Part 3, which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,

declares:

“The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.” (_C-175_)

The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England and Poland and France, and were prepared to do so. On 5 November 1937, Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellery, the minutes of which, referred to as the Hossbach notes, contain the remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland, and France:

“The Fuehrer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space’.” (_386-PS_)

Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as “participation in world economy”, and declared:

“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of nations.” (_386-PS_)

* * * * * *

“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor.” (_386-PS_)

On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the Reichschancellery was taking place, a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish ambassador’s audience with Hitler (_TC-73 No. 33_). In the course of this conversation, the communique stated:

“It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig question.” (_TC-73 No. 33_)

On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document is headed, “Very Confidential—Personal Only”, and is entitled “Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.” It states in part:

“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following:

“Change of the status quo in the east in the German sense can only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that England, which so to speak has, taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate.

“This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe:”

The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong partnership between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a summary:

“Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends.

“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly.

“Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy.

“The particular question whether in the event of a war by Germany in central Europe France and thereby England would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here.” (_TC-75_)

Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, “I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally.” (_TC-75_)

On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that speech he said:

“In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the state with which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has there been a ‘detente,’ but in the course of the years there has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to an understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.

“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us—peace.” (_2357-PS_)

A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, “Organizational Study 1950,” originated in the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force. Its purpose was said to be: “The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force.” (_L-43_). The result gained is termed, “Distant Objective.” From this is deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the process, which is called, “Final Objective 1942.” This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc. (_L-43_)

The Table of Contents is divided into various sections. Section I is entitled, “Assumptions.” In connection with the heading “Assumption I, frontier of Germany”, a map is enclosed (_Chart No. 10_). The map shows that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the boundaries of the Reich.

The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum:

“Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:

“1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia.” (_L-43_)

The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four _Geschwader_ employed against England, very much concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full use of their range, they can reach all English territory down to the last corner. Under the paragraph “Assumption” double heading 2, the “Organization of Air Force in peacetime” is shown and seven group commands are indicated: (1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) Munich; (4) Vienna; (5) Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. (_L-43_)

Finally, the study declares:

“The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands * * *” (_L-43_)

The original of this document is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the German Air Force, and the inferences that can be drawn from it should therefore not be over-emphasized. At least, however, it shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time.

On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to him as “The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary.” The document reads as follows:

“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of territory.

“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments.

“For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.

“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact [is] that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.

“But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of ‘the right to autonomy’ and ‘Racial unity’. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to.” (_TC-76_)

That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On 26 September he said:

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe.” (_TC-29_)

A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September, with no precise date, and entitled “Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England’,” stated as follows:

“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”

* * * * * *

“If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power who needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and intended. As a result, the conspirators were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now that they intended and had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland.

It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his military commanders at a later date, that, in his own words, from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March. Immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi excuse or justification for their attack on that country.

The earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the question of Danzig, which commenced almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. A document taken from the Official Polish White Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October, where Ribbentrop had discussions with M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany. The report states:

“In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (_Gesamtloesung_) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”

* * * * * *

“Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.” (_TC-73 No. 44_)

It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for attacking Poland.

Another document taken from the Polish White Book (_TC-73 No. 45_) sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German government in reply to the suggestions put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part reviews the history of Polish-German relationship and emphasizes the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig. Paragraph 6 of the document states:

“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the statute, and continues as follows:

“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich, the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.

“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from the German point of view. The Nazis had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish government had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what the German government had hoped for. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished.

Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the Polish government had offered to enter into discussions with the German government, another top secret order was issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by Keitel (_C-137_). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. The order is headed “First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 October 1938,” and reads:

“The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.

“The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition is _quasi-revolutionary_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, _not a war against Poland_.” (_C-137_)

The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and therefore the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with Poland. But Keitel’s order shows how the German government answered the Polish proposal to enter into discussions.

On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. (_TC-73 No. 48_). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offered to answer any questions. He said he had always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discussed the question of Danzig and emphasized that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. The conversation continued:

“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.

“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term ‘_Korperschaft_,’ which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government.” (_TC-73 No. 48_)

It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed (_C-137_) orders had already been issued for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some six weeks later Hitler assured the Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be quite at his ease.

On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as follows:

“Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.”

* * * * * *

“In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned.” (_TC-73 No. 49_)

Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which the following is a pertinent extract:

“In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations.” (_2530-PS_)

Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave further assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (_TC-73 No. 57_)

In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German position against Poland. Within a week of the completion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia heat was beginning to be applied on Poland.

On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw Ribbentrop. The nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden:

“I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.

“He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students’ demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”

* * * * * *

“Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other.”

* * * * * *

“I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.

“Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.

“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.

“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

“Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution.” (_TC-73 No. 61_)

That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon learned what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched in.

As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments:

“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty’s government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to this effect.

“I may add that the French government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty’s Government.” (_TC-72 No. 17_)

On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (_TC-72 No. 18_)

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The subject is “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.” The order reads:

“Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.

“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

“Part II ‘_Fall Weiss_’ [the code name for the operation against Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later.

“The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to ‘_Fall Weiss_’:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for ‘_Fall Weiss_’ and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the armed forces.

“3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of May, 1939.” (C-120)

This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW.

Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It reads:

“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war.

“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks.

“II. ‘_Fall Weiss_’.

“III. The annexation of Danzig.

“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.” (_C-120_)

Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, declares:

“* * * Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime.” (_C-120_)

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.

On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent passages from that memorandum:

“The German government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish government and the British government a temporary understanding to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened.” (_TC-72 No. 14_)

The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues:

“* * * The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish government with the British government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.

“Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.

“From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration.”

* * * * * *

“The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government. In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude that the Polish government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government. The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations.” (_TC-72 No. 14_)

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year guarantee, and continues:

“The Polish government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish government even rejected German proposals made with this object.

“At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void.” (_TC-72 No. 14_)

In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his offer. He expressed his disappointment:

“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance. * * *” (_TC-72 No. 13_)

The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well have had a copy of the orders for “_Fall Weiss_” in his pocket as he spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of “the International Press.”

In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish position is summarized in one sentence:

“It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland” (_TC-72 No. 16_).

The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. (_TC-72 No. 16_)

The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (_C-120_). Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently were enclosed “Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy.” Not only were military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.

This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The report of this meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (_L-79_). In his address to the conference Hitler cried out for _lebensraum_ and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.

Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present. The following is a significant paragraph:

“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England.” (_L-79_)

So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France.

C. _Final Preparations: June-September 1939_

(1) _Final Preparations of the Armed Forces._ A precise timetable for the attack had been called for. On 22 June 1939 it was ready. It provided as follows:

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a ‘preliminary timetable’ for ‘_Fall Weiss_’ based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this timetable.

“The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:—

“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers.

“It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.” (_C-126_)

All this became relevant later, when the German government made allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. This order shows that in June the Germans were mobilizing, only doing so secretly. The order continues:

“For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.” (_C-126_)

The order is signed by Keitel.

A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that order, reads in part:

“Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out ‘_Fall Weiss_’ remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats [Doenitz] is handing in his Operation Orders by 12 August.” (_C-126_)

Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig. It provides:

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.” (_C-30_)

The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant in the subsequent discussion of the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was making specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken, and that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.

The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister, and published in the British Blue Book, show the kind of thing that was happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows:

“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig _Heimwehr_.

“All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and ‘_verboten_’ notices.

“The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’

“Master of British steamer ‘High Commissioner Wood’ whilst he was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin.” (_TC-71_).

And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July states:

“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire.” (_TC-71_).

On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler’s speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese.” (_L-79_). Now, when the preparations were complete, Hitler disclosed his intentions to his Italian comrades in the hope that they would join him. Ciano was surprised at Hitler’s attempt to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He therefore tried to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce could have a little more time to prepare himself. (_TC-77_)

The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, if not at the same time as Poland. In trying to show the strength of Germany and its certainty of winning the war as a means of persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler declared:

“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colors. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country.

“With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect.

“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and, as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.

“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”

* * * * * *

“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions.” (_TC-77_)

Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons—the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland. The minutes of the Italo-German meeting continue:

“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awakening sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.

“Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer’s statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time.

“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.” (_TC-77_)

Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. He argued further:

“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany.” (_TC-77_)

The Fuehrer’s answer was clear:

“The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.” (_TC-77_)

The Germans could not possibly bombard or destroy any place such as Danzig where there happened to be Germans living. The discussion continued:

“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer’s view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano’s as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed to advance to Berlin.” (_TC-77_)

The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following day:

“The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so.”

* * * * * *

“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through lack of space; not only was there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.

“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them.

“Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years she would be incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the West could be settled.

“Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. He—Ciano—quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following question:

“The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic conditions.

“The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October. These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August.

“Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.” (_TC-77_)

(2) _Economic Preparations._ If the military preparations were throughout this period nearing their completion, at the same time the economists had not been idle. A letter dated 25 August 1939, from Funk to the Feuhrer, reads:

“My Fuehrer!

“I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of these days.

“The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to you with all respect that I have succeeded by means of precautions taken during the last few months, in making the Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so unassailable, that even the most serious shocks in the international money and credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime I have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of the Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad which it was possible to lay hands on. Under the proposals I have prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy, without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the General Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed by you to make this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuehrer.

“Heil my Fuehrer /signed/ Walter Funk.” (_699-PS_)

It is difficult in view of that letter to see how Funk can claim that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German government to wage war.

(3) _The Obersalzburg Speech._ On 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed his commanders in chief at Obersalzburg. (_1014-PS_). At this date preparations were complete. In the course of his speech Hitler declared:

“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.”

* * * * * *

“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective.”

* * * * * *

“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war—never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.”

* * * * * *

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East.” (_1014-PS_)

These passages emphasize the intention of the Nazi government not only to conquer Poland but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.

In another significant passage, Hitler stated:

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some _Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation.

“The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”

* * * * * *

“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_)

(4) _Diplomatic Preparations: Provoking the Crisis._ On 23 August 1939, the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free City. (_TC-72 No. 62_). That event was, of course, aimed at stirring up feeling in the Free City at that time.

At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The affidavit of General Lahousen (_Affidavit A_) refers to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS Forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about on the German side of the frontier. Three short reports found in the British Blue Book corroborate this affidavit. They are reports from the British ambassador in Warsaw.

The first of them is dated 26 August, and reads:

“Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German frontier.

“Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

“_Gazeta Polska_, in inspired leader, today says these are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.

“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side. This was best answer to ravings of German press.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.” (_TC-72 No. 53_)

The next report is dated the same date, 26 August and reads:

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is without any foundation whatever.” (_TC-72 No. 54_)

The report of the next day, 27 August, reads as follows:

“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, if not complete falsification.

“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain, the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods regarding Czechoslovakia last year.

“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March [when the rest of Czechoslovakia was seized] exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent aggression in Poland.

“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter objects.

“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr Hitler.

“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more than 10 per cent of population in any commune.

“8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of destroying Polish independence.

“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove that Herr Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.” (_TC-72 No. 55_)

Further corroboration of General Lahousen’s affidavit is contained in a memorandum of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. That conversation with Keitel took place on 17 August, and went as follows:

“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action would be executed only by the Army.” (_795-PS_)

That was the position at the end of the third week in August 1939. On 22 August the Russian-German Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. The orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of 25 of August.

(5) _Pleas for peace._ On the same date, 22 August, news reached England that the German-Russian agreement was being signed. The significance of that pact from a military point of view as to Germany was obvious, and the British government immediately made their position clear in one last hope, that the German government might possibly think better. The Prime Minister wrote to Hitler as follows:

“Your Excellency.

“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.

“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can not alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill.

“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

“If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

The Prime Minister therefore urged the German government to try to solve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force. He suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two governments, Polish and German, might take place. Prime Minister Chamberlain concluded:

“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

On the following day, 23 August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister Chamberlain. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought England’s friendship, and went on to say that Germany, “like every other State, possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce.” The letter continued as follows:

“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

“The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland.

“The atrocities which then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation.”

* * * * * *

“Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the Germans.”

* * * * * *

“The German Reich government has received information to the effect that the British government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England, or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France, it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces.”

* * * * * *

“The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I.” (_TC-72 No. 60_).

On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was signed in London. Each government undertook to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. (_TC-73 No. 91_)

A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier addressed a letter to Hitler, which reads as follows:

“The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication * * *.

“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of the governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands.

“You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests, as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor, than I credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.

“These two convictions are fully compatible.

“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over, the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution.

“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.

“In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high-minded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French government, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

“If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be—destruction and barbarity.” (_TC-78_)

On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier’s letter of 26 August. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter which he had received from him earlier in the week. (_TC-79_)

After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German Government could no longer be in any doubt as to the position of both the British and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland. But the pleas for peace did not end there. On 24 August President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic (_TC-72 No. 124_). His letter stated in part:

“In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed.

“To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.

“I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Government of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods:

“First, by direct negotiation;

“Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or

“Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation.” (_TC-72 No. 124_).

Hitler’s answer to that letter was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning. The reply to Mr. Roosevelt’s letter from the President of the Polish Republic, however, was an acceptance of the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. (_TC-72 No. 126_)

On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:

“I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night.”

The Polish reply is then set out.

“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

“Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept.” (_TC-72 No. 127_)

But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it pay heed to the Pope’s appeal on the same date, 24 August (_TC-72 No. 139_). It is an appeal in similar terms. There was yet a further appeal from the Pope on 31 August:

“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for.” (_TC-72 No. 141_).

Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the Pope referred as “pending negotiations”, were unhappily, completely bogus negotiations insofar as Germany was concerned. They were put forward simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting her obligations to Poland. The final German “offers” were no offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were merely an attempt to make it easier to seize and conquer Poland than it would likely be if England and France were to observe the obligations they had undertaken.

(6) _Events of the Last Week in August, 1939._ This was the progress of those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-Soviet Pact was signed. On 24 August, orders were given to the German armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the British Prime Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons and a joint communique had been issued, on 6 April, that the two nations would in fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement had been signed.

Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler, the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war—not to cancel the war, but solely to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, which was a mixture of bribe and threat, and with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out.

On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British Government’s reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any agreement reached should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not these proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to Germany are of no great matter. For once it had been made clear—as it was in the British Government’s reply of 28 August—that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government had no concern with further negotiation but was concerned only to afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent itself from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward.

On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British Government’s reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear that the whole object of this letter was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler agreed to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the Corridor.

It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, plus the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That demand was unacceptable at that time. To make quite certain of refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor. There was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole territory must become German.

Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, Hitler stated: “On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow night, the 30th of August.”

This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed Poland no opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.

At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss.

On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he replied that he did not, Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31 August, at 9 o’clock, the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the evening of 31 August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposal, and it was the first that the British Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.

After that broadcast, at 9:15—perhaps while the broadcast was still in its course—a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville Henderson for the first time.

This summary of events during that last week of August 1939 is based upon the contents of several documents which will now be alluded to.

In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was asked the question:

“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?” (_TC-90_)

This was Goering’s answer:

“Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’ So then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?’ At this same time—I don’t know whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in connection with Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic channels to do everything to stop war with England. After the guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.” (_TC-90_)

The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows:

“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’

“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia.’ [The dates obviously are wrong].

“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’

“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’” (_TC-90_)

In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted war with England. It will be recalled, however, that after the speech of Hitler on 22 August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play their part. (_798-PS_)

Hitler’s verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book, which he handed to Sir Neville Henderson on 25 August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from aiding Poland, commences by stating Hitler’s desire to make one more effort to prevent war. In the second paragraph he asserts again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable:

“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests of European peace.

“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest period of war.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

Then comes the bribe.

“The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is however prepared and determined after the solution of this problem to approach England once more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his action. And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means. * * *” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

Again Hitler stressed irrevocable determination never to enter into war with Russia. He concluded as follows:

“If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing for Germany and also for the British empire, a peace might result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of ad infinitum decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

The British Government was not of course aware of the real object that lay behind that message, and, taking it at its face value, wrote back oh 28 August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, as follows:

“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of April the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland.

“But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His Majesty’s Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.”

* * * * * *

“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 74_)

That reply knocked the German hopes on the head. The Nazis had failed despite their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving face as much as possible.

In his interview with Hitler, Sir Neville Henderson emphasized the British attitude that they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. The interview concluded as follows:

“In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles? and Was he ready to discuss the question of any exchange of population? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter. There I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers. As regards to the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.’” (_TC-72 No. 75_)

The German reply, as outlined before, was handed to Sir Neville Henderson at 7.15 P. M. on 29 August. The reply sets out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in a previous note, and goes on to say that the German Government is prepared to enter into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor as well as Danzig shall be returned to the Reich. The reply continues:

“The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory which has always been recognized as being necessary; viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right to the Corridor has been “recognized” for so long. On 28 April, Hitler demands consisted only of Danzig, the Autobahn, and the railway. But now Hitler’s aim was to manufacture justification and to put forth proposals which under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain accept. The note states:

“The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees.

“On this subject, the German Government makes the following declaration:

“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador.”

* * * * * *

“For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital interests of questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiators.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously explained, insufficient time was allowed for the Polish Emissary to reach Berlin by midnight the following night.

Sir Neville Henderson’s account of his interview on the evening of 29 August summarizes what took place then:

“I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.” (_TC-72 No. 79_)

Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of 30 August, at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that the British Government reciprocated the desire for improved relations. It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its interest to other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. It understood that the German Government accepts the condition that the settlement should be subject to international guarantee. The British Government makes a reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last letter, and is informing the Polish Government immediately. Lastly, the British understand that the German Government is drawing up the proposals. (_TC-72 No. 89_)

Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at midnight on 30 August:

“I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

“Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: * * *”

* * * * * *

“When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

“I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government. In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday.” (_TC-72 No. 92_)

Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany had also given the orders to attack Poland some days before. On the following day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski’s account of the conversation:

“I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London’s suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor.” (_TC-73 No. 112_)

But it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to the German Army to invade. A “Most Secret order” signed by Hitler, described as his “Direction No. 1 for the conduct of the war,” dated 31 August 1939, reads in part:

“Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

“The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for ‘_Fall Weiss_’, with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

“Date of attack—1 September 1939

“Time of attack—04:45 [inserted in red pencil]

“This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

“In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.” (_C-126_)

That evening, 31 August, at nine o’clock, the German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which they were willing to enter into discussions with the Polish Government. The proposals were set out at length. By this time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them. This is a document which seems difficult to explain other than as an exhibition or an example of hypocrisy. The second paragraph states:

“Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.”

The manner in which they did that has been shown. The German Broadcast continued, that instead of the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization; and that only toward 12 o’clock on the night of 30 August 1939 did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations. The fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Reich did not arrive, removed the necessary conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views of the German Government as regards the possible basis for negotiation. Since His Majesty’s Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis for negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary. The Broadcast thereafter went on to set out the Nazi version of the story of the negotiations over the last few days. (_TC-73 No. 113_)

On 1 September, when his armies were already crossing the Polish frontier, Hitler issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:

“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of arms.

“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force.

“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German people.

“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the last.

“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

“Long live our people and the Reich.” (_TC-54_)

So that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at that time, anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards.

“The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we told the truth or not. Might is what counts—or victory is what counts and not right.” (_1014-PS_)

On that day, 1 September, when news came of this invasion of Polish ground, the British Government, in accordance with their treaty obligations, sent an ultimatum to the German Government, in which it stated:

“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 110_)

At 9 o’clock on 3 September the British Government handed a final ultimatum to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. It read in part:

“* * * Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than eleven o’clock, British Summer Time, today 3d September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour.” (_TC-72 No. 118_)

And so it was that at 11 o’clock on 3 September a state of war existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. The plans, preparations, intentions, and determination to carry out this assault upon Poland which had been going on for months, for years before, had come to fruition despite all appeals to peace, all appeals to reason. It mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had. If there is any doubt left about this matter, two more documents remain for consideration. Even now, on 3 September, Mussolini offered some chance of peace. At 6:30 hours on 3 September Mussolini sent a telegram to Hitler:

“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

“Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference within two or three days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.

“This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.

“Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its ‘moral satisfaction.’ If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.” (_1831-PS_)

Perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s aims were, for his offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply:

“Duce:

“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies, to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German Armed Forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with, sincere thanks. But I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialist Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.” (_1831-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND AND FRANCE

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 4; V. │ I │ 26, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ *699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │ │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│ │ │49) │ III │ 509 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │ │concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │ │Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ │29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ │22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665 │ │ │ *1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │ │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │ │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ │72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ 1796-PS │Notes to the War Diary from March 1939 │ │ │to January 1940. │ IV │ 370 │ │ │ 1822-PS │Telegram from Minister of Foreign │ │ │Affairs in Rome to Minister of Foreign │ │ │Affairs in Berlin, 25 August 1939, │ │ │concerning conference with Mussolini and│ │ │Ciano. │ IV │ 459 │ │ │ 1823-PS │Hitler reply to Mussolini, 27 August │ │ │1939, concerning attitude of Italy in │ │ │conference of 25 August 1939. │ IV │ 462 │ │ │ 1828-PS │Memorandum handed to German Foreign │ │ │Office by Count Magistrate in Rome, 7 │ │ │August 1939. │ IV │ 463 │ │ │ *1831-PS │Correspondence between Hitler and │ │ │Mussolini, September 1939. (GB 75) │ IV │ 463 │ │ │ 1832-PS │Telephone report of Reich Minister for │ │ │Foreign Affairs in Rome, 27 August 1939.│ IV │ 468 │ │ │ 1889-PS │Account of conference of Fuehrer and │ │ │Italian Ambassador Attolico, 31 August │ │ │1939. │ IV │ 528 │ │ │ *2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, │ │ │concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA │ │ │539) │ IV │ 1035 │ │ │ *2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │ │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ │German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. 50-52. │ │ │(GB 30) │ IV │ 1099 │ │ │ *2368-PS │Hitler’s speech before Reichstag, 30 │ │ │January 1937, published in Documents of │ │ │German Politics, Part VI, 2, p. 42. (GB │ │ │26) │ IV │ 1102 │ │ │ *2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │ │January 1939, published in Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267 │ │ │ *2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390 │ │ │ 2817-PS │Telegram from German Embassy, Rome, to │ │ │Ribbentrop, concerning answer of Duce to│ │ │Hitler’s second letter, 27 August 1939. │ V │ 452 │ │ │ *2818-PS │Secret additional protocol to the │ │ │Friendship and Alliance Pact between │ │ │Germany and Italy. (GB 292) │ V │ 453 │ │ │ 2834-PS │Letter from Mussolini to Fuehrer, 25 │ │ │August 1939. │ V │ 502 │ │ │ *2835-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │ │conversation between Ribbentrop and the │ │ │Duce, 10 March 1940. (GB 291) │ V │ 502 │ │ │ *2846-PS │Affidavit of Edwin Lahousen, 13 November│ │ │1945. │ V │ 507 │ │ │ *2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │ │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │ │(USA 156) │ V │ 566 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │ │Navy files containing notes year by year│ │ │from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of │ │ │the German Navy, and dated 18 February │ │ │1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│ │ │49) │ VI │ 827 │ │ │ *C-30 │Air-Sea Forces Orders for Occupation │ │ │Danzig, 27 July 1939. (GB 46) │ VI │ 831 │ │ │ *C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for │ │ │“Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. │ │ │(GB 41) │ VI │ 916 │ │ │ *C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” │ │ │and directions for secret mobilization. │ │ │(GB 45) │ VI │ 932 │ │ │ *C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 to│ │ │Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. (GB 33)│ VI │ 949 │ │ │ *C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and │ │ │Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538)│ VI │ 956 │ │ │ *C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by │ │ │Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002 │ │ │ *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ │69) │ VI │ 1006 │ │ │ *D-738 │Memorandum on second conference between │ │ │German Foreign Minister with Hungarian │ │ │Prime and Foreign Minister on 1 May │ │ │1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193 │ │ │ *L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”, 2│ │ │May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.) │ VII │ 788 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VIII │ 920 │ │ │ *R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │ │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │ │1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83 │ │ │ *TC-2 │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific │ │ │Settlement of International │ │ │Disputes—1907. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 276 │ │ │ *TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │ │of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279 │ │ │ *TC-9 │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article │ │ │100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 290 │ │ │ *TC-15 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │ │Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │ │ │16) │ VIII │ 331 │ │ │ *TC-18 │Declaration concerning wars of │ │ │aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │ │ │of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│ │ │(GB 17) │ VIII │ 357 │ │ │ *TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │ │97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359 │ │ │ *TC-21 │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January │ │ │1934. (GB 24) │ VIII │ 368 │ │ │ *TC-28 │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26 │ │ │September 1938, from Documents of German│ │ │Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │ 378 │ │ │ *TC-29 │German assurances to Poland, 26 │ │ │September 1938, from Documents of German│ │ │Politics, Part VI, p. 336. (GB 32) │ VIII │ 378 │ │ │ *TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │ │incorporation of Memel with German │ │ │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │ │ │German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB │ │ │4) │ VIII │ 408 │ │ │ *TC-54 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German │ │ │Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 408 │ │ │ *TC-70 │Hitler’s Reichstag speech concerning │ │ │agreement with Poland, 30 January 1934, │ │ │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 31 January │ │ │1934. (GB 25) │ VIII │ 433 │ │ │ *TC-71 │Reports of British Consul in Danzig, │ │ │July 1939. (GB 47) │ VIII │ 434 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 13 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │ │speech, 28 April 1939. (GB 43) │ VIII │ 438 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 14 │British Blue Book. German memorandum │ │ │renouncing 1934 agreement, 28 April │ │ │1939. (GB 42) │ VIII │ 441 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 16 │British Blue Book. Polish Government’s │ │ │reply, 5 May 1939, to 28 April memo. (GB│ │ │44) │ VIII │ 445 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 17 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │ │Minister’s statement in House of │ │ │Commons, 31 March 1939. (GB 39) │ VIII │ 450 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 18 │British Blue Book. Anglo-Polish │ │ │communique issued 6 April 1939. (GB 40) │ VIII │ 450 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 53 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │ │51) │ VIII │ 451 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 54 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │ │52) │ VIII │ 452 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 55 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ │Ambassador, Warsaw, 27 August 1939. (GB │ │ │53) │ VIII │ 452 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 56 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │ │Minister’s letter to Hitler, 22 August │ │ │1939. (GB 55) │ VIII │ 453 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 60 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │ │British Prime Minister, 23 August 1939. │ │ │(GB 56) │ VIII │ 455 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 62 │British Blue Book. Danzig Senate Decree │ │ │appointing Forster Head of State, 23 │ │ │August 1939. (GB 50) │ VIII │ 457 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 68 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s verbal │ │ │communique to Sir Neville Henderson, 25 │ │ │August 1939. (GB 65) │ VIII │ 458 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 74 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ │reply, 28 August 1939, to Hitler’s │ │ │message of 25 August. (GB 66) │ VIII │ 460 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 75 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │ │Henderson conversation, 28 August 1939. │ │ │(GB 67) │ VIII │ 463 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 78 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │ │British Government, 29 August 1939. (GB │ │ │68) │ VIII │ 466 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 79 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │ │Henderson conversation, 29 August 1939. │ │ │(GB 69) │ VIII │ 469 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 89 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ │reply, 30 August 1939, to German │ │ │communication of 29 August. (GB 70) │ VIII │ 470 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 92 │British Blue Book. Ribbentrop and Sir N.│ │ │Henderson conversation, midnight 30 │ │ │August 1939. (GB 71) │ VIII │ 472 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 110 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ │ultimatum, 1 September 1939. (GB 74) │ VIII │ 473 │ │ │ TC-72 No. 113 │British Blue Book. Copy German proposals│ │ │handed to Sir N. Henderson 9:15 P.M., 31│ │ │August 1939. │ VIII │ 474 │ │ │ TC-72 No. 118 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ │final ultimatum, 3 September 1939. │ VIII │ 474 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 124 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │ │appeal to Hitler, 24 August 1939. (GB │ │ │59) │ VIII │ 475 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 126 │British Blue Book. President Moscicki’s │ │ │reply to President Roosevelt, │ │ │25 August 1939. (GB 60) │ VIII │ 476 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 127 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │ │second appeal to Hitler, 25 August 1939.│ │ │(GB 61) │ VIII │ 477 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 139 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 24│ │ │August 1939. (GB 62) │ VIII │ 477 │ │ │ *TC-72 No. 141 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 31│ │ │August 1939. (GB 63) │ VIII │ 480 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 33 │Polish White Book. German-Polish │ │ │communique, 5 November 1937. (GB 27) │ VIII │ 480 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 44 │Polish White Book. Lipski, Ribbentrop │ │ │luncheon, conversation, 24 October 1938.│ │ │(GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 45 │Polish White Book. Beck’s instructions │ │ │to Lipski, 31 October 1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 48 │Polish White Book. Beck and Hitler │ │ │conversation, 5 January 1939. (GB 34) │ VIII │ 486 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 49 │Polish White Book. Beck and Ribbentrop │ │ │conversation, 6 January 1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 57 │Polish White Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │ │speech, 30 January 1939. (GB 37) │ VIII │ 488 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 61 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop and Lipski│ │ │conversation, 21 March 1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 91 │Polish White Book. Anglo-Polish │ │ │Agreement, 25 August 1939. (GB 57) │ VIII │ 492 │ │ │ *TC-73 No. 112 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop-Lipski │ │ │conversation, 31 August 1939. (GB 72) │ VIII │ 494 │ │ │ TC-73 No. 113 │Polish White Book. German broadcast 9 │ │ │P.M. 31 August 1939. │ VIII │ 495 │ │ │ *TC-75 │Memo for the Fuehrer, 2 January 1938, │ │ │concerning Anglo-German relations. (GB │ │ │28) │ VIII │ 513 │ │ │ *TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August 1938.│ │ │(GB 31) │ VIII │ 515 │ │ │ *TC-77 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │ │ │1939. (GB 48) │ VIII │ 516 │ │ │ *TC-78 │French Prime Minister’s letter to │ │ │Hitler, 26 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 529 │ │ │ *TC-79 │Hitler’s reply to French Prime Minister,│ │ │27 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 531 │ │ │ *TC-90 │Goering’s interrogation, 29 August 1945.│ │ │(GB 64) │ VIII │ 534 │ │ │ *TC-91 │Ribbentrop’s interrogation, 29 August │ │ │1945. (GB 276) │ VIII │ 535 │ │ │ Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January │ │ │1946, substantially the same as his │ │ │testimony on direct examination before │ │ │the International Military Tribunal at │ │ │Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December │ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 587 │ │ │ *Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion │ │ │1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779 │ │ │ **Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 │ │ │ **Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

9. AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK

In the early hours of the morning of 9 April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. Those invasions constituted wars of aggression, and also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances.

A. _Treaties and Assurances Violated._

The invasions constituted violations of the Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In addition there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and Denmark. There was the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on 2 June, 1926 (_TC-17_). The first Article of that Treaty is in these terms:

“The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present Treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise between Germany and Denmark and which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring with the consent of both Parties before the Permanent Court of International Justice.

“Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been laid down in other Conventions in force between the Contracting Parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of such Conventions.” (_TC-17_)

The remaining Articles deal with the machinery for arbitration.

There was also the treaty of nonaggression between Germany and Denmark which was signed by Ribbentrop on 31 May 1939, ten weeks after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia (_TC-24_). The preamble and Articles 1 and 2 read as follows:

“His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor of the German Reich,

“Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor of the German Reich.

“Article I: The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against the other.

“Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any way.

“Article II: The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a period of ten years from that date.” (_TC-24_)

The Treaty is dated 31 May 1939. At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of Ribbentrop. The invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces less than a year after the signature of this treaty showed the utter worthlessness of treaties to which Ribbentrop put his signature.

With regard to Norway, Ribbentrop and the Nazi conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. Hitler gave an assurance to Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands on 28 April 1939 (_TC-30_). That, of course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, and was presumably an attempt to try to reassure the Scandinavian States. Hitler said:

“I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by the German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State.

“I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.” (_TC-30_)

A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on 2 September 1939, the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. On that day an aide memoire was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo. It reads:

“The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances, to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate.” (_TC-31_)

There followed a further German assurance to Norway in a speech by Hitler on 6 October 1939 in which he said:

“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” (_TC-32_)

These treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark. These assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For it is now known that as early as October 1939 the conspirators were plotting the invasion of Norway, and that the most active conspirators in that plot were Raeder and Rosenberg.

B. _Early Planning for Invasion._

The Norwegian invasion is in one respect not a typical Nazi aggression, in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important, and because he coveted glory for his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway, which he sought to develop. And in the Norwegian, Vidkun Quisling, Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent.

The early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway are disclosed in a letter which Raeder wrote on 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German Naval historian (_C-66_). It is headed “Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for publications.” The first part deals with “Barbarossa” (the plan to invade Russia). The next part is headed “(b) _Weseruebung_,” which was the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. The following is a pertinent passage from the letter:

“During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October 1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKl (the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff) for their information and prepared some notes based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time the SKl was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us—control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval operations and of air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast—outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.” (_C-66_)

This report of Raeder shows that the evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.

Before this report of October 1939 was made to the Fuehrer, Raeder sought a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On 3 October 1939, he made out a questionnaire headed, “Gaining of Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)” (_C-122_). It reads:

“The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

“(_a_) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

“(_b_) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

“(_c_) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

“(_d_) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply position?”

“F.O.U.-boats” [a reference to Doenitz] “already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.”)

“(_e_) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g. Skagen?” (_C-122_)

A memorandum written by Doenitz on Norwegian bases presumably relates to the questionnaire of Raeder, which was in circulation about that time. Doenitz’s document is headed, “Flag Officer Submarines, Operations Division,” and is marked “Most Secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.” Then there are set out “suppositions”, “advantages and disadvantages”, and then “conclusions”. The last paragraph (III) reads:

“The following is therefore proposed:

“(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

“_a._ Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions.

“_b._ Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.

“_c._ Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.

“_d._ Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.

“Secondly, establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative.” (_C-5_)

In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in Rosenberg.

C. _Use of the Fifth Column: Quisling._

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a political weapon are now proven historical facts. Should further proof be required, it is found in a “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (_Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP_) from 1933 to 1943” (_007-PS_). This was Rosenberg’s Bureau. The report reads:

“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (_Aussenpolitische Amt_) was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions.

“Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those Nations and states constituted an _Insulating Ring_ encircling the Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.

“In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on economic consideration, had become progressively more dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the Bureau put the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences.” (_007-PS_)

There follows an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s Bureau in various parts of the world. The last paragraph of the main body of the report reads in part:

“With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.” (_007-PS_)

The Annex to the report shows what the “exploitation of personal connections” involved. Annex One to the document is headed, “To Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” The subheading is “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940”. The annex reads:

“As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia, only ‘_Nasjonal Samling_’ led in Norway by the former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally, all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the English.

“From the beginning, it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their former attitude, no successful progress of _Nasjonal Samling_ was to be expected. During the winter 1938-1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of the Bureau.

“When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain.

“Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau. The Staff Director of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer.” (_007-PS_)

This document is another illustration of the close interweaving between the political and military leadership of the Nazi State. Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg (_C-66_). The second paragraph of the Raeder report, headed “_Weseruebung_,” reads as follows:

“In the further developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally—in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_C-66_)

The details of the manner in which Raeder made contact personally with Quisling are not clear. In a report from Rosenberg to Raeder, however, the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to Raeder. The second paragraph of this report reads as follows:

“The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing (the Norwegian Parliament) had, in defense of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that, if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished.” (_C-65_)

Then came the details of a plot to overthrow the government of Norway by the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with Rosenberg:

“A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army, would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success—would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an accomplished fact. * * *

“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.” (_C-65_)

Subsequent developments are indicated in a report by Raeder of his meeting with Hitler on 12 December 1939 at 1200 hours, in the presence of Keitel, Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. The report is headed “Norwegian Question”, and the first sentence reads:

“C-in-C Navy” (Raeder) “has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable.” (_C-64_)

There then follows, in the next, two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling’s views. The fourth paragraph reads:

“The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C-in-C Navy” [Raeder] “suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation.

“(_a_) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned by Norway, or

“(_b_) To agree to do so by force.” (_C-64_)

It was at a meeting on 12 December that Raeder made the above report to Hitler.

Raeder’s record of these transactions reports the next event:

“Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_C-66_)

A note at the bottom of the page states:

“At the crucial moment, R” (presumably Rosenberg) “hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th of December.” (_C-66_)

That is Raeder’s note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy.

The report continues:

“On the grounds of the Fuehrer’s discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

“Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.” (_C-66_)

Raeder’s note referring to the “crucial” moment was an appropriate one, for on the same day that it was written, 14 December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Rosenberg’s report on the activities of his organization deals with further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December. The extract reads:

“Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict. * * *”

“Should the enemy attempt to extend the war however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop’s organization], the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop] being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau [Rosenberg’s organization].

“Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.” (_007-PS_)

Here again is a further indication of the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.

D. _Operational Planning_

The information available on the events of January 1940 is not full, but it is clear that the agitation of Raeder and Rosenberg bore fruit. An order signed by Keitel, dated 27 January 1940, marked “Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study ‘N’”, (an earlier code name for the _Weseruebung_ preparations) and classified "Access only through an officer,” stated:

“C-in-C of the Navy [Raeder] has a report on this * * *

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.

“A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”

* * * * * *

“All further plans will be made under the cover name ‘_Weseruebung_.’” (_C-63_)

The importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision, is this: Prior to this date, 27 January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking the operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel’s on 27 January 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels.

Certain entries in the diary of Jodl reveal how the preparations progressed (_1809-PS_). The entry for 6 February commences:

“New idea: Carry out ‘H’ [_Hartmundt_, another code word for the Norwegian and Danish invasion] and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 February reads:

“Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of ‘Weser Exercise.’ Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 28 February reads:

“I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer, that Case Yellow [the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands] and Weser Exercise [the invasion of Norway and Denmark] must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible.” (_1809-PS_)

It will be observed that the new idea of 6 February, that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved, had been abandoned by 28 February.

The entry for 29 February reads:

“Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, _Chef Landesverteidigung_, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff.” (_1809-PS_)

Then came Hitler’s order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). It bears the date of 1 March 1940, and reads as follows:

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most Secret.

“Directive for _Fall Weseruebung_.

“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—_Fall Weseruebung_. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain.

“In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the _Fall Weseruebung_ will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.”

* * * * * *

“I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst. * * *”

“The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

“It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

“In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives.” (_C-174_)

The section on “The Occupation of Denmark” which is given the code name of “_Weseruebung Sued_”, provides:

“The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland.

“Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast.” (_C-174_)

There then follow other instructions with regard to the operation.

The section on “The Occupation of Norway”, given the code name of “_Weseruebung Nord_”, provides:

“The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

“The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops. * * * The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain.” (_C-174_)

Whilst these preparations were being made, and just prior to the final decision of Hitler, reports were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling. The third paragraph in Annex I, the section dealing with Norway, has this information:

“Quisling’s reports, transmitted to his representative in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January. These increasingly better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that government’s intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members’ views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau [Rosenberg’s bureau], which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to 17th of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer ‘Altmark’ in Jessingjord.* * *” (_007-PS_)

(That is a reference to the action by the British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel _Altmark_, which was carrying three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and that the action taken by H.M.S. _Cossack_, which was restricted to rescuing the three hundred British prisoners on board, no attempt being made to destroy the _Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board her, was fully justified under international law.)

The Rosenberg report continues:

“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians.” (_007-PS_)

And so the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary. The entry for 3 March relates:

“The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift entry into N [Norway] with strong forces.

“No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary.” (_1809-PS_)

The last entry for 3 March reads:

“Fuehrer decides to carry out ‘Weser Exercise’ before case ‘Yellow’ with a few days interval.” (_1809-PS_)

Thus, the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country. It will be observed from those entries of 3 March that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of aggression against Norway.

The entry in Jodl’s diary for 5 March reads:

“Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about ‘Weser Exercise.’ Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless.

“Result: (_a_) Stronger forces to Narvik.

“(_b_) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim).

“(_c_) Christiansand can be left out at first.

“(_d_) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.

“(_e_) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case.

“Fuehrer does not give order yet for ‘W’ [Weser Exercise]. He is still looking for an excuse.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads:

“English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.’” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 March reads:

“Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst’s Force, detailed to conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, and even exaggerate them.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of 28 March reads:

“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

“In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 April reads:

“Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April 9th.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 4 April reads:

“Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen.” (_1809-PS_)

From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April 1940, reads in part:

“* * * The barrage-breaking vessels (_Sperrbrechers_) will penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord, disguised as merchant steamers.

“Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero hour.” (_C-115_)

An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled “Behavior during entrance into the harbor,” reads in part:

“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen:

“Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.

“Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:

“Koeln H.M.S. Cairo “Koenigsberg H.M.S. Calcutta “Bromso H.M.S. Faulkner “Karl Peters H.M.S. Halcyon “Leopard British destroyer “Wolf British destroyer “E-boats British motor torpedo boats

“Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.” (_C-115_)

An order dated 24 March 1940, classified “Most Secret,” provides:

“Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln’ H.M.S. Cairo. Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German steamers.” (_C-115_)

Doenitz’s order in connection with this operation is headed “Top Secret, Operation Order ‘_Hartmut_.’”

“Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force on the codeword ‘_Hartmut_.’ With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity.

“The day and hour are designated as ‘Weser-Day’ and ‘Weser-Hour’, and the whole operation is known as ‘_Weseruebung_’.

“The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side. * * * The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.” (_C-151_)

E. _Nazi Justification of Invasion._

On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (_TC-55_). That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. The memorandum further states:

“The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.” (_TC-55_)

In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on 1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat:

“The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.” (_TC-55_)

What the Nazis meant by “protection of the kingdom of Norway” was shown by their conduct on 9 April.

A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states:

“* * * The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as the head.”

* * * * * *

“The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser ‘Blucher’, carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack; resistance was organized throughout the country.” (_TC-56_)

What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government (_D-628_). An extract from it reads:

“Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by the Royal Danish Government.

“On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o’clock the same morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark’s territorial integrity and political independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war.

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there was no possibility of anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which according to the German Minister’s statement was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality so that fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment.” (_D-628_)

What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary (_D-627_). That dispatch reads:

“The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable information subsequently received and are given below. Early in the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor, whilst a number of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding the harbor approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this, the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the population to keep calm and cooperate with the Germans. I enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was locked, so the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King’s palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three, one of them fatally. Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitudes.”

* * * * * *

“It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in Jutland. It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties. The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th April and drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him, in blissful ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him.” (_D-627_)

The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish governments spoke of the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of those two small countries. Two documents indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. An entry in Jodl’s diary for 19 April reads:

“Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled: since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal [presumably a reference to Goering] is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn’t take sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population, that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn’t supply enough troops. The Air Force can’t do everything.” (_1809-PS_)

It will be seen from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven that already by 19 April, rule by Gauleiters had replaced rule by Norwegians.

A memorandum dated 3 June 1940, signed by Fricke, at that date the head of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff, which was a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations, relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases (_C-41_). It reads:

“These problems are preeminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy.

“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of States and under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.

“The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities.

“1. The territories of Denmark, Norway and Northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organized that they can in future be considered as German possessions.

“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy and where a gradual ‘Germanizing’ of the territory appears practicable.

“2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany’s main body, and which, like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile State. Such areas might be considered possibly around Brest and Trondjem.

“3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired in this war should result in the existing population of these areas feeling themselves politically, economically and militarily to be completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question, that the smaller States such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy these countries again, then in practice the same, but psychologically much more, will be achieved.” (_C-41_)

Then Fricke recommends:

“The solution given in 3, therefore, appears to be the proper one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above.”

* * * * * *

“Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will make an extension of these demands possible.” (_C-41_)

The submission of the prosecution is that that and other documents which have been submitted tear apart the veil of Nazi pretense. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Goering; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to Deputy │ │ │of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, on the │ │ │Political Preparation of the Norway │ │ │Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19 │ │ │ *007-PS │Report on activities of the Foreign │ │ │Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 signed │ │ │Rosenberg. (GB 84) │ III │ 27 │ │ │ *957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │ │February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641 │ │ │ 1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │ │concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│ │ │to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ 3596-PS │Covering memorandum and notes of │ │ │conversation on 8 August 1940, between │ │ │Chief Custodian of Army Archives GOES │ │ │and Major-General Himmler. │ VI │ 299 │ │ │ *C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │ │Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │ │concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815 │ │ │ *C-41 │Memorandum by Fricke, 3 June 1940, on │ │ │questions of territorial expansion and │ │ │bases. (GB 96) │ VI │ 868 │ │ │ *C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB 87) │ VI │ 883 │ │ │ *C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB│ │ │86) │ VI │ 884 │ │ │ *C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning │ │ │visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885 │ │ │ *C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assmann, 10 │ │ │January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │ │and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887 │ │ │ *C-115 │Naval deception and camouflage in │ │ │invasion of Norway taken from file of │ │ │naval operation orders for operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”. (GB 90) │ VI │ 914 │ │ │ *C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │ │Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October│ │ │1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928 │ │ │ *C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by │ │ │Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965 │ │ │ *C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003 │ │ │ *D-627 │Dispatch from British Minister in │ │ │Copenhagen to Foreign Secretary, 25 │ │ │April 1940. (GB 95) │ VII │ 97 │ │ │ *D-628 │Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude│ │ │towards Denmark before and during │ │ │occupation. (GB 94) │ VII │ 98 │ │ │ *D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │ │April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99 │ │ │ *L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │ │operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106 │ │ │ *M-156 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │ │Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. (GB │ │ │284) │ VIII │ 49 │ │ │ *TC-17 │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation │ │ │between Germany and Denmark, signed at │ │ │Berlin, 2 June 1926. (GB 76) │ VIII │ 346 │ │ │ *TC-24 │Treaty of nonaggression between German │ │ │Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, 31 May │ │ │1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373 │ │ │ *TC-30 │German assurance to Denmark, Norway, │ │ │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April │ │ │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78) │ VIII │ 379 │ │ │ *TC-31 │German assurance to Norway, 2 September │ │ │1939. (GB 79) │ VIII │ 380 │ │ │ *TC-32 │German assurance to Norway, 6 October │ │ │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80) │ VIII │ 381 │ │ │ *TC-55 │German ultimatum to Norway and Denmark, │ │ │9 April 1940, from Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Part VIII, pp. 21-31. (GB 92) │ VIII │ 410 │ │ │ *TC-56 │German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1 │ │ │October 1945. (GB 93) │ VIII │ 414 │ │ │ **Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 │ │ │ **Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND LUXEMBOURG

The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. That guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940.

Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (_TC-3_; _TC-4_), the Locarno Arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in which Belgium’s independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (_TC-16_). Article I of the latter treaty provides:

“The contracting parties” (the Netherlands and the German Reich) “undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration or conciliation as provided.” (_TC-16_)

Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last article, Article 21, provides that the Convention shall be valid for ten years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.

The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1929 (_TC-20_). The first few words of Article 1 are familiar:

“The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by

Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, which are in the common form.

Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription. And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations acknowledged, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced.

And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance—he used the word “solemn”—which amounted to a full guarantee (_TC-33_). In April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium:

“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the following communication to Your Excellency: The German Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the international position of Belgium. For its part, it has repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of January 30th, 1937, to its own point of view. The German Government has also taken cognizance of the declaration made by the British and French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * *

“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the following declaration: First, the German Government has taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit to express. That is to say, (_a_) of the policy of independence which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (_b_) of its determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its determination that in no circumstances will it impair this inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The German Government, like the British and French Governments, is prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack or to invasion. * * *” (_TC-34_)

The following reply was made:

“The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this communication.” (_TC-34_)

Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her, and its assertion that the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and the other Western Powers. Yet eighteen months afterwards Germany had violated that assurance.

That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders and to the high command of Germany can be seen from a document which came into existence on 24 August 1938, at the time when the Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and when it was uncertain whether there would be war with the Western Powers. This Top Secret document is addressed to the General Staff of the 5th Section of the German Air Force, and deals with the subject, “Extended Case Green—Appreciation of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. The last paragraph (No. H) reads:

“Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy. * * *

“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take, and in this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.” (_375-PS_)

It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. It was recommended as a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the knowledge that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that view, treaties would be completely ignored. Such was the honor of the German Government and of its leaders.

In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been peacefully annexed, and the time had come for further guarantees. Assurances which were accordingly given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939 (_TC-30_). A guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a speech by Hitler in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to Hitler’s intentions (_TC-42-A_). In “The Nazi Plan,” a motion picture shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution (_3054-PS_), the delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech was shown. Hitler appeared in one of his jocular moods, as his words were greeted and delivered in a jocular vein. The film shows that Goering, who sits above Hitler in the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors.

In this speech Hitler declared:

“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the territory or possessions of the following independent nations, and above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes on to name the following as the countries in question: Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

“Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel themselves threatened, and secondly and particularly, whether this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.

“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the form of a blunt rejection. Actually, this counter-question of mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations listed, since they are not at present in possession of their liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of all their rights.

“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his peculiar telegram.” (_TC-42-A_)

Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against its neighbors. The hollow falsity of that declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by the minutes of Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May (_L-79_). The first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer, Goering, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl’s deputy), and various others. The purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation, which proceeded in this fashion:

“What will this struggle be like?”

* * * * * *

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

* * * * * *

“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.” (_L-79_)

In Hitler’s speech on 22 August, the following passage occurred:

“Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider this impossible.

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries.” (_798-PS_)

Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian Government:

“In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit to Your Majesty the following communication:

“Though the German Government is at present doing everything in its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become inevitable.

“The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October 13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no circumstances impair the inviolability of Belgium and will at all times respect Belgium territory. The German Government renews this undertaking; however, in, the expectation that the Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violations on the part of a third power, but that, on the contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgium Government were to adopt a different attitude, the German Government would naturally be compelled to defend its interests in conformity with the new situation thus created.” (_TC-36_)

It seems likely that the decision having been made to violate Belgian neutrality, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the future.

A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939 (_TC-40_). Likewise assurances were given to Luxembourg at the same time. It is in the same terms as the other two assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee with the sting in the tail (_TC-42_). Poland was occupied by means of a lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces were free for other tasks. The first step that was taken, so far as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned, was a German assurance on 6 October 1939, as follows:

“Belgium.

“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in Belgium as a threat.” (_TC-32_)

A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same day:

“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing differences between the two countries and has not created any new ones.” (_TC-32_)

The value of these pledges of Germany’s good faith is shown by an order issued on the very next day, 7 October. This order was from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and was addressed to various Army Groups. The third paragraph provided:

“The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

“At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands.” (_2329-PS_)

Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (_C-62_)

That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army. It declared, in part:

“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (_C-62_)

The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the West-Frisian islands.

It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of combining with themselves and their neighbors.

Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent passages:

“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order which the general attack will start.

“The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time.”

* * * * * *

“Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation.”

* * * * * *

“At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”

“The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (_440-PS_)

In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.

A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of Keitel, in the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Airforce. It states that if a quick breakthrough should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare,” and “_b_ Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant * * *.” (_C-10_)

From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed either by Keitel or by Jodl. (_C-72_)

On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. (_TC-58_)

The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:

“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.

“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case ‘Yellow.’” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this entry:

“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” (_1809-PS_)

In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their neutrality.

At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was taken.

After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian report:

“From 4:30 information was received which left no shadow of doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station.”

* * * * * *

“At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister] “stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished’.”

* * * * * *

“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to make the following declaration: In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military Command.”

* * * * * *

“In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had just made. * * *” (_TC-58_)

The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the invasion had started, read in part as follows:

“The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.

“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.

“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.

“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.

“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.

“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.” (_TC-57_)

The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and the Netherlands Press, and to allege attempts by the British Intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, although no instances were given (_TC-57_). The document continued:

“In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.” (_TC-57_)

It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is merely saying, “The orders to do so have now been issued.”

A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was sent to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The second paragraph of the latter declared:

“In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries * * *”. (_TC-60_)

The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was committed against her is contained in _TC-59_.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│ │ │(USA 84) │ III │ 280 │ │ │ *440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │ │November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │ │war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ │29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│ │ │to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *2329-PS │Order by Commander in Chief of the Army,│ │ │7 October 1939. (GB 105) │ IV │ 1037 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed │ │ │by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th │ │ │Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817 │ │ │ *C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war, │ │ │signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │ │directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 on │ │ │Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880 │ │ │ *C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West, │ │ │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893 │ │ │ *L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct of│ │ │war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA │ │ │540) │ VII │ 800 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │ │of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279 │ │ │ *TC-4 │Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights │ │ │and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons│ │ │in War on Land. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 282 │ │ │ *TC-13 │Arbitration Convention between Germany │ │ │and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925.│ │ │(GB 15) │ VIII │ 320 │ │ │ *TC-16 │Convention of Arbitration and │ │ │conciliation between Germany and the │ │ │Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May│ │ │1926. (GB 97) │ VIII │ 337 │ │ │ *TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │ │97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359 │ │ │ *TC-20 │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation │ │ │between Germany and Luxembourg, signed │ │ │at Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98) │ VIII │ 362 │ │ │ *TC-30 │German assurance to Denmark, Norway, │ │ │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April │ │ │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78) │ VIII │ 379 │ │ │ *TC-32 │German assurance to Norway, 6 October │ │ │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80) │ VIII │ 381 │ │ │ *TC-33 │German assurance to Belgium and the │ │ │Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Part IV, │ │ │pp. 42-43. (GB 99) │ VIII │ 381 │ │ │ *TC-34 │German Declaration to the Belgian │ │ │Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100) │ VIII │ 381 │ │ │ *TC-36 │Declaration made by Ambassador of │ │ │Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102) │ VIII │ 382 │ │ │ TC-37 │German assurance to Belgium, 6 October │ │ │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Vol. VII, p. 351. │ VIII │ 383 │ │ │ *TC-40 │Declaration of German Minister to the │ │ │Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103) │ VIII │ 383 │ │ │ TC-41 │German assurance to the Netherlands, 6 │ │ │October 1939, from Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 351. │ VIII │ 384 │ │ │ *TC-42 │German assurance to Luxembourg, 26 │ │ │August 1939. (GB 104) │ VIII │ 384 │ │ │ *TC-42-A │German assurance to Luxembourg, 28 April│ │ │1939. (GB 101) │ VIII │ 385 │ │ │ *TC-57 │German ultimatum to Belgium and the │ │ │Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents │ │ │of German Politics, Part VIII, pp. │ │ │142-150. (GB 112) │ VIII │ 416 │ │ │ *TC-58 │“Belgium, the official account of what │ │ │happened 1939-1940”. (GB 111) │ VIII │ 421 │ │ │ *TC-58-A │Secret instruction to the Commander of │ │ │2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane│ │ │of 10 January 1940. (GB 110) │ VIII │ 423 │ │ │ *TC-59 │Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940, │ │ │following German aggression. (GB 111) │ VIII │ 429 │ │ │ *TC-60 │German memorandum to Luxembourg, 9 May │ │ │1940, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113) │ VIII │ 431 │ │ │ Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 643 │ │ │ **Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 │ │ │ **Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

11. AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

A. _Treaties and Assurances Breached._

The invasions of Greece and of Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 1941, constituted direct breaches of The Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. In the case of Yugoslavia, the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis. The assurance was originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on 28 April 1938 (_2719-PS_), but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on 6 October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag. The German Foreign Office release on 28 April 1938 reads, in part:

“Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.

“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made:”

* * * * * *

“3. Yugoslavia.

“The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them.” (_2719-PS_)

In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler declared:

“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.

“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.” (_TC-92_)

As is now known this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. It occurred a week after the Reichschancellery conference recorded in the Schmundt note (_L-79_). The reference to “nerve-wracked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in these terms:

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.” (_TC-43_)

B. _Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and Bulgaria._

Despite the obligation of Germany, under the Convention of 1899, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing Assurance which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg, 12 and 13 August 1939 (_TC-77_). The effect of the meeting was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only two months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, were seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained its position and did not enter the war when Germany invaded Poland, and since the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. If was apparently for this reason that on 6 October, through Hitler’s speech, the Nazis repeated the assurance they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied Armies in May and June 1940, the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently, at three o’clock in the morning on 28 October 1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.

This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these words:

“The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”

A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which—this is clear from the contents—must have been written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November [transcriber's note: October] 1940, contained these sentiments:

“Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.

“Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.” (_2762-PS_)

It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a “Top Secret Directive” issued from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part:

“_Directive No. 18._

“The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.* * *” (_444-PS_)

After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, the order continues:

“_Balkans_

“The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.

“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

“_The commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.” (_444-PS_)

The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden:

“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom.”

In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on Greece.

This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number 20, dealing with Operation _Marita_, bears a distribution list which shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two paragraphs state:

“The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

“My plan, therefore, is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (_b_) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation _Marita_). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.” (_1541-PS_)

The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

“The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.

“Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.” (_1541-PS_)

Another “Top Secret Directive” carries the plan a little farther. It deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads:

“The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.” (_448-PS_)

Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:

“_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.

“_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation.

“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army.” (_448-PS_)

That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as shown on the original, was initialed by both Keitel and Jodl. A copy went to Raeder, and the copy sent to Foreign Intelligence presumably reached Ribbentrop.

A conference took place on 19 and 20 January between Keitel and the Italian General, Guzzoni. This was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. In the speech which the Fuehrer made on 20 January 1941, after the conference with the Italians, he declared:

“* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:

“_a._ An operation against Greece.

“_b._ Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.

“_c._ Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

“Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.” (_C-134_)

At a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8 February, the following plans were discussed:

“Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.”

* * * * * *

“* * * The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.

“The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to assure the success of the military operations.” (_1746-PS_)

A further top secret directive of 19 February sets the date for the Operation _Marita_ (_C-59_). It states that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on 28 February, the river crossed on 2 March, and the final orders to be issued on 26 February at the latest. On the original of this order the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of Keitel.

The position of Bulgaria at this moment was this: Bulgaria adhered to the Three-Power Pact on 1 March 1941. On the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan _Marita_ and associated directives already referred to. The landing of British troops in Greece on 3 March, in accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by the British Government, may have accelerated the movement of the German forces. In any event, as has been shown, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time.

A short extract from a report by Raeder on an interview with Hitler, which the original shows took place in the presence of Keitel and Jodl at 1600 hours on 18 March, shows the ruthless nature of the German intentions:

“The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement.

“_Fuehrer_: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.” (_C-167_)

This report shows, it seems clear, that the Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral which did not remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with, and getting the better of, their Italian allies.

C. _Lulling the Unsuspecting Victim._

They were not yet, however, ready to deal with Yugoslavia, towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. On 25 March, in accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on 15 February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markvic to Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on 25 March. On this occasion Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance. The first made this guarantee:

“Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

“At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes:

“‘Mr. Prime Minister:

“‘In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

“‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’” (_2450-PS_)

That letter was signed by Ribbentrop, who was present at the meeting in August 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. It was in fact 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order.

The second letter reads:

“Mr. Prime Minister:

“With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung], that in the agreement between the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory.” (_2450-PS_)

The position at this stage, 25 March 1941, was therefore that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning up of the Greek question.

The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact appears very clearly from an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano. The first paragraph states:

“The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy venture.” (_2765-PS_)

Again, it is a matter of history that on the night of 26 March 1941, when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_, and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of 27 March ready to defend, if need be, its independence.

D. _Further Planning for Attack._

The Nazis reacted rapidly to this altered situation, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. A conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia took place on 27 March 1941. Those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich Marshall (Goering); Chief, OKW, (Keitel); and the Chief of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab_, (Jodl). A report of the conference notes that “later on the following persons were added,” and among them is included Ribbentrop (_1746-PS_). Hitler’s statement proceeded as follows:

“The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German.”

* * * * * *

“The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country’s attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the Government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

“It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

“Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

“This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.” (_1746-PS_)

Thus it appears that two days after Yugoslavia had signed the Tri-Partite Pact and the Nazis had given assurances, simply because there had been a _coup d’état_ and it was possible that the operations against Greece might be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia was decided on without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the views of the new Government.

The report of the meeting continues:

“5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves.” (_1746-PS_)

It is again a matter of history that the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o’clock on the following Sunday morning, 6 April 1941.

At that same meeting of 27 March 1941 a tentative plan, drawn up by Jodl, was offered:

“In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.” (_1746-PS_)

An order (Directive No. 25) was issued after the meeting of 27 March. The first paragraph reads:

“The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.” (_C-127_)

As another result of the meeting, a telegram, containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, was forwarded to the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and Ribbentrop. It was written to advise Mussolini of the course decided on, and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce was given his orders. The first five paragraphs read:

“Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.

“(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.

“(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

“(3) I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic, but nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole position.

“(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.

“These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.

“I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.

“(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known.” (_1835-PS_)

Hitler continues with a further emphasis on the importance of secrecy. An operational order (_R-95_) followed, which was signed by General von Brauchitsch, and which merely passed to the Armies the orders contained in Directive No. 25. (_C-127_)

E. _Explanations._

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place in the morning of 6 April 1941. On that day Hitler issued a proclamation (_TC-93_). The following passage is an extract:

“From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.

“The documents published today [the German ‘White Book’] afford a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests.

“In the face of this I have always emphasized that:

“(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that

“(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object at a given time of being able to advance thence from the southeast into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south.”

* * * * * *

“In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and various Nations allied to Germany.” (_TC-93_)

One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August 1939, and the meeting with Ribbentrop and the others on 27 March, a few days earlier.

In a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943, he sets out his views, two and a half years later on the action taken in April, 1941. In Paragraph 11 he stated:

“What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece. The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.” (_L-172_)

F. _Summary._

To summarize: The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as November or December 1940 and was scheduled for the end of March or the beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of International Law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting victim.

In the meanwhile, Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece, or at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.

The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided that, irrespective of whether or not his Government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.

It was not worth while to the Nazis to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s intentions, for it would be so little trouble, now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, 6 April 1941, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously. The formality was observed of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as it had given to the Italians in the preceding October.

G. _The Pattern of Aggression._

There is one common factor which runs through the whole of the Nazi aggressions. It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression, which was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.

The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the night of April 8-9 1940, and was well under way as a military operation, before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a. m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning.

The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than five o’clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the ease of Holland the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.

Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of 28 October 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a three hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, also, both began in the small hours of 6 April 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler at five o’clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was bombed. In the case of Greece, it was at twenty minutes past five that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.

The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is, in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime: to attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage, and to proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. This is clearly the method of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own.

It is impossible not to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the “honest broker” himself or by his honest clerk, Ribbentrop.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│ │ │Headquarters signed by Hitler and │ │ │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, │ │ │concerning plans for prosecution of war │ │ │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │ │ │Greece. (GB 116) │ III │ 403 │ │ │ *448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │ │Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │ │concerning participation of German │ │ │Forces in the Fighting in the │ │ │Mediterranean Theater of Operations. (GB│ │ │118) │ III │ 413 │ │ │ *1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │ │provisional directions for partition of │ │ │Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838 │ │ │ *1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 │ │ │December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and Bulgarian │ │ │Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by │ │ │Hitler to German High Command on │ │ │situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; │ │ │plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 │ │ │March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ *1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 │ │ │ *1835-PS │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, 28 │ │ │March 1941. (GB 126) │ IV │ 475 │ │ │ *1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in │ │ │Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477 │ │ │ *1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12 │ │ │August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508 │ │ │ *2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │ │Minister of Yugoslavia, as published in │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │ │ │26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186 │ │ │ 2719-PS │German assurance to Yugoslavia; official│ │ │announcement by German Foreign Office, │ │ │28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic │ │ │Representatives, published in Documents │ │ │of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p. │ │ │324. │ V │ 378 │ │ │ *2762-PS │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini │ │ │(probably early November 1940). (GB 115)│ V │ 410 │ │ │ *2765-PS │Extract from notes of conference between│ │ │Hitler and Ciano in Vienna, 25 March │ │ │1941. (GB 124) │ V │ 411 │ │ │ *2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │ │166) │ V │ 689 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for execution │ │ │of operation “Marita”, 19 February 1941.│ │ │(GB 121) │ VI │ 879 │ │ │ *C-127 │Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler,│ │ │27 March 1941. (GB 125) │ VI │ 938 │ │ │ *C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on│ │ │conference between German and Italian │ │ │Generals on 19 January and subsequent │ │ │speech by Hitler, 20 January 1941. (GB │ │ │119) │ VI │ 939 │ │ │ C-147 │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed │ │ │by Hitler, 12 November 1940. │ VI │ 957 │ │ │ *C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │ │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *R-95 │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30│ │ │March 1941, concerning deployment │ │ │instructions for “Action 25” and │ │ │supplementary instruction for action │ │ │“Marita”. (GB 127) │ VIII │ 70 │ │ │ TC-43 │German assurance to Yugoslavia, 6 │ │ │October 1939, from Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 352. │ VIII │ 386 │ │ │ *TC-77 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │ │ │1939. (GB 48) │ VIII │ 516 │ │ │ *TC-92 │Hitler’s address at dinner for Prince │ │ │Regent of Yugoslavia, 1 June 1939. (GB │ │ │114) │ VIII │ 536 │ │ │ *TC-93 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │ │German people, 6 April 1941, from │ │ │Documents Concerning the Conflict with │ │ │Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114) │ VIII │ 537

12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

A. _Inception of the Plan._

The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On that day—just a week before the invasion of Poland—the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. This Treaty (_TC-25_) contained two significant articles:

“Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.”

* * * * * *

“Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two partners would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commission.” (_TC-25_)

The Treaty was signed for the U.S.S.R. by the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and for the German Government by Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information (_1834-PS_). Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the U.S.S.R. in the following words:

“Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia.” (_1834-PS_)

In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them to do so. That they did so regard it is evident from the fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. In a speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters at Munich in November 1943, Jodl admitted that:

“Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.” (_L-172_)

At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of _lebensraum_ at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practicable.

As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the _Wirtschaft Rustung Amt_, or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (_Wi Rue Amt_). General Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft of a work entitled “Basic Facts For a History of German War and Armaments Economy,” which he prepared during the Summer of 1944 (_2353-PS_). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940:

“On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.” (_2353-PS_)

This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R.

Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter-Intelligence Service Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (_1229-PS_). This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations already underway. It provides:

“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.

“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests—especially on the Balkan—with strong forces against Russian seizure.

“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply:

“1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.

“2. The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant.

“3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.

“4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the _antiaircraft protection_ in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.

“5. Concerning improvements on _railroads_, _roads_, _airdromes_, _etc._, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.

“The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

By order of /signed/ Jodl.” (_1229-PS_)

Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the army’s operational plans. This order was contained in a Top Secret directive from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (_444-PS_). The directive begins by saying that:

“The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.” (_444-PS_)

It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.:

“* * * 5. _Russia_

“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

“Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me.” (_444-PS_)

On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on _Fall Barbarossa_ (_1799-PS_). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_ and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it occurred:

“Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.

“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.

“The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”

* * * * * *

“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.” (_1799-PS_)

B. _Plan Barbarossa._

By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces for _Barbarossa_—Directive No. 21—was issued (_446-PS_). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word _Barbarossa_ to denote the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages in that directive is the opening sentence:

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa).” (_446-PS_)

The directive continues:

“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941.”

* * * * * *

“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.” (_446-PS_)

The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows:

“V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.” (_446-PS_)

The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature.

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive.

C. _Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa._

The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (_C-35_). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date:

“_30 January 1941_

7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces”. (_C-35_)

”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all:

“II. _Objectives of War Against Russia._

* * * * * *

_d._ To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (_C-35_)

This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement _Barbarossa_ almost six months before the operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.

Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (_C-33_). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical:

“In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.” (_C-33_)

On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for _Barbarossa_. The conference also discussed the plans for _Sonnenblume_, which was the code name for the North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (_872-PS_). During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial operations:

“_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan.

1st Deployment Staffel (_Aufmarschstaffel_)

2nd “ “ “

transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and Gibraltar.]

“_In industry_ the full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.

“From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the planned operation against England] can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable.

“The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

“_C-in-C Army_ requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.

“_Fuehrer_ When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.” (_872-PS_)

This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded _Barbarossa_ as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected _Barbarossa_, as follows:

“_Conclusions_:

“1. _Barbarossa_

“_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the _main aim_ is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

“_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

“_c._ Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.

“_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).

“_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.” (_872-PS_)

As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the same line (_874-PS_). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their treacherous attack:

“_Top Secret_ “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. “Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41 DRAFT

“Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)

“For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt.

“K. J. W.” [Initials of Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (_874-PS_)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (_446-PS_), which was issued in the form of “Directives for Special Areas” (_447-PS_). This detailed operational order, which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed “Area of Operations and Executive Power” and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b:

“* * * _b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_ is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for the preparation of the _political administration_, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_447-PS_)

The order then states that, in time, political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3:

“_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own _political_ administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into _North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_ (_White Russia_) _and South_ (_Ukraine_). In these territories _the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich_ who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

“3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas under political administration in the rear of the area of operations, _commanding officers_ who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

“The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the Armed Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the _military sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial Commander_ and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.

“_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.

“_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (_447-PS_)

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in Section I, paragraph 4:

“4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (_447-PS_)

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows:

“III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland._

9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.” (_447-PS_)

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden:

“IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._

12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

“signed: KEITEL” (_447-PS_)

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document (_C-170_) which has been identified by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows:

“_Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five weeks._ All measures which can be construed as _offensive actions_ are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.” (_C-170_)

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June—more than seven weeks away. A “Top Secret” report of a conference with the Chief of the Section _Landsverteidigung_ of the _Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab_ on 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs:

“1. _Timetable Barbarossa_:

The Fuehrer has decided:

_Action Barbarossa_ begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

“2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa: Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.

_Sector Middle_: Great German superiority.

_Sector South_: Russian superiority.” (_873-PS_)

Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (_C-39_) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as follows:

“_Top Military Secret_ “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op) “Fuehrer’s Headquarters (no date) “Top Secret (_Chefsache_) _Only through officer_

“_21 copies_ 3rd copy Ob. d. m. I op.00845/41 Received 6 June Enclosures:—

“The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: Keitel” (_C-39_)

The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page—Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (_spaetester Anhaltetermin_)” (_C-39_). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: ‘Dortmund’” (_C-39_). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: “Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (_Schwerpunkt_), concentration of armour and artillery must be reckoned with” (_C-39_). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW and provides as follows:

“_Invasion Day_

“H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (_C-39_)

In the Remarks column it is stated that:

“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force.” (_C-39_)

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941—8 days before “D-Day” (_C-78_). This order, signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows:

“TOP SECRET Only by Officer “Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant “at Berchtesgaden 9th June 1941

“_To the Fuehrer_

Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret

“_Top Secret_

“_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_

“1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

“3. _Time Table._ “_a._ 11.00 hrs. “Silver Fox” “_b._ 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs. Army Group South “_c._ 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs. Lunch party for all participants in conference “_d._ From 15.30 hrs. Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group “Center” in this order.

Participants see enclosed list of participants.

(list of names, etc. follows)

“(signed) Schmundt Colonel of the General Staff and Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”. (_C-78_)

There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the military figures—Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

D. _Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R._

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic. The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_, received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R., which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation (_2353-PS_). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these terms:

“* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of the _Wi Rue_ together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.

“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of 1940.

“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:

“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.

“2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

“3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.

“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).

“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.

“These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.”

“Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.

“For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office, resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.” (_2353-PS_)

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas held a conference, with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows:

“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.

“Essential Points:

“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. _Purpose_: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.

“2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.

“3. Clear statement that _the organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration_. Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

“4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:

_a._ Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.

_b._ Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complimentary districts.

“5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term _war economy_ inspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.

“6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. _The main mission of the organization_ will consist of _seizing raw materials and taking over all_ _important concerns_. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).

“After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week.

“Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.

“Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.

“(signed:) Hamann”. (_1317-PS_)

Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (_447-PS_). The order stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and political administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated his authority to the Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_ (Thomas). (_447-PS_)

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain the organizational set-up of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_. (_Oldenburg_ was the code name given to this economic counterpart of _Barbarossa_.) Section I of the report of this conference (_1157-PS_) deals with the general organization of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ as it had developed. The report begins:

“_Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941_ I. _Welcome_

“Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.

“_Barbarossa—Oldenburg_

“As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of _all_ economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.

“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (_Chef Wi Rue Amt_).

“Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the _Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties_ under the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.

“His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:

5 economic inspectorates

23 economic commands

12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.

“These offices are used in the _military rear area_; the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

“A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.

“In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.

“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the _entire_ economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.

“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ down to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into three large groups, i.e.

“_Group H_ dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization.

“_Group L_ which concerns itself with all questions of feed and agriculture, and

“_Group W_ which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers; further questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation.

“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.” (_1157-PS_)

The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel and staffing problems, and similar details.

These documents portray the calculated method with which the Nazi conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage an attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The story of how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.)

E. _Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression._

As has already been indicated, and as will be later more fully developed, there were both economic and political motives for the action of the Nazi conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. The economic aspects have been discussed. Equally elaborate planning was engaged in by the Nazi conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim of their aggression. That political aim may be described as the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful political factor in Europe, and the acquisition of _Lebensraum_. For the accomplishment of these purposes the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent Rosenberg.

As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his staff, prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R. (_1017-PS_). This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. The memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This memorandum begins:

“_Subject: The U.S.S.R._

“Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come into being through the annexation of states of a related or even of an essentially alien character.

“A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present not so many military as administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the _political_ goal which is to be attained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations.

“If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one may conclude that:

“1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;

“2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain;

“3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this necessitates and the great directives for the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all together in one place.

“It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the area to be occupied which are essential to Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been assured.

“Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia’s population the following national or geographical units:

“_a._ Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.

“_b._ White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.

“_c._ Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

“_d._ The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.

“_e._ The Don area with Rostov as its capital.

“_f._ The area of the Caucasus.

“_g._ Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.” (_1017-PS_)

The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or geographical units thus listed in some detail. At the end of the paper the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly outlines his plan in these terms:

“_Summary_

“The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points briefly outlined here:

“1. The creation of a central department for the occupied areas of the U.S.S.R., to be confined more or less to wartime.

“Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would be the task of this department—

“_a._ To issue binding political instructions to the separate administration area, having in mind the situation existing at the time and the goal which is to be achieved.

“_b._ To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the occupied areas.

“_c._ To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and food;

“2. The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the separate administration area, grouped together by race or by reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

“As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent it.

“The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.

“2.4.41” (_1017-PS_)

It is evident that the “presently envisaged” administration operating on a purely economic basis, to which this memorandum objects, was the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ which was set up under Goering and Thomas.

Rosenberg’s statement of the political purpose of the invasion and his analysis of methods for achieving it apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Fuehrer Order dated 20 April 1941 he was named “Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East-European Region”. This order is part of a correspondence file regarding Rosenberg’s appointment (_865-PS_). Hitler’s order reads as follows:

“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.

“An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him.

“The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.

“Fuehrer’s Headquarters 20th April 1941. “The Fuehrer (signed) Adolf Hitler “Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery (signed) Dr. Lammers” (_865-PS_)

This particular copy of the Fuehrer’s Order was enclosed in a letter which Dr. Lammers wrote to Keitel requesting cooperation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a Deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows:

“The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery “Berlin W8 21st April 1941 VossStrasse 6

At present Fuehrer Headquarters, mail without exception to be sent to the Berlin address.

“To: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel

“Personal. By courier.

“My dear General Field Marshal.

“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East-European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister of Economics and you, yourself.

“Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him.

“It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office, with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.

“I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

“Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, Dr. Lammers.” (_865-PS_)

Keitel wrote Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of his compliance with the request:

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. “25 April 1941 “Most Secret “By courier

“To:

“The Head of the Reich Chancellery,

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

“Personal

“Dear Reich Minister.

“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.

“Heil Hitler “Yours very sincerely, “K. 25/4” (_865-PS_)

Keitel also wrote Rosenberg, telling of his compliance with Lammers’ request:

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces “25th April 1941 “Most Secret “By courier

“To:

“Reichsleiter Rosenberg

“_Personal._

“Dear Reichsleiter,

“The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.

“Heil Hitler “Yours very sincerely, “K. 25/4” (_865-PS_)

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg began building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient. All the documents now discussed were found in Rosenberg’s files.

In a memorandum dated 8 May 1941, entitled “General Instructions for all Reichcommissars in the occupied Eastern Territories”, Rosenberg gives instructions to his chief henchmen and outlines clearly the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the English translation the following remarks appear:

“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from the Great Russian (_gross-russisch_) pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever.

“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commissariat Eastland (_Ostland_) including White Ruthenia will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in the following instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for all Reich Commissars.” (_1030-PS_)

The fifth paragraph presents an interesting rationalization of a contemplated robbery:

“The German people has achieved, in the course of centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real estate property was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of compensation and restitution of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich Commissariat.” (_1030-PS_)

“An Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia” (_1029-PS_) is typical of the directives issued to each of the appointed commissioners. This order is amazingly frank in outlining the intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their aggression. It begins:

“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have, constantly been in close relationship with the German people. A 700 year old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a European direction, and has added this region to the living space of Greater Germany.

“The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White Russia [last words added in pencil] must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.

“For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of germanizing or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly germanized to the extent of 50% by Danish, German and Swedish blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller than in Esthonia. In this country stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanization (on the East Prussian border).”

* * * * * *

“The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly Germanized land, is to be established as a mighty, German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilization from Bolshevism. For the rest, the solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.” (_1029-PS_)

These two directives are sufficiently typical of the lot to show the extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby. They are reinforced by a later report of Rosenberg’s. On 28 June 1941, less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April (_1039-PS_). This report makes disclosures concerning the number of conspirators who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all the ministries and offices of both the State and the Party were involved in this operation. The report was found in Rosenberg’s files and, although it is rather long, it is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups and organizations to justify quotation in full:

“_Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions_

“Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer’s decree of 20.4.1941 a conference with the Chief of the OKW [Armed Forces High Command] took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the Chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (_OK-stellung_) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (_Abkommandierung_) by command of the Chief of the OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office.

“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of people of the East-European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the Military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.

“Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme Commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done.

“Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (_Reichswirtschaftsminister_) Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war-economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff (_Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab_) East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary (_Staatssekretaer_) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I am in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economies, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.). After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners.

“The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department ‘Enlightenment and Press’ (_Aufklaerung und Presse_) and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

“Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (_Gebiet_) Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Maingovernment. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (_Kreise_). In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above-named command of the Chief of the OKW.

“In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader (_Reichsaerztefuehrer_) Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service.

“Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present.

“Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader (_Korpsfuehrer_) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff (_Stabschef_) of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader (_Reichsorganisationsleiter_), who has instructed the commander of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in connection with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions.

“Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer [SS Lt Gen] Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.

“Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements.

“The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine, influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.

“As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and the State. I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General and Chief commissariats more than 900 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces—not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefore all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer’s decree.

“The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer’s order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantial work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have been scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic—political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. A department of ‘Law, Finance, and Administration’ has been taken over by Regierungspraesident Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department ‘Enlightenment and Press’. It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (_Reichspressechef_) for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.

“Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far-reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide.” (_1039-PS_)

(As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff, it will be shown how all this planning and preparation for the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor were actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection as a European Power.)

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: “I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast; that the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. The Nazi conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

F. _The Motives for the Attack._

It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany bound by solemn covenant not to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward the territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of “Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy” (_2353-PS_), that insofar as the German-Soviet trade agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end. Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw material being thus delivered was considered essential to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about maintaining their obligations. At page 315 of his book Thomas says:

“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.

“The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.” (_2353-PS_)

Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more forcefully:

“In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.” (_2353-PS_)

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty obligations with Germany, but she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. A file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command, covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack (_C-170_), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be sufficient to quote a few entries, which include reports from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. Entry 165 reads:

“165 A 22.29 4 June

“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany.” (_C-170_)

Entry 167 reads:

“167 A 22.53 6 June

“Ambassador in Moscow reports * * * Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly—as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good.” (_C-170_)

Entry 169 also reiterates this point:

“169 A 22.65 7 June

“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow * * *. All observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing.” (_C-170_)

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. No doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative, “_Drang Nach Osten_,” had been a cardinal principle of the Party almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German ambition, and acquisition of _Lebensraum_. Economically, it offered opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein Kampf_, where he stated, at page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English edition:

“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special examination the relation of Germany to Russia:

“1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs; and

“2. This question is also the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”

Again, at page 654 of the same edition:

“And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil policy of the future.

“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes, previously discussed, of the organization which Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a speech which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of the East, he restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with the economic goal (_1058-PS_). A short extract from that speech reads as follows:

“The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from these of the Western people. The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. An historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today.” (_1058-PS_)

As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Britain had served further to strengthen them in their belief in the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the previous discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory to be occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable. If any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine, regardless of the consequences to the Russian people which such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum showing clear and conscious recognition by the Nazis that their plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people. (_2718-PS_)

On 20 June 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum along a similar line, in which he stated that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw materials (_1456-PS_). This policy expressed the theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This memorandum reads, in part:

“The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:

“1. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical endeavors. It is impossible to try and manufacture everything we lack, by synthetic procedures, or other measures. For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them.

“At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks respectively to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances.” (_1456-PS_)

On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to an end. In view of the solemn pledge of nonaggression; the base and sinister motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a) │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 6; V. │ I │ 27, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│ │ │Headquarters signed by Hitler and │ │ │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, │ │ │concerning plans for prosecution of war │ │ │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │ │ │Greece. (GB 116) │ III │ 403 │ │ │ *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │ │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │ │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │ │Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 │ │ │ *447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941,│ │ │concerning Directives for special areas.│ │ │(USA 135) │ III │ 409 │ │ │ *864-PS │Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on │ │ │conference between Hitler and Chief OKW │ │ │concerning future relations of Poland to│ │ │Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609) │ III │ 619 │ │ │ *865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg│ │ │and Lammers, April 1941, concerning │ │ │appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW│ │ │representatives with Rosenberg. (USA │ │ │143) │ III │ 621 │ │ │ *872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │ │Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │ │“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African │ │ │operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626 │ │ │ *873-PS │Top secret memorandum of discussion with│ │ │the Chief “L”, 30 April 1941, about the │ │ │invasion of Russia. (USA 137) │ III │ 633 │ │ │ 874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J, │ │ │and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │ │Deception measures. │ III │ 634 │ │ │ 876-PS │Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941, │ │ │concerning Deception of the enemy. │ III │ 635 │ │ │ 886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │ │courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │ │civilians in the district “Barbarossa”, │ │ │signed by Keitel for Hitler, and │ │ │initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637 │ │ │ *1017-PS │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1 │ │ │regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 142) │ III │ 674 │ │ │ *1019-PS │Appendix to Memorandum No. 2. │ │ │Recommendation as to the personnel for │ │ │the Reich Commissariats in the East and │ │ │for the Political Central Office in │ │ │Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823) │ III │ 681 │ │ │ *1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│ │ │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May │ │ │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia │ │ │File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690 │ │ │ *1030-PS │General instructions for all Reich │ │ │Commissars in the Occupied Eastern │ │ │Territories, 8 May 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg file. (USA 144) │ III │ 692 │ │ │ 1034-PS │Minutes of discussion concerning │ │ │Construction and Administration, 22 June│ │ │1941. │ III │ 693 │ │ │ *1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 │ │ │ *1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │ │ │Rosenberg before people most intimately │ │ │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│ │ │his “Russia File”. (USA 147) │ III │ 716 │ │ │ 1156-PS │Report to Goering from Chief of Office │ │ │for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 │ │ │March 1941. │ III │ 808 │ │ │ *1157-PS │Report on conference, 29 April 1941, │ │ │concerning top secret plan for Economic │ │ │exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg │ │ │Plan). (USA 141) │ III │ 811 │ │ │ *1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German Intelligence│ │ │Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6 │ │ │September 1940. (USA 130) │ III │ 849 │ │ │ 1316-PS │Top secret note for files on conference │ │ │of 21 March 1941 concerning employment │ │ │of Quartermaster General. │ III │ 908 │ │ │ *1317-PS │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a │ │ │discussion of the economic exploitation │ │ │of Russia, presided over by General │ │ │Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140) │ III │ 911 │ │ │ *1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel │ │ │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │ │ │148) │ IV │ 21 │ │ │ *1517-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning │ │ │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│ │ │1941. (USA 824) │ IV │ 55 │ │ │ *1799-PS │Annex 1 to report of Chief of General │ │ │Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, │ │ │concerning planned operation in the │ │ │East. (USA 131) │ IV │ 374 │ │ │ *1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 │ │ │ *2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ │Facts for History of German War and │ │ │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 │ │ │ *2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │ │discussion with State Secretaries about │ │ │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378 │ │ │ 3014-PS │Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring, │ │ │former German military attache in │ │ │Moscow, concerning planning for the │ │ │attack on the USSR in early August 1940.│ V │ 734 │ │ │ 3031-PS │Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21 │ │ │November 1945, stating that first │ │ │directive for campaign against USSR was │ │ │issued in August 1940. │ V │ 740 │ │ │ 3032-PS │Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, │ │ │21 November 1945, stating that the │ │ │projected campaign against USSR was │ │ │first made known to him at conference │ │ │with Jodl, 29 July 1940. │ V │ 741 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ 3579-PS │Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the │ │ │status of deliveries under │ │ │German-Russian economic agreement, 28 │ │ │September 1940. │ VI │ 276 │ │ │ *C-33 │Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning │ │ │operation “Barbarossa” and “Marita”. │ │ │(USA 133) │ VI │ 846 │ │ │ *C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, │ │ │p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852 │ │ │ C-37 │References to operation “Barbarossa” in │ │ │the German Naval War Diary, June 1941. │ VI │ 854 │ │ │ *C-38 │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting │ │ │decision on action against enemy │ │ │submarines and Order to attack Soviet │ │ │submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) │ VI │ 855 │ │ │ *C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │ │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138) │ VI │ 857 │ │ │ *C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │ │1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │ │treatment of civilians in the USSR for │ │ │offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB│ │ │162) │ VI │ 871 │ │ │ C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │ │for destruction of all copies of Order │ │ │of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without │ │ │affecting its validity. │ VI │ 875 │ │ │ C-53 │Order signed by Keitel, 20 September │ │ │1940, concerning Military Missions to │ │ │Rumania. │ VI │ 877 │ │ │ C-54 │Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning │ │ │military activities in Rumania. │ VI │ 877 │ │ │ *C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command to│ │ │Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146)│ VI │ 908 │ │ │ *C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │ │convening conference on Barbarossa on 14│ │ │June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909 │ │ │ C-150 │Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu,│ │ │18 June 1941. │ VI │ 963 │ │ │ *C-170 │File of Russo-German relations found in │ │ │OKM files covering period 25 August 1939│ │ │to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) │ VI │ 977 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 │ │ │ *TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │ │and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │ │September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │ 375 │ │ │ Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │ │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │ │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756 │ │ │ Statement XV │Why Hungary Went to War Against the │ │ │Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., │ │ │Nurnberg, 3 May 1946. │ VIII │ 767

13. COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The conspirators then projected the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New World of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies aboard a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.

A. _Formal German—Japanese—Italian Alliances._

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936 (_2508-PS_). This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937 (_2506-PS_).

It is an interesting fact—especially in light of the evidence to be presented regarding Ribbentrop’s active participation in collaboration with the Japanese—that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler’s Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin—a ten-year military-economic alliance (_2643-PS_). Again Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister: This Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and collaboration with each other in the establishment of a “new order” in Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part:

“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:

“Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

“Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

“Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

* * * * * *

“Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.” (_2643-PS_)

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish the “new order” presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938.

A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, is relevant in this connection. Mr. Hull declared:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of United States in the determining of this country’s policies.” (_2944-PS_)

No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. Nevertheless, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy—the record of a conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This record, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, reads:

“_File Memorandum_

“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the following subjects:

“1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.

“2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (_Abwehr_), he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only in case of war.

“3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.” (_2195-PS_)

B. _Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan_

The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and against those with whom they contemplated war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back” by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world.

The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

(1) _Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth._ At least as early as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. (_1834-PS_)

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their “strictly confidential and purely personal information,” with the further note that “these statements are of fundamental significance for orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report stated, in part:

“Strictly secret “Extract

“from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.”

* * * * * *

“After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM] regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

“* * * Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect? (_1834-PS_)

Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare against England, he said:

“* * * Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

“1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

“2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

“3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.” (_1834-PS_)

The subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument is noteworthy. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty.

The remainder of Ribbentrop’s argument shows something of the real nature of the German-Japanese alliance:

“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened; Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.” (_1834-PS_)

The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, is clear. The participation of the German military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression is shown in a Top Secret order signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled “Basic Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan” (_C-75_). It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. Two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the prosecution. Document _C-75_ is Copy No. 2 of the order, distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (the OKM). Copy No. 4, designed for the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_—the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces—was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff was Jodl.

Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan (_C-75_). It reads:

“TOP SECRET “Only by Officer

“Armed Forces High Command (OKW)

Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)

No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

“Fuehrer’s Headquarters 5 March 1941 [Various handwritten notations and stamps] “14 copies “2nd copy “Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan

“The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

“1. It must be the _aim_ of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible _to take active measures in the Far East_. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

“The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The “Barbarossa” operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—“slightly exaggerated”]

“2. _To prepare the way_ for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the _Japanese military potential_ with all means available.

“For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

“In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.

“3. The _harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties_ is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

“This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

“_a._ The _common aim_ of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

“_b._ The great successes achieved by Germany in _mercantile warfare_ make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

“_c._ The _raw material situation_ of the _pact powers_ demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

“_d._ The _seizure of Singapore_ as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

“A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

“4. In the _military commissions_ to be formed in accordance with the _Three Power Pact_, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the _three_ participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of _economic warfare_.

“The working out of the details is the responsibility of the “Main Commission” with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

“The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

“Signed in draft: Keitel

“Correctness certified by JUNGE Lieutenant Commander” (_C-75_)

It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators’ cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases.

A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 (_C-75_) and was attended by Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record of this meeting discloses that Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy, made the following calculations:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (_C-152_)

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of this meeting establishes this:

“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.” (_C-152_)

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives:

“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

“The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

“He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.”

* * * * * *

“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

“In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

“In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be united.” The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.”

* * * * * *

“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

“The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.” (_1877-PS_)

On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were also found in German Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following exchange:

“* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.”

* * * * * *

“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.

“In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

“1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

“2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

“3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (_1882-PS_)

Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. _And_ Japan had better get the positions she wants _during_ the war. Ribbentrop’s assurances, (_1877-PS_) that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict, and his continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the Japanese.

The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1, states:

“The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (_1538-PS_)

The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.

(2) _Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R._

The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese “stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan (_C-75_), the Nazi conspirators had been preparing “_Fall Barbarossa_”, the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation”. (_C-75_)

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. (_1877-PS_)

Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo (_2896-PS_). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows:

“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.”

* * * * * *

“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.” (_2896-PS_)

Ott’s reply to this telegram (_2897-PS_), dated 13 July 1941, was as follows:

“Telegram (Secret Cipher System) “Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs. Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs. As fast as possible! “#1217 dated 13.7 for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs

Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941

“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.

Ott.” (_2897-PS_)

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents, covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these exhortations.

The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The discussion proceeded as follows:

“_Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942._

“He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.” (_2911-PS_)

Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of “so sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The conference went as follows:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.

“The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.

“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.”

* * * * * *

“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready for that”. (_2954-PS_)

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference reveal the following:

“The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment.” (_2929-PS_)

(3) _Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific.

In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments, respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.

(_a_) _Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States._ The Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (_R-140_). The statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of his long speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued:

“I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.” (_R-140_)

Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators’ schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war—_at that time_.

Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force (_376-PS_). This memorandum is marked “_Chefsache_”—the German designation for Top Secret—and is directed from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a “brief resumé of the military questions current here”, is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph 5 states:

“5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:—

“a. No operational commitment

“b. Portuguese neutrality

“c. Support of France and Spain

“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

“Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.” (_376-PS_)

The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by paragraph 7:

“7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.” (_376-PS_)

Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy, reads:

“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies:

“1. _In general_: The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the _Army_ to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.

“_Naval_ armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America. “The main effort in armament will be shifted to the _Air Force_, which must be greatly increased in strength.” (_C-74_)

(_b_) _Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ From the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the United States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States.

It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with the Japanese (_C-75_), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3_a_ as aiming at “forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war”. Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the framework of that policy the possibility of the United States’ entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on United States’ possessions practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in subparagraph 3 (_c_):

“_c. The raw material situation of the pact powers_ demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.” (_C-75_)

The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below subparagraph 3 (_d_):

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).” (_C-75_)

In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States’ interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also clearly envisaged by Raeder in his meeting of March 1941 with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which he stated:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (_C-152_)

Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of U.S. involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in (_1834-PS_), Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise intervention by Japan was bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved:

“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.” (_1834-PS_)

In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggests coordinated action. He indulged in a typical bit of Nazi cynicism:

“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.” (_1834-PS_)

Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop—this time in a conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka—discussed the possible involvement of the United States. (_1877-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States and could lead the U.S. to involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict. This fact is clear from the report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 April 1941 (_1881-PS_). The report states, in part:

“* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese.

“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.”

* * * * * *

“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?” (_1881-PS_)

The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were. This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German military-attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (_1538-PS_). The attache reports the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States. In paragraph 1, this sentence appears:

“Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (_1538-PS_).

A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view of their press of commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R., set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in war at that time. Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Islands document (_376-PS_). They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of the move against Singapore. They knew also that the Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operational plans against the United States. They knew at least part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and pushed their Eastern allies still farther along that course. On 4 April 1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan were to become involved in war with the United States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike without delay. The following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941:

“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.” (_1881-PS_)

Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States:

“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (_1881-PS_)

Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end there. Another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister, dated 30 November 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read as follows:

“The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is very great. The Japanese Government since it sent Ambassador Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he told me. He is convinced that this position is in our favor and makes the United States think that her entry into the European war would be risky business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These differences of opinion concern, for example, the further treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest (one word missing) however resulted from the U. S. attempt to make the three-power agreement ineffective. U. S. suggested to Japan to conclude treaties of nonaggression with the U. S., the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty obligations and for this reason American demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions promised by the U. S. and merely mentioned that grave decisions were at stake. “The U.S. is seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.

“Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and she hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the Three Power Agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.

“Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U. S. note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these circles America’s position, especially in the China question, is very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-U. S. negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the Axis powers.” (_2898-PS_)

Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano during the period 3 December to 8 December 1941 fill in the picture (_2987-PS_). These are taken from notes which Ciano jotted down in the course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5 December read:

“_December 3._

_Wednesday_

“Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said: “We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939.” What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

“_December 4._

_Thursday_

“Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it. * * *”

“_December 5._

_Friday_

“A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn’t * * *.” (_2987-PS_)

It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement was reached. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without previous warning or declaration of war commenced an attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, four days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on the United States. (_2507-PS_)

The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United States resolved that “the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared”. (_2945-PS_)

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, even probability of such involvement as a result of the actions they were encouraging; they were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the United States; and they accepted the consequences by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a U.S.-Japanese conflict result. In dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured. But those documents which have been discovered, and introduced into evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

The entry in the Ciano Diary for 8 December 1941 gives an interesting sidelight on Ribbentrop’s reaction to the Japanese sneak attack:

“_December 8._

_Monday._

“A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the “long run” I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis.” (_2987-PS_)

A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The subject matter was the Pearl Harbor attack. The top secret notes of this conference read in part:

“* * * First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.

“The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration of war!” This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike—as hard as possible, indeed—and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the future.” (_2932-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ │ 7; V. │ I │ 28, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *376-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by Major │ │ │Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, concerning│ │ │current military questions, including │ │ │question of occupation of Atlantic │ │ │Islands referring to the United States. │ │ │(USA 161) │ III │ 288 │ │ │ *1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in │ │ │Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, 24│ │ │May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100 │ │ │ *1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 │ │ │ *1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │ │Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │ │1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499 │ │ │ *1877-PS │Report on conversation between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin, 29 │ │ │March 1941. (USA 152) │ IV │ 520 │ │ │ *1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop, in │ │ │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522 │ │ │ *1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ │and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │ │(USA 153) │ IV │ 526 │ │ │ *2195-PS │File memorandum on conversation with │ │ │Oshima, 31 January 1939, signed Himmler.│ │ │(USA 150) │ IV │ 852 │ │ │ 2506-PS │Protocol of Adherence by Italy to │ │ │Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 November 1937, │ │ │published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, 1940, 4th edition. │ V │ 239 │ │ │ *2507-PS │Note from Ribbentrop to U. S. Charge │ │ │d’Affaires in Berlin, 11 December 1941, │ │ │containing German Declaration of War on │ │ │United States, published in Documents of│ │ │German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1, No. │ │ │74, pp. 497-9. (USA 164) │ V │ 241 │ │ │ *2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │ │Communist International, 25 November │ │ │1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents of│ │ │German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242 │ │ │ *2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power Pact│ │ │between Germany, Italy and Japan, 27 │ │ │September 1940, signed by Ribbentrop for│ │ │Germany. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │ │ │II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355 │ │ │ *2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │ │Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July 1941. │ │ │(USA 155) │ V │ 564 │ │ │ *2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │ │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │ │(USA 156) │ V │ 566 │ │ │ *2898-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador to │ │ │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 30 November │ │ │1941. (USA 163) │ V │ 566 │ │ │ *2911-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │ │and Oshima, 9 July 1942. (USA 157) │ V │ 580 │ │ │ *2929-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │ │and Oshima, 18 April 1943. (USA 159) │ V │ 603 │ │ │ *2932-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ │Oshima, 14 December 1941. (USA 165) │ V │ 603 │ │ │ 2944-PS │Statement by U. S. Secretary of State, │ │ │27 September 1940, published in Peace │ │ │and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, │ │ │1931-1941. │ V │ 624 │ │ │ 2945-PS │Joint resolution by the U. S. Senate and│ │ │House of Representatives declaring state│ │ │of war with Germany, 11 December 1941, │ │ │published in Peace and War, U. S. │ │ │Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. │ V │ 625 │ │ │ *2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │ │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │ │(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658 │ │ │ *2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │ │166) │ V │ 689 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ 3598-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ │Tokyo to Berlin, 30 November 1941. VI │ 308 │ │ │ │ 3599-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ │Rome to Tokyo, 3 December 1941. │ VI │ 310 │ │ │ 3600-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ │Tokyo to Berlin, 6 December 1941. │ VI │ 312 │ │ │ 3733-PS │Minutes of interview held on 19 August │ │ │1941, between Vice-Minister Aman and │ │ │Ambassador Ott. │ VI │ 545 │ │ │ *3780-PS │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with │ │ │Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning Japanese│ │ │treatment of American terror pilots. (GB│ │ │293) │ VI │ 655 │ │ │ *3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │ │Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. (USA│ │ │790) │ VI │ 752 │ │ │ *C-74 │Top Secret Order concerning personnel │ │ │and materiel program, signed by Hitler, │ │ │14 July 1941. (USA 162) │ VI │ 905 │ │ │ *C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, signed│ │ │Keitel, 5 March 1941, concerning │ (USA │ │collaboration with Japan. │ 151) │ VI │ │ │ C-147 │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed │ │ │by Hitler, 12 November 1940. │ VI │ 957 │ │ │ *C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 │ │ │March 1941, concerning audience of │ │ │C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March │ │ │1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966 │ │ │ *D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │ │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │ │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │ │December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160 │ │ │ *D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │ │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │ │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │ │December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163 │ │ │ *R-140 │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant, │ │ │Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing │ │ │transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 July│ │ │to representatives of aircraft industry.│ │ │(USA 160) │ VIII │ 221