CHAPTER V.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DELAWARE.—PHILADELPHIA UNDER HOWE AND UNDER ARNOLD.

BY FREDERICK D. STONE,

_Librarian of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania._

"THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of his country, but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman."

So wrote Thomas Paine, December 19, 1776. The preceding month had been fraught with adversity. The loss of Fort Washington on the 16th of November had rendered Fort Lee useless, as with it alone the passage of the river could not be obstructed. Its evacuation was immediately ordered, and the ammunition and some of the guns were removed. Before all could be taken away, however, the fort became the object of the enemy's attention. On the night of the 19th, two columns under Cornwallis, composed of British and Germans, with a detachment from the fleet, in all about six thousand men, crossed the river and landed at Closter dock, seven miles above Fort Lee, then commanded by General Greene. The night was stormy, and the movement escaped the notice of Greene's sentries. By morning the sailors had dragged the artillery to the top of the Palisades, and everything was ready for an advance upon the fort. Greene was informed of the landing of Cornwallis, and immediately took steps to secure a retreat for his command, then numbering about three thousand men. Word was sent to Washington, who was at the village of Hackensack with the troops which he had brought with him from White Plains. In three quarters of an hour the commanding general was at Greene's side. Seeing that the fort was not tenable, he ordered a retreat. No time was to be lost; and leaving the tents standing, the kettles over the fires, and such stores as could not be removed, the troops were hurried towards the advancing enemy with such speed that they gained the road leading to the only bridge over the Hackensack before Cornwallis could intercept them.

The situation of the Americans was now more precarious than it had been at Fort Lee. They were in danger of being shut in between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; they were in a perfectly flat country, without intrenching tools or camp equipage; their right flank could be turned and their line of retreat threatened if the British should land a force at the head of Newark Bay or at Amboy. Washington's forces were greatly reduced by reverses and by desertions. Nearly all that were left were militia of the flying camp, called out for an emergency, and impatient to return home, as their time of service had nearly expired. Small as his numbers were, Washington was obliged to post some at Amboy and others at Brunswick, to protect his flanks. As those remaining were insufficient to hinder the advance of the enemy in his front, he ordered Lee, whom he had left in command on the east of the Hudson, to cross that river and join him, and, with hardly three thousand men, Washington began his retreat through the Jerseys.

On the 21st he was at Aquacknoc Bridge on the Passaic, and by the 23d at Newark. On the 28th he left Newark, the advance-guard of the British entering the town as his rear-guard quitted it, and the next day he arrived at Brunswick. Here an attempt would have been made to prevent the enemy crossing the Raritan, but the stream was fordable in a number of places. As the British approached, the Jersey and Maryland brigades, whose terms of service expired that day, refused to stay an hour longer, and as the British crossed the river the line of march was again taken up for Trenton. This point was reached on the 2d of December, two brigades having been left at Princeton, under Stirling, to watch the enemy.

Having seen his stores and baggage safely over the Delaware, and being reinforced by about twelve hundred militia from the neighborhood of Philadelphia, Washington faced about on the 6th, with such men as were fit for service, and set out to join Stirling at Princeton.

It had not been the intention of Howe, when he ordered Cornwallis over the Hudson, to do more than take possession of and hold East Jersey, and Cornwallis's orders did not permit him to go beyond Brunswick. But the slight opposition which Washington was able to offer to the British advance excited in Howe the hopes of capturing Philadelphia, and he joined Cornwallis in person at Brunswick. After a short halt, he pushed on towards Stirling at Princeton, and before Washington could reach that general Stirling was in full retreat, to avoid being intercepted. A retrograde movement was ordered, and by the 8th the American army was on the west bank of the Delaware. The advance of Cornwallis's column reached the river before the rear-guard of the Americans had landed on the Pennsylvania side; but as Washington had secured all the boats for a considerable distance above and below Trenton, his position was comparatively a safe one. Here for a time he rested his men, and urged upon Congress the necessity of raising additional troops, and the importance of preparing for the defence of Philadelphia, as the military stores were in that city.

In his retreat through the Jerseys, Washington was greatly embarrassed by the conduct of General Charles Lee. The instructions he had given Lee on the 17th of November to join him may have been discretionary, but the language and frequency of his orders left no doubt of the expectations of the commander-in-chief. But Lee chose to read the orders in the light of his wishes. On the east of the Hudson he had an independent command, which he purposed to retain as long as he could. Schemes and suggestions that should have had no weight were allowed to delay his passage over the river until December 2d, and then his advance was slow and hesitating. The prospect of receiving reinforcements from the Northern army, which would make his command equal to that of Washington, strengthened his wish to act independently. He proposed, as soon as the troops from the north should join him, to attack the rear of the enemy. While this plan may not have been devoid of military judgment, it is doubtful if it would have had more than a temporary effect on Howe's movements, while it would have deprived Washington of the reinforcements he so greatly needed. Notwithstanding Washington's explicit directions to avoid the enemy in joining him, Lee hung so close to the enemy's flank as to leave a doubt of his real intentions, and on the morning of the 13th, just after having put on record that he believed Washington to be "damnably deficient", he was surprised and taken prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, at White's tavern, near Baskingridge, three miles from his camp.

The estimation in which Lee was held gave an undue importance to his capture. The British thought that in it they had deprived their opponents of nearly all the military science they possessed, and they styled him the American Palladium. With the Americans he had many friends, who were flattered that a soldier of European distinction should have espoused their cause, and, dazzled with his success at Charleston, they rated him higher than Washington, and, unintentionally perhaps, weakened the confidence that should have been reposed in the commander-in-chief by his subordinates.

Having failed to overtake Washington in New Jersey, Howe turned northward to Coryell's Ferry, fifteen miles above Trenton, in hopes of finding boats to enable him to cross the Delaware; but in this he was disappointed. He then took post at Pennington with a portion of his force, while with the remainder he returned to Trenton, repaired the bridges below the town which the Americans had destroyed, and extended his line as far as Burlington.

So great was the terror spread through New Jersey as the British advanced, that many of her citizens took advantage of the amnesty which was offered by the Howes to all who would put themselves under their protection within sixty days from the 30th of November. Chief among these was Samuel Tucker, president of the Committee of Safety, who had held many positions of honor and trust. Nor was this defection confined to the east side of the Delaware. It was now that Joseph Galloway, and citizens of Philadelphia, like the Allens, who had supported the cause of the colonies until independence became the avowed object of the war, sought safety within the British lines. But the influence which their conduct might have exercised upon the people was neutralized by what was soon endured at the hands of the British and Hessian troops. Never before had any of the colonies been exposed to the unbridled impulses of a mercenary and licentious soldiery. Houses were plundered and their contents destroyed in mere wantonness, women were forced to submit to indignities, and all the horrors which usually attended the invasion of a European country by a foreign army in the eighteenth century were transferred to the soil of New Jersey.[887]

In Philadelphia the excitement was intense. On the 28th of November a meeting was held in the State House yard to consider the condition of affairs. It was addressed by Mifflin, who had been sent to the city to warn Congress of the danger which threatened the army. He spoke with animation, and endeavored to rouse the people to action. His efforts met with some success, and in a few days the troops that reinforced Washington prior to his retreat into Pennsylvania were in motion. On the 30th the Council of Safety advised the citizens to prepare, upon short notice, to remove their wives and children to places of safety. On December 2d, when it was known in the city that Howe's army was at Brunswick, crowds gathered at the Coffee House to learn the news. The stores and schools were closed, and all business was suspended. No one was allowed to cross the Delaware without a pass, while recruiting parties with drums beating paraded in the streets. The roads leading from the city were crowded with vehicles of every description, bearing the families of citizens and their effects to places of refuge.

When these means of transportation failed, the water craft on the Delaware was pressed into service. Women with children in their arms were crowded in smoky cabins so low that they could not sit upright, while the younger girls were quartered on the decks, from whence they were driven by the snow and rain. But sadder sights presented themselves in the streets of the city. The sick of the army arrived daily. Many of the men had gone to the field clad only for a summer campaign. They had succumbed to exposure, and had reached Philadelphia in an almost naked condition. Measures were at once set on foot for their relief. Vacant houses were taken for their accommodation. The most seriously afflicted were sent to the hospitals, while committees of citizens went from door to door begging clothing for their use.

Handbills were issued giving information of the advance of the enemy, and to awaken the indignation of the people printed sheets were circulated describing the insults to which the women of New Jersey had been subjected. Some of the citizens refused to take the Continental money, as it was rumored that Congress would soon disperse. On the 11th of December Congress requested Washington to contradict this rumor in general orders, and to assure the army that the delegates would remain in Philadelphia until it was certain the enemy would capture the city. It was well that Washington exercised his discretion in this matter, for the next day the crushing news was known throughout the city that he had been obliged to cross the Delaware. Congress at once adjourned to Baltimore, having first conferred on Washington "full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations of the war."

The state of political affairs in Pennsylvania was the chief cause of the inefficiency which exposed Philadelphia to the danger of capture and of the panic with which her citizens were seized. The old colonial charter had been abrogated, but the new constitution had not been put into effect, and the condition of society bordered upon anarchy.

For two weeks after Washington had retreated across the Delaware there seemed little chance of impeding the British advance. "Day by day the little handful was decreasing, from sickness and other causes." The services of all the regular troops in it, with the exception of those from Virginia and Maryland, expired on the first of the year, and the militia could not be depended upon. "They come", wrote Washington, "you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment." "These", he said again to Congress, on the 20th of December, "are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence." On Congress he urged the importance of raising at once an army upon a more substantial basis, and impressed upon those around him the necessity of the utmost vigilance. But in the anguish of the moment he wrote to his brother: "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up.... I cannot entertain the idea that [our cause] will finally sink, though it may remain for some time under a cloud."

Each day brought new difficulties to be overcome. When it was learned that the fleet that had sailed from New York had appeared off New London, the march of a portion of Heath's troops, which had been ordered from Peekskill, was countermanded, and three regiments from Ticonderoga were directed to halt at Morristown, where about eight hundred militia had been collected, and General Maxwell was sent to command them. On the 20th, the troops under Gates and Sullivan joined Washington. The former had been sent by Schuyler. Sullivan's division was that which had been commanded by Lee up to the time of his capture. Washington had been led to believe that a portion of these troops had reënlisted, and he had been waiting until they should join him to strike a blow at Howe's forces. Only a small number of the men had done so, however, and he found that on the first of the year he would have but fifteen hundred men independent of the militia. It was evident, therefore, that the blow must be struck at once.

On the 14th of December the British troops went into winter-quarters. They were stationed at Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown. Howe returned to his easy quarters in New York. Cornwallis obtained permission to visit England, and left Grant at Brunswick in command of New Jersey. The troops at Trenton were under the Hessian, Lieut.-Col. Rahl; those at Bordentown were commanded by his superior, Count Donop, who had some outposts as far south as Burlington and Mount Holly. Howe knew his line was too far extended, but he wished to cover the county of Monmouth, where there were indications of an outbreak on the part of some loyalists. The American army reached from Coryell's Ferry to Bristol. The crossings above Trenton were guarded by Stirling, Mercer, Stephen, and Fermoy. Ewing lay opposite Trenton. Dickinson with a few New Jersey troops was opposite Bordentown, and Cadwalader with the Pennsylvania militia was at Bristol.

Washington decided to attack the troops at Trenton. His men fit for duty did not exceed five thousand, and of these nearly two thousand were militia. The troops under Rahl consisted of three battalions of Hessians, having with them six field-pieces, fifty chasseurs, and twenty dragoons,—twelve hundred in all. Circumstances favored the plan which Washington now adopted. Colonel Griffin, with two companies of Virginians and some militia, had driven a party of Hessians, who had penetrated as far south as Moorestown and Haddonfield, back to Mount Holly, where they had been reinforced by Donop, who was thus too far removed from Trenton to support Rahl in case of an emergency. The success of Griffin made the militia at Bristol anxious for service, and it was decided by Cadwalader and Reed, who was with him, to gratify them by supporting Griffin. To this Washington assented, and at the same time confided to Reed and Cadwalader his contemplated movement against Trenton. On the morning of the 23d he wrote to them asking if the plan had been carried out, and informed them that one hour before day on the morning of the 26th was the time he had fixed upon for attacking Rahl. "For heaven's sake", he wrote, "keep this to yourselves as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us. Our numbers, sorry I am to say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity, dire necessity, will, nay must justify an attack. Prepare and concert with Griffin; attack as many of their posts as you possibly can with a prospect of success; the more we can attack at the same instant the more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result from it."

Washington was informed that it was impracticable to act with Griffin; and Reed repaired to Philadelphia to urge Putnam to create a diversion by crossing the river at Cooper's Ferry. He found, however, that little could be expected from Putnam, and returned to Bristol on the 25th, where Cadwalader was preparing to carry out the part which Washington had assigned to him. It was the intention of Washington to cross the Delaware above Trenton with about one half of his command, and attack the enemy, while Ewing and Cadwalader should cross opposite Trenton and Bristol, and not only cut Rahl's line of retreat but prevent Donop from reinforcing him.

Notwithstanding the fact that no aid could be expected from Putnam, Washington determined to proceed, and urged Cadwalader to do all in his power to support him. The boats had been gathered at McKonkey's Ferry, nine miles above Trenton, and as the men marched to them the footprints they left in the snow were here and there tinged with blood from the feet of those who wore broken shoes. The boats were promptly manned by Glover's regiment from Marblehead, and at dark the crossing began. It was three o'clock before the artillery was landed, and four before the troops took up the line of march. The attack was to have been made about five, and against a more vigilant enemy this delay would have proved fatal. But Rahl was not vigilant. He despised his opponents, and refused to protect his position with redoubts as instructed by Donop. He had been informed of Washington's intended movement, but paid no attention to the report. It so happened that on the morning of the attack his outposts had been fired upon by a body of strolling militia, and this he supposed was the attack he was to look for. Washington had with him two thousand four hundred men. These he divided into two columns. One was commanded by Sullivan, and marched by the river road which entered the town on the northwest. The other, under Greene, took the Pennington road which approached the town from the north. The Americans advanced in a violent storm of snow and hail. Greene's command arrived at the outskirts of the town three minutes before Sullivan's. The attacks of both parties were almost simultaneously. Many of the guns were rendered useless by the storm, and the men were ordered to charge. Those who had bayonets fixed them and rushed upon the pickets, who retired. The Hessians were taken entirely by surprise. For a while Rahl was allowed to remain undisturbed in bed, but when matters grew serious he was aroused and hurriedly assumed command. Some of his half-formed regiments were advanced towards the Americans, but were driven back, throwing those in their rear into inextricable confusion. Two lines of retreat were open to Rahl. One lay over the bridge which crossed the Assanpink, south of the town; the other was the road to Brunswick. But Sullivan's attack was so spirited that the Hessians were driven past the road which led to the bridge, and as they attempted to escape towards Brunswick, Washington intercepted them with Hand's riflemen and held them in check. A battery under Captain Thomas Forrest created great havoc in their ranks, and two of their guns were turned against it. These were immediately charged by the Americans, who were led by Captain William Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe. Both were wounded, but the guns were captured. Rahl was mortally wounded in trying to rally his men, and shortly after he fell his command surrendered. All was over in three quarters of an hour. With the exception of the horse and a small number of the infantry which escaped over the Assanpink or to Brunswick, Rahl's entire force was either killed or captured. The prisoners numbered nine hundred and eighteen. The killed, Washington thought, did not exceed twenty or thirty. The Americans had two privates killed, one frozen to death, and two officers and four men wounded. As the enemy were supposed to be in force at Princeton and Bordentown, and the Americans were in no condition to withstand an attack, it was thought best not to risk the advantage which had been gained, and as soon as the men were rested the army, with its prisoners, returned to Pennsylvania.

Ewing and Cadwalader had been unable to carry out the parts assigned them, on account of the ice. The latter sent a portion of his infantry over the river, but recalled it when he found he could not land his artillery. With no definite news of Washington's success, Cadwalader recrossed on the morning of the 27th, supposing Washington to be at Trenton. He soon learned his mistake, but discovered that Donop had retreated towards Brunswick when he heard of the action at Trenton. Cadwalader then moved on to Burlington, and on the 29th marched to Crosswicks. The desperate condition of affairs previous to the battle had stimulated the people to extraordinary efforts, and the news of the victory raised their spirits in proportion to the depression they had so lately suffered. Ignorant of the victory Washington had achieved, Congress on the 27th vested him with powers that virtually constituted him a military dictator for the period of six months. To convince the people of the reality of the victory, the Hessians were marched through the streets of Philadelphia, and one of their standards was hung up in the chamber of Congress at Baltimore. Public rejoicings broke forth on every side. "The Lord of Hosts has heard the cry of the distressed, and sent an angel to their assistance", exclaimed Muhlenberg, the patriarch of the Lutherans. On the 27th and 28th of December, fifteen hundred militia under Mifflin followed Cadwalader into New Jersey, while the Jerseymen gathered at Morristown and other points. In the face of this feeling it was necessary that the offensive should be resumed, and on the 30th Washington occupied Trenton. The service of the New England troops expired on the first of the year; but through the efforts of Robert Morris money was raised to offer bounties, which, with appeals to their patriotism, induced them to remain six weeks longer with the army.

As soon as Cornwallis heard of the surprise at Trenton, he gave up his visit to England and hastily joined Grant at Brunswick. On the 30th, with 8,000 men, he marched towards Trenton, with the determination of driving Washington over the Delaware or capturing his entire force. Washington immediately ordered Cadwalader and Mifflin to Trenton, and sent forward a detachment under General Fermoy to retard the advance of Cornwallis. On the night of January the 1st this detachment was at Five Mile Run, between Trenton and Princeton. Early on the morning of the 2d Cornwallis set out from Princeton, where he had halted the night previous. The Americans retired before him, disputing every foot of ground. Hand's riflemen, Scott's Virginians, and Forrest's battery bore the brunt of the fighting. It was nearly noon by the time Shabbakong Creek was reached, and two hours passed before the British succeeded in crossing it. The main portion of the American army was strongly posted on the south side of the Assanpink, the banks being sufficiently high to enable the men in the rear to fire over the heads of those in front of them. As the British approached Trenton, troops were sent forward by Washington to support the Americans. A battery placed on a hill beyond Trenton held the British in check for a short time, but the Americans were soon driven into the town and across the bridge. The cannonading on both sides was heavy, but the British were unable to force their way across the stream, and as night approached Cornwallis, against the advice of his officers, withdrew his troops, determined to renew the conflict in the morning. "If ever there was a crisis in the affairs of the Revolution", wrote Wilkinson, "this was the moment. Thirty minutes would have sufficed to have brought the two armies into contact, and thirty minutes more would have decided the combat." Washington's position was indeed critical. It was hardly possible that with his raw levies he could continue to hold in check the well-disciplined troops of Cornwallis, which in the morning would be reinforced with troops he had left at Maidenhead and Princeton. The Delaware behind Washington was full of floating ice, and to cross it in that condition was impossible. If Cornwallis should force the Americans' position, the victory of the British would be decisive. Immediately after dark a council of war was held. It was then decided to turn the left flank of the enemy, strike a blow at Princeton, where the garrison was small, and march on Brunswick, the depository of the British stores. The sentries of both armies were posted along the banks of the Assanpink, and at some points were within one hundred and fifty yards of each other. Working parties were sent within hearing distance of the enemy to throw up intrenchments, the guards were doubled, and everything was done to indicate that Washington intended to defend his position to the last. But at midnight the fires were replenished and the troops silently withdrawn. Marching by the Quaker road, Washington turned the left flank of Cornwallis, and by daybreak reached a point directly south of Princeton. With the main body he moved directly on the town, and ordered a detachment under Mercer to march to the left and demolish the bridge over Stony Brook, thus destroying direct communication with Cornwallis. The garrison at Princeton consisted of the 17th, 40th, and 55th regiments and three companies of light horse. The 17th and 55th, with a few dragoons, started at sunrise on the morning of the 3d to join Cornwallis. The 17th, under Colonel Mawhood, had crossed the bridge over Stony Brook, that Mercer was to destroy, and was some distance beyond it, when Mawhood discovered Mercer on his flank and rear, moving north on the east side of the stream. He at once recrossed the bridge, and both parties endeavored to gain the high ground east of the stream. As the Americans had the shortest distance to march, they were successful, and with their rifles they poured a deadly fire into the 17th and 55th, as they advanced to drive them from their position. They had no bayonets, however, and were unable to stand the charge of the British. They fled through an orchard in their rear, leaving their commander mortally wounded on the ground. It was not until Mawhood emerged from the orchard that he was aware that the whole American army was within supporting distance of the troops he had just engaged. On hearing the firing on his left, Washington halted his column, and with the Pennsylvania militia moved to the support of Mercer. Encouraged by the irresolution of the militia, Mawhood charged them, but other regiments coming up and the militia gaining confidence, the British halted, and then fled, as the Americans in turn advanced against them. The 55th retreated to Princeton and joined the 40th. They made a mere show of defending the town, took refuge in the college building, deserted it, and were soon seen in full retreat across the Millstone towards Brunswick. Washington's troops had been under arms for over eighteen hours, and were too much fatigued to follow them. Having dispersed the 17th regiment, he destroyed the bridge over Stony Brook and Millstone as the head of Cornwallis's rear-guard came in sight. It was commanded by Leslie, who had marched from Maidenhead as soon as he heard the firing in his rear. Washington turned north at Kingston, and proceeded to Somerset Court-House, where he rested his men. Cornwallis was not aware that the Americans had been withdrawn from his front until he heard the sound of the guns at Princeton. Realizing at once that he had been outgeneralled, and that his stores were in danger, he ordered a retreat. Failing to reach Princeton in time to be of service, he continued his march to Brunswick, and made no attempt to follow Washington. The losses of the British in these engagements were severe; those on the 2d of January were never known. At Princeton, Washington estimated that one hundred men were left dead upon the field, and that the killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to five hundred. Ensign Inman, of the 17th, wrote that of the two hundred and twenty-four rank and file of his regiment, which set out on the morning of the 3d, one hundred and one were either killed or wounded, and that he was the only officer of the right wing not injured. The Americans lost only twenty or thirty privates, but many officers. Bravely had they urged their men on in the thickest of the fight. That Washington escaped seemed a miracle to those who saw him lead the troops which drove Mawhood back. Hazlet, Morris, Neal, and Shippin fell upon the field. Mercer, mortally wounded, died upon the 12th, lamented by the whole country. From Somerset Court-House Washington marched to Morristown, where he went into winter-quarters. The British troops were soon all withdrawn to Amboy and Brunswick. In less than three weeks Washington had turned back the tide of adversity, and had compelled his opponents to evacuate West Jersey.

Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook, and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and extended his line to Somerset Court-House, and Arnold was sent to Trenton to take measures to prevent his crossing the Delaware. The militia turned out in a spirited manner, and Howe did not care to advance in the face of the opposition they could offer, with Washington on his flank. He endeavored to bring on a general engagement with the latter, but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy.

Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. With the object of reaching the fleet he started to cross to Staten Island; but learning that Washington was at Quibbletown, he recalled his men and proceeded to Westfield, hoping to outflank him. But, as Washington retired, Howe was unsuccessful, and finally passed over to Staten Island, totally evacuating New Jersey.

For over six weeks Washington was ignorant of Howe's intentions. Supposing that he would endeavor to coöperate with Burgoyne, and would sail up the Hudson, Washington moved his army to Ramapo, in New York. On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. Its departure was promptly reported to Congress. Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry.

On the 24th of July Washington heard that the fleet had sailed southward, and in consequence marched his army from Ramapo to Coryell's Ferry. He continued his march to Philadelphia, when he learned that the fleet was off the capes of Delaware; but as it was soon lost sight of, he retraced his steps, and halted in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, twenty miles from Philadelphia. While there, Lafayette, De Kalb, and Pulaski joined the army.

For a while everything was in suspense. Concluding at last that Howe had sailed for Charleston, Washington consulted with his officers, and decided to return to the Hudson, so that Burgoyne could be opposed or New York attacked, as circumstances should direct. He was just about to do this when word was brought that the fleet had entered Chesapeake Bay, and was at least two hundred miles from the capes. This news created great consternation in Philadelphia, but the excitement was not as great as it had been the previous winter, when Howe was at Trenton. Repeated alarms had made the people callous, and internal political differences continued to divide them. Besides this, the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. Stirring appeals were made by the authorities, new bodies of militia were ordered to be raised, handbills calculated to arouse the people were issued, but all with unsatisfactory results. To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats.

The Americans halted south of Wilmington, and a picked corps under Maxwell was thrown to the front. The country below was patrolled by parties of Delaware militia under Rodney, and Washington reconnoitred it in person. The disembarkation of Howe's army on the 25th was watched by a few militia, who fled when a landing was effected. Howe's men were in good health, but hundreds of his horses had died on the voyage, and those that survived were little better than carrion. His advance, therefore, was slow. He moved in two columns, one on each side of Elk River. Several days were spent in collecting horses, and on the 3d of September the columns joined at Aitken's tavern. Here a severe skirmish took place with Maxwell's corps, which was driven back. Washington's force then lay behind Red Clay Creek, his left resting on Christiana Creek, and extending in the direction of Newport. On the 8th the British advanced as if to attack the American left, but by night Washington learned that the greater part of Howe's army was at Milltown, on his right. Fearing that Howe would push past him in that direction, cross the Brandywine, and gain the road to Philadelphia, Washington, on the evening of the 8th, quietly withdrew his troops from Red Clay Creek, and threw them in front of Howe, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine. A redoubt, commanded by Proctor, was thrown up on the east bank to protect the crossing. Wayne's division, formerly Lincoln's, was within supporting distance, and Greene's, still further to the rear, was to act as a reserve. The Pennsylvania militia, under Armstrong, formed the left wing. They were posted at the fords below Chad's, which were easily protected. The right wing was commanded by Sullivan. It was composed of his own division and those of Stirling and Stephen. Both Washington and Sullivan were unacquainted with the country to their right, and supposed that, when they guarded the fords three miles above where Sullivan was stationed, the enemy could not approach from that direction without their receiving timely notice.

The British marched from Milltown to Kennett Square. On the morning of the 11th, Knyphausen with 7,000 men took the direct road to Chad's Ford. He skirmished with Maxwell, who had crossed the stream to meet him, and drove him back over the Brandywine. At daybreak on the same day, another column, 7,000 strong, set out from Kennett Square. It was commanded by Cornwallis, and Howe accompanied it in person. It took a road leading north to a point above the forks of the Brandywine, turned to the east, crossed the west branch at Trimble's Ford and the east at Jeffrey's, and then moved south. The plan was that Knyphausen should engage the attention of the Americans in front until Cornwallis had gained a position to attack their right. In this Knyphausen was successful, his attempts to cross the Brandywine at Chad's Ford being only feints.

About noon Washington heard of Cornwallis's march. He promptly determined to cross the stream and engage Knyphausen, while Cornwallis was too far distant to reinforce him or threaten the American right. Wayne, Greene, and Sullivan's divisions were ordered to advance. Greene had gained the west bank when word was received from Sullivan that a Major Spear had assured him that there must be some mistake. He had that morning passed over the road Cornwallis was said to be on, and had seen nothing of him. Fearing that Cornwallis's march was only a feint, and that he had returned and rejoined Knyphausen, Washington ordered Greene back and sent scouts out for additional information. By two o'clock it was obtained. Cornwallis was discovered on the road to Dilworth, and would soon be in the rear of the Americans. Stirling and Stephen were deployed on the hill southwest of Birmingham Meeting-House, and Sullivan's division was ordered to join them. Before it could reach its position Cornwallis began the attack. As he attempted to turn the American right, Sullivan endeavored to move his three divisions to the east. His own division had been formed in line half a mile from those of Stirling and Stephen, and in closing the gap it fell into confusion and was routed. With the divisions of Stirling and Stephen, Sullivan made every effort to hold the position; but he was outnumbered, his left flank was uncovered, and his entire command was finally driven in confusion from the field. Sullivan, Stirling, and Conway had encouraged their men with exhibitions of personal bravery, and Lafayette, who acted as a volunteer, was wounded while endeavoring to rally some fugitives. When Washington heard the firing in the direction of Birmingham he rode thither with the utmost speed. Meeting the fugitives, he ordered Greene to support the right wing. The order was executed with wonderful promptness. Greene, throwing Weedon's brigade on the flank of the enemy and Muhlenberg's in their front, checked the pursuit. But the Americans were obliged to fall back until they came to a narrow defile, flanked on both sides by woods, from which the British could not drive them, and night ended the conflict. When Knyphausen learned that Cornwallis was engaged he pushed across the stream at Chad's Ford, but Wayne, Maxwell, and Proctor held him in check until they found that the right wing had been defeated, when they retired in good order, fighting as they fell back towards Chester. There at night the defeated army gathered, and Washington reported to Congress that, notwithstanding the misfortunes of the day, his troops were in good spirits.

The American loss was about one thousand, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, five hundred and seventy-nine. That the conduct of the Americans inspired their opponents with respect is shown by the language of Sir William Howe in summarizing the opposition he had met with up to this time. "They fought the king's army", he wrote, "on Long Island; they sustained the attack at Fort Washington; they stood the battle at Brandywine: and our loss upon those occasions, though by no means equal to theirs, was not inconsiderable."

The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow. Wayne was to have been reinforced by detachments under Smallwood and Gist, which did not reach him. When the British moved nearer to the Lancaster road, Wayne took position in their rear. He supposed that they were ignorant of his presence, and wrote to Washington to that effect. But on the night of the 20th he was attacked by a strong detachment under Major-General Grey, and although he had taken measures to guard against a surprise, the onslaught was so sudden that his men, who were sleeping on their arms, were unable to make an effective resistance, and about one hundred and fifty were either killed or wounded by the bayonet.

Howe on the 21st resumed his march towards Philadelphia. Finding that the Americans had thrown up intrenchments at Swedes Ford, he turned up the river as if to cross above. Washington feared that it was his intention to strike at Reading, where his stores were deposited, and to protect them marched in the same direction on the opposite side of the river. When he reached Potts Grove, now Pottstown, he discovered that Howe, by a retrograde movement on the night of the 22d, had crossed at Fatland and Gordon's fords, and was in full march for Philadelphia.

On the day of the battle of Brandywine the citizens of Philadelphia heard the sound of cannon in the west, and gathered in the streets to discuss and wonder what the future would bring forth. At night a messenger arrived with news of the disaster. Everything was in confusion, and when, on the morning of the 19th, about one o'clock, a letter was received from Colonel Hamilton stating that the British were marching on the city, the members of Congress were aroused from their beds, and departed in haste for Lancaster, where they had agreed to meet should their removal from Philadelphia become necessary.

"It was a beautiful still moonlight night, and the streets as full of men, women, and children as on a market day." The alarm was premature, but on the 25th Howe's army encamped at Germantown. Through Thomas Willing, a leading citizen of Philadelphia, the inhabitants were promised by Sir William Howe that if they should remain peaceably in their dwellings they would not be molested. The next morning, Cornwallis, with three thousand men, took possession of the city. The troops marched down Second Street to the music of "God save the King", and were greeted by some of the inhabitants with "acclamations of joy", but the people generally "appeared sad and serious." Howe immediately began to throw up a line of intrenchments north of the city, extending from the Delaware to the Schuylkill, and informed his brother, the admiral, who was in Delaware Bay, that the army was in possession of the city. The defences of the river prevented the fleet from approaching, and the day after the occupation an attempt was made by the American flotilla to cannonade the city. The smaller vessels were driven off before they had done serious damage, but the frigate "Delaware" ran aground and was captured.

The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city. In the centre stood the market-house, and along the road which there crosses the main street Howe's army was encamped. The left under Knyphausen reached to the Schuylkill, the right under Grant and Mathews to the York road. At the upper end of the town stood the large stone mansion of Benjamin Chew, late chief justice of the province, and in a field opposite the 40th Regiment under Colonel Musgrave was encamped. The advance was a mile beyond at Mount Pleasant, where the second battalion of light infantry was stationed, with their pickets thrown out at Mount Airy still further on. After Howe crossed the Schuylkill, Washington marched to Pennybacker's Mills, and thence to Metutchen Hills, fifteen miles from Philadelphia. He had been reinforced by McDougall's brigade and other troops; and learning that Howe had detached a portion of his command to reduce the forts on the Delaware, he determined to attack him at Germantown. His plan was to engage the troops at Mount Pleasant with a portion of his army, while a large force under Greene should move down the Lime Kiln road, which enters the town from the east at the market-house, and attack Grant and Mathews. At the same time the Pennsylvania and Jersey militia were to make demonstrations on the enemy's left and right flanks respectively.

Washington moved from his quarters on the evening of October 3d. Sullivan commanded the troops that were to attack the enemy in front, and was followed by the reserve under Stirling, which Washington accompanied. Sullivan arrived at Chestnut Hill on the morning of the 4th at sunrise, and halted two hours to allow Greene to gain his ground, that the attacks might be made at the same time. Captain Allen McLane's company and a portion of Conway's brigade were then ordered to advance. They drove the guard at Mount Airy back on the light infantry, and held them in check while Sullivan formed his line. Wayne's division was on the east of the road, Sullivan's on the west. The whole under Sullivan then moved forward, driving the light infantry before them. A thick fog enveloped everything, and the men could not see forty yards in front of them. But Wayne's men dashed on, calling to each other to remember Paoli and crying for vengeance. The light infantry were reinforced by the 40th Regiment under Musgrave. Just then Howe rode up, calling out: "For shame, light infantry! I never saw you retreat before." But he found the attack was general, and rode back to the main line. Down the main street and past Chew's house Sullivan and Wayne pursued the flying troops. But here the rout of the British was checked by Agnew, who hastened forward with a portion of the left wing. As the reserve passed Chew's house they were fired upon by six companies of the 40th that had taken refuge there with their commander Musgrave. Stirling endeavored to dislodge them, but the effort was futile. Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens and Major Louis Fleury daringly attempted to fire the house, but were unsuccessful. While this was going on, Greene made his attack on the right wing. His march had taken half an hour longer than anticipated, while he still met the enemy sooner than planned, as their first battalion of light infantry had been moved forward the night before on the Lime Kiln road. Greene attempted to advance in line of battle, but his line was thrown into confusion. He drove a portion of the troops back to the market-house, but when he encountered Grant he was obliged to retire, and a part of his command was captured. Woodford's brigade wandered so far from Greene's right as to reach the rear of Chew's house. It was then directly behind Wayne's division, and when the brigade fired on the house Wayne's men retired, as they supposed the enemy were in their rear. This uncovered Sullivan's flank, and he too was obliged to fall back. The British pursued until Whitemarsh was reached, where Wayne checked them with a battery posted on the hill, near the church. The Americans lost nearly eleven hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British, five hundred and twenty-one. The American General Nash, of North Carolina, and the British General Agnew were mortally wounded. While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that though driven from the field of Brandywine they were still aggressive.

It was now evident to Howe that he must open communication with New York by water, or his army would be in a state of siege. His attention was therefore turned to the defences of the Delaware which were held by the Americans. The most formidable of these was Fort Mifflin, situated on an island in the river a short distance below the mouth of the Schuylkill. Opposite this, at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore, was Fort Mercer, while four or five miles below, at Billingsport, was another fortification. Opposite these points _chevaux-de-frise_ were sunk in the channel, which were protected by the batteries and by a fleet of small vessels, known as the Pennsylvania navy, commanded by Commodore John Hazelwood. Besides these, there were several larger vessels which had been built by order of Congress.

On the 19th of October Howe withdrew his troops from Germantown and encamped them behind his lines of intrenchments on the north side of the city. Before this he had erected batteries to attack Fort Mifflin. He now sent a body of men, under Colonel Stirling, over the river from Chester to capture the fort at Billingsport. The garrison there was not sufficient for the defence of the fort, and as the British approached they evacuated the post. By the 21st Admiral Howe succeeded in passing the lower _chevaux-de-frise_, and his vessels sailed up the river to a point nearly opposite Fort Mifflin. On the same day three battalions of Hessians, with artillery, crossed into Jersey from Philadelphia to attack Fort Mercer. They arrived before the fort on the afternoon of the 22d. It was commanded by Colonel Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, who had with him but six hundred men. The fortifications were unfinished, but a strong redoubt, with an abatis, had been constructed. Donop summoned the garrison to surrender, and upon receiving a refusal formed his regiments for the attack. They rushed upon the embankments and passed the abandoned lines with little opposition. But when they charged the redoubt, they were met with a fire that nearly filled the ditches with killed and wounded. Most of the men retired in confusion, and those who attempted to scale the works were beaten back in a hand-to-hand conflict. It was intended that the fleet should coöperate with Donop; that the "Vigilant", with sixteen 24-pounders, should pass to the west of Fort Mifflin, while other vessels should engage Hazelwood and prevent his offering assistance to Greene. The plan failed, however, at all points. The "Vigilant" could not sail up the west channel, and Hazelwood was more than a match for the vessels sent against him. He drove them back, while some of his boats sailed close to the shore and poured an effective fire into the flank of Donop's column. It was in vain that Donop and his officers re-formed the men and led them back to the attack. They were shot down in scores as they attempted to remove the abatis, and in three quarters of an hour from the time the engagement opened the men withdrew for the last time, leaving Donop behind them, mortally wounded. He died three days afterwards, "finishing", to use his own words, "a noble career early." His command had numbered about twenty-five hundred men, one sixth of whom were either killed or wounded. The Americans had but fourteen killed and twenty-three wounded. Two of the vessels which had been sent against Hazelwood, the "Augusta" and the "Merlin", ran aground, and were discovered in that position by the Americans on the 22d. They were at once attacked, and the magazine of the "Augusta" exploded with terrific force. She had been set on fire either by accident or by a shot from the American batteries, and blew up before all of her crew could be removed. It was found impossible to save the "Merlin", and she was fired by her officers and destroyed.

Taught caution by these reverses, Howe made no further effort to capture the forts until he had succeeded in erecting a number of batteries on the Pennsylvania shore within range of Fort Mifflin. On the 10th of November these were opened with serious result to the Americans. The reply from the fort was spirited, and the damage done to it in daytime was repaired during the night. On the first day, Colonel Samuel Smith, of Maryland, who commanded the garrison, was wounded, and was taken to Red Bank. The second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, was relieved, on account of ill-health, by Major Simeon Thayer, of Rhode Island, and the defence of the fort was continued. On the 15th the "Vigilant", carrying sixteen 24-pounders, and a hulk with three guns of the same capacity, succeeded in passing up the west channel and taking the fort in the rear, while other vessels engaged the fleet. The fort by this time was little more than a mass of ruins. The ammunition was nearly exhausted. Major Fleury, the engineer of the fort, and Major Talbot were wounded; nearly all the guns were dismounted, and whenever the men appeared on the platforms they were picked off by sharpshooters in the shrouds of the vessels. During the night of the 15th the garrison was removed to Red Bank, as preparations were being made to storm the place the next day, and on the morning of the 16th the British took possession of the place. The gallant defence of this fort by about three hundred men called forth commendations from all sides. Swords were voted to Hazelwood and Smith by Congress, while Fleury and Thayer were promoted. Fort Mercer was now the only water-defence held by the Americans. With the object of capturing it, on the 18th Cornwallis marched to Chester and crossed to Billingsport. Greene was sent to oppose him, and crossed the Delaware at Bristol; but before he could render any assistance to Varnum, who commanded the troops on the Jersey side of the river, that officer was obliged to retire before Cornwallis and abandon Fort Mercer, which the British now destroyed. Lafayette, who was with Greene, made a spirited attack on a body of Hessians encamped near Gloucester, for which he gained considerable credit. The majority of the small vessels of the Pennsylvania navy succeeded in passing up the river by the batteries that Howe had erected at Philadelphia, but the larger ones, together with nearly all those built by Congress, were destroyed.

A few days after the fall of Fort Mifflin the British transports made their way up to Philadelphia, and to some extent relieved the distress that the scarcity of provisions occasioned. About the end of October Washington removed his headquarters to Whitemarsh, and on November 24th reconnoitred the enemy's lines with a view to attack them. A majority of his officers, however, opposed the plan. It was soon evident that Sir William Howe was about to resume the offensive, and Greene was recalled from Jersey. On the evening of December 4th, Howe, with nearly all his army, marched out of Philadelphia with the avowed intention of driving Washington over the mountains. His advance-guard arrived at Chestnut Hill about daylight the next morning. General James Irvine with the Pennsylvania militia met them at the foot of the hill, and, after a sharp skirmish, the militia fled, leaving Irvine wounded in the hands of the British. When Howe arrived in front of Washington's lines he found them so strong that he did not dare to attack them, and after spending four days in endeavoring to gain a position that would compel Washington to attack him, he suddenly gave up the design and returned to the city.

As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built of logs, and were fourteen by fifteen feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. "My brigade's out of provisions, nor can the commissary obtain any meat", wrote Huntington on the 22d of December. "Three days successively we have been destitute of bread", said Varnum the same day, "and two days we have been entirely without meat." Soap, vinegar, and other articles necessary for the health of the men were never furnished, and so imperfectly did the clothier-general perform his duties that many of the men were without shirts, and hundreds were confined to the hospitals and farm-houses for want of shoes. Blankets and proper coverings were so scarce that numbers, after toiling during the day, were obliged to sit by the fires all night to keep from freezing. By the 23d of December two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men were unfit for duty, because they were barefoot and otherwise naked. The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. "The unfortunate soldiers", wrote Lafayette, in after-years, "were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them.... The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew." At times, however, it seemed as if the forbearance of the men was exhausted, and that the war would end in mutiny. But the officers succeeded in allaying the feelings of discontent, and under the management of Greene, who assumed the duties of quarter-master-general on the 23d of March, a change for the better took place.

While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. "The Continental Congress and the currency", wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, "have greatly depreciated." Many of the members entertained the widespread fear of a standing army, and refused to follow the advice given by Washington for the relief of the men who defended them. Some of the delegates, indeed, did not hesitate to criticise the judgment of Washington, and question his abilities. The capture of Burgoyne gave them an opportunity of comparing the results of the Northern and Southern campaigns. In writing of Washington's army a member of Congress said to Gates: "We have had a noble army melted down by ill-judged marches, which disgrace their authors and directors, and which have occasioned the severest and most just sarcasm and contempt of our enemies. How much you are to be envied, my dear general! How different your conduct and your fortune! In short, this army will be totally lost unless you come down and collect the virtuous band, who wish to fight under your banner, and with their aid save the southern hemisphere. Congress must send for you." "I am weary", exclaimed John Adams, "with so much insipidity." "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters." It was a matter for thanksgiving, he thought, that the credit of defending the Delaware was "not immediately due to the commander-in-chief nor to Southern troops. If it had been, idolatry and adulation would have been unbounded." The prevalence of these sentiments made it easy for disappointed soldiers like Mifflin and Conway to spread dissensions which, if they had been allowed to grow, would have brought about the removal of Washington. Mifflin's eloquence and abilities as a politician far exceeded his merits in the field; and he was jealous of the preference shown by Washington for Greene and Knox. Conway aspired to a major-generalship, and was chagrined that Washington opposed him. If Washington had been removed and Lee or Gates appointed in his place, Mifflin and Conway would have been benefited by the change. The schemes of the last two were warmly supported by James Lovell and Dr. Benjamin Rush, and the most insidious measures were entered upon to undermine the reputation of Washington. Anonymous letters were circulated for this purpose, and the country was made to ring with the cry that, under a Gates, a Lee, or a Conway, the Southern army would be victorious. Through the influence of this faction, Gates was made president of the Board of War, of which Mifflin was a member, and authority which belonged to the commander-in-chief was vested in it. To separate Lafayette from Washington, and gain for themselves the influence of his name, the "Cabal", as it has been called, proposed an impracticable winter campaign against Canada, which Lafayette was to command, with Conway to assist him. But here the faction spent its strength. The friends of Washington had been put on their guard by the disclosure of a correspondence which showed the malignity of his enemies. Wilkinson, who was on Gates's staff, repeated, while his tongue was loosened with wine, an opinion expressed in a letter that Conway had written to Gates. Gates read it to his military family. "Heaven has been determined to save your country", it said, "or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it." The words reached Washington, who enclosed them to Conway, simply informing him that he understood they formed a portion of a letter of his to Gates. It was in vain that the members of the Cabal attempted at first to carry the matter through with a high hand, then to deny that such a letter had ever been written, and finally to excuse themselves. Their ends were discovered and their power was gone. Lafayette would have nothing to do with the Canadian expedition unless De Kalb was made his second in command. He repaired to Albany only to find that no measures had been taken to carry out the promises made him, and as the friends of Washington were soon in the ascendency in Congress, Lafayette was recalled to Valley Forge.

Through the advice of a committee which Congress had sent to camp to inquire into the condition of the army, many defects and abuses were corrected, and its organization was improved. The new troops that had been called for came in slowly, but their effectiveness was increased through the exertion of Baron Steuben, who joined the army about the close of February. A pupil of Frederick the Great, and a distinguished officer in the Prussian service, he won the esteem of Congress by offering to serve as a volunteer. His experience and industry soon instilled a discipline into the army which it had never known, and in May he was made inspector-general, with the rank and pay of a major-general.

* * * * *

While the American army was suffering at Valley Forge the British were comfortably quartered in Philadelphia. When they first entered the city it presented a sorry appearance: 590 dwellings and 240 stores were unoccupied; the leaden spouts of many houses had been taken down to mould into bullets, and the bells of the churches and public buildings had been removed to places of safety. The male population between the ages of eighteen and sixty numbered but 5,335, and of these one fifth were Quakers. The feelings of the Quaker citizens had been greatly outraged by the arrest and banishment to the western part of Virginia of a number of their people. Sullivan had discovered on his march through New Jersey what he believed to be a treasonable correspondence on their part with the enemy, and he had forwarded the papers to Congress. The matter had been referred to the authorities of Pennsylvania, who found in the correspondence, and in an address issued by the Quaker meeting in December, the grounds for sending the Quaker leaders into exile. It was but natural that the families of these men should have looked upon the British as their deliverers from an outrageous tyranny. But they soon found to their sorrow that their opposition to war afforded them as little protection from one side as from the other. The property destroyed by the British was enormous, and a revulsion of feeling was the consequence. At one time seventeen handsome houses beyond the lines were set on fire to prevent their being occupied by the American pickets. Persons living in the neighborhood of the city were robbed by both parties, and their crops carried off or destroyed. The temptation to sell their produce for hard money induced some of the neighboring farmers to supply the enemy with luxuries, though they found access to the city hazardous. The Americans under Smallwood guarded the roads leading to Wilmington, while Generals Potter and Lacy scoured the country west and north of the city. Captains Allen McLane, Clark, and Lee watched the movements of the enemy and reported them to Washington, but they could not oppose the large forces that Howe frequently sent out to protect those who were willing to risk furnishing him with provisions.

The desolation which surrounded the town was soon in striking contrast with the scenes within. The empty stores were occupied by itinerant traders from New York, who offered for sale articles of luxury that the war had driven from the American market. The officers of the army were quartered on the citizens, and after the campaign closed they gave themselves up to social enjoyments. Clubs met at the public-houses, and weekly balls were given at the City Tavern. As many of the officers were men of education and refinement, they were warmly welcomed in the families of leading citizens; but there was another class who did much to change the moral aspect of the city, when, by following the loose example of their commander, Sir William Howe, they shocked the staid citizens with their immorality. Cock-fighting and gambling were favorite amusements, and a faro-table kept by a foreigner proved the ruin of many young officers. The theatre on South Street was fitted up under directions of Captains André and De Lancey. Some of the scenes were painted by André. The profits of the performances were divided among the widows and orphans of the soldiers. As spring approached, horse-racing was added to the list of amusements. While citizens of wealth could take part in the gaieties which surrounded them, those in moderate circumstances suffered privations. Firewood was extremely scarce and provisions high. "Nothing but hard money will pass", wrote a resident to a relative outside of the lines. "There is plenty of goods, but little money among the tradespeople. The market is poor. I received the butter by J——; we are no longer accustomed to eat butter on our bread. I keep it to make water soup, which we have nearly every day." The army of occupation, on the other hand, was plentifully supplied with military stores after the defences on the Delaware were captured.

Martial law ruled supreme. The appointment of Joseph Galloway to be superintendent of police and the designation of magistrates under him were the only steps taken towards the revival of civil authority, and Galloway received his orders from headquarters.

The supineness of Howe robbed the British of all the benefits that might have resulted from the capture of Philadelphia. Attempts were made to raise regiments of loyalists, but so little support did the scheme receive that it was only partially successful. The "Pennsylvania Loyalists", of which William Allen, Jr., was colonel, and the "Queen's Rangers", commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, were the most efficient of these corps. No attempt was made to drive Washington's half-starved forces from their camp, although their condition was perfectly well known to Howe through the deserters that flocked to the city. The military movements of Howe while in Philadelphia were confined to foraging expeditions and attacks on isolated posts that could be surprised and broken up with little danger of loss. While these were successful, they gave to the war a predatory character that reflected little credit on British arms, and intensified the bitterness entertained for all representatives of royal authority.

The British government, dissatisfied with the results of Howe's campaigns, decided early in 1778 upon his recall. Sir Henry Clinton, his successor, arrived in Philadelphia the 8th of May, and on the 18th an entertainment was given by the officers of the army in honor of the retiring commander. The fête was styled the "Mischianza", and consisted of a regatta, a mock tournament, and a ball. But "Knights of the Burning Mountain" and of the "Blended Rose", with squires and ladies decked with spangles and ribbons, could not disguise the fact that the royal army had failed in accomplishing the task assigned to it, and the chagrin of its veterans was deepened by the frivolous scenes which marked the retirement of Sir William Howe.

The alliance with France made it necessary for the British to contract their operations, and Sir Henry Clinton brought with him orders to evacuate Philadelphia. His intention of doing so became known to Washington, and that his information might be more certain he ordered Lafayette, with a body of two thousand four hundred men, the flower of the army, to cross the Schuylkill and take a position near the city. This movement was made on the very day of the Mischianza, and on the morning of the 19th Howe learned that Lafayette was at Barren Hill, twelve miles distant. Clinton had not yet assumed command, and in the hope of closing his career in America by a brilliant stroke, Howe determined to make an effort to capture the young Frenchman and his detachment. So confident was he of doing this, that, before leaving the city, he invited his friends to meet Lafayette, whom he promised to bring with him on his return, while his brother, the admiral, prepared a vessel in which to take the distinguished captive to England. On the night of the 19th Grant, with five thousand men, marched by way of Frankford and Oxford, and by morning he had gained a point on the Swedes Ford road two miles in the rear of Lafayette. Another detachment, under Grey, was sent by way of Chestnut Hill to attack Lafayette's flank; while the main portion of the army, under Howe, took the Ridge road, to attack him in front. Lafayette's position was on high ground, and was naturally strong. Neither Grey nor Howe could approach him without his being aware of their advance. In his rear were two roads. One led along the riverside to Matson's Ford, three miles distant; the other along a ridge, a short distance from the river, to Swedes Ford, still higher up. The ground between the roads was heavily wooded. Had Grant, who held the Swedes Ford road, sent a portion of his force to Matson's Ford (which he could have done by a cross-road), Lafayette's only line of retreat would have been destroyed. But in place of doing this he marched down the Swedes Ford road to attack the American rear. Through the carelessness of his scouts, Lafayette was ignorant of Grant's position. He was preparing his force to receive Howe, when he heard of the column advancing from Chestnut Hill. He had just faced a portion of his troops in that direction when he learned that Grant was in his rear. Lafayette's danger was now apparent, but he was equal to the occasion. Without losing a moment, he sent troops through the woods, with orders to allow themselves to be seen at times by Grant, and lead him to suppose that they were the advance-guards of larger numbers. He also left a small body to engage the attention of Howe and Grey, and then silently marched his detachment along the river road, below Grant, to Matson's Ford. Grant was entirely deceived. He halted his men, reconnoitred the troops seen in the woods, and then pushed on to Barren Hill, where he met the other columns and discovered that Lafayette had escaped. The British pursued him to the ford, but by the time they reached it Lafayette had drawn up his force on the other side, and his rear-guard could be seen following him, dotting the river like the corks of a seine. Fearing that Lafayette had been reinforced by the entire American army, Howe made no attempt to follow him, but returned to the city, and on the 24th sailed for England.

The evacuation of Philadelphia was now only a question of time, and the news that it had been decided upon was appalling to the Tory citizens who had openly committed themselves to the royal side. In their despair they offered to raise three thousand men, if two thousand of the royal army could be left in addition, to protect the city. Howe had advised some of them to make terms with Congress, but those who had been most active in serving him decided to leave with the army. One hundred and eighty transports arrived in the Delaware, and such diligence was used in loading them that for days light carts drawn by soldiers, and every kind of carriage, from wagons to wheelbarrows, were constantly rolling between the houses and the river. As fast as the transports received their cargoes they dropped down the river. The defences were dismantled. On the 30th of May bodies of troops were thrown across the Delaware to protect the passage of the army. Everything was now ready for the departure of the British, but the final movement was delayed for a few days on account of the arrival of the commissioners appointed under the conciliatory bills of Parliament. At last, on the morning of June 18th, the men were withdrawn from the lines and marched below the city, where they were embarked upon boats and taken over to Gloucester. This was done so quietly that many of the citizens were not aware of the departure of the army until they noticed the absence of the redcoats in the streets. "They did not go away", wrote a resident, "they vanished."

By narrowly watching the movements of the enemy Washington was convinced that it was Clinton's intention to march the greater part of his army across Jersey. In this opinion he was opposed by the erratic Charles Lee, who had been exchanged, and had reached the camp. Lee could not believe that the British would give up Pennsylvania, and argued that it was more probable that they would strike at Lancaster, or possibly cross the lower Susquehanna and take up a position on its west bank. Before this, however, Washington had sent all of the Jersey troops into that State. He had put them under the command of Maxwell, with directions to coöperate with Dickinson, who commanded the militia, in opposing any attempt Clinton should make to cross the State. On the 18th of June George Roberts rode at full speed into camp at Valley Forge. He had been at the ferry over the Schuylkill at Market Street, and citizens on the Philadelphia side had shouted over the water that the British had gone. They had destroyed the bridge, so that he was unable to cross, but the intelligence could be relied upon. Shortly afterwards a letter was received from Captain Allen McLane confirming the news. He had ridden into the city from the north, and had picked up some stragglers.

Washington had everything in readiness to move the army at a moment's notice. Six brigades were immediately put in motion, and the remainder of the army followed the next day. Crossing the Schuylkill at Valley Forge, Washington marched directly for Coryell's Ferry on the Delaware, which he crossed on the 22d. He now sent a picked corps under Morgan to assist Maxwell. At Hopewell a council of war was held. Lee opposed any attack, and argued that, on military grounds, rather than delay the British, he would build a bridge of gold to facilitate their march. He so successfully urged his views that it was decided to move on a line parallel with the enemy, and send only a detachment of fifteen hundred men under Scott to aid Maxwell in annoying their flanks. Greene, Lafayette, and Wayne protested against the decision of the Council, and as their views agreed with Washington's, and were supported by Steuben and Du Portail, Washington determined to attack Clinton if an opportunity offered. For this purpose he moved his army to Kingston, whence he could strike at Clinton's line if he attempted to cross the Raritan. He also sent Wayne with a thousand men and Poor's detachment to join Scott and Maxwell. The command of this body belonged to Lee, but as he did not approve of the change in the plans, he declined it in favor of Lafayette. Subsequently, however, Lee claimed it, and to relieve Washington from an embarrassing position, and save Lee's feelings, Lafayette magnanimously yielded. The Jersey militia had turned out in a spirited manner, and under Dickinson and Forman were doing all in their power to retard Clinton's advance. They destroyed the bridges as they retired from Haddonfield to Mount Holly, and filled up the wells so that the enemy could not obtain water. The heat was intense and the British suffered severely. Clinton arrived at Crosswicks on the 23d, just in time to save a bridge over the creek at that place. There he learned that Washington was in Jersey, and would soon be on his flank if he continued to march in his present direction. Encumbered as he was with a baggage train twelve miles long, Clinton knew it would be impossible to protect it in crossing the Raritan. He determined, therefore, to march by the way of Freehold to the Neversink Hills, from which place he could embark his army for New York. Morgan and Maxwell hung on his rear from the time he left Crosswicks, and to protect his baggage Clinton sent it to the head of the column. As he approached Freehold, he knew from the frequency with which troops were seen on his left that he was in close proximity to the American army. He arrived at Freehold, where the court-house of Monmouth County is situated, on the morning of the 26th, and there encamped. The head of his column extended a mile and a half beyond the court-house on the road to Middletown. His left was on the road just marched over from Crosswicks to Freehold. The village was entered on the west by a road leading to Cranberry. It passed over low ground that was intersected by several swamps and ravines, which, with woods, completely covered the left of Clinton's line. The American army reached Cranberry, eight miles from Freehold, on the morning of the 26th. On account of a violent storm it was obliged to halt there, but the advance under Lee was within five miles of the enemy. When Washington heard of Clinton's position he ordered Lee to prepare a plan to attack him as soon as he resumed his march, unless it should prove that there were strong reasons for his not doing so. On the evening of the 27th Lee called his officers together only to tell them that no plan could be decided upon until the field was reached. At sunrise on the morning of the 28th, Knyphausen, with the baggage, began his march towards Middletown. At eight o'clock he was followed by the rest of the army. Scarcely had the rear-guard moved from its ground when it was fired upon by the militia under Dickinson. The militia were forced to retire, and as they did so were met by Lee's detachment as it advanced from Englishtown. On account of conflicting information the Americans halted for a short time, and then engaged the enemy and drove them towards their retreating columns. As matters were growing serious, Clinton reinforced his rear-guard, and the fighting promised to become general. But Lee had no faith in the ability of the Americans to cope with the British, and as the latter occupied strong ground he withdrew his men. From the time Clinton began his march across Jersey, Lee had contended that all the Americans could hope to do was to fall upon some isolated party of the enemy and either rout or capture it. To effect this he endeavored to draw the rear-guard of the British across the ravines intersecting the low ground west of Freehold, and while they were thus separated from the main body to defeat them. But his men could not understand his strategy. As they were withdrawn from one position after another they lost heart. It seemed to them that they were flying from a shadow, and so frequently were they ordered back that the retreat became rapid and confused. When Washington heard that Dickinson had engaged the enemy he again sent word to Lee to attack them also, unless there were powerful reasons for the contrary, and he would support him with the entire army. The day was excessively hot, and the men threw off their knapsacks that they might march more quickly. As they came to the church which stands between Englishtown and Freehold, stragglers were met who told them that Lee was retreating. Unwilling to believe the story, Washington spurred to the front to learn the truth. After passing the ravine which borders the low ground we have spoken of, on the west, he met Lee and his men in full retreat. A stormy scene ensued. Overwhelmed by the indignation which Washington manifested, Lee vainly endeavored to excuse his conduct. Little time, however, was lost in wasting words. Calling upon Colonels Stewart and Ramsey, who were near him with their regiments, to check the enemy, then but two hundred yards distant, Washington crossed the ravine in his rear, and formed his men as they came up on its western bank. Greene was placed on the right and Stirling on the left, while Wayne remained east of the ravine in front of Greene. In this position a severe engagement took place. Encouraged by the retreat of Lee, Clinton sent additional reinforcements to his rear, and vainly strove to drive Washington from his chosen ground. A battery under the Chevalier de Mauduit Duplessis, planted on an elevation on Greene's right, kept up an effective fire on the enemy's left, while Wayne repelled a desperate charge led by Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, in which that officer fell at the head of his men. Night ended the conflict, and both parties slept on the ground which they had occupied. At midnight Clinton withdrew his troops, and, leaving his dead unburied, resumed his march to Middletown. He retired so silently that Poor, who lay close to his right, was not aware of the movement, and on the morning of the 29th the Americans found themselves alone on the field. By daybreak Clinton was on too strong ground to be attacked, and after resting his men a few days Washington marched to the North River, and Clinton embarked for New York.

The battle of Monmouth, as the conflict at Freehold was called, was the last general engagement fought on Northern soil. The Americans had 229 killed and wounded, the British over 400. Besides this, the latter lost many by desertion on their march, and numbers fell from the effects of the heat, which registered ninety-six degrees on the day of the battle.

Lee's conduct would probably have passed unnoticed had he not, in a letter to Washington, endeavored to defend himself, while he demanded the grounds which called forth the remarks addressed to him on the battlefield. The letter was written in a highly improper spirit, and the result was a court-martial, that found Lee guilty of disobedience of orders, misbehavior before the enemy, and disrespect of the commander-in-chief. For these reasons he was suspended from command for twelve months, and before he was again ordered to service he was dismissed from the army for having written an impertinent letter to Congress.

Before leaving Valley Forge, Washington directed General Arnold, who had not fully recovered from the wounds received at Saratoga, to proceed to Philadelphia and take military command of the city. The duties assigned him were of a delicate nature. Congress had ordered that when the Americans took possession of the city no goods should be sold or removed until their ownership had been decided upon by a properly constituted commission. The object of this was to secure for the army such goods as the British and Tories might have abandoned or parted with at nominal prices to their friends. In his instructions to Arnold, Washington had referred him to the resolutions of Congress for his guidance, and had urged him to take every step in his power to preserve tranquillity and give security to individuals of every class until the restoration of civil power. Arnold arrived on the morning of the 19th of June, and with the approbation of several of the principal citizens issued a proclamation that closed the stores and suspended business. It also commanded the citizens to make returns to the town major of goods in their possession, beyond those needed for family use, that the purchasing agents of the army might contract for those they required. The temptation to benefit himself by the power he now exercised was greater than Arnold could withstand, and three days after he issued his first proclamation he entered into an agreement with the clothier-general of the army and another individual, that all goods purchased for the public and found to be superfluous should be charged to them and sold for their joint account. It soon became noised about that Arnold was personally interested in the purchases ostensibly made for the government, and although the secret of the agreement was preserved until after his treason, the knowledge of his speculations in Montreal gave such a color of truth to the rumor that the community were greatly dissatisfied: besides, he took up his abode in a spacious mansion on Market Street, formerly the residence of Governor Penn, which Howe had just vacated, and entered upon a style of living far beyond his means.

When the exiled Whigs returned to their homes they found the city in a filthy condition, and its surroundings a scene of desolation. The houses in the built-up portions of the city were not much injured, but many of them had been stripped of their furniture, and the papers were filled with advertisements of missing articles which the owners hoped to recover. The Supreme Executive Council resumed its sessions in Philadelphia on the 26th of June. Its patriotic president, Thomas Wharton, Jr., had died at Lancaster the month previous, and it was presided over by the vice-president, George Bryan. The Congress assembled more slowly. On the 2d of July a few delegates gathered in the State House, and two days afterwards celebrated the anniversary of Independence at the City Tavern; but it was not until the 7th that a sufficient number were present to conduct business. On the 12th, Gérard, the French ambassador, arrived. Until a suitable residence could be found for him he was the guest of Arnold. Congress received and entertained him on the 6th of August. No opportunity was lost of honoring the new ally. On the birthday of Louis XVI. the president and members of Congress called upon his ambassador and offered their congratulations, and on the 25th were in turn entertained by Gérard.

In the midst of their rejoicings the Whigs did not forget the Tories, whom they looked upon as promoters of their sufferings. Many of them had been attainted of treason while the government was at Lancaster, but the most obnoxious had gone off with the British. Such as remained were summoned before the authorities, and so great was the clamor against them that several were executed for aiding the enemy. The new Constitution had been put into effect, but it was opposed by a number of conscientious Whigs, and its administration was largely in the hands of new men, who did not command universal respect. The depreciation of the currency had also a demoralizing effect. Speculation ran wild, and the greatest extravagance prevailed. The prices of all kinds of commodities rose to enormous figures, and the attempts of Congress to regulate them by law and fix the value of the currency only served to increase the evil. The community was soon divided into two classes. The Anti-Constitutionalists and the Tories formed one party; the supporters of the new government the other. The latter zealously advocated all the measures of Congress, and, classing their opponents under the one head of "Tories", accused them of being the authors of all the difficulties that embarrassed the government; it was through their efforts that traitors were allowed to go unpunished, and the necessaries of life locked up so that higher prices could be wrung from the people. "Party disputes and personal quarrels", wrote Washington from Philadelphia, in December, "are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit ... are but secondary considerations." "Our money", he continued, "is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, or a supper, that will cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only take men off from acting in this business, but even from thinking of it."

It was in a community thus rent by faction and passion that Arnold commanded. The early restoration of civil power limited his authority, but his arrogance soon brought him in conflict with the new government. Unable to brook the restraint it put upon him, he joined its opponents, and was soon the centre of a gay and fashionable circle that gladly added so distinguished a soldier to their number. Arnold at that time was a widower, in his thirty-eighth year. He was of a susceptible nature, and before long fell in love with Miss Peggy Shippen, the daughter of Edward Shippen, a leading lawyer of character and position, whose political opinions caused him to be numbered among the disaffected. In this company the temptations to spend money were not easily resisted, and Arnold soon yielded to them. He gave elegant entertainments, and lived ostentatiously, if not extravagantly. He was soon involved in debt, and in the hopes of extracting himself entered into questionable speculations. His quarrel with the state authorities became more bitter, and in February, 1779, the Council published a series of charges which were referred to Congress. The committee who considered them failed to find Arnold guilty of any intentional wrong, and on the 19th of March he resigned the command of Philadelphia, and on the 8th of April was married to Miss Shippen. The Pennsylvania authorities were dissatisfied with the action of the committee of Congress, and succeeded in having the case reconsidered. After considerable delay, it was determined that the whole matter should be referred to a court-martial, to be appointed by the commander-in-chief. The court met in December, and the following month found Arnold guilty of two of the charges that had been preferred against him. The most serious one, that of speculating in goods bought for the public while the stores were closed, was not sustained for want of evidence, which was not discovered until after his treason. The acts he was found guilty of were indiscretions rather than crimes; and for these he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief.

EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

DURING the movements of Washington to check the British in their attempts to secure New York, what Congress called a flying camp was formed of some militia in Jersey, under Mercer, to impede the enemy's advance in case he turned towards Philadelphia.[888]

In Nov., 1776, Washington, crossing into New Jersey,[889] left Lee in command on the New York side, but Washington, at first requesting, afterwards instructed Lee to follow him (Sparks's _Washington_, iv. 168, 186-7, 193; 5 Force, iii. 779; _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1872, p. 267). Lee's secret purpose was to find some excuse for delaying, and so to prolong his independent command, with a chance of making a brilliant stroke. He endeavored at first to quiet Washington's importunities by detaching a part of Heath's force at Peekskill, but Heath would take orders only from Washington (_Memoirs_).[890] Finally Lee was moved to follow (Dec. 2d and 3d), and while crossing Jersey "to reconquer it" he was surprised at his transient quarters, Dec. 13, 1776, and captured. Captain Bradford, Lee's aid, gave Stiles the account which is entered in his diary (Johnston's _Campaign of 1776, Docs._, p. 146, and _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, 1860, p. 33).[891]

We have abundant evidence of the consternation which ensued in Philadelphia upon the advance of the British to Trenton.[892] The political condition of the government of the colony was very unstable. The colonial charter, under the instigation of Congress (May 10, 1776), had been overthrown by a convention called in the interests of the patriot party, which in July had met to frame a new constitution.[893] This, however, upon its adoption, failed of being effective, by its opponents' obstructive movements to prevent the organization of an executive council, so that in the interim the supreme power, such as it was, resided in a Council of Safety, which was hampered in its control of the militia. Such was the conjunction when fear of an invasion came, and the Quaker element was passive under the alarm, and, indeed, antagonistic to measures of resistance.[894]

The Jersey campaign in general can be followed in original authorities in Sparks's _Washington_, vol. iv.; Force's _5 Amer. Archives_, iii.; in Joseph Reed's "Narrative of the movements of the American army in the neighborhood of Trenton in the winter of 1776-1777", which, having been used in Reed's _Reed_, i. ch. 14, is printed in the _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, Dec., 1884, p. 391; the account by Congress,—not very correct,—dated Baltimore, Jan. 9, 1777, and sent to France (Lee's _R. H. Lee_, and E. E. Hale's _Franklin in France_, 97); and the current reports sent from Boston, Feb. 27, by Bowdoin to Franklin (Hale, p. 110.)[895]

The principal British contemporary accounts are in Stedman, _Annual Register_, Howe's _Narrative_, the evidence of Cornwallis in the _Detail and Conduct of the War_, and _Letter to a Nobleman_, 1779.

The story is also told in local monographs,[896] and by the general historians.[897]

On the temporary clothing of Washington with dictatorial powers, see the Circular of Congress (Dec. 28th), explaining why it was done (_Journals_, i. 585). Cf. also Sparks's _Washington_, iv. 550; Greene's _Greene_, i. 292; Thacher's _Military Journal_, 74; Wells's _Sam. Adams_, ii. 458, and the adverse views of Abraham Clark in _N. Jersey Rev. Corresp._, p. 68.

The purpose of some sudden stroke on Washington's part is well indicated.[898] The advance of Griffin with militia was opportune in drawing Donop forward to Mount Holly, so that he was too distant to support Rahl at Trenton.

On the attack on Trenton there is special record from the Washington papers in Sparks (iv. 242, 246, 541), Dawson, i. 20 (to Congress), _Mass. Soc. Hist. Col._, xliv. 32 (to Heath, and Heath's letter in _N. H. State Papers_, viii. 445). Others are in 5 Force, iii., a full record of the battle. Congress wrote to the agents in France (_Diplom. Corresp._, i. 246.)[899]

What is known as the Reed-Cadwalader controversy, hinging upon the alleged weakness or defection of Joseph Reed at this time, is more particularly examined in another place.

On the English side we have Howe's despatch in Dawson (i. 202) Tryon to Germain in _N. Y. Col. Doc._ (viii. 694). The effect of the battle in England to discourage the expatriated loyalists is told in Hutchinson's _Diary_, ii. 139. Stedman accuses Howe of bad judgment in placing so unfit a man in command as Rahl. Adolphus (ii. 385), On "private information" supposed to have been Arnold's, says that Arnold suggested to Washington the movement, and Mahon (vi. 130) has followed Adolphus.

Bancroft (ix. 217; cf. Irving, ii. 466) notes the Hessian journals which he had used.[900]

The affair at Princeton has special treatment in the Washington papers (Sparks, iv. 259; Dawson, i. 204), and is necessarily covered by the general historians.[901] On the English side Howe's letter (Jan. 5, 1777) to Germain is the principal source, and it will be found in _Gent. Mag._, Feb., 1777; C. C. Haven's _Thirty days_, 60; Dawson, i. 210. Cf. Mahon, vi. 132.[902]

Howe's campaign of 1777 was the ruin of his military reputation.[903] Jones, in his severe criticism upon Howe, unjustly charges Galloway with making the suggestion of the expedition to the Head of Elk.[904] It is certain that Galloway threw himself upon Howe's protection not far from the time when Howe committed himself to a plan of capturing Philadelphia. About the same time it has been charged that General Lee, by a treasonable project, aided Howe's purposes in the same direction.

George H. Moore laid before the N. Y. Hist. Soc., in June, 1859, the document in Lee's handwriting, dated March 29, 1777, while he was a prisoner in New York, in which he sketches a plan for Howe's guidance in the coming campaign. The "plan" in fac-simile, together with an elucidation of it, was printed in Moore's _Treason of Charles Lee_, New York, 1860. The "plan" is also in _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1872, p. 361. Lee was at that time trying to induce Congress to send commissioners to New York to confer with him (Bancroft, ix. ch. 19), but Congress was not ensnared. Moore contends (p. 84) that the "plan" is responsible for Howe turning towards Philadelphia, instead of going north to help Burgoyne. Bancroft (ix. 333; also see p. 211) asserts that it could have had no influence on Howe's movements.[905]

Lecky quotes Galloway's testimony, that of the 66,000 men voted by Congress for this campaign, hardly 16,000 were in the field. Bancroft admits that no one better than Marshall (iii. ch. 3) has described the part of Washington in this campaign.[906]

At the opening of the campaign Washington was kept long in suspense as to the purpose of Howe. The eastern people feared his object was Boston.[907] Alexander Hamilton early in the season had become Washington's aide, and his letters at once begin to contain speculations on Howe's purpose (_Works_, Lodge's ed., vii. 481, 496, 500). On May 28th, Washington moved his headquarters from Morristown[908] to Middlebrook, and it was thought Howe would attempt to march direct for Philadelphia. On June 12th, Sullivan writes to Weare that Howe was to be confronted the next day (_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 584); and when it was known that Howe was retiring towards New York, Washington, June 23d, little credited a report, then prevalent, that the British army was panic-struck (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll._, vii. 138).[909] Cf., for all these movements, Montresor's _Journal_.

In July, when news came of the fall of Ticonderoga, there were no signs that Howe was preparing to coöperate with Burgoyne, and Hamilton wondered (_Works_, vii. 507, 515). When Howe sailed from New York, Washington was in suspense.[910] On July 31st, it was learned that Howe's fleet was at the capes of Delaware, and the next day the vessels had disappeared.[911] It was now supposed that Howe had gone to Charleston, S. C., and that Washington might safely reinforce the Northern army (_Hamilton's Works_, vii. 517). Lafayette first took his seat at a council of war called to consider the propriety of this (Sparks's _Washington_, v. 445).

In August, 1777, Gen. Sullivan conducted a raid into Staten Island to seize Tories. He captured some papers which implicated the Philadelphia Quakers in inimical movements. (Cf. _Journals of Congress_, ii. 246, 253.) In other respects the incursion was unfortunate, and his movements were examined by a court of inquiry, which acquitted him.[912]

Howe had been six weeks at sea, with three weeks' provisions, when he landed at the Head of Elk.[913]

Upon Washington's march to confront Howe, see, for the preliminary movements, William J. Buck's paper on "Washington's Head Quarters on the Neshaminy", in the _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i. 275.[914]

Upon the battle on the Brandywine the main American source is the letters of Washington. With Washington's aid, R. H. Harrison wrote to Congress from Chad's Ford, Sept. 11th, at 5 P. M., a letter which was at once circulated in broadside (Sabin, iii. p. 463; Hildeburn, no. 3,533). Pickering drafted for the commander-in-chief the report (_Life of T. Pickering_, i. 157) written at Chester, at midnight, September 11th (Sparks, i. 251; v. 58; Dawson, i. 278). Hamilton was on Washington's staff (J. C. Hamilton's _Life of Hamilton_). C. C. Pinckney, also on the staff, wrote a letter in 1820 (_Hist. Mag._, July, 1866, x. 202). Marshall, as a participant, drew somewhat upon personal experience in his account in the _Life of Washington_. Lafayette's narrative, as given to Sparks, is in the _Sparks MSS._ (no. xxxii. Cf. also Lafayette's _Mémoires_). There is a journal of Capt. William Beatty, of the Maryland line, in the _Hist. Mag._, 2d. ser., i. 79. Sparks examines some of the disputed points of the battle.[915]

There are contemporary records and opinions in the _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., x. 316; the letter of the N. H. delegates in Congress in _N. H. State Papers_, viii. 678; current reports in Moore's _Diary_, 495; gossip in Adams's _Familiar Letters_, 296, etc.; Knox's account (Sept. 13th) in Drake's _Knox_, 48.[916]

On the British side, we find Howe's report, Oct. 10th, to Germain in Almon, v. 409; Dawson, i. 281. Cf. the evidence before Parliament in the _Conduct of the War_ and the narrative in Stedman.[917]

The Hessian participancy is examined in Lowell's _Hessians_, 197. Bancroft quotes Ewald's _Beyspiele grosser Helden_ as the testimony of an eye-witness of Washington's well-conducted retreat.[918]

A portion of the British troops used breech-loaders.[919]

The movements of the opposing armies toward Philadelphia can be followed in the main in the authorities cited for the battle. Some local details are in Pennypacker's _Phœnixville_, and an account of the damage done by the British on the march is in Smith's _Delaware County_ (p. 544).

For the Paoli attack, we have Wayne's defence at the court-martial in Dawson, i. 315, and in the _One hundredth anniversary of the Paoli massacre_, p. 52, which last contains also, beside sundry contemporary records, the addresses of J. S. Futhey (also in _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i. 285) and Wayne McVeagh. The report of Howe to Germain is in Dawson, i. 317.[920]

On Sept. 26th, Washington described the state of the army, then at Potsgrove (_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461). He was foiled by a rain in an effort to hold the British once more at bay, and Howe entered Philadelphia.[921]

Sullivan, with the charge of inefficiency for Brandywine still hanging over him, was the first to encounter the outposts of the British at Chestnut Hill, when he opened the day of Germantown. His letter (Oct. 25th) addressed to the president of New Hampshire was first printed by Sparks.[922]

Washington's letters to Congress and others are of the first importance.[923]

In Timothy Pickering's _Life_ (i. 166) there is an account of the battle from his journal, which sustains the positions taken by Pickering in 1826,—though he does not refer to it at that time,—in the controversy which was waged by him and Sparks with Johnson, the author of the _Life of Greene_.[924]

Of the writers near the event, Gordon drew from original sources; Marshall was an actor in the scenes; and there are accounts in Wilkinson, i. 353, 359, 361. G. W. P. Custis's _Recollections_, ch. 4, and the later writers need to be consulted.[925]

On the English side, Howe's despatch to Germain is in Dawson (i. 330). The letter of a British officer, dated Philadelphia, Oct. 19, 1777 (London Chronicle, Jan. 3-6, 1778), is reprinted in _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, April, 1887, p. 112.[926]

The seaward defence of Philadelphia depended on the forts Mercer and Mifflin, on the _chevaux-de-frise_ in the river, and on the Pennsylvania navy. Howe's first attempt, in October, to get his shipping up to support his army failed.[927]

The _chevaux-de-frise_ at Billingsport was laid by Robert Whyte, who went subsequently over the enemy, and he is charged with placing it purposely in a defective manner. Wallace (p. 228, with plans, p. 134), who examines the evidence, seems to think the charge is proved. Respecting the share of the navy in the defence of the river, the principal sources are the minutes of the naval board, etc., in _2 Penna. Archives_, vol. i., and other papers in iv. 748. An examination of this defence is made in Wallace, p. 130, etc.[928]

Upon the attack of Donop on Fort Mercer, at Red Bank (Oct. 22), the letter received by Washington from Major Ward, written at the desire of the commander of the fort, Col. Christopher Greene (cf. Greene's _Nath. Greene_, i. 489), is in Sparks's _Washington_, v. 112, and Dawson, i. 355, as is also Commodore Hazlewood's description of the naval part of the attack.[929]

Lafayette talked with Sparks of Donop (_Sparks MSS._, xxxii.). Knyphausen's report is in the archives at Marburg, and is used by Lowell (_Hessians_, 206). The despatches of the Howes are in Almon (v. 499), and Dawson (i. 356, 357).

Of the attack (Nov. 10-16) on Fort Mifflin (Mud Island) and its evacuation, with the opening of the river to the British fleet, the best garner of contemporary accounts with comment, is in Wallace's _Bradford_ (p. 194, etc.), but some of this material is found also elsewhere.[930]

There has been some dispute over the respective claims of Col. Samuel Smith[931] and Commodore Hazlewood for the defence of the fort (Wallace, App. 10).

On the British side we have the despatches of the Howes (Dawson, i. 364, 366), the journal of Montresor (_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, 1882, v. 393; vi. 34); the letters in Scull's _Evelyns in America_, 246, 253; and the account in Rivington's _Gazette_, cited by Wallace.

In addition to the references already made for the two attacks, the entire movements on the river are illustrated more generally in the letters of Washington, copied from the Penna. Archives, as well as in the diary of the Council of War in the _Sparks MSS._, no. 2. There are other contemporary accounts.[932]

Lafayette's attack on Gloucester soon followed. See plan on page 430.

The contrasts between the hilarities of the British in Philadelphia and the trials of the Americans at Valley Forge during the winter are abundantly illustrated.

The publication of the _Penna. Evening Post_ was resumed in Philadelphia, Oct. 11, 1777, and continued during the British occupation of Philadelphia.[933]

Various diaries kept in and near Philadelphia have been preserved,[934] and the details of the life in the town have been worked up by modern writers.[935]

The complimentary festival given to General Howe on his departure, known as the Mischianza, took place May 18th, at the Wharton house.[936]

On the condition of Washington's camp at Valley Forge we have first the testimony of his own letters and those of his corespondents,[937] as well as that of sundry diaries and journals.[938]

The question of supplies as affecting the camp is considered in Stuart's _Trumbull_ and Greene's _Greene_ (ii. 48), this general being made quartermaster-general in March.

There are preserved various orderly-books of the camp.[939]

There were efforts to reorganize the army during the winter. Congress had created a board of war in November, 1777 (Pickering, i. 187; Lossing, ii. 867). On Jan. 10, 1778, a committee of Congress was appointed to visit the camp and concert plans for the reorganization (_Journals_, ii. 401). A plan was drawn up by conference, and later adopted by Congress (Sparks, v. 525). Francis Dana wrote from the camp, Feb. 12th, to Congress, and the draft, found among the papers of Laurens, was printed in the _Polit. Mag._ (vol. i.,—1780), by which it was thought to appear that Howe could have destroyed the American army if he had had enterprise.[940]

A few days after the taking of Philadelphia, the Rev. Jacob Duché, of that city, who had been an approved supporter of the Americans, transmitted a letter to Washington, tempting him to desert the cause. Washington sent the letter to Congress; but Sparks could not find it in the Archives at Washington, and prints it from _Rivington's Gazette_ (_Corresp. of the Rev._, i. 448). The letters which grew out of this act, including one of expostulation from Francis Hopkinson, the brother-in-law of Duché, and that of repentance sent to Washington by Duché in 1783, can be found in Sparks, v. 94, 476.[941]

The military movements during the autumn of 1777 were mainly to try the temper of the opposing forces and to secure forage, and the incessant watching of each other's motions made Pickering write to Elbridge Gerry (Nov. 2d,—_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461) that "since Brandywine we have been in a constant state of hurry."[942]

During this time, Oct.-Dec., Washington was kept informed of the British movements through the letters of Maj. Clark (_Penna. Hist. Soc. Bull._, vol. i.). There was in November a project discussed of taking Philadelphia by storm (Drake's _Knox_, 136). Congress was urging the States to renewed efforts (_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 728). Early in December Howe had tried to allure Washington to a battle near Chestnut Hill or Whitemarsh (Sparks, v. 180; Dawson, i. ch. 31). By the middle of December the American army had gone into winter-quarters at Valley Forge (Reed's _Reed_, i. 345), but not without having thought at the same time of an attack on New York (_Ibid._, 344).

In January an attempt by the Americans to destroy the shipping at Philadelphia, by floating combustibles down the river from above, failed; but it gave rise to Hopkinson's humorous verses on the "Battle of the Kegs."[943]

In March Congress was urging young men of spirit and property to raise light cavalry troops (_Journals_, ii. 463), for Simcoe's British horsemen were raiding about the country for forage, meeting, however, now and then with resistance, as at Quintin's Bridge (March 18th) and Hancock's Bridge (March 21st).[944] At the beginning of May there was another conflict at Crooked Billet.[945] Three weeks later (May 20th) Lafayette skilfully extricated himself from an advanced position at Barren Hill, whither Washington had sent him towards the enemy, and Where the British commander sought to cut him off.[946]

Clinton, on relieving Howe from the command in Philadelphia, was instructed to evacuate the city (Sparks, v. 548). This materially changed the plans for the campaign, which had been determined upon prior to the announcement of the French alliance (_Sparks MSS._, xlv. and lviii.). Washington meanwhile was considering an alternative of plans, and getting the opinions of his general officers;[947] but the movements of the British to evacuate Philadelphia soon changed all.[948]

The battle of Monmouth, though in the end a victory for Washington, secured for the British what they fought for, a further unimpeded march toward New York. Washington's letters are of the first importance.[949] We have also accounts by Hamilton;[950] by Lafayette,[951] as given to Sparks; and statements by several other witnesses.[952]

The trial of Lee, and the papers produced by it, furnish abundant contemporary evidence. The trial was published at Philadelphia, 1778, as _Proceedings of Court-Martial held at Brunswick in New Jersey, July 4, 1778_.[953]

On the British side, Clinton's despatch is in _Lee Papers_, (1872), p. 461; Dawson, i. 415. A British journal kept during the march is in the _N. J. Hist. Soc. Proc._, i. 15; an orderly-book picked up on the field is in a transcript in the Penna. Hist. Society.[954]

The British retreat is commended in Baron von Ochs's _Betrachtungen über die neuere Kriegskunst_ (Cassel, 1817). Cf. Lowell's _Hessians_, p. 209.

Respecting the Conway Cabal, the best gathering of the documentary evidence is in an appendix to Sparks's _Washington_.[955] Sparks's conclusion is that the plot never developed into "a clear and fixed purpose", and that no one section of the country more than another specially promoted it. Mahon (vi. 243) thinks that Sparks glides over too gently the participation of the New Englanders, who have been defended from the charge of participation by Austin in his _Life of Elbridge Gerry_ (ch. 16). Gordon implicates Samuel Adams, and J. C. Hamilton is severe on the Adamses (_Repub. U. S._, i. ch. 13, 14). Mrs. Warren found no cause to connect Sam. Adams with the plot, and Wells (_Sam. Adams_, ii. ch. 46) naturally dismisses the charge. It is not to be denied that among the New England members of Congress there were strong partisans of Gates, and the action of Congress for good in military matters was impaired by an unsettled estimate of the wisdom of keeping Washington at the head of the army, though it did not always manifest itself in assertion (Greene's _Greene_, i. 287, 403, 411). Nothing could be worse than John Adams's proposition to have Congress annually elect the generals (_Works_, i. 263); and he was not chary of his disgust with what was called Washington's Fabian policy. Sullivan, in one of his oily, fussy letters to Washington (_Corresp. of the Rev._, ii. 366) finds expression of a purpose to revive the plot in William Tudor's massacre oration in Boston in March, 1779. The expressions of Charles Lee, that "a certain great man is most damnably deficient" (Moore's _Treason of Lee_, p. 68), like utterances of others, are rather indicative of ordinary revulsions of feeling under misfortunes than of a purpose of combination among the disaffected. Gates's refusal to reinforce Washington, and Hamilton's vain efforts to persuade him, naturally fall among the indicative signs;[956] and this apathy of Gates very likely conduced immediately to the loss of Fort Mifflin at the time it was abandoned (Wallace's _Bradford_, App. 12). The attempt to gain over Lafayette by the attractions of a command in invading Canada, can be followed in Sparks's _Washington_.[957]

THE TREASON OF ARNOLD.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE AUTHORITIES BY THE EDITOR.

JUST when and by what act Arnold was put in treasonable correspondence with the British is not clearly established. Bancroft[958] says it was towards the end of February, 1779,[959] but he gives no authority.

Clinton, in Oct., 1780,[960] says it was eighteen months before, which would place it about April, 1779, and this is the period adopted by Sparks[961] and Sargent.[962] The latter writer thinks Arnold made the advances; the former believes them to have come from the British.[963] It has also been believed that the mutual recognition was effected in some way through a Lieutenant Hele, a British spy, who was in Philadelphia after Arnold took command. There might arise a suspicion that the understanding was induced through the Tory family of Miss Peggy Shippen, whom Arnold had married in April, 1779. There are stories of her maintaining correspondence with her British friends in New York, but we do not know of any letters remaining as proof of it, except one from André to that lady after her marriage to Arnold, and after the British correspondence with him under feigned names had begun, in which letter the gambolling Major André commiserated his fair friend of the previous winter on the difficulty she might experience in buying gewgaws in Philadelphia, and offering to find them for her in New York. Whether this language, like the commercial phrases in which Arnold was at this time conducting his correspondence under the name of "Gustavus" with one "John Anderson", a British merchant in that city, was likewise a blind is not probably to be discovered, and it might or might not involve a doubt as to the privity of Peggy Arnold in the rather lagging negotiations;[964] but the probability is that André wrote the letter in his own name in order that Arnold might, by the similarity of the handwriting, identify his _pseudo_ Anderson; for by this time the nature of information which inured to the advantage of the British, and which Gustavus communicated to Anderson from time to time, had pretty well convinced Clinton that the person with whom he was dealing was high in rank, and probably near headquarters in Philadelphia.

Arnold had warm admirers; and those who trusted him for certain brilliant merits in the field included, among others, Washington himself; but Congress did not confide in him with so unquestioning a spirit. That body had raised over him in rank several of his juniors, much to Arnold's chagrin[965] and Washington's annoyance; and it was only after a renewed exhibition of his intrepidity at Danbury that it had tardily raised him to a major-generalship. Though his commission of May, 1777, gave him equal rank, it made him still, by its later date, the junior of those who had been his inferiors.[966] The Burgoyne campaign had been fought by him under a consequent vexation of mind, and his spirits chafed, not unreasonably, at the slight. The wound he then received incapacitating him for the field, had induced Washington, as has been shown, to put him in command of Philadelphia after the British evacuated it. It was now observed that he more willingly consorted with the Tory friends of his wife than with the tried adherents of the cause. His arrogance and impetuosity of manner always made him enemies. The Council of Pennsylvania by a resolution (_Hist. Mag._, Dec., 1870), as we have seen, brought Congress to the point of ordering a court-martial to decide upon the charges preferred against the general, and to Arnold's revulsion of feelings at this time has been traced, by some, the beginning of his defection.[967] Certain it is that he was kept in suspense too long to render him better proof against insidious thought, for it was not till December, 1779, that the trial came on. Meanwhile his debts pressed, his scrutinizers were vigilant, and there seems some reason to believe that he sought to get relief by selling himself to the French minister,—a project which, if we may believe the account, was repelled by that ambassador. To add to his irritation, Congress did not find the accounts which he had rendered of his expenditures in the Canada expedition well vouched, and Arnold resented their inquiries as an imputation upon his honesty.[968]

The trial at last resulted in his acquittal on two of the more serious charges; but being judged censurable on two others, he was sentenced to a public reprimand from the commander-in-chief.[969]

The burden of a public reproof, no matter how delicately imposed, was not calculated to arrest the defection of man already too far committed to retreat. If we may believe Marbois, not the best of guides, there was found among Arnold's papers, after his flight, a letter, undated and unsigned, in which he was urged to emulate the example of Gen. Monk, and save his country by an opportune desertion of what was no longer a prospering cause.[970] It soon became evident to Arnold that of himself, destitute of representative value, he was not a commodity that Clinton was eager to buy. Accordingly the recusant soldier sought to offer a better bargain to the purchaser by the makeweight of something that Clinton particularly longed for, and this was the possession of the Hudson Valley through its chief military posts.[971] To get a hold upon this, the time was opportune, for there was a change to be made in its commander. Arnold, however, did not get the coveted prize without some intrigue, for Washington, when he found that the wounded soldier professed eagerness for hotter work, proposed his taking the command of one of the wings of the main army. Arnold met the compliment by referring to his wounds as precluding work in the saddle, and induced Schuyler and R. R. Livingston to importune Washington to assign him to West Point.[972] The device succeeded, and Arnold reached West Point, as its commander, in the first week of August, and established his headquarters in the confiscated house which had belonged to Beverley Robinson, and which was situated on the east bank of the river, a little below West Point.[973] Clinton could have no longer any doubt of the identity of his correspondent, now that "Gustavus" wrote from the Robinson house.

The conspirators' first effort was to establish communications through Robinson, on business ostensibly having relations to this confiscated property; but Washington, to whom, for appearances, Arnold showed Robinson's application for an interview, told him that the civil, and not the military, powers should meet such proposals. Arnold could find at this time little difficulty in transmitting his clandestine letters, for there was constant occasion for the passage of flags from his own headquarters. To cover his proceedings from the officers of the American outposts, he only had to pretend that the expected messages or messengers were from his own spies in New York.[974]

Clinton was apparently not willing to commit himself to any bargain, unless Arnold would give a personal interview as an evidence of his sincerity; while Arnold, in according, on his part insisted that his interviewer should be the convenient Anderson. André, since he had become the adjutant-general of the British army, was now fully understood to represent that fictitious New York merchant. Arnold named Robinson's house for the meeting, and would make arrangements by which any flag should pass the outposts. This was objected to, and the neutral ground near Dobbs Ferry was settled upon. Here Arnold went in his barge; but the officers of the British guard-boats were not in the secret, and the meeting failed by reason of their chasing Arnold's barge up the river. Another attempt was planned, but this failed in the beginning, apparently by André's going up to the "Vulture", sloop-of-war, which was lying in the river, instead of landing lower down, as was expected. André was provided with full instructions, which if obeyed would have saved him the ignominy of a felon's death. He was not to put off his uniform, was not to go within the American lines, and was not to receive any papers. His bargain with Arnold was to have no written expression, and it involved on Sir Henry's part the dispatch of an ample force in a flotilla from Sir George Rodney's fleet, then in New York, where the men were already embarked, ostensibly for the Chesapeake, and the attack was to be made on the 25th of September, when it was supposed that Washington would have left the Hudson to go to Connecticut for an interview with Rochambeau. There was further to be made by André a promise that Arnold should have a commission in the British army and a sum of money. The American general, on his part, was so to dispose the forces in the works about West Point that the attack would, beyond doubt, end in a surprise and a mastery that would give color to the necessity of a surrender, which he was promptly to make.

It now became necessary that some device should be practised to let Arnold know that André had reached the "Vulture." There had just happened some firing upon a boat of the "Vulture", in going to meet what the British captain supposed or pretended to suppose a white flag displayed on the shore. This gave the opportunity of dispatching a flag to the commander in the Highlands, to remonstrate against such perfidy. The British captain accordingly sent such a message, and André wrote the letter in a hand which he knew Arnold would recognize, and moreover countersigned it with "John Anderson, Secretary."

Arnold at once bent to the occasion. He engaged one Joshua Hett Smith, who lived in the neighborhood, to go by night to the "Vulture" in a boat, and bring to the adjacent shore a gentleman whom he would find on board, from whom Arnold expected to get information. How far Smith was a dupe or a knave has never been satisfactorily determined. The business would seem to have had a plain significance to a quick-witted man; but a court was not able later to convict Smith of knowing precisely what it all meant. Smith had also with him two oarsmen, and it was not apparently believed that they were in a position to know enough to render their patriotism doubtful. It was then by night, in a boat steered by Smith, that André, dressed in his uniform, but with an overcoat wrapped about him, was rowed ashore. According to Smith, the darkness and the outer garment so concealed Andre's dress that his steersman never suspected him to be an officer. Arnold was found waiting in the bushes, a little remote from the landing. Here Smith left the two conspirators alone and returned to his boat; but when the signs of dawn began to appear he returned to warn them. Arnold, who had brought along with him an extra horse, mounted André on it, and the two started to go to Smith's house,[975] which was two or three miles away on the hill, and within the American lines.

If André is to be believed, he was not told that he was to go within the American outposts, and indeed there is no conclusive evidence to show why they went to Smith's house at all. Perhaps Smith or the boatmen refused, in the growing light, to take the risk of the return to the vessel. The general opinion has been that the conspirators had not concluded their negotiations, and needed more time. That Arnold had had a predetermined purpose to go to the house, if necessary, seems to be made clear from the fact that he had induced Smith to move his family away from their home temporarily, and on some pretext which Smith did not object to. André says that he first discovered Arnold's plan to get him within the American lines when, as they rode on their way, Arnold gave the countersign at the outposts. This was the first departure from Clinton's instructions. After they had reached the house the day broadened, and, the sound of cannon being heard, André went to a window, whence he could see the "Vulture" in the distance,[976] and saw that the Americans had dragged some cannon to a neighboring point, whence their fire became so annoying that the vessel raised her anchor and fell down the river. André became anxious lest this incident should preclude his return by water. The day had not far advanced when the bargain was completed, and Arnold prepared to leave for West Point to perfect the dispositions expected of him. He left behind sundry papers, mostly in his own handwriting, which André was to take to Clinton. Why another injunction of his superior was evaded by André in accepting the papers is not clear. They conveyed no information about the condition of the post which Clinton did not already possess or André could repeat to him. Possibly it was thought that, being in Arnold's autograph, the documents might serve as a pledge for what André was verbally to report to him.

Arnold seems to have made no certain provision for his fellow-conspirator's return to the "Vulture", but he left passes, which could be used either on the water or land passage, as circumstance might determine. André spent an anxious day after Arnold left. He was finally cheered by observing that the "Vulture", as if mindful of him, had returned to her previous moorings; but his hopes were futile. As night came on Smith showed no signs of arranging for a water passage to the ship, and made excuses.

The fact probably was, that, after the cannonading of the morning, Smith had no desire to risk himself on the river in a boat. It was accordingly agreed that André should undertake to return to New York by land, and that Smith should accompany him beyond the American outposts, under the protection of Arnold's pass and of his own acquaintance with the officers of the lower posts. It now became necessary for André to disregard another of Clinton's directions, and exchange his uniform for common clothes.[977] This done, he put the papers which Arnold had given him under his soles and within his stockings. Thus arrayed, about dusk the two started, accompanied by Smith's negro servant. They crossed King's Ferry, and proceeding on their way were stopped once, but suffered to advance on showing Arnold's pass. After spending the night at a house, they had gone on some distance the next morning when Smith parted with André, and, going to Robinson's house, reported to Arnold that André had been conducted beyond the lines. André went on in better spirits than before, feeling sure now that he could encounter nothing more serious than some wandering cowboys, as the British marauders who infested the Neutral Ground between the two armies were called, and with whom he could easily parley to their satisfaction. The natural foes of the "Cowboys" were the "Skinners", who harried the unfortunate adherents of the British along the same roads, and wrestled with the Cowboys as opportunity offered.[978] As it happened, a party of the American prowlers were out to intercept some British marauders, and three of the number were ensconced close by a stream not far from Tarrytown, on the upper side. They were by name John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart. Paulding was by force of character the leader, and was dressed in a refugee's suit, which not many days before had been put upon him in exchange for his own better garments, when he had come out from confinement within the British lines. This suit, as well as Paulding's profession that he was "of the lower party", given to André's inquiry when, as he came along, he was stopped by the men, led to André's revealing himself as a British officer. When the traveller found he had made a mistake, he showed Arnold's pass, and tried to enforce it by threats of the American commander's displeasure if the captors dared to disregard it. This failing, he tried bribes, and it was André's opinion that if he could have made the payment sure he might have got off, as money seemed to be their object. The men, on the other hand, said that they could have resisted any offer of money when, on searching their prisoner, they found the papers in his boots.[979] Paulding, who alone could read, saw the purport of the documents, and pronounced André a spy.

André was remounted and led under their combined guidance to the quarters[980] of Colonel Jameson, who commanded some dragoons at Northcastle. That officer recognized Arnold's handwriting in the papers found on the prisoner, but he seems to have been bewildered by the discovery, though it was afterwards urged that he thought the transaction was a plot of "John Anderson", whoever he might be, to implicate Arnold in some mischief. How far the prisoner himself may have prompted Jameson is not known, for it was clear enough to André that Arnold only could now extricate him from the gathering toils. Accordingly, events took a promising turn for him when Jameson dispatched the prisoner, under escort, to Arnold's headquarters, with a letter which informed his superior of what was apparent enough, that some dangerous papers had been found on Anderson, and that he had sent them to Washington. Major Benjamin Tallmadge, one of his officers, who was absent on a scout, returned before André had long been gone, and learning the particulars from Jameson saw at once the blunder, and persuaded Jameson to send a messenger to recall André and his escort. Jameson did so, but insisted that the letter to Arnold should go on, as it did.

The messenger with the papers sought to intercept Washington on the lower road from Hartford, which the commander-in-chief was supposed at that time to be traversing on his return from the interview with Rochambeau.

The next morning André was sent, for better security, in the charge of Tallmadge to Colonel Sheldon's quarters at New Salem. Here, getting permission to walk in the door-yard in the custody of an officer named King, André revealed his name and station, and being allowed pen and paper, he made the same avowal in a letter to Washington, which, when written, he handed to Tallmadge. Its contents confirmed that officer's suspicion that the prisoner was a military man, for he had shown a soldier's habit of turning on his heel as he paced his room.

Washington, returning by the upper road, had missed Jameson's messenger, who, retracing his steps, passed through New Salem, where he was entrusted also with the letter which André had just written, and then went on towards the Robinson house, where Washington was then supposed to be.

It was now the 25th, the very day when Rodney was to come up the river with his flotilla, and Arnold sat at breakfast at this same Robinson house,[981] not knowing what the day would develop. There were with him Mrs. Arnold, who had not long before (Sept. 15) come from Philadelphia, and two of Washington's aides, who had arrived a little in advance of their chief.

It was two days earlier than Washington had been expected back, and this was a serious perplexity in the mind of the conspirator. The suspense was soon ended, for Jameson's messenger to him shortly arrived, and the letter was put in Arnold's hands before the company. He read it, showed, as was remembered afterwards, a little agitation, but only a little, and in a few minutes left the table, saying that it was necessary for him to go to West Point. It seemed natural enough to his guests; but Mrs. Arnold observed his agitation more keenly, and followed him to their chamber, where all was revealed to her. She swooned; he kissed the infant lying there; descended the stairs;[982] stopped an instant to say to the breakfast party that Mrs. Arnold was not feeling well and would not come down again; mounted a horse which he had already ordered; hurried down the steep road to the river; entered his barge and seated himself in its prow; directed his men to row to mid-stream; and then priming his pistols, which he had taken from his holster, he ordered them to hurry down the river, as he had to go with a flag to the "Vulture", and must hasten back to meet Washington, who was shortly to reach his quarters. He tied a white handkerchief to a cane, and waved it as he passed Livingston's batteries at Verplanck's Point, and that officer recognizing the barge allowed it to pass on. In a few minutes more he was under the "Vulture's" guns, and then under her flag. His boatmen resisted his offers of recompense for desertion, and were not allowed to return to shore to spread the intelligence, which they now comprehended.[983]

Not long after Arnold left the Robinson house, Washington arrived, and, learning that Arnold had gone to West Point, he passed over unsuspicious to that post, where he was surprised not to find Arnold.[984] While Washington was gone, Jameson's messenger with the captured papers and André's letter arrived, and Hamilton, left behind by Washington, opened them as his confidential aide.[985] As soon as Washington's boat approached on his return from West Point, Hamilton went towards the dock to meet his chief, whispered a word, and both later entered the house and were closeted. The plot was revealed. Hamilton was dispatched to Livingston to head off Arnold in his escape if possible, but on reaching that officer's post it was found that Arnold's boat had already passed. Before Hamilton was ready to set out on his return, a flag from the "Vulture" brought ashore a letter from Arnold, addressed to Washington, framed in lofty expressions of his own rectitude, and avowing the innocence of Smith, of his own wife, and his aides.[986] Before Hamilton's return, Washington had dined with his officers without revealing the secret, but he shortly took Knox and Lafayette into his confidence. There was naturally great uncertainty as respects the extent of the conspiracy, and of what preparations the enemy had made for an immediate onset. The anxiety of the moment was soon evinced by the great activity of aides and orderlies. Word was sent in every direction for arrangements to be made for any emergency.[987]

André was brought to West Point, and Smith was arrested and held for examination. Special precautions were taken to keep them apart and to prevent escape. André was then conveyed down the river, still under Tallmadge's care, to headquarters at Tappan, where he was closely guarded in an old stone house, still standing.[988]

A board of general officers was at once summoned to consider the case and recommend what action should be taken. The papers taken from André were laid before them.[989] André himself was brought into their presence, when he made a written statement, and answered questions. He acknowledged everything, but said nothing to implicate others. He affirmed that he did not consider himself under the protection of a flag when he landed from the "Vulture." The report of the board was that André was a spy, and merited the death of a spy. Washington ordered the execution, and sent a record of the proceedings to Congress and recommended its publication. Congress printed the record.[990]

Clinton was meanwhile informed of what had happened by the return of the "Vulture" to New York, and wrote to Washington that Arnold's flag and pass should save André from the character of a spy. Beverley Robinson wrote to a similar purport, and so did Arnold; but the latter added a threat of retaliation in case André was executed, which was not calculated to further the purpose of André's friends, and it is rather surprising they allowed the letter to proceed. Washington replied in effect that a flag must be used in good faith to preserve its character, and that the concealment of dress and papers was the action of a spy.

Gen. Robertson was sent by Clinton to make further representations, and Washington put off the execution till Greene could confer with that general at an outpost. A repetition of the arguments on the British side made no change in the aspects of the case; and when Robertson quoted Arnold as saying André was under a flag, Greene told him they believed André rather than Arnold. Robertson wrote again to Washington, who had now definitely fixed mid-day of Oct. 2d for the execution. Washington thought it also best to leave unanswered a note of André requesting to be shot rather than hanged. Further letters, amplifying the British arguments, were prepared,[991] but before they could be sent to Washington word came that the execution had taken place.

During his confinement in Tappan, and after he became aware of his fate, André conducted himself with a cheerful dignity that much endeared him to the gentlemen who came in contact with him. His servant had brought from New York fresh linen and his uniform, which André put on with evident satisfaction. He practised his ready skill in pen-and-ink drawing, and made several sketches, which he gave to his attendants as souvenirs.[992] As his hour approached, he said graciously to his escort, "I am ready", and went to the place appointed, surrounded by guards and through a large concourse of people. Of the general officers of the army at the post only the commander-in-chief and staff were absent; and as the sad procession passed headquarters the blinds were drawn, and no one was seen. When the gibbet came in sight, André shrank a moment, but instantly recovered, for he had nourished hopes that his request as to the manner of his death would not be denied. He bandaged his eyes himself; lifted the cloth a moment to say that he wished all to bear witness to the firmness with which he met his death; and when the cart was withdrawn died instantly.[993] When his uniform was removed and placed in his servant's hands, the coffin which contained the body was buried near the spot.

His remains were disinterred in 1821 and taken to England,[994] where they were deposited in Westminster Abbey, beside the monument which had been erected there to his memory shortly after his death.[995] Many years after the removal, a rude boulder,[996] on which a simple record was chiselled, was placed on the spot of his burial; but this had disappeared when a few years since a plain monument, with an inscription by Dean Stanley of the Abbey, was made to perpetuate the record of his grave.[997]

Arnold received the price of his desertion,[998] was made a general in the British service, and turned his sword, both in Connecticut and Virginia, against his countrymen. Afterwards he went to England, was treated with an enforced respect in some places, and scorned in others.[999] He lived for a while in New Brunswick, but he never escaped the torments which the presence of honorable men inflicted upon him. His descendants live to-day in England and in Canada, and some of them have attained high rank in the British army; and no one of them, as far as known, has disgraced the good name of the old Rhode Island family, whence Benedict Arnold descended.[1000]

The report of the court respecting André, with its appendix (already referred to), and the trial of Smith were the first public sifting of the evidence about the conspiracy. Smith was acquitted by the military tribunal,[1001] and was then turned over to the civil authorities for a further trial; but, succeeding in escaping in women's clothes, he reached New York, and England, where several years later he published a narrative, which it is not easy to reconcile with all his evidence in his trial,—the supposition[1002] being that he was addressing injured Americans in the one case and disappointed Britons in the other.[1003] Marbois, the secretary of the French legation at Philadelphia at the time, wrote a _Complot d'Arnold et Clinton_, which was not published till 1816 at Paris. Sparks says, that what came under Marbois' personal observation is valuable; but otherwise the book, as most students think, should be used with caution.[1004]

The earliest comprehensive treatment of the subject—and it has hardly been surpassed since—was in Sparks's _Life and Treason of Arnold_ (Boston), and he gives the principal documentary evidence in his _Washington_, vol. vii. App.[1005]

The next special examination of the conspiracy was made in Winthrop Sargent's[1006] _Life and Career of Major John André_ (Boston, 1861),—an excellent book.[1007]

In 1864 the story necessarily made a part of Edward C. Boynton's _History of West Point_, who pointed out the military advantage of the Highlands of the Hudson.[1008] Not long after this, Henry B. Dawson, then editing the _Yonkers Gazette_, printed in its columns sixty-eight contemporary documents or narratives, and these, subsequently printed from the same type in book-form, constitute no. 1 of Dawson's _Gazette Series_, under the title of _Papers concerning the capture and detention of Major John André_ (1866). It is the most complete gathering of authentic material which has been made.

The volume (x.) of Bancroft which contains his account of the conspiracy appeared in 1875, and was constructed "by following only contemporary documents, which are abundant and of the surest character, and which, taken collectively, solve every question.... The reminiscences of men who wrote in later days are so mixed up with errors of memory and fable that they offer no sure foothold."[1009]

The _Life of Arnold_, by Isaac N. Arnold, of Chicago, and the _Two Spies_ of Benson J. Lossing, are the last considerable examinations of the subject.[1010]

The story of the culmination and collapse of the conspiracy is easily told with the abundant testimony of those who were observers and actors,—much of the record being made at the time, though some of it, put upon paper at varying intervals later, may need to be scrutinized closely, particularly as regards André's demeanor from the moment of his arrest to his execution.[1011]

For the English side we must mainly depend on the letters and statements of Clinton, which are elaborate, and may well be supplemented by contemporary and later English historians.[1012]

As respects the justice of André's execution, the military authorities were disagreed on the two sides at the time, and for a while the alleged offence of Washington was considered in England a conspicuous blot upon his character; but Lord Mahon has been the only prominent instance of continued belief in this view among English writers, who have generally conceded the right of the Americans to count André a spy, however they might wish that Washington had been more clement. The attractive manners and brilliant mental habit of André have blinded even American writers to the atrocious nature of his mission, and to the sinister purpose which a man of sensibility and elevated character should never have grasped, even amid the license which a state of war gives. The power to face death with a calm and graceful courage may indeed be mated with the moral lightness that belongs to an intellectual popinjay and a debased intriguer.[1013]