CHAPTER IX
THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE
The measure of naval strength required by any State is determined mainly by the naval strength of its possible adversaries in the event of war, and only in a secondary degree by the volume of the maritime interests which it has to defend. Paradoxical as the latter half of this proposition may seem at first sight, it can easily be shown to be sound. The maritime interests, territorial and commercial, of the British Empire are beyond all comparison greater than those of any other State in the world; but if no other State possessed a naval force strong enough to assail them seriously, it is manifest that the naval force required to defend them need be no greater than is sufficient to overcome the assailant, and would not therefore be determined in any degree by the volume of the interests to be defended. Each State determines for itself the measure of naval strength which it judges to be necessary to its security. No State expects to have to encounter the whole world in arms or makes its provision in view of any such chimerical contingency. The utmost that any State can do is to adjust its naval policy to a rational estimate of all the reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict, due regard being had to the extent of its financial resources and to such other requirements of national defence as circumstances impose on it. Germany, for example, has proclaimed to all the world in the preamble to the Navy Law of 1900 that--
"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."
I am not concerned in any way with the political aspects of this memorable declaration. But its bearing on the naval policy of the British Empire is manifest and direct. England is beyond all question "the greatest naval Power" in the world. The declaration of Germany thus lays upon England the indefeasible obligation of taking care that by no efforts of any other Power shall her "own supremacy"--that is her capacity to secure and maintain the command of the sea in all reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict--be rendered doubtful. There is no State in the world on which decisive defeat at sea would inflict such irretrievable disaster as it would on England and her Empire. These islands would be open to invasion--and if to invasion to conquest and subjugation--the commerce of the whole Empire would be annihilated, and the Empire itself would be dismembered. I need not attempt to determine what measure of naval strength is required to avert this unspeakable calamity. It suffices to say that whatever the measure may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. That is merely the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace.
It will be observed that the German declaration assumes that "a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its forces against" a single adversary. This raises at once the question of the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace strategy of position. I shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two individual and specific naval Powers. I shall merely assume that of two possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem unduly I shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single Power but an alliance of one or more separate Powers, while still adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two belligerents is as defined above. If England is one of the Powers affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this assumption is a legitimate one.
In such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would very rarely be expedient. The stronger belligerent would of course seek, in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of position as to further that paramount purpose. But it does not follow that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. He would concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the encounters anticipated--so far as mere numbers apart from fighting efficiency can ensure victory--and the residue would be available for other and subsidiary purposes. If there were no residue, then the required superiority would not have been attained, and the belligerent who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. One of these consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes above mentioned would have to be neglected until the main issue was decided, and if these purposes were of any moment he would have so far to pay the penalty of his neglect. Nothing is more fatal in warfare than to attempt to be equally strong everywhere. If you cannot do everything you desire at once you must concentrate all your energies on doing the most important and the most vital things first. When the tree is cut down the branches will fall of themselves. The history of the War of American Independence is full of illustrations of the neglect of this paramount principle. England was worsted much more by faulty distribution than by insufficiency of force.
At the same time it must be observed that the outlying and subsidiary purposes of the conflict cannot be of vital moment so long as the superior belligerent is at firm grips with the central forces of his adversary. We are dealing with the assumption that of two belligerents one is so far superior to the other that he may entertain a reasonable confidence of being able to deny the command of the sea to his adversary and in the end to secure it for himself. It is an essential part of this assumption that the forces of the superior belligerent will be so disposed as to make it exceedingly difficult and, subject to the fortune of war, practically impossible for any considerable portion of the enemy's forces to act on a vigorous offensive without being speedily brought to book by a superior force of his adversary, and that the peace strategy of the latter will have been ordered to that end. So long as this is the case the virtual command of the sea will be in the hands of the superior belligerent, even though his forces may be so concentrated, in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, as to leave many regions of the sea apparently unguarded. They are adequately guarded by the fact that the enemy is _ex hypothesi_ unable to reach them--or if by a successful evasion of his adversary's guard he manages to send a detachment, large or small, to aim at some outlying objective, the initial superiority of force possessed by his adversary will always enable the latter to send a superior force in pursuit of the fugitive. Much harm may be done before the fugitive is brought to book, but no State, however strong, need ever expect to go to war without running risks and suffering occasional and partial reverses.
It is thus a pure delusion to assume, as loose thinkers on the subject too often assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered or imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once should war unhappily break out. Not long ago the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons used the following words:--"Ten years ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of every sea. We have the command of no sea in the world except the North Sea at this moment." Those who have followed and assimilated the exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is contained in these words. There is, as I have shown, no such thing as a command of the sea in time of peace. The phrase is merely a definition of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. Ten years ago we had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval Power. The concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the North Sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of peace, and never can exist even in time of war until we have fought for it and secured it. The concentration in question is, together with the simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote, contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime interests to defend. There are, it is true, some disadvantages involved in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in home waters. Naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of its appearance in distant seas. But these, after all, are subsidiary considerations which must be subordinated to the paramount needs of a sound strategy, whether offensive or defensive.
It follows from the foregoing exposition of the principles which govern the strategic distribution of naval force in peace and war that a great naval Power must often maintain fleets of considerable strength in distant seas. England has for many generations maintained such a fleet in the Mediterranean, and it is hard to see how any reasonably probable change in the international situation could absolve her from that obligation. There are other and more distant stations on which she has maintained and still does maintain squadrons in a strength which has varied greatly from time to time in accordance with the changing phases of international relations and of strategic requirements as affected thereby. The measure of these requirements is determined from time to time by the known strength of the hostile forces which would have to be encountered in any reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict. But there is one antecedent requirement which is common to all considerable detachments of naval force in distant waters. In order to maintain their efficiency and mobility they must have a naval base conveniently situated within the limits of their station to which they may resort from time to time for repair, refit, and supply. The need for supply at the base is less paramount than that for refit and repair, because it is manifest that the control of maritime communications which has enabled the requisite stores to reach the base will also enable them to reach the ships themselves, wherever they may be at the moment. But for all refit and repair which cannot be effected by the ships' companies themselves, with the aid of an attached repair ship, the ships must go to the base, and that base must be furnished with docks capable of receiving them.
It is essential to note that the base is there for the sake of the ships. The ships are not there for the sake of the base. It is a fatal inversion of all sound principles of naval strategy to suppose that the ships owe, or can afford, to the base any other form of defence than that which is inherent in their paramount and primary task of controlling the maritime communications which lead to it. So long as they can do this the base will be exposed only to such attacks as can be delivered by a force which has evaded but not defeated the naval guard, and to this extent the base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and ultimately reduced. It will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. As such it does not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies beyond the range of its own guns. All that it ever does or can do is, by its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based upon it constantly to renew its efficiency and mobility, and thereby to discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications entrusted to its keeping. But such command is in all cases exercised by the fleet and not by the base. If the fleet is not there or not equal to its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of weakness and not of strength to the naval Power which holds it.
It is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by a Power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic value and importance is a great advantage to such a Power and a corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. It will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large measure a delusion. As against a weaker adversary than itself the occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the Power which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed without a struggle. On the other hand, as against an adversary strong enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to reverses which, if not positively disastrous, must always be exceedingly mortifying. Of two things one. Either the belligerent in such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger force of the enemy, or he must leave the base to its fate, in which case it is certain to fall in the long run. In point of fact the occupation of distant bases by any naval Power is merely the giving of hostages to any and every other Power which in the day of conflict can establish its command of the sea. That is the plain philosophy of the whole question.
It only remains to consider very briefly the question of the supply of fleets operating in distant waters. In a very interesting and suggestive paper on the "Supply and Communications of a Fleet," Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge has pointed out that "in time of peace as well as in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used on board ship, viz., naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, etc." Of these the consumption of victualling stores is alone constant, being determined by the number of men to be victualled from day to day. The consumption of nearly all the other stores will vary greatly according as the ship is more or less at sea, and it is safe to say that for a given number of ships the consumption will be much greater in time of war, especially in coal, engineers' stores, and ordnance stores, than it is in time of peace. But in peace conditions Admiral Bridge estimated that for a fleet consisting of four battleships, four large cruisers, four second-class cruisers, thirteen smaller vessels of various kinds, and three torpedo craft, together with their auxiliaries, the _minimum_ requirements for six months--assuming that the ships started with full supplies, and that they returned to their principal base at the end of the period--would be about 6750 tons of stores and ammunition, and 46,000 tons of coal, without including fresh water. The requirements of water would not be less than 30,000 tons in the six months, and of this the ships could distil about half without greatly increasing their coal consumption; the remainder, some 15,000 or 16,000 tons, would have to be brought to them. In time of war the requirements of coal would probably be nearly three times as great as in time of peace, and the requirements of ammunition--estimated in time of peace at 1140 tons--might easily be ten times as great. Thus in addition to the foregoing figures we have 16,000 tons of water, and in war time a further _minimum_ addition of some 90,000 tons of coal and 10,260 tons of ammunition, making in all a round total of 170,000 tons for a fleet of the size specified, which was approximately the strength of the China Fleet, under the command of Admiral Bridge, at the time when his paper was written.
All these supplies have to be delivered or obtained periodically and at convenient intervals in the course of every six months. They are supplies which the ships must obtain as often as they want them without necessarily going back to their principal base for the purpose, and even the principal base must obtain them periodically from the home sources of supply. There are two alternative ways of maintaining this continuous stream of supply. One is that in advance of the principal base, what is called a secondary base should be established from which the ships can obtain the stores required, a continuous stream of transports bringing the stores required to the secondary base from sources farther afield, either from the principal base or from the home sources of supply. The other method is to have no secondary base--which, since it contains indispensable stores, must be furnished with some measure of local defence, and which, as a place of storage, may turn out to be in quite the wrong place for the particular operations in hand--but to seize and occupy a "flying base," neither permanent nor designated beforehand, but selected for the occasion according to the exigencies of the strategic situation, and capable of being shifted at will in response to any change in those exigencies. History shows that the latter method has been something like the normal procedure in war alike in times past and in the present day. The alternative method is perhaps rather adapted to the convenience of peace conditions than to the exigencies of war requirements. During his watch on Toulon Nelson established a flying base at Maddalena Bay, in Sardinia, and very rarely used the more distant permanent base at Gibraltar. Togo, as I have stated in an earlier chapter, established a flying base first at the Elliot Islands and afterwards at Dalny, during the war in the Far East. Instances might easily be multiplied to show in which direction the experience of war points, and how far that direction has been deflected by the possibly deceptive teaching of peace. I shall not, however, presume to pronounce _ex cathedra_ between two alternative methods each of which is sanctioned by high naval authority. I will only remark in conclusion that though the establishment of permanent secondary bases may, in certain exceptional cases, be defensible and even expedient, yet their multiplication, beyond such exceptional cases of proved and acknowledged expediency, is very greatly to be deprecated. The old rule applies--_Entia non sunt praeter necessitatem multiplicanda._
* * * * *
My task is now finished--I will not say completed, for the subject of naval warfare is far too vast to be exhausted within the narrow compass of a Manual. I should hardly exaggerate if I said that nearly every paragraph I have written might be expanded into a chapter, and every chapter into a volume, and that even so the subject would not be exhausted. All I have endeavoured to do is to expound briefly and in simple language the nature of naval warfare, its inherent limitations as an agency for subduing an enemy's will, the fundamental principles which underlie its methods, and the concrete problems which the application of those methods presents. Tactical questions I have not touched at all; strategic questions only incidentally, and so far as they were implicated in the discussion of methods. Political issues and questions of international policy I have eschewed as far as might be, and so far as it was necessary to deal with them I have endeavoured to do so in broad and abstract terms. Of the many shortcomings in my handling of the subject no one can be more conscious than I am myself. Yet I must anticipate one criticism which is not unlikely to be made, and that is that I have repeated and insisted on certain phrases and ideas such as "command of the sea," "control of maritime communications," "the fleet in being," "blockade," and the like, until they might almost be regarded as an obsession. Rightly or wrongly that has, at any rate, been done of deliberate intent. The phrases in question are in all men's mouths. The ideas they stand for are constantly misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misapplied. I hold that, rightly understood, they embody the whole philosophy of naval warfare. I have therefore lost no opportunity of insisting on them, knowing full well that it is only by frequent iteration that sound ideas can be implanted in minds not attuned to their reception.
INDEX
Aircraft, 121
Alabama, the, 109
Alexander, his conquest of Darius, 48
Allemand, his escape from Rochefort, 66, 67
Amiens, Peace of, 73
_Animus pugnandi_, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 58, 59, 61, 78
Antony, Mark, 72
Armada, the, 79, 112
Bacon, quoted, 6
Baraille, De, his part in the Dunkirk campaign, 87, 88
Barham, Lord, 18, 64; and Nelson, 66, 67; his conduct of the Trafalgar campaign, 118
Base, flying, 142; naval, 137
Battle-cruiser, its functions, 122-128
Beachy Head, Battle of, 32, 35; campaign of, 70, 78
Berlin Decrees, 100
Bettesworth, 118
Blockade, 17; a form of disputed command, 20-29; military, its methods, 23; military and commercial, 21
Bolt from the blue, 80, 89
Boscawen, at Lagos, 79
Brest, 33, 35; blockaded by Cornwallis, 30; blockaded by Hawke, 79; De Roquefeuil at, 81, 82
Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, on a fleet in being, 31; on supply and communications of a fleet, 140; his estimate of Torrington, 32, 40; on Torrington's trial, 42
Brundusium, Caesar at, 72
Cadiz, Killigrew at, 34
Caesar, his Pharsalian campaign, 71, 72
Calais, the Armada at, 79
Calder, his action off Finisterre, 118; Barham's instructions to, 64
Camperdown, Duncan at, 126
Cape St Vincent, meeting of Nelson with Craig and Knight off, 65
Capital ships, 113
Carthagena, Spanish ships at, 66
Charles, Prince, 82
Chateau-Renault, 33, 35
Clausewitz, his definition of war, 4; on limited and unlimited war, 5, 22
Colomb, Admiral, on differentiation of naval force, 114; on Torrington's strategy, 40, 43, 79
Command of the sea, 6, 10, 11-19, 20, 21, 50, 52, 54, 71, 94, 98, 121, 133, 134, 135; its true meaning, 15, 135; no meaning except in war, 15, 135
Command of the sea, disputed, in general, 49-67
Commerce, maritime, extent of British, 53; in war, 93-110; its modern conditions, 101-110
Concentration of naval force, its conditions, 132
Conflans, at Brest, 79
Corbett, Mr Julian, 62, 67; on the Dunkirk campaign, 89; on commerce in war, 105; on Craig's expedition, 61, 66; on projects of invasion, 77; on the Trafalgar campaign, 118
Cornwallis, and the blockade of Brest, 18, 30
Craft, small, 57, 76
Craig, his expedition to the Mediterranean, 61-67
Cuba, its deliverance by the United States, 54
Dalny, Togo at, 26, 143
Dettingen, 80
Downs, the, Norris ordered to, 85
Duncan, at Camperdown, 126
Dungeness, Roquefeuil anchors at, 87; Norris at, 88; Norris and Roquefeuil at, 89
Dunkirk, troops collected at, 81; embargo at, 83; Saxe and Baraille at, 88
Egypt, Napoleon's descent on, 73
Elliott Islands, Togo at, 26, 143
Embargo, at Dunkirk, 83
Farragut, 7
Fleets, and base, their true relation, 138
Fleet in being, phrase first used by Torrington, 42; defined, 45, 58; a form of disputed command, 30-48
Fleets, supply of, 140
Food Supply, Royal Commission on, 99
Fortress fleet, 48, 58; Admiral Mahan on, 47, 55
Ganteaume, at Brest, 31
General chase, 125
General Staff, the, 117
Germany, Navy Law of 1900, 130
Goschen, Lord, quoted, 124
Gravelines, 79, 87
Gunfleet, the, 37, 40, 44
Hague Conference, 102
Hannay, Mr David, 100
Hannibal, his passage of the Alps, 61
Hardy, Nelson's, on big ships, 124
Hawke, 32; blockades Brest 79; at Quiberon Bay, 126
Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on the command of the sea, 45
Invasion, 51, 68-92; dilemma of, 70
Invasion over sea, three ways of, 75
James II., 32
Justin of Nassau, and the Armada, 79
Killigrew, Vice-Admiral, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44, 78; his expedition to Cadiz, 34; his return to Plymouth, 35.
Knight, Rear-Admiral, escorts Craig, 65
Lagos, Boscawen and De La Clue at, 79
Lepanto, Battle of, 112
Line of battle, the, 113
Lisbon, Craig and Knight at, 65
Lissa, Battle of, 8
Louis XIV., 33
Maddalena Bay, Nelson's base at, 143
Mahan, Admiral, on commerce at sea, 98, 99; on a fleet in being, 31, 43; on a fortress fleet, 47, 55; on Hannibal's passage of the Alps, 61; on Nelson, 48, 123; on territorial expansion, 52
Maida, Battle of, 66
Makaroff, Admiral, 47, 59
Manchuria, 59; Japanese successes in, 55
Maria Theresa, 80
Mary, Queen, her orders to Torrington, 40, 44
Mathews, his action off Toulon, 80; in the Mediterranean, 83, 84
Medina Sidonia, and the Armada, 79
Mediterranean, the, England's position in, 136, 137
Merchant vessels, conversion of into warships at sea, 101-104
Morbihan, the, troops collected in, 79
Napoleon, 30, 31; and the campaign of Trafalgar, 18, 19; his descent on Egypt, 61, 73; his ignorance of the sea, 74
Naval force, differentiation of, 111-128; distribution and supply of, 129-145
Naval strength, measure of, 129
Naval warfare, defined, 1; special characteristic of, 56; its limitations, 51; philosophy of, 145; its primary aim, 14
Nelson, 18, 32, 46, 123; his advanced squadron, 127; and Barham, 66, 67; his base at Maddalena Bay, 143; on the blockade of Toulon, 22; on Craig's expedition, 64; evaded by Napoleon, 73; evaded by Villeneuve, 63; at Trafalgar, 60; his Trafalgar Memorandum, 126; his pursuit of Villeneuve, 37, 38
Newcastle, Duke of, 83
Nile, Battle of the, 74
Norman Conquest, the, 68, 75
Norris, Sir John, 83; in the Downs, 87; leaves the Downs, 88; and Roquefeuil at Dungeness, 89; at St Helen's, 85, 86
North Sea, concentration in, 135
Orde, Sir John, raises the blockade of Cadiz, 65
Orders in Council, the British, 100
Parma, Duke of, and the Armada, 79
Peace strategy of position, 131, 132, 136
Philippines, the, acquired by the United States, 52
Pitt, 61, 62, 63, 67
Plymouth, Killigrew at, 35
Pompey, at Pharsalus, 71, 72
Port Arthur, 27; how blockaded by Togo, 26, 143; its capture by Japan, 54, 55; first Japanese attack on, 46; Russian fleet at, 47, 58
Pretender, the, 80
Privateering, 99, 101
Property, private, at sea, 95-97
Puerto Rico, acquired by the United States, 52
Quiberon Bay, Battle of, 79, 126
Rochefort, Allemand escapes from, 66, 67
Roquefeuil, De, at Brest, 81, 82; anchors at Dungeness, 87; puts to sea, 82; and Norris at Dungeness, 89; off the Start, 84, 86
Rozhdestvensky, at Tsu-Shima, 60
Sampson, Admiral, 46
Santiago, 46; its capture by the United States, 54
Saxe, Marshal, at Dunkirk, 81; with Baraille at Dunkirk, 88
Sea, its characteristics, 13
Sea power, 6, 10, 13, 52, 55
Sea transport, 14
Sebastopol, siege of, 6, 46
Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, 33, 35, 39, 40, 44, 78
Sovereignty of the Seas, 49, 50
St Helen's, Norris at, 85, 86
Start, the, De Roquefeuil off, 84, 86
Submarine, the, 24, 120, 121
Supply, of fleets, two alternative methods of, 142
Syracuse, Athenian expedition to, 61
Talavera, Battle of, 73
Teignmouth, French raid on, 42
Telegraphy, wireless, 26, 117
Togo, Admiral, 59; his method of blockading Port Arthur, 26, 143
Torbay, Tourville's projected descent on, 33
Torpedo craft, 24, 57, 69, 120
Torpedo, the locomotive, 24
Torrington, Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 34, 35, 36, 47, 78; anchors at Beachy Head, 41; Admiral Bridge on, 32, 40, 42; Colomb on, 43; on a fleet in being, 32, 42; ordered to give battle, 44; his strategy, 38, 39; tried by Court Martial, 42; warns Mary and her Council, 40
Toulon, Chateau-Renault at, 33
Tourville, 33, 34, 43, 44, 48, 70, 78; at Brest, 35; in the Channel, 36
Trade routes, 104
Trafalgar, 63; campaign of, 90, 91; and Craig's expedition, 61; its significance, 19
Tsu-Shima, Battle of, its effects, 54, 55
Utrecht, Treaty of, 82
Villeneuve, pursued by Nelson, 37; driven out of the West Indies, 38; leaves Toulon, 63
War, defined, 1; its origin, 2; its primary object, 4; of American Independence, 99, 133; Boer, 8, 56, 94; civil, 1, 2; Crimean, 6; Cuban, 9, 46; in the Far East, 9; of 1859, 7; of 1866, 7; of 1870, 8, 54; of Secession in America, 2, 7; the Seven Years', 79
Wars, the Dutch, 93, 113
War Staff, 118, 119
Wellington, 73; his Peninsular Campaigns, 19
William the Conqueror, 68
William III., 32
Wolseley, Lord, on communications, 73
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57 Comparative Religion. By Dr F.B. Jevons.
69 Plato: Moral and Political Ideals. By Mrs J. Adam.
26 The Moral Life and Moral Worth. By Prof. Sorley, Litt.D.
3 The English Puritans. By John Brown, D.D.
11 An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland. By the Rt Hon. the Lord Balfour of Burleigh, K.T., G.C.M.G.
41 Methodism. By Rev. H.B. Workman, D.Lit.
EDUCATION
38 Life in the Medieval University. By R.S. Rait, M.A.
LAW
13 The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters (in England and Wales). By G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M.
BIOLOGY
1 The Coming of Evolution. By Prof. J.W. Judd, C.B., F.R.S.
2 Heredity in the Light of Recent Research. By L. Doncaster, M.A.
25 Primitive Animals. By Geoffrey Smith, M.A.
73 The Life-story of Insects. By Prof. G.H. Carpenter.
48 The Individual in the Animal Kingdom. By J.S. Huxley, B.A.
27 Life in the Sea. By James Johnstone, B.Sc.
75 Pearls. By Prof. W.J. Dakin.
28 The Migration of Birds. By T.A. Coward.
36 Spiders. By C. Warburton, M.A.
61 Bees and Wasps. By O.H. Latter, M.A.
46 House Flies. By C.G. Hewitt, D.Sc.
32 Earthworms and their Allies. By F.E. Beddard, F.R.S.
74 The Flea. By H. Russell.
64 The Wanderings of Animals. By H.F. Gadow, F.R.S.
ANTHROPOLOGY
20 The Wanderings of Peoples. By Dr A.C. Haddon, F.R.S.
29 Prehistoric Man. By Dr W.L.H. Duckworth.
GEOLOGY
35 Rocks and their Origins. By Prof. Grenville A.J. Cole.
44 The Work of Rain and Rivers. By T.G. Bonney, Sc.D.
7 The Natural History of Coal. By Dr E.A. Newell Arber.
30 The Natural History of Clay. By Alfred B. Searle.
34 The Origin of Earthquakes. By C. Davison, Sc.D., F.G.S.
62 Submerged Forests. By Clement Reid, F.R.S.
72 The Fertility of the Soil. By E.J. Russell, D.Sc.
BOTANY
5 Plant-Animals: a Study in Symbiosis. By Prof. F.W. Keeble.
10 Plant-Life on Land. By Prof. F.O. Bower, Sc.D., F.R.S.
19 Links with the Past in the Plant-World. By Prof. A.C. Seward, F.R.S.
PHYSICS
52 The Earth. By Prof. J.H. Poynting, F.R.S.
53 The Atmosphere. By A.J. Berry, M.A.
65 Beyond the Atom. By John Cox, M.A.
55 The Physical Basis of Music. By A. Wood, M.A.
71 Natural Sources of Energy. By Prof. A.H. Gibson, D.Sc.
PSYCHOLOGY
14 An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. By Dr. C.S. Myers.
45 The Psychology of Insanity. By Bernard Hart, M.D.
77 The Beautiful. By Vernon Lee.
INDUSTRIAL AND MECHANICAL SCIENCE
31 The Modern Locomotive. By C. Edgar Allen, A.M.I.Mech.E.
56 The Modern Warship. By E.L. Attwood.
17 Aerial Locomotion. By E.H. Harper, M.A., and Allan E. Ferguson, B.Sc.
18 Electricity in Locomotion. By A.G. Whyte, B.Sc.
63 Wireless Telegraphy. By Prof. C.L. Fortescue, M.A.
58 The Story of a Loaf of Bread. By Prof. T.B. Wood, M.A.
47 Brewing. By A. Chaston Chapman, F.I.C.
* * * * *
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