m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards,

Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the _Landesleitung_ from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” (_812-PS_)

(2) _Germany’s Preparation for the Use of Force._ When news of the Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered preparation for the march into Austria. He made diplomatic preparations by explaining in a letter to Mussolini the reasons why he was going to march into Austria. In the absence of von Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The entry for the 10th of March 1938 reads:

“By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (_Gauleiter_) Buerckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.

“Prepare case Otto.

“1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

“Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

“1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.” (_1780-PS_)

In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11 March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed political and military intentions:

“1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

* * * * * *

“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

“I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.” (_C-102_)

An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided further:

“If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

“The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question”. (_C-103_)

The military preparations for invasion were complete.

(3) _The Events of 11 March in Austria._ The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty.

The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by Schuschnigg (_2996-PS_). Schuschnigg first states that he had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March 10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m. Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-Horstenau. Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was in a rage. (_2996-PS_)

Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by the German Government:

“Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour, and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to carry out a plebiscite concerning the Anschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier’.

“I further state and say that after informing the Federal President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.

“Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows:

‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows:

‘“The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so”’.

“I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, and, after some conversation with him and other members of the Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p. m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal Chancellor.

“I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.

“I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March 1938 ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force * * *.” (_2996-PS_)

The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer’s report corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (_812-PS_)

Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27 telephone conversations, held in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on 11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler (_2949-PS_). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then beginning again with AA).

The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as S. The transcript is in part, in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the following conversation occurred:

“F: How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?

“S: No.

“Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

“F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?

“S. The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 p. m.

“F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

“Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer. Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05.

“F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (_2949-PS, Part A_)

Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet.

An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna. He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be legalized promptly:

“Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?

“Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even discuss that.

“Goering: With all of its organizations.

“Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.

“Goering: In uniform?

“Dombrowski: In uniform.

“Goering: Good.

“Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right.” (_2949-PS, Part C_)

In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by 7:30 p. m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart, as to who should be appointed to the cabinet:

“Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.

“Dombrowski: That’s understood.

“Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.

“Dombrowski: Yes, yes.

“Goering: Give me the name.

“Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right?

“Goering: Yes?

“Dombrowski: Yes.

“Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (_2949-PS, Part C_)

About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as follows:

“G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations (again interruption) and then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.” (_2949-PS, Part E_)

An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied:

“Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order”. (_2949-PS, Part H_)

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows:

“G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all right?

“S. But if he threatens?

“G. Yes.

“S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (_antreten_).

“G. Call me via Blitz.” (_2949-PS, Part H_)

It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and invasion by German troops.

Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows:

“G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?

“S: Yes.

“G: Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any difference.

“S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.

“G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.

“S: Yes.

“G: Well, now you are officially authorized.

“S: Yes.

“G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (_2349-PS, Part I_)

Another historical event—the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to help put down disorder—was discussed over the telephone. A conversation held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows:

“G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied.

“K: Well, we represent the Government now.

“G: Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes:

‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible’.

“K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?)” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows:

“G: Then our troops will cross the border today.

“K: Yes.

“G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.

“K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal Chancery.

“G: Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.

“K: Yes.

“G: Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at 3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone.

And an hour later, at 9:54 p. m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows:

“D: I need the telegram urgently.

“K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.

“D: This is marvelous. Thank you.

“K: Listen to the radio. News will be given.

“D: Where?

“K: From Vienna.

“D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?

“K: _Jawohl!_” (_2949-PS, Part M_)

(4) _The Order to Invade Austria._ Communications with Austria were now suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

“Re: Operation Otto

“_Directive No. 2_

“1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

“2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

“The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

“3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER” (_C-182_)

(5) _Communications with Rome—Avoidance of Disaster._ But at the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds—Italy. Italy had massed forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July 1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

At 10:25 p. m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a very-friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus:

“Hesen: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.

“Fuehrer: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.

“H: Yes.

“F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.

“H: Yes, I told him that, too.

“F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.” (_2949-PS, Part N_)

It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (_1780-PS_) to the letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March 1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote: “I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.” He stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile intentions toward Italy. (_2510-PS_)

After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.” (_2467-PS_)

(6) _The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor._ Late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p. m. (_2465-PS_)

(7) _Later Communications with London—Misleading Explanations._ On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and misled other nations:

“G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (_Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaft_). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.

“R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?

“G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (_Volksreferenten_) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally; all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherland Front (_Vaterlandische Front_) would fight to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. * * *”

* * * * * *

“G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

“R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?

“G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting explanations—that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attache, came along merely to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and place:

“G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

“R: I shall see you this afternoon.

“G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.

“R: That is marvelous.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as follows:

“My Lord,

“With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.

“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time.” (_3045-PS_)

The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows:

“Dear Reich Minister,

“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding _inter alia_, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.

“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.

“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.” (_3045-PS_)

Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s independence:

“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.” (_3287-PS_)

Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events:

“* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.

“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people.” (_3287-PS_)

In light of the documents already adverted to, this version of events given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.

F. _The Invasion and Absorption of Austria._

(1) _The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in Fact._ In accordance with the directive of March 11 (_C-182_), the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing and purporting to justify the invasion (_TC-47_). The British Government and the French Government filed protests.

The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz and they both expressed their joy over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. (_2485-PS_)

A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what was happening in Vienna:

“Secretary of State,

Washington.

70, March 12, noon.

“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible union’.

“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian legion.

“SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.

“Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested.

“Himmler and Hess here.

WILEY” (_L-292_)

(2) _Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law._ The law-making machine was put to work on the task of consolidation. First, Miklas was caused to resign as President (_2466-PS_). Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President. He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of 13 March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion passed the same day (_2307-PS_). This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich.

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides:

“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty between that State and the principle Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, * * *”

Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.”

This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938, concerning the question of reunion. But this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union. It could not undo Germany’s union with and control over Austria. To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (_2936-PS_). Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and People; Jewish officials, as defined, were not permitted to take the oath. (_2311-PS_)

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich laws, including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and the 1933 law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler, Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. (_1060-PS_)

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to ensure acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna (_2935-PS_). The ballot, addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked the voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification” on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (_1659-PS_). The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13. (_2307-PS_)

(3) _The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions._ Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that it did (with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression. The conference of the conspirators held on November 5, 1937, which laid plans for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food, through expulsion of a million people, and an increase in fighting strength in part through the improvement in frontier. (_386-PS_)

Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready cash, taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. (_2313-PS_)

Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss, there was enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for active military service. (_1660-PS_)

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938:

“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.” (_L-172_)

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of their second phase of their aggressions. Czechoslovakia was next.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │ 23-24, │ (a, b); V. │ I │ 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 │ │ │August 1939 and report from Gauleiter │ │ │Rainer to Reichskommissar Gauleiter │ │ │Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the │ │ │NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March │ │ │1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586 │ │ │ **1060-PS │Order pursuant to law concerning Reunion│ │ │of Austria with German Reich, 16 March │ │ │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ │249. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ III │ 717 │ │ │ *1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, on │ │ │his parting visit with Chancellor │ │ │Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103 │ │ │ **1659-PS │Second Order concerning Plebiscite and │ │ │Election for the Greater German │ │ │Reichstag of 24 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 170 │ │ │ 1660-PS │Decree for registration for active │ │ │service in Austria in the year 1938 of │ │ │16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 631. │ IV │ 171 │ │ │ *1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28 │ │ │August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305 │ │ │ *1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │ │February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ │72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ *2219-PS │Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart │ │ │to Goering, 14 July 1939. (USA 62) │ IV │ 854 │ │ │ *2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │ │September 1936, concerning Danube │ │ │situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930 │ │ │ *2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 May │ │ │1935, concerning intention of Austrian │ │ │government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930 │ │ │ *2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July │ │ │1935, concerning National Socialism in │ │ │Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932 │ │ │ *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with │ │ │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB │ │ │133) │ IV │ 997 │ │ │ **2310-PS │First Decree of Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor concerning Introduction of │ │ │German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March │ │ │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ │247. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 1004 │ │ │ **2311-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor │ │ │concerning Administration of the Oath to│ │ │Officials of Province of Austria, 15 │ │ │March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ │I, p. 245. (Referred to but not offered │ │ │in evidence.) │ IV │ 1005 │ │ │ **2313-PS │Order for Transfer of Austrian National │ │ │Bank to Reichsbank, 17 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 254. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 1006 │ │ │ **2367-PS │Hitler’s speech of 1 May 1936, published│ │ │in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │ │German edition, 2-3 May 1936. (Referred │ │ │to but not offered in evidence.) │ IV │ 1101 │ │ │ *2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 │ │ │August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23 │ │ │ *2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting of│ │ │Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February │ │ │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (GB │ │ │132) │ V │ 206 │ │ │ *2463-PS │Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, │ │ │11 March 1938, published in Documents of│ │ │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(USA 703) │ V │ 207 │ │ │ **2464-PS │Official Austrian communique of the │ │ │reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet │ │ │and general political amnesty, 16 │ │ │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 208 │ │ │ **2465-PS │Announcement of appointment of │ │ │Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, 11 │ │ │March 1938, published in Documents of │ │ │German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 209 │ │ │ **2466-PS │Official communique of resignation of │ │ │Austrian President Miklas, 13 March │ │ │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 209 │ │ │ 2467-PS │Hitler’s telegram to Mussolini from │ │ │Linz, 13 March 1938, published in │ │ │Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol.│ │ │VI, Part 1. │ V │ 210 │ │ │ **2469-PS │Official German and Austrian communique │ │ │concerning equal rights of Austrian │ │ │National Socialists in Austria, 18 │ │ │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 210 │ │ │ **2484-PS │Official German communique of visit of │ │ │Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to │ │ │Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938, │ │ │published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 234 │ │ │ **2485-PS │Address by Federal Chancellor │ │ │Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City Hall │ │ │at Linz, 12 March 1938, published in │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI, │ │ │Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to but not│ │ │introduced in evidence.) │ V │ 234 │ │ │ 2510-PS │Hitler letter to Mussolini, 11 March │ │ │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 135-7, │ │ │No. 24. │ V │ 244 │ │ │ **2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 July│ │ │1934, published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. 38. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 441 │ │ │ 2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary and │ │ │Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German │ │ │Government to Reich Chancellery, │ │ │inclosing report on Political situation │ │ │in Austria, 14 January 1937. │ V │ 498 │ │ │ *2832-PS │Entry for July 26, 1934 from Ambassador │ │ │Dodd’s diary. (USA 58) │ V │ 500 │ │ │ 2909-PS │Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 November│ │ │1945. │ V │ 578 │ │ │ **2935-PS │Order concerning establishment of Reich │ │ │Propaganda Office in Vienna, 31 March │ │ │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ │350. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ V │ 604 │ │ │ **2936-PS │Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor, concerning the Austrian │ │ │Federal Army, 13 March 1938, published │ │ │in Documents of German Politics, 1938, │ │ │Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to │ │ │but not offered in evidence.) │ V │ 604 │ │ │ *2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from Air │ │ │Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA 76) │ V │ 628 │ │ │ *2968-PS │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer │ │ │concerning plaque erected in Austrian │ │ │Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │ │ │Dollfuss. (USA 60) │ V │ 677 │ │ │ 2985-PS │Telephone message of Mr. Hadow, British │ │ │Legation, Vienna, to Sir John Simon, 26 │ │ │July 1934. │ V │ 687 │ │ │ **2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ │Austrian-German Treaty of 11 July 1936. │ │ │(USA 66) (Objection to admission in │ │ │evidence upheld) │ V │ 703 │ │ │ 2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ │his visit to Berchtesgaden on 12 │ │ │February 1938. │ V │ 709 │ │ │ 2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ │events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713 │ │ │ *3045-PS │Letter, 12 March 1938, to British │ │ │Embassy enclosing letter from Henderson │ │ │to Halifax, 11 March 1938. (USA 127) │ V │ 765 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ 3062-PS │Memorandum found in Goering’s office, 19│ │ │November 1936, concerning Guido Schmidt,│ │ │Foreign Minister of Austria under │ │ │Schuschnigg. │ V │ 868 │ │ │ *3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │ │Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │ │704) │ V │ 961 │ │ │ *3270-PS │Goering’s speech on 27 March in Vienna, │ │ │published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183. (USA │ │ │703) │ V │ 1047 │ │ │ *3271-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 19│ │ │August 1939. (USA 700) │ V │ 1047 │ │ │ *3287-PS │Letter from von Neurath to Henderson, 12│ │ │March 1938. (USA 128) │ V │ 1090 │ │ │ *3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, │ │ │28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100 │ │ │ 3390-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 25│ │ │October 1937. │ VI │ 105 │ │ │ 3392-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │ │September 1937. │ VI │ 109 │ │ │ 3395-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │ │September 1937. │ VI │ 113 │ │ │ *3396-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Jury. │ │ │(USA 889) │ VI │ 114 │ │ │ *3397-PS │Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, 8 │ │ │January 1938. (USA 702) │ VI │ 115 │ │ │ 3400-PS │Minutes of meeting of German │ │ │Association, 28 December 1918, and │ │ │Constitution and By-Laws thereof found │ │ │in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for │ │ │period of 1918 to 1943. │ VI │ 118 │ │ │ *3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │ │Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, 10│ │ │December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124 │ │ │ 3467-PS │Law on Limitation of travel to Republic │ │ │Austria 29 May 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p. │ │ │311. │ VI │ 169 │ │ │ *3471-PS │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21 │ │ │February 1938, with enclosures noting │ │ │activity of Leopold as leader of │ │ │Austrian Nazis and possible appointment │ │ │of Klausner as his successor. (USA 583) │ VI │ 195 │ │ │ *3472-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 │ │ │February 1938, requesting that Leopold │ │ │be forbidden to negotiate with │ │ │Schuschnigg except with approval of │ │ │Reich authorities. (USA 582) │ VI │ 196 │ │ │ *3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │ │January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │ │intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197 │ │ │ 3574-PS │Filing notice regarding discussion │ │ │between Chief of CI and Chief of Foreign│ │ │CI on 31 January 1938, 2 February 1938, │ │ │signed Canaris. │ VI │ 265 │ │ │ 3576-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 19 │ │ │February 1938, with enclosure reporting │ │ │on situation in Austria as of 18 │ │ │February. │ VI │ 271 │ │ │ 3577-PS │Letter presumably from Buerkel to │ │ │Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March 1938, │ │ │concerning Aryanization of Jewish-held │ │ │business in Austria and disposition of │ │ │resulting funds. │ VI │ 275 │ │ │ *C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │ │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │ │74) │ VI │ 911 │ │ │ *C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March 1938,│ │ │on conduct towards Czech or Italian │ │ │troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913 │ │ │ *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ │69) │ VI │ 1006 │ │ │ *C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander │ │ │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March │ │ │1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017 │ │ │ *L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ │Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │ │German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 │ │ │May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890 │ │ │ *L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to State │ │ │Department, 23 November 1937, regarding │ │ │his visit to Warsaw. (USA 70) │ VII │ 894 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 │ │ │ *L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │ │1938, concerning anniversary of │ │ │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │ │(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094 │ │ │ L-281 │Text of Schuschnigg radio address of 11 │ │ │March 1938, contained in telegram from │ │ │American Legation in Vienna to the │ │ │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938. │ VII │ 1096 │ │ │ L-291 │Telegram from American Embassy Berlin to│ │ │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938, │ │ │concerning Austrian situation. │ VII │ 1097 │ │ │ *L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in │ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │ │1938, concerning propaganda dropped over│ │ │Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098 │ │ │ L-293 │Telegram from American Legation in │ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │ │1938. │ VII │ 1098 │ │ │ *TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │ │Government and Government of Federal │ │ │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │ 369 │ │ │ *TC-26 │German assurance to Austria, 21 May │ │ │1935, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ │Part III, p. 94. (GB 19) │ VIII │ 376 │ │ │ TC-47 │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of │ │ │Austria, 12 March 1938. │ VIII │ 398 │ │ │ Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 643 │ │ │ **Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780 │ │ │ **Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 │ │ │ **Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. _Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression._

In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a program of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This program was intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food-reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when the Nazi conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia they had reached approximately the halfway point in this preliminary program.

The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. The events of this conference are contained in the so-called Hossbach minutes. The question for Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at this meeting, is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest cost (_386-PS_). At the top of his agenda stood two countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German intentions toward Czechoslovakia.

A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. On 21 April 1938, Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretexts which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war. In the alternative, and this alternative they found to be preferable, they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given to the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. (_388-PS, Item 2_)

Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning.

B. _The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations._

This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of amicable German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they had in the fall of 1937 determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and by assurances freely given to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice,

“* * * all disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy. * * *” (_TC-14_)

The preamble of this treaty stated:

“The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States; have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect. * * *” (_TC-14_)

Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward Czechoslovakia were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11 and 12 March 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time Goering assured M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the developments in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement: “_Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort_” (“I give you my word of honor”) (_TC-27_). At the same time von Neurath, who was handling German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured M. Mastny on behalf of Hitler and the German government that Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925 (_TC-27_).

C. _Planning for Aggression._

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In both countries the Nazi conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed. The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. Thenceforth _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted to Case Green (_Fall Gruen_), the designation given to the operation against Czechoslovakia.

The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret “Directive for the Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War”, signed by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July 1937, included as a probable warlike eventuality, for which a concentration plan was to be drafted, Case Green (“War on two fronts with the main struggle in the southeast”) (_C-175_). The original section of this directive dealing with the “probable war” against Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition:

“The war in the east can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand.” (_C-175_)

After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such action, the directive continues as follows:

“2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for this attack.

“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning, and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.” (_C-175_)

The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding principles the following statement:

“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces * * * to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur.” (_C-175_)

It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without public announcement “in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as regards strength and time of attack.” (_C-175_). This directive is, of course, a directive for staff planning. But the nature of the planning, and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.

Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938. On the political level this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders-in-chief on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938 Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to Germany, who had suggested an interchange of views (_2786-PS_). An acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter was signed by Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:

“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.” (_2786-PS_)

D. _Development of Specific Plans._

At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time (_388-PS, Item 2_). This meeting was followed in the late spring and summer of 1938 by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green. These notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, Hitler’s headquarters, near Berchtesgaden. This file, preserved intact, is document (_388-PS_).

The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovak armament and defense. This interest is reflected in _Item 4_ of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in General Jodl’s office of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters; _Item 12_, Short survey of Armament of the Czech Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed “Z” for Zeitzler; and _Item 13_, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated Berlin, 9 June 1938 and classified “Most Secret”. The following are four of the questions on which Hitler wanted authoritative information:

“Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

“Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

“Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?” (_388-PS, Item 13_)

These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.

As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier of Germany. A telegram, presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, read in part as follows:

“Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Keitel: * * * The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the west.” (_388-PS, Item 8_)

In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack. It was decided that preparations for X-day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October.

On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This conference was the occasion on which Hitler made known to the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators the outlines of his plan to attack Czechoslovakia and issued the necessary instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler’s adjutant:

“FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

“From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I served as adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties were to handle correspondence and complaints addressed to the Fuehrer’s office. Occasionally I attended conferences held by the Fuehrer.

“I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery of all the people who were important, from the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this conference, as I recall, included Goering, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and General von Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the following statement: ‘It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map.’ Hitler then revealed the outlines of the plan to attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the Generals, saying: ‘So, we will first tackle the situation in the East. Then I will give you three to four years’ time, and then we will settle the situation in the West.’ The situation in the West was meant to be the war against England and France.

“I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on leaving the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath: ‘Well, what do you say to these revelations?’ Neurath thought that the situation was not so serious as it appeared and that nothing would happen before the spring of 1939.

“/s/ Fr. Wiedemann.” (_3037-PS_)

In the months after the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler made no secret of this meeting. In a speech before the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler spoke as follows:

“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there, I had resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action against this state by October 2. I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West.” (_2360-PS_)

Hitler also referred to this conference in his meeting with President Hacha on 15 March 1939. (_2798-PS_)

Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is _Item 11_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). Entitled “Two front war with main effort in the Southeast,” this directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the “Directive for Unified Preparation for War” promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (_C-175_). This directive represented a further development of the ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as _Item 5_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Keitel to General von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the Luftwaffe. In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured “as from 1 October 1938 at the latest”. (_388-PS, Item 11_)

This document, which is the basic directive under which the _Wehrmacht_ carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as follows:

“1. _Political Prerequisites._

“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

“2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action._

“The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

“_a._ suitable obvious cause and, with it

“_b._ sufficient political justification,

“_c._ action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

“From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

“But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part—which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent—before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

“3. _Conclusions for the Preparation of “Fall Gruen”._

_a._ For the _Armed War_ it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures already in peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

“_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

“4. _Tasks of the Armed Forces._

“Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

“_a._ The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

“_b._ For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

“_c._ The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time _at the same time_ as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.

“For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.

“5. _Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces._

“_a._ _Army_: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle, of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the _West_ must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration ‘Gruen’. Independent of this, a first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The _remaining frontiers_ as well as East Prussia, are to be only weakly protected. But, always depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

“_b._ _Air Force._ While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the Army * * *.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy the directive continues as follows:

“In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war-economic strength by rapidly reconnoitering and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations—insofar as military operations permit.—can be of decisive importance to us.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before the date of their planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which the Czech industrial plant would make to the Nazi war economy. The last paragraph of this directive reads as follows:

“All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.

“(Signed) ADOLF HITLER “Certified copy “(Signed) Zeitzler “Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not supersede the 30 May directive. It reads, in part:

“The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.”

* * * * * *

“However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”

* * * * * *

“The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.”

“K [Initialed by Keitel] Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]” (_388-PS, Item 14_)

The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of the possibility that, during the execution of Case Green, France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute _Item 15_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), give a timetable of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.

Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in three entries in General Jodl’s diary written in the spring of 1938 (_1780-PS_). Although the first entry is not dated, it appears to have been written several months after the annexation of Austria:

“After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

“The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

“Because of Germany’s self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for ‘green’ on 30 May.

* * * * * *

“_23 May_:

“Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L).”

* * * * * *

“_30 May_:

“The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate breakthrough into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.” (_1780-PS_)

E. _Luftwaffe Participation in Early Planning for Case Green._

During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further expansion of the Reich. A Top Secret Document, dated 2 June 1938, was issued by Air Group Command 3 and entitled “Plan Study 1938: Instruction for Deployment and Combat: Case Red.” (_R-150_). This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable progress, at this date, in planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia. Various possibilities under which war with France may occur are noted: all of them are predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict:

“France will

“_a_ either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of ‘Case Green’, or

“_b_ start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.

“_c_ It is possible but not likely that France will begin the fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”

* * * * * *

“Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of ‘Case Green’ or whether she makes the opening move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.” (_R-150_)

By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia, south of Upper Silesia, for suitable landing grounds. This action is disclosed by a report of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938 (_1536-PS_). This was a Top Secret document, for General Officers only, of which only two copies were made. Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German air attache in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. The first four paragraphs of the enclosure read:

“I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities.

“For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.

“I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.

“I used my official car (_Dienst Pkw_) for the journey to Freudenthal, taking precautions against being observed.” (_1536-PS_)

By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum entitled “Extended Case Green,” which consisted of an estimate of possible action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia (_375-PS_). This Top Secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe General Staff is dated at Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France will declare war on Germany during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. The first two sentences read as follows:

“The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.” (_375-PS_)

F. _Negotiations with Italy and Hungary about Case Green._

Knowledge of pending action against Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi conspirators. A captured document from German Foreign Office files contains a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938 (_2800-PS_). At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed “For the Reichsminister [Ribbentrop] only.” This note reads:

“Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months’ holiday now which he could not do later on.

“Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister.” (_2800-PS_)

A month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin, asking that he be told the date on which Case Green would take place. The German response is outlined in a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico, signed “R” (for Ribbentrop) and dated 23 August 1938:

“On the voyage of the ‘Patria’ Ambassador Attolico explained to me that he had instructions to request the notification of a contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from the German government.

“In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. In any case, the Italian government will be the first one Who will receive such a notification.

“23 Aug 1938 “R (initial).” (_2791-PS_)

Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the pending attack. The conversation is recorded in another German Foreign Office Memorandum:

“Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to communicate the following:

“He had received another written instruction from Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French frontier.’

“Berlin, 27 August 1938 “R

“N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision.

“Berlin, 2 September 1938.” (_2792-PS_)

Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. It will be recalled that in early March 1938 Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi planning (_2786-PS_). At that time the decision was in the negative. But by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack.

From August 21st to 26th Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited Germany. Admiral Horthy witnessed the launching of the _Prince Eugen_ and conferred with Hitler. There were discussions of the Czechoslovak question. A captured German Foreign Office document, signed by von Weizsäcker, records the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 August 1938 (_2796-PS_). In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement, and said:

“Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well.” (_2796-PS_)

Von Weizsäcker’s memorandum reads as follows:

“Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1 or 2 more years’ time for its development should be allowed.

“Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.

“The Hungarian reply thus, remained a conditional one. Upon, the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conference—the time of Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.

“In the meantime, more positive language was used by von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary’s intention to participate on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.

“When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon, he was very relieved _when the Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded nothing of Hungary_. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs, he would have no objections.” (_2796-PS_)

By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that in the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. Another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum reports a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. The last paragraph of this memorandum states:

“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today’s conversation von Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary’s military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1st of this year.” (_2797-PS_)

The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears to be that of von Weizsäcker.

These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are corroborated by General Jodl’s diary. The entry for 21-26 August reads as follows:

“_21-26 August_:

“Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (_Reichsverweser_). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz.

“They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

“Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.” (_1780-PS_)

The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September. Jodl’s diary entry for that day states:

“_6 September_:

“Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

“Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer—especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.” (_1780-PS_)

G. _Final Preparations for the Attack._

The setting in which these events took place was that of the Munich Pact and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September 1938, frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world. These statesmen, unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the Nazi conspirators.

The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-unknown story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers reveal the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in negotiating the Pact of Munich as a stepping-stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a snare and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi conspirators. The nature of the trap is indicated by the events of the weeks just preceding the Munich agreement.

With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supply.

On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled “Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures” (_388-PS, Item 17_). This memorandum demonstrates clearly the complicity of the OKW and of Keitel and Jodl, in the fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch. The memorandum reads as follows:

“_TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES_

“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

“The army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW _also demands_ that the X order be given _not later than 1400 on X minus 1_.

“To this the following must be said:

“Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for this incident is of the utmost importance.

“It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

“If the _Fuehrer_ intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises.

“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air-attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

“If, for technical reasons, the _evening hours_ should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the _Wehrmacht_ has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the _Abwehr_ Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

“I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these points.

“J [Jodl] 26/8.” (_388-PS, Item 17_)

In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August.

On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (_388-PS, Item 18_). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state:

“_Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch_: Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘_Gruen_’. Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

“_Fuehrer_: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.

“?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility of “drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt noted:

“The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces.)” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the pending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. The 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary states:

“_8 September_:

“General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

“General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

“I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

“In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

“We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl), (X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o’clock). The ‘Y time’ has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.” (_1780-PS_)

Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s minutes are _Item 19_ in his file (_388-PS_). In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:

“_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept, if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.

“_The Fuehrer_: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

“_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

“_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.” (_388-PS, Item 19_)

From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the intricate planning required before the attack. On 11 September Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of International Law and exploiting those of the Czechs. The 11 September entry in the Jodl diary reads as follows:

“_11 September_:

“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

“The joint preparations for refutation (_Wiederlegung_) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.” (_1780-PS_)

This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, Jodl’s section of the OKW (_C-2_). Seven copies of this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table are as follows:

“1_a_. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.

“2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed;

“3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.

“4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.

“5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.

“6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.

“7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.

“8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.

“9. Churches are used for military accommodation.

“10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.” (_C-2_)

From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing the _Reichsarbeitsdienst_, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows:

“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

“(signed) ADOLF HITLER.” (_388-PS, Item 20_)

Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is _Item 21_ in the Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which would receive military training. This is _Item 24_ in the Schmundt file. (_388-PS_)

Two entries in Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows:

“_15 September_:

“In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

“_16 September_:

“General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg.

“With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech border.

“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General Jodl referred to appears as _Item 22_ in the Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order provide:

“The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.”

* * * * * *

“However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work of the Lines.” (_388-PS, Item 22_)

The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five participating armies—the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—was set forth (_388-PS, Item 26_). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green (_388-PS, Item 31_). Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views. These notes are _Item 54_ in the Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs read:

“_COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY._

“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.” (_388-PS, Item 54_)

A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two paragraphs read:

“_Thus it is proposed_:

“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)” (_388-PS, Item 54_)

On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is _Item 32_ in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message read:

“As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (_388-PS, Item 32_)

Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read:

“_26 September_:

“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

“In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.

“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

“A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

“The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority.

“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

“2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.

“_27 September_:

“1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as _Item 33_ of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression:

“MOST SECRET “_MEMORANDUM_

“At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘_Gruen_’ on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:

“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

H. _The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia._

The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the north, west, and south.

The Czechoslovak government’s official report for the prosecution and trial of German major war criminals, entitled “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia,” shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with Hitler’s NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of the _Sudeten Volksport_, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established the “German Home Front” (_Deutsche Heimatfront_), which the following spring became the Sudeten German Party (_Sudeten-deutsche Partei—SDP_). Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to “honest democracy” and to the Czech state. His party, none-the-less, was built on the basis of the Nazi _Fuehrerprinzip_, and he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy“. The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press; the campaign against “bolshevism” was intensified; terrorism in the Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization, patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established, known as the FS (_Freiwilliger Selbstschutz_, or Voluntary Vigilantes). On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, Henlein came into the open with his “Karlsbad Program”. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten-Germans to profess “German political philosophy”, which, it was clear, meant National Socialism. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these included:

(1) _Espionage._ Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.

(2) _Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia._ The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural centers gradually underwent “_Gleichschaltung_”, i.e., “purification”, by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institution.

(3) _German Direction and Leadership._ The Henleinists maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with _Saenger Feste_ (choral festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.

(4) _Propaganda._ Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the false report of “Russian troops and airplanes” centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population.

(5) _Murder and Terrorism._ The Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the Nazi Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad Henlein quoted on page 29 of “Four Fighting Years”, a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of the _Wiener Verwaltungsakadamie_, he discussed the “fight for the liberation of the Sudetens” in the following terms:

“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * * in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich.” (_2863-PS_)

I. _Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation._

The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland agitation.

A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument of the Nazi conspirators (_3060-PS_). The Henlein party, it appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads as follows:

“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises;

“1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.

“2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of “_Zeit_” (Time) is to be improved.

“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (_Volksschutzgesetze_) and ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed.

“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.

“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.

“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.

“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party.” (_3060-PS_)

The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (_2789-PS_). This letter, dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign Office files, states:

“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.

“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith.

“We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

“The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.

“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

“I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.

“Heil Hitler, “Loyally yours, “/s/ Konrad Henlein.” (_2789-PS_)

This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy toward Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the German minister in Prague to feel free to suggest “early personal” talks.

Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with Hitler himself. The captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March read as follows:

“The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party * * *”

* * * * * *

“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.

“Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (_mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle_), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

“In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.

“Berlin, 29 March 1938. “R [Initial]” (_2788-PS_)

Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz represented the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. (_2788-PS_)

In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, the attack on Czechoslovakia, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months. The entry for 22 May 1938 in General Jodl’s diary reads as follows:

“22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein” (see enclosure). (_1780-PS_)

The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing.

It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans (_2863-PS_). The foregoing documents show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore, from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. A secret memorandum, captured in the German Foreign Office files, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds. This memorandum reads:

“MEMORANDUM

“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.

“Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.^{*}

“Berlin, 19 August 1938 /s/ Woermann

^{*} “_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten marginal note].” (_3059-PS_; _also 3061-PS_)

As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August the Air Attache at the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten-German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the company of the local leader of the FS (the Henlein equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech army—a fact which, the attache noted, served as excellent camouflage.

The Air Attache’s report reads in part as follows:

“The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.

“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s private car for the trip.

“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.

“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.” (_1536-PS_)

In the latter part of the Air Attache’s report reference is made to the presence of reliable agents and informers (_V-Leute_) apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein Party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the _Abwehrstelle_, the intelligence office in Breslau. (_1536-PS_)

In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent the following telegram to the German Legation in Prague:

“Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.

“(signed) ALTENBURG” (_2858-PS_)

Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.

As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder in the Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two countries. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in Prague, dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is dated 16 September:

“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.

“Woermann.” (_2855-PS_)

The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two paragraphs read:

“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:

“The Reich Government has decided that:

“(_a_) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the week.

“(_b_) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (_2854-PS_)

The third telegram was sent on 24 September:

“According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result.

“(signed) WOERMANN” (_2853-PS_)

On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last paragraph read:

“Confidential:

“Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.

“WOERMANN” (_2856-PS_)

In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and his followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nurnberg speech in which he accused “this Benes” of “torturing” and planning the “extermination” of the Sudeten-Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful _Reichssender_ radio station his determination to lead the Sudeten-Germans “home to the Reich” and denounced “the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague”. From his headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was assigned to Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of 17 September Koechling received far-reaching military powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly stated: the “maintenance of disorder and clashes”. _Item 25_, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled Most Secret reads as follows:

“Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt. Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.” (_388-PS, Item 25_)

General Jodl’s diary gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired manner. Jodl’s entries for 19 and 20 September 1938 state:

“_19 September_:

“Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

“_20 September_:

“England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

“Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.” (_1780-PS_)

A report from Henlein’s staff, which was filed in Hitler’s headquarters, boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps in the following terms:

“Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the _enemy_.” (_388-PS, Item 30_)

In this document the word “attack” was subsequently crossed out, and the word “defense” substituted. Similarly “the enemy” was changed to read “the Czech terrorists”.

In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in close touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and with the SS and SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was Oberfuehrer Gottlob Berger, who in later years became prominent in the SS command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows:

“I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make the following statement:

“1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW _Abwehr_, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred with Henlein.

“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s headquarters I became familiar with the composition and activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the paper figure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command. In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades, and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal. Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.

“3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.

“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same.

“(Signed) Gottlob Berger” (_3036-PS_)

[1] “(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).”

Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration with the SD, (_Sicherheitsdienst_) Himmler’s intelligence organization. An affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads as follows:

“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

“1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI). In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and Munich.

“2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence Office, which has been established there. This Service Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.

“3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed before Heydrich and Himmler.

“4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it was only a small quantity.

“5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.

“The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

“(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.” (_3029-PS_)

Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS _Totenkopf_ battalions were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch. _Item 36_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28 September, states:

“Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (_388-PS, Item 36_)

According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary these SS Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from Hitler. (_1780-PS_)

As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia (_388-PS, Item 37_). On 28 September Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order of the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory:

“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

“As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (_388-PS, Item 34_)

On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler:

“1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_:

“The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

“It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_388-PS, Item 38_)

J. _Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich Agreement._

Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (_TC-23_)

On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.

During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the _Wehrmacht_ had been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia” (_388-PS, Item 39_). This directive contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:

“2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

“The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation ‘_Gruen_’.” (_388-PS, Item 39_)

It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces:

“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (_388-PS, Item 39_)

The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (_388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42_). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (_388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49_)

On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21 October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date (_388-PS, Item 51_). On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (_388-PS, Items 52, 53_)

As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’s _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the _Sudetengau_. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ constituted itself as the _National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei_ (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators.

K. _Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia._

With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the union of the _Volksdeutsche_, the people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the _Volksdeutsche_ in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words:

“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”

* * * * * *

“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.” (_2358-PS_)

Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. _Item 48_ of the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were the questions:

“Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?

“Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or moving up of new forces?

“Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures?

“Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of October 1st?” (_388-PS, Item 48_)

Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.

On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new conquests:

“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

“Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

“1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

“2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

“3. The occupation of the Memelland.”

* * * * * *

“It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for ‘_Gruen_’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time ‘_Grenzsicherung West_’ (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.

“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

“_a. Army_

“The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.

“_b. Air Force_

“The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

“For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.” (_C-136_)

This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters.

Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order provides:

“2. _COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38._

“Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

“The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces _only_, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.

“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

“Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. “KEITEL” (_C-138_)

This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of Raeder.

As the _Wehrmacht_ moved forward with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s handwriting:

“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (_2795-PS_)

L. _Extension of Fifth Column Activity_

As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the _Wehrmacht_ alone to accomplish their calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See _2858-PS_.)

By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to become _Volksgruppenfuehrer_, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows:

“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.

“HENCKE” (_2859-PS_)

Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office:

“_On the question of payments to KARMASIN_

“Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.

“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.

“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments will continue.

“Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.

“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.

“/s/ WOERMANN” (_2794-PS_)

This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia.

Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style:

“To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS _never_ want to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS want _full independence_ with strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK.

“An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives.

“The _Jewish problem_ will be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.

“The _Germans_ in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.

“The _German influence_ with the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.

“At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS.

“The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows:

“After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.” (_2790-PS_)

It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive:

“I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (_2790-PS_)

It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.

In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespasses on its sovereignty. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, published in _Boehmen und Maehren_, the official periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941, page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations:

“The SS on March 15, 1939

“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (_Freiwilliger Selbstschutz_), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.

“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”

* * * * * *

“In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.

“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *” (_2826-PS_)

The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (_D-571_, _D-572_) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the French Yellow Book. (_2943-PS_)

In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British government:

“Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)

Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:

“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows—

“1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.

“2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution.

“3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin.

“4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.

“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks “ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS” (_3030-PS_)

At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_; _2943-PS_)

M. _Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force._

At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation:

“Your Excellency,

“My sincere thanks.

“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the life of Hungary.

“In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.

“I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.

“Your devoted friend. “(Signed) HORTHY”

“Budapest. 13.3.1939.” (_2816-PS_)

From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was advanced somewhat.

On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure:

“_Telegram in secret code_

“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

“In case you should get any written communication from President HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech government wants to communicate with you during the next few days.

“(Signed) RIBBENTROP”. (_2815-PS_)

On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for truth:

“* * * Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people or even a single soldier to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. He would not tolerate it, and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.

“The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.” (_2802-PS_)

Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State Meissner.

While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of 13 March a German plane was placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.

With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open revolt against the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves was hostile. Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks and especially against members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that the situation was intolerable and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble which Prague had become in the heart of Europe.

After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs Chancellery. They found there Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. The captured German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be remembered that this account of the conference of the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and must be read as an account biased by its source.

Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even humble. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer’s hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then in his seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his country, because “it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene.” The conference proceeded as follows, with Hitler speaking:

“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the Lower Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw the final consequences because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time, and also later in his conversations with Chvalkovsky, he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benes’ tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things, which, to him, were a symbol of the whole situation. At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his conclusions because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission, such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was.

“Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my [restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty.

“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.’

“That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his proposals stated above.

“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.

“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.” (_2798-PS_)

In reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in the four hours left to him before the German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, that might be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final, that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, which included Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, for their support. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. At this point Hacha and Chvalkovsky retired from the room. (_2798-PS_)

A dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, published in the British Blue Book, describes a conversation with Goering in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth (_2861-PS_). Dispatch No. 77 in the French Yellow Book from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting (_2943-PS_). The following account of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, as well as from the captured German minutes (_2787-PS_). (Cf. also _3061-PS_.)

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reichs Chancellery, he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was on hand for that purpose. It appears that he was given an injection to sustain him during the ordeal. When the two Czechs returned to the room the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the _Wehrmacht_. They reminded him that in three hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the border. Goering boasted of what the German _Wehrmacht_ would do if Czech forces resisted the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Goering said, his Luftwaffe would blast half Prague into ruins in two hours. And that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 in the morning signed the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him. This Declaration of 15 March 1939 reads:

“the President of the Czechoslovak State * * * entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.” (_TC-49_)

While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the representatives of the Czech government, the _Wehrmacht_ had in some areas already crossed the Czech border. The Czech industrial centres of Maehrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz, close to the Silesian and Polish borders, were occupied by German troops and SS units during the early evening of 14 March. An article in the German military magazine, the _Wehrmacht_, of 29 March 1939 describes the movement of German troops during the occupation:

“From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the Ostmark, seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the command of the Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps, had already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and Maehrisch Ostrau.

“The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection, while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were given the same mission for Moravia.

“For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly reconnaissance planes and antiaircraft artillery) as well as parts of the _SS Verfuegungstruppen_ were placed at the disposal of the two army groups.

“On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border and then moved on with utmost precision. * * *” (_3571-PS_)

(Other descriptions of the military movements of 14 and 15 March are contained in documents _2860-PS_, _3618-PS_, and _3619-PS_.)

At dawn on 15 March German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly, “Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” (_TC-50_)

On the following day, in direct contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German Reich under the name of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” This decree, signed in Prague on 16 March 1939 by Hitler, Lammers, Frick, and Ribbentrop, commenced with this declaration:

“The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the living space of the German people.” (_TC-51_)

The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia henceforth was to be subjugated to Germany. A German Protector was to be appointed by the Fuehrer for the so-called Protectorate. The German Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs and their excise. It was specified that German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. (_TC-51_)

At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia, who at German insistence had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the independence of their week-old state was in fact qualified. A Treaty of Protection between Slovakia and the Reich was signed in Vienna on 18 March and by Ribbentrop in Berlin on 23 March (_1439-PS_). A secret protocol to this treaty was also signed in Berlin on 23 March by Ribbentrop for Germany, and by Tuka and Durcansky for Slovakia (_2793-PS_). The first four articles of this treaty provide:

“The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments have agreed on the following provisions.

“ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its territory.

“ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

“The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.

“Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

“German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

“ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

“ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German Government.” (_1439-PS_)

The secret protocol provided for close economic and financial collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German government. Article I, Paragraph 3, provided:

“(3) Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s disposal. The entire soil-research (_Bodenforschung_) will be placed under the Reich agency for soil-research (_Reichsstelle fuer Bodenforschung_). The government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation to determine whether the present owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been neglected.” (_2793-PS_)

In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant evidence that they considered Slovakia a puppet State, in effect a German possession. A memorandum of information given by Hitler to von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939 deals in the main with problems arising from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. It states in part:

“Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

“Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.

“_Czech Protectorate._

“H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the threat of severe penalties.

“We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia _without_ paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February though shall be paid for.

“Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.” (_R-100_)

The German conquest of Czechoslovakia in direct contravention of the Munich agreement was the occasion for formal protests from the British (_TC-52_) and French (_TC-53_) governments, both dated 17 March 1939. On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States issued a statement which read in part as follows:

“* * * This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close and friendly relations.” (_2862-PS_)

N. _The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions._

With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in Berlin on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). This program of conquest had been intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders.

Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic:

“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (_1301-PS, Item 10_)

In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German government concerned with war production, read as follows:

“1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39 of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible. * * *” (_R-133_)

In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s conclusions as follows:

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these words:

“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.”

* * * * * *

“* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.” (_1874-PS_)

The absorption of the Sudetenland, effected on 1 October 1938, in practical effect destroyed Czechoslovakia as a military power. The final conquest of Czechoslovakia came on 15 March 1939. This conquest had been the intention and aim of the Nazi leaders during the preparations for Case Green in the summer of 1938, and had been forestalled only by the Munich agreement. With Czechoslovakia, less than six months after the Munich agreement, securely in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had achieved their objective. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Reich, shortening German frontiers and adding the Czech manufacturing plant to the German war potential. The puppet state of Slovakia, conceived in Berlin and independent only in name, had been set up to the east of Moravia. In this state, which outflanked Poland to the south, the Nazi army, under the terms of the treaty drafted by Ribbentrop, took upon itself the establishment of bases and extensive military installations. From this state in September 1939 units of the German Army did, in fact, carry out the attack on Poland.

Logic and premeditation are patent in each step of the German aggression. Each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned as a stepping-stone to new and more ambitious aggression. The words of Hitler in the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, are significant,

“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_)

It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In his lecture at Munich on 7 November 1943 Jodl spoke as follows:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the Reich:

“The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortifications had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid.” (_789-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │ │ (a, c); V. │ I │ 22, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│ │ │(USA 84) │ III │ 280 │ │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *998-PS │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │ │ │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official │ │ │Report for the prosecution and trial of │ │ │the German Major War Criminals by the │ │ │International Military Tribunal │ │ │established according to Agreement of │ │ │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│ │ │91) │ III │ 656 │ │ │ *1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │ │including minutes of conference with │ │ │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │ │1938, concerning acceleration of │ │ │rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 │ │ │ *1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │ │and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 March│ │ │and in Berlin 23 March 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB │ │ │135) │ IV │ 18 │ │ │ *1536-PS │Report of Luftwaffe General Staff, │ │ │Intelligence Division, 12 August 1938, │ │ │on reconnaissance by German Air Attache │ │ │at Prague for airfields in │ │ │Czechoslovakia, enclosing report of the │ │ │Air Attache, Major Moericke, 4 August │ │ │1938. (USA 83) │ IV │ 96 │ │ │ *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ │72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ *1874-PS │Notes on conference between Goering, │ │ │Mussolini and Ciano, 15 April 1939. (USA│ │ │125) │ IV │ 518 │ │ │ 2358-PS │Speech by Hitler in Sportspalast, │ │ │Berlin, 26 September 1938, from │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │ │ │27 September 1938. │ IV │ 1100 │ │ │ *2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │ │January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January │ │ │1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101 │ │ │ *2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419 │ │ │ *2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │ │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │ │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │ │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 March │ │ │1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422 │ │ │ *2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │ │Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424 │ │ │ *2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop, │ │ │Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │ │(USA 110) │ V │ 425 │ │ │ *2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │ │Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │ │August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426 │ │ │ *2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ │conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │ │Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 September│ │ │1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426 │ │ │ *2793-PS │Confidential protocol concerning │ │ │economic and financial collaboration │ │ │between the German Reich and State of │ │ │Slovakia. (USA 120) │ V │ 427 │ │ │ *2794-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │ │payments to Karmasin, 29 November 1939. │ │ │(USA 108) │ V │ 429 │ │ │ *2795-PS │Handwritten postscript by Ribbentrop to │ │ │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ │Ribbentrop-Chvalkovsky conversation, 21 │ │ │January 1939. (USA 106) │ V │ 430 │ │ │ *2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │ │conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop│ │ │and von Weizsäcker and the Hungarian │ │ │Ministers Imredy and von Kanya, 23 │ │ │August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430 │ │ │ *2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │ │conversation between Ribbentrop and von │ │ │Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432 │ │ │ *2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │ │meeting between Hitler and President │ │ │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │ │ │(USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433 │ │ │ *2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │ │conversation with Attolico, the Italian │ │ │Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA 85) │ V │ 442 │ │ │ *2801-PS │Minutes of conversation between Goering │ │ │and Slovak Minister Durkansky (probably │ │ │late fall or early winter 1938-39). (USA│ │ │109) │ V │ 442 │ │ │ *2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ │conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │ │Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │ │Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443 │ │ │ *2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German │ │ │Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. (USA │ │ │116) │ V │ 451 │ │ │ *2816-PS │Letter from Horthy, the Hungarian │ │ │Regent, to Hitler, dated Budapest, 13 │ │ │March 1939. (USA 115) │ V │ 451 │ │ │ *2826-PS │The SS on March 15, 1939, an article by │ │ │SS-Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank, in │ │ │magazine Bohemia and Moravia, May 1941, │ │ │p. 179. (USA 111) │ V │ 472 │ │ │ *2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │ │1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521 │ │ │ *2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ │German Legation in Prague, 17 September │ │ │1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521 │ │ │ *2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ │German Legation in Prague, 16 September │ │ │1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522 │ │ │ *2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │ │1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522 │ │ │ *2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ │German Legation in Prague, 19 September │ │ │1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523 │ │ │ *2859-PS │Telegram from German Legation, Prague, │ │ │to Consulate at Bratislava, 22 November │ │ │1938. (USA 107) │ V │ 523 │ │ │ *2860-PS │Document No. 10 in the British Blue │ │ │Book. Speech by Lord Halifax in the │ │ │House of Lords, 20 March 1939. (USA 119)│ V │ 523 │ │ │ *2861-PS │Document No. 12 in the British Blue │ │ │Book. Dispatch from Sir Nevile Henderson│ │ │to British Foreign Office, 28 May 1939, │ │ │relating details of conversation with │ │ │Goering. (USA 119) │ V │ 524 │ │ │ *2862-PS │Document No. 126 in Peace and War. │ │ │Statement by Acting Secretary of State │ │ │Sumner Welles, 17 March 1939. (USA 122) │ V │ 525 │ │ │ **2863-PS │Lecture by Konrad Henlein, delivered in │ │ │Vienna, 4 March 1941. Quoted in “Four │ │ │Fighting Years”, Czechoslovak Ministry │ │ │of Foreign Affairs, London, 1943, pp. │ │ │29-30. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) (USA 92) │ V │ 525 │ │ │ 2906-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of meeting│ │ │between Hitler and Chvalkovsky, the │ │ │Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 21 │ │ │January 1939. │ V │ 571 │ │ │ *2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │ │73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow Book.│ │ │Excerpts from eight dispatches from M. │ │ │Coulondre, the French Ambassador in │ │ │Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, │ │ │between 13 and 18 March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608 │ │ │ **3029-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ │November 1945, on activities of the SD │ │ │along the Czechoslovak border during │ │ │September 1938. (USA 103) (Objection to │ │ │admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 738 │ │ │ 3030-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ │November 1945, on relationship between │ │ │the SD and pro-Nazi Slovak groups in │ │ │March 1939. │ V │ 739 │ │ │ **3036-PS │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the │ │ │composition and activity of the Henlein │ │ │Free Corps in September 1938. (Objection│ │ │to admission in evidence upheld.) (USA │ │ │102) │ V │ 742 │ │ │ 3037-PS │Affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, 21 │ │ │November 1945, on the meeting between │ │ │Hitler and his principal advisers in │ │ │Reichs Chancellery on 28 May 1938. │ V │ 743 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │ │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │ │Sudeten-German Party between 1935 and │ │ │1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855 │ │ │ *3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in Prague │ │ │to Foreign Office in Berlin about policy│ │ │arrangements with Henlein, 16 March │ │ │1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856 │ │ │ *3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │ │Czechoslovak Report entitled German │ │ │Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” (document│ │ │998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857 │ │ │ 3571-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache, │ │ │Berlin, including an article in magazine│ │ │Wehrmacht, 29 March 1939, describing │ │ │occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by │ │ │German troops. │ VI │ 264 │ │ │ 3618-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │ │Berlin, 20 March 1939, concerning │ │ │occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 389 │ │ │ 3619-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │ │Berlin, 19 April 1939, concerning │ │ │occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 398 │ │ │ 3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │ │1938, concerning his conversation with │ │ │Ciano about the Polish demands made on │ │ │Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400 │ │ │ *3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │ │1946, concerning the activities of │ │ │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation for │ │ │occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA 805) │ VI │ 778 │ │ │ *C-2 │Examples of violations of International │ │ │Law and proposed counter-propaganda, │ │ │issued by OKW, 1 October 1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799 │ │ │ *C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │ │October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │ │initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947 │ │ │ *C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed │ │ │by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │ │OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950 │ │ │ *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ │69) │ VI │ 1006 │ │ │ *D-571 │Official report of British Minister in │ │ │Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March │ │ │1939. (USA 112) │ VII │ 88 │ │ │ *D-572 │Dispatch from Mr. Pares, British Consul │ │ │in Bratislava to Mr. Newton, 20 March │ │ │1939, describing German support of │ │ │Slovak separatists. (USA 113) │ VII │ 90 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 │ │ │ *R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │ │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │ │1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83 │ │ │ *R-133 │Notes on conference with Goering in │ │ │Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed │ │ │Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. (USA│ │ │124) │ VIII │ 202 │ │ │ *R-150 │Extracts from Luftwaffe Group Command │ │ │Three Study on Instruction for │ │ │Deployment and Combat “Case Red”, 2 June│ │ │1938. (USA 82) │ VIII │ 268 │ │ │ *TC-14 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │ │Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16 │ │ │October 1925. (GB 14) │ VIII │ 325 │ │ │ *TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │ │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │ │ │1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370 │ │ │ *TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │ │ │and 12 March 1938, as reported by M. │ │ │Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to │ │ │London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21) │ VIII │ 377 │ │ │ *TC-49 │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │ │1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │ │ │Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│ │ │German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │ │ │(GB 6) │ VIII │ 402 │ │ │ *TC-50 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │ │German people and Order of the Fuehrer │ │ │to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │ │ │pp. 499-501. (GB 7) │ VIII │ 402 │ │ │ *TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │ │ │Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │ │ │8) │ VIII │ 404 │ │ │ *TC-52 │Formal British protest against the │ │ │annexation of Czechoslovakia in │ │ │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ │March 1939. (GB 9) │ VIII │ 407 │ │ │ *TC-53 │Formal French protest against the │ │ │annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in │ │ │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ │March 1939. (GB 10) │ VIII │ 407 │ │ │ Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ │1945. │ VIII │ 643 │ │ │ **Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780 │ │ │ **Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 │ │ │ **Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

5. OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

_The following address, opening the British presentation of the case under Count II of the Indictment, was delivered by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P., British Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom, before the Tribunal on 4 December 1945._