Part 4
7.--This day passed without any intelligence of our friends. Towards evening, a Malay officer and some soldiers formerly in our service, but forced into that of the Candians after Major Davie's surrender, arrived amongst us, and informed me, that a fortnight before a rumour had prevailed of six English divisions having entered the Candian territory; that many of his countrymen had accompanied the Candians to oppose these divisions, but had returned without having seen an enemy. It was generally believed that these divisions had been driven back.
He added that the Candians were in great force in the neighbourhood, and delayed their attack only until the climate should begin to take effect upon us; and that the firing which Lieutenant Povelary had taken for that of our columns on the morning of the 6th was a rejoicing at our embarrassed situation, which seemed to them to admit neither of advance nor retreat, but to lead inevitably to surrender, and consequent massacre.
I was greatly at a loss what to make of this statement. The officer's character I knew to be respectable; and their report of the number of divisions corresponded exactly with the fact.
8.--Early this morning detached Lieutenant Povelary with a party to the top of the hills, to ascertain whether a camp, or any part of our troops, could be discerned. He brought no tidings of them.
In the forenoon, some gun Lascars, who had been taken prisoners with Major Davie, effected their escape to us, and related that they had just returned from the frontiers, whither they had marched with a body of Candians for the purpose of opposing the English troops that were advancing into the country; that they had actually seen one detachment with whom their party had exchanged a few shots, by which a Candian chief was wounded; that soon after, this detachment marched back to the English territory, whereupon the whole corps in which they served was recalled to the capital; that a rumour prevailed amongst the Candians that all the English troops except my detachment were repulsed; that the King had proclaimed to his people that he had driven five English armies back to the sea, and that it only remained for them to chastise a few banditti who had stolen up from Batticolo.
My anxiety for the safety of my detachment had been hourly increasing since my arrival in Candy, and was now wrought up to the highest pitch. I considered its situation as eminently perilous. The army under General Macdowal had been only twenty days getting to Candy in 1803, though encumbered by six-pounders, and obliged to halt several days for want of Coolies. The detachment that I conceived to be coming up were lighter, and consequently would have been enabled to march much quicker.
The distance from Columbo to Candy is only 103 miles, and that from Trincomalé, 142, and the roads from both places perfectly known whereas my route lay partly through the province of Ouva, the most mountainous and least known of the whole island; and, in consequence of my being obliged to make a circuit for the purpose of forming a junction with Colonel Maddison, amounted to 194 miles.
The time elapsed even since one of the detachments had been seen on the frontiers was enough, and more than enough, for its arrival; that they were driven back by the Candians, could not for a moment be believed. I considered the King's proclamation merely as an artifice to encourage his troops, yet the non-arrival of our divisions still continued to increase my surprise and uneasiness. Our provisions were now considerably reduced, and much of our ammunition expended. Our situation began also to make a powerful impression on the Europeans, as well as on the native troops. The former, with the exception of a few artillery-men, consisted of the 19th regiment, a great part of which corps had been sacrificed the year before, under Major Davie. Many of these men had been in Candy with General Macdowal; the massacre was still fresh in their recollection. They saw displayed in savage triumph in several of the apartments of the palace, the hats, shoes, canteens, and accoutrements of their murdered comrades, most of them still marked with the names of their ill-fated owners.
I could easily collect, from the conversation of the officers, that few of them agreed with regard to what ought to be done. I therefore avoided calling a council of war, persuaded that it would only give rise to unpleasant differences. Added to this, the rains had already set in with considerable violence, and I was perfectly aware of the difficulty of passing the Candian river during the monsoon. Under these circumstances, to have remained longer in the capital would, in the event of the other divisions not arriving (of whose appearance there was now scarcely any hope), have occasioned the certain destruction of my detachment. On the other hand, should they come up (and I had no reason to doubt that one of them had been seen on the frontiers), what must the General think on finding that my detachment had thus returned without co-operation? Added to this, I had to dread the censure and disgrace that might result from a step thus precipitately taken.
Balancing between these opposite motives, the state of my mind, on this distressing occasion, it is impossible to describe; it can only be conceived by those who have had the misfortune to be placed in circumstances of similar anxiety.
Obliged to assume an air of gaiety amongst the troops, whilst my mind was agitated by the most melancholy reflections; feeling that not only the honour, but the life, of every man in the detachment depended on my conduct, I may truly say that even those individuals who were suffering around me from sickness and from wounds had no reason to envy the situation of their commander.
Though strongly prompted by my own feelings to continue following up what I deemed to be the object of my orders, I at this period regarded the safety of the detachment entrusted to my command as paramount to every other consideration. I therefore determined, in the first instance to cross the Candian river, so as, at all events, to ensure my retreat, and take post on the left bank, where I might wait a day or two longer for the tidings of the other detachments. I clearly foresaw that this movement would draw the whole of the enemy upon me, and consequently lead to a considerable expenditure of ammunition. They were in great force in the neighbourhood, and had for the last two days abstained from molesting us, waiting to see what steps I should pursue: yet of the two evils this appeared the least. By encamping on the left bank of the river, we should be in readiness to co-operate with any of the other detachments that might arrive. We should also be enabled to retreat either on Columbo or Trincomalé, whereas returning by the Batticolo road was completely out of the question. In addition to its length, and the difficulties which the country presented, I knew that the Candians had been employed in blocking up the passes to prevent our return. Besides, I must have crossed the Mahavilla Gonga twice, at the fords of Padrepelly and Pangaram.
Having weighed these circumstances, I came to the resolution of marching out of Candy the next morning.
9.--At six A.M. commenced my march, abstaining from destroying or even injuring the town of Candy, that in the event of our troops still coming up, the followers might not be deprived of shelter. On the outside of the town, we passed a number of skeletons hanging on the trees, the remains of our massacred officers. We next reached the banks of the river, the scene of the cruel catastrophe which closed the career of Major Davie's detachment, and found the ground still covered with the bones of the victims. The river not being fordable, we were under the necessity of encamping on this ominous spot, while a party returned to Candy for materials to make rafts. Meanwhile the enemy were seen assembling in vast numbers on the opposite bank. They took care to remind us of the danger of our situation, calling to us to observe the bones of our countrymen, and assuring us that ere long we should experience a similar fate. They repeatedly urged the natives to desert, as the only means of preserving their lives. It is but justice here to remark, that of the native troops, whether Sepoys or Malays, not a man proved unfaithful to his colours. Even from the followers, I had hitherto experienced a degree of fidelity scarcely to be expected from their general character, not a man having yet deserted me. But our situation was now about to become too trying for their resolution.
At three P.M. two rafts were completed; but the current was so rapid that our tow-ropes immediately gave way. Punting was therefore the only expedient, and this was attended with much delay.
Late in the evening Lieutenant Rogers having crossed with a few Europeans, attacked and drove from the hill above the ferry a strong party of the enemy, with the loss of one of their chiefs who was bayoneted. This considerably checked their ardour. The greater part of the night was taken up in getting over our invalids.
10.--In the course of the morning, the river having fallen, some of the troops and followers forded it. We were also enabled to get over part of the stores. But towards noon the rain set in, and, as is usual in mountainous countries, the river became almost immediately too deep to be passed in that manner. By the rapidity of the current, one of our two small rafts was completely carried away, and the other became nearly unmanageable. Our tents, the 3rd company of Sepoys, and our rear guard were still on the right bank of the river.
Apprehending that if these men were not quickly brought over, they would be lost to us for ever, I ordered them to cross without delay, which was effected with great difficulty by four o'clock, leaving the tents behind.
The constant skirmishing of the last two days had reduced our stock of ammunition to two small barrels of 800 rounds each, and several of the troops were without cartridges. Nearly two days had now elapsed since my departure from Candy; and no intelligence had reached me of the other detachments. I felt, therefore, the necessity of coming to an immediate decision relative to my future proceedings; and the troops and followers having now all passed, I determined without loss of time to commence my retreat.
The Trincomalé road, though longer, appeared upon the whole to present fewer obstacles than that leading to Columbo. In following the latter, we should have been under the necessity of taking by storm the two posts of Geeriagamme and Garlgaddray, situated at the top of the Columbo passes, through both of which the road runs. I therefore gave the preference to the former route. We were 142 miles from Trincomalé, with a road before us less rugged indeed in its nature than that which we had traversed, but in which we were likely to be equally exposed to annoyance from the enemy. As the bullocks would only impede our progress, I determined to leave them behind, and directing each soldier to take six days' rice on his back, abandoned the rest of the stores.
Whilst destroying the other stores, a parcel of loose powder, which had unfortunately been left near one of the boxes containing shells, took fire, which was immediately communicated to the fuses, and the shells continued to burst amongst us for some time, killing and wounding several of the Coolies who were to have carried them, and desperately wounding a serjeant of artillery. This accident occasioned some confusion, of which the enemy took advantage, and commenced a general attack, with a trifling loss on our side; in which, however, they were repulsed.
About five o'clock in the afternoon, we were enabled to commence our march, our Coolies carrying a long train of sick and wounded.
It was late before we reached the top of the Trincomalé pass, and the rain, the darkness, and the ruggedness of the mountains put it quite out of our power to descend. We here passed a distressing night, exposed to incessant rain, without the means of preparing victuals, and hearing the fall of the trees which the Candians were felling lower down on the mountain to obstruct our next day's march.
11.--Found the Candians posted on the different hills that command the pass, while the road was blocked up in many places with large trees, and in some with breastworks. After several hours' labour and exposure to the enemy's fire, we gained the bottom of the pass with the loss of five Europeans, eight Sepoys, and thirty followers, killed and wounded; a loss considerable in itself, but smaller than I had expected from the opposition that awaited us. Here I was deprived of the services of Lieutenant Vincent, who received a wound in the thigh; a deprivation which I felt severely, from the very able assistance he had hitherto afforded me.
We now continued our route, proceeding very slowly on account of the great increase of our wounded. Towards evening we passed the ruins of Fort Macdowal, which the Candians had entirely destroyed, and halted only when the darkness and rain prevented us from finding our way further.
12.--Continued our march without stopping, harassed as usual by the enemy, who were indefatigable in blocking up the roads before us. During this morning, Lieutenant Smith, of the 19th, a most promising young officer, received a severe wound in the breast, which completely deprived me of his services. At five P.M. perceiving that the enemy had strongly fortified a hill over which we had to pass, I attacked and carried it by the bayonet, with the loss of two Europeans and five Sepoys killed. On reaching the summit, we found the road so completely closed up, that we could not attempt to pursue it that night; and to aggravate our misfortune, we had lost the guides acquainted with this part of the country, two of them having deserted and one having been shot this day.
13.--As soon as it was daylight, I perceived a path lying in a northerly direction, which I followed as our only guide; concluding that if it did not conduct us to Trincomalé, it would lead to some of our other settlements.
The enemy this morning appeared more resolute than they had hitherto showed themselves. Led on by our own Malays and gun Lascars who had formerly deserted to them, they attacked our line both in front and rear, and actually cut in amongst the Coolies, who became perfectly panic-struck, threw down the sick and wounded, and either ran into the forests to conceal themselves, or rushed in among the troops, whom they threw into confusion. Unfortunately, two wounded Europeans, a serjeant of the Royal Artillery and a private of the 19th, who were in charge of the rear-guard, on this occasion fell into the hands of the enemy.
The Bengal Lascars and Malays in the Candian service repeatedly addressed their country-men in our ranks, informing them that the King of Candy did not consider them as his enemies, and promising that such of them as would come over to join him should be appointed Captains in his army; but that, if they persisted in continuing with the Europeans, whom they represented as an impure beef-eating race, they would be massacred along with them, the moment they should fall into their hands. All these endeavours to shake the fidelity of the native troops, however, still continued unavailing. As the day advanced, the path became so narrow and intricate that I foresaw it would be impossible to make much farther progress after dark, without entangling the detachment in the woods. I therefore halted, and directed Lieutenant Virgo to go forward and order back the advanced guard with the sick and wounded. This officer not returning, I sent on a corporal to know the cause of the delay, and to bring back a part of the 19th for the purpose of assisting to charge the enemy, who had by this time collected a considerable force in a village in our rear. The corporal returned, unable to find our advanced guard. I sent him forward again in quest of them with an escort, and after a considerable time had elapsed, he returned a second time, reporting that he had been three miles in front, without being able to gain the least intelligence of them, or even to trace what path they had followed. The enemy were now assembled in considerable force in our rear, with the apparent intention of closing with us. I determined immediately to charge them with the few Europeans belonging to the rear-guard and the native troops; leaving a strong party on the spot where we had been stationed, for the purpose of directing our vanguard (if they should return) to a village at some distance, where I intended to pass the night.
Our brave fellows advanced to the charge, gallantly led on by Lieutenants Povelary and Smith of the Bengal Sepoys; they soon routed the Candians, and the few who still had strength to pursue, occasioned a considerable loss to the enemy. Among their slain, I was happy to find two of our Malay deserters, who had made themselves particularly conspicuous for the last three days, not only in animating the enemy, but in encouraging our men to desert. On this occasion, we took four large gengals and a quantity of muskets. The village afforded us shelter from the inclemency of the weather, and, what was still more welcome, a quantity of boiled rice.
Since our departure from Candy on the 9th, our only food had consisted of raw rice, which latterly had become musty and mildewed. We had been engaged in one continued skirmish, exposed without intermission alternately to a scorching sun and a violent rain; and glad at night, when we could get a stone or log of wood, to raise our heads from the wet ground. From seven o'clock till two, it generally continued fair, and the effects of the sun were powerfully felt. After two, the rain set in, and continued incessantly during the whole of the night.
14.--I was much concerned at the advanced guard not returning, and on resuming my march, followed the road which I thought it most likely they had taken. We had now the satisfaction to find that the enemy's pursuit had considerably slackened, owing chiefly to the spirited attack of the preceding evening, which showed them that, although weakened, we were far from being conquered; and owing in some measure also to the inconvenience they too suffered from the incessant rains. Passed this night in the woods without shelter.
15.--The enemy's fire continued to decrease; a few shots only were fired at us in the course of the day, and those without effect. Halted at night in a small village, where we were enabled to procure shelter, and some refreshment.
16.--Saw a few of the enemy at a distance; they did not attempt to molest us. We here found ourselves in the Trincomalé road. Halted at night in a small village a few miles from Minery Lake, where I was surprised to find the advanced guard with Lieutenant Virgo, but (painful to add) without Lieutenants Vincent and Smith, and two wounded soldiers of the 19th. I was informed that Lieutenant Smith had died of his wounds; and there was every reason to suppose that Lieutenant Vincent had met a similar fate, or perhaps the more distressing one of falling into the merciless hands of the Candians. Thus were lost to the service two excellent officers, in the prime of life, who had conducted themselves throughout this arduous expedition with a degree of zeal, intrepidity, and perseverance, highly creditable to themselves, and consolatory to their friends. I shall ever regret the loss of these meritorious young men, from whose conduct I had on so many occasions derived considerable aid. The guard alleged that they had lost their way in the woods, and were nearly starved; that the Coolies had completely deserted them; that they were themselves so exhausted as to be scarcely able to walk, and had no means of carrying the sick, whom they were under the necessity of abandoning; that they were without guides, and found their way to the village where we then were by mere chance. Considering Lieutenant Virgo as the cause, in the first instance, of this disaster, by not bringing back the guard, I ordered him into arrest.
This officer pleaded, in vindication of his conduct, that the soldiers had refused to obey his orders. On further inquiry, I found that the situation in which the soldiers were placed had in some degree shaken their discipline, and that they were even encouraged in insubordination by one of the non-commissioned officers, over whom Lieutenant Virgo, from belonging to another corps, had not sufficient control.
Under these circumstances, I thought it best to release this officer from arrest, and to submit the whole affair to the Commanding Officer of Trincomalé.
17.--Continued our march unmolested by the enemy, and passed the night in the woods.
18.--Reached the lake of Candelly, where we were again exposed to the inclemencies of the monsoon without the least shelter.
In proportion as the annoyance of the enemy slackened, and the necessity of personal exertion diminished, I had more time for reflection; and I may truly say, that the last few days of our march were not to me those in which I least suffered either in body or mind.
In common with the rest of the detachment, I had performed the greater part of the retreat barefooted. Had I possessed, indeed, changes of boots and shoes, I could not have used them, my feet having swelled, and become so tender from constant wet, that I could not without considerable pain put them to the ground.
In this condition, emaciated by fatigue, and labouring besides under a severe dysentery, arising, I presume, from the nature of the water, cold, and want of proper food, I was for the two last days obliged to be carried in my cloak, fastened to a stick.
These bodily sufferings, however, severe as they were, were only shared in common with many of those around me, and fell far short of the anguish of my mind. Whilst I witnessed the melancholy state of my brave companions, I could not help reflecting, that, perhaps, my precipitate retreat from Candy had brought all this distress and misery upon them; that the other divisions were possibly now in Candy, carrying into execution the General's plans; and that, in such case, I must, by my premature retreat, incur the censure of the General, and perhaps of the whole army.
On the other hand, in the event of our troops not coming up, I was satisfied that, had I remained a single day longer in Candy, the river, from the constant rains which we had experienced, would have become completely impassable; that our provisions would have been expended, without the possibility of procuring any fresh supply; and that, though determined not to capitulate under any extremity, we must, in the end, have been over-powered, owing to the want of ammunition, as well as from the pressure of sickness and famine.
While my mind was agitated by these conflicting reflections, we arrived at Tamblegamme on the 19th, where we were met by some officers from Trincomalé, who had heard that morning of our approach.