Native Races and the War

Chapter 6

Chapter 64,064 wordsPublic domain

"Possessing for two centuries no book except the Bible, the South African Dutch communities are fond of comparing their lot with that of the 'Chosen People.' Going forth, like the Jews, in search of a 'Promised Land,' they never for a moment doubted that the native populations were specially created for their benefit. They looked on them as mere 'Canaanites, Amorites, and Jebusites,' doomed beforehand to slavery or death.

"They turned the land into a solitude, breaking all political organization of the natives, destroying all ties of a common national feeling, and tolerating them only in the capacity of 'apprentices,' another name for slaves.

"In general, the Boers despise everything that does not contribute directly to the material prosperity of the family group. Despite their numerous treks, they have contributed next to nothing to the scientific exploration of the land.

"Of all the white intruders, the Dutch Afrikanders show themselves, as a rule, most hostile to their own kinsmen, the Netherlanders of the mother country. At a distance the two races have a certain fellow-feeling for each other, as fully attested by contemporary literature; but, when brought close together, the memory of their common origin gives place to a strange sentiment of aversion. The Boer is extremely sensitive, hence he is irritated at the civilized Hollanders, who smile at his rude African customs, and who reply, with apparent ostentation, in a pure language to the corrupt jargon spoken by the peasantry on the banks of the Vaal or Limpopo."

No impartial student of recent South African History can fail, I think, to see that the results of Mr. Gladstone's policy in the retrocession of the Transvaal have been unhappy, however good the impulse which prompted his action. To his supporters at home, and to many of his admirers throughout Europe, his action stood for pure magnanimity, and seemed a sort of prophetic instalment of the Christian spirit which, they hoped, would pervade international politics in the coming age.

To the Transvaal leaders it presented a wholly different aspect. It meant to them weakness, and an acknowledgment of defeat. "Now let us go on," they felt, "and press towards our goal, i.e., the expulsion of the British from South Africa." The attitude and conduct of the Transvaal delegates who came to London in 1883, and of their chiefs and supporters, throws much light on this effect produced by the act of Mr. Gladstone.

There can be no doubt that the desire to supplant British by Dutch supremacy has existed for a long time. President Kruger puts back the origin of the opposition of the two races to a very distant date. In 1881, he said, "In the Cession of the Cape of Good Hope by the King of Holland to England lies the root out of which subsequent events and our present struggle have grown." The Dutch believe themselves,--and not without reason,--capable of great things, they were moved by an ambition to seize the power which they believed,--and the retrocession fostered that belief,--was falling from England's feeble and vacillating grasp. "Long before the present trouble" says a Member of the British Parliament well acquainted with South African affairs, "I visited every town in South Africa of any importance, and was brought into close contact with every class of the population; wherever one went, one heard this ambition voiced, either advocated or deprecated, but never denied. It dates back some forty or fifty years."[15] The first reference to it is in a despatch of Governor Sir George Grey, in 1858; and it is to be found more definitely in the speeches of President Burgers in the Transvaal Raad in 1877 before the annexation, and in his _apologia_ published after the annexation. The movement continued under the administration of Sir Bartle Frere, who wrote in a despatch (published in Blue book) in 1879, "The Anti-English opposition are sedulously courting the loyal Dutch party (a great majority of the Cape Dutch) in order to swell the already considerable minority who are disloyal to the English Crown here and in the Transvaal." Mr. Theodore Schreiner, the brother of the Cape Premier, in a letter to the "Cape Times," November, 1899, described a conversation he had some seventeen years ago with Mr. Reitz, then a judge, afterwards President of the Orange Free State, and now State Secretary of the Transvaal, in which Mr. Reitz admitted that it was his object to overthrow the British power and expel the British flag from South Africa. Mr. Schreiner adds; "During the seventeen years that have elapsed I have watched the propaganda for the overthrow of British power in South Africa being ceaselessly spread by every possible means, the press, the pulpit, the platform, the schools, the colleges, the legislature; and it has culminated in the present war, of which Mr. Reitz and his co-workers are the origin and the cause."

The Retrocession of the Transvaal (1881) gave a strong impulse to this movement, and encouraged President Kruger in his persistent efforts since that date to foster it. A friend of the late General Joubert,--in a letter which I have read,--wrote of Mr. Kruger as "the man who, for more than twenty years past, has persistently laboured to drive in the wedge between the two races. It has been his deliberate policy throughout."

I always wish that I could separate the memory of that truly great man, Mr. Gladstone, from this Act of his Administration. Few people cherish his memory with more affectionate admiration than I do. Independently of his great intellect, his eloquence, and his fidelity in following to its last consequences a conviction which had taken possession of him, I revered him because he seemed like King Saul, to stand a head and shoulders above all his fellows,--not like King Saul in physical, but in moral stature. Pure, honourable and strong in character and principles, a sincere Christian, he attracted and deserved the affection and loyalty of all to whom purity and honour are dear. I may add that I may speak of him, in a measure also as a personal friend of our family. I have memories of delightful intercourse with him at Oxford, when he represented that constituency, and later, in other places and at other times.

I recall, however, an occasion in which a chill of astonishment and regret fell upon me and my husband (politically one of his supporters), in hearing a pronouncement from him on a subject, which to us was vital, and had been pressing heavily on our hearts. I allude to a great speech which Mr. Gladstone made in Liverpool during the last period of the Civil War in America, the Abolitionist War. Our friend spoke with his accustomed fiery eloquence wholly in favour of the spirit and aims of the combatants of the Southern States, speaking of their struggle as one on behalf of liberty and independence, and wishing them success. Not one word to indicate that the question which, like burning lava in the heart of a volcano, was causing that terrible upheaval in America, had found any place in that great man's mind, or had even "cast its shadow before" in his thoughts. It appeared as though he had not even taken in the fact of the existence of those four millions of slaves, the uneasy clanking of whose chains had long foreboded the approach of the avenging hand of the Deliverer. This obscured perception of the question was that of a great part, if not of the majority, of the Press of that day, and of most persons of the "privileged" classes; but that _he_, a trusted leader of so many, should be suffering from such an imperfection of mental vision, was to us an astonishment and sorrow. As we left that crowded hall, my companion and I, we looked at each other in silent amazement, and for a long time we found no words.

As I look back now, there seems in this incident some explanation of Mr. Gladstone's total oblivion of the interests of our loyal native subjects of the Transvaal at the time when he handed them over to masters whose policy towards them was well known. These poor natives had appealed to the British Government, had trusted it, and were deceived by it.

I recollect that Mr. Gladstone himself confessed, with much humility it seemed to us, in a pamphlet written many years after the American War, that it "had been his misfortune" on several occasions "not to have perceived the reality and importance of a question _until it was at the door_." This was very true. His noble enthusiasm for some good and vital cause so engrossed him at times that the humble knocking at the door of some other, perhaps equally vital question, was not heard by him. The knocking necessarily became louder and louder, till at last the door was opened; but then it may have been too late for him to take the part in it which should have been his.

FOOTNOTE:

[Footnote 15: Speech of Mr. Drage, M.P., at Derby, December, 1899.]

V.

VISIT OF TRANSVAAL DELEGATES TO ENGLAND. THE LORD MAYOR'S REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THEM AT THE MANSION HOUSE. DR. DALE'S LETTER TO MR. GLADSTONE. MR. MACKENZIE IN ENGLAND. MEETINGS AND RESOLUTIONS ON TRANSVAAL MATTERS. MANIFESTO OF BOER DELEGATES. SPEECHES OF W.E. FORSTER, LORD SHAFTESBURY, SIR FOWELL BUXTON, AND OTHERS. THE LONDON CONVENTION (1884).

In 1883, two years after the retrocession of the Transvaal, the Boers, encouraged by the hesitating policy of the British Government, sent a deputation to London of a few of their most astute statesmen, to put fresh claims before Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Derby, then Colonial Minister. They did not ask the repeal of the stipulations of the Convention of 1881--that was hardly necessary, as these stipulations had neither been observed by them nor enforced by our Government, but what they desired and asked was the complete re-establishment of the Republic, freed from any conditions of British Suzerainty. This would have given them a free hand in dealing with the natives, a power which those who knew them best were the least willing to concede.

Sir R.N. Fowler was at that time Lord Mayor of London. According to the custom when any distinguished foreigners visit our Capital, of giving them a reception at the Mansion House, these Transvaal delegates were presented for that honour. But the door of the Mansion House was closed to them, and by a Quaker Lord Mayor, renowned for his hospitality!

The explanation of this unusual act is given in the biography of Sir R. Fowler, written by J.S. Flynn, (page 260.) The following extract from that biography was sent to the _Friend_, the organ of the Society of Friends, in November, 1899, by Dr. Hodgkin, himself a quaker, whose name is known in the literary world:--"The scene of Sir R. Fowler's travels in 1881 was South Africa, where he went chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining how he could best serve the interests of the native inhabitants. He left no stone unturned in his search for information--visiting Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of the Cape, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel Mitchell, Bishops Colenso and Macrorie, the Zulu King Cetewayo, the principal statesmen, the military, the newspaper editors, the workers at the diamond-fields, and many others. The result of his inquiries was to confirm his belief of the charges which were made against the Transvaal Boers of wronging and oppressing the blacks.

"It was the opinion of many philanthropists that the only way to insure good Government in the Transvaal--justice to the natives, the suppression of slavery, the security of neighbouring tribes--was by England's insisting on the Boer's observance of the Treaty which had been made to this effect, and the delimitation of the boundary of their territory in order to prevent aggression. With this object in view meetings were held in the City, petitions presented by Members of Parliament, resolutions moved in the House; and when at last it was discovered that Mr. Gladstone's Government was unwilling to fulfil its pledges in reference to South Africa, and that in consequence the native inhabitants would not receive the support they had been led to expect, considerable indignation was felt amongst the friends of the aborigines. The demand which they made seems to have been moderate. The Transvaal, which before the war, had been reckoned, for its protection, a portion of the British dominions, was now made simply a State under British Suzerainty, with a debt to England of about a quarter of a million (in lieu of the English outlay during the three years of its annexation), and a covenant for the protection of the 800,000 natives in the State, and the Zulu, Bechuana, and Swazi tribes upon its borders. The English sympathisers with these natives simply asked that the covenant should be adhered to. There was little chance of the debt being paid, and that they were willing to forego; but they maintained that honour and humanity demanded that the Boers should not be allowed to treat their agreement with us as so much waste paper.

"The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies received the Transvaal delegates graciously, but the doors of the Mansion House were shut against them. Its occupant at that time would neither receive them into his house nor bid them God-speed. He had made a careful study of the South African question, and he felt no doubt that this deputation represented a body of European settlers who were depriving the natives of their land, slaying their men, and enslaving their women and children. He desired to extend the hospitality of the Mansion House to visitors from all countries, and to all creeds and political parties; but the line must be drawn somewhere, and he would draw it at the Boers. The boldness of his action on this occasion startled some even of his friends. He was, of course, attacked by that portion of the press which supported the Government. On the other hand, he had numerous sympathisers. Approving letters and telegrams came from many quarters, one telegram coming from the 'Loyalists of Kimberley' with 'hearty congratulations.' As for his opponents, he was not in the least moved by anything they said. He held it to be impossible for any respectable person who knew the Boers to support them. This was no doubt strong language, but it was not stronger than that of Moffat and Livingstone; not a whit stronger either than that used by W.E. Forster, who had been a member of the Gladstonian Government."

Dr. Hodgkin prefaced this extract by the following lines, addressed to the Editor of the _Friend_:

"Dear Friend,--In re-perusing a few days ago the life of my late brother-in-law, Sir R.N. Fowler, I came upon the enclosed passage, which I think worthy of our consideration at the present time.

Of late years the disputes between our Government and the African Republic have turned so entirely on questions connected with the status of the settlers in and around Johannesburg, that we may easily forget the old subjects of dispute which existed for a generation before it was known that there were any workable goldfields in South Africa, and before the word "Uitlander" had been mentioned amongst us. I must confess that for my part I had forgotten this incident of Sir R.N. Fowler's Mayoralty, and I think it may interest some of your readers to be reminded of it at the present time. I am, thine truly,--THOMAS HODGKIN. Barmoor, Northumberland."

* * * * *

The late Dr. Dale, of Birmingham, was one of those whose minds were painfully exercised on the matter of the abandonment of the natives of the Transvaal to the Boers. An extract from his life was sent in February this year to the _Spectator_, with the following preface:--

"Sir,--I have been greatly impressed by the justice of much that has been said in the _Spectator_ on the fact that the present war is a retribution for our indifference and apathy in 1881. We failed in our duty then. We have taken it up now, but at what a cost! In reading lately the life of Dr. Dale, of Birmingham, I was struck by his remarks (pp. 438 and 439) on the Convention of Pretoria. These remarks have such a bearing on the present situation that I beg you will allow me to quote them:"--

"In relation to South African affairs he (Dr. Dale) felt silence to be impossible. He had welcomed the policy initiated by the Convention of Pretoria (1881) conceding independence to the Transvaal, but imposing on the Imperial Government responsibility for the protection of native races within and beyond the frontiers. In correspondence with members of the House of Commons and in more than one public utterance, he expressed his satisfaction that the freedom of the Boers did not involve the slavery of the natives. At first the outlook was hopeful, but the Boers soon began to chafe against the restrictions to which they were subjected.... The Rev. John Mackenzie brought a lamentable record of outrage and cruelty.... Dr. Dale particularly urged that the Government should insist on carrying out the 18th article of the Convention of Pretoria. 'The policy of the Government seemed to me both righteous and expedient, singularly courageous and singularly Christian. But that policy included two distinct elements. It restored to the Boers internal independence, it reserved to the British Government powers for the protection of native races on the Transvaal frontier. It is not unreasonable for those who in the face of great obloquy supported the Government in recognising the independence of the Transvaal, to ask that it should also use its treaty powers, and use them effectively for the protection of the natives.' To this statement the _Pall Mall_ (John Morley) replied that the suzerainty over the Transvaal maintained by us was a 'shadowy term,' and that those who demanded that our reserved rights should be enforced were bound to face the question whether they were willing to fight to enforce them. Was Dr. Dale ready to run the risk of a fresh war in South Africa? Dr. Dale replied, should the British Government and British people regard with indifference the outrages of the Boers against tribes that we had undertaken to protect?... 'If the Government of the Republic cannot prevent such crimes as are declared to have been committed in the Bechuana country, and if we are indifferent to them, we shall have the South African tribes in a blaze again before many years are over, and for the safety of our Colonists we shall be compelled to interfere.' In the ensuing Session the Ministerial policy was challenged in both Houses of Parliament, and in the Commons Mr. Forster indicted the Government for its impotence to hold the Transvaal Republic to its engagements. Dr. Dale wrote a long letter to Mr. Gladstone:--'If it had been said that power to protect the natives should be taken but not used, it is at least possible that a section of the party might have declined to approve the Ministerial policy.... The one point to which I venture to direct attention is the contrast, as it appears to me, between the declaration of Ministers in '81, in relation to the native races generally, and the position which has been taken in the present debate.' Mr. Gladstone's reply was courteous, but not reassuring."

* * * * *

Mr. Mackenzie, British Commissioner for Bechuanaland, came to England in 1882. In the following year the Delegates from the Transvaal came to London, and in 1884 the Convention was signed, which was called the "London Convention."

These years included events of great interest. Mr. Mackenzie wrote:--"On my way to England I met a friend who had just landed in South Africa from England. He warned me 'If you say a good word for South Africa, Mr. Mackenzie, you will get yourself insulted. They will not hear a word on its behalf in England; they are so disgusted with the mess that has been made.'

'They had good reason to be disgusted, but I want all the same to tell them a number of things about the true condition of the country.'

'They will not listen,' my friend declared, 'They will only swear at you.' This was not very encouraging, but it was not far from the truth as to the public feeling at that time.

Being in the----counties of England I was offered an introduction to the Editor of a well-known newspaper, who was also a pungent writer on social questions under a _nom de plume_ which had got to be so well known as no longer to serve the purpose of the writer's concealment of identity.

'You come from South Africa, do you,' said the great man; 'a place where we have had much trouble, but mean to have no more.'

'Trouble, however,' I answered, 'is inseparable from Empire. Whoever governs South Africa must meet with some trouble and difficulty, although not much when honestly faced.'

'I assure you,' he broke in, 'we are not going to try it again after the one fashion or the other. We are out of it, and we mean to remain so.'

'You astonish me,' I answered; 'what about the Convention recently signed at Pretoria (1881)? What about the speeches still more recently made in this country in support of it?'

'As to the Convention, I know we signed something; people often do when they are getting out of a nasty business. We never meant to keep it, nor shall we.'

I believe I whistled a low whistle just to let off the steam, and then replied calmly, 'Will you allow me to say that by your own showing you are a bad lot, a very bad lot, as politicians.'

'That may be, but it does not alter the fact, which is as I state.'

'Well, I am an outsider, but I assure you that the English people, should they ever know the facts, will agree with me in saying that you are a bad lot. Such doctrines in commerce would ruin us in a day. You know that.'

'The people are with us. They are disgusted and heart-sore with the whole business.'

'I grant you that such is their frame of mind, but I think their attitude will be different when they come to consider the facts, and face the responsibilities of our position in South Africa. The only difficulty with me is to communicate the truth to the public mind.'

I was much impressed by this interview. Did this influential editor represent a large number of English people? Were they in their own minds out of South Africa, and resolved never to return?

... 'I do not know what you think, Mr. Mackenzie, but we are all saying here that Mr. Gladstone made a great mistake in not recalling Sir Bartle Frere at once. In fact, we are of opinion that Frere should have been tried and hanged.'

The speaker was a fine specimen of an Englishman, tall, with a good head, intelligent and able as well as strong in speech. He was a large manufacturer, and a local magnate. His wife was little and gentle, and yet quite fearless of her grim-looking lord. She begged that I would always make a deduction when her husband referred to South Africa. He could never keep his temper on that subject, My host abruptly demanded, 'But don't you think that Frere should have been hanged?'

'My dear, you will frighten Mr. Mackenzie with your vehemence, and you know you do not mean it a bit.'

'Mean it! Isn't it what everybody is saying here? At any rate I have given Mr. Mackenzie a text, and he must now give me his discourse.'

I then proceeded to sketch out the work which Sir Bartle Frere had had before him, its fatal element of haste, with its calamitous failures in no way chargeable to him. 'In short, I concluded, but for the grave blunders of others you would have canonized Sir Bartle Frere instead of speaking of him as you do. He is the ablest man you ever sent to South Africa. As to his personal character, I do not know a finer or manlier Christian.' ...