Chapter VII), was made possible by the following Cabinet laws: Law of 4

April 1933 concerning factory representative councils and economic organizations (controlling employee representation) (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 161) (_1770-PS_); Law of 19 May 1933 concerning Trustees of Labor (abolishing collective bargaining) (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 285) (_405-PS_); Law of 20 January 1934 regulating National Labor (introducing leadership principle into industrial relations (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 45) (_1861-PS_); and Law of 26 June 1935 establishing Reich Labor Service (compulsory labor service) (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 769). (_1389-PS_)

Even the anti-Jewish Nurnberg laws of 15 September 1935, although technically passed by the Reichstag, were nevertheless worked out by the Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Franz A. Medicus, who served as _Ministerialdirigent_ in the Ministry of the Interior, made this statement in a book published in 1940 (_2960-PS_):

“* * * The work of the Reich Ministry of Interior forms the basis for the three Nurnberg Laws passed by a resolution of the Reichstag on the occasion of the Reich party meeting of Freedom.

“The ‘Reich Citizenship Law’ as well as the ‘Law for the protection of German blood and German honor’ (Blood Protection Law) opened extensive tasks for the Ministry of Interior not only in the field of administration. The same applies to the ‘Reich Flag Law’ that gives the foundation for the complete re-organization of the use of the flag * * *” (_2960-PS_).

(_b_) _Decrees of The Council of Ministers._ Decrees of the Council of Ministers similarly supplied the “legal” basis for other criminal actions of the Nazi conspirators. Among these laws are the following: Decree of 5 August 1940 imposing a discriminatory tax on Polish workers in Germany (1940 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1077); Decree of 4 December 1941 regarding penal measures against Jews and Poles in the occupied Eastern Territories (1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 759) (_2746-PS_); and Decree of 30 June 1942 concerning the employment of Eastern Workers (1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 419). (_2039-PS_)

Almost immediately upon Hitler’s coming to power, the Cabinet participated in the Nazi conspiracy to wage aggressive war. This fact appears clearly from the minutes of the second session of the working committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense, dated 22 May 1933 and signed by Keitel (_EC-177_); from a letter dated 24 June 1935 and signed by von Blomberg, the Reichs Minister of War, which transmits a copy of the secret, unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and also a copy of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 in the Council for the Defense of the Reich (_2261-PS_); and from a letter dated 5 September 1939 transmitting a copy of the secret, unpublished Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 (a note dated 4 September 1938 attached to this law states that the Reich Defense law of 21 May 1935 and the decisions of the Cabinet previously mentioned are repeated) (_2194-PS_). These three documents, important in the conspiracy to wage aggressive war emphasize the participation of the Reich Cabinet and Reich Ministers, through legislative enactments, in the conspiracy.

The Reich Defense Council was a creation of the Cabinet. On 4 April 1933 the Cabinet decided to form that agency (_2261-PS_). The circumstances of its creation were discussed at the meeting of 22 May 1933 (_EC-177_):

“_Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council_

“All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To avoid these mistakes a _central agency_ has been created which occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue its existence in time of war.

“In accordance with the cabinet decision of the 4 April 1933 the Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war emergency, will go into immediate action.

“In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying and utilizing all powers and means of the nation.” (_EC-177_)

The composition of the Reich Defense Council is thereupon set out. Hitler was President; the Minister of Defense was his deputy; and he, plus six more ministers (there were only ten at that time) and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staffs were permanent members. The remaining ministers, as well as “leading industrialists”, were subject to call. Of the defendants who were then members of the Council, there was von Neurath as Foreign Affairs Minister; Frick as Interior Minister, Goering as Air Minister; and Raeder as Chief of the Navy Command Staff. (_EC-177_)

The presence of Cabinet ministers was indispensable. The cabinet by that time could legislate for the Reich. It had a definite role to play in this planning, as Keitel pointed out (_EC-177_):

“_Col. Keitel_:—Points out once more the urgency of the tasks, since it had been possible to do only very little in this connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries; (e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries with each other.” (_EC-177_)

Each separate ministry, moreover, was scheduled for a definite task.

“* * * In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down, which have come up in the _Reichswehr_ Ministry and must be considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the support on the part of other Ministries was frequently based only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was lacking. The following work plans are finished.

“_a._ Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Economics. Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Labor.

“These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation of a war economy.

“_b._ Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry.

“_c._ Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry.

“Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the competent Ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other Ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later on. The Office of Air Raid Protection will work out a work plan in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for Aviation.” (_EC-177_)

The secrecy of all undertakings was stressed:

“_Security and Secrecy._”

“Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.

“The secrecy of all Reich Defense work has to be maintained very carefully. Communications with the outside by _messenger service_ only, has been settled already with the Post Office, Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the Reichswehr Ministry. _Main Principle of security_: No document must be lost since, otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make use of it. Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the _Reichswehr_ Ministry has worked out security directives for the Reich Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.” (_EC-177_)

As time went on and greater concentration of power was needed, the Cabinet made changes and additions to this secret war planning body. Article 6 of the Secret Defense Law of 1935 (_2261-PS_) provided:

“(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war economy.

“(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

“(3) Subordinate to him are:

The Reichsminister for Economy. The Reichsminister for Food and Agriculture. The Reichs Labor Minister.

The Reichs Forest Master, and all Reichs’ agencies immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. Furthermore the financing of the war effort (in the province of the Reichs Finance Ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under his responsibility.

“(4) The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy is authorized, within his realm of responsibility to issue legal regulations, which may deviate from the existing laws.” (_2261-PS_)

Schacht was named as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. It will be noted that the Reich Ministers for Food and Agriculture and for Labor, and the Reichs Forest Master (who by this time had Cabinet rank) had not been included in the original membership of the Reichs Defense Council. Darré was Minister for Food and Agriculture, Seldte for Labor, and Goering was Reich Forest Master.

On the same day the Law was passed, the Cabinet made these decisions covering the newly-created Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy (_EC-177_):

“1. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy appointed by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime * * *.

“2. The Reichsminister of War and the Plenipotentiary for War Economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on both sides.

“3. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy will be a permanent member of the Reich Defense Council (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_). Within the working committee he represents through his leadership staff the interests of war economy.” (_EC-177_)

The complete reorganization of this Reich Defense Council took place in 1938, under the Secret Defense Law of 4th September of that year. By that time, there had been a reorganization of the Armed Forces: the chief of the OKW had been created and the War Ministry had been abolished (_2194-PS_). The Reich Defense Council in 1938 was composed of Goering, as permanent deputy and Minister of Air and Supreme Commander of the Air Force; Raeder as Supreme Commander of the Navy; Hess as Deputy of the Fuehrer; von Neurath as President of the Secret Cabinet Council; Frick as Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration; Keitel as Chief of the OKW; Funk as Plenipotentiary for Economics; Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Schacht as President of the Reichsbank directorate (_2261-PS_). An important part of the Reich Defense Council was the Working Committee. The minutes of the twelfth meeting of the Reich Defense Working Committee, on 14 May 1936, read (_EC-407_):

“1. _The National Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces_, General Field Marshal von Blomberg, opened the 12th meeting of the Reichs Defense Committee by expressing thanks for the work accomplished and pointing out in principle the necessity of a preparation for a total mobilization with emphasis on the most important measures to be taken at this time. (Among others; mobilization schedule, legal basis, preparations in the demilitarized zone.) He further indicates the assignment of the national resources (_Reichsressort_) to finance its measures for preparation of the Reichs defense out of its budget.

“2. The _chairman_ of the _Reichs Defense_ Committee, Lieutenant General Keitel, states:

“In today’s and future meetings of the Reichs Defense Committee a cross section of the general situation concerning all matters of the national defense is presented. The picture of the situation does not appear in the reports of the meetings.

“The open discussion of State secrets before our large committee gives the special obligation to the chairman of the Reichs Defense Committee of pointing out its _secrecy_.

“Today’s sessions takes place under the auspices of the restoration of the State authority in the demilitarized zone.

“The difficulties of the economic situation, which are presented today, must be mastered.” (_EC-407_)

This Working Committee was still functioning in 1939. The Mobilization Book for Civil Administration of 1939 states, in part (_1639-A-PS_):

“D. _Terms for Mobilization Preparations by the Civil Administration._

“The acceptance of all new measures in the Mobilization Book for Civil Administration must be requested from the Chief of the Reich Defense Committee (Department of State Defense in the Armed Forces High Command).” (_1639-A-PS_)

The composition of the Working Committee was redefined by the Secret Law of 1938 as follows (_2194-PS_):

“_The Reich Defense Committee_ [_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_] (RVA):

“(1) The Reich Defense Committee is the working Committee of the RVR. It prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their execution, and secures collaboration between armed forces, chief Reich offices, and party.

“(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the activity of the committee and gives the directions to the GBV and GBW and to the Reich ministries not subordinated to them and to the chief Reich offices according to the decisions of the RVR, which directions are necessary for securing their uniform execution.

“(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner for the four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW, and the Reich Defense officials.

“(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense (_RV-Referenten_) and their deputies are commissioned by the deputy of the leader, by the Reich Chancellery, by each Reich Ministry, by the Reich Leader of the SS and chief of the German police, by the Reich work leaders, by the Reich Forest Master, by the Chief Inspector for the German Road Net, by the Reich Office for Regional Order, by the Reichsbank directorate, and in the Prussian state ministry. RV-Referent and his deputy are immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary, and to the chief of the Reich office, resp.” (_2194-PS_)

The GBV and the GBW mentioned in the portion quoted above are, respectively, the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and for Economy. Under them were grouped other ministries, some of which were already permanent members of the Council. By paragraph 3 of the Secret Law the following were made subordinate to the Plenipotentiary for Administration: the Ministers of the Interior, Justice, Science and Education, Churches; the Reich Authority for Spatial Planning; and, for limited purposes, the Minister of Finance. Subordinate to and under the direction of the Plenipotentiary for Economy (a position formerly held by Schacht under the title “War Economy” and later held by Funk) were the ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and for limited purposes, the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank; the Reich Forest Master; and the Commissioner for Price Control from the 4-Year Plan.

Paragraph 5 of the law (_2194-PS_) shows that subordinated to the Chief of the OKW were the Reich Postal Minister, the Reich Transportation Minister, and the General Inspector for German Highways.

This concentration of power by the Cabinet was for one purpose only: to plan secretly with the strongest means at hand for the waging of aggressive war. Further evidence of this objective is contained in an affidavit by Frick covering the place, activities, and scope of the Reich Defense Council, including the Three-Man College (_2986-PS_):

“I, Wilhelm Frick, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

“I was Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration (_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer die Reichsverwaltung_) from the time when this office was created, until 20 August 1943. Heinrich Himmler was my deputy in this capacity. Before the outbreak of the war my task as Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration was the preparation of organization in the event of war, such as, for instance, the appointment of liaison men in the different ministries who would keep in touch with me. As Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration, I, together with the Plenipotentiary for Economy and OKW formed what was called a ‘3-Man College’ (_Dreierkollegium_). We also were members of the Reich defense Council (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_), which was supposed to plan preparations and decrees in case of war which later on were published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. Since, as soon as the war started, everything had to be done speedily and there would have been no time for planning, such measures and decrees were prepared in advance in case of war. All one then still had to do was to pull out of the drawer the war orders that had been prepared. Later on, after the outbreak of the war, these decrees were enacted by the Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich.

“(_Signed_) _Dr. Wilhelm Frick_” (_2986-PS_).

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE REICH CABINET

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 68 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │ │Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270 │ │ │ *352-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to the │ │ │Plenipotentiary of Administration, 14 │ │ │June 1942, concerning the jurisdiction│ │ │of the Council of Ministers for the │ │ │Defense of the Reich. (USA 398) │ III │ 276 │ │ │ 405-PS │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 │ │ │May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ │I, p. 285. │ III │ 387 │ │ │ *1141-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Members of │ │ │the Council of Ministers for Defense │ │ │of the Reich, 17 September 1939. (USA │ │ │393) │ III │ 805 │ │ │ 1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │ │Property subversive to People and │ │ │State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962 │ │ │ 1389-PS │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26 │ │ │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 769. │ III │ 963 │ │ │ 1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │ │State and Party, and for the │ │ │Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │ │December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973 │ │ │ 1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 252) │ III │ 978 │ │ │ 1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │ │Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979 │ │ │ 1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │ │Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 175. │ III │ 981 │ │ │ 1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │ │restoration of the Professional Civil │ │ │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986 │ │ │ 1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │ │to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987 │ │ │ 1401-PS │Law regarding admission to the Bar, 7 │ │ │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 188. │ III │ 989 │ │ │ 1402-PS │The Homestead Law of 29 September │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 685. │ III │ 990 │ │ │ *1534-PS │Eltz letter of resignation, 30 January│ │ │1937. (USA 402) │ IV │ 95 │ │ │ *1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │ │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │ │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143 │ │ │ **1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │ │universal military conscription. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 163 │ │ │ *1701-PS │Memorandum from Frick to the Reich │ │ │Minister and Chief of the Reich │ │ │Chancellery, 9 August 1943, enclosing │ │ │draft law and memorandum of comment │ │ │thereon by Rosenberg, 22 December │ │ │1943. (USA 392) │ IV │ 203 │ │ │ 1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │ │(USA 255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208 │ │ │ 1770-PS │Law concerning factory representative │ │ │councils and economic organizations, 4│ │ │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 161. │ IV │ 343 │ │ │ *1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │ │the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │ │Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349 │ │ │ 1861-PS │Law on the regulation of National │ │ │labor, 20 January 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 45. │ IV │ 497 │ │ │ 1862-PS │Ordinance for execution of Four Year │ │ │Plan, 18 October 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 887. │ IV │ 499 │ │ │ 1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │ │Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552 │ │ │ 1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │ │process, published in Legal │ │ │Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │ │Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584 │ │ │ 1962-PS │Law to change the Penal Code of 28 │ │ │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 839. │ IV │ 600 │ │ │ *1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │ │concerning administration of Newly │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ │319) │ IV │ 634 │ │ │ 2001-PS │Law to remove the Distress of People │ │ │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 │ │ │ 2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │ │the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639 │ │ │ 2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │ │of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │ │March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640 │ │ │ 2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │ │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641 │ │ │ 2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │ │Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642 │ │ │ 2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 49. │ IV │ 643 │ │ │ 2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │ │law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │ │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 341. │ IV │ 648 │ │ │ *2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │ │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │ │30 August 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │ │(GB 250) │ IV │ 650 │ │ │ 2022-PS │Law against overcrowding of German │ │ │schools and Higher Institutions, 25 │ │ │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 225. │ IV │ 651 │ │ │ 2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │ │of Public Enlightenment and │ │ │Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652 │ │ │ 2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │ │Reich Ministry for Public │ │ │Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 449. │ IV │ 653 │ │ │ 2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │ │Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │ │217) │ IV │ 654 │ │ │ 2039-PS │Decree concerning the conditions of │ │ │employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│ │ │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 419. │ IV │ 655 │ │ │ 2047-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │ │concerning the removal of the distress│ │ │of People and Reich, 30 January 1937. │ │ │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │105. │ IV │ 660 │ │ │ 2048-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │ │concerning the removal of the distress│ │ │of People and Reich, 30 January 1939. │ │ │1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│ IV │ 660 │ │ │ 2057-PS │Law relating to National Emergency │ │ │Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 699 │ │ │ 2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │ │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │ │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703 │ │ │ 2075-PS │Decree for appointment of a chief of │ │ │organization of Germans abroad within │ │ │the Foreign Office, 30 January 1937. │ │ │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │187. │ IV │ 704 │ │ │ 2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │ │formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705 │ │ │ 2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │ │Ministry for Science, Education and │ │ │Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706 │ │ │ 2082-PS │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of │ │ │Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661. │ IV │ 708 │ │ │ 2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │ │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │713. │ IV │ 709 │ │ │ 2089-PS │Decree relating to Reich Air Ministry,│ │ │5 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 241. │ IV │ 719 │ │ │ 2090-PS │Decree relating to coordination of │ │ │Jurisdiction of Reich and Prussia in │ │ │relation to church affairs, 16 July │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 1029. │ IV │ 720 │ │ │ 2091-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor appointing a Reich Minister│ │ │for Armaments and Munitions, 17 April │ │ │1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 513. │ IV │ 720 │ │ │ 2092-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer for │ │ │concentration of war economy, 2 │ │ │September 1943. 1943 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 721 │ │ │ 2093-PS │First Executive Order relating to │ │ │transfer of forestry and hunting │ │ │matters to the Reich, 12 July 1934. │ │ │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │617. │ IV │ 723 │ │ │ 2094-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │ │concerning Reich Labor Leader in Reich│ │ │Ministry ofInterior, 30 January 1937. │ │ │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│ IV │ 723 │ │ │ 2095-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on Establishment of │ │ │Supreme Reich Authority—“The Reich │ │ │Labor Leader”, 20 August 1943. 1943 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 495. │ IV │ 724 │ │ │ 2097-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │ │relating to designation of Chief of │ │ │Praesidialkanzlei, 1 December 1937. │ │ │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │1317. │ IV │ 724 │ │ │ *2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │ │February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725 │ │ │ 2099-PS │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of │ │ │Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 725 │ │ │ 2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │ │Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726 │ │ │ 2101-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │ │concerning Inspector General of German│ │ │Highways administration of 3 April │ │ │1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 192. │ IV │ 727 │ │ │ 2102-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │ │concerning Inspector General for Water│ │ │and Power, 29 July 1941. 1941 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 467. │ IV │ 727 │ │ │ 2103-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on Cabinet │ │ │Legislation, 10 May 1943. 1943 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 729 │ │ │ *2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │ │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │ │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │ │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843 │ │ │ 2231-PS │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die │ │ │Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34. │ IV │ 873 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │ │Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │ │copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │ │1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │ │Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │ │for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │ │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │ │133) │ IV │ 997 │ │ │ 2355-PS │Second Law relating to right to vote │ │ │for Reichstag, 18 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 258. │ IV │ 1098 │ │ │ *2380-PS │Articles from National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396). │ V │ 6 │ │ │ *2473-PS │Extracts from National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1943, showing party │ │ │positions of other Cabinet members in │ │ │1943. (USA 324) │ V │ 226 │ │ │ 2550-PS │Law on modification of rules of │ │ │general criminal procedure, 16 │ │ │September 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1841. │ V │ 293 │ │ │ *2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │ │Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327 │ │ │ 2746-PS │Decree concerning organization of │ │ │Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles │ │ │and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │ │ │4 December 1941. 1941 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │ │759-761. │ V │ 386 │ │ │ 2847-PS │Extracts from Reichs Ministerialblatt,│ │ │1933, regarding Cabinet change in the │ │ │Common Business Order of Reich │ │ │Ministries, para. 57c, the Circulation│ │ │of Drafts. │ V │ 509 │ │ │ 2848-PS │File memorandum from files of Council │ │ │of Ministers, initialled L. │ V │ 510 │ │ │ 2849-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, Vol. 4, │ │ │p. 81. │ V │ 511 │ │ │ *2852-PS │Minutes of meetings of Council of │ │ │Ministers for Reich Defense. (USA 395)│ V │ 512 │ │ │ 2957-PS │Extract from German Civil Servants │ │ │Calendar, 1940, p. 111. │ V │ 663 │ │ │ *2959-PS │The Reich Minister, published in New │ │ │Formation of Justice and Economy, p. │ │ │66. (USA 399) │ V │ 664 │ │ │ *2960-PS │The Reich Ministry of Interior, │ │ │published in Publications on the State│ │ │Structure. (USA 406) │ V │ 668 │ │ │ 2961-PS │Regulations for the leadership of the │ │ │German People, 1940, p. 62. │ V │ 668 │ │ │ *2964-PS │Memorial meeting of the Reich Cabinet,│ │ │published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │ │Munich edition, 1 February 1937. (USA │ │ │401) │ V │ 672 │ │ │ 2970-PS │Extracts concerning The New │ │ │Construction of the State from New │ │ │Formation of Law and Economy. │ V │ 677 │ │ │ *2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │ │Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688 │ │ │ *2999-PS │Affidavit of Hans Heinrich Lammers, 22│ │ │November 1945. (USA 391) │ V │ 725 │ │ │ 3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │ │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │ │(USA 782) │ VI │ 718 │ │ │ *3863-PS │Extracts from Operations in the Third │ │ │Reich by Lammers. (GB 320) │ VI │ 786 │ │ │ *D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │ │participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │ │the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │ │403) │ VI │ 1055 │ │ │ *D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │ │October 1934, concerning participation│ │ │in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056 │ │ │ *D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │ │Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057 │ │ │ *EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │ │Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │ │26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328 │ │ │ *EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │ │Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462 │ │ │ **Chart No. 6 │Reich Cabinet and Subsidiaries. │ │ │(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 775 │ │ │ *Chart No. 18 │Organization of the Reich Government. │ │(2905-PS; USA 3) │ End of VIII

4. THE STURMABTEILUNG (SA)

The _Sturmabteilung_, or SA, is the organization which the world remembers as the “Brown Shirts” or Storm Troops—the gangsters of the early days of Nazi terrorism. Since it was the first of the organizations created by the Nazis as instruments to effectuate their illegal objectives, the SA occupied a place of peculiar importance in the scheme of the conspirators. Unlike some of the other organizations, the functions of the SA were not fixed or static. The SA was an agency adapted to many designs and purposes, and its role in the conspiracy changed from time to time various phases toward the final objective—abrogation of the Versailles Treaty and acquisition of the territory of other peoples and nations. If the conspiracy is likened to a pattern, with its various parts fitting together like the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle, the piece representing the SA would be found to constitute the essential link in the pattern.

The SA participated in the conspiracy as a distinct and separate unit, having a legal character of its own. An ordinance passed in March, 1935, provided that the SA and certain other agencies were thereafter to be considered “components” of the Nazi Party (_1725-PS_). This ordinance further provided, in Article 5, that:

“* * * The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal character.” (_1725-PS_)

Similarly, the 1943 Organization Book of the Nazi Party which characterizes the SA as an “entity,” declares:

“The Fuehrer prescribes the law of conduct; he commands its use. The Chief of Staff represents the SA as a complete entity on the mandate of the Fuehrer.” (_3220-PS_)

While the SA was composed of many individual members, they acted as a unit. They were closely bound together by many common factors, including uniform membership standards and disciplinary regulations; a common and distinctive uniform; common aims and objectives; common activities, duties, and responsibilities; and a fanatical adherence to the ideologies conceived by the Nazis. Although membership in the SA was voluntary, the SA man was expected to withdraw if

“he can no longer agree with SA views or if he is not in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed upon him as a member of the SA.” (_2354-PS_)

The SA man was well schooled in the philosophies and activities which he was required to adopt in his daily life. Uniformity of action and thought in such matters was in part obtained by the publication and distribution of a weekly periodical entitled “_Der SA-Mann_.” This publication was principally devoted to fostering various aspects of Nazi ideology. In addition, “_Der SA-Mann_” reported upon the activities of the SA and its constituent groups.

The SA developed from scattered bands of street ruffians into a cohesive unit organized on a military basis, with military training and military functions, and with an aggressive spirit and philosophy. The organization extended throughout the entire Reich and was organized vertically into local subdivisions. Horizontally, there were special units including military, cavalry, communications, engineer, and medical units. These various groups and branches were coordinated by the SA Headquarters and operational offices, located in Munich.

A. _The Relationship Between The SA and The Nazi Party._

The affiliation between the SA and the Nazi leaders was closely maintained, for the purpose of enabling the conspirators to employ the SA for any activity necessary in effectuating the objectives of the conspiracy. The SA was conceived and created by Hitler, in 1921, at the very inception of the conspiracy. Hitler retained the direction of the SA throughout the conspiracy, delegating responsibility for its leadership to a Chief of Staff. Goering was an early leader of the SA, and maintained close connection with it throughout the conspiracy. Hess participated in many of the early battles of the SA and was leader of an SA group in Munich. Frank, Streicher, von Schirach, and Sauckel each held the position of _Obergruppenfuehrer_ in the SA, a position corresponding to the rank of Lieutenant General; and Bormann was a member of the Staff of the SA High Command.

The close relationship between the SA and leaders of the Nazi Party is demonstrated by the fact that the _Hoheitstraeger_ (Bearers of Sovereignty) of the Nazi Leadership Corps were authorized to call upon the SA for assistance in carrying out particular phases of the Party program. For example, at page 71 of the Organization Book of the Nazi Party (1943 edition) the following statement is made (_1893-PS_):

“The _Hoheitstraeger_ is responsible for the entire political appearance of the Movement within this zone. The SA leader of that zone is tied to the directives of the _Hoheitstraeger_ in that respect.

“The _Hoheitstraeger_ is the ranking representative of the Party to include all organizations within his zone. He may requisition the SA located within his zone for the respective SA leader if they are needed for the execution of a political mission. The _Hoheitstraeger_ will then assign the mission to the SA * * *.

“Should the _Hoheitstraeger_ need more SA for the execution of political mission than is locally available, he then applies to the next higher office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests the SA from the SA office in his sector.” (_1893-PS_)

This close relationship is further shown by an ordinance for the execution of a Hitler decree (_2383-PS_):

“The leader of affiliated organizations, as well as the leaders of the party women’s organization, are subordinate to the sovereign bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically, functionally, disciplinarily, and personally.”

* * * * * *

“The formations of the NSDAP, with exception of the SS, for whom special provisions apply, are subordinated to the sovereign bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically and in respect to commitment. Responsibility for the leadership of the units rests in the hands of the unit leader.” (_2383-PS_)

It was in compliance with the authority of the Leadership Corps that the SA was used in the seizure of trade union properties.

In addition, the SA demonstrated its close affiliation to the Nazi Party by participating in various ways in election proceedings. A pamphlet entitled “The SA,” depicting the history and general activities of the SA, written by an SA Sturmfuehrer upon orders from SA Headquarters, declares that the SA stood—

“at the foremost front of election fights.” (_2168-PS_)

Further evidence of the close relationship between the SA and Nazi leaders is found in the distribution list of the confidential publication of the Nazi Leadership Corps, which shows that this strictly confidential magazine was distributed to Lieutenant-Generals and Major-Generals of the SA. (_2660-PS_)

The interest and participation of Nazi leaders in the activities of the SA is clearly shown in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” for the period from 1934 to March 1939 (_3050-A-E-PS_). Throughout these volumes there appear photographs of Nazi leaders participating in SA activities. The following are descriptions of a few of these photographs, together with the page numbers upon which they appear:

Photograph of Himmler, Huhnlein (Fuehrer of NSKK) and Lutze, bearing caption: “They lead the soldiers of National Socialism,” 15 June, 1935, p. 1.

Photograph of Hitler at SA Ceremony, carrying SA Battle Flag. The picture bears the caption: “As in the fighting years the Fuehrer, on Party Day of Freedom, dedicates the new regiments with the Blood Banner,” 21 September, 1935, p. 4.

Photograph of Lutze and Hitler, 19 September, 1936, p. 4.

Photograph of Hitler and SA officers, 1 January, 1938, p. 3.

Photograph of Streicher with SA men, and reviewing SA Troops, 25 November, 1938, p. 1.

Photograph of Goering in SA uniform reviewing SA marching troops under the caption: “Honor Day of the SA,” 21 September, 1935, p. 3.

Photographs of Goering, Hess, and Hitler in SA uniform at the ceremonies dedicated to SA men killed in the Munich Putsch, 16 November, 1935, p. 3.

Photograph of Goering marching in SA uniform, 19 September, 1936, p. 3.

Photographs of Goering at ceremonies held upon occasion of his being made Obergruppenfuehrer of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA, 23 January, 1937, p. 3.

Photograph of Goering leading Feldherrnhalle Regiment of SA in parade, 18 September, 1937, p. 3.

The work of the SA did not end with the seizure of the German government by the Nazis, but affiliation between the SA and Nazi leaders continued thereafter. The importance of the SA in connection with the Nazi Government and control of Germany is shown by the law of 1 December 1933 entitled, “The Law on Securing the Unity of Party and State” (_1395-PS_):

“* * * The Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of SA become members of the Reich Government in order to insure close cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public authorities.” (_1395-PS_)

Similarly, a decree promulgated by Hitler providing for supervision of premilitary training by the SA declares:

“The offices of the Party and State are to support the SA in this training program and to value the possession of the certificate for the SA military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)

The complete control of the SA by the Nazis at all times is shown by the so-called “Roehm Purge” of June 1934 (see _2407-PS_). Roehm had been Chief of Staff of the SA for several years, and was responsible for the development of SA into a powerful, organization. SA members were required to take a personal oath of fidelity to Roehm. But when his policies conflicted with those of the Nazi leaders, he was removed, murdered, and replaced by Victor Lutze. This drastic action was accomplished without revolt or dissension in the ranks of the SA, and with no change in its objectives or program. The SA remained “a reliable and strong part of the National Socialist Movement * * * full of obedience and blind discipline,” whose function was to “create and form the new German citizens.” (_2407-PS_)

The importance of the SA in the Nazi plan for the utilization of the people of Germany is shown in Hitler’s pronouncement “The Course for the German Person,” which appears in the issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 5 September 1936, at page 22. Hitler’s statement reads as follows:

“The boy, he will enter the Young Volk, and the lad, he will enter the Hitler Youth, the young man will go into the SA, in the SS, and in other units, and the SA and SS men will one day enter into the labor service and from there to the Army, and the soldier of the Volk will return again into the Organization of the Movement, the Party, in the SA and SS and never again will our Volk decay as it once was decayed”.

Thus the SA was constantly available to the conspirators as an instrument to further their aims. It was natural that Victor Lutze, the former Chief of Staff of the SA, in a pamphlet entitled “The Nature and Tasks of the SA,” declared:

“The SA cannot be independent of the National Socialist Movement but can only exist as a part of it.” (_2471-PS_)

B. _Participation by the SA in the Conspiracy._

The principal functions performed by the SA in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy may be classified into four distinct phases, each of which corresponds with a particular phase in the progression of the conspiracy.

The first phase consists of the use of the SA and its members as the instrument for the dissemination of Nazi ideology throughout Germany. The employment of SA for this purpose continued throughout the entire period of the conspiracy. In the second phase, the period prior to the Nazi seizure of power, the SA was a militant group of fighters whose function was to combat all opponents of the Party. In the third phase, the period of several years following the Nazi seizure of power, the SA participated in various measures designed to consolidate the control of the Nazis, including the dissolution of the trade unions, the persecution of the church, and Jewish persecutions. During this period the SA continued to serve as a force of political soldiers whose purpose was to combat members of political parties considered hostile to the Nazi Party. The fourth aspect of SA activities consisted of its employment as an agency for the building up of an armed force in Germany in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and for the preparation of the youth of Germany for the waging of an aggressive war.

(1) _The Propagation of Nazi Doctrine._ From the very start the Nazi leaders emphasized the importance of the SA’s mission to disseminate Nazi doctrines. The responsibility of propagating National Socialist ideology remained constant throughout. This is shown in an excerpt from _Mein Kampf_ in which Hitler declared:

“* * * As the directing idea for the inner training of the _Sturmabteilung_, the intention was always dominant, aside from all physical education, to teach it to be the unshakeable convinced defender of the National Socialist idea.” (_2760-PS_)

Hitler’s pronouncement as to the function of SA in this respect became the guiding principle of SA members, for _Mein Kampf_ was taken to express the basic philosophy of the SA. The Organization Book of the Nazi Party declares that the training of SA members should consist of—

“The training and rearing upon the basis of the teachings and aims of the Fuehrer as they are put down in ‘Mein Kampf’ and in the Party program, for all spheres of our life and our National Socialist ideology.” (_2354-PS_)

The Party Organization Book also declares that the SA is the

“training and rearing instrument of the Party.” (_2354-PS_)

Similarly, in an article which appeared in “_Der SA-Mann_”, at page 1 of the issue of January 1934, the functions of the SA were set forth as follows:

“First, to be the guaranty of the power of the National Socialist State against all attacks from without as well as from within.

“Second, to be the high institute of education of the people for the living National Socialism.”

The function of the SA as propagandist of the Party was more than a responsibility which SA took unto itself. It was a responsibility recognized by the law of Germany. The law for “Securing the Unity of Party and State,” promulgated by the Reich Cabinet in 1933, provided:

“The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and State.” (_1395-PS_)

As the principal ideology bearers of the Nazi Party SA members were “the soldiers of an idea,” to use the expression employed by Nazi writers. Examples of the use of the SA as Nazi propagandist will be seen in the description of the other functions performed by the SA. For in each case the SA combined its propagandist responsibility instrument with the other functions which it performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

(2) _Strong-Arm Terrorization of Political Opponents._ In the early stages of the Nazi Movement the SA combined propaganda with violence along the lines expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_:

“The Young Movement from the first day, espoused the standpoint that its idea must be put forward spiritually but that the defense of this spiritual platform must, if necessary, be secured by strong-arm means.” (_2760-PS_)

So that the Nazis might better spread their philosophies, the SA was employed to gain possession and control of the streets for the Nazis. Its function was to beat up and terrorize all political opponents. The importance of this function is explained in a pamphlet written by SA Sturmfuehrer Bayer, upon orders from SA Headquarters (_2168-PS_):

“Possession of the streets is the key to power in the State—for this reason the SA marched and fought. The public would have never received knowledge from the agitative speeches of the little Reichstag faction and its propaganda or from the desires and aims of the Party if the martial tread and battle song of the SA Companies had not beat the measure for the truth of a relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the governmental system. They wanted the young Movement to keep silent. Nothing was to be read in the press about the labor of the National Socialists, not to mention the basic aims of its platform. They simply did not want to awake any interest in it. However, the martial tread of the SA took care that even the drowsiest citizens had to see at least the existence of a fighting troop.” (_2168-PS_)

And in _Mein Kampf_ Hitler defined the task of the SA as follows:

“We have to teach the Marxists that the master of the streets in the future is National Socialism, exactly as it will once be the Master of the State.” (_2760-PS_)

The importance of the work of SA in the early days of the Movement was indicated by Goebbels in a speech which appeared in _Das Archiv_ in October 1935:

“* * * The inner-political opponents did not disappear due to mysterious unknown reasons but because the Movement possessed a strong-arm within its organization and the strongest strong-arm of the Movement is the SA * * *.” (_3211-PS_)

Specific evidence of the activities of the SA during the early period of the Nazi Movement (1922-31) is to be found in a series of articles appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” entitled, “SA Battle Experiences Which We Will Never Forget.” Each of these articles is an account of a street or meeting-hall battle waged by the SA against a group of political opponents in the early days of the Nazi struggle for power. These articles demonstrate that during this period it was the function of SA to employ physical violence in order to destroy all forms of thought and expression which might be considered hostile to Nazi aims or philosophy.

The titles of these articles are sufficiently descriptive to constitute evidence of SA activities. Some of these titles, together with the page and reference of “_Der SA-Mann_” upon which they appear, follow:

Article entitled: “We subdue the Red Terror,” 24 February, 1934: p. 4. Article entitled: “Nightly Street Battles on the Czech Border,” 8 September, 1934: p. 12. Article entitled: “Street Battle in Chemnitz,” 6 October, 1934: p. 5. Article entitled: “Victorious SA,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7. Article entitled: “SA Against Sub-Humanity,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7. Article entitled: “For the Superiority of the Street,” 10 November, 1934: p. 10. Article entitled: “The SA Conquers Rastenburg,” 26 January, 1936[_sic_]: p. 7. Article entitled: “Company 88 Receives its Baptism of Fire,” 23 February, 1935: p. 5. Article entitled: “Street Battles at Pforghein,” 23 February, 1935: p. 5. Article entitled: “The SA Breaks the Red Terror,” 1 June, 1935: p. 7. Article entitled: “The Blood Sunday of Berlin,” 10 August, 1935: p. 10. Article entitled: “West Prussian SA Breaks the Red Terror in Christburg,” 24 August, 1935: p. 15. Portrait symbolizing the SA Man as the “Master of the Streets,” entitled, “Attention: Free the Streets,” 11 September, 1937: p. 1. Article entitled: “9 November, 1923, in Nurnberg,” 30 October, 1937.

As an example of the nature of these articles, the article appearing in the Franken Edition of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 30 October 1937, at page 3, is typical. It is entitled: “9 November 1923 in Nurnberg,” and reads in part as follows:

“We stayed overnight in the Coliseum. Then in the morning we found out what had happened in Munich. ‘Now a revolution will also be made in Nurnberg,’ we said. All of a sudden the Police came from the Maxtor Guard and told us that we should go home, that the Putsch in Munich failed. We did not believe that and we did not go home. Then came the State Police with fixed bayonets and drove us out of the hall. One of us then shouted ‘Let’s go to the Cafe Habsburg!’ By the time we arrived, however, the Police again had everything surrounded. Some shouted then: ‘The Jewish place will be stormed * * * Out with the Jews!’ Then the Police started to beat us up. Then we divided into small groups and roamed through town and wherever we caught a Red or a Jew we knew, a fist fight ensued.

“Then in the evening we marched, although the Police had forbidden it, to a meeting in Furth. During the promenade again the police attempted to stop us. It was all the same to us. Already in the next moment we attacked the police in our anger so that they were forced to flee. We marched on to the Geissmann Hall. There again they tried to stop us. But the Landsturm, which was also there, attacked the protection forces like persons possessed, and drove them from the streets. After the meeting we dissolved and went to the edge of town. From there we marched in close column back to Nurnberg. In the Wall Street near the Plaerrer the Police came again. We simply shoved them aside. They did not trust themselves to attack, for what would a blood bath have meant? We decided beforehand not to take anything from anyone. Also in Furth they had already noticed that we were up to no good. A large mass of people accompanied us on the march. We marched with unrolled flags and sang so that the streets resounded: Comrade reach me your hand; we want to stand together, even though they have false impressions, the spirit must not die, Swastika on the steel helmet, black—white—red armband, we are known as Storm Troop (SA) Hitler!”

Through such means the SA was chiefly responsible for destroying all political elements hostile to the Nazis, including liberalism and capitalism. This is shown by an article which appeared on 6 January, 1934, at page 1 of “_Der SA-Mann_,” entitled “The SA Man in the New State!”

“The New Germany would not have been without the SA man and the new Germany would not exist if the SA man would now, with the feeling of having fulfilled his duty, quietly and unselfishly and modestly step aside or if the new State would send him home much like the Moors who had done his obligations.

* * * * * *

“What has been accomplished up until now, the taking over of the power in the State and the ejection of those elements which are responsible for the pernicious developments of the post war years as bearers of Marxist liberalism, and capitalism are only the preliminaries, the spring-board for the real aims of National Socialism.

“Being conscious of the fact that the real National Socialist construction work would be building in an empty space without the usurpation of power by Adolf Hitler, the movement and the SA man as the aggressive bearer of its will primarily have directed all their efforts thereupon, to achieve the platform of continued striving and to obtain the fundamental for the realization of our desires in the State by force * * *

“* * * Out of this comes the further missions of the SA for the completion of the German revolution. First: To be the guaranty of the power of the National Socialist State against all attacks from without as well as within. Second: To be the high institute of education of the people for the living National Socialism. Third: to build a bridge over which the present day German youth can march free and unhampered as first generation into the formed Third Reich.”

(3) _Consolidation of Nazi Control of Germany._ The Third function of the SA was to carry out various programs designed to consolidate Nazi control of the German State, including particularly the dissolution of the trade unions and the Jewish persecutions. In the words of an SA officer, it was the function of the SA to be the “tool for strengthening the structure of the new State,” and “to clean up” all that was “worth cleaning up.” It was generally employed, says the SA man, “where communism and elements hostile to the State still insolently dared to rebel.” (_2168-PS_)

SA groups were employed to destroy political opposition by force and brutality where necessary. As an example, an affidavit of William F. Sollman reads as follows:

“* * * From 1919 until 1933 I was a Social Democrat and a member of the German Reichstag. Prior to March 11, 1933, I was the editor-in-chief of a chain of daily newspapers, with my office in Cologne, Germany, which led the fight against the Nazi Party.

“On March 9, 1933, members of the SS and SA came to my home in Cologne and destroyed the furniture and my personal records. At that time I was taken to the Brown House in Cologne where I was tortured, being beaten and kicked for several hours. I was then taken to the regular government prison in Cologne where I was treated by two medical doctors * * * and released the next day. On March 11, 1933, I left Germany.” (_3221-PS_)

Prior to the organization of the Gestapo on a national scale local SA meeting places were designated as arrest points, and SA members took into custody Communists and other persons who were actually or supposedly hostile to the Nazi Party. This activity is described in an affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former U. S. Consul in Berlin:

“* * * At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places throughout the country was the SA (Storm Troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local SA meeting places became ‘arrest points.’ There were at least fifty of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazis party were taken to these points, and, if they were enemies of sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo headquarters.” (_1759-PS_)

In addition, SA members served as guards at concentration camps during this consolidation period and participated in mistreatment of the persons there imprisoned. A report to Hitler by the public prosecutor of Dresden concerning the _Knollprosse_ of one Vogel, who was accused of mistreatment of the persons imprisoned in a concentration camp, reads as follows (_787-PS_):

“The prosecuting authority in Dresden has indicted Oberregierungsrat Erich Vogel in Dresden (case designation 16 STA 4 107/34) on account of bodily injury while in office. The following subject matter is the basis of the process:

“Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the province of Saxony since its foundation and is chief of Main section II, which formerly bore the title ZUB (_Zentralstelle fuer Umsturzbekaempfung_) (Central office for combatting overthrow). In the process of combatting efforts inimical to the State Vogel carried out several so called borderland actions in the year 1933 in which a large number of politically unreliable persons and persons who had become political prisoners in the border territories were taken into protective custody (_Schutzhaft_) and brought to the Hohnstein protective custody camp. In the camp serious mistreatment of the prisoners has been going on at least since summer of 1933. The prisoners were not only, as in protective custody camp Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state of unconsciousness for no reason with whips and other tools but were also tortured in other ways, as for instance with a drip-apparatus especially constructed for the purpose, under which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away with serious purulent wounds of the scalp. The guilty SA-leaders and SA-men were sentenced to punishment of six years to nine months of imprisonment by the main criminal court of the provincial court in Dresden of 15 May 1935 (16 STA. 3431.34). Vogel, whose duties frequently brought him to the camp, took part in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened in the reception room of the camp during completion of the reception formalities, and in the supply room, during issuing of the blankets. In this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel was generally known to the personnel of the camp—exactly because of his function as head of the ZUB—and his conduct became at least partly a standard for the above-named conduct of the SA-leaders and men.”

* * * * * *

“In his presence, for instance, the SA-men Mutze dealt such blows to one man, without provocation, that he turned around on himself. As already stated, Vogel not only took no steps against this treatment of the prisoners, but he even made jokes about it and stated that it amused him the way things were popping here.

“In the supply room Vogel himself took a hand in the beating amid the general severe mistreatment. The SA-men there employed whips and other articles and beat the prisoners in such a manner that serious injuries were produced; the prisoners partly became unconscious and had to lie in the dispensary a long time. Vogel was often present in the supply room during the mistreatment. At least in the following cases he personally laid violent hands upon prisoners.”

* * * * * *

“* * * the prisoner was laid across the counter in the usual manner, held fast by the head and arms, and then beaten for a considerable time by the SA men with whips and other articles. Along with this Vogel himself took part in the beating for a time, and after this mistreatment slapped him again, so that the prisoner appeared green and blue in the face. The prisoner is the tinsmith Hans Kuehitz, who bore the nickname Johnny. Upon his departure Vogel gave the head of the supply room, Truppenfuehrer Meier from 6 to 8 reichsmarks with the stated reason that the SA men ‘had sweated so.’ The money was then distributed by Meier to those SA-comrades who had taken part in the mistreatment.” (_787-PS_)

Similarly, the SA participated in the seizure and dissolution of the German trade unions in 1933, a measure taken by the Nazis under the direction of Robert Ley. An official Nazi Party circular containing an order promulgated by Robert Ley concerning the program for the seizure of the union properties read as follows:

“SA, as well as SS, are to be employed for the occupation of trade union properties and for the taking into protective custody all personalities who come into the question.” (_392-PS_)

The SA also participated extensively in the Jewish persecutions conducted by the Nazis. The affidavit of Mr. Geist, former U. S. Consul in Berlin (_1759-PS_) sets forth numerous instances of attacks upon Jewish-American citizens. Mr. Geist also declares that on the morning after the Nazis’ acquisition of power, SA groups roamed the streets of Berlin seizing and beating Jewish persons and other political opponents of the Nazi Party. Thereafter SA men participated in many attacks of physical violence upon Jews, including Jewish-American citizens. In addition, uniformed SA men were employed as a display of threatening force in order to coerce Jewish persons to dispose of their property at greatly reduced values. (_1759-PS_)

SA participation in the Jewish program of 10 to 11 November, 1938, is disclosed in a confidential report of an SA Brigade Fuehrer to his Group Commander, dated 29 November, 1938 (_1721-PS_):

“TO: SA Group Electrical Palatinate (Kurpfalz) _MANNHEIM_

“The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November 1938.

‘On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set fire immediately.

‘Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach Brigade Fuehrer or office by 8:30.’

“I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the most exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once.

“I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area of * * *

“_Standarte 115_

1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse Destroyed by fire 2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse Destroyed by fire 3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt Interior and furnishings wrecked 4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen Interior and furnishings wrecked 5. Synagogue at Griesheim Interior and furnishings wrecked 6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt Interior and furnishings wrecked 7. Synagogue at Eberstadt Destroyed by fire”

* * * * * *

“_Standarte 145_

1. Synagogue at Bensheim Destroyed by fire 2. Synagogue at Lorch in Hessen Destroyed by fire 3. Synagogue at Heppenheim Destroyed by fire 4. Prayer House Alsbach Destroyed by fire 5. Meeting room Alsbach Destroyed by fire 6. Synagogue at Rimbach Furnishings completely destroyed”

* * * * * *

“_Standarte 168_

1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt Destroyed by fire 2. Synagogue in Offenbach Destroyed by fire 3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg Destroyed by fire 4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main Destroyed by fire 5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main Destroyed by fire 6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen Destroyed by fire 7. Synagogue in Langen Destroyed by fire 8. Synagogue in Egelsbach Destroyed by fire”

* * * * * *

“_Standarte 186_

1. Synagogue in Beerfelden Blown up 2. Synagogue in Michelstadt Furnishings wrecked 3. Synagogue in Koenig Furnishings wrecked 4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald Furnishings wrecked 5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt Furnishings wrecked 6. Synagogue in Dieburg Furnishings wrecked 7. Synagogue in Babenhausen Furnishings wrecked 8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau Destroyed by fire 9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach Furnishings destroyed 10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim Furnishings destroyed”

* * * * * *

“_Standarte 221_

1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross-Gerau Destroyed by fire 2. Synagogue in Ruesselsheim Torn down and furnishings destroyed 3. Synagogue in Dornheim Furnishings destroyed 4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen Furnishings destroyed”

“The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (STARKENBURG) “/s/[Illegible] “Brigadefuehrer” (_1721-PS_)

In connection with the persecutions of the Jews, the SA again performed its propaganda function. It was the function of the SA to create and foster among the people an anti-Jewish spirit. Evidence of this function is to be found in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”. Article after article in this publication was devoted to propaganda designed to engender hatred toward the Jewish race. The nature of these articles is apparent from some of the titles:

Article entitled: “Finish up with the Jew”, with subtitle: “We want no women to buy from Jews, and no Jewish girl friends,” 27 July, 1935, p. 4.

Article entitled: “The Jewish World Danger,” 2 February, 1935, p. 5.

Article entitled: “Jewish Worries,” (defending the practices of excluding Jews from certain resorts). 20 July, 1935, p. 4.

Article entitled: “Jews aren’t wanted Here,” with pictures posted on outskirts of villages showing signs bearing the same message. (1 June, 1935, p. 1.) The last portion of this article reads as follows:

“Since the day when National Socialism unrolled its flag and the march began for the Germany for Germans, our battle also included the Jewry * * * Let the Jew continue with his methods against New Germany. We know that at the end we will remain the victor for

Snake remains a snake, and Jew remains a Jew! * * *

* * * “German women, if you buy from Jews and German girl, if you carry on with Jews, then both of you betray your German Volk and your Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, and commit a sin against your German Volk and its future! Then, also, outside of the last German village, the sign will stand ‘Jews are not wanted here!’ and then, finally, no German citizen will again cross the threshold of a Jewish store. To achieve this goal is the mission of the SA man as political soldier of the Fuehrer. Next to his word and his explanations stands his example”.

Article entitled: “God Save the Jew,” 17 August, 1935, p. 1.

Photograph showing SA men gathered around trucks upon which are posted signs reading: “Read _The Stuermer_ and you will know the Jew.” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.

Photograph apparently representing public SA rally showing large sign which reads: “He who knows a Jew knows a devil,” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.

Article entitled: “The Face of the Jew” (with portrait of a Jew holding the hammer and sickle), 5 Oct., 1935, p. 6.

Article entitled: “Jews, Blacks and Reactionaries,” 2 November, 1935, p. 2.

Article entitled: “The Camouflaged Benjamin—Jewish Cultural Bolshevism in German music,” 23 November, 1935, p. 2.

Article entitled: “The Jewish Assassination,” 15 February, 1936, p. 1.

Article entitled: “Murder—The Jewish Slogan,” 4 April, 1936, p. 11.

Series of articles entitled: “The Jewish Mirror.” Eight weekly installments beginning 22 May 1936, p. 17.

Series of articles entitled: “Gravediggers of World Culture,” beginning 5 December, 1936, p. 6 and continuing weekly to 13 March 1937.

Article entitled: “Rumania to the Jews?” 2 January, 1937, p. 6.

Article entitled: “Bismarck’s Position on Jews,” 2 January, 1937, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Jewry is a Birth Error,” 13 February 1937, p. 5.

Article entitled: “The Protection of the German Blood,” 24 April, 1937, p. 1.

Article entitled: “Crooked Ways to Money and Power,” 24 April, 1937, p. 1.

Article entitled: “The Camouflage of Jewry—Beginning or End?” 22 May, 1937, p. 14.

Article entitled: “How come still German Jews?” 18 June, 1938, p. 2.

Article entitled: “Westheimer Jew Servants,” 22 January, 1938, p. 2.

Article entitled: “The Poor Jew—Well, Well!!” 19 March, 1938, p. 15.

Article entitled: “Jewish Methods, Churchly Parallel,” 9 September, 1938, p. 4.

Article entitled: “Jews and Free Masons,” 13 January, 1939, p. 15.

Article entitled: “Friends of the World Jewry—Roosevelt and Ickes,” 3 February, 1939, p. 14.

The circulation of these articles was not intended to be confined to members of the SA. On the contrary, the plan was to educate the members of the SA with this philosophy, and for the SA in turn to disseminate it into the minds of the German people. This fact is demonstrated in the introduction to a series of anti-Jewish articles entitled “Gravediggers of World Culture,” which began in the issue of 5 December, 1936, at page 6. This introduction stated in part as follows:

“We suggest that the comrades especially take notice of this series of articles and see that they are further circulated.” (_3050-A-E-PS_)

In addition, intensive campaigns were conducted to persuade the public to purchase and read “_Der SA-Mann_,” and various issues were posted in public places so that the general public might read them. “_Der SA-Mann_” itself contained several photographs showing particular issues posted upon street bulletin boards. There are also several photographs showing advertising displays, one of which reads as follows “_Der SA-Mann_ belongs in every house, every hotel, every inn, every waiting room, and every store” (page 3 of the issue of 31 October, 1936). (_3050-A-E-PS_)

In view of such widespread publicity for the objectives and methods of the SA, it is inconceivable that volunteers for membership did not know of the criminal character of this organization.

(4) _Fostering of Militarism._ In the final phase of the SA in the conspiracy—its participation in the preparation for aggressive warfare—the SA was again employed to inculcate a particular Nazi ideology into the minds of the German people. It was the function of the SA to prepare Germany mentally for the waging of an aggressive war.

At all times, and especially during the period from 1933-39, SA leaders emphasized to SA members the duty and responsibility of creating and fostering a militaristic spirit throughout Germany. In 1933, Hitler established the so-called SA sports program and at that time, according to Sturmfuehrer Bayer in his pamphlet “The SA,”

“the SA was “commissioned to obtain an increase of and preservation of a warlike power and a warlike spirit as the expression of an aggressive attitude”. (_2168-PS_)

In 1937, Hitler renewed the so-called sports program and then declared the program to be a means “for the fostering of a military spirit” among the German people. (_3050-A-E-PS_)

The Organization Book of the Party is to the same effect. The function of the SA is characterized as follows:

“While the political organization of the NSDAP has carried out the political leadership, the SA is the training and education instrument of the Party for the realization of the world-philosophical soldier-like attitude.

“Consequently, the young German in the SA is being inculcated in the first instance from the standpoint of world philosophy and character, and trained as the bearer of National Socialist armed will.” (_3220-PS_)

The contents of a number of articles designed to serve as war propaganda material may be gained from their titles, which are very graphic. A number of articles relate to the Nazi _Lebensraum_ philosophy:

Article entitled: “The German Living Space,” 5 January, 1935, p. 13.

Article entitled: “Folk and Space—A Geopolitical View,” 27 April, 1935, p. 13.

Article entitled: “The Enlargement of our Living Space,” 25 April, 1936, p. 10.

Article entitled: “Our Right, Our Colonies,” 10 October, 1936, p. 15.

Article entitled: “Our Right for Colonies,” 18 December, 1937, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Space and Folk,” 14 October, 1938, p. 3.

Article entitled: “Colonies for Germany,” 2 January, 1937, p. 4. This article reads in part as follows:

“The German Ambassador in London, Herr von Ribbentrop, recently, on occasion of a reception in the Anglo-German Fellowship * * * has renewed, in a speech which aroused great interest, the unretractable claim of Germany for the restitution of its colonies which had been snatched away.

“Shortly thereafter the Reichsbank president and Reich Minister of Economics, Dr. Schacht, published in the English magazine, ‘Foreign Affairs,’ a detailed article on the German colonial problem. * * *

“For the rest Dr. Schacht laid out the categorical demand that Germany must, in order to solve its raw materials problem, get colonies, which must be administered by Germany, and in which the German standard currency must be in circulation.”

The next group consists of articles condemning the Versailles Treaty:

Article entitled: “What is the Situation regarding our battle for Equal Rights?” 7 April 1934, p. 4.

Article entitled: “The Dictate of Versailles,” 30 June, 1934, p. 15. This article reads in part as follows:

“* * * The dictate of Versailles established the political, economical and financial destruction of Germany in 440 artfully—one could also say—devilishly devised paragraphs; this work of ignominy is a sample of endless and partly contradictory repetitions in constantly new forms. Not too many have occupied themselves with this thick book to a great extent, for one could only do it with abomination * * *”

Article entitled: “The Unbearable Limitations of our Fleet,” 7 July, 1934, p. 15.

Article entitled: “Versailles after 15 years,” 19 January, 1935, p. 13. This article reads in part as follows:

“This terrible word ‘Versailles,’ since a blind nation ratified it, has become a word of profanity for all those who are infatuated in the spirit of this enormous production of hatred. The Versailles dictate is German fate in the fullest sense of the word. Every German stood up under the operation of this fate during the past 15 years. Therefore, every last German must also grasp the contents of this dictate so that one single desire of its absolute destruction fills the whole German Volk.”

Article entitled: “How about Germany’s fight for Equal Rights?” 16 March, 1935, p. 1.

Article entitled: “Through Adolf Hitler’s Acts: Free from Versailles,” 30 January, 1937, pp. 12-13.

Article entitled: “Versailles will be Liquidated,” 13 February, 1937. This article reads in part as follows, p. 4:

“The National Socialist Movement has again achieved a victory, for upon its flag since the beginning of the fight stands: The liquidation of the Versailles Treaty. For this fight the SA marched year after year * * *.”

A third group consists of articles describing preparations for war allegedly being carried on by other nations:

Article entitled: “Military Training of the English Youth” (showing pictures of Eton students wearing traditional Eton dress—tall hats and frock coats—marching with rifles), 26 January, 1935, p. 14.

Article entitled: “The Army of the Soviet Union” (with pictures of self-propelled artillery and tanks. One picture bears the quotation “The Artillery of the Red Army is already extensively motorized”), 16 March, 1935, p. 14.

Photograph of Russian Artillery bearing the notation “Soviet Russian Heavy artillery on maneuver,” 16 March, 1935, p. 1.

Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “plans of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”), 30 March, 1935, p. 14.

Article entitled: “The Red Danger in the East,” 4 April, 1936, p. 13.

Article entitled: “The Red Army Today,” 4 April, 1936, p. 13.

Article entitled: “Russia prepares for World War,” 29 August, 1936, p. 10.

Article entitled: “Red Terrorism Nailed Down,” 19 June, 1937, p. 7.

Cartoon bearing title “Stalin Wants World Revolution,” 26 February, 1938, p. 13.

These lists of articles are not exhaustive. These articles are merely typical of many in similar vein which appear throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_.”

(5) _The Training of German Youth for Aggressive Warfare._

The important responsibility of training the youth of Germany in the technique of war, and of preparing them physically and spiritually for the waging of aggressive warfare, was delegated to the SA. Hitler characterized this task of the SA in these words:

“Give the German Nation six million perfectly trained bodies in sport, all fanatically inspired with the love for the Fatherland and trained to the highest offensive spirit and a National Socialist State will, if necessary, have created an Army out of them in less than two years.” (_3215-PS_)

The military character of the SA is demonstrated by its organizational structure (_2168-PS)_. As appears from the SA organizational chart, (_Chart Number 8_) it was organized into units closely corresponding to those of the German army. The organizational scheme consisted of divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In addition, there were special units and branches, including cavalry, signal corps, engineer corps, and medical corps. There were also three officer training schools (_2168-PS_). SA members wore distinctive uniforms adapted to military functions, bore arms, and engaged in training, forced marches, and other military exercises. These facts are disclosed in photographs and articles in “_Der SA-Mann_”.

SA members, moreover, were governed by general regulations which closely resemble service regulations of an armed force (_2820-PS_). According to these regulations, “discipline and obedience are the foundations as strong as steel for each military unit.” These regulations further provide for punishment for disobedience. The punishments provided demonstrate the militaristic character of the SA. They include the following:

Reprimand in private; Reprimand in presence of superiors and announcement thereof at formations; Prohibition of right to wear the service uniform; House arrest; Arrest and confinement in jail; Demotion in rank; Prohibition of right to carry weapon. (_2820-PS_)

Preparation for war through the SA training program was commenced in Germany as early as 1933, but the scope of this program was not made public because it constituted a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The strict secrecy with which the program was surrounded is shown by an order from the Chief of Staff of the SA dated 25 July, 1933 (_D-44_):

“Further to my instruction Z II 1351/33 dated 11 July 33, I find cause to ask all SA authorities to exercise the greatest caution with regard to any publicity given to the SA service not only in the press, but also in the information and news sheets of the individual SA units.

“Only during the last few days, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, at the request of the Foreign Office, has given strict instructions to all Reich authorities according to which the most severe control is to be exercised on all publications which might give other countries an opening to construe German infringements of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. “As is known from the Geneva negotiations, our opponents have piled up material collected in Germany and submitted to them, which they use against us on every occasion during the conferences.

“From this point of view, the information sheets circulating among the subordinate SA units cause the liveliest concern. I hold all higher SA leaders responsible that any such internal information sheets appearing in the district of their command are submitted to the most stringent control _before they go into print_, and I feel compelled to draw attention to the threat of a prosecution for treason, pronounced by official instructions issued in the last few days, in cases where such reports, printed no doubt in good faith, are publicized and therefore exposed to the danger of falling into the wrong hands.

“On principle, pictures of the technical specialized units of the SA and SS, in particular of the signals, motorized and possibly also of the air wings which now exist outside these formations, are forbidden, such pictures enabling other countries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop units.” (_D-44_)

Secrecy was also required in the order assigning a _Wehrmacht_ officer to the SA in January, 1934, to assist in the SA Training Program (_2823-PS_). A memorandum from SA Headquarters dated 20 January, 1934 designates an officer of the _Wehrmacht_ to assist in the military training of SA members and goes on to provide:

“For the purpose of disguise, Lt. Col. Auleb will wear SA uniform with insignia of rank according to more detailed regulations of the Supreme SA leaders”. (_2823-PS_)

The military training program of the SA was for many years conducted under the guise of a sports program. This plan was created by Hitler as early as 1920 in founding what he called the National Socialist Sport Troop (SA). Hitler’s declaration at the time of the creation of this sports organization was as follows:

“The Sport Troop * * * is but the bearer of the military thought of a free people.” (_3215-PS_)

The fact that the so-called Sports Program was in reality closely associated with and in fact a means of providing military training for German youth, is shown by the following characterization of the program by Lutze, the Chief of Staff of the SA, in an article written in 1939 (_3215-PS_):

“* * * This goal setting also served for the decrees of the Fuehrer to the SA of 1935 regarding the renewing of, in 1936 regarding the evaluation of, in 1937 regarding the yearly repetitive exercises of the SA sport badge. Parallel to this decree of the Fuehrer for the physical betterment and military training the organizational and development missions within the SA were met. Out of the conception that the preservation and intensification of the military power of our people must especially be requested by military and physical exercises, the training was especially carried out systematically in these fields. In 25 schools of the troop and in 3 Reichsfuehrer schools of the SA yearly 22,000 to 25,000 officers and non-coms were trained since 1934 in special educational courses until they possessed the education and examination certificates. In clearly outlined training directives the training goals which had to be achieved yearly were given and at the same time the yearly Reich competitive contests were established. Hand in hand the training of the Fuehrer Corps and corresponding organizational measures and the training at the front proceeded on the broadest basis.” (_3215-PS_)

The military nature of the Sports Program is likewise demonstrated by the tests and standards required to obtain the sports award. The Organization Book of the Party lists these tests as follows (_2354-PS_):

“The performance test includes three groups of exercises:

Body exercises, Military sports, Topographical (naval) services.

“Group I: Body exercises;

100-meter race, Broad jump, Shot-put, Throwing of hand grenades, 3000-meter race.

“Group II: Military sports;

25-Kilometer march with pack, Firing of small-caliber arms, Aimed throwing of hand grenades, 200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles, Swimming or bicycle riding, Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.

“Group III: Terrain service;

Orientation, Terrain observation, Estimate of terrain, Estimate of distance, Camouflage, Observing and reporting, Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service.” (_2354-PS_)

In 1939, the SA Sports Program was formally recognized, in a decree issued by Hitler, as a military training program. At the same time the SA was openly declared to be an agency for pre- and post-military training, that is, military training prior to and following military service in the _Wehrmacht_ (_2383-PS_).

The decree provided in part as follows:

“Der Fuehrer. In amplification of my decree of the 15th February, 1935, and 18th March, 1937, regarding the acquisition of the SA sport insignia and the yearly repetitive exercises, I lift the SA sport insignia to the SA military insignia and make it as a basis for pre-imposed military training.

“I designate the SA as standard bearer of this training.

“These soldiers who honourably were discharged out of the active military service and who were serviceable soldiers are to be placed into the Army ranks for the retaining of their spiritual and physical energy and to be attached to the SA insofar as no other organization of the Party (the SS, NSKK, and SFK) have received them for special training.” (_2383-PS_)

The SA military training program was not confined to its members, but extended to the entire youth of Germany. Thus the Chief of Staff of the SA, in re-establishing the sports program in 1935, declared (_2354-PS_):

“In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are not members of the movement, inasfar as they comply racially and ideologically with the National Socialist requirements”. (_2354-PS_)

The pamphlet entitled “The SA”, shows that responsibility for conducting this nation-wide program was lodged in the operational main office of the SA (_2168-PS_). According to the pamphlet it was the duty of this office to—

“Prepare the fighting training of the bodies of all Germans capable of bearing arms (_Wehrfahig_) and as preparation therefore must organize the execution of corporal exercises (basic physical training) and sports achievements, so that the widest stratum of the population is laid hold upon and will be kept in condition to bear arms (_Wehrtuchtig_) both physically and spiritually, as well as ideologically in character up to greatest old age.” (_2168-PS_)

The extent to which the SA carried the military training program into the lives of the German people may be seen from the following excerpt from “Das Archiv” (_3215-PS_):

“Next to the companies of the SA were the sport badge associations (SAG) in which all the militaristic nationals entered who were prepared to voluntarily answer the call of the SA for the preservation of military proficiency. Up until now around 800,000 nationals outside of the SA could successfully undergo the physical betterment as well as the political military training of the SA on the basis of the SA sport badge.

“As pronounced proof heretofore it may be shown that alone 13,400 officers and around 30,000 non-coms in the Reserve Corps of the Wehrmacht from its (SA) own ranks stand at the disposal of the SA and can be employed at any time for the direction of SA military forces * * *”. (_3215-PS_)

In 1939, the extension of the SA military program to non-SA members was officially recognized by Hitler. This occurred in the ordinance for the execution of the Hitler decree of 16 January, 1942:

“Every German man who has completed his seventeenth year and who shows preliminary requirements for honorary service with the weapon, has the _customary_ duty to win the SA military insignia in preparation for military service.

“During the years in the Hitler Youth following his sixteenth year, he is to prepare himself for the winning of the SA military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)

The SA, in its military training program, was no mere marching and drilling society. It embraced every phase of the technique of modern warfare. This appears clearly from the articles on military training which appear throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann”. The titles of these articles indicate their substance. The foll_owing are a few examples:

Article entitled: “Defense Platoon and the Company in Battle” (with diagrams), 27 January, 1934, p. 10.

Article entitled: “_Die Luftwaffe_” (with diagrams on Aircraft Gunnery), 3 February 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Pistol Shooting,” 17 February, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Orientation in Terrain,” 10 March, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “First Aid—ABC,” 17 March, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “We go into the Terrain” (relating to map study and map symbols), 24 March, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “What every SA Man must know about Aviation,” 21 April, 1934, p. 13.

Article entitled: “Expert firing in German National Sport” (relating to small caliber firing), 12 May, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Chemical Warfare,” 19 May, 1934, p. 13.

Article entitled: “What every SA Man should know about Aviation,” 19 May, 1934, p. 12.

Article entitled: “Flame Throwers on the Front,” 26 May, 1934, p. 14.

Article entitled: “Modern Battle Methods in the View of the SA Man,” 2 June, 1934, p. 14.

Article entitled: “The Significance of Tanks and Motors in Modern War,” 4 August, 1934, p. 13.

Article entitled: “The Rifle 98,” 8 September, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “The Combat Battalion” (with description of tactical missions and maneuvers of the battalion), 15 September, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Air Strategy and Air Tactics,” 29 September, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Gas Protection and the Gas Mask,” 6 October, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “The Pistol 08” (with diagram of the pistol, its nomenclature and field stripping), 6 October, 1934, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Training the SA in Map and Terrain Study,” 24 November, 1934, p. 4.

Article entitled: “The Defense,” with subheading “What does the War of Tomorrow look like?” 1 December, 1934, p. 13.

Series of articles by a Wehrmacht officer entitled: “Training in the Army of the Third Reich,” beginning on 12 January, 1935, p. 13.

Series of articles entitled: “Construction and Composition of various units of the Modern Army,” written by a Brigadier General in the _Wehrmacht_—beginning 26 January, 1935, p. 15, and ending 20 April, 1935, p. 16.

Article entitled: “Small caliber firing” (with sketches of ammunition, rifles, targets, and aiming technique), 26 January, 1935, p. 19.

Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “Plans of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”), 30 March, 1935, p. 14.

The issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” also contain many photographs and articles demonstrating SA participation in military exercise, including forced marching, battle maneuvers, obstacle runs, small calibre firing, and the like. Among these photographs and articles are the following:

Each issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” contains advertisements for the sale of various items of military equipment, including uniforms, steel helmets, rifles, boots, grenades, field glasses, ammunition, etc. (See, for example, 20 January, 1934, p. 16; and 9 March, 1935, p. 16.)

Picture of SA men marching in military formation executing “goose step,” 14 April, 1934, p. 8.

Group of pictures showing SA Troops marching in military formations and in full pack and bearing flags being reviewed by Hitler. Title of page is “SA Marches into the New Year,” 12 January, 1935, p. 3.

Photographs of uniformed SA Troops marching in streets of Saarbrucken with caption: “In the streets of free Saarbrucken thuds the marching steps of the SA,” 9 March, 1935, p. 3.

Group of photographs entitled: “SA Brigade 6 marches for the German Danzig,” 4 May, 1935, p. 3.

Article entitled: “Who fights against us we will defeat, who provokes us we shall attack” (with picture of SA men in military formation bearing caption: “We are a political ideological troop”), 13 July, 1935, p. 1.

Article entitled: “The SA is and remains the Shock Troop of the Third Reich” (with picture of _Gruppenfuehrer_ reviewing SA men marching in uniform and in full pack, in military formation), 24 August, 1935, p. 2.

Article entitled: “SA Men at the heavy machine gun,” 3 July, 1936, p. 14.

Photograph of SA men in uniform and full pack on obstacle run, 29 August, 1936, p. 7.

Article entitled: “Fight, Fight, Fight” with subtitles:

“Preparation of Francken Division for the NS War Games” (with picture of SA men bearing arms), 26 June, 1937, p. 4.

Photograph of SA men bearing weapons, bearing caption:

“Austria’s SA: through battle, distress and persecution, to victory.”

Photograph bearing caption: “German-Austrian SA was armed in the hour of decision,” 2 April, 1938, p. 1.

Photograph of SA men bearing arms on battle maneuvers, 19 August, 1938, p. 8., bearing the caption: “The way to victory.”

Article entitled: “SA and the _Wehrmacht_” (with pictures of SA men on field maneuvers throwing hand grenades), 2 September, 1938, p. 1.

Photograph of SA men on field maneuvers, 9 September, 1938, p. 18.

Photograph of SA men bearing arms in trenches, apparently on field maneuvers, 16 September, 1938, p. 1. (Frankens-SA).

Photographs of SA men marching under arms, and on the rifle range, 30 September, 1938, p. 4. (Frankens-SA).

Photograph of SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ marching in goose-step with rifles and steel helmets and with the Luftwaffe insignia of sovereignty on their uniform and helmets, 11 November, 1938, p. 4.

Photograph entitled “Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ was there”, (referring to the incorporation of the Sudetenland), 14 October, 1938, p. 6.

Photograph bearing the caption: “Training with the KK Rifle. Something entirely new for the Sudeten German. Every SA man must be outstanding in marksmanship,” 6 January, 1939, p. 3.

Article entitled: “The SA—the forger of military power,” with the subheading: “The SA as Bearer of the Pre-military Training,” 27 January, 1939, p. 1.

Photograph of Von Brauchitsch (_Wehrmacht_) and Lutze reviewing the SA, 3 February, 1939, p. 3.

Photograph of SA on march with full pack and rifles. (Frankens-SA), 3 February, 1939, p. 1.

C. _Cooperation with the Wehrmacht in Preparation for Aggression._

Evidence of the SA’s participation in the conspiracy is found in the care which was taken at all times to coordinate the military training program of the SA with the requirements of the _Wehrmacht_. As early as 1934, an SA memorandum provided that the SA chief of training and his subordinates should remain—

“* * * in direct touch with the respective offices and sections of the Reich Defense Ministry.” (_2823-PS_)

The same memorandum recites that a Lieutenant-Colonel of the _Wehrmacht_ was assigned to the SA with the duty of participating—

“* * * in all questions regarding training and organization * * *.” (_2823-PS_)

Another SA memorandum declared that:

“* * * permanent liaison between the Reich Defense Ministry and the Supreme Commander of the SA * * * has been assured.” (_2821-PS_)

Hitler’s words regarding cooperation between _Wehrmacht_ and SA were as follows:

“The requirements of the _Wehrmacht_ are to be taken into consideration in organization and training.

“The Chief of Staff of the SA releases the required executionary directives in agreement with the Commander in Chief of the _Wehrmacht_ units. He alone is responsible for the fulfillment.” (_2383-PS_)

A speech by the Chief of Staff of the SA relating to the technical and specialized branches of the SA revealed that this opportunity for collaboration with the _Wehrmacht_ in specialized military training was utilized to the utmost:

“In the course of this development also special missions for military betterment (program) were placed on the SA. The Fuehrer gave the SA the cavalry and motor training and called SA Obergruppenfuehrer Littmann as Reich Inspector with the mission to secure the * * * recruits and requirements for the German Wehrmacht through the SA. In close cooperation with parts of the Wehrmacht special certificates were created for the communication, engineer and medical units which, like the cavalry certificate of the SA, are valued as statement of preference for employment in said units.” (_3215-PS_)

The specialized training given SA members, in accordance with the requirements of technical branches of the _Wehrmacht_, is described by SA Sturmfuehrer Bayer as follows (_2168-PS_):

“* * * On one side the young SA man who enters the armed forces (_Wehrmacht_) from his branch, comes prepared with a multitude of prerequisites which facilitate and speed up training in technical respects; while on the other side those very soldiers, having served, who return out of the armed forces into the SA keep themselves, by constant practice, in a trained condition physically and mentally and impart their knowledge to their fellows.

“Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhancement of armed strength (_Wehrkraft_) and armed spirit (_Wehrgeist_) of the German people.” (_2168-PS_)

And, with respect to the mounted or cavalry SA—

“* * * the SA each year is able to furnish many thousands of young trained cavalrymen to our _Wehrmacht_. * * * At present the SA cavalry has at its disposal 101 cavalry units in whose schools, year in and year out, young Germans who are obligated for military service receive the training which fits him for entrance into a section of troops which is of their own choosing.” (_2168-PS_)

The close relationship between the SA and the _Wehrmacht_ is shown throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”, which contain a number of articles on military training written by _Wehrmacht_ officers. The same relationship is shown in many photographs. For example, in the issue of 1 May, 1937, at page 4, there is a picture of a _Wehrmacht_ formation drawn up in front of an SA building with SA officers and men in the background. The picture is entitled—

“Day after day the closed formations of the _Wehrmacht_ march in Wurzburg to the subscription places of the SA for thanksgiving to the nation in order to announce its close relation with the SA, and to express thanks to the Fuehrer for making the Reich capable of defense.”

Page 2 of the issue of 27 January, 1939, contains a photograph of the SA Chief of Staff, Lutze, addressing a group of SA men. The photograph bears the caption, “We will be the bridge between the Party and the _Wehrmacht_.” Page 3 of the issue of 3 February, 1939, reproduces a photograph of General von Brauchitsch and Chief of Staff Lutze reviewing an SA unit.

The close cooperation between the _Wehrmacht_ and the SA, and the significance of the SA military training program is shown by the fact that service in the SA was considered as military service under the Conscription Law of 1935. The Organization Book of the Party declared that—

“Equally significant is a suitable education and training which the SA has accomplished within the yearly classes, and which have satisfied their arms obligation.” (_3220-PS_)

And an article in “Das Archiv” declared—

“It was announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths can fulfill their military conscription in the SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ whose Commander is General Field Marshall SA Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The Regiment for the first time was employed as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in the occupation of the Sudetenland under its Fuehrer and Regimental Commander SA Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.” (_3214-PS_)

There was never any misunderstanding among SA men as to the reasons which lay behind their military training program. They were preparing for war and knew it. The purpose of the so-called “Sports Program” was announced time after time in articles in “_Der SA-Mann_.” For example, the introduction to an article entitled, “The War of Tomorrow,” which appeared in the issue of 6 July, 1937, at page 12, declared:

“By decree of the Fuehrer of 18th March, 1937, the SA Sport Badge was declared as a means for the aggressive training of the body, for the fostering of a military spirit, for the retaining of military efficiency and thereby as a basis for German military power. * * *

“* * * In the following article an attempt is made to occupy every SA Fuehrer, who does not have the opportunity due to their profession or many-sided SA services, with questions concerning military policy and modern war direction, to give him an overall view of facts, teachings, opinions and beliefs which today are not without decisive influence upon the military policy, upon the character of the coming war and upon the modern national defense.”

D. _Participation of the SA in Warfare._

It would be natural in view of the above quotation, to expect the SA to have been used as a striking force in the first steps of the aggressive warfare launched by Germany, and as a basis for so-called Commando Groups. Such was the case. SA units were among the first of the Nazi military machine to invade Austria in the spring of 1938. This fact was proudly announced in an article appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” for 19 March, 1938, at p. 10, entitled, “We were the First!” Similarly, the SA participated in the occupation of the Sudetenland (_3214-PS_). It was announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths could fulfill their military conscription duty in the SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_, commanded by General Field Marshall SA Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The regiment was employed for the first time as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in the occupation of the Sudetenland, under its Fuehrer and Regimental commander SA Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.

SA participation in the occupation of the Sudetenland is also shown by an affidavit of Gottlob Berger, a former officer in the SS who was assigned to the Sudeten-German Free Corps (_3036-PS_). Berger declares—

“* * * 1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle at Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW Abwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred with Henlein.

“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s Headquarters I became familiar with the composition and activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria, one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area, and possibly a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous service in the SA and NSKK [Nazi Motor Corps] as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils and blankets, were supplied by the SA.” (_3036-PS_)

The adaptability of the SA to whatever purpose was required of it is demonstrated by its activities subsequent to the outbreak of the war. During the war the SA continued to carry out its military training program, but it also engaged in various other functions:

“The General of the SA, Wilhelm Schepmann, gave further orders to increase the employment of the SA in the homeland war territories because of the requirements of total war employment. This was done in numerous business conferences with Fuehrers of the SA-Divisions.

“As a result of these conferences, as well as of measures already carried out earlier for the totalization of the war employment, the SA now has placed 86 per cent of its main professional Fuehrer Corps at disposal at the Front even though the war missions of the SA have increased in the fields of pre-military training, the SA penetration into new territorial parts of the Reich, the air war employment, the State and national guard etc., during war time.

“The SA as a whole has given at present an even 70% of its nearly million members to the Wehrmacht.” (_3219-PS_)

The SA even extended its activities into Poland:

“By command of the General of the SA, the ‘SA-Unit General Government’ was established, the command of which was taken over by Governor-General SA Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Frank.” (_3216-PS_)

An affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, bureau chief in the RSHA, reads as follows:

“* * * From the beginning of 1944 on the SA also participated in many of the functions which had previously been entrusted only to the SS, SIPO and Army, for instance the guarding of concentration camps, the guarding of prisoner of war camps, the supervision over forced laborers in Germany and occupied areas. This cooperation of the SA was planned and arranged for by high officials in Berlin as early as the middle of 1943 * * *.” (_3232-PS_)

E. _Special Responsibility of Goering for the SA Program._

Hermann Goering participated in the conspiracy in his capacity as an SA member and leader. In 1923, Goering became Commander of the entire SA. A few months later Goering participated in the so-called Munich Putsch. SA troops participated with him in this action.

Goering’s intention to employ the SA as a terroristic force to destroy political opponents is shown by a speech made by him on 3 March, 1933, at a Nazi demonstration in Frankfurt Am Main (_1856-PS_). Goering spoke as follows:

“Certainly, I shall use the power of the State and the police to the utmost, my dear Communists! So you won’t draw any false conclusions by the struggle to the death in which my fist will grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there. Those are the Brown Shirts.” (_1856-PS_)

The importance of the SA under Goering in the early stages of the Nazi movement is shown by a letter written to Goering by Hitler (_3259-PS_):

“My dear Goering:

“When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied the success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal comrade in the battle for power. You contributed essentially to creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to thank you wholeheartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the great values which you have for the National Socialist Revolution and consequently for the German people.

“In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.

“Yours, “(s) Adolf Hitler!” (_3259-PS_)

Although Goering did not retain command of the SA, he at all times maintained a close affiliation with the organization. This is shown by the photographs of Goering participating in SA activities which have been mentioned previously. In 1937, Goering became Commander of the _Feldherrnhalle_ Regiment of the SA. This was the Regiment which was employed in the occupation of the Sudetenland. (_3214-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE STURMABTEILUNG (SA)

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 72 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 392-PS │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │ │ │Social Life of New Germany with │ │ │Special Consideration of the German │ │ │Labor Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller │ │ │(Berlin, 1938). (USA 326) │ III │ 380 │ │ │ *787-PS │Memorandum to Hitler from Public │ │ │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935, │ │ │concerning criminal procedure against │ │ │Vogel on account of bodily injury │ │ │while in office. (USA 421) │ III │ 568 │ │ │ *1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 252) │ III │ 978 │ │ │ *1721-PS │Confidential report of SA │ │ │Brigadefuehrer, November 1938, │ │ │concerning destruction of Jewish │ │ │property. (USA 425) │ IV │ 214 │ │ │ 1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │ │unity of Party and State, 29 March │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 502. │ IV │ 224 │ │ │ *1759-PS │Affidavit of Raymond H. Geist. (USA │ │ │420) │ IV │ 288 │ │ │ *1856-PS │Extract from book entitled “Hermann │ │ │Goering—Speeches and Essays”, 3rd │ │ │edition 1939, p. 27. (USA 437) │ IV │ 496 │ │ │ *1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the│ │ │NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529 │ │ │ *2168-PS │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst │ │ │Bayer, entitled “The SA”, depicting │ │ │the history, work, aim and │ │ │organization of the SA. (USA 411) │ IV │ 772 │ │ │ 2260-PS │Settlement of Relationship between │ │ │NSDAP and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) │ │ │published in National Socialist Party │ │ │Press Service release, 21 June 1933. │ IV │ 933 │ │ │ *2354-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ │NSDAP, 5th, 6th and 7th editions, │ │ │concerning SA. (USA 430) (See Chart │ │ │No. 17.) │ IV │ 1091 │ │ │ *2383-PS │Ordinance for execution of decree of │ │ │Fuehrer concerning position of the │ │ │Head of Party Chancellery of 16 │ │ │January 1942, published in Decrees, │ │ │Regulations, Announcements. (USA 410) │ V │ 9 │ │ │ *2407-PS │Order concerning the Roehm purge and │ │ │appointment of Lutze as Chief of │ │ │Staff, published in Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, 1934. (USA 412) │ V │ 82 │ │ │ *2471-PS │Pamphlet No. 12 in a series entitled │ │ │“Here Speaks the New German”. Speech │ │ │made in January 1936 by Victor Lutze, │ │ │Chief of Staff of SA, subject: “The │ │ │Affairs and Tasks of SA”. (USA 413) │ V │ 211 │ │ │ 2532-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │ │ │Ruehle. │ V │ 268 │ │ │ *2660-PS │Distribution Plan for Gaue, Kreise, │ │ │and Ortsgruppen, from The Bearers of │ │ │Sovereignty, 2nd Issue, 3rd Year, │ │ │February 1939. (USA 325) │ V │ 365 │ │ │ *2760-PS │Extract from Mein Kampf by Adolf │ │ │Hitler, 1933 edition. (USA 256) │ V │ 396 │ │ │ *2820-PS │General Service Regulations for the SA│ │ │of the NSDAP, published in Munich, 12 │ │ │December 1933. (USA 427) │ V │ 456 │ │ │ 2821-PS │Memorandum from Supreme SA │ │ │Headquarters, 19 March 1934, │ │ │concerning organization of the SA and │ │ │collaboration between Wehrmacht and │ │ │SA. (USA 431) │ V │ 458 │ │ │ 2822-PS │Letter from the Reich Military │ │ │Ministry, 26 May 1933, suggesting that│ │ │an SA branch and Reich Defense Council│ │ │be united. │ V │ 459 │ │ │ *2823-PS │Memorandum of SA Headquarters, January│ │ │1934, concerning assignment of │ │ │Wehrmacht officer to Training Division│ │ │of SA. (USA 429) │ V │ 459 │ │ │ *2824-PS │Extract from book entitled │ │ │“Concentration Camp Oranienburg”. (USA│ │ │423) │ V │ 461 │ │ │ **3036-PS │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the │ │ │composition and activity of the │ │ │Henlein Free Corps in September 1938. │ │ │(Objection to admission in evidence │ │ │upheld.) (USA 102) │ V │ 742 │ │ │ **3050-A-E-PS │Excerpts from The SA Man. (USA 414; │ │ │USA 415; USA 416; USA 417; USA 418) │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 777 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3211-PS │Goebbels to the SA, 17 October 1935, │ │ │from The Archive, Vol. 19, October │ │ │1935, p. 939. (USA 419) │ V │ 928 │ │ │ 3212-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 34, │ │ │January 1937, p. 1452. │ V │ 929 │ │ │ 3213-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 50, May│ │ │1938, pp. 156-157. │ V │ 929 │ │ │ 3214-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 55, │ │ │October 1938, p. 1069. (USA 432) │ V │ 930 │ │ │ *3215-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 60, │ │ │March 1939, p. 1834. (USA 426) │ V │ 930 │ │ │ *3216-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97, │ │ │April 1942, p. 54. (USA 434) │ V │ 933 │ │ │ 3217-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97, │ │ │April 1942, p. 54. │ V │ 933 │ │ │ 3218-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, October │ │ │1933, pp. 482-485. │ V │ 934 │ │ │ *3219-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 125, │ │ │August 1944, p. 367. (USA 433) │ V │ 934 │ │ │ *3220-PS │Excerpt from Organization Book of │ │ │NSDAP, 1943 edition, p. 358. (USA 323)│ V │ 935 │ │ │ *3221-PS │Affidavit of William F. Sollman, 26 │ │ │October 1945. (USA 422) │ V │ 936 │ │ │ *3232-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 435) │ V │ 937 │ │ │ *3252-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │ │Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │ │1937. (USA 424) │ V │ 957 │ │ │ *3259-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │ │Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │ │p. 69. (USA 424) │ V │ 1007 │ │ │ *D-44 │Circular, 25 July 1933, referring to │ │ │publications of SA activities. (USA │ │ │428) │ VI │ 1024 │ │ │ Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │ │November 1945. │ VIII │ 631 │ │ │ L-198 │State Department Dispatch by Consul │ │ │General Messersmith, 14 March 1933, │ │ │concerning molesting of American │ │ │citizens in Berlin. │ VII │ 1026 │ │ │ L-199 │Newspaper clippings from Berliner │ │ │Tageblatt, 29 March 1933, regarding │ │ │boycott action. │ VII │ 1034 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ Statement XIII │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │ │ │written in Nurnberg prison, 24 October│ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 749 │ │ │ **Chart No. 8 │Organization of the SA. (Enlargement │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ End of VIII │ │ │ *Chart No. 17 │Foreign Organization of the NSDAP. │ │(2354-PS; USA 430) │ End of VIII

5. THE SCHUTZSTAFFELN (SS)

In the early weeks of the trial, there appeared in a newspaper circulated in Nurnberg an account of a correspondent’s visit to a camp in which SS prisoners of war were confined. The thing which particularly struck the correspondent was the one question asked by the SS prisoners: Why are we charged as war criminals? What have we done except our normal duty?

The evidence which follows will answer that question. It will show that just as the Nazi Party was the core of the conspiracy, so the SS was the very essence of Nazism. For the SS was the elite group of the Party, composed of the most thorough-going adherents of the Nazi cause, pledged to blind devotion to Nazi principles, and prepared to carry them out without any question and at any cost. It was a group in which every ordinary value was so subverted that today its members can ask, what is there unlawful about the things we have done?

In the evidence of the conspirators’ program for aggressive war, for concentration camps, for the extermination of the Jews, for enslavement of foreign labor and illegal use of prisoners of war and for the deportation and Germanization of inhabitants of conquered territories, in all this evidence the name of the SS runs like a thread. Again and again that organization and its components are referred to. It performed a responsible role in each of these criminal activities, because it was and indeed had to be a criminal organization.

The creation and development of such an organization was essential for the execution of the conspirators’ plans. Their sweeping program and the measures they were prepared to use and did use, could be fully accomplished neither through the machinery of the government nor of the Party. Things had to be done for which no agency of government and no political party even the Nazi Party, would openly take full responsibility. A specialized type of apparatus was needed—an apparatus which was to some extent connected with the government and given official support, but which, at the same time, could maintain a quasi-independent status so that all its acts could be attributed neither to the government nor to the Party as a whole. The SS was that apparatus.

Like the SA, it was one of the seven components or formations of the Nazi Party referred to in the Decree on Enforcement of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State of 29 March 1935 (_1725-PS_). But its status was above that of the other formations. As the plans of the conspirators progressed, it acquired new functions, new responsibilities, and an increasingly more important place in the regime. It developed during the course of the conspiracy into a highly complex machine, the most powerful in the Nazi State, spreading its tentacles into every field of Nazi activity.

The evidence which follows will be directed toward showing first, the origin and early development of the SS; second, how it was organized—that is, its structure and its component parts; third, the basic principles governing the selection of its members and the obligations they undertook; and finally, its aims and the means used to accomplish them.

The history, organization, and publicly announced functions of the SS are not controversial matters. They are not matters to be learned only from secret files and captured documents. They were recounted in many publications, circulated widely throughout Germany and the world—in official books of the Nazi Party itself, and in books, pamphlets, and speeches by SS and State officials published with SS and Party approval. Throughout this section there will be frequent reference to and quotation from a few such publications.

A. _Origin and General Functions of the SS._

(1) _Origin._ The first aim of the conspirators was to gain a foothold in politically hostile territory, to acquire mastery of the street, and to combat any and all opponents with force. For that purpose they needed their own private, personal police organization. The SA was created to fill such a role. But the SA was outlawed in 1923. When Nazi Party activity was again resumed in 1925, the SA remained outlawed. To fill its place and to play the part of Hitler’s own personal police, small mobile groups known as protective squadrons—_Schutzstaffel_—were created. This was the origin of the SS in 1925. With the reinstatement of the SA in 1926, the SS for the next few years ceased to play a major role. But it continued to exist as an organization within the SA—under its own leader, however—the Reichsfuehrer SS.

This early history of the SS is related in two authoritative publications. The first is a book by SS Standartenfuehrer Gunter d’Alquen entitled “The SS” (_2284-PS_). This pamphlet of some 30 pages, published in 1939, is an authoritative account of the history, mission, and organization of the SS. As indicated on its fly leaf, it was written at the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler. Its author was the editor of the official SS publication “_Das Schwarze Korps_”. The second publication is an article by Himmler, entitled “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police.” It was published in 1937 in a booklet containing a series of speeches or essays by important officials of the Party and the State, and known as “National Political Course for the Armed Forces from 15 to 23 January 1937”. (_1992-A-PS_)

As early as 1929, the conspirators recognized that their plans required an organization in which the main principles of the Nazi system, specifically the racial principles, would not only be jealously guarded but would be carried to such extremes as to inspire or intimidate the rest of the population. Such an organization would also have to be assured complete freedom on the part of the leaders and blind obedience on the part of the members. The SS was built up to meet this need. The following statement appears on page 7 of d’Alquen’s book, “_Die SS_” (_2284-PS_):

“On the 16th of January, 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested comrade of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer SS. Heinrich Himmler assumed charge therewith of the entire _Schutzstaffel_ totaling at the time 280 men, with the express and particular commission of the Fuehrer to form of this organization an elite troop of the Party, a troop dependable in every circumstance. With this day the real history of the SS begins as it stands before us today in all its deeper essential features, firmly anchored into the national Socialist movement. For the SS and its Reichsfuehrer, Heinrich Himmler, its first SS man, have become inseparable in the course of these battle-filled years.” (_2284-PS_)

Carrying out Hitler’s directive, Himmler proceeded to build up out of this small force of men an elite organization which, to use d’Alquen’s words, was “composed of the best physically, the most dependable, and the most faithful men in the Nazi movement.” As d’Alquen further states, at page 12 of his book:

“When the day of seizure of power had finally come, there were 52,000 SS men, who in this spirit bore the revolution in the van, marched into the new State which they began to help form everywhere, in their stations and positions, in profession and in science, and in all their essential tasks.” (_2284-PS_)

(2) _General Functions._ The conspirators now had the machinery of government in their hands. The initial function of the SS—that of acting as their private army and personal police force—was thus completed. But its mission had in fact really just begun. That mission is described in the Organizations book of the NSDAP for 1943 as follows:

“_Missions_

“The most original and most eminent duty of the SS is to serve as the protector of the Fuehrer.

“By order of the Fuehrer its sphere of duties has been amplified to include the internal security of the Reich.” (_2640-PS_)

This new mission—protecting the internal security of the regime—was somewhat more colorfully described by Himmler in his pamphlet, “The SS as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting Organization,” published in 1936 (_1851-PS_):

“We shall unremittingly fulfill our task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just as the _Wehrmacht_ guarantees the safety, the honor, the greatness, and the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of subhumans be able to be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we know, on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades or may it be in centuries.” (_1851-PS_)

This conception necessarily required an extension of the duties of the SS into many fields. It involved, of course, the performance of police functions. But it involved more. It required participation in the suppression and extermination of all internal opponents of the regime. It meant participation in extending the regime beyond the borders of Germany, and eventually, participation in every type of activity designed to secure a hold over those territories and populations which, through military conquest, had come under German domination.

B. _Organization and Branches of the SS._

The expansion of SS duties and activities resulted in the creation of several branches and numerous departments and the development of a highly complex machinery. Although those various branches and departments cannot be adequately described out of the context of their history, a few words about the structure of the SS may be useful.

For this purpose reference is made to the chart depicting the organization of the SS as it appeared in 1945. This chart was examined by Gottlob Berger, formerly Chief of the SS Main Office, who stated in an attached affidavit that it correctly represents the organization of the SS (_Chart Number 3_).

(1) _Supreme Command of the SS._ At the very top of the chart is Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, who commanded the entire organization. Immediately below, running across the chart and down the right hand side, embraced within the heavy line, are the twelve main departments constituting the Supreme Command of the SS. Some of these departments have been broken down into the several offices of which they were composed, as indicated by the boxes beneath them. Other departments have not been so broken down. It is not intended to indicate that there were not subdivisions of these latter departments as well. The breakdown is shown only in those cases where the constituent offices of some department may have a particular significance in this case.

These departments and their functions are described in two official Nazi publications: The first is the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943, at pages 419-422 (_2640-PS_). The second is an SS manual, which bears the title: “The Soldier Friend—Pocket Diary for the German Armed Forces—Edition D: Waffen SS” (_2825-PS_). It was prepared at the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and issued by the SS Main Office for the year ending 1942. In addition, the departments are listed in a directory of the SS published by one of the Main Departments of the SS (_2769-PS_). This document was found in the files of the Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS. It is entitled “Directory for the _Schutzstaffel_ of the NSDAP, 1 November 1944”, marked “Restricted”, and bears the notation “Published by SS Fuerhungshauptamt, Kommandant of the General SS. Berlin—Wilmersdorf.”

Returning to the chart, following down the central spine from the Reichsfuehrer SS to the regional level, the Higher SS and Police Leaders, the supreme SS commanders in each region are reached. Immediately below these officials is the breakdown of the organization of the Allgemeine or General SS. To the left are indicated two other branches of the SS—the Death Head Units (_Totenkopf Verbaende_) and the Waffen SS. To the right under the HSS Pf is the SD. All of which, together with the SS Police Regiments, are specifically named in the Indictment (Appendix B) as being included in the SS.

(2) _Principal Branches of the SS._ Up to 1933 there were no such specially designated branches. The SS was a single group, made up of “volunteer political soldiers.” It was out of this original nucleus that new units developed.

(_a_) _The Allgemeine SS._ The Allgemeine (General) SS was the main stem from which the various branches grew. It was composed of all members of the SS who did not belong to any of the special branches. It was the backbone of the entire organization. The personnel and officers of the Main Departments of the SS Supreme Command were members of this branch. Except for high ranking officers and those remaining in staff capacities, as in the Main Offices of the SS Supreme Command, its members were part-time volunteers. Its members were utilized in about every phase of SS activity. They were called upon in anti-Jewish pogroms of 1938; they took over the task of guarding concentration camps during the war; they participated in the colonization and resettlement program. In short, the term “SS” normally meant the General SS.

It was organized on military lines as will be seen from the chart (_Chart Number 3_), ranging from district and subdistrict down through the regiment, battalion, and company, to the platoon. Until after the beginning of the war it constituted numerically the largest branch of the SS. In 1939 d’Alquen, the official SS spokesmen, said, in his book, “The SS” (_2284-PS_):

“The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided today into 14 corps, 38 divisions, 140 infantry regiments, 19 mounted regiments, 14 communication battalions and 19 engineer battalions as well as motorized and medical units. This General SS stands fully and wholly on call as in the fighting years, except for one small part of the chief leaders and men. The corps, which are presently led by a Lt. General or Major General, are subdivided into divisions, regiments, battalions and companies.” (_2284-PS_)

Similar reference to the military organization of the General SS will be found in Himmler’s speech, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police” (_1992-A-PS_), and in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943 (_2640-PS_). Members of this branch, however,—with the exception of certain staff personnel—were subject to compulsory military service. As a result of the draft of members of the General SS of military age into the Army, the numerical strength of presently active members considerably declined during the war. Older SS men and those working in or holding high positions in the Main Departments of the Supreme Command of the SS remained. Its entire strength during the war was probably not in excess of 40,000 men.

(_b_) _The SD._ The second component to be mentioned is the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS, almost always referred to as the SD. Himmler described the SD in these words (_1992-A-PS_):

“I now come to the Security Service (SD); it is the great ideological intelligence service of the Party and, in the long run, also that of the State. During the time of struggle for power it was only the intelligence service of the SS. At that time we had, for quite natural reasons, an intelligence service with the regiments, battalions and companies. We had to know what was going on on the opponents side, whether the Communists intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether our people were to be suddenly attacked or not, and similar things. I separated this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the units of the General SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men, or even the companies, are too likely to discuss everyday problems.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Although, as Himmler put it, the SD was only the intelligence service of the SS during the years preceding the accession of the Nazis to power, it became a much more important organization promptly thereafter. It had been developed into such a powerful and scientific espionage system under its chief, Reinhard Heydrich, that on 9 June 1934, just a few weeks before the bloody purge of the SA, it was made, by decree of Hess, the sole intelligence and counter-intelligence agency of the entire Nazi Party (_2284-PS_). Its organization and numbers, as they stood in 1937, were thus described by Himmler (_1992-A-PS_):

“The Security Service was already separated from the troop in 1931 and separately organized. Its higher headquarters, coincide today with the _Oberabschnitte_ and _Abschnitte_—[that is, the districts and subdistricts of the General SS]—and it has also field offices, its own organization of officials with a great many Command Posts, approximately three to four thousand men strong, at least when it is built up.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Up to 1939 its headquarters was the SS Main Security Office (_Sicherheitshauptamt_), which became amalgamated in 1939 into the Reich Main Security Office (or RSHA), one of the SS main departments shown on the chart (_Chart Number 3_).

The closer and closer collaboration of the SD with the Gestapo and Criminal Police (Kripo), which eventually resulted in the creation of the RSHA, as well as the activities in which the SD engaged in partnership with the Gestapo are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo. The SD was, of course, at all times an integral and important component of the SS. But it is more practicable to deal with it in connection with the activities of the whole repressive police system with which it functioned.

(_c_) _The Waffen SS._ The third component is the Waffen SS, the combat arm of the SS, which was created, trained, and finally utilized for the purposes of aggressive war. The reason underlying the creation of this combat branch was described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party for 1943:

“The Waffen SS originated out of the thought: to create for the Fuehrer a selected long service troop for the fulfillment of special missions. It was to render it possible for members of the General SS, as well as for volunteers who fulfill the special requirements of the SS, to fight in the battle for the evolution of the National Socialist idea, with weapon in hand, in unified groups, partly within the framework of the Army.” (_2640-PS_)

The term “Waffen SS” did not come into use until after the beginning of the war. Up to that time there were two branches of the SS composed of fulltime, professional, well-trained soldiers: the so-called _SS Verfuegungstruppe_, translatable perhaps as “SS Emergency Troops”; and the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_, the “Death Head Units.” After the beginning of the war, the units of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ were brought up to division strength, and new divisions were added to them. Moreover, parts of the SS Death Head Units were formed into a division, the _SS Totenkopf Division_. All these divisions then came to be known collectively as the “Waffen SS”.

This development is traced in the Organization Book of the Nazi Party for 1943:

“The origin of the Waffen SS goes back to the decree of 17 March 1933, establishing the “Stabswache” with an original strength of 120 men. Out of this small group developed the later-called SS Verfuegungstruppe (SS Emergency Force).” (_2640-PS_)

The function and status of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ are described in a Top Secret Hitler order, 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_). That order provides, in part:

* * * * * *

“II. The Armed Units of the SS.

“A. (The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_)

“1. The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit exclusively at my disposal. As such and as a unit of the NSDAP its members are to be selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the philosophical and political standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and for the _Schutzstaffel_. Its members are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers from those who are subject to serve in the army who have finished their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period for volunteers is for 4 years. It may be prolonged for _SS Unterfuehrer_. Such regulations are in force for SS leaders. The regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount of time in the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_.”

* * * * * *

“III. Orders for the Case of Mobilization.

“A. The employment of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ in case of mobilization is a double one.

“1. By the Supreme Commander of the Army within the wartime army. In that case it comes completely under military laws and regulations, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.

“2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders, in that case it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German Police.

“In case of mobilization I myself will make the decision about the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ into the wartime army, these things will depend on the inner-political situation at that time.” (_647-PS_)

Immediately after the issuance of this decree, this militarized force was employed with the Army for aggressive purposes—the taking over of the Sudetenland. Following this action, feverish preparations to motorize the force and to organize new units, such as antitank, machine gun, and reconnaissance battalions, were undertaken pursuant to further directives of the Fuehrer. By September 1939, the force was fully motorized, its units had been increased to division strength, and it was prepared for combat. These steps are described in the National Socialist Yearbook for the years 1940 (_2164-PS_) and 1941 (_2163-PS_). The Yearbook was an official publication of the Nazi Party, edited by Reichsleiter Robert Ley and published by the Nazi Party publishing company.

After the launching of the Polish invasion, and as the war progressed, still further divisions were added. The Organizations Book of the Nazi Party for 1943 (_2640-PS_) lists some eight divisions and two infantry brigades as existing at the end of 1942. This was no longer a mere emergency force. It was an SS army and hence came to be designated as the “Waffen SS” that is, “Armed” or “Combat” SS. Himmler referred to the spectacular development of this SS combat branch in his speech at Posen on 4 October 1943 to SS Gruppenfuehrers, in these terms:

“* * * Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard units (_Wachverbande_) 8 to 9,000 strong,—that is, not even a division, all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months before the war began.”

* * * * * *

“In the hard battles of this year, the Waffen-SS has been welded together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections, and from these it formed: bodyguard units (_Leibstandarte_), military SS (_Verfuegungstruppe_), Death’s Head Units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our ‘Reich’, Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and ‘Viking’ Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: ‘Viking’ is at my side, ‘Reich’ is at my side, ‘Death’s Head’ is at my side,—‘Thank God’ now nothing can happen to us.” (_1919-PS_)

The transformation of a small emergency force into a vast combat Army did not result in any separation of this branch from the SS. Although tactically under the command of the _Wehrmacht_ while in the field, it remained as much a part of the SS as any other branch of that organization. Throughout the war it was recruited, trained, administered and supplied by the main offices of the SS Supreme Command. Ideologically and racially its members were selected in conformity with SS standards, as shown by the recruiting standards of the Waffen SS published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend” (_2825-PS_). A section of that manual entitled “The Way to the Waffen SS,” reads:

“Today at last is the longed-for day of the entrance examination where the examiners and physicians decide whether or not the candidate is ideologically and physically qualified to do service in the Armed Forces SS.

“Everyone has acquainted himself with the comprehensive Manual for the Waffen SS; the principal points are as follows:

“1. Service in the Armed Forces SS counts as military service. Only volunteers are accepted.”

* * * * * *

“3. Every pure-blooded German in good health between the ages of 17 and 45 can become a member of the armed forces SS. He must meet all the requirements of the SS, must be of excellent character, have no criminal record, and be an ardent adherent to all Nazi socialist doctrines. Members of the _Streifendienst_ and of the _Landdienst_ of the Hitler Youth will be given preference because their aptitudes, qualities and schooling are indicative that they have become acquainted very early with the ideology of the SS.”

* * * * * *

“In all cases of doubt or difficulty the recruiting offices of the Waffen SS will advise and aid volunteers. They have branches over the entire Reich, always at the seat of the Service Command Headquarters, and work closely with the recruiting of the Waffen SS in the Main Office (SS Hauptamt) of the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_2825-PS_)

The recruiting activities of the SS Main Office are illustrated by its recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You,” an elaborate illustrated booklet containing full information covering the Waffen SS:

“If you answer the call of the Waffen SS and volunteer to join the ranks of the great Front of SS Divisions, you will belong to a corps which has from the very beginning been directed toward outstanding achievements, and, because of this fact, has developed an especially deep feeling of comradeship. You will be bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable elements of the young German generation. Over and above that you will be especially bound to the National Socialist ideology.” (_3429-PS_)

The SS Main Office, through which these recruiting activities were conducted, was one of the principal departments of the SS Supreme Command. It is shown on the chart (the second box from the left) (_Chart Number 3_). In the breakdown of that department, shown by the boxes underneath, will be found the central recruiting office.

Other departments of the Supreme Command performed other functions in connection with the Waffen SS. The SS Operational Headquarters (_SS Fuehrungshauptamt_)—the fifth box from the left—contains the Command Headquarters of the Waffen SS (_Chart Number 3_). The functions of this department are thus defined in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

“In the _Fuehrungshauptamt_ the command office of the Waffen SS handles tasks of military leadership: Training and organization of the units of the Waffen SS, supply of the troops with arms, equipment and ammunition, procurement of motor vehicles for the Waffen SS and General SS, personnel and disciplinary affairs.” (_2825-PS_)

The SS Legal Main Office (_Hauptamt SS Gericht_) (indicated on the chart by the second box from the top on the right hand side within the heavy embracing line—(_Chart Number 3_)) controlled the administration of courts-martial and discipline within the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler order of 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_) had, it is true, provided that in the event of mobilization the SS militarized forces should come completely under military laws and regulations. That provision was modified by subsequent enactments: The decree of 17 October 1939 relating to special jurisdiction in penal matters for members of the SS and for members of police groups on special tasks (_2946-PS_); and the decree of 17 April 1940, entitled “Second Decree for the Implementation of the Decree Relating to a Special Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for Members of the SS” (_2947-PS_). These two decrees established a special jurisdiction in penal matters for various classes of SS members, including members of the SS militarized units, in cases which would ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of the _Wehrmacht_; and created special SS courts to handle such cases under the direction of the SS Legal Main Office. Thus, in the vital question of discipline, as well as in recruiting, administration, and supply, the Waffen SS was subject to the SS Supreme Command.

The place of the Waffen SS as an integral part of the entire SS organization was strongly emphasized by Himmler in his address to officers of the _SS Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

“You must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my mind solely on—now, please don’t become conceited—the most splendid part of the SS because it _is_ the most positive part and because the trade you are following _is_ the most positive and most manly. I cannot do that. I must always have the _entire_ SS in my mind.

“If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most positive and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed SS. I would deny your life. Because this armed SS will live only if the entire SS is alive. If the entire corps is actually an order which lives according to these laws and realizes that one part cannot exist without the other—you are unimaginable without the General SS, and the latter is not imaginable without you. The police is not imaginable without the SS, nor are we imaginable without this executive branch of the state which is in our hands.” (_1918-PS_)

(_d_) _The Totenkopf Verbaende._

The fourth component to be mentioned is the SS Death Head Units (_SS Totenkopf Verbaende_). Their origin and purpose are succinctly described by d’Alquen on page 20 of his book, “_Die SS_”:

“The SS Death Head Units form one part of the garrisoned SS. They arose from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited for the guarding of concentration camps in 1933.

“Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed political soldier, is guarding enemies of the State who are held in concentration camps.

“The SS Death Head Units obligate their members to 12 years service. It is composed mainly of men who have already fulfilled their duty to serve in the _Wehrmacht_. This time of service is counted completely.” (_2284-PS_)

Since the Death Head Units, like the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_, were composed of well trained professional soldiers, they were also a valuable nucleus for the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler order of 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_) provided for this task in the event of mobilization. The _Totenkopf Verbaende_ were to be relieved from the duty of guarding concentration camps and transferred as a skeleton corps to the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_. Section II C, subparagraph 5, of that order provides: “5. _Regulations for the case of the Mobilization_.

“The _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ form the skeleton corps for the reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ (police reinforcement), and will be replaced in the guarding of the concentration camps by members of the General SS who are over 45 years of age and had military training.

“The skeleton corps—which up to now were units of the two replacement units for the short time training of the reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_—will be transferred to the _SS-Verfuegungstruppe_ as skeleton crews of the replacement units for that unit.” (_647-PS_)

(_e_) _The SS Polizei Regimente._

The final component specifically referred to in the Indictment is the SS Police Regiments. The SS eventually succeeded in assuming controls over the entire Reich Police. Out of the police, special militarized forces were formed, originally SS Police Battalions, and later expanded to SS Police Regiments. Himmler, in his Posen speech, declared:

“Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and the Sipo [the Security Police] they still cover the same field. I can see that great things have been achieved. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists and former members of the police—police officials, as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is not lower than that of the security battalions of the Armed Forces. Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the ‘savage peoples.’ Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio of about 1 to 3.” (_1919-PS_)

The results of this blend of militarized SS police and “savage peoples” will be seen in the evidence, subsequently referred to, of the extermination actions conducted by them in the Eastern territories. These exterminations which were so successful and so ruthless that even Himmler could find no words adequate for their eulogy.

(3) _Unity of the Organization._

Each of the various components described above played its part in carrying out one or more functions of the SS. The personnel composing each differed. Some were part-time volunteers; others were professionals enlisted for different periods of time. But every branch, every department, every member was an integral part of the whole organization. Each performed his assigned role in the manifold tasks for which the organization had been created. No better witness to this fact could be called upon than the Reichsfuehrer SS, whose every endeavor was to insure the complete unity of the organization. The following words are taken from his Posen speech:

“It would be an evil day if the SS and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices, performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think that the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so come about, that this SS organization with all its branches—the General SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police (_Ordnungspolizei_), the SIPO (with the whole economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_ bloc, _one_ body, _one_ organization.

* * * * * *

“The regular uniformed police and SIPO, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just as this is and must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic organization, and medical services. I am always doing something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if these bonds should ever be loosened—then everything—you may be sure of this—would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation, and in a short space of time.” (_1919-PS_)

C. _Selection, Training, and Obligations of Members._

To understand this organization, the theories upon which it was based must be kept clearly in mind. The underlying philosophy of the SS, the principles by which its members were selected, and the obligations imposed upon them furnish the key to all its activities. It is necessary, therefore, to consider them in some detail.

(1) _The Racial Basis of the SS._

(_a_) _The SS as a racial and biological elite._

The fundamental principle of selection was what Himmler called that of Blood and Elite. The SS was to be the living embodiment of the Nazi doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood, and of the Nazi conception of a master race. In Himmler’s own words, the SS was to be a “National Socialist Soldierly Order of Nordic Men” (_1992-A-PS_). In describing to the _Wehrmacht_ the reasons behind his emphasis on racial standards of selection and the manner in which they were carried out, he said:

“* * * Accordingly, only good blood, blood which history has proved to be leading and creative and the foundation of every state and of all military activities, only Nordic blood, can be considered. I said to myself that should I succeed in selecting from the German people for this organization as many people as possible a majority of whom possess this desired blood, in teaching them military discipline and, in time, the understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology which results from it, then it will be possible actually to create such an elite organization which would successfully hold its own in all cases of emergency.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Further on in the same speech, Himmler described the selection of candidates for his organization:

“* * * They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of 100 men we can use on the average of 10 or 15, no more. We ask for the political reputation record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the record of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and naturally the physical examination and his records from the Hitler Youth. Further, we ask for a record of hereditary health showing that no hereditary disease exists in his parents and in his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is a certification of the race commission. This examining commission is composed of SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians.” (_1992-A-PS_)

This same strict selection process for the SS was somewhat similarly described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party for 1943:

“_Selection of Members_

“For the fulfillment of these missions a homogeneous firmly welded fighting force has been created bound by ideological oaths, whose fighters are selected out of the best Aryan humanity.

“The conception of the value of the blood and soil serves as directive for the selection into the SS. Every SS man must be deeply imbued with the sense and essence of the National Socialist Movement. He will be ideologically and physically trained so that he can be employed individually or in groups in the decisive battle for the National Socialist ideology.

“Only the best and thoroughbred Germans are suited for commitment, in this battle. Therefore it is necessary that an uninterrupted selection is retained within the ranks of the SS, first superficially, then constantly more thoroughly.” (_2640-PS_)

The creation of a racial and biological elite had some very practical reasons behind it. The conspirators’ plans for conquest and exploitation of the conquered territories required the development of a Nazi aristocracy which would dominate Germany and Europe for centuries to come. That purpose was explicitly stated by Himmler in his Posen speech:

“One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today: the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together our organization, this organization which we have built up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do this—we,—if I may say so, we older men—for twenty years full of toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this organization will march forward into the future young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of giving the German people, the Germanic people, the superstratum of society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people need for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen and technicians, will emerge. In addition this superstratum must be so strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice two or three sons from every family on the battle-field, and that never-the-less the continued flowing of the bloodstream is assured.” (_1919-PS_)

He forcibly made the same point in his address to officers of the _SS Leibstandarte_ “Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

“The ultimate aim for these 11 years during which I have been the Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an order of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which unfailingly and without sparing itself can be made use of because the greatest losses can do no harm to the vitality of this order, the vitality of these men, because they will always be replaced. To create an order which will spread the idea of nordic blood so far that we will attract all nordic blood in the world, take away the blood from our adversaries, absorb it so that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of grand policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others cannot have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived so many years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance further on the way. Everything we are going to do will lead us further on the way.” (_1918-PS_)

Since the SS was to be made a Nazi aristocracy which would dominate not only Germany but the world for centuries to come, it was essential that the SS stock be perpetuated. To insure the continuance of this good blood, the first step was to limit marriages of SS men to women meeting the same requirements as to health, descent, and ideological background as the SS man himself. This was accomplished by an order of the Reichsfuehrer SS issued on 31 December 1931. This SS marriage law is set out in full in d’Alquen’s Book, “The SS,” (_2284-PS_). But proper marriages were not enough without children. A series of orders took care of that. On 13 September 1936, Himmler issued an order entitled “Foundation of the Organization ‘_Lebensborn e.V._’”, published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

“As early as December 13, 1934, I wrote to all SS leaders and declared that we have fought in vain if political victory was not to be followed by victory of birth of good blood. The question of multiplicity of children is not a private affair of the individual but his duty towards his ancestors and our people.

“The SS has taken the first step in this direction long ago with the engagement and marriage decree of December 1931. However, the existence of sound marriage is futile if it does not result in the creation of numerous descendants.”

* * * * * *

“The minimum amount of children for a good sound marriage is four. Should unfortunate circumstances deny a married couple their own children, then every SS leader should adopt racially and hereditarily valuable children, educate them in the spirit of National Socialism, let them have an education corresponding to their ability.” (_2825-PS_)

The drive for perpetuation of SS stock was continued. A further order of Himmler, issued on 28 October 1939, directed to the entire SS and the Police, is also published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

“The old saying that only those who have children can die in peace must again become acknowledged truth in this war, especially for the SS.

* * * * * *

“Though in other times it may perhaps be considered an infraction of necessary social standards and conventions, German women and girls of good blood can fulfill a high obligation by bearing children out of wedlock to soldiers going to the front, whose eventual return or death for Germany lies entirely in the hands of fate—not out of promiscuity but out of a deep sense of ethics.”

* * * * * *

“Let us never forget that the victory of the sword and of the spilled blood of our soldiers remains fruitless, if it is not succeeded by the victory of the child and the colonizing of conquered soil.” (_2825-PS_)

A final order designed to assure continuance of good SS blood was issued on 15 August 1942, entitled “SS Orders to the Last Sons”, also published in “The Soldier Friend”:

“You SS men have been withdrawn from the front lines by order of the Fuehrer because you are the last sons. This measure has been taken because the people and the State have an interest in seeing that your families do not die out.

“It has never been the nature of SS men to submit to a fate without attempting to effect a change. It is your duty to see to it that you are no longer the last sons by producing as many children of good blood as possible.” (_2825-PS_)

These orders were not the product of some benevolent theorist in eugenics who was interested in large and happy SS families for their own sake. They stemmed from a basic idea of the conspiracy, the plan to insure Germany’s continued capacity to wage war for generations. Himmler put this theory very bluntly in his speech to officers of the _SS Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

“* * * If we once had not enough sons, those who will come after us will have to become cowards. A nation which has an average of four sons per family can venture a war; if two of them die, two transmit the name. The leadership of a nation having one son or two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any decision on account of their own experience, because they will have to tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France, which is the best example. France had to accept from us a dictate.” (_1918-PS_)

(_b_) _The SS as an exterminator of “inferior” races._

Domination of Europe through a Nazi Elite required more, however, than the positive side of racism—that is, the building up of a numerous “biologically superior” group. It necessarily meant also the destruction of other races. The SS had to be, and was, taught not merely to breed, but to exterminate. In a speech delivered at Kharkov in April 1943, Himmler declared:

“We have—I would say, as very consistent National Socialists—taken the question of blood as our starting point. We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism. Antisemitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, anti-semitism for us, will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is finished within the whole of Germany.” (_1919-PS_)

But it was not merely against Jews that SS efforts were directed. All non-Nordic races were similarly condemned. In his Posen speech, Himmler stated this basic principle of the SS:

“One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS men: We must be honest, decent, loyal and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What other nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the antitank ditch for Germany is finished.”

* * * * * *

“That is what I want to instill into this SS and what I believe I have instilled in them as one of the most sacred laws of the future.” (_1919-PS_)

(_c_) _Indoctrination of members in SS racial theories._ These were the principles which were publicly reiterated, over and over again, so that the newest recruit was thoroughly steeped in them. In his Kharkov speech to the commanding officers of three Waffen SS divisions, Himmler strongly insisted on indoctrinating all SS members in his theories of the racial struggle.

“This is what is important for us as SS men, for our province of duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German armed forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like to impress upon you. This is what I beg you as commanding officers, as chiefs and as leaders, to teach the young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of you—that you really concern yourself with the man, the young fellow of 17 or 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us—that is what I request and demand of you.

“We have only one task—to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without mercy.” (_1919-PS_)

This function of the SS men in the racial struggle was publicly proclaimed in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

“He openly and relentlessly fights against the most dangerous enemies of the State: Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits and political clergymen.” (_2640-PS_)

(2) _The Obligation of Obedience._ Indoctrination of the organization in principles of racial hatred was not enough. The members had to be ready and willing tools, prepared to carry out tasks of any nature, however distasteful, illegal or inhuman. Absolute obedience was the necessary second foundation stone of the SS. The Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943 thus describes this fundamental requirement:

“Obedience must be unconditional. It corresponds to the conviction that the National Socialist ideology must reign supreme. He who is possessed by it and fights for it passionately subjects himself voluntarily to the obligation to obey. Every SS man is prepared, therefore, to carry out blindly every order which is issued by the Fuehrer or which is given by his superior, irrespective of the heaviest sacrifices involved.” (_2640-PS_)

The same point was emphasized by Himmler in the Posen speech:

“I would like here to state something clearly and unequivocally. It is a matter of course that the little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the senior leaders of the SS, that is the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, are a model of blind obedience.” (_1919-PS_)

(3) _The SS as a Terroristic Agency._ A necessary corollary of these two fundamental principles of race and of blind obedience was ruthlessness. Subsequent evidence of SS activities will prove how successfully the SS learned the lesson it was taught. The SS had to and did develop a reputation for terror which was carefully cultivated. Himmler himself attested to it as early as 1936 in a speech publicly delivered at the Peasant’s Day Rally and subsequently published and circulated in pamphlet form under the title “The SS as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting Organization”:

“I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they see their black coats. We understand the reason for this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many.” (_1851-PS_)

(4) _Continuance of the Elite and Voluntary Character of the SS._ The role which the SS was to play required that it remain constantly the essence of Naziism, and that its elite Nazi quality never be diluted. For this reason the SS was for a time temporarily closed to new members, and those who had proved unfit were weeded out. Himmler described this process in his article “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police” (_1992-A-PS_). Referring to the influx of new adherents to the Party and its organizations in 1933, he said:

“A very difficult question confronted us at that time. It was a question of deciding whether to close the Party and its organizations to further membership and thus remain pure in quality but small in volume, or of opening them to further membership to increase their volume.”

* * * * * *

“The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it while some of the other organizations accepted as great a number of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under my control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the newly accepted members who proved unsuitable.” (_1992-A-PS_)

These standards were not abandoned later. Indeed, in 1943 the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party stated that:

“The demands with respect to racial purity of the SS are being increased every year.”

And in the same year, 1943, Himmler emphasized this point in a letter written to Kaltenbrunner (_2768-PS_).

This letter from the Reichsfuehrer SS, which bears the date 24 April 1943, states in part as follows:

“Referring again to the matter which I discussed some time ago, i.e., the admission of SIPO officials into the SS. I wish to clarify again: I want an admission only if the following conditions are fulfilled:

“1. If the man applies freely and voluntarily;

“2. If, by applying strict and peacetime standards, the applicant fits racially and ideologically into the SS, guarantees according to the number of his children a really healthy SS stock, and is neither ill, degenerate nor worthless.”

* * * * * *

“I beg you not only to act accordingly in the future, but especially also that numerous admissions into ranks of the SS in the past be reexamined and revised according to these instructions.” (_2768-PS_)

(5) _Method of Acquiring Membership in the SS._ The normal method by which membership in the SS was attained was discussed by Himmler in his article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and Police”:

“The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the young man enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three months he takes the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a candidate (_Anwaerter_). As a candidate during the first year he takes examinations for his SA sport insignia and his bronze sport insignia. At the age of 19 or 19½, according to the time of his acceptance, he is conscripted for the labor service and subsequently for the _Wehrmacht_. After two more years he comes back from the _Wehrmacht_ unless he remains there as a prospective noncommissioned officer or reenlists. If he returns to us, he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a period of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks following his return from the _Wehrmacht_ he receives special instruction about the marriage law and all other laws pertaining to the family, and the honor laws. On the 9th of November, following his return from the _Wehrmacht_, he becomes an SS man in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of the SS is just as much an SS man in the sense of the SS organization as the common man at the front. On this 9th of November he is awarded the dagger, and at this occasion he promises to abide by the marriage law and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is also subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor laws of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have this right. The SS man remains in the so-called active General SS until his 35th year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in the SS reserve, and after his 45th year in the _Stammabteilung_ of the SS, identified by the grey color patch.” (_1992-A-PS_)

The oath to the Fuehrer, referred to by Himmler in the passage just quoted, appears in the SS recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You”:

“The Oath of the SS Man:

“I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, loyalty and bravery. I vow to you, and to those you have named to command me, obedience unto death, so help me God.” (_3429-PS_)

D. _Criminal Aims and Activities of the SS._

(1) _The Purge of 20[_sic_] June 1934._ Proof of the elite Nazi quality and thorough reliability of the SS, the test by which it won its spurs, occurred on 30 June 1934, when it participated in the purge of the SA and other opponents or potential opponents of the Nazi regime. That was the first real occasion for use of this specialized organization which could operate with the blessing of the Nazi State but outside the law. In an affidavit signed and sworn to in Nurnberg on 19 November 1945, Wilhelm Frick says, referring to the victims of that purge:

“They were just killed on the spot. Many people were killed—I don’t know how many—who actually did not have anything to do with the putsch. People who just weren’t liked very well, as for instance, Schleicher, the former Reich Chancellor, were killed * * * The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these orders to suppress the putsch.” (_2950-PS_)

Himmler referred to this same event in his Posen speech:

“Just as we did not hesitate on June 20,[_sic_] 1934, to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it and will never speak about it.” (_1919-PS_)

It was in recognition of its services in this respect that the SS was elevated to the status of a component of the Party equal in rank to the SA and other similar branches. The following announcement appeared on page 1 of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_ of 26 July 1934:

“The Reich press office announces the following order of the Fuehrer.

“In consideration of the greatly meritorious service of the SS, especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP.

“Munch 20 July 1934.” (_1857-PS_)

(2) _Functions as a Repressive Police Organization._

One of the first steps essential to the security of any regime is control of the police. The SS was the type of organization which the conspirators needed for this purpose. Their aim was to fuse the SS and police, and to merge them into a single, unified repressive force.

Shortly after the seizure of power the conspirators began to develop as part of the state machinery, secret political police forces. These originated in Prussia with the Gestapo, established by decree of Goering in April 1933, and were duplicated in the other German States. (This development is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) By 1934 Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, had become the chief of these secret political police forces in each of the German states except Prussia, and deputy chief of the Prussian Gestapo. In that capacity he infiltrated these forces with members of the SS until a virtual identity of membership was assured.

On 17 June 1936, by Decree on the Establishment of a Chief of the German Police (_2073-PS_), the new post of Chief of the German Police was created in the Ministry of the Interior. Under the terms of the decree, Himmler was appointed to this post with the title of “Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior.” The combination of these two positions, that of leadership of the SS and head of all the police forces in the Reich, was no accident but was intended to establish a permanent relation between the two bodies and not a mere “transitory fusion of personnel.” The significance of the combination of these two positions was referred to by Hitler in the preamble to his secret order of 17 August 1938:

“By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior on June 17th, 1936 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, page 487), I have created the basis for the unification and reorganization of the German Police.

“With this step, the _Schutzstaffeln_ of the NSDAP, which were under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police even up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of the German Police.” (_647-PS_)

Upon his appointment, Himmler immediately proceeded to reorganize the entire Reich Police Force, designating two separate branches: (1) the regular uniformed police force (_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), and (2) the Security Police (_Sicherheitspolizei_, or Sipo). The Sipo was composed of all criminal police organizations in the Reich and all the secret political police forces, or Gestapo. This reorganization was achieved by the Decree Assigning Functions in the Office of the Chief of the German Police (_1551-PS_). To be head of the Sipo, that is the criminal police and Gestapo, Himmler appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who was at that time the Chief of the SD. Thus, through Himmler’s dual capacity as leader of the SS and as Chief of the Police, and through Heydrich’s dual capacity as head of the Sipo and as chief of the SD, a unified personal command of the SS and Security Police Forces was achieved. But further steps toward unification were later taken. In 1939, the Security Police and the SD were combined in a single department, the Reich Security Main Office, commonly referred to as the RSHA. (The details of the organization of the RSHA are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) The important point to be observed is this: The newly created Reich Security Main Office was not a mere department of the Government. It was a dual body: an agency of the government, organizationally placed in the Department of the Interior, and at the same time one of the principal departments of the SS, organizationally placed in the Supreme Command of the SS. (cf. the chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_)). The following description of the RSHA appears in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

“The RSHA handles all the organizational, personnel, management and technical affairs of the Security Police and the SD. In addition, it is the central office of the State Police and criminal police executive, as well as the central directorate of the intelligence net of the SD.” (_2640-PS_)

The position of the RSHA in the Supreme Command of the SS is also similarly described in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)

But it was not merely the Gestapo and the Criminal Police which came under the sway of the SS. The regular uniformed police as well were affected. For, like the RSHA, the Department of the Regular Police (_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), was not merely a department in the Ministry of the Interior, but also simultaneously in the Supreme Command of the SS. Its position in the SS is indicated by the seventh box on the chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_). The following description of the Department of the Regular Police appears in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

“The sphere of duties of the Main Office of the _Ordnungspolizei_ includes police administration as well as the management and direction of the protective police (_Schutzpolizei_) of the Reich, the Gendarmes, the protective police of the community, the water protection police, the air protection police, the fire protection police, the protective groups in the occupied territories, the colonial police, the volunteer fire department, the compulsatory and youth fire departments, the technical aid and the technical SS and police academy.” (_2640-PS_)

The position of this Department in the SS Supreme Command is also similarly described in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)

This unity of the Command was not a mere matter of the highest headquarters. It extended down to the operating level. As the chart shows, the Higher SS and Police Leader in each region, who was directly subordinate to Himmler, had under his command both the Security Police and the regular, uniformed police (_Chart Number 3_). These forces were subject to his orders as well as to those of the RSHA and the Department of the Regular Police respectively. This position of the Higher SS and Police Leader is described in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943. (_2640-PS_)

SS control of the police was, however, not only a matter of organization and of unified command. Unity of personnel was also in large measure achieved. Vacancies occurring in the police forces were filled by SS members; police officials retained in the force were urged to join the SS; and schools operated by the SS were the required training centers for police as well as SS officials. These measures are described in Himmler’s article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police” (_1992-A-PS_). They are also described in an authoritative book on the police and on the SS, entitled “The German Police,” written by Dr. Werner Best, a Ministerial Director in the Ministry of the Interior and a department head in the Security Police and published in 1940. It bears on its flyleaf the imprimatur of the Nazi Party and is listed in the official list of National Socialist Party bibliography. Chapter 7 from that book is reproduced in document (_1852-PS_). Reference is also made to the order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police of 23 June 1938, entitled “Acceptance of Members of the Security Police into the SS” (_1637-PS_). In that order provision was made for admitting members of the Security Police into the SS upon certain conditions. The preamble of the order states that it was issued “with the aim of fusing members of the German Police with the ‘_Schutzstaffel_’ of the National Socialist German Workers Party into one uniformly turned out State Protective Corps of the National Socialist Reich” (_1637-PS_). Parenthetically, it should be observed that even this aim was not sufficient to cause a relaxation of SS admission standards since the order provided that, to be admitted as an SS member, personnel of the Security Police were obliged to fulfill the general requirements of the SS (its racial and ideological standards).

Through this unity of organization and personnel, the SS and the police became identified in structure and in activity. The resulting situation was described by Best as follows:

“Thus the SS and the Police form a unit, both in their structure and in their activity, although their individual organizations have not lost their true individuality and their position in the larger units of the Party and State administration * * *”

* * * * * *

“In the relationship between the Police and the SS, the principle of the ‘orderly’ penetration of an organization of the National order has been realized for the first time to the final outcome through the supporters of the National Socialist movement”. (_1852-PS_)

As Himmler stated in his address to the officers of _SS-Leibstandarte_ “Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

“I want to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to view the other great activity of the entire SS (_Gesamt-SS_) and entire Police. We must see to it that you consider the activity of the man in the green uniform as just as valuable as the activity you yourself are engaged in. You have to consider the work of the SD man or the man of the Security Police as a vital part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry arms”. (_1918-PS_)

Through the police the SS was in a position to carry out a large part of the functions assigned to it. The working partnership between Gestapo, the criminal police, and the SD, under the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS, resulted in the ultimate in repressive and unrestrained police activity. (cf. the discussion in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) It must be remembered that the Gestapo activities were but one aspect of SS functions—one part of the whole criminal SS scheme.

(3) _Functions and Activities with Respect to Concentration Camps._ Control over the police, however, was not enough. Potential sources of opposition could be tracked down by the SD. Suspects could be seized by the criminal police and Gestapo. But those means alone would not assure the complete suppression of all opponents and potential opponents of the regime. For this purpose concentration camps were invented, and the SS was given large responsibility in that system.

(_a_) _Criminal activities of SS guards and camp personnel._ The first requirement of the camps was for guard and administrative personnel. Part-time volunteer members of the _Allgemeine SS_ were originally utilized as guards. But part-time volunteers could not adequately serve the need of the extensive and long-range program that was planned. Hence, beginning in 1933 full-time professional guard units (the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_) were organized. Their very name (“Death Head Units”) and their distinguishing insignia, the skull and cross bones, appropriately marked the type of activity in which they engaged.

During the war, members of the _Allgemeine SS_ resumed the function of guarding the camps which they had undertaken when the camps were created. This was provided for in the Hitler order of 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_) directing the substitution of _Allgemeine SS_ members for the Death Head Units in the event of mobilization. That substitution took place. In reviewing the events of the period between 1938 and 1940, significant for the SS, the National Socialist Yearbook of 1940 congratulated the _Allgemeine SS_ on the performance of its new mission:

“However, not only the garrisoned parts of the SS were employed. Also the General SS were brought forth for special missions. Thousands of younger and older SS comrades were employed for the strengthening of the police and for the guarding of concentration camps and have faithfully fulfilled their duty throughout the weeks.” (_2164-PS_)

It is unnecessary to repeat the evidence of wholesale brutalities, tortures, and murders committed by SS guards. These were not sporadic crimes committed by irresponsible individuals. They were a part of a definite and calculated policy, which necessarily resulted from SS philosophy, and which was carried out from the initial creation of the camps.

Himmler bluntly explained to the _Wehrmacht_ in 1937 the prevailing view of the SS as to the inmates of concentration camps:

“It would be extremely instructive for everyone, some members of the _Wehrmacht_ were already able to do so, to inspect such a concentration camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced of the fact that no one had been sent there unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals and freaks. No better demonstration of the laws of inheritance and race, as set forth by Doctor Guett, exists than such a concentration camp. There you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are cross-eyed, deformed, half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior products. All that is assembled there. Of course, we distinguish between those inmates who are only there for a few months for the purpose of education, and those who are to stay for a very long time. On the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind of instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have, for the most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of real character can be found there.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Even these “slave-like souls,” however, might be redeemed by SS hygienic measures. For, as Himmler continued:

“The discipline thus means order. The order begins with these people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can really only be accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a toothbrush with which most of them have been unfamiliar.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Despite this callous jest to the _Wehrmacht_, all pretense was swept away in Himmler’s speech to his own Gruppenfuehrers at Posen:

“I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps. And here I must say this—that we shall be able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite of all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal substratum of the German people in concentration camps: I’ll answer for that.” (_1919-PS_).

Certainly there was no “silly humanitarianism” in the manner in which SS men performed their task. An illustration of their conduct, not in 1944 or 1945 but in 1933, is shown in four reports relating to the deaths of four different inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau between May 16 and 27, 1933. Each report is signed by Winterberger, the Public Prosecutor of the District Court in Munich, and addressed to the Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Munich. The first (_641-PS_) 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Dr. Alfred Strauss, a prisoner in protective custody in Dachau. That report states:

“On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single, attorney at law, Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2 pistol shots from SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk outside of the fenced part of the camp prescribed to him by the camp doctor.

“Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.

“On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of his head. Besides, the body showed several black and blue spots (_Blutunterlaufung_) and also open wounds.”

* * * * * *

“I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made application for opening and execution of the judicial preliminary investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest against him.” (_641-PS_)

The second (_642-PS_) also 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Leonhard Hausmann, another prisoner in Dachau. That letter states:

“On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old, married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS Staff Sergeant Karl Ehmann. According to the account of the latter, Hausmann was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was supervised by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him anymore. Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw him running away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, called ‘Halt’ several times, once also ‘Stop,’ but in vain. Whereupon Ehmann raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming; Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a distance of 10 to 12 meters.

“The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 1933 with the assistance of the State court physician. It was found that death was due to a shot through the left side of the chest. According to the autopsy protocol, the shot was fired from a distance less than 1 meter. Meanwhile the legal-medical institute ascertained that the distance was less than 30 cm.” (_642-PS_)

The third (_644-PS_) 22 May 1933, relates to the death of Louis Schloss, an inmate of Dachau. Attached to the letter is a copy of a report of the autopsy conducted in the Schloss case, signed by the examining physicians. The letter of 22 May 1933, begins:

“In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau informed the State Prosecution that an inmate of the concentration camp Dachau, the merchant Louis Schloss, from Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1889, has hanged himself in solitary confinement. At the request of the state prosecution, on the same day the legal inspection was performed with the assistance of the state court physician with the State Court Munich II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous whip marks and as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an autopsy was carried out on 17 May 1933. According to a preliminary certificate of the participating physicians, the autopsy did not prove death by hanging”. (_644-PS_)

The preliminary opinion of the examining physician states:

“Preliminary opinion:

“I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.

“II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found, particularly on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as well as on both legs, abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In the region of the buttocks and shoulders extensive destruction of adipose tissue was found together with the blood suffusions. This is adequate to explain death through autointoxication and fat embolism.” (_644-PS_)

The fourth (_645-PS_) 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Sebastian Nefzger, another Dachau prisoner. The letter reads:

“On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the Lower Court Dachau:

“Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933, to the Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the prisoner Nefzger Sebastian merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse 17/0, born: 1/10/1900 in Munich, religion: Catholic, marital status: married—showed that death through the action of third persons must be excluded. Death was indubitably caused by excessive bleeding resulting from an opened artery of the left hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician.

“Neither the Lower Court Dachau nor the State Attorney Munich II had up to that time been informed of Nefzger’s death reported in the letter in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in the night of the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The Lower Court Dachau informed the State Attorney, Munich II of this letter. A coroner’s inquest was ordered, which took place as late as May 27, 1933. Since the physician appointed by the Superior Court, doubted that death had occurred to excessive bleeding and in identified marks of strings on the victim’s neck, a judicial autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29, 1933. The resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I) The autopsy discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm must be excluded as a cause of death: II) The cut on the left wrist reveals three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are lacking. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the wound has been self-inflicted: III) It must be assumed that the cause of death was suffocation. As a cause for suffocation, strangulation and throttling must be considered. The characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree with those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by hanging.” (_645-PS_)

These four murders, committed within the short space of two weeks in the Spring of 1933, each by different SS guards, are but a few examples of SS activities in the camps even as early as 1933. Many similar examples from that period and later periods could be produced.

Indeed, that sort of thing was officially encouraged. Disciplinary Regulations for the Dachau Concentration Camp were issued on 1 October 1933 by SS Fuehrer Eicke, who later became commander of all the Death Head Units (_778-PS_). The fourth paragraph of the introduction of those rules provides:

“Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception, punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests of the Fatherland warrant it. The fellow countryman who is decent but misled will never be affected by these regulations. But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians and intellectual provocators—regardless of which kind—; be on guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck and you will be shut up according to your own methods.” (_778-PS_)

So many inmates were killed “while trying to escape,” to use the pat official phrase, that by 1936 the Minister of Justice was moved to appeal to Himmler to regulate the use of firearms by the Death Head Units. A memorandum 9 March 1936, prepared by Minister of Justice Guertner, reads as follows:

“On the 2d of this month, using the Hoppe case as an illustration, I discussed the question of use of arms by the guard-personnel of the concentration camp with the Reichsfuehrer SS. I suggested to Himmler that he issue an order on the use of arms for the officials subordinated to him. I referred in this respect to the example of the decree on the use of arms by the armed forces of 17 January of this year. Himmler has promised me that such a decree will be issued and will grant us participation in the preliminary work.” (_781-PS_)

The memorandum bears the pencil notation, “Initiative with Himmler”. Subsequent events showed how Himmler carried out this initiative.

(_b_) _Administration of concentration camps through SS agencies._ Furnishing guard personnel was not the only function of the SS with relation to the camps. The entire internal management of the camps, including the use of prisoners, their housing, clothing, sanitary conditions, the determination of their right to live and the disposal of their remains, was controlled by the SS. Such management was first vested in the leader of the SS Death Head Units, who also had the title of Inspector of the Concentration Camps. This official was originally a part of the SS Main Office (_SS Hauptamt_), represented on the chart by the second box from the left (_Chart Number 3_).

During the course of the war, in March 1942, control of concentration camps was transferred to another of the departments of the SS Supreme Command, the SS Economic and Administration Main Office (commonly known as WVHA). That department is indicated on the chart by the third box from the left (_Chart Number 3_).

That change was announced in a letter to Himmler 30 April 1942 from SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Pohl, the Chief of WVHA (_R-129_). In that letter Pohl reported on the measures he had taken to carry out Himmler’s order of 3 March 1942 to transform the camps into large scale economic enterprises, and inclosed an order to all concentration camp commanders which provided that no longer was there to be any limit on working hours in the camps. (_R-129_)

(_c_) _SS control of concentration camps and the slave labor program._ This shift of control to WVHA coincided with the change in the basic purposes of the concentration camps. Political and security reasons, which previously had been the grounds for confinement, were abandoned and the camps were made to serve the Nazi slave labor program.

To satisfy the increased demands for manpower it was not enough to work the inmates of the camp harder. More inmates had to be obtained. Through its police arm, the SS was prepared to satisfy this demand. On 17 December 1942 an order was issued to all commanders of the Security Police and SD directing that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work be sent immediately to the concentration camps (_1063-D-PS_). Thirty-five thousand prisoners was, of course, merely the beginning. The SS dragnet was capable of catching many more slaves. A directive to all the departments of the SS Supreme Command signed by Himmler at his field headquarters on 5 August 1943, ordered the collection of men, women, and children for work in coal mines (_744-PS_). This directive implements an order signed by Keitel directing the use of all males captured in guerilla fighting in the East for forced labor (_744-PS_). The Himmler directive, it will be noted, is addressed to every main office in the SS Supreme Command:

“_Subject_: Manpower for coal mining industry. _Reference_: Letter of the command staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS—journal No. Ia/1909/43 secret.

Secret

1. Chief of the personal staff of Reichsfuehrer SS.

2. SS Main Office.

3. Reich security main office (RSHA).

4. Race and resettlement main office—SS.

5. Main office, ordinary police.

6. SS economic administrative main office.

7. SS personal main office.

8. Main office SS court.

9. SS Supreme Command—Headquarters of the Waffen SS.

10. Staff Headquarters of the Reichscommissar for the consolidation of Germanism.

11. Main office center for Racial Germans (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_).

12. Office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer.

13. Chief of the guerilla-fighting units.

14. Higher SS and Police Leader Ostland.

15. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-Center.

16. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-South.

17. Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast.

18. Higher SS and Police Leader East.

19. Higher SS and Police Leader Alpine territory.

20. Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia.

21. Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.

“To figure 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order, that all young female prisoners, capable of work, are to be sent to Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Commissioner Sauckel.

“Children, old women, and men are to be collected and employed in the women’s and children’s camps, established by me, on estates as well as on the border of the evacuated area.” (_744-PS_)

In April 1944 the SS was called on to produce even more laborers, this time 100,000 to be drawn from Hungarian Jews, as shown by the minutes of Speer’s discussion with Himmler on 6 and 7 April 1944. (_R-124_)

The last source of manpower had not been tapped. To Jews, deportees, women and children, there was added the productive power of prisoners of war. Naturally enough it was through the SS that the conspirators squeezed the last drop of labor from such prisoners. Speer’s minutes of his conference with the Fuehrer on 5 March 1944, state:

“Told the Fuehrer of the Reichs Marshal’s wish for further utilization of the production power of prisoners of war by giving the direction of the Stalag to the SS with the exception of the English and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal good and has asked Colonel von Below to arrange matters accordingly.” (_R-124_)

That matters were soon arranged is shown by Speer’s statement made at the 58th discussion of the Central Planning Board on 25 May 1944 (_R-124_):

“Speer: We have come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS as soon as possible so that PW’s he picks up are made available for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to 40 thousand men per month.” (_R-124_)

Finally, in order to insure SS control over the labor of prisoners of war, the Reichsfuehrer SS was appointed by Hitler as head of all prisoner of war camps on 25 September 1944. A circular letter from the Director of the Party Chancellery, 30 September 1944 and signed by M. Bormann, states:

“1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944: The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are transferred to the commander of the Reserve Army from October 1, 1944.

* * * * * *

“2. The Reichsfuehrer SS has commanded:

“_a._ In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to Gottleb Berger, SS-Lieut. General (_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen-SS_) Chief of Staff of the _Volkstums_.”

* * * * * *

“_c._ The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint action between SS-Lieut. General Berger (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer) and SS-Lieut. General Pohl.

“The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war affairs is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General Berger and the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” (_058-PS_)

So impressive were the results obtained from SS concentration camp labor that Goering on 14 February 1944 called on Himmler for more inmates for use in the aircraft industry (_1584-I-PS_). Himmler’s reply to that request reads, in part, as follows:

“Most Honored Reichsmarshal:

“Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.

“This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000 prisoners_ are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total of _90,000 prisoners is_ contemplated.

“The production is being discussed, established, and executed between the Reich Ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.

“We assist with all forces at our disposal.

“The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of the required working speed thru constant and supervision of the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total work, better results can definitely be expected.

“We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000 prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2,000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109.

“In Oranienburg we are employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60% of the total crew of the plant.”

* * * * * *

“The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of 14 Feb. 1944 are already under way.

“I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on this subject.

“Heil Hitler “[initialled] HH” (_1584-III-PS_)

Inclosed with that letter was a report in tabular form of the number of prisoners being used in each of the concentration camps, the total man-hours for the month of January 1944, and the type of production in which such prisoners were engaged. That report is signed by Pohl, the Chief of WVHA (_1584-III-PS_). The total appearing under the column “Number of prisoners planned” is 90,785; under the column “Number of prisoners used,” 35,839; and under the column “Man-hours—January,” 8,733,495. (_1584-III-PS_)

The extent to which the number of prisoners was increased through SS efforts is illustrated by a report from Office Group D of WVHA, 15 August 1944:

“_Subject_: Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners clothing type G and Z and the supply of G available. “Reference: Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.”

* * * * * *

“With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for 1.8.1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as the clothing report for 15.8.44.

“(1). The actual number on 1.8.44, consisted of: _a._ Male prisoners 379,167 _b._ Female prisoners 145,119

“In addition, there are the following new arrivals:

1. From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action) 90,000 2. From Litzmannstadt (Police prison and Ghetto) 60,000 3. Poles from the General Government 15,000 4. Convicts from the Eastern Territories 10,000 5. Former Polish officers 17,000 6. From Warsaw (Poles) 400,000 7. Continued arrivals from France approx. 15,000-20,000

“Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be received into the Concentration Camps within the next few days.” (_1166-PS_)

(_d_) _SS control of concentration camps and the ill treatment and murder of inmates._ The intensive drive for manpower to some extent interfered with the program already undertaken by WVHA to exterminate certain classes of individuals in the camps. This is shown by a letter from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 28 March 1942, addressed to a number of concentration camp commandants and signed Liebehenschel, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer:

“It became known through a report of a Camp Commandant that 42 prisoners out of 51 which were mustered out for the special treatment 14 f 13 again became capable of work after a period of time and therefore do not have to be directed to the special treatment. From this it appears that the selection of the prisoners is not being handled according to given directives. Only those prisoners are allowed to be directed to the examination commission who fulfill the given stipulations and who above all are no longer capable of work.

“In order to be able to fulfill the designated missions of the concentration camps, the working capabilities of every prisoner must be retained for the camp. The camp commandants of the concentration camps are requested to especially make this their aim.” (_1151-P-PS_)

Another letter from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 27 April 1943, addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, signed by Gluecks, SS Brigade Fuehrer and Major General of the Waffen SS, deals with the same point:

“The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided, after consultation, that in the future only mentally sick (_geisteskranke_) prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13 by the medical commissions appointed for this purpose.

“All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bedridden cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can perform in bed.

“The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the future.

“Requests for fuel for this purpose, therefore, do not take place.” (_1933-PS_)

The SS, however, was to some degree enabled to achieve both goals—that of increased production and of elimination of undesirable individuals, as shown by the agreement between Minister of Justice Thierack and Himmler on 18 September 1942 (_654-PS_). That agreement provided for the delivery of antisocial elements after the execution of their sentences to the Reichsfuehrer SS “to be worked to death.”

The conditions under which such persons worked in the camps were well calculated to lead to their deaths. Those conditions were regulated by the WVHA. An illustration of WVHA management is to be found in an order directed to commandants of concentration camps, 11 August 1942, and issued by SS Brigade Fuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Gluecks, Chief of Office Group D of WVHA (_2189-PS_):

“The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered, that punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women by _prisoners_—under the ordered supervision.

“In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the main SS economic administration office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps for men.” (_2189-PS_)

Even after their deaths, the prisoners did not escape the management of WVHA. A directive to the commanders of concentration camps, 12 September 1942, signed by the Chief of the Central Office of Office Group D of WVHA, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Liebehenschel, provided:

“According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of Security Police and SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to the home-cemeteries within the Protectorate.

“Based on different events (Demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of cemeteries in the home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates, etc.) within the Protectorate, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants of deceased Nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps. In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions shall be available at this agency.” (_2199-PS_)

(_e_) _SS use of concentration camp labor for pecuniary profit._ The SS regarded the inmates of concentration camps as its own personal property to be used for its own economic advantage. The suggestion in Himmler’s letter to Goering, will be recalled, that the SS be given a larger responsibility in the armament program conducted in the camps (_1584-III-PS_). As early as 1942 Speer recognized that the SS was motivated by the desire for further profits when he suggested to Hitler in a conference on 20, 21, and 22 September that the SS receive a share of the war equipment produced by concentration camp labor in ratio to the working hours of the prisoners (_R-124_). The Fuehrer agreed that a 3 to 5 percent share would satisfy SS commanders (_R-124_). Himmler himself frankly admitted his intention to derive profits for SS purposes from the camps in his speech to the officers of the SS Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” (_1918-PS_):

“* * * The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite for a healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of the entire Fuehrerkorps can be carried out only when I get the money for it from somewhere; nobody is going to give me the money, it must be earned, and it will be earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals to do positive work. The man, guarding these prisoners, serves just as hard as the one on close-order drill. The one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people will learn within 3 to 4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime I shall form guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months only—to fight the inferior being (_Untermenschentum_), and this will not be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the inferior races. This activity is necessary, as I said; 1. to eliminate those negative people from the German people; 2. to exploit them once more for the great folk community by having them break stones and bake bricks so that the Fuehrer can again erect his grand buildings; and 3. to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in houses, in ground, in settlements so that our men can have houses in which to raise large families and lots of children. This in turn is necessary because we stand or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the good blood is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world.” (_1918-PS_)

(4) _Functions and activities with respect to human experiments._ One aspect of SS control over concentration camps remains to be mentioned—its direction of the program of biological experiments on human beings which was carried on in the camps. An American military tribunal has passed judgment on some of the SS members who participated in these experiments at Dachau. The purpose of this discussion is to show only that those experiments were the result of SS direction and that the SS played a vital part in their successful execution.

The program seems to have originated in a request by Dr. Sigmund Rascher to Himmler for permission to utilize persons in concentration camps as material for experiments with human beings, in connection with research he was conducting on behalf of the Luftwaffe. A letter dated 15 May 1941, addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS and signed by S. Rascher reads in part as follows:

“For the time being I have been assigned to the _Luftgaukommando_ VLL, Munich for a medical course. During this course, where researches on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: can you make available two or three professional criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made at _Bodenstaendige Bruefstells fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe_, Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation. They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a representative of the air forces surgeon who makes these experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problem in question could only be solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be used as that material.)” (_1602-PS_)

Dr. Rascher promptly received assurance that he would be allowed to utilize concentration camp inmates for his experiments.

A letter dated 22 May 1941, addressed to Dr. Rascher and bearing the signature of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Karl Brandt, reads in part:

“Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter of 15 May 1941, for partial reply.

“I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch with you.” (_1582-PS_)

The altitude experiments were conducted by Rascher. In May 1942 General Field Marshal Milch on behalf of the Luftwaffe expressed his thanks to the SS for the assistance it furnished in connection with the experiments. This letter, dated 20 May 1942, addressed to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff reads in part:

“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils at high seas, would be important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major (M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt. (M.C.) Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.

“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.

“I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.

“I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with

“Heil Hitler! “Always yours “s/s E. Milch” (_343-PS_)

Having finished his high-altitude experiments, Dr. Rascher proceeded to experiment with methods of rewarming persons who had been subjected to extreme cold. On 10 September 1942 he rendered an intermediate report on intense chilling experiments which had been started in Dachau on 15 August (_1618-PS_). That report states:

“The experimental subjects (VP) were placed in the water, dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12°.”

* * * * * *

“Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood, up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation of the right chamber. As soon as the temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) died invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation.”

* * * * * *

“During attempts to save severely chilled persons (_Unterkuehlte_), it was shown that rapid rewarming was in all cases preferable to slow rewarming, because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal heat.

“Rewarming by animal warmth—animal bodies or women’s bodies—would be too slow.” (_1618-PS_)

Although Rascher was of the preliminary opinion that rewarming by women’s bodies would be too slow, means for conducting such experiments were nevertheless placed at his disposal. A letter from the Reichsfuehrer SS, signed Himmler, 16 November 1942, and addressed to Lt. General Pohl, the head of WVHA, read as follows:

“The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov 1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered through exposure (_Unterkuehlung_) in ice, snow, or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or means:

“I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of these who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a danger of contagion. * * *” (_1583-PS_)

To insure the continuance of Rascher’s experiments, Himmler arranged for his transfer to the Waffen SS. A letter dated November 1942 from the Reichsfuehrer SS addressed to “Dear Comrade Milch,” stated:

“You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave (_Arzt des Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe_).

“These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who deserve only to die (_todeswuerdig_) from concentration camps for these experiments.”

* * * * * *

“I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and Wolff a “non-Christian” physician should be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the adminstrative[administrative?] authorities, so that the results would really obtain a hearing.

“I believe that this solution—to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and under my orders—is the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed in the post of Dachau—who is under my command—about me in utterances delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.” (_1617-PS_)

Rascher’s experiments were by no means the only experiments in which the SS was interested. Without attempting even to outline the whole extent of the experimental program, one further illustration of this type of SS activity may be mentioned. That is a report prepared by the Chief Hygienist in the office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police, SS Oberfuehrer Dr. Mrugowsky, 12 September 1944, relating to experiments with poisoned bullets.

“On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widman and the undersigned, experiments with Akonotinnitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had been sentenced to death. The caliber of the bullets used was 7.65 cm and they were filled with the poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiments received one shot in the upper part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the case of 2 persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected * * *.”

* * * * * *

“The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable. After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to 44 minutes a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned persons swallowed frequently, later the flow of saliva is so strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then, a sensation of choking, and vomiting start.” (_L-103_)

The next three paragraphs describe in coldly scientific fashion the reactions of the dying persons. That description then concludes:

“At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he put 4 fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became quite red.

“The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the disturbance of the motor nerves increased so much that the persons threw themselves up and down rolled their eyes and made aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last, the disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum, the condemned lay still. Massetercramp and loss of urine was observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, and 129 minutes after they were shot.” (_L-103_)

The fact that SS doctors engaged in such experiments was no accident. It was consistent with an ideology and racial philosophy which, to use Himmler’s own words, regarded human beings as lice and offal. But the most important factor was the fact that only the SS was in a position to supply necessary human material. And it did supply such material through WVHA. A letter from the Department Chief of Office Group D of WVHA, 12 May 1944, addressed to the commandants of all concentration camps dealt with the assignment of prisoners for the experimental purposes:

“There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_ assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.

“To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment into the concentration camp.

“Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes without permission.” (_1751-PS_)

It was on the basis of its ability to supply such material that the Ministry of Finance was prepared to subsidize the SS experimental program. This matter was discussed in a series of letters between the Ministry of Finance, the Reichs Research Department, and the Reich Surgeon of the SS and police (_002-PS_). The first is from the office of the Executive Council of the Reichs Research Department, addressed to the Reichs Surgeon SS and Police, 19 February 1943, and signed by Mentzel, Chief of Bureau, SS Brigade Leader:

“The Reichs Minister of Finance told me that you requested 53 leading positions (BES. GR C3-C8) for your office, partly for a new research institute.

“After the Reichsmarschall of the Great German Reich had, as President of the Reichs Research Dept., entrusted himself with all German research, issued directives among other things, that in the execution of military important scientific tasks, the available institutions including equipment and personnel should be utilized to the utmost for reasons of necessary economization (of effort).

“The foundation of new institutes comes therefore only in question in as far as there are no outstanding institutes available for the furtherance of important war research tasks.” (_002-PS_)

To this letter the Reich Surgeon of SS and Police replied on 26 February 1943:

“In acknowledgment of your correspondence of the 19th Feb. 1943, I am able to reply the following to it today:

“The appropriation for the 53 key positions for my office which you made the basis of your memorandum was a veritable peace plan.

“The special institutes of the SS which are to be partly staffed through this appropriation are to serve the purpose to establish and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research, the particular possibilities of research only possessed by the SS.”

* * * * * *

“I will gladly be at your disposal at any time to discuss the particular research aims in connection with the SS, which I would like to bring up upon the direction of the Reichs Director SS.” (_002-PS_)

An interview between the Reich Surgeon and Mentzel took place, and on 25 March 1943 Mentzel wrote the following letter to the Reich Minister of Finance:

“In regard to your correspondence of the 19th Dec (J 4761—174 I g III. Ang) to which I gave you a preliminary communication on the 19th Feb, I finally take the following position:

“The Surgeon General-SS and Police, in a personal discussion, told me that the budget claim which he looks after is used primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen SS. Since it is established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of scientific research possibilities, they pertain therefore exclusively to such affairs that are carried out with the material (Prisoners—‘_Haflinge_’) which is only accessible to the Waffen SS and are therefore not to be undertaken for any other experimental purposes.

“I cannot object therefore on the part of the Reichs Experimental Counsel against the budget claims of the Surgeon General, SS and Police.” (_002-PS_)

(5) _Functions and Activities with respect to Jewish Persecution._ Through its activities with respect to concentration camps the SS performed part of its mission to safeguard the security of the Nazi regime. But another specialized aspect of that mission must not be forgotten. Himmler had defined that task as the prevention of a “_Jewish_ Bolshevist revolution of subhumans.” In plain words this meant participation in the Nazi program of Jewish persecution and extermination. That program involved every branch and component of the SS.

The racial philosophy of the SS made that organization a natural agency for the execution of all types of anti-semitic measures. The SS position on the Jewish question was publicly stated in the SS newspaper “_Das Schwarze Korps_,” in the issue of 8 August 1940, by its editor, Gunter d’Alquen (_2668-PS_). “_Das Schwarze Korps_” was the official propaganda agency of the SS which every SS man was required to read and to induce others to read. This was the SS position on the Jews:

“Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe should realize that the German peace which awaits it must be a peace without Jews.” (_2668-PS_)

The attempted “solution” of the Jewish question through pogroms and “spontaneous” demonstrations occurred following the murder of von Rath in November 1938. In these demonstrations all branches of the SS were called on to play a part. The teletype message from SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued on 10 November 1938 concerning “Measures against Jews tonight,” provided:

“* * * The direction of the measures of the Security Police concerning the demonstrations against Jews is vested with the organs of the State Police—inasmuch as the inspectors of the Security Police are not issuing their own orders. In order to carry out the measures of the Security Police, officials of the Criminal Police, as well as members of the SD, of the _Verfuegungstruppe_ and the _Allgemeine SS_ may be used.” (_3051-PS_)

With the outbreak of the war and the march of Nazi armies over the Continent, the SS participated in “solving” the Jewish question in all the countries of Europe. The solution was nothing short of extermination. To a large degree these wholesale murders were disguised under the name of “anti-partisan” or “anti-guerilla” actions, and as such included as victims not merely Jews but Soviets, Poles, and other Eastern peoples. One example of an action confined essentially to Jews was the mass annihilation of Jews in gas vans (_501-PS_). Those vans were operated by the Security Police and SD under the direction of RSHA. Another example is found in the report entitled “Solution of the Jewish Question in Galicia,” prepared by SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of the Police Katzman and rendered to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police Krueger (_L-18_). The “solution,” which consisted in evacuation and extermination of all the Jews in Galicia and confiscation of their property, was carried out under the energetic direction of the SS and Police Leaders, with the assistance of SS police units, as the report proudly boasts. Three additional items in that report dealing specifically with the SS should be noted. The first is the text under a photograph in the original report:

“Great was the joy of the SS men when the Reichsfuehrer SS in person in 1942 visited some camps along the Rollbahn.” (_L-18_)

The second is a balance sheet, showing the income from forced Jewish labor and expenditures therefrom. Item 3 on the balance sheet reads as follows:

“3. Amount paid over to the SS cashier: _a._ Camps 6,876,251,00 Zl _b._ W&R Factories 6,556,513,69 Zl ———————— 13,432,764,69 Zl

Further payments to the SS-cashier are effected every month.” (_L-18_)

The third is the last two paragraphs of the report:

“Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy to the last day.

“Only thanks to the sense of duty of every single leader and man have we succeeded to get rid of this PLAGUE in so short a time.” (_L-18_)

One final example of SS participation in Jewish extermination is the report by SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Police, Stroop, of the destruction of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw during April and May 1943 (_1061-PS_). Two sections of that report dealing with the constitution of the participating forces should be noted. A table of the units used indicates the average number of officers and men from each unit employed per day. It will be observed that among the units involved were the staff of the SS and Police Leader, two battalions of the Waffen SS, two battalions of the 22d SS Police Regiment and members of the Security Police. The part played by the Waffen SS particularly came in for high praise from the writer of the report. Tribute is paid to the toughness of the men of the Waffen SS, Police, and _Wehrmacht_. In the next paragraph the writer says:

“Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen SS had been trained for only three or four weeks before being assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the pluck, courage and devotion to duty which they showed.” (_1061-PS_)

The selection methods and ideological education of Waffen SS men furnished such good grounding that a few weeks of practice was all that was required to turn them into excellent exterminators. Himmler’s proud boast of the part that the SS played in the extermination of the Jews occurs in his Posen Speech:

“Most of _you_ must know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same time—apart from the exceptions caused by human weakness—to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never been written and is never to be written * * *.” (_1919-PS_)

(6) _Functions and activities with respect to preparing for and waging aggressive war._ From the very beginning the SS made prime contributions to the conspirators’ aggressive aims. First, it served as one of the para-military organizations under which the conspirators disguised their building up of an Army in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Second, through affiliated SS organizations in other countries and through some of the departments in its own Supreme Command, it fostered Fifth Column movements outside Germany and prepared the way for aggression. Third, through its militarized units, it participated in the aggressive actions which were eventually carried out.

(_a_) _The SS as a para-military organization._ The para-military character of the General SS is apparent from the military character of its structure, the military discipline required of its members, and the steps it took to enlist in its ranks young men of military age. In addition to this volunteer Army the SS created, as early as 1933, fully armed professional soldiers who complied with the requirement for compulsory military service by performing duties in the SS. These were the _SS Vorfuegungstruppe_ and the Death Head Units.

(_b_) _The SS as a fifth column agency._ While building up the SS as a military force within Germany, the conspirators also utilized it in other countries to lay the groundwork for aggression. During the seizure of Austria, the _SS Standarte 89_ was directly involved in the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss, and a memorial placque was erected in Vienna as a tribute to the SS men who participated in that murder (_L-273_; _2968-PS_). Subsequently, on the night of 11 March 1938, the SS with the SA marched into Vienna and occupied all government buildings and important posts in the city. (See the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel (_812-PS_); and the record of the telephone conversations between Goering and Dambrowski (_2949-PS_)).

The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein’s Free Corps played in that country the part of fifth column which the SS had played in Austria and was rewarded, in September 1938, by being placed under the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS (_388-PS, Items 37, 38_). Moreover, a Most Secret OKW order of 28 September 1938, reveals that the SS had its own armed units, four battalions of _Totenkopf Verbaende_, actually operating in Czechoslovakian territory before the Munich Pact was signed (_388-PS, Item 36_).

But SS preparations for aggression were not confined to military forces. One of the departments of the SS Supreme Command, the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_, was a center for fifth column activity. At the secret meeting between Ribbentrop and Henlein in March 1938, at which the line to be followed by the Sudeten German Party was determined, the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ was represented by Professor Haushofer and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz (_2788-PS_). And when the Foreign Office in August 1938 awarded further subsidies to Henlein’s Sudeten Party, the memorandum of that recommendation (_3059-PS_) contained the significant footnote:

“Volksdeutsche Mittlestelle will be informed.” (_3059-PS_)

(_c_) _SS participation in aggressive war._ When at last the time came to strike, the SS was ready. In the words of the National Socialist Yearbook for 1940 (_2164-PS_):

“When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland began on that memorable October 1, 1938, _Verfuegungstruppe_ as well as the Death Head Units were along with those in the lead. * * *”

“The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS when it served to establish order in collapsing Czechoslovakia. This action ended with the founding of the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.

“Only a week later, on the 29th of March 1939, Memel also returned to the Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania. Again it was the SS, here above all the Eastern Prussian SS, which played a prominent part in the liberation of this province.” (_2164-PS_)

In the final act which set off the war, the attack on Poland in September 1939, the SS acted as stage manager. In his affidavit (_Affidavit A_), Maj. Gen. Erwin Lahousen describes the simulated attack on the radio station Gleiwitz by Germans dressed in Polish uniforms, as one of the most mysterious actions which took place in the _Abwehr_ office:

“This was an incident which had been deliberately engineered and directed by the SD and it was executed by prisoners from Concentration Camps dressed up in Polish uniforms, and using Polish weapons and equipment. Those prisoners were later murdered by the SD in order to eliminate any possibility of their giving testimony of the incident.” (_Affidavit A_)

The war erupted and the Waffen SS again took its place in the van of the attacking forces.

(7) _Functions and activities with respect to commission of war crimes._ During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities possessed by the SS—qualities not only of its combat force, but of its other components as well—in executing tasks embracing the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

(_a_) _“Antipartisan” operations._ A directive issued by Keitel on 13 March 1941, making preparations 3 months in advance for the attack on Russia, provided that in the area of operations the Reichsfuehrer SS was entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration—tasks which would result from the struggle about to commence between two opposing political systems. (_447-PS_)

One of the steps taken by the Reichsfuehrer SS to carry out those “special tasks” was the formation and use of so-called “anti-partisan” units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech:

“In the meantime I have also set up the Chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

“It is notable that by setting up this department, we have gained for the SS in turn, a division, a corps, an army, and the next step—which is the High Command of an army or area of a group—if you wish to call it that.” (_1919-PS_)

What the SS did with its division, corps, and army, out of which the anti-partisan units were formed, is illustrated in the “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Task Forces of the Security Police and SD in the U.S.S.R.,” covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941 (_R-102_). The report shows that so-called “anti-partisan” activity was actually nothing but a name for extermination of Jews and persons believed politically undesirable. The report is a carefully organized and detailed description of such extermination. Section I describes the stations of the various Task Forces involved, and section II their activities. The latter section is divided into parts, each dealing with a different geographical region—the Baltic area, White Ruthenia, and the Ukraine. Under each area the report of activities is classified under three headings: (_a_) Partisan activity and counteraction; (_b_) arrests and executions of communists and officials; and (_c_) Jews. The following units were involved (_R-102_):

“The present stations are:

“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk. “Task Force B: continues in Smolensk. “Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew. “Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder Commandos_) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.” (_R-102_)

The section headed “Baltic area” and subsection labeled “Jews” read as follows (_R-102_):

“Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.

“However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_), formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.”

* * * * * *

“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern Territory.” (_R-102_)

In the section headed “White Ruthenia,” the subsection labeled “Partisan activity and counteraction,” the following appear:

“In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children’s home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.

“_b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials, and criminals._

“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators.” (_R-102_)

The preceding subsection ends with the following statement:

“The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons.” (_R-102_)

And under the section headed “Ukraine,” the subsection “Jews,” this statement occurs:

“_Shitomir_

In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.” (_R-102_)

The foregoing report deals with the activities of four Task Forces—A, B, C, and D. The more detailed report of Task Force A up to 15 October 1941 shows great variety of SS components in such a task force:

“This description of the over-all situation showed and shows that the members of the Stapo [The Secret State Police], Kripo and SD [Security Service] who are attached to the Action-Group, are active mainly in Lithouania, Latvia, Esthonia, White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the Armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures against the returning population and under their own officers. This is so much easier because the Action detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their disposal native police units, as described in encl. 1, and because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to White-Ruthenia.

“The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD during the individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the advance and the activities of the Action-Group and the Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Armed-SS and of the uniformed police who are reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security Police and the SD.” (_L-180_)

Inclosure 1_a_ to this report shows the constitution of the Force:

“_Total Strength of Action Group A_: _Percent_ “Total: 990 Waffen-SS 340 34.4 Motor Bicycle-Riders 172 17.4 Administration 18 1.8 Security Service [SD] 35 3.5 Criminal Police [Kripo] 41 4.1 State Police [Gestapo] 89 9.0 Auxiliary Police 87 8.8 Order Police 133 13.4 Female Employees 13 1.3 Interpreters 51 5.1 Teleprinter-Operators 3 0.3 Wireless-Operators 8 0.8 ” (_L-180_)

Another report on the anti-partisan activity, from the General Commissar for White Ruthenia to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, 5 June 1943, deals with the results of the police operation “Cottbus”:

“* * * SS Brigadefuehrer, Major General of Police von Gottberg, reports that the operation ‘Cottbus’ had the following result during the period mentioned:

Enemy dead 4,500 Dead suspected of belonging to bands 5,000 German dead 59

* * * * * *

“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.

“By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated in the operation * * *” (_R-135_)

SS Obergruppenfuehrer vom dem Bach was referred to by Himmler as “our comrade” when he placed him in charge of anti-partisan activity.

(_b_) _Execution of civilians._ The activities so far dealt with were joint activities in which the Gestapo, Order Police, the SD, Waffen SS, and SS Police Regiments were all involved. But these units were, of course, also used individually to carry out tasks of such a nature—tasks for which any component of the SS was well trained. A letter from the Chief of the Command Office of the Waffen SS to the Reichsfuehrer SS, 14 October 1941, contains an intermediate report on civilian state of emergency:

“* * * I deliver the following report regarding the commitment of the Waffen SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of emergency:

“In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for shootings, and relatively for the supervision at hangings.

“Up until now there occurred:

“in Prague: 99 shootings 21 hangings “in Bruenn: 54 shootings 17 hangings “Total: 191 executions (including 16 Jews)

“A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct of the officers, noncoms and men will be made following the termination of the civilian state of emergency.” (_1972-PS_)

(_c_) _Murder of prisoners of war._ It is not surprising that units of the Waffen SS, a branch which had thus been employed for extermination actions and the execution of civilians, also violated the laws of warfare when carrying on ordinary combat activities. Proof of these violations is contained in a supplementary report of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Court of Inquiry concerning the shooting of allied prisoners of war by the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler Jugend) in Normandy, France, on 7-21 June 1944 (_2997-PS_). The Court of Inquiry concluded that there occurred in Normandy, between 7 and 17 June 1944, seven cases of violations of the law of war, involving the shooting of 64 unarmed allied prisoners of war in uniform, many of whom had been previously wounded, and none of whom had resisted or endeavored to escape; that the perpetrators were members of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the so-called Hitler Jugend Division; that enlisted men of the 15th Company of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of that Division were given secret orders to the effect that SS troops should take no prisoners and that prisoners were to be executed after having been interrogated; that similar orders were given to men of the 3d Battalion of the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and to the 12th SS Engineering and Reconnaissance Battalions; and that the conclusion was irresistible that it was understood throughout the Division that a policy of denying quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was openly approved. (_2997-PS_)

Other combatants met a similar fate at the hands of other components of the SS. (The execution of allied fliers, of commandos, and paratroopers, and of escaped prisoners of war who were turned over to the SD to be destroyed, is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.)

Combatants who were taken prisoner of war encountered the SS in another form. (Section 6 on the Gestapo discusses the selection, by SS groups stationed in prisoner of war camps, of prisoners for what the Nazis euphemistically called “special treatment.”) Finally, the entire control of prisoners of war was turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS, pursuant to the circular letter from the Nazi Party Chancellery placing Himmler in charge of all prisoner of war camps. (_058-PS_)

(8) _Functions and activities with respect to Germanization of conquered lands._ The final phase of the conspiracy in which the SS played a leading role comprehended the colonization of conquered territories, the destruction of their national existence, and the permanent extension of the German frontier. These objectives were carried out through the forcible evacuation and resettlement of inhabitants of conquered regions, confiscation of their properties, “denationalization” and “reeducation” of persons of German blood, and the colonization of conquered territories by Germans. (See Chapter X on the Slave Labor Program and Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation.)

The SS was the logical agency to formulate and carry out the execution of this program. The numerous statements made by Himmler as to SS training for its role as the aristocracy in the “new Europe” leave that beyond doubt. Himmler immediately proceeded to put these theories into practice upon his appointment on 7 October 1939 as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom. (_686-PS_)

To make and carry out plans for the program of evacuation and resettlement, a new department of the SS Supreme Command, the Staff Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom, was created. The functions of this office are thus described in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

“The Main Office of the Staff of the Reichs Commissar for the Consolidation of German Nationality is entrusted with the whole settlement and constructive planning and with its execution in the Reich and all those territories within the authority of the Reich, including all administrative and economic questions in connection with settlement, especially the deployment of manpower for this purpose.” (_2640-PS_)

The colonization program had two principal objectives: the first phase was the destruction of the conquered peoples, by exterminating them, deporting them, and confiscating their property; the second phase was the bringing back of racial Germans to settle in the newly acquired land and to live from the wealth of those who had been eliminated.

(_a_) _Elimination and deportation of conquered people._ The extermination actions contributed in part to clearing the conquered territories of persons deemed dangerous to the Nazi plan. But not every undesirable could be liquidated. Moreover, manpower was needed for the Nazi war effort. Mass deportation thus accomplished the twin purpose of providing labor and of freeing the land for German colonists. The participation of SS agencies in deporting persons from the conquered territories to meet the increased demands of the Nazi war machine for manpower has already been shown. The evacuation and resettlement program, however, required the use of additional SS agencies to deport persons occupying the desired living space. For this purpose immigration centers were set up under the direction of RSHA, as is stated in the National Socialist Yearbook for 1941:

“For some time now the Reichsfuehrer-SS has had at his disposal an office under the management of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_. This office has the task of dealing with National German questions and the raising of required support.

“In addition to the VM the Immigration Center Offices with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS (under the management of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Sandberger) and the Settlement Staff of the Reich-Commissioner were created, which, in cooperation with the NSV [National Socialist Welfare Organization] and the Reich Railroad Agency, took charge of the Migration of National Germans.” (_2163-PS_)

Further evidence is contained in the affidavit of Otto Hoffman, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS and Police, who was chief in the Main Office for Race and Settlement in the SS Supreme Command until 1943. This affidavit, taken at Freising, Germany, on 4 August 1945 reads as follows:

“* * * 2. The executive power, in other words the carrying out of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich and later Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 1942). The Chief of the RSHA also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration center (EWZ) which classified the Germans, living abroad who returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms, already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the chief office of the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_L-49_)

Other SS agencies also were included. The report, dated 22 May 1940, relating to confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises and deportation of the Polish owners to Germany, shows that the following SS agencies were involved in this action:

“Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided (1)—by the enterprise of the East German Corporation of Agricultural Development, (2)—by the SS NCO School in Lublinitz and the concentration camp of Auschwitz.

“These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS men for the day of the confiscation, etc.” (_1352-PS_)

The extent to which departments of the Supreme Command of the SS were concerned with the evacuation program is shown by the minutes of a meeting on 4 August 1942 dealing with the treatment of deported Alsatians (_R-114_). The minutes list those present at the meeting as follows:

“Present: “SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Dr. Stier } SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Petri } ‘RR’ Hoffmann } Staff Headquarters Dr. Scherler } SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Foerster } SS.- ‘Obersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Hinrichs, Chief of Estate Office and Settlement Staff, Strasbourg [_Leiter des Bodenamtes und Ansiedlungsstabes Strasburg_] SS.- ‘Sturmbannfuehrer’ Bruckner, Intermediate Office for Racial Germans (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_) SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Hummisch, Main Office Reich Security [_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_] SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Sieder, Main office for race and settling [_Rus-Hauptamt_] Dr. Labes, D. U. T.” (_R-114_)

The minutes read in part as follows:

“1. _State of deportation in Alsace._

“The starting point of the conference was a report on the deportation effected so far and further plans for resettlement in Alsace.”

* * * * * *

“_B._

“The representatives of the SS Main Offices present were united in this opinion:

“II. 1. The Gauleiter’s plans for evacuation can be approved in principle, since they confine themselves in fact to a class of persons, whose presence in the Reich would be insupportable for racial and political reasons.” (_R-114_)

(_b_) _Resettlement of conquered territories by Germans._ The SS not only destroyed or deported conquered peoples and confiscated their property, but it also repopulated the conquered regions with so-called racial Germans. Thousands upon thousands of these Germans were transported from all parts of Europe to join the greater Reich. Not all Germans were deemed reliable colonists, however. Those who were not, were returned to Germany proper for “re-Germanization” and “reeducation” along Nazi lines. A typical instance of the fate of such Germans is found in the decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom of 16 February 1942, dealing with the treatment to be accorded so-called “Polonized” Germans (_R-112_). By the terms of that decree two other SS functionaries were charged with the responsibility for the re-Germanization program, the Higher SS and Police Leaders and the Gestapo. Paragraph III of the decree provides:

“III. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will further the re-Germanization actions with every means at their disposal and continuously take stock of their success. In case they find that obstacles are put in the way of a re-Germanization action, they will report on their findings to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for appropriate measures. Where it proves to be impossible to attain re-Germanization even by forcible measures taken by the State Police, they will apply for a revocation of the naturalization through the Reich Fuehrer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood and give notice to the competent State Police (Superior) Office.” (_R-112_)

Paragraph IV of the decree provides:

“IV. In the course of fulfilling their duties imposed on them by this Decree the competent State Police (Superior) Offices will take in particular the following measures:”

* * * * * *

“4. They will assist the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in their task of re-Germanization, particularly in removing obstacles by forcible measures whenever there is opposition to re-Germanization. Before ordering forcible measures by the State Police they will give the Counsellor of the person in question an opportunity to state his opinion.

“5. They will take into protective custody all persons, with regard to whom the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer has applied for revocation of their naturalization and will order their imprisonment in a Concentration Camp.” (_R-112_)

In the final stage of the process, the resettlement of the conquered lands by racially and politically desirable Germans, still other SS agencies participated. The National Socialist Yearbook for 1941 states that:

“Numerous SS-leaders and SS-men helped with untiring effort in bringing about this systematic migration of peoples, which has no parallel in history.

“There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties which, however, were immediately overcome due to the unbureaucratic working procedure. This was especially guaranteed above all by the employment of SS leaders.

“The procedure called ‘_Durchschleusung_’ (literally, ‘passing through the lock’) takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The resettler is passed through 8 to 9 offices, following each other in organic order: registration office, card-index office, certificate and photo-office, property office, and biological hereditary and sanitary test office. The latter was entrusted to doctors and medical personnel of the SS and of the Armed Forces. The SS-Corps Areas [_Oberabschnitte_] Alpenland, North-West, Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and South East, the SS-Main Office [_SS-Hauptamt_], the NPEA (National Political Education Institution) Vienna, and the SS-Cavalry-School in Hamburg provided most of the SS-Officer and SS-Non-Coms who worked at this job of resettlement.”

* * * * * *

“The settlement, establishment and care of the newly won peasantry in the liberated Eastern territory will be one of the most cherished tasks of the SS in the whole future.” (_2163-PS_)

E. _Defendant’s Membership in the SS._

In the course of its development from a group of strong armed bodyguards, some 200 in number, to a complex organization participating in every field of Nazi endeavor, the SS found room for its members in high places. Persons in high places moreover, found for themselves a position in the SS. Of the defendants charged in the indictment at least 7 were high ranking officers in the SS. They are the defendants Ribbentrop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and Seyss-Inquart. The vital part that Kaltenbrunner played in the SS, the SD, and the entire Security Police system is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.

With respect to the other six defendants, the facts as to their membership in the SS are to be found in two official publications. The first is the membership list of the SS as of 1 December 1936. On line 2, page 8, of that publication, there appears the name “Hess, Rudolf,” followed by the notation, “By authority of the Fuehrer the right to wear the uniform of an SS Obergruppenfuehrer.” In the 1937 edition of the same membership list, line 50, page 10, there appears the name “Bormann, Martin,” and in line with his name on the opposite page, under the heading “Gruppenfuehrer,” appears the following date “20.4.37.” In the same edition, line 56, page 12, is the name “von Neurath, Konstantin” and on the opposite page, under the column headed “Gruppenfuehrer,” the date “18.9.37.”

The second publication is “_Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag_” for the Fourth Voting Period, edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial Director of the German Reichstag, an official handbook containing biographical data as to members of the Reichstag. On page 349 the following appears: “von Ribbentrop, Joachim, _Reichsminister des Auswaertigen_, SS Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 360 the following: “Sauckel, Fritz, _Gauleiter_ and _Reichsstatthalter_ in Thuringen, SS Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 389 the following: “Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, Dr. Jur., Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.”

F. _Conclusion._

It is the prosecution’s contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B of the Indictment, was unlawful. Its participation in every phase of the conspiracy alleged in Count One is clear. As an organization founded on the principle that persons of “German blood” were a “master race,” it exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine. It served as one of the means through which the conspirators acquired control of the German government. The operations of the SD, and of the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_ in concentration camps, were means used by the conspirators to secure their regime and terrorize their opponents as alleged in Count One. All components of the SS were involved from the very beginning in the Nazi program of Jewish extermination. Through the _Allgemeine SS_ as a para-military organization, the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ and _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_ as professional combat forces, and the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ as a fifth column agency, it participated in preparations for aggressive war, and, through its militarized units, in the seizure of Austria, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland, and the waging of aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war, all components of the SS had a part in the war crimes and crimes against humanity, set forth in Counts Three and Four,—the murder and ill treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory, the murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and the Germanization of occupied territories.

The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise—a unified organization. Some of its functions were, of course, performed by one branch, or department or office, some by another. No single branch or department participated in every phase of its activity. But every branch and department and office was necessary to the functioning of the whole. The situation is much the same as in the case of the individual defendants at the bar. Not all participated in every act of the conspiracy; but all performed a contributing part in the whole criminal scheme.

The evidence has shown, not only that the SS was an organization of volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest standards of selection. It was not easy to become an SS member. That was true of all branches of the SS. During the course of the war, as the demands for manpower increased and the losses of the Waffen SS grew heavier and heavier, there were occasions when men drafted for compulsory military service were assigned to units of the _Waffen SS_ rather than to the _Wehrmacht_. Those instances were relatively few. Evidence of recruiting standards of the Waffen SS in 1943 has shown that membership in that branch was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in other branches. The fact that some individuals may have been arbitrarily assigned to some Waffen SS unit has no bearing on the issue before the tribunal, which is this, whether the SS was or was not an unlawful organization. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other of the organizations alleged to be unlawful, might desire to show that their participation in the organization was small or innocuous, that compelling reasons drove them to apply for membership, that they were not fully conscious of its aims, or that they were mentally irresponsible when they became members. Such facts might or might not be relevant if they were on trial. But in any event this is not the forum to try out such matters.

The question before this Tribunal is simply this, whether the SS was or was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has fully shown what the aims and activities of the SS were. Some of these aims were stated in publications. The activities were so widespread and so notorious, covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality of the organization could not have been concealed. It was a notorious fact, and Himmler himself admitted that in 1936, when he said:

“I know that there are people in Germany now who become sick when they see these black coats. We know the reason and we don’t expect to be loved by too many.”

It was at all times the exclusive function and purpose of the SS to carry out the common objectives of the conspirators. Its activities in carrying out those functions involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter. By reason of its aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof, the SS should be declared a criminal organization in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SCHUTZSTAFFELN (SS)

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 70 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *002-PS │Letters of Reichs Research Department │ │ │regarding the budget of the SS. (USA │ │ │469) │ III │ 5 │ │ │ *058-PS │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944 │ │ │concerning reorganization of the │ │ │concerns of prisoners of war. (USA │ │ │456) │ III │ 103 │ │ │ *343-PS │Letter from Milch, Chief of the │ │ │Personal Staff, to Himmler, 31 August │ │ │1942, and letter from Milch to Wolff, │ │ │20 May 1942. (USA 463) │ III │ 266 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ 447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │ │1941, concerning Directives for │ │ │special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409 │ │ │ *501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │ │execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │ │signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │ │Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │ │1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418 │ │ │ *641-PS │Report of Public Prosecutor General in│ │ │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │ │of Dr. Strauss in Dachau by an SS │ │ │guard. (USA 450) │ III │ 453 │ │ │ *642-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │ │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │ │of Hausmann in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ │(USA 451) │ III │ 454 │ │ │ *644-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │ │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │ │of Schloss in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ │(USA 452) │ III │ 455 │ │ │ *645-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │ │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │ │of Nefzger in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ │(USA 453) │ III │ 457 │ │ │ *647-PS │Secret Hitler Order, 17 August 1938, │ │ │concerning organization and │ │ │mobilization of SS. (USA 443) │ III │ 459 │ │ │ *654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │ │on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │ │delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │ │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467 │ │ │ 686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor to strengthen German │ │ │Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │ │Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │ │(USA 305) │ III │ 496 │ │ │ *744-PS │Secret letter of Keitel, 8 July 1943, │ │ │concerning manpower for coal mining. │ │ │(USA 455) │ III │ 540 │ │ │ *778-PS │Disciplinary and Penal Measures for │ │ │Concentration Camp Dachau and Service │ │ │Regulations for the Camp Personnel, │ │ │signed Eicke, 1 October 1933. (USA │ │ │247) │ III │ 550 │ │ │ 781-PS │Memorandum by Minister of Justice, │ │ │Guertner, of conference with Himmler, │ │ │9 March 1936, concerning issuance of │ │ │decree on use of arms by concentration│ │ │camp officials. │ III │ 557 │ │ │ *812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │ │22 August 1939 and report from │ │ │Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │ │Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │ │events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │ │1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586 │ │ │ *1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │ │Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │ │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │ │(USA 275) │ III │ 718 │ │ │ *1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │ │concerning prisoners qualified for │ │ │work to be sent to concentration │ │ │camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778 │ │ │ 1151-P-PS │Letter from WVHA, 28 March 1942, │ │ │concerning “Action 14 F 13” from files│ │ │of Gross Rosen Concentration camp. │ III │ 808 │ │ │ 1166-PS │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15 │ │ │August 1944, concerning number of │ │ │prisoners and survey of prisoners │ │ │clothing. (USA 458) │ III │ 824 │ │ │ *1352-PS │Reports concerning the confiscation of│ │ │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and│ │ │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III │ 916 │ │ │ 1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │ │of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │ │1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │ │pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106 │ │ │ *1582-PS │Letter from SS Sturmbannfuehrer Brandt│ │ │to Dr. Rascher, 22 May 1941, │ │ │concerning use of prisoners for │ │ │high-flight research. (USA 462) │ IV │ 114 │ │ │ *1583-PS │Letter from Himmler, 16 November 1942,│ │ │concerning feminine prisoners in │ │ │concentration camps. (USA 465) │ IV │ 115 │ │ │ *1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │ │February 1944, concerning formation of│ │ │7th Airforce Group squadron for │ │ │special purposes. (USA 221) │ IV │ 117 │ │ │ *1584-III-PS │Correspondence between Himmler and │ │ │Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use │ │ │of concentration camp inmates in │ │ │aircraft industry. (USA 457) │ IV │ 118 │ │ │ *1602-PS │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 15│ │ │May 1941, asking for use of prisoners │ │ │for experiments in high-altitude │ │ │flights. (USA 454) │ IV │ 132 │ │ │ 1616-PS │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 17│ │ │February 1943, concerning freezing │ │ │experiments. │ IV │ 133 │ │ │ 1617-PS │Letter from Himmler to General Field │ │ │Marshal Milch, 13 November 1942, │ │ │concerning transfer of Dr. Rascher to │ │ │Waffen-SS. (USA 466) │ IV │ 133 │ │ │ *1618-PS │Report of Freezing experiments in │ │ │Dachau, 15 August 1942, signed by Dr. │ │ │Rascher. (USA 464) │ IV │ 135 │ │ │ 1637-PS │Order of Himmler, 23 June 1938, │ │ │concerning acceptance of members of │ │ │Security Police into the SS. 1938 │ │ │Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp. │ │ │1089-1091. │ IV │ 138 │ │ │ *1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │ │published in The German Police, 1 │ │ │February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191 │ │ │ 1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │ │unity of Party and State, 29 March │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 502. │ IV │ 224 │ │ │ *1751-PS │Letter to all concentration camp │ │ │commanders, from Gluecks, 12 May 1944,│ │ │concerning assignment of prisoners for│ │ │experimental purposes. (USA 468) │ IV │ 279 │ │ │ *1851-PS │The Security Squadron as an │ │ │Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization │ │ │1936 by Himmler from The New Germany │ │ │Speaks Here, book 11. (USA 440) │ IV │ 488 │ │ │ *1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │ │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │ │No. 16.) │ IV │ 490 │ │ │ *1857-PS │Announcement of creation of SS as │ │ │independent formation of NSDAP. │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 July 1934, │ │ │p. 1. (USA 412) │ IV │ 496 │ │ │ 1918-PS │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on │ │ │day of Metz. (USA 304) │ IV │ 553 │ │ │ *1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │ │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │ │170) │ IV │ 558 │ │ │ 1932-PS │Letter from Office of Chief of │ │ │Department D of WVHA, 7 June 1943, │ │ │concerning handling of prisoners who │ │ │fall under Night and Fog decree. │ IV │ 579 │ │ │ *1933-PS │Letter to Commandant of Gross Rosen │ │ │Camp from Department 10 of WVHA, 27 │ │ │April 1943, providing that “Action 14 │ │ │F 13” be applied only to insane. (USA │ │ │459) │ IV │ 581 │ │ │ *1972-PS │Letter from Chief of SS Operations │ │ │Headquarters to Himmler, 14 October │ │ │1941, reporting on executions of │ │ │Czechs by Waffen SS. (USA 471) │ IV │ 604 │ │ │ *1992-A-PS │Organization and Obligations of the SS│ │ │and the Police from “National │ │ │Political Education of the Army, │ │ │January 1937”. (USA 439) │ IV │ 616 │ │ │ 2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │ │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │ │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703 │ │ │ *2163-PS │The SS during the War-Year 1939-40, │ │ │published in National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1941. (USA 444) │ IV │ 762 │ │ │ *2164-PS │The SS since the Reichparteitag 1938, │ │ │published in National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1940. (USA 255) │ IV │ 768 │ │ │ *2189-PS │Orders from Department D of Economic │ │ │and Administrative Main Office, 11 │ │ │August 1942, concerning punishment by │ │ │beating. (USA 460) │ IV │ 842 │ │ │ 2199-PS │Letter to Commanders of concentration │ │ │camps, 12 September 1942, concerning │ │ │return of urns of inmates deceased in │ │ │concentration camps. (USA 461) │ IV │ 853 │ │ │ *2284-PS │The Organizational Structure of the │ │ │Third Reich—The SS—from Writings of │ │ │the Hochschule for Politics. (USA 438)│ IV │ 973 │ │ │ *2640-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ │NSDAP, 1943. (USA 323) │ V │ 346 │ │ │ *2668-PS │“And Don’t Forget the Jews”, from the │ │ │Black Corps, 8 August 1940, No. 32, p.│ │ │2. (USA 269) │ V │ 367 │ │ │ *2768-PS │Letter from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, │ │ │24 April 1943. (USA 447) │ V │ 412 │ │ │ *2769-PS │Order of Battle of the SS, 1 November │ │ │1944. (USA 442) │ V │ 413 │ │ │ *2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │ │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │ │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │ │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422 │ │ │ *2825-PS │Soldier’s Friend—pocket diary for │ │ │German Armed Forces with calendar for │ │ │1943. (USA 441) │ V │ 462 │ │ │ 2946-PS │Decree relating to Special │ │ │Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for │ │ │members of SS and for members of │ │ │Police Groups on Special Tasks of 17 │ │ │October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 2107. │ V │ 625 │ │ │ 2947-PS │Second decree for implementation of │ │ │decrees relating to Special │ │ │Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for │ │ │members of SS and members of Police │ │ │Groups on special tasks of 17 April │ │ │1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 659. │ V │ 627 │ │ │ 2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │ │Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │ │76) │ V │ 628 │ │ │ *2950-PS │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │ │ │(USA 448) │ V │ 654 │ │ │ *2968-PS │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer │ │ │concerning plaque erected in Austrian │ │ │Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │ │ │Dollfuss. (USA 60) │ V │ 677 │ │ │ *2997-PS │Supplementary report of Supreme │ │ │Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary │ │ │Force, Court of Inquiry, concerning │ │ │shooting of Allied Prisoners of War in│ │ │Normandy, France. (USA 472) │ V │ 716 │ │ │ *3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │ │all stations of State Police, 10 │ │ │November 1938, on measures against │ │ │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │ │termination of protest actions. (USA │ │ │240) │ V │ 797 │ │ │ *3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │ │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │ │Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │ │1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855 │ │ │ *3429-PS │Extract from The SS Calls You. (USA │ │ │446) │ VI │ 133 │ │ │ 3815-PS │Report of the SS, 25 April 1942, │ │ │concerning the activities of Hans │ │ │Frank in Poland. │ VI │ 745 │ │ │ *3839-PS │Statement of Josef Spacil, 9 November │ │ │1945, concerning the meaning of │ │ │“resettlement” and “special │ │ │treatment”. (USA 799) │ VI │ 774 │ │ │ *3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │ │1946, concerning the elimination of │ │ │the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775 │ │ │ 3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │ │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │ │concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │ │Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776 │ │ │ *3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │ │1946, concerning the activities of │ │ │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation │ │ │for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA│ │ │805) │ VI │ 778 │ │ │ *3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ │819) │ VI │ 787 │ │ │ *3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │ │1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │ │Concentration Camp and dying statement│ │ │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│ │ │797) │ VI │ 790 │ │ │ *D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │ │SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │ │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │ │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │ │1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │ │relative to procedure in cases of │ │ │unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │ │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74 │ │ │ *D-665 │Hitler’s license for the SS. (GB 280) │ VII │ 170 │ │ │ *D-745-A │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 8 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │811) │ VII │ 208 │ │ │ *D-745-B │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 19 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │812) │ VII │ 209 │ │ │ *D-746-A │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 8 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │813) │ VII │ 209 │ │ │ D-746-B │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 19 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │814) │ VII │ 210 │ │ │ *D-748 │Affidavit of Karl Totzauer, 15 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │816) │ VII │ 211 │ │ │ *D-749-B │Statement of Rudolf Hoess, 20 March │ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │817) │ VII │ 212 │ │ │ *D-750 │Deposition of August Harbaum, 19 March│ │ │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ │818) │ VII │ 213 │ │ │ *L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │ │of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │ │concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │ │Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755 │ │ │ *L-49 │Affidavit of Otto Hoffman, Chief of SS│ │ │Main Office for Race and Settlement, 4│ │ │August 1945. (USA 473) │ VII │ 795 │ │ │ *L-103 │Letter, 12 September 1944, concerning │ │ │experiments with │ │ │Akonitin-nitrate-bullets. (USA 467) │ VII │ 877 │ │ │ L-156 │Circular letter from Office of │ │ │Commissioner for Four-Year Plan, 26 │ │ │March 1943, concerning removal of Jews│ │ │to labor camps. │ VII │ 905 │ │ │ *L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │ │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │ │A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978 │ │ │ L-198 │State Department Dispatch by Consul │ │ │General Messersmith, 14 March 1933, │ │ │concerning molesting of American │ │ │citizens in Berlin. │ VII │ 1026 │ │ │ L-201 │Excerpts from Berlin newspapers, April│ │ │1933, concerning violence against Jews│ │ │and discrimination against politically│ │ │undesirable professors. │ VII │ 1035 │ │ │ L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │ │1938, concerning anniversary of │ │ │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │ │(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094 │ │ │ *L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │ │formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │ │September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │ │September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109 │ │ │ *R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │ │Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │ │October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96 │ │ │ *R-112 │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner │ │ │for the Consolidation of German │ │ │nationhood, 16 February 1942, 1 July │ │ │1942, 28 July 1942. (USA 309) │ VIII │ 108 │ │ │ *R-114 │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18 │ │ │August 1942, concerning directions for│ │ │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │ │ │314) │ VIII │ 122 │ │ │ *R-124 │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │ │ │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning │ │ │labor supply. (USA 179) │ VIII │ 146 │ │ │ *R-129 │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to │ │ │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning │ │ │concentration camps. (USA 217) │ VIII │ 198 │ │ │ *R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ │reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │ │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 │ │ │ R-143 │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939, │ │ │concerning procedure for confiscation │ │ │of works of art, archives, and │ │ │documents. │ VIII │ 246 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │ │December 1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596 │ │ │ Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │ │November 1945. │ VIII │ 631 │ │ │ Affidavit G │Affidavit of Fritz Ernst Fischer, 21 │ │ │November 1945. │ VIII │ 635 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ *Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772 │ │ │ *Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │ │Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │ │System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774 │ │ │ *Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │ │(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII │ │ │ *Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │ │(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │ │1943-1945. (2346-PS; USA 480) │ End of VIII

6. THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)

This section on the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO) includes evidence on the criminality of the _Sicherheitsdienst_ (SD) of the _Schutzstaffel_ (SS). In the Indictment the SD is included by special references as a part of the SS, since it originated as a part of the SS and always retained its character as a party organization, as distinguished from the GESTAPO, which was a State organization. As will be shown in this section, however, the GESTAPO and the SD were brought into close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-gathering agency and the GESTAPO as the executive agency of the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime. This close working relationship between the GESTAPO and the SD was accomplished by the appointment of Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, to the position of Chief of the German Police. What is proved in this section with respect to the criminality of the SD applies directly to the case against the SS. The relationship between the SS and the GESTAPO is considered in section 5 on the SS.

A. _Development of the Gestapo and the SD._

(1) _Development of the GESTAPO._ The _Geheime Staatspolizei_, or GESTAPO, was first established in Prussia on 26 April 1933 by Goering, with the mission of carrying out the duties of political police with or in place of the ordinary police authorities. The GESTAPO chief was given the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the Minister of the Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction (_2104-PS_). Pursuant to this law, and on the same date, the Minister of the Interior issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a State Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin. (_2371-PS_)

On 30 November 1933 Goering issued a decree for the Prussian State Ministry and for the Reichs Chancellor which acknowledged the valuable services which the GESTAPO was able to render to the State and which placed the GESTAPO under his direct supervision as Chief. The GESTAPO was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration of the Interior, responsible directly to Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This decree gave the GESTAPO jurisdiction over the political police matters of the general and interior administration and provided that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to the directives of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). By a decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices were separated from their organizational connection with the district government and established as independent authorities of the GESTAPO. (_2113-PS_)

Parallel to the development of the GESTAPO in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler, created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political Police and also directed the formation of political police forces in the other federal states outside of Prussia. The unification of the political police of the various states took place in the spring of 1934 when Hermann Goering appointed Himmler the Deputy Chief of the Prussian GESTAPO in place of the former Deputy Chief, Diels. Himmler thereby obtained unified control over the political police forces throughout the Reich. (_1680-PS_)

On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the GESTAPO was promulgated by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This law provided that the Secret State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State, and declared that orders in matters of the Secret State Police were not subject to the review of the administrative courts (_2107-PS_). On the same date, 10 February 1936, a decree for the execution of said law was issued by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister and by Frick as Minister of the Interior. This decree provided that the GESTAPO had authority to enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures affecting that area, that it was the centralized agency for collecting political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it administered the concentration camps. The GESTAPO was given authority to make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon Party as well as upon State. (_2108-PS_)

On 28 August 1936 a circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the political police forces of the German provinces were to be called the “_Geheime Staatspolizei_” (Secret State Police). The regional offices were still to be described as State Police (_2372-PS_). On 20 September 1936 a circular of the Minister of the Interior commissioned the GESTAPO Bureau in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the political police commanders in all the States of Germany. (_L-297_)

The law relating to financial measures in connection with the police of 19 March 1937 provided that officials of the GESTAPO were to be considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich. (_2243-PS_)

Through the above laws and decrees the GESTAPO was established as a uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(2) _Development of the SD._ In 1932 the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, created the _Sicherheitsdienst_, or SD, as an intelligence service of the SS under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich. (_1680-PS_)

On 9 June 1934, the NSDAP issued an ordinance which merged all information facilities then existing within the Party organization into the SD, and the SD was established as the sole Party information service. (_1680-PS_)

In the course of its development, the SD came into increasingly closer cooperation with the GESTAPO and also with the _Reich Kriminalpolizei_, the Criminal Police, or KRIPO. The GESTAPO and the KRIPO considered together were called the _Sicherheitspolizei_, the Security Police, or SIPO. The SD was also called upon to furnish information to various State authorities. On 11 November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior declared that the SD was to be the intelligence organization for the State as well as for the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a close cooperation between the SD and the authorities for the General and Interior Administration. (_1680-PS_; _1638-PS_)

Through the above laws and decrees the SD was established as a uniform political information service operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(3) _Consolidation of the GESTAPO and the SD._ The first step in the consolidation of the political police system of the State (the GESTAPO) and the information service of the Nazi Party (the SD) took place in the spring of 1934 when Goering appointed Himmler Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO. Heydrich was the head of the SD under Himmler, and when Himmler took over the actual direction of the GESTAPO, these two agencies were in effect united under one command. (_1956-PS_; _2460-PS_)

On 17 June 1936, “for the uniformity of police duties in the Reich,” the position of Chief of the German Police was established in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to which was assigned the direction and protection of all police affairs within the jurisdiction of the Reich. By this law Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police under Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, and was given the right to participate in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet as Chief of the German Police. (_2073-PS_)

On 26 June 1936 Himmler issued a decree providing for the appointment of a chief of the uniformed police and of a chief of the Security Police. This decree divided the German police system into two principal branches:

(_a_) _Ordnungspolizei_ (ORPO or Regular Police).

(_b_) _Sicherheitspolizei_ (SIPO or Security Police).

The _Ordnungspolizei_ was composed of the _Schutzpolizei_ (Safety Police), the _Gendarmerie_ (Rural Police), and the _Gemeindepolizei_ (Local Police). The _Sicherheitspolizei_ was composed of the _Reich Kriminalpolizei_ (KRIPO) and the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO). Daluege was named head of the _Ordnungspolizei_ and Heydrich was named head of the _Sicherheitspolizei_. Since Heydrich was also head of the SD, he took the new title of Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_1551-PS_)

On 27 September 1939 by order of Himmler, in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of the GESTAPO and the SD, together with the Criminal Police, were centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD under the name of the _Reichssicherheitshauptamt_, Reich Security Main Office, or RSHA. Under this order the personnel and administrative sections of each agency were coordinated in _Amt_ I and _Amt_ II of the RSHA; the operational sections of the SD became _Amt_ III (except for foreign intelligence which was placed in _Amt_ VI); the operational sections of the GESTAPO became _Amt_ IV and the operational sections of the KRIPO became _Amt_ V. Ohlendorf was named the Chief of _Amt_ III, the SD within Germany; Mueller was named the Chief of _Amt_ IV, the GESTAPO; and Nebe was named the Chief of _Amt_ V, the KRIPO. (_L-361_)

On 27 September 1939 Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the foregoing order of Himmler, in which he ordered the designation and heading “_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_” to be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and the heading “The Chief of the Security Police and SD” in transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided that the GESTAPO would continue to use the designation and heading “_Geheime Staatspolizeiamt_” according to particular instructions. (_L-361_)

In 1944 most of the sections of the _Abwehr_ (military intelligence) were incorporated into the various sections of the RSHA and into a new section connected with _Amt_ VI, called the _Militaerisches Amt_. (_2644-PS_)

Heydrich was Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until his death on 4 June 1942, after which Himmler directed the organization until the appointment of the defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Kaltenbrunner took office on 30 January 1943 and remained Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until the end of the war. (_2644-PS_)

B. _Organization of the Gestapo and the SD._

(1) _Organization of the Gestapo_ (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA). The headquarters organization of the GESTAPO (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA) was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained five sub-sections.

Section A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service and was subdivided as follows:

A 1 Communism, Marxism and associated organizations, war crimes, illegal and enemy propaganda. A 2 Defense against sabotage, combatting of sabotage, political falsification. A 3 Reaction, opposition, legitimism, liberalism, matters of malicious opposition. A 4 Protective service, reports of attempted assassinations, guarding, special jobs, pursuit troops.

Section B dealt with political churches, sects and Jews, and was subdivided as follows:

B 1 Political Catholicism. B 2 Political Protestantism Sects. B 3 Other churches, Freemasonry. B 4 Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, dispossession of rights of German citizenship. (Eichmann was head of this office).

Section C dealt with card files, protective custody, and matters of press and Party, and was subdivided as follows:

C 1 Evaluation, main card index, administration of individual files, information office, supervision of foreigners. C 2 Matters of protective custody. C 3 Matters of the press and literature. C 4 Matters of the Party and its formations, special cases.

Section D dealt with regions under greater German influence, and was subdivided as follows:

D (_aus. arb._) Foreign Workers. D 1 Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of the former Jugoslavia, Greece. D 2 Matters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich. D 3 Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State, emigrants. D 4 Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark. D 5 Occupied Eastern territories.

Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:

E 1 General security matters, supply of legal opinions in matters of high and State treason, and other security matters. E 2 General economic matters, defense against economic espionage, protection of works and those engaged in guarding. E 3 Security West. E 4 Security North. E 5 Security East. E 6 Security South.

Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and was subdivided as follows:

F 1 Frontier police. F 2 Passport matters. F 3 Identification and identity cards. F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers. F 5 Central visa office. (_L-219_)

Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established throughout the Reich and designated as _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ or _Staats Polizeistellen_, depending upon the size of the office. These offices reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the supervision of _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police in the various provinces. The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between the Security Police and the central offices of the general and interior administration. (_2245-PS_)

In the occupied territories the regional offices of the GESTAPO were coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD under _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD, who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1285-PS_)

(2) _Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA)._ The headquarters organization of the SD (including only _Amt_ III of the RSHA and not _Amt_ VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch) was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained four sections.

Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich and was subdivided as follows:

A 1 General questions of work on spheres of German life. A 2 Law. A 3 Constitution and administration. A 4 National life in general. A 5 General questions of police law, and technical questions of legislation.

Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as follows:

B 1 Nationality questions. B 2 Minorities. B 3 Race and health of the people. B 4 Citizenship and naturalization. B 5 Occupied territories.

Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:

C 1 Science. C 2 Educational religious life. C 3 Folk culture and art. C 4 Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of material.

Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows:

D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature. D b Colonial economics. D S Special questions and review of material. D West Western occupied regions. D Ost Eastern occupied regions. D 1 Food economy. D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport. D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance. D 4 Industry and Power. D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (_L-219_)

Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called _SD-Oberabschnitte_ and _SD-Unterabschnitte_. In 1939 these designations were changed to _SD-Abschnitte_ and _SD-Leitabschnitte_. Offices of the _SD-Abschnitte_ were located in the same place as the _Staatspolizeistellen_. _SD-Abschnitte_ located where there were _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ were called “_SD Leitabschnitte_.” Direct orders came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of the _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police under _Kommandeurs_ of the SIPO and SD who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1680-PS_, _L-361_)

(3) _Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD._ The central offices of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The office of Heydrich was called “Chief of the Security Police and SD.” (_1551-PS_)

When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the functions were somewhat redistributed.

_Amt_ I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.

_Amt_ II handled organization, administration, and law for the three agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts, and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.

_Amt_ III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting political opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting criminals. Subsection V D was the criminalogical institute for the SIPO handling matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.

_Amt_ VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan, Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special section dealing with sabotage.

_Amt_ VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism. (_L-185_; _L-219_)

The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD. The _Inspekteurs_ were also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed for each _Wehrkreis_.

The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in each _Wehrkreis_ and supervised not only the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD but also the _Inspekteurs_ of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS. (_1285-PS_)

In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and SD, known as _Einsatz_ Groups, operated with and in the rear of the Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The _Einsatz_ Groups were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, _Sonderkommandos_, and _Teilkommandos_, all of which performed the functions of the Security Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied territories had been consolidated, the _Einsatz_ Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These combined forces were placed under the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD, and the offices were organized in sections similar to the RSHA headquarters. The _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD reported directly to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD, who in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised more direct control over the _Befehlshabers_ and the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority. (_1285-PS, Chart Number 19._)

C. _Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy._

(1) _Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO._ In the basic law of 10 February 1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have “the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to the State.” The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason, espionage, and sabotage cases, “and in other cases of criminal attacks on Party and State.” (_2107-PS_; _2108-PS_)

In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, commented as follows:

“Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is the object of protection.” (_2232-PS_)

The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order published by the Party Chancery:

“To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds directed against both.” (_1723-PS_)

In _Das Archiv_, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were described in part as follows:

“Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist Fuehrer-State.” (_1956-PS_)

The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the following words:

“The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist constructive work could be executed in the past ten years without any serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation.” (_1680-PS_)

The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be obtained.

“The duties of the political police and the necessary means for their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to the State.” (_2232-PS_)

The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

“As long as the ‘police’ carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)

The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of security and order “even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down for this purpose.” (_1437-PS_; _1438-PS_)

The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on 2 May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within the GESTAPO itself. (_2347-PS_)

The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided specifically in Section VII:

“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the review of the administrative courts.” (_2107-PS_)

Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

“It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate whether the will of the leadership lays down the ‘right’ rules, i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action—the ‘police’ law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual misuse of the legislative power by a people’s leadership—be it a harmful severity or weakness—will, because of the violations of the ‘laws of life,’ be punished in history more surely by fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a State Court of Justice.” (_1852-PS_)

The great power of the GESTAPO was “_Schutzhaft_”—the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings on the theory of “protective custody.” This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by authority of law. (_2499-PS_)

In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its exercise. (_L-301_; _779-PS_)

The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without knowledge of their superiors. (_775-PS_)

As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of 12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided that protective custody could be ordered:

“* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who endangered the security of the people and the State through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and State”;

that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody; that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary regulations. (_1723-PS_)

The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in _Das Archiv_, 1936, in the following language:

“The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity of the persons in question might endanger the security of the State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer time.” (_1956-PS_)

The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936. (_2108-PS_)

Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so forth. (_1956-PS_)

(2) _Tasks and Methods of the SD._ The task of the SD, after it became the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or neutralize opposition. (_1956-PS_)

The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as follows:

“As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the Interior—the duty of supporting the Security Police—which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of the tasks of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.” (_1852-PS_)

To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and informants operating out of various SD regional offices established throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres of German life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (_2614-PS_)

The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials, evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the identity of persons who cast “No” votes and “invalid” votes in the referenda. (_2614-PS_; _R-142_)

The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” published in _Das Archiv_, January 1936, stated:

“As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security of the state.” (_1956-PS_)

(3) _The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy._ The GESTAPO was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political opponents of National Socialism and the fight against Communism. (_2460-PS_)

In “_Aufbau Einer Nation_,” published in 1934, Goering said:

“For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own reflection created the office of the Secret State Police. This instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.” (_2344-PS_)

So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the political opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took over direct control of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). Goering’s position as Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (_2372-PS_). Even as late as December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the Prussian GESTAPO. (_D-183_)

Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (_2460-PS_)

The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:

“* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the political field which took place without court verdict. Of primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at that time published in the papers. For people guilty of immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary arrest—without court verdict and without legal measures for him. The terroristic measures, which led to the development of the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force.” (_2460-PS_)

D. _Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD._

In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in principal part committed by the centralized political police system the development and organization of which has previously been considered. In some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction with other groups and organizations.

Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, “SIPO and SD.” The SIPO and SD was composed of the following organizations,—the GESTAPO, the KRIPO and the SD.

The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about 40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was voluntary.

The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in 1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the Reich.

The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000 in 1943-45. It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was voluntary. (_3033-PS_)

In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term “SD” was used as an abbreviation in the term “SIPO and SD.” Since the GESTAPO was the primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms. (_3033-PS_)

The term “Chief of the Security Police and SD” describes the person who is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters office called the RSHA. The “Chief of the Security Police and SD” and the “head of the RSHA” are always one and the same person. The RSHA was a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS. Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to _Amt_ III of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to _Amt_ IV of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to _Amt_ V of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).

Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment of most of the criminal activities discussed hereinafter.

E. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace._

Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, “border incidents” were fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler with an excuse to wage war. (_2751-PS_)

Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity, it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen, Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.

The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:

“* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

“4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was ‘Canned Goods.’

“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack report to Mueller for Canned Goods.’ I did this and gave Mueller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots and left.” (_2751-PS_; _2479-PS_)

These were the “frontier incidents” to which Hitler referred in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, “My New Order,” Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)

F. _War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD._

(1) _The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables (“Einsatz Groups”)._ About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task forces of the SIPO and SD, called _Einsatzgruppen_ or Special Task Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the German armies into Russia, combatting partisans and members of resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In the beginning four _Einsatz_ Groups were formed. _Einsatz_ Group A, operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. _Einsatz_ Group B, operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief of _Amt_ V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. _Einsatz_ Group C, operating toward Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. _Einsatz_ Group D, operating in the south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of _Amt_ III (SD) of the RSHA.

The _Einsatz_ Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the _Einsatzkommandos_ were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The Army assigned the area in which the _Einsatzkommandos_ were to operate, but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the _Einsatz_ Groups and the RSHA.

The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led _Einsatz_ Group D, reads in part as follows:

“When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of _Einsatzgruppe_ D in the southern sector, and in the course of the year during which I was leader of the _Einsatzgruppe_ D, it liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also among them some Communist functionaries.

“In the execution of this extermination program the _Einsatzgruppen_ were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, and the _Einsatzkommandos_ into still smaller units, the so-called _Sonderkommando_ and _Teilkommandos_. Usually the smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing. The men, women and children were led to a place of execution which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in Group D, but ordered that several of the men should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the neck. I did not approve of these methods.” (_2620-PS_)

The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe’s interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various construction projects under his supervision. He was personally acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The original letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is attached to Graebe’s affidavit, which states in part as follows:

“In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after 22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses. Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for their children and children for their parents. That did not prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since several families and groups had barricaded themselves in especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward the train. Again and again the calls ‘Open the door,’ ‘Open the door’ echoed through the ghetto.” (_2992-PS_)

The leader of _Einsatz_ Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that other _Einsatz_ Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:

“Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about 30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation. All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as Jews.

“Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the trucks—men, women, and children of all ages—had to undress upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip. They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted according to shoes, over and underclothing, I saw a pile of shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed, stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1, 8 and 10, and two grown-up daughters of about 20 to 24. An old woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about 20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound. Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she pointed at herself and said, ‘23 years.’ I walked around the mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed together the people were lying on top of each other so that only their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show that they were still alive. The excavation was already two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000 people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation, his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them. They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people, some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back, around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just arrived. This time it included sick and frail persons. An old, very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others who were already naked, while two persons held her up. Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my car back to Dubno.” (_2992-PS_)

There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of _Einsatz_ Group B, available. The first report, found in Himmler’s personal files, states that during the first four months of the Russian campaign _Einsatz_ Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the _Einsatz_ Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the extermination program. It states:

“In view of the extension of the area of operations and the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against vermin—that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.” (_L-180_)

With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:

“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore performed extensive executions both in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed smoothly. * * *”

Enclosure 8, “Survey of the number of executed persons” is quoted directly from the report:

“_Enclosure 8—Survey of the number of executed persons_

Area │ Jews │Communists│ Total “Lithuania: │ │ │ Kowono town and surroundings │ │ │ (land) │ 31,914│ 80│ 31,994 Schaulen │ 41,382│ 763│ 42,145 Wilna │ 7,015│ 17│ 7,032 │ —————│ —————│ ————— │ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171 │==========│==========│========== “Latvia: │ │ │ Riga town and surroundings │ │ │ (land) │ │ │ 6,378 Mitau │ │ │ 3,576 Libau │ │ │ 11,860 Wolmar │ │ │ 209 Dueanaburg │ 9,256│ 589│ 9,845 │ —————│ —————│ ————— │ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868 │==========│==========│========== “Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158 │==========│==========│========== “White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620 │==========│==========│========== “Total: │ │ │ Lithuania │ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171 Latvia │ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868 Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158 White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620 │ —————│ —————│ ————— │ 118,430│ 3,387│ 121,817

“to be added to these figures: In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms 5,500 Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area 2,000 Lunatics executed 748 ———— 122,455 Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502 ———— 135,567” (_L-180_)

The second report from _Einsatz_ Group A (_L-180_) reports the extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to Esthonia, it states in part:

“Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work. Today there are no longer any Jews in Esthonia.”

With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:

“Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by these _Sonderkommandos_. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.”

With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:

“Therefore by means of selected units—mostly in the proportion of 1:8—first of all the prisons, and then systematically, district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows: Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000 Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to 5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen on earthworks and work of that sort.”

With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:

“In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews have been shot up to now.”

With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part

“Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80 percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The death rate is rising continually also as a result of the extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed.”

Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled “Jewish Executions Carried out by _Einsatzgruppe_ A,” on which, by the use of coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by _Einsatz_ Group A is shown (_Chart Number 4_). The map shows thousands of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews “still on hand” in the Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins, during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.

On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the _Einsatzkommandos_ operating in his area for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:

“On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o’clock a first lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.” (_1104-PS_)

This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941 with the following comment:

“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal.” (_1104-PS_)

On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. (_1104-PS_)

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_1104-PS_)

On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses that destruction of villages continued, and reports the execution of 1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217 people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (_1113-PS_)

The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:

“The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the Court-Prison by the SD (_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube) on 13 April 1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2 hours before the actions in question.

“Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14 April 43 from 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings. _Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of the SD was always present in person, and also took the gold objects with him.

“This has not been done before 13 April 1943.”

This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories on 1 June 1943. (_R-135_)

Death vans were used by the _Einsatz_ Groups to murder victims by gas. These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The vans were built for the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, which sent them to the _Einsatz_ Groups in the field. They were first used in the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war (_2348-PS_). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in the following words:

“We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the victims had been brought. They were told that they would be resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes. The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were taken out and buried.” (_2620-PS_)

A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to Rauff, the head of the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, on 16 May 1942, states:

“The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer) stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

“I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the civilian population called the van “death van”, as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

“* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches which appeared after each unloading.

“* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.” (_501-PS_)

The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the commandant of the SIPO and SD “Ostland” to the RSHA, _Amt_ II D, on 15 June 1942, states:

“A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

“The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.” (_501-PS_)

The reports of the various _Einsatz_ Groups were summarized at RSHA, and the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested, particularly _Amt_ III (the SD), _Amt_ IV (the GESTAPO), and _Amt_ V (the KRIPO) (_2752-PS_). One such report covering the period 1-31 October 1941 is entitled “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the _Einsatz_ Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR” (_R-102_). This report describes in summary form the activities of the various _Einsatz_ Groups during the month of October 1941. The report first discusses the stations and in that regard states:

“During the period covered by this report the stations of the Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only in the Northern Sector.

“The present stations are:

“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.

“Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.

“Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.

“Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder_ Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.” (_R-102_)

The report next discusses the activities of each _Einsatz_ Group. There is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the _Einsatz_ Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans, Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:

“* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_), formed at the time of the entry of the _Wehrmacht_, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.

“The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in Pernau and environs.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in a camp that is being prepared.

“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

“* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly partisan infested village.

“The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their connections with partisans.

“During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow, 25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the report states in part:

“* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

“In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot at Beresna.

“It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilev.

“In Borissov 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were executed.

“In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in incitement and horror propaganda [_Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda_] against the German army of occupation.

“In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

“In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.

“_MOGILEV_

“In Mogilev too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.

“_Wit_

“Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and 2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

“In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

“At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had participated in acts of sabotage.

“_Witebsk_

“On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in part:

“Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in part:

“The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National Germans [_Volksdeutschen_] and partly put at the disposal of the provisional city administration for distribution to the needy population.

“_Shitomir_

“In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.

“_Cherson_

“In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the _Wehrmacht_ for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons.” (_R-102_)

These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD. (_R-102_)

The activities of the _Einsatz_ Groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were formed and sent into action in the West (_2890-PS_). Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a _Sonderkommando_ (section of _Einsatz_ Group C) states as follows:

“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of operations especially to guarantee the security of the army. Besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be eliminated [_sind * * * auszumerzen_] through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly position against us.

“2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points of harsh measures:

“1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.

“2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.

“3. The shooting of children.

“4. The total burning down of villages.

“5. The “shooting, while trying to escape” of Security Service (SD) prisoners.

“Chief of _Einsatz_ Group C confirmed once more the correctness of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the energetic actions.

“With regard to the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.

“The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of now. The following orders are given:

“1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.

“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on, is to take place by roster only for the time being, without arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were active in a leading position.

“3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [_Uberholung_] villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force.

“4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.

“5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

“6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of security police through above orders for the time being, that is only done for the following reason. The most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political reliability check or similar things will be issued.

“(signed) Christiansen.” (_3012-PS_)

The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the Jews by the GESTAPO, _Obersturmbannfuehrer_ Eichmann, estimated in his report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by shootings, mainly by the _Einsatz_ Groups of the SIPO and SD during the campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (_2615-PS_)

(2) _The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and executing them._ The program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab_, states:

“* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [with U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this group that special measures would have to be taken against political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was not possible to turn over the political functionaries and commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German troops.” (_2884-PS_)

The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the following words:

“In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened to _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the _Einsatzkommandos_ and executed outside the camps. To my knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within the Reich—to my knowledge—the GESTAPO had been made responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the greater part of the war.” (_2622-PS_)

Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in the _Wehrmacht_, states:

“* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the higher German political and military leadership followed the policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types of Russian prisoners of war captured by the _Wehrmacht_. In June and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * * Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of Section IV, he was responsible for the carrying out of these measures. Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of instituting the necessary measures for the execution of commissars. * * * In the discussion that followed, Mueller promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that these executions would take place in the future outside the camp, so that the troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised further a certain limitation in the concept of ‘Bolshevistically infected.’ This concept and its interpretation had been hitherto left to the discretion of the SD _Sonderkommandos_. * * * An agreement was concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD. Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war under the control of the OKW were delivered to the GESTAPO and SD for execution. The term ‘_Sonderbehandlung_’ in the official documents and way of speaking of the SD was equivalent to ‘condemned to death’.” (_2846-PS_)

On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to Commandos of the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing in part as follows:

“The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure 1). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limit of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp-commander and the defense-officers assigned to him.

“The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further ‘treatment’

“_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way unbearable elements among them.

“_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

“The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp-commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.

“Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

“By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must proceed step by step at once. * * *

“Above all, the following must be discovered: All important functionaries of state and party, especially

Professional revolutionaries

Functionaries of the Komintern

All policy forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.

All peoples-commissars and their deputies

All former political commissars in the Red-Army

Leading personalities of the state-authorities of central and middle regions.

The leading personalities of the business world.

Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence

All Jews

All persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists. * * *

“Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the general-government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory. * * *

“In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the _Einsatz_-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the _Einsatz-Kommando_ [?] must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the _Einsatz_-group concerned in the occupied territories. * * *” (_502-PS_)

On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration camp Gross Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, a list of Russian PWs who had been executed the preceding day. (_1165-PS_)

On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO offices in which he ordered that diseased PWs should be excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for execution. The letter began:

“The commandant of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in this way. * * *” (_1165-PS_)

The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official, states:

“* * * 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached to subsection IVA1 a special department that was headed by the _Regierungsoberinspektor_, later _Regierungsamtmann_, and _SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer_ Franz Koenigshaus. In this department were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed according to which captured Soviet Russian political Commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency making the request and a second one to the concentration camp designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a concentration camp for execution. * * *

“* * * 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front small screening teams (_Einsatzkommandos_) headed by lower ranking members of the Secret Police (GESTAPO). These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders that had been given, and to report them to the Office of the Secret Police (_Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt_). * * *” (_2542-PS_)

(3) _The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they were executed (“Bullet Decree”)._ In March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD forwarded an OKW order to regional SIPO and SD offices in which the OKW ordered that, on recapture, every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words “_Stufe III_”. Whether escaped British and American officers and nonworking NCOs, upon recapture, should be handed over to the SIPO and SD was to be decided by the High Command of the Army. In connection with this order, the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ should take over the escaped officers from the camp commandants and transport them in accordance with a procedure theretofore in force to the Mauthausen concentration camp. The camp commandant was to be informed that the prisoners were being handed over under the operation “_Kugel_”. On the journey the prisoners of war were to be placed in irons. The GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ were to make half-yearly reports, giving numbers only, of the handing over of prisoners of war. Escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war, with the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command. The Stalag was to be informed of the recapture and asked to surrender them with the words “_Stufe III_”. (_1650-PS_)

On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was issued on the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided that prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the GESTAPO if they were guilty of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured, or refused to work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were screened out by _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD, or were guilty of sabotage. No reports on transfers were required (_1514-PS_). This decree was known as the “_Kugel Erlass_” (“Bullet Decree”). Prisoners of war sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to the outside world and were executed. (_2478-PS_; _2285-PS_.)

(4) _The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder._ The first concentration camps were established in 1933 at Dachau in Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given by law the responsibility of administering the concentration camps. (_2108-PS_)

The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into protective custody, and orders for protective custody were carried out in the State concentration camps. (_1723-PS_)

The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration camps, transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration camps, designating concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners, and so forth. (_D-50_; _D-46_.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and the chances for reforming the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The concentration camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III for the most serious prisoners. (_1063-A-PS_)

Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit persons to concentration camps for short periods, at first 21 days and later 56 days, but all other orders for protective custody had to be approved by the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders for protective custody issued by GESTAPO headquarters had to be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner. (_2477-PS_)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix the length of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the term as “until further notice”. (_1531-PS_)

The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained a register called the “_Haftbuch_.” In this register the names of all persons arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds for the arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to concentration camps, an entry was made in the _Haftbuch_ to that effect. The reason assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to concentration camps usually was that, according to the GESTAPO, the person endangered by his attitude the existence and security of the people and the State. Further specifications of grounds included such offenses as that of “working against the Greater German Reich with an illegal resistance organization,” “being a Jew,” “suspected of working for the detriment of the Reich,” “being strongly suspected of aiding desertion,” “because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich,” “refusal to work,” “sexual intercourse with a Pole,” “religious propaganda,” “working against the Reich,” “loafing on the job,” or “defeatist statements.” Sometimes specification of the grounds simply referred to an “action,” under which a large number of persons would be arrested and sent to concentration camps. (_L-358_; _L-215_.)

On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported that, in connection with an increase in slave labor required by concentration camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could round up 45,000 Jews, including invalids, aged, and children. The telegram stated:

“In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the following may be applied in the Jewish sector:

“1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.

“2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.

“3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.” (_1472-PS_)

On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the _Kommandeurs_ and _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD and to the directors of the GESTAPO regional offices, in which he stated that Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into concentration camps not later than at the end of January. The order further provided that Eastern or foreign workers who had escaped or broken the labor contracts were to be sent to the nearest concentration camps as quickly as possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and educational work camps who were fit for work should be delivered to the nearest concentration camps. (_1063-D-PS_)

On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring to said directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated that measures are to be carried out until 30 April ‘43. More explicit instructions were given as to which concentration camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He said:

“Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit for work are sent to concentration camps, and adolescents only in accordance with the provisions issued; otherwise, contrary to the purpose, the concentration camps become overburdened.” (_L-41_)

On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the decrees of 17 December 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had achieved the intended goal. (_1063-E-PS_)

On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a letter that the RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all Jews who were released from prison were to be handed over to the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an imprisonment of over six months were to be transferred to the GESTAPO for internment in a concentration camp for the duration of the war. (_701-PS_)

The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps was carried out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the section handling Jews in the Gestapo. Eichmann’s staff was composed of members of the SIPO, especially the GESTAPO. The Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and SD to annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the annihilation camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000 Jews shot by the _Einsatz_ Groups. The extermination of Jews in the annihilation camps was accomplished mainly after the beginning of 1943, during the time Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_2615-PS_)

(5) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of forced labor._ On 26 November 1942, Fritz Sauckel transmitted a letter to the president of provincial employment offices in which he stated that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into concentration camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial. The remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be transported without their families into the Reich, there to be put at the disposal of the Labor Allocation Offices to serve as replacements for Jews eliminated from the armament factories. (_L-61_)

During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the _Einsatz_ Groups in the East was modified, and orders were issued to round up hundreds of thousands of persons for the armament industry.

“In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament industry one million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily. * * * The activity of the labor offices * * * is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. * * * When searching villages, esp. when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissions by force. * * * The most important thing is the recruiting of workers.” (_3012-PS_)

On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent the return of Eastern emigrants and civilian workers from the Reich to the East, and to keep them in German war production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to be countered by the GESTAPO with the severest measures, arrest and confinement in concentration camps (_1573-PS_). The Chief of the Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction over labor reformatory camps established under control of the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign workers. (_1063-B-PS_)

(6) _The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers, and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers._ On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued an order which provided that the GESTAPO and SD were responsible for taking counter-measures against single parachutists or small groups of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers were captured by the _Wehrmacht_, they were to be handed over to the GESTAPO and the SD. (_553-PS_)

On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of Commando units, even when in uniform, or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were to be exterminated to the last man by fighting or by pursuing them. Even if they wished to surrender, they were not to be spared. Members of such Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to the _Wehrmacht_ through other channels, were to be turned over immediately to the SD. (_498-PS_)

On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in a Top Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, stated that he had instructed the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris to treat parachutists in English uniform as members of Commando operations in accordance with Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942. (_1276-PS_)

On 26 June 1944, WFSt issued an order in which it was stated that enemy paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be treated as commandos, and that it was immaterial whether the paratroopers were in uniform or civilian clothes. The order provided that in cases of doubt enemy soldiers who were captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was to be applied or not. (_532-PS_)

Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders were executed. (_526-PS_; _2374-PS_.)

The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen concentration camp, states in part:

“* * * Concerning the American Military Mission which landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January, 1945, I remember, when these officers were brought to Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the number of the arrivals were about 12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform which was American or Canadian; brown-green color, shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten days after their arrival the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype. _Standartenfuehrer_ Ziereis came to me into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot according to martial law and their belongings were given to me by 1st Sgt. [_Oberscharfuehrer_] Niedermeyer. * * *” (_L-51_)

On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security Police stating that it was not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes between Germans and English and American terror flyers who had bailed out. (_R-110_)

In 1944 at a conference of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:

“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be informed that pogroms of the populace against English and American terror-flyers are not to be interfered with; on the contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.” (_2990-PS_)

On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-_Abschnitte_ Koblenz stated that the Army had issued a similar order, namely, that German soldiers were not to protect enemy flyers from the populace and that the Army no longer attached value to enemy flyers taken prisoner. (_745-PS_)

(7) _The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment (“Nacht und Nebel Erlass”)._ On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the directive, since called the “_Nacht und Nebel Erlass_” (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories, except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. An executive ordinance was issued by Keitel the same date, and on 4 February 1942 the directive and ordinance were published to the police and the SS. (_L-90_)

In compliance with the above directive, the military intelligence turned over cases, other than those in which the death sentence was probable, to the GESTAPO and the Secret Field Police for secret deporting to Germany. (_833-PS_)

After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the disposition of their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or their relatives. Even when they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD refused to notify the families, so that anxiety would be created in the minds of the family of the arrested person. (_668-PS_)

(8) _The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary methods._ The GESTAPO arrested, placed in protective custody, and executed civilians of occupied territories under certain circumstances. Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to normal judicial processes. (_674-PS_)

On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be turned over to Himmler to be worked to death, and a special criminal procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal courts. (_654-PS_)

On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the offices of the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding. This order provided that ordinary criminal procedure would not be applied against Poles, Jews, gypsies, and other Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned over to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to Germans.

“* * * Such considerations which may be right for adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a German are, however, wrong for adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a person of alien race. In the case of punishable offenses committed by a person of alien race the personal motives actuating the offender must be completely eliminated. The only standard may be that German civil order is endangered by his action, and that consequently preventive measures must be taken to prevent the recurrence of such risks. In other words, the action of a person of alien race is not to be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but from the angle of the police guard against danger.

“As a result of this, the administration of penal law for persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the administrators of justice into the hands of the police. * * *” (_L-316_)

(9) _The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ On 19 July 1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom published an order transmitted through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only the guilty person but also all his (or her) male relatives should be shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age put into a concentration camp. (_L-37_)

In the summer of 1944, the _Einsatzkommando_ of the SIPO and SD at Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration camp because they were relatives of deserters and were, therefore, “expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go free.” (_L-215_)

(10) _The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners in the SIPO and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies._ On 21 July 1944, the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom forwarded an order of the _Befehlshaber_ of the SIPO and SD to the effect that it was essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and SD prisons be kept as low as possible. Inmates were to be subjected only to short formal interrogations and then to be sent by the quickest route to concentration camps. Preparations were to be made for total clearance of the prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the evacuation of the prisoners, they were to be shot and their bodies buried or otherwise disposed of, the buildings to be dynamited, and so forth. In similar circumstances, the Jews who were still employed in the armament industries or in other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be avoided at all costs. (_L-53_)

(11) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private property._ In connection with the program for the mass extermination of Jews and Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and the SD seized all personal effects of the persons executed or murdered. On the eastern front the victims were required not only to give up all their personal possessions, but even to remove their outer garments prior to being murdered. (_2620-PS_)

In connection with the program of confiscation of scientific, religious, and art archives and objects, an agreement was entered into between Rosenberg and Heydrich, under which the SD and Rosenberg were to cooperate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections. (_071-PS_)

(12) _The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree interrogations._ On 26 October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO offices from the RSHA signed Mueller, “by order,” in referring to execution of protective custody during the war, stated in part:

“In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future, also be transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment. * * *” (_1531-PS_)

On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, through Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of third degree methods in interrogating where preliminary investigation indicates that the prisoner could give information on important facts such as subversive activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner’s own crimes. The order stated in part:

“* * * 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.

“* * * 4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist amongst other methods, of:

very simple diet (bread and water)

hard bunk

dark cell

deprivation of sleep

exhaustive drilling

also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted).” (_1531-PS_)

On 24 February 1944 the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the district Radom, “in view of the variety of methods used to date in third-degree interrogations and in order to avoid excesses,” published an order issued by the BdS Cracow based on regulations in force for the Reich which followed closely the limitations laid down in the above decree of 12 June 1942. (_L-89_)

G. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity._

(1) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews._ The persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime is a story of increasingly severe treatment, beginning with restrictions, then seizure and spoliation of property, commitment to concentration camps, deportation, slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program carried out by the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD and in the annihilation camps to which Jews were sent by the SIPO and SD has already been considered. In this subdivision, the place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of this persecution will be treated.

Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality, including minorities, race and national health, immigration, and resettlement. Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by Eichmann, dealt with Jewish affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German citizenship. One of the functions of the SD was to furnish information concerning the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews. (_L-185_; _L-219_.)

The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws, such as those preventing Jews from engaging in business, restricting their right to travel, and prohibiting them from associating with gentiles. Violations of such restrictions resulted in protective custody and confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (_L-217_; _L-152_; _L-167_.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO and the SD to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in November 1938 following the von Rath incident in Paris. As many Jews were to be arrested in all districts as the available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were to be singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male adults of not too advanced age. Immediately after completion of the arrests, the competent concentration camp was to be notified in order to provide for speediest transfer of Jews to the camps. (_3051-PS_)

On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret express letter on the results of the action as reported by the GESTAPO. The report stated in part:

“* * * The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the reports: 815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or destroyed, only indicate a fraction of the actual damage caused, as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to general statements such as ‘numerous’ or ‘most shops destroyed.’ Therefore the figures given must have been exceeded considerably.

“191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76 completely destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls, [_Gemeindehauser_] cemetery chapels and similar buildings were set on fire and 3 more completely destroyed.

“20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and 3 foreigners. The latter were arrested for their own safety.

“36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and those injured include 2 Poles.” (_3058-PS_)

On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich:

“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution of the Jewish problem through furtherance of emigration and evacuation as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.” (_710-PS_)

In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley, _Ministerialrat_ in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the solution of the Jewish problem, attended by representatives of the ministries, was called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Boley states:

“The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had charge of Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his opening remarks Eichmann referred to former conferences that had taken place in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and that on this occasion he wished to discuss the matter in a more basic manner. He stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of the Security Police and SD who attended the conference made it clear to those present that the remaining Jews had to be sent forcibly to concentration camps or be sterilized. Those present at the conference must have carried away the impression that the objectives were the extermination of the Jewish people.” (_2645-PS_)

The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of the program for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were screened out at extermination centers, such as Auschwitz, and the remainder were taken into concentration and work camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and passed through the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner (formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and then to Eichmann for execution. (_2376-PS_; _1472-PS_.)

In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during the period from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that time Galicia had been entirely cleared of Jews. In all, 434,392 Jews were deported from Galicia alone. In connection with the deportations, Jewish property was confiscated, including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all kinds. The Security Police participated in this action along with other police and SS detachments. (_L-18_)

In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in the segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in the subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps, and in the final clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was established in November of 1940. Over 300,000 Jews were deported from it between July and October 1942, and 6,500 more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943 the final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the direction of the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area, and with units of the SIPO, Waffen SS, Order Police, and some military and Polish police units. Thousands of Jews were killed in the action. About 7,000 were transported to “T. II” where they were exterminated. The remaining 40,000 to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps. (_1061-PS_)

In Denmark the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD was ordered in September of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish belief and send them to Stettin by ship and from there to the concentration camp at Theresienstadt. In spite of the protests of the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD, Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct orders to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the clearance program. (_2375-PS_)

In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by Eichmann. This action took place under direction of the GESTAPO after the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported from Hungary due to the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO. (_2605-PS_)

(2) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of the churches._ The fight against the churches was never brought out into the open by the GESTAPO and the SD as in the case of the persecution of the Jews. The struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional churches after the end of the war. (_1815-PS_)

Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life. Section B1 of the GESTAPO dealt with political Catholicism. Section B2 with political Protestantism sects, and Section B3 with other churches and Freemasonry. (_L-185_)

As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against the churches. An order by the State Police of Dusseldorf prohibited the churches from engaging in public activities, especially public appearances in groups, sports, hikes, and the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. (_R-145_)

In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers in protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of the Government to ring church bells on the occasion of the death of Hindenburg. (_1521-PS_)

The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it considered to have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO at Munich dissolved by order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian dioceses. (_1481-PS_)

An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of the GESTAPO and the SD in the fight against the churches is disclosed in the file of the GESTAPO regional office at Aachen (_1815-PS_). On 12 May 1941 the Chief of the GESTAPO issued a directive in which he reported that the Chief of the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which the treatment of church politics which had theretofore been divided between the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over entirely by the GESTAPO. The SD “church specialists” were to be temporarily transferred to the same posts in the GESTAPO and operate an intelligence service in the church political sphere there. SD files concerning church political opposition were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to retain material concerning the confessional influence on the lives of the people.

On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church specialists attached to GESTAPO regional offices was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in Berlin. The notes on the speeches delivered at this conference indicate that the GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked with determination and “true fanaticism.” The immediate objective of the GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the Church did not win back any lost ground. The ultimate objective was stated to be the destruction of the confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the collection of material through the GESTAPO church intelligence system to be produced at a proper time as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.

The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were discussed. It was stated to be impractical to deal with political offenses under normal legal procedure owing to lack of political perception which prevailed among the legal authorities. The so-called “agitator-Priests,” therefore, had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments were to be applied to priests according to individual circumstances: warning, fine, forbidden to preach, forbidden to remain in parish, forbidden all activity as a priest, short-term arrest, protective custody. Retreats, youth and recreational camps, evening services, processions and pilgrimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering with the war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation, etc.

In executing this program close cooperation was required between the GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of the Church in its opposition to the Nazi state was the responsibility of the GESTAPO. The result of this treatment of the Church in the sphere of “religious life” remained the province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Church.

H. _Conclusion._

The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering in Prussia in April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime, and that henceforward the GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term “GESTAPO” became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.

Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.

The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him before the GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a tyrannical rule of men, the GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of oppression.

The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal act of the conspiracy. The categories of these crimes, apart from the thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, indicate the extent of GESTAPO and SD complicity.

The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as an excuse for attacking Poland.

Through the _Einsatz_ Groups they murdered approximately 2,000,000 defenseless men, women, and children.

They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from prisoner of war camps and murdered them.

They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and murdered some of them.

The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps and sent millions of people into them for extermination and slave labor.

The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible for sending 4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation camps.

The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor, and sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps and concentration camps for disciplining.

They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers.

They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment.

They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedures which did not accord them fair trials, and by summary methods.

They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons who had allegedly committed crimes.

They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies.

They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private property.

They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and of the churches.

In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an organization, closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports were submitted to Berlin, and all important decisions emanated from Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short duration, had to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From 1943 to the end of the war the defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin. The GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its principal divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against which it committed the worst crimes—Jews, churches, communists, and political liberals. Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an entity, each section performing its part in the general criminal enterprises ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.

The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.

As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:

1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.

2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their capacity as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.

3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter.

In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of the Security Police and the SD, said:

“Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering—and yet at home with a certain feeling of security because of their presence,—brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this profession.” (Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich, published in December 1943.)

The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality, inhumanity, sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of the GESTAPO and that it was and should be declared, a criminal organization, in accordance with article 9 of the Charter.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ 29, 70, │ Appendix B. │ I │ 71 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │ │1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │ │19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │ │371) │ III │ 119 │ │ │ *498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │ │of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │ │501) │ III │ 416 │ │ │ *501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │ │execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │ │signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │ │Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │ │1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418 │ │ │ *502-PS │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled │ │ │“Regulations for the Commandos of the │ │ │Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to │ │ │be activated in Stalags”. (USA 486) │ III │ 422 │ │ │ *526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │ │concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │ │in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434 │ │ │ 532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437 │ │ │ *553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │ │regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │ │(USA 500) │ III │ 441 │ │ │ 654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │ │on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │ │delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │ │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467 │ │ │ *668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │ │and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of punishable │ │ │offenses against the Reich or │ │ │occupation forces in occupied │ │ │territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476 │ │ │ *674-PS │Secret letter from President of High │ │ │District Court of Kattowitz re │ │ │executions being carried out by │ │ │Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 │ │ │December 1941. (USA 505) │ III │ 478 │ │ │ *701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │ │Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │ │Poles and Jews who are released from │ │ │Penal institutions of Department of │ │ │Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510 │ │ │ *710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │ │July 1941, concerning solution of │ │ │Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525 │ │ │ 745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │ │June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │ │who have been shot down. │ III │ 543 │ │ │ 775-PS │Memorandum of Minister of the Interior│ │ │concerning clarification of police │ │ │matters, 1935. │ III │ 547 │ │ │ 779-PS │Directive by Frick, regulating │ │ │“protective custody”, 12 April 1934. │ III │ 555 │ │ │ 833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │ │of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of crimes │ │ │against the Reich or occupying forces │ │ │in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600 │ │ │ 1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │ │Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │ │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │ │(USA 275) │ III │ 718 │ │ │ *1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │ │January 1941, concerning │ │ │classification of concentration camps.│ │ │(USA 492) │ III │ 775 │ │ │ *1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │ │July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │ │Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777 │ │ │ *1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │ │concerning prisoners qualified for │ │ │work to be sent to concentration │ │ │camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778 │ │ │ 1063-E-PS │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,│ │ │concerning increased shipments to │ │ │concentration camps. │ III │ 780 │ │ │ *1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │ │enclosing copies of report concerning │ │ │anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783 │ │ │ 1113-PS │Report of 6 November 1942 concerning │ │ │action “Marshfever”. │ III │ 792 │ │ │ *1165-PS │Letter from Commandant of │ │ │concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23 │ │ │October 1941, and letter of Mueller to│ │ │all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, │ │ │concerning execution of Russian PW’s. │ │ │(USA 244) │ III │ 821 │ │ │ *1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │ │and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │ │concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │ │525). │ III │ 855 │ │ │ 1285-PS │Extract from The German Police, 1943, │ │ │pp. 81-82. │ III │ 863 │ │ │ 1437-PS │Law concerning reuniting of Austria │ │ │with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262. │ IV │ 17 │ │ │ 1438-PS │Fuehrer concerning administration of │ │ │Sudeten-German territory, 22 October │ │ │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 1453. │ IV │ 17 │ │ │ *1472-PS │Copy of telegram from Mueller to │ │ │Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │ │ │recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279) │ IV │ 49 │ │ │ *1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │ │dissolving and confiscating property │ │ │of Catholic Youth Womens Organization │ │ │in Bavaria. (USA 737). │ IV │ 50 │ │ │ *1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │ │Area Command concerning delivery of │ │ │prisoners of war to secret state │ │ │police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53 │ │ │ *1521-PS │Report from the Bavarian Political │ │ │Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 │ │ │August 1934, concerning National │ │ │mourning on occasion of death of von │ │ │Hindenburg. (USA 740) │ IV │ 75 │ │ │ *1531-PS │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │ │ │concerning execution of protective │ │ │custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │ │ │concerning third degree. (USA 248) │ IV │ 93 │ │ │ 1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │ │of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │ │1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │ │pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106 │ │ │ *1573-PS │Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941, │ │ │concerning measures to be taken │ │ │against Emigrants and civilian workers│ │ │from Russian areas and against Foreign│ │ │workers. (USA 498) │ IV │ 112 │ │ │ 1638-PS │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 │ │ │November 1938, on cooperation of SD │ │ │and other authorities. 1938 Reichs │ │ │Ministerialblatt, p. 1906. │ IV │ 142 │ │ │ *1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │ │from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │ │4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │ │escaped PWs except British and │ │ │American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158 │ │ │ *1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │ │published in The German Police, 1 │ │ │February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191 │ │ │ *1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │ │offices with the Secret State Police, │ │ │25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │ │Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │ │II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219 │ │ │ *1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │ │the study and treatment of church │ │ │politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415 │ │ │ *1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │ │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │ │No. 16.) │ IV │ 490 │ │ │ 1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │ │Police, published in The Archives, │ │ │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598 │ │ │ 2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │ │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │ │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703 │ │ │ 2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │ │Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │ │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730 │ │ │ 2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │ │November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │ │Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731 │ │ │ 2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │ │February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │ │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732 │ │ │ 2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │ │State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │ │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732 │ │ │ 2113-PS │Decree for application of law of 30 │ │ │November 1933, concerning Secret State│ │ │Police of 8 March 1934. 1934 │ │ │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143. │ IV │ 743 │ │ │ 2232-PS │Tasks and Means of a Political Police,│ │ │from German Administrative Law by Hans│ │ │Frank, pp. 420-430. │ IV │ 881 │ │ │ 2243-PS │Law relating to finance measures in │ │ │connection with the police, 19 March │ │ │1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 325. │ IV │ 924 │ │ │ 2245-PS │Frick decree of 20 September 1936 │ │ │concerning employment of Security │ │ │Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs │ │ │Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344. │ IV │ 928 │ │ │ *2273-PS │Extract from a top secret report of │ │ │Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart │ │ │No. 4.) │ IV │ 944 │ │ │ *2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │ │officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │ │at Mauthausen. (USA 490) │ IV │ 991 │ │ │ 2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │ │1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065 │ │ │ 2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │ │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │ │577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066 │ │ │ 2348-PS │Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, │ │ │RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485) │ IV │ 1068 │ │ │ 2371-PS │Execution of ordinance for Security of│ │ │people and state, 28 February 1933. │ │ │1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 543. │ IV │ 1102 │ │ │ 2372-PS │Unified Designation of offices of │ │ │Secret State Police in Reich. 1936 │ │ │Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V, │ │ │pp. 1344-5. │ IV │ 1105 │ │ │ 2374-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June │ │ │1945, concerning treatment of │ │ │English-American commando groups. │ V │ 1 │ │ │ 2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │ │November 1945, concerning activities │ │ │of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2 │ │ │ 2376-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │ │November 1945, concerning treatment of│ │ │Jews. │ V │ 3 │ │ │ *2460-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751) │ V │ 205 │ │ │ *2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229 │ │ │ 2478-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 230 │ │ │ 2479-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 230 │ │ │ *2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order │ │ │served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March │ │ │1935. (USA 232) │ V │ 236 │ │ │ *2542-PS │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September│ │ │1945. (USA 489) │ V │ 286 │ │ │ *2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │ │former President of the Hungarian │ │ │Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │ │1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313 │ │ │ 2614-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 918) │ V │ 337 │ │ │ 2615-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 338 │ │ │ *2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341 │ │ │ 2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 343 │ │ │ 2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 357 │ │ │ 2645-PS │Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 357 │ │ │ *2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390 │ │ │ 2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 392 │ │ │ 2846-PS │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 507 │ │ │ 2884-PS │Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14 │ │ │November 1945. │ V │ 550 │ │ │ 2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO│ │ │and SD. │ V │ 557 │ │ │ *2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694 │ │ │ *2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │ │494) │ V │ 696 │ │ │ *3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │ │1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │ │Service, and record of telephone │ │ │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │ │1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731 │ │ │ *3033-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 488) │ V │ 741 │ │ │ *3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │ │all stations of State Police, 10 │ │ │November 1938, on measures against │ │ │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │ │termination of protest actions. (USA │ │ │240) │ V │ 797 │ │ │ 3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │ │November 1938, reporting action │ │ │against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854 │ │ │ 3343-PS │Speech delivered at labor-meeting of │ │ │Prussian State Council on 18 June │ │ │1934, from Speeches and Essays of │ │ │Hermann Goering. │ VI │ 78 │ │ │ 3344-PS │Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief│ │ │of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7 │ │ │September 1942, No. 39, p. 249. │ VI │ 78 │ │ │ *3360-PS │Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating │ │ │to recaptured escaped Eastern │ │ │laborers. (USA 499) │ VI │ 95 │ │ │ 3363-PS │Special delivery letter, 21 September │ │ │1939, from Chief of Security Police to│ │ │Chiefs of all detail groups concerning│ │ │Jewish problem in Occupied zone. │ VI │ 97 │ │ │ *3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │ │1946, concerning the elimination of │ │ │the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775 │ │ │ *3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │ │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │ │concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │ │Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776 │ │ │ *3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ │819) │ VI │ 787 │ │ │ D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │ │concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025 │ │ │ D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │ │at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027 │ │ │ D-183 │Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 │ │ │December 1938, concerning treatment of│ │ │articles secured during protest action│ │ │against Jews. │ VI │ 1075 │ │ │ *D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │ │SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │ │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │ │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │ │1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │ │relative to procedure in cases of │ │ │unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │ │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74 │ │ │ *D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │ │concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │ │and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │ │Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221 │ │ │ *D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │ │regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │ │non-German civilians in Occupied │ │ │Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222 │ │ │ *L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │ │of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │ │concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │ │Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755 │ │ │ *L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │ │and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │ │July 1944, concerning collective │ │ │responsibility of members of families │ │ │of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782 │ │ │ *L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │ │Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │ │1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │ │to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784 │ │ │ *L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │ │1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798 │ │ │ L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │ │SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │ │Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │ │clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814 │ │ │ *L-61 │Express letter from Sauckel to │ │ │Presidents of Landes Employment │ │ │Office, 26 November 1942, concerning │ │ │employment of Jews and exchange of │ │ │Jews in essential employment against │ │ │Polish labor. (USA 177) │ VII │ 816 │ │ │ *L-89 │Top secret letter issued by the │ │ │Commandant of the SIPO and SD, │ │ │District Radom, 24 February 1944, │ │ │concerning intensified interrogations.│ │ │(USA 507) │ VII │ 868 │ │ │ *L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │ │concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │ │Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │ │signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │ │directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │ │1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871 │ │ │ L-152 │RSHA Order concerning fraternization │ │ │of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941. │ VII │ 903 │ │ │ L-167 │Orders of the Reichsminister of the │ │ │Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning │ │ │use of public transportation by Jews, │ │ │and covering letters. │ VII │ 917 │ │ │ *L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │ │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │ │A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978 │ │ │ *L-185 │Organization plan of the RSHA, 1 │ │ │January 1941. (USA 484) │ VII │ 996 │ │ │ *L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │ │Luxembourgers committed to │ │ │concentration camps at various times │ │ │in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045 │ │ │ L-217 │Order of Secret State Police │ │ │concerning camouflage of Jewish │ │ │businesses, 20 November 1936. │ VII │ 1052 │ │ │ *L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │ │October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053 │ │ │ L-297 │Law commissioning Secret State Police │ │ │Bureau with supervision of duties of │ │ │Political Police commanders in │ │ │provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343. │ VII │ 1099 │ │ │ L-301 │New ruling on protective custody, from│ │ │The Archive, April 1934, p. 31. │ VII │ 1099 │ │ │ *L-316 │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │ │ │by Streckenbach, concerning │ │ │jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern │ │ │Nationals. (USA 346) │ VII │ 1104 │ │ │ *L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │ │Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107 │ │ │ *L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │ │formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │ │September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │ │September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109 │ │ │ *R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │ │Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │ │October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96 │ │ │ *R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │ │Senior Executive SS and Police │ │ │officers. (USA 333) │ VIII │ 107 │ │ │ *R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ │reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │ │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 │ │ │ *R-142 │Memoranda to Koblenz District │ │ │Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │ │ │1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10│ │ │April 1938. (USA 481) │ VIII │ 243 │ │ │ R-145 │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at │ │ │Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning│ │ │sanction of denominational youth and │ │ │professional associations and │ │ │distribution of publications in │ │ │churches. (USA 745) │ VIII │ 248 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │ │December 1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596 │ │ │ Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606 │ │ │ Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772 │ │ │ *Chart No. 4 │Report of Special Purpose Group “A” │ │ │regarding Jews killed in the Baltic │ │ │Countries, White Russia and Lithuania.│ │ │(2273-PS; USA 487) │ VIII │ 773 │ │ │ *Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │ │Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │ │System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774 │ │ │ *Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │ │(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII │ │ │ *Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │ │(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │ │1943-1945. (USA 480) │ End of VIII

7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches—large branches to be sure—of the Nazi Party. The German police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full power.

That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern witnesses to this fact.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs; he found a small _Reichswehr_ and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history.

The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment—the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany—skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple. The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if necessary by force or threat of force. Force—armed might—was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the _Reichswehr_, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the war proceeded they became his tools.

But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal. The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners of the Nazis will be fully developed.

A. _Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command Group._

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the public mind, but the _Grosse Generalstab_ no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and operations of the German armed forces.

(1) _Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces._ When the Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg. Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.

In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed “High Commands”—_Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine_, from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH and OKM).

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called the _Wehrmachtamt_ or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces—_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_—usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941. (The genesis of this department is explained in _L-79_.)

This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):

“DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally.

“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its functions becomes ‘The High Command of the Armed Forces’ and comes directly under my command as my military staff.

“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His status is equal to that of Reich Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas according to my directives.

“Berlin, 4 February 1938.

“The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor “(S) Adolf Hitler “The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery “(S) Dr. Lammers “Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces “(S) Keitel”

Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official designation of _Oberkommando der Luftwaffe_ (OKL) until 1944. Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von Greim.

OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff was known as the _Generalstab_ (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it was known as the _Fuehrungstab_ (Operations Staff); but in all cases the functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.

Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an “army group”. An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more “armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.

In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was known as an “air fleet” (_Luftflotte_) and the lower units under the air fleet were called “corps” (_Fliegerkorps_ or _Jagdkorps_) or “divisions” (_Fliegerdivisionen_ or _Jagddivisionen_).

Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly subordinate to the German Admiralty.

(2) _Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal._ The group charged in the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands described above; and second, the officers who held the top field commands.

The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this reason his office has been included in the group.

The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are still living.

With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in the field who had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term _Oberbefehlshaber_ defies literal translation into English: literally the components of the word mean “over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups and armies always had the status and title of _Oberbefehlshaber_. In the Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_, although they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.

The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.

The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place two American officers, selected for ability and experience in interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.

These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (_3702-PS_), who held the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General), the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly, a member of the group. His statement reads:

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.”

“(S) Halder” (_3702-PS_)

A substantially identical statement (_3703-PS_) was made by von Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” (_3702-PS_), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (_3703-PS_)

Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General Staff chart (_Chart Number 7_) accurately portrays the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

Another affidavit by Halder (_3707-PS_) sets forth certain less important matters of detail:

“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.

“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the ‘National Defense’ Section and was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement of 7 November (in the Army: ‘General Staff of the Army’; in the Air Force ‘General Staff of the Air Force’).

“Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not worked out by the ‘Great General Staff’ but by the Naval Staff.”

“(Signed) Franz Halder” (_3707-PS_)

This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning responsibilities.

An affidavit (_3708-PS_) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who had the rank of _Oberst_ (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, furnishes a few details on the _Luftwaffe_:

“_Luftflottenchefs_ have the same status as the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

“They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation ‘_Befehlshaber_’ and from then on that of ‘_Oberbefehlshaber_.’ This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities which they previously had.”

“(Signed) Brauchitsch” (_3708-PS_)

(3) _Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group._ In many respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised, perfected, and refined in detail.

The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch (_3705-PS_):

“STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended by a change which he desired.

“After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details in order to hear their desires and recommendations.

“After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relatively small staff which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who exercised jurisdiction.

“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)

* * * * *

“SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.

“Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.

“During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.

“Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.”

“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)

The _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field, therefore—and in the case of the army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and armies—participated in planning, and directed the execution of the plans. The _Oberbefehlshaber_ were also the repositories of general executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_447-PS_). This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941). Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power (_Vollziehende Gewalt_)”, subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:

“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General-Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief [_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.”

* * * * * *

“The area of operations created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power [_Vollziehende Gewalt_] in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief [_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (_447-PS_)

The official command invitation to participate in consultations at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union, also shows the group at work (_C-78_). This meeting is referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and von Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_) mentioned above. This document, signed by Colonel Schmundt, Chief _Wehrmacht_ Adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941, begins:

“_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa [the code name for the invasion of the U.S.S.R.] by the Commanders of Army Groups and Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.”

This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this conference which closely parallels the structure of the group as set forth in the Indictment. The list includes General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and a member of the group; and General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a member of the group. Then there are three subordinates who were not members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Next is navy Captain Wagner, who was chief of the Operations Staff, Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group. On the air side there were General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group; General Joschonnek, chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants. Passing to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we find that Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel, Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of the group; General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those present were Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval War Staff, and a member of the group; and an assistant who was not a member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all members of the group as _Oberbefehlshaber_, and Keller, a member of the group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen that, except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group, and that in fact the participants in these consultations included the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations against the Soviet Union.

B. _Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group._

The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted (Charter, Article 9). Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter of the total number accused, are members of this group.

In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering. Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with crimes under all counts of the Indictment.

The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are all four in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four counts of the Indictment.

The defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an _Oberstleutnant_ (Lieutenant Colonel) when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately attained the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General). He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the _Wehrmacht_, and continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four counts of the Indictment.

The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, _Grossadmiral_, and in addition to being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. He retired from Supreme Command of the Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.

The last of these five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of _Grossadmiral_. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German government. He is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.

Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a whole. Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in no essential respect from the other 125 odd members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are generally representative of the group, and their expressed ideas and actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members.

It is not, of course, the prosecution’s position, and it is not essential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the members of any other organization or group named in the Indictment), actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the prosecution’s position that the leadership of the group and the purposes to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter. Other members of the group performed such acts. The German Armed Forces were so completely under the group’s control as to make the group responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of the Charter.

(1) _The Planning and Launching of Wars of Aggression._ It is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on such exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and this group are charged with.

This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might for this criminal purpose. They joined knowingly and willfully in initiating and waging aggressive wars. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.

Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on the part of all branches of the Armed Forces and particularly by the high-ranking officers who control such forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparations for and waging of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated therein.

This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain military leaders of Germany, after defeat, to insist that until the troops marched they lived in an ivory tower of military technicalities, unable or unwilling to observe the end to which their work led. The documentary evidence which follows fully refutes any such contentions.

The purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria may be summarized as follows:

(i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of an air force;

(ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering on 10 March 1935;

(iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935, fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000; and

(iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.

These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the impossibility of the Nazis’ achieving these ends without cooperation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.

Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty (_2261-PS_); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland (_C-139_); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2 March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out (_C-159_). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis.

The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937 entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (_C-156_). This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:

“The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”

* * * * * *

“This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its fulfilment.

“The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.” (_C-156_)

Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (_L-172_):

“1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength [_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_ would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two forces.

“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty [_Wehrhoheit_] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.” (_L-172_)

Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as follows:

“A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

“1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

“2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

“3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to one-third of the whole world.

“It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared _economically_ as well as _politically_ and _militarily_ and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff”, contained recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950 (_L-43_). The recommendations are based on certain assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this study (_Chart Number 10_). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven “Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw. (_L-43_)

The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an affidavit (_3704-PS_) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February 1938, is significant:

“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.

“I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.

“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.

“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘Chief of Staff’ under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as _Reichswehrminister_ and _Reichskriegsminister_. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.

“As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his decisions.

“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.” (_3704-PS_)

This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_). Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows:

“* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.

“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.

“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.” (_3706-PS_)

It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution.

It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression.

(_a_) _Austria._ Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret (_386-PS_). The only other participants were the four principal military leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat from the flanks”. (_386-PS_)

The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:

“That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications” (_386-PS_).

In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of Austria (_1780-PS_). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February 1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler:

“_11 February_

“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol”. (_1780-PS_)

Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna:

“_13 February_

“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval”. (_1780-PS_)

These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed by Keitel (_1775-PS_). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

“_a._ through V-men (_V-Maenner_) in Austria, “_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier, “_c._ through travelling agents.”

* * * * * *

“4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in _Wehrkreis VII_ and between Berlin and Munich.

“5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

“6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (_1775-PS_)

As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers and threats of force were very effective in Austria:

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these plans were known as “Case Otto”) in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:

“By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District Leader [_Gauleiter_] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.

‘Prepare case Otto’.” (_1780-PS_)

In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (_C-102_). On the same evening Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12 March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (_C-182_)

The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November 1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary (_386-PS_). In February, Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (_1780-PS_). Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (_1775-PS_). When the actual invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (_L-172_) Jodl explained:

“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’, in its turn, brought with it not only fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive”. (_L-172_)

(_b_) _Czechoslovakia._

The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Case Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and wilful participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff and High Command Group.

The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show, that Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of German aggression (_386-PS_). After the absorption of Austria in March 1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political and military factors was worked out (_388-PS_):

“A. _Political Aspect_

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. _Military Conclusions_

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.

* * * * * *

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”.

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague]. (_388-PS_)

From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and in Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_). These two sources of information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command Group. They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they passed their days mounting mock battles at the _Kriegsakadamie_; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense, on a purely hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were aggressive or not.

If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at diplomatic gatherings.

If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and military support.

No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:

“The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [_die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt_] that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.’ The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.” (_1780-PS_)

But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in the years from 1938 to 1942.

If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a Most Secret directive to Keitel (_388-PS Item 11_) in which he said:

“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.” (_388-PS Item 11_)

Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same day:

“The Fuehrer signs directive ‘Green’, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line”. (_1780-PS_)

The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 14, 16, 17_) and in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) shows how those military preparations went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions, planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) and the later items in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 18 to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54_). The day the Munich Pact was signed, Jodl noted in his diary:

“The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.” (_1780-PS_)

Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich (_388-PS Item 40_; _C-136_; _C-138_). Ultimately the absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats (_2802-PS_). Once again, Jodl in his 1943 lecture (_L-172_) explained clearly why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) already quoted:

“The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”

“A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity.”

“Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to Hitler.”

“Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”

(_c_) _Poland._ The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group.

Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel involving “Fall Weiss” (_C-120_). The series starts with a re-issuance of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces”. This periodically re-issued directive was encountered previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.

In essence these directives are (_a_) statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments, and (_b_) indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April 1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered, was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:

“1. _Political Requirements and Aims._ German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

“The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

“Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.

“The attitudes of the _Baltic States_ will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

“On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

“2. _Military Conclusions._ The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the ‘Western Democracies’. ‘Fall Weiss’ constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.” (_C-120_)

It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game. The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_). At this conference Hitler announced:

“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: _to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity_”. (_L-79_)

Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following were present: Goering (C-in-C _Luftwaffe_); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel (Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch (Inspector General of the _Luftwaffe_); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont (Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the middle of June 1939 (_C-142_), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field commanders-in-chief (the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of Army Groups and Armies) so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in accordance with the general plan:

“The object of the operation is to _destroy the Polish Armed Forces_. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. _The intention of the Army High Command_ is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger, non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.

“The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly.” (_C-142_)

A document of approximately the same date reveals an _Oberbefehlshaber_ at work in the field planning the attack (_2327-PS_). This document, signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the Polish campaign, states in part:

“The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.

“The order of deployment by the High Command, ‘_Fall Weiss_’ authorizes the Third Army Group [in _Fall Weiss_, 8th Army Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for ‘_Fall Weiss_’.”

* * * * * *

“The whole correspondence on ‘_Fall Weiss_’ has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret [_Chefsache_]. This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every way—even in connection with other documents.

“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July.

“I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information.

“The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command

“(signed) F. Blaskowitz.”

“_Aims of Operation ‘Fall Weiss’_

“1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.

“Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (_2327-PS_)

Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the _Oberbefehlshaber_ assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (_798-PS_). This speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_), was addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General Staff and High Command Group.

(_d_) _The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece._ On 1 September 1939 Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German losses were insignificant.

The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) affidavits had all been solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France and England.

Then came the three years of the war—1939, 1940, 1941—when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east. Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union—all this territory was invaded and overrun.

In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.

Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a “Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West.” (_L-52_). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent extracts:

“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power, which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace-treaty.

“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.

“As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”

* * * * * *

“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops.

“The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.

“The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”

* * * * * *

“_Belgium and Holland_—Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany.

“_The Nordic States_—Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of _Oberbefehlshaber_ again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs (_789-PS_):

“For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation.”

* * * * * *

“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”

* * * * * *

“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant”. (_789-PS_)

Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly—the winter of “phony war”. The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.

“Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.” (_789-PS_)

That is what Hitler told the _Oberbefehlshaber_. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.

The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is utterly without foundation.

Hitler’s utterances in October (_L-79_) and November (_789-PS_) 1939 are full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9 October 1939 (_L-52_) to the four service chiefs affirmatively indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:

“_The Northern States_—Providing no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (_C-122_). Raeder was stimulated to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany (_C-66_). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940 to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)

Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939, replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there (_C-5_). Raeder’s visit to Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as follows (_L-323_):

“_Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff) on ‘Weseruebung’._ 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare. The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.

“12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.

“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With reference to this essay, _Kapitan zur see_ Krancke is working on ‘_Weseruebung_’, and OKW.

“During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup, and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on political developments in Norway and military questions. In general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the organization. The support which had been promised him in the form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the coup [_Aktion_] so urgent that the expansion of his organization could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the OKW.” (_L-323_)

On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (_C-64_). In the meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling (_C-65_). As result of all this, on Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940. The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name “_Weseruebung_.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive was initialled by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no qualms.

As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (_L-79_), when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the possibility of war with England said:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored”. (_L-79_)

And in the speech to the _Oberbefehlshaber_ in November 1939 (_789-PS_), after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack France and England by first invading the Low Countries. “No one will question that when we have won,” he said.

Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940 (_1809-PS_) contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. These entries show that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun these neutral countries.

On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare”. On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H (Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (_1809-PS_). The German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism and naivete.

In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel (_1809-PS_). On 21 February Hitler put General von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an _Oberbefehlshaber_ and a member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (_1809-PS_). On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days thereafter.

France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of Britain (“Operation _Seeloewe_”) never came to pass. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d’etat of 26 March 1940 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated in _444-PS_; _1541-PS_; _C-167_; _1746-PS_. The decisions were made, and the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (_R-95_):

“1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

“_The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible_ * * *”

* * * * * *

“5. _Timetable for the operations._ a. On 5th April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (_R-95_)

(_e_) _The Soviet Union._ It is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944 (_C-66_):

“1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his ‘unalterable decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the ‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.”

* * * * * *

“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical.” (_C-66_)

But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (_3704-PS_) says; that some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have already been cited. (_446-PS_; _C-35_; _872-PS_; _C-78_; _447-PS_)

(_f_) _Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility for Aggression._ The nature of the accusation against this Group for plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make military plans and command troops.

It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches. Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of Treaties.

The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.

There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group, and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.

In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.

Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for “_Weseruebung_” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the final planning and reporting conference for “_Barbarossa_,” 17 additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.

It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war, mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the actual onslaught.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.

The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.

The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization, but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders of a nation.

Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”

(2) _War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity._ It is proposed to show that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility for war crimes committed by them.

It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.

It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known by such respectable-sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and “elimination of insecure elements.”

(_a_) _Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military Missions._ This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942 (_498-PS_). The order began with a recital that allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos. This order reads as follows:

“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

“2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

“3. I therefore order: From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

“6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

“(S) Adolf Hitler” (_498-PS_).

This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands. (_498-PS_)

On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (_503-PS_) for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order. In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this explanation:

“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

“_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands._

“_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus._

“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

“By order of “Jodl”

* * * * * *

“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.”

* * * * * *

“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the _Luftwaffe_ of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.

“England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.

“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

“These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

“(signed) A. Hitler” (_503-PS_).

Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War Staff (_C-179_) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order:

“Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.

“(s) Wagner” (_C-179_).

* * * * *

“_Note for Distribution_:

“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After notification, those copies distributed over and above the Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must be withdrawn and destroyed.” (_C-179_)

On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942 (_C-178_). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court martial penalties:

“From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February 1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to figure _6_ of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 26 367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

“The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein:

“1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East _and_ West may have portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

“2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even _after_ they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy ‘Commando Operations’ would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered.” (_C-178_)

The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The proof is contained in the following document (_508-PS_):

“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November 20:

“a. No firing on the part of German defense.

“b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.”

* * * * * *

“On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely, the others slightly wounded.

“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”

* * * * * *

“Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers.”

* * * * * *

“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (_508-PS_)

In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway (_512-PS_). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them. This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s supplementary order (_503-PS_), and is obviously in flat contradiction of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for this procedure is explained as follows:

“_TOP SECRET_—According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA) last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short interrogation).” (_512-PS_)

Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (_526-PS_): On 30 March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced only that the unit was destroyed:

“On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.

“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.”

* * * * * *

“_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.

“_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

“Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

“_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:

“In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.” (_526-PS_)

Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (_509-PS_) from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1943, shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara, Italy, were given “special treatment” (_Sonderbehandelt_), which, as previous evidence has shown, (_3040-PS_) means death. What happened to the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital is not known. (_509-PS_)

An affidavit (_2610-PS_) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit states:

“FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

“I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

“I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’ This Military Commission consisting of five officers was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No. 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945 and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as follows:

“‘Charge: Violation of the law of war.’

“‘Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *’.”

* * * * * *

“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler order.

“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12 October 1945:

“‘_FINDINGS_: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is my duty to inform you that the commission in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge: “‘GUILTY’. “‘SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring, sentences you: “‘TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY’.” (_2610-PS_)

The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed by Warlimont (_506-PS_) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person:

“WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge [_Heeresgruppenrichter_] with the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.” (_506-PS_)

The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (_531-PS_) dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:

“Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:

“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat operations, etc.’ is to be extended.

“The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_ penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution.” (_531-PS_)

Warlimont’s memorandum (_531-PS_) continues by reciting the position taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:

“_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff_:

“1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.

“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.

“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando order is to be applied or not.

“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.” (_531-PS_)

On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message (_551-PS_) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:

“_Subject_: Treatment of Commando Participants.

“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.

“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct. 1942, remain exempted.

“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

“3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it.

“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.”

“[Initial] W [Warlimont] “[signature] Keitel (_551-PS_).

In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont (_1279-PS_) embodies the discussions which were had at that time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually resulted from these discussions (_537-PS_), dated 30 July 1944 and signed by Keitel, provides:

“_Re: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions,’ captured together with partisans._

“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order re the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g. Kdos).

“This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being made record.

“The Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_

“Keitel” (_537-PS_)

Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (_L-51_) signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the executions took place, reads in part:

“Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January 1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot according to martial law and T/Sgt [_Oberscharfuehrer_] Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945, a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt. [_Obersturmfuehrer_] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt. [_Untersturmfuehrer_] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in written form to the various sections and supervised the compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution orders.” (_L-51_)

The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942, and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that these orders were carried out in numerous instances.

(_b_) _War Crimes on the Eastern Front._ The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare.

On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with anti-partisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal policies and activities.

It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_C-50_) provided:

“_Order_

“_Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE IN THE AREA ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures._

“The application of martial law aims in the first place at _maintaining discipline_.

“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

“This is possible only if _the troops_ take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration).

“I. _Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians._

“1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts-martial will not be competent for _crimes committed by enemy civilians_.

“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, _persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer_. _This officer will decide whether they are to be shot._

“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, _collective despotic measures_ will be taken without delay against _localities_ from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

“5. It is _expressly forbidden_ to _keep_ suspects _in custody_ in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

“6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce _military jurisdiction for civilians_, in areas which are sufficiently settled.

“For the _area of the_ ‘_Political Administration_’ this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

“II. _Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees._

“1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees _prosecution is not obligatory_ even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.

“2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

“3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether _legal measures_ are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a _court martial_ only if _maintenance of discipline_ or _security of the Forces_ call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.

“_The order to institute proceedings_ requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

“4. _Extreme caution_ is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

“III. _Responsibility of the Military Commanders._

“Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are _personally_ responsible for seeing that:

“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.

“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of _verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs_.

“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

“IV. _Security._

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as “Most Secret”:

“By order “Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces “(signed) Keitel” (_C-50_)

Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated 16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed (_C-148_). This order was of general application in all theaters of war, but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:

“_Subject_: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.

“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

“It can be seen that this is a _mass movement centrally directed by Moscow_, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.

“In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that _nationalist and other circles_ will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.

“This creates an increasing _danger to the German war effort_, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.

“2. _The measures taken up to now_ to deal with general insurrection movement _have proved inadequate_. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action _everywhere with the most drastic means_ in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.

“Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.

“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following _general directions_:

“_a._ It should be inferred, in _every case_ of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of _Communist origin_.

“_b._ In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on _the first indication_, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.

“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.”

* * * * * *

“4. _The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories_ are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection.”

“[Indecipherable initial] “Keitel” (_C-148_)

The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941 a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the Commander-in-Chief (_Oberbefehlshaber_) of the German 8th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front (_UK-81_). Reichenau (who died in 1942) was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:

“Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

“Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a ‘wait and see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.

“The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:

“1. _Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces._

“2. _The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia._

“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

“Commander-in-Chief “(Signed) von Reichenau “Field Marshal.” (_UK-81_)

Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28 October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (_UK-81_)

These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the _Wehrmacht_ joined in the monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known as _Einsatzgruppen_) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian population.

In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of villages (_3012-PS_). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,

“as a rule no more children will be shot” (_3012-PS_).

A report covering the work of the _Einsatzgruppen_ in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941 disregards every vestige of decency (_R-102_). It states cynically that, in the Baltic areas,

“spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination” (_R-102_).

This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just as much as “_Weserubung_” was a code word for the invasion and subjugation of Norway and Denmark.

Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (_1061-PS_) stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army:

“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the _Waffen SS_, Police and _Wehrmacht_ became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)

To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk (_R-135_). This report describes an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000 suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt:

“The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492 rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy dead. The battalion _Direwanger_ is particularly known to have destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.

“Units of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_] also took part in the action, by order of SS Lt. General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] von dem Bach. SA Colonel [_Standartenfuehrer_] Kunze led the troops [Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.

“Of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_], one railroad employee had been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of this large scale action on the peaceful population had been disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and the Police in December. The population of Begomie was predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German Air Attacks during the fighting.” (_R-135_)

The _SS Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach referred to in this quotation is mentioned in Himmler’s speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 (_1919-PS_). In this speech Himmler announced the appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units:

“In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the Anti-partisan Units” [_Bandenkampf-Verbunde_]. Our comrade _SS-Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

“It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group—if you wish to call it that.” _(1919-PS_)

The report of _Einsatzgruppe A_, (_L-180_) covering the period up to 15 October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies:

“Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions.”

* * * * * *

“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period.”

* * * * * *

“After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”

* * * * * *

“1. _Instigation of self-cleansing actions._

“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i.e., the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.

“In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.

“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in _Latvia_. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.”

* * * * * *

“5. _Other jobs of the Security Police._

“1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore

in Aglona (Lithouania) 544 lunatics in Mariampol (Lithouania) 109 lunatics and in Magutowo (near Luga) 95 lunatics

were liquidated.”

* * * * * *

“When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4.”

* * * * * *

“Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.” (_L-180_).

Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the _Wehrmacht_ and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents quoted above. An affidavit (_3710-PS_) by Walter Schellenberg who, at the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA, states:

“In the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.

“The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer’s command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.

“The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:

“1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;

“2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under command and functional control of the RSHA;

“3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;

“4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich.

“The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.

“The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.

“This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either ‘acting for’ or ‘by order of’ the OKH.

“After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer’s command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.

“Today I read the ‘Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941),’ as well as the ‘Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.’ The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited ‘Comprehensive Report,’ which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective _Oberbefehlshabers_ with Combat Group A was ‘in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial’ (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title ‘Summary of the Number of Executed Persons,’ particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.

“In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.

“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer’s command ‘to smash utterly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible,’ including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreement.”

“(signed) Walter Schellenberg “26. XI. 45” (_3710-PS_)

Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the _Wehrmacht_ and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan warfare (_3711-PS_) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:

“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.

“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer’s headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.

“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to handle this matter.

“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with _Wehrmacht_ troops in Russian as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German _Wehrmacht_. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.

“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.

“I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”

“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt “Retired Captain of the Reserve” (_3711-PS_)

The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (_3713-PS_; _3714-PS_). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:

“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.

“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.

“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans.” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s second statement reads:

“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare:

“As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.

“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

“(signed) Roettiger” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s third statement reads:

“During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.

“(Signed) Roettiger” (_3714-PS_)

An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany (_1786-PS_). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories:

“The General Quartermaster [_General Quartiermeister_] together with the Economic Staff (East) [_Wirtschaftsstab Ost_] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to ‘training centres in their own area,’ and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.

“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff [_Wehrmachtfuehrungstab_] this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the ‘peaceful population’ which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [_Wehrmacht_] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces [_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader [_Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer_] and orders that the difference between ‘punitive work’ and ‘work in Germany’ is to be made clear to the population.” (_1786-PS_)

A final group of four affidavits show that the SD _Einsatzgruppen_ on the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary support of the _Wehrmacht_, and that the nature of their activities were fully known to the _Wehrmacht_. The first of these is a statement (_3715-PS_) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor of the Police, and was head of Himmler’s personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:

STATEMENT

“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.

“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Himmler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3715-PS_)

Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:

“As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were _completely subordinate_ to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called ‘purifications,’ is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3716-PS_)

In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division, the following statement is made:

“At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.

“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin “Colonel” (_3718-PS_)

Finally an affidavit (_3717-PS_) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:

“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.

“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.

“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.

“During anti-partisan operations _within_ operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

“(Signed) Heusinger “Generalleutnant.” (_3717-PS_)

(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the same effect as his affidavit _3712-PS_.)

(_c_) _Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment._ The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take “ruthless action”, left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military standpoint.

Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take “revenge on sub-human Jewry” and that they were not merely soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities”. The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the _Einsatzgruppen_, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The _Einsatzgruppen_ were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.

The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.

C. _Conclusion._

The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written (“The Time for Decision”, 1944, pp. 261-262) that:

“* * * the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff.

“It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff.”

* * * * * *

“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future.”

The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired”, Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.

It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.

No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot.

In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.

Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 72 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting │ │ │ the Laws and Customs of War on Land,│ │ │ Annex, Articles 4, 23. │ VI │590, 594 3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │ │ treatment of Prisoners of War, │ │ │ Articles 2,3. │ VI │ 600 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │ │1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280 │ │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │ │the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │ │November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │ │adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │ │November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │ │Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │ │Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │ │November 1940, concerning plans for │ │ │prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │ │Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │ │116) │ III │ 403 │ │ │ *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │ │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │ │1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │ │Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 │ │ │ 447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │ │1941, concerning Directives for │ │ │special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409 │ │ │ *498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │ │of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │ │501) │ III │ 416 │ │ │ *503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │ │1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │ │of his commando order of the day │ │ │before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426 │ │ │ *506-PS │Draft of top secret letter, 22 June │ │ │1944, initialled by Warlimont, │ │ │concerning enemy agents. (USA 549) │ III │ 430 │ │ │ *508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │ │about shooting of British glider │ │ │troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430 │ │ │ *509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │ │reporting “special treatment” for │ │ │three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ *512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │ │Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │ │interrogation of saboteurs before │ │ │shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │ │OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433 │ │ │ *526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │ │concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │ │in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434 │ │ │ *531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │ │inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │ │about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │ │550) │ III │ 435 │ │ │ *537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of members of │ │ │foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │ │together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439 │ │ │ 551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Commando │ │ │participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440 │ │ │ *728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │ │Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │ │June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │ │enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526 │ │ │ 729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │ │June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │ │enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529 │ │ │ 730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │ │attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │ │1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 530 │ │ │ 731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │ │concerning measures to be taken │ │ │against Anglo-American air crews in │ │ │special instances. │ III │ 531 │ │ │ 732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │ │1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │ │terror aviators. │ III │ 532 │ │ │ 733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of terror │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 533 │ │ │ *735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │ │fix the cases in which the application│ │ │of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │ │would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533 │ │ │ 737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │ │aviators. │ III │ 536 │ │ │ *740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │ │aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537 │ │ │ 741-PS │Secret memorandum, 5 July 1944, │ │ │concerning terror aviators. │ III │ 538 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │ │22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ *872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │ │Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │ │“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │ │(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626 │ │ │ *1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │ │Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │ │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │ │(USA 275) │ III │ 718 │ │ │ *1279-PS │Minutes of meeting concerning │ │ │treatment of members of foreign │ │ │“Military Missions” captured with │ │ │partisan groups and draft of order, 7 │ │ │July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA │ │ │552) │ III │ 857 │ │ │ *1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │ │December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │ │Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │ │speech by Hitler to German High │ │ │Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │ │March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │ │Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ *1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │ │February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ 1786-PS │Excerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary │ │ │of the Deputy Chief of the Armed │ │ │Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561) │ IV │ 369 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │ │1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │ │The Jewish Question, under the │ │ │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │ │12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425 │ │ │ *1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │ │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │ │170) │ IV │ 558 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │ │Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │ │copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │ │1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │ │Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │ │for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June │ │ │1939, concerning operation “Fall │ │ │Weiss”. (USA 539) │ IV │ 1035 │ │ │ *2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │ │August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23 │ │ │ *2610-PS │Affidavit of Frederick W. Roche, │ │ │Major, U. S. Army, 7 November 1945. │ │ │(USA 548) │ V │ 330 │ │ │ *2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ │conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │ │Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │ │Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443 │ │ │ *3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │ │1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │ │Service, and record of telephone │ │ │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │ │1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731 │ │ │ 3040-PS │Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 │ │ │February 1942, concerning commitment │ │ │of manpower from the East. (USA 207) │ V │ 744 │ │ │ *3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411 │ │ │ *3703-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │ │Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │ │532) │ VI │ 413 │ │ │ *3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │ │Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414 │ │ │ *3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │ │Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │ │535) │ VI │ 415 │ │ │ *3706-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Johannes │ │ │Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA │ │ │537) │ VI │ 417 │ │ │ *3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │ │Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419 │ │ │ *3708-PS │Affidavit of Colonel Bernd von │ │ │Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA │ │ │534) │ VI │ 419 │ │ │ *3710-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 557) │ VI │ 420 │ │ │ *3711-PS │Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, │ │ │26 November 1945. (USA 558) │ VI │ 424 │ │ │ 3712-PS │Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 │ │ │November 1945. │ VI │ 425 │ │ │ *3713-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 8 │ │ │December 1945. (USA 559) │ VI │ 429 │ │ │ 3714-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 28 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 560) │ VI │ 430 │ │ │ *3715-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 562) │ VI │ 431 │ │ │ *3716-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 563) │ VI │ 433 │ │ │ *3717-PS │Affidavit of General Heusinger, 1 │ │ │December 1945. (USA 564) │ VI │ 434 │ │ │ *3718-PS │Affidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 │ │ │December 1945. (USA 565) │ VI │ 435 │ │ │ *3739-PS │Memo on General Staff and High Command│ │ │and affidavit thereto. (USA 778) │ VI │ 624 │ │ │ *3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ │819) │ VI │ 787 │ │ │ *C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │ │Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │ │concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815 │ │ │ *C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │ │Navy files containing notes year by │ │ │year from 1927 to 1940 on │ │ │reconstruction of the German Navy, and│ │ │dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, │ │ │September 1938. (USA 49) │ VI │ 827 │ │ │ *C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January │ │ │1941, p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852 │ │ │ *C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │ │1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │ │treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │ │offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │ │GB 162) │ VI │ 871 │ │ │ *C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │ │87) │ VI │ 883 │ │ │ C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │ │(GB 86) │ VI │ 884 │ │ │ *C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder │ │ │concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885 │ │ │ *C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │ │January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │ │and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887 │ │ │ *C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │ │convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │ │14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909 │ │ │ *C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │ │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │ │74) │ VI │ 911 │ │ │ *C-102 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │ │for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │ │Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916 │ │ │ *C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │ │Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │ │October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928 │ │ │ *C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │ │Weiss” and directions for secret │ │ │mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932 │ │ │ *C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │ │October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │ │initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947 │ │ │ *C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │ │by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │ │OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950 │ │ │ *C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │ │signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │ │53) │ VI │ 951 │ │ │ *C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and│ │ │Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA │ │ │538) │ VI │ 956 │ │ │ *C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │ │subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961 │ │ │ C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership │ │ │of Government of Reich, from “Fight of│ │ │the Navy against Versailles │ │ │1919-1935”. (USA 41) │ VI │ 970 │ │ │ *C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed │ │ │by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974 │ │ │ *C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │ │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977 │ │ │ *C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003 │ │ │ *C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │ │saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012 │ │ │ *C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │ │1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │ │and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014 │ │ │ *C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │ │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017 │ │ │ *D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │ │against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023 │ │ │ *D-411 │Letters of 26 and 28 November 1941, │ │ │enclosing orders concerning protection│ │ │of troops against Partisans and │ │ │sabotage. (USA 556) │ VII │ 49 │ │ │ *D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │ │SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │ │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │ │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │ │1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │ │relative to procedure in cases of │ │ │unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │ │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74 │ │ │ D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177 │ │ │ *D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183 │ │ │ *D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │ │concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │ │and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │ │Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221 │ │ │ *D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │ │regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │ │non-German civilians in Occupied │ │ │Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222 │ │ │ *D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │ │concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │ │and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │ │Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │ │thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223 │ │ │ *D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │ │regarding offenses by non-German │ │ │civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │ │302) │ VII │ 225 │ │ │ *D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │ │regarding offenses by non-German │ │ │civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │ │301) │ VII │ 226 │ │ │ *D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │ │offenses by non-German civilians in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228 │ │ │ *D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │ │21 September 1940, relative to │ │ │application of capital punishment in │ │ │connection with Railway strike in │ │ │Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229 │ │ │ D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │ │offenses of non-German civilians in │ │ │Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229 │ │ │ *D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │ │Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers, 14 June 1944. (GB │ │ │307) │ VII │ 231 │ │ │ *D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232 │ │ │ *D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │ │June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │ │Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233 │ │ │ *D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234 │ │ │ *D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │ │treatment of Anglo-American │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarschall to Chief │ │ │of OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │ │Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │ │June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236 │ │ │ *D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │ │Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │ │315) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ *D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │ │June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │ │“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │ │signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │ │concerning treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │ │“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241 │ │ │ *D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │ │(GB 319) │ VII │ 242 │ │ │ *L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”,│ │ │2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. │ │ │10.) │ VII │ 788 │ │ │ *L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │ │1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798 │ │ │ *L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │ │of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │ │(USA 540) │ VII │ 800 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ L-166 │Minutes of conference on Fighter │ │ │Aircraft with Reichsmarshal on 15 and │ │ │16 May 1944. │ VII │ 911 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │ │Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │ │lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │ │November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │ │Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920 │ │ │ L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │ │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │ │A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978 │ │ │ *L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │ │operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106 │ │ │ *R-95 │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, │ │ │30 March 1941, concerning deployment │ │ │instructions for “Action 25” and │ │ │supplementary instruction for action │ │ │“Marita”. (GB 127) │ VIII │ 70 │ │ │ *R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │ │Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │ │October 1941, (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96 │ │ │ R-118 │Drafts of letters and memoranda of │ │ │General Staff of Armed Forces │ │ │concerning treatment of enemy fliers. │ VIII │ 127 │ │ │ *R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ │reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │ │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 │ │ │ *TC-54-B │Von Brauchitsch appeal to the people │ │ │of Danzig, from Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Part VII, p. 596. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 410 │ │ │ *UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │ │of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │ │reprisals for partisan activity in │ │ │Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572 │ │ │ UK-81 │Letters of 26 November and 28 October │ │ │1941, with enclosed orders on │ │ │protection of troops against Partisans│ │ │and Sabotage and conduct of troops in │ │ │Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 582 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │ │December 1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │ │November 1945, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596 │ │ │ Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │ │January 1946, substantially the same │ │ │as his testimony on direct examination│ │ │before the International Military │ │ │Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622 │ │ │ Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November│ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 643 │ │ │ Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │ │January 1946. │ VIII │ 647 │ │ │ Affidavit J │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January │ │ │1946. │ VIII │ 653 │ │ │ Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │ │Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,│ │ │by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │ │September 1945. │ VIII │ 669 │ │ │ Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │ │of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │ │Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672 │ │ │ Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │ │Armed Forces During the War and in │ │ │Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │ │Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │ │1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776 │ │ │ *Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion│ │ │1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779