the companies concerned are not private firms but business enterprises of the Reich, so that also actions with regard to them, just as with regard to government offices, are reserved to the highest authorities of the Reich. I supervise the following companies * * *.” (_327-PS_)

There follows a list of nine companies—a trading company, an agricultural development Company, a supply company, a pharmaceutical company, and five banking concerns. The mission of the trading company is stated to be:

“Collection of all agricultural products as well as commercial marketing and transportation thereof. (Delivery to armed forces and the Reich.)” (_327-PS_)

The letter continues as follows:

“During this period, the Z.O. (Central Trading Corporation), together with its subsidiaries, has collected:

“Grain 9,200,000 tons Meat and meat products 622,000 tons Linseed 950,000 tons Butter 208,000 tons Sugar 400,000 tons Fodder 2,500,000 tons Potatoes 3,200,000 tons Seeds 141,000 tons Other agricultural products 1,200,000 tons and 1,075,000,000 eggs

“The following was required for transportation:

“1,418,000 railroad box cars and 472,000 tons of boat shipping space.” (_327-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALFRED ROSENBERG

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 59 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *001-PS │Memorandum for the Fuehrer signed │ │ │Rosenberg, 18 December 1941, │ │ │concerning Jewish possessions in │ │ │France. (USA 282) │ III │ 1 │ │ │ *003-PS │Report of activity of NSDAP Bureau for│ │ │Foreign Affairs, October 1939. (USA │ │ │603) │ III │ 10 │ │ │ *004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │ │Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │ │on the Political Preparation of the │ │ │Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19 │ │ │ *007-PS │Report on activities of the Foreign │ │ │Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 │ │ │signed Rosenberg. (GB 84) │ III │ 27 │ │ │ 016-PS │Sauckel’s Labor Mobilization Program, │ │ │20 April 1942. (USA 168) │ III │ 46 │ │ │ *017-PS │Letter from Sauckel to │ │ │Reichsministerfor the Occupied Eastern│ │ │Territories, 5 October 1942, │ │ │concerning mobilization of foreign │ │ │labor forces. (USA 180) │ III │ 60 │ │ │ *018-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Sauckel, 21 │ │ │December 1942, concerning labor in the│ │ │East. (USA 186) │ III │ 61 │ │ │ *019-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ │March 1943, concerning draft of │ │ │workers from the East. (USA 181) │ III │ 65 │ │ │ *031-PS │Memorandum, 12 June 1944, concerning │ │ │evacuation of youths from the │ │ │territory of Army Group “Center”, and │ │ │interoffice memorandum, Ministry for │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories, 14 June │ │ │1944. (USA 171) │ III │ 71 │ │ │ *054-PS │Report to Reich Ministry for Occupied │ │ │Eastern Territories, 7 October 1942, │ │ │concerning treatment of Ukrainian │ │ │Specialists. (USA 198) │ III │ 90 │ │ │ *064-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27 │ │ │September 1940, enclosing letter from │ │ │Gauleiter Florian criticizing churches│ │ │and publications for soldiers. (USA │ │ │359) │ III │ 109 │ │ │ *070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │ │25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │ │National Socialist mottos for morning │ │ │prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118 │ │ │ *072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │ │1941, concerning confiscation of │ │ │property, especially of art treasures │ │ │in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122 │ │ │ 084-PS │Interdepartmental report of Ministry │ │ │for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 │ │ │September 1942, concerning status of │ │ │Eastern laborers. (USA 199) │ III │ 130 │ │ │ *089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │ │March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │ │issue further newsprint to │ │ │confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147 │ │ │ *098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │ │February 1940, urging creation of │ │ │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │ │provide moral foundation for NS │ │ │religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152 │ │ │ *101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │ │Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │ │concerning undesirability of religious│ │ │literature for members of the │ │ │Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160 │ │ │ *122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ │April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │ │of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │ │elimination of theological faculties │ │ │in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173 │ │ │ *199-PS │Letter from Alfred Meyer to Sauckel, │ │ │11 July 1944, concerning forced labor │ │ │of children. (USA 606) │ III │ 213 │ │ │ *212-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file │ │ │concerning instructions for treatment │ │ │of Jews. (USA 272) │ III │ 222 │ │ │ *254-PS │Letter from Raab to Reichsministerfor │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 June │ │ │1944, concerning burning of houses in │ │ │Wassilkow district. (USA 188) │ III │ 231 │ │ │ 265-PS │Memorandum of oral report by Lyser to │ │ │Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on situation │ │ │in district Shitomir. (USA 191) │ III │ 234 │ │ │ *290-PS │Letter from Rosenberg Ministry, 12 │ │ │November 1943, concerning burning of │ │ │houses in Mueller’s district. (USA │ │ │189) │ III │ 240 │ │ │ *294-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by │ │ │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning│ │ │conditions in Russia. (USA 185) │ III │ 242 │ │ │ *327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │ │October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │ │of property in Eastern Occupied │ │ │Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257 │ │ │ 342-PS │Decree, 13 October 1941, concerning │ │ │confiscation of Jewish property. │ III │ 264 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │ │Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │ │concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │ │Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │ │Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621 │ │ │ *957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │ │February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641 │ │ │ 1015-B-PS │Report on activities of Special Staff │ │ │for Pictorial Art, October 1940 to │ │ │July 1944. │ III │ 666 │ │ │ *1017-PS │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1 │ │ │regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found │ │ │in Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA │ │ │142) │ III │ 674 │ │ │ 1024-PS │Memorandum, 29 April 1941, concerning │ │ │organization for handling problems in │ │ │the Eastern Territories. (USA 278) │ III │ 685 │ │ │ *1028-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May │ │ │1941, concerning instructions for a │ │ │Reichskommissar in the Ukraine. (USA │ │ │273) │ III │ 690 │ │ │ *1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a │ │ │Reich Commissar in the Baltic States”,│ │ │8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg’s │ │ │“Russia File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690 │ │ │ *1030-PS │General instructions for all Reich │ │ │Commissars in the Occupied Eastern │ │ │Territories, 8 May 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg file. (USA 144) │ III │ 692 │ │ │ *1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 │ │ │ *1056-PS │Directives concerning administration │ │ │of Occupied Eastern Territories (Brown│ │ │Folder). (USA 605) │ III │ 701 │ │ │ *1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, │ │ │by Rosenberg before people most │ │ │intimately concerned with Eastern │ │ │Problem, found in his “Russia File”. │ │ │(USA 147) │ III │ 716 │ │ │ *1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │ │enclosing copies of report concerning │ │ │anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783 │ │ │ 1188-PS │Decree of Fuehrer concerning economy │ │ │in newly Occupied Eastern Territories,│ │ │20 May 1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832 │ │ │ 1199-PS │Conference memorandum, 4 July 1941, │ │ │concerning utilization of Soviet PW’s │ │ │for forced labor in Reich. (USA 604) │ III │ 840 │ │ │ *1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │ │Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │ │(GB 159) │ IV │ 280 │ │ │ *1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │ │concerning administration of Newly │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ │319) │ IV │ 634 │ │ │ *2319-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ │NSDAP, 4th edition, 1937. (USA 602) │ IV │ 1009 │ │ │ *2349-PS │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th │ │ │Century” by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941. │ │ │(USA 352) │ IV │ 1069 │ │ │ *2433-PS │Extracts from “Nature, Foundation and │ │ │Aims of NSDAP” by Rosenberg, 1934. │ │ │(USA 596) │ V │ 93 │ │ │ *2523-PS │Account of conversations between │ │ │Goering and Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258 │ │ │ *2777-PS │Article: Space Policy by Rosenberg, │ │ │published in National Socialist │ │ │Monthly, May 1932, p. 199. (USA 594) │ V │ 418 │ │ │ *2886-PS │Excerpt from “The Work of Alfred │ │ │Rosenberg”—a bibliography. (USA 591) │ V │ 551 │ │ │ *2889-PS │The Jew Question as World Problem, │ │ │speech by Rosenberg, published in │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │ │edition, 29 March 1941. (USA 595) │ V │ 554 │ │ │ 2891-PS │Extracts from Rosenberg’s “Myth of the│ │ │20th Century”. │ V │ 558 │ │ │ *3000-PS │Report, from Chief of Main Office III │ │ │with the High Command in Minsk to │ │ │Reicke, 28 June 1943, on experiences │ │ │in political and economic problems in │ │ │the East, particularly White Ruthenia.│ │ │(USA 192) │ V │ 726 │ │ │ 3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3428-PS │Letter from Kube, 31 July 1942, │ │ │concerning combatting of Partisans and│ │ │action against Jews in White Ruthenia.│ │ │(USA 827) │ VI │ 131 │ │ │ *3528-PS │Extract concerning NSDAP community │ │ │schools, from The Third Reich, 1934. │ │ │(USA 599) │ VI │ 213 │ │ │ *3529-PS │Extract concerning Adolf Hitler │ │ │Schools, from Documents of German │ │ │Politics. (USA 365) │ VI │ 214 │ │ │ *3530-PS │Extract containing biographical data │ │ │of Alfred Rosenberg, from The German │ │ │Leader Lexicon, 1934-35. (USA 593) │ VI │ 214 │ │ │ *3531-PS │Extract from the National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1938, concerning Rosenberg’s│ │ │office for ideological training. (USA │ │ │597) │ VI │ 215 │ │ │ *3532-PS │Extract from The Educational Letter, │ │ │March 1934, concerning importance of │ │ │ideological training. (USA 598) │ VI │ 216 │ │ │ *3552-PS │Education in the Ordensburg, from The │ │ │Third Reich. (USA 577) │ VI │ 240 │ │ │ *3553-PS │Extract from The Myth of the 20th │ │ │Century. (USA 352) │ VI │ 240 │ │ │ *3554-PS │Extracts from The Myth of the 20th │ │ │Century, published in Book News, No. │ │ │11, November 1942. (USA 601) │ VI │ 242 │ │ │ *3557-PS │Extracts from Dates in History of │ │ │NSDAP, 1939, pp. 4-5. (USA 592). │ VI │ 243 │ │ │ 3559-PS │Award of German National Prize, from │ │ │Alfred Rosenberg’s The Man and His │ │ │Work. (USA 600) │ VI │ 243 │ │ │ 3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │ │France 1942 concerning removal of │ │ │French art objects through the German │ │ │Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg │ │ │in France. │ VI │ 646 │ │ │ *3780-PS │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with │ │ │Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning │ │ │Japanese treatment of American terror │ │ │pilots. (GB 293) │ VI │ 655 │ │ │ *C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │ │(GB 86) │ VI │ 884 │ │ │ *C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder │ │ │concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885 │ │ │ *C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │ │January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │ │and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887 │ │ │ *EC-347 │Directives for operation of the │ │ │Economy in Occupied Eastern │ │ │Territories. (USA 320) │ VII │ 421 │ │ │ *L-188 │Report of 8 August 1944, on │ │ │confiscation up to 31 July 1944. (USA │ │ │386) │ VII │ 1022 │ │ │ *L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │ │July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │ │Eastern populations and territories. │ │ │(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 │ │ │ *M-153 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │ │Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. │ │ │(GB 284) │ VIII │ 48 │ │ │ *M-156 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │ │Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. │ │ │(GB 284) │ VIII │ 49 │ │ │ R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ │reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │ │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ *Chart No. 17 │Foreign Organization of the NSDAP. │ │(2354-PS; USA 430) │ End of VIII

8. HANS FRANK

A. _FRANK HELD A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE DEUTSCHE ARBEITERPARTEI (NSDAP) AND IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT._

Frank held the following positions in the NSDAP and the German Government:

(1) Member of NSDAP, 1928-1945.

(2) Member of the Reichstag, 1930-1945.

(3) Reich Minister Without Portfolio, 1934-1945.

(4) Reich Commissar for the Coordination of the State Administration of Justice and for Reformation of the Law (_Reichskommisar fuer die Gleichschaltung der Justiz in der Landern und fuer Erneuerung der Rechtsordnung_), April 1933-December 1934, in the Ministry of Justice.

(5) President, International Chamber of Law, 1941-42.

(6) President, Academy of German Law (_Praesident der Akademie fuer Deutsches Recht_), 1933-1942.

(7) Governor-General of the Occupied Polish Territories (_General Gouverneur fuer die besetzten polnischen Gebiete_), October 1939-1945.

(8) Bavarian State Minister of Justice, March 1933-December 1934.

(9) Reichsleiter of NSDAP, 1933-1942.

(10) Leader of the National Socialist Lawyers League (_Bund Nationalsozialistischer deutscher Juristen_), 1933-1942.

(11) Editor or author of the following between 1930 and 1942:

(_a_) “_Deutsches Recht_” (Magazine of National Socialist Jurist League)

(_b_) Magazine of the Academy of German Law.

(_c_) National Socialist Handbook for Law and Legislation. (_2979-PS_)

B. _FRANK PROMOTED THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS. AS THE LEADING NAZI JURIST, HE FURTHERED THE REALIZATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM IN THE FIELD OF LAW._

Frank himself described his role in the Nazi struggle for power in the following words in August 1942:

“I have since 1920 continually dedicated my work to the NSDAP. * * * As National Socialist I was a participant in the events of November 1923, for which I received the _Blutorden_. After the resurrection of the movement in the year 1925, my real greater activity in the movement began, which made me, first gradually, later almost exclusively, the legal advisor of the Fuehrer and of the Reich leadership of the NSDAP. I thus was the representative of legal interests of the growing Third Reich in a legal ideological as well as practical legal way. * * * The culmination of this work I see in the big Leipzig Army Trial in which I succeeded in having the Fuehrer admitted to the famous oath of legality, a circumstance which gave the Movement the legal grounds to expand generously. The Fuehrer indeed recognized this achievement and in 1926 made me leader of the National Socialist Lawyers League; in 1929 Reich Leader of the Reich Legal Office of the NSDAP; in 1933 Bavarian Minister of Justice; in the same year Reich Commissioner of Justice; in 1934 President of the Academy of German Law founded by me; in December 1934 Reich Minister Without Portfolio; and in 1939 I was finally appointed to Governor General for the occupied Polish territories.

“So I was, am and will remain the representative jurist of the struggle period of National Socialism. * * *

“I profess myself now, and always, as a National Socialist and a faithful follower of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whom I have now served since 1919.” (_2233-X-PS_)

Frank’s Diary, from which this quotation is taken, to which frequent reference is made in this section, is the official journal, kept at Frank’s direction, of his administration in the General Government. It consists of 38 volumes in which are recorded the official texts of speeches, transcripts of conferences, minutes of cabinet sessions, etc. The volumes are divided into several concurrent series (_Tagebuch, Abteilungsleitersitzungen_ etc.) which cover the several aspects of the official business of the administration.

As the “representative jurist of the struggle period of National Socialism” and in the various juridical capacities listed in the preceding section, Frank was between 1933 and 1939 the most prominent policy-maker in the field of German legal theory.

In 1934 Frank founded the Academy of German Law, of which he was president until 1942. The statute defining the functions of the Academy conferred on it wide power to coordinate juridical policies:

“It is the task of the Academy for German Law to further the rejuvenation of the Law in Germany. Closely connected with the agencies competent for legislation, it shall further the realization of the National Socialist Program in the realm of Law. This task shall be carried out through well-fixed scientific methods.

“The Academy’s task shall cover primarily:

“1. The composition, the initiation, judging and preparing of drafts of law.

“2. The collaboration in rejuvenating and unifying the training in jurisprudence and political science.

“3. The editing and supporting of scientific publications.

“4. The financial assistance for research and work in specific fields of Law and Political Economy.

“5. The organization of scientific meetings and the organization of courses.

“6. The cultivation of connections to similar institutions in foreign countries”. (_1391-PS_)

What Frank as policy-maker in the field of law conceived as his task he explained in a radio address on 20 March 1934:

“The first task was that of establishing a unified German State. It was an outstanding historical and juristic—political accomplishment on the part of our Fuehrer that he reached boldly into the development of history and thereby eliminated the sovereignty of the various German states. . . .

“The second fundamental law of the Hitler Reich is racial legislation. The National Socialists were the first ones in the entire history of human law to elevate the concept of race to the status of a legal term. The German nation, unified racially and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against any further disintegration of the German race stock. . . .

“The sixth fundamental law was the legal elimination of those political organizations which within the state, during the period of the reconstruction of the people and the Reich, were once able to place their selfish aims ahead of the common good of the nation. This elimination has taken place entirely legally. It is not the coming to the fore of despotic tendencies but it was the necessary legal consequence of a clear political result, of the 14 years’ struggle of the NSDAP.

“In accordance with these unified legal aims in all spheres, particular efforts have for months now been made as regards the work of the great reform of the entire field of German law. * * *” (_2536-PS_)

Frank concluded his remarks by pointing out that the outward forms of legality could be preserved in building the Nazi state:

“As a leader of the German Jurists I am convinced that together with all strata of the German people, we shall be able to construct the legal state of Adolf Hitler in every respect and to such an extent that no one in the world will at any time be able to attack this legal state as regards its laws”. (_2536-PS_)

In his speech at the Congress of the Reich Group of University Professors of the National Socialist Jurists’ League on 3 October 1936, Frank explained the necessity for excluding Jews from the legal field:

“* * * this topic embraces all that which in our opinion will contribute to establishing National Socialism in the field of jurisprudence, thus eliminating any alien racial spirit therefrom. * * *

“We National Socialists have started with anti-Semitism in our fight to free the German people, to re-establish a German Reich and to build our entire German spiritual, cultural and social life on the indestructible foundation of our race. We started a gigantic battle in 1919 * * * It took all the self-confidence of German manhood to withstand and to triumph—in this fight to substitute the German spirit for Jewish corruption over the concerted attacks of powerful world groups of which Jewry is a representative.

“Particularly we National Socialist Jurists have a mission of our own to accomplish in this battle. We construct German law on the foundations of old and vital elements of the German people. * * *

“It is so obvious that it hardly needs mentioning that any participation whatsoever of the Jew in German law—be it in a creative, interpretative, educational or critical capacity—is impossible. The elimination of the Jews from German jurisprudence is in no way due to hatred or envy but to the understanding that the influence of the Jew on German life is essentially a pernicious and harmful one and that in the interests of the German people and to protect its future an unequivocal boundary must be drawn between us and the Jews.” (_2536-PS_)

As the leading Nazi jurist, Frank accepted and promoted the system of concentration camps and of arrest without warrant. In an article on “Legislation and Judiciary in the Third Reich” published in the Journal of the Academy of German Law in 1936, Frank explained:

“To the world we are blamed again and again because of the concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a warrant of arrest?’ I say, put yourselves into the position of our nation. Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made final victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on German soil.” (_2533-PS_)

Just as the other conspirators mobilized the military, economic, and diplomatic resources of Germany for war, Frank, in the field of legal policy, geared the German juridical machine for a war of aggression, which, as he explained in 1942 to the NSDAP District _Standortsfuehrung_ Galicia at a mass meeting in Lemberg, had for its purpose:

“* * * to expand the living space for our people in a natural manner”. (_2233-S-PS_)

Frank was proud of this accomplishment. In a speech before the Academy of German Law in November 1939, he stated:

“Today we are proud to have formulated our legal principles from the very beginning in such a way that they need not be changed in the case of war. For the rule, that right is that which is useful to the nation, and wrong is that which harms it, which stood at the beginning of our legal work, and which established this collective term of nation as the only standard of value of the law—this rule dominates also the law of these times.” (_3445-PS_)

C. _THROUGH USE OF HIS OFFICE AS GOVERNOR GENERAL, FRANK PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE TERRITORY OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND._

Certain of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi conspirators, and in particular by Frank in the General Government of Poland are discussed in Chapter X on the Slave Labor Program, Chapter XI on Concentration Camps, Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews, and