CHAPTER VI

THE OPERATIONS IN VOLHYNIA AND ON THE DÜNA

It has been seen that when King Jerome resigned his command, the 5th and 8th Corps went to reinforce Davout, Latour-Maubourg to observe Bobruisk, while the 7th Corps returned to Slonim. Reynier was instructed to take the place of Schwarzenberg in guarding the frontier of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while the latter marched on Minsk. Reynier himself was convinced that his corps was far too weak for the prescribed duty, while he had better information than his master of Tormazov’s real strength. Nevertheless he endeavoured to carry out Napoleon’s orders. On the 19th he ordered Klengel’s infantry brigade and a regiment of cavalry to take the place of an Austrian detachment at Kobrin. On the same day Schwarzenberg informed Napoleon that Tormazov had some 30,000 men at Lutsk. The Emperor, however, was sceptical. On the 22nd he ordered Reynier to enter Volhynia, saying that Tormazov’s “army” was merely a collection of reserve battalions. On the same day he told Davout that Tormazov had only 8000 men of 3rd battalions. The movements which he had ordered continued, and by the 24th the Austrians were about Slonim, on the way to Minsk, while the 7th Corps, moving in the opposite direction, was approaching Kobrin, some 30 miles east of Brest-Litovsk.

Napoleon’s information was hopelessly inaccurate. So far he could not be accountable for the unforeseen situation which was now to disclose itself. But his refusal to believe Schwarzenberg and Reynier is distinctly blameworthy, and can only be attributed to the fatal optimism which had now become fixed in him.

General Tormazov, when hostilities broke out, commanded an army which was neither concentrated nor complete in its organisation. Three infantry divisions, a brigade of combined Grenadier companies, 3 regiments of Hussars, and a cavalry corps 36 squadrons strong, were scattered over western Volhynia. General Sacken’s reserve troops--12 depleted battalions and 24 squadrons--were at Zaslavl and Staroï Konstantinov near the frontier of Podolia, and the irregulars were scattered along the Austrian and Polish borders. It was not until the middle of July that a respectable force was at last concentrated near Lutsk.

Tormazov’s original task was the defence of Volhynia, but Napoleon showed no intention of making any eccentric movements in that direction. On hearing of Bagration’s retreat on Bobruisk, he thought that he himself might be obliged to fall back towards Kiev, in order not entirely to lose touch with the Second Army. By the middle of July, however, the situation became clearer. The allied troops were pouring along the Warsaw-Smolensk road, and there were only few and small detachments guarding the Polish frontier. He therefore determined to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw by way of Lublin; and General Lambert, his cavalry commander, had already crossed the Bug, when he was recalled.

On July 17th instructions reached Tormazov from Alexander to advance northward against the flanks and rear of the forces that were opposed to Bagration. It is probable that this manoeuvre promised more immediate results than the contemplated advance on Warsaw. At the same time it is by no means certain that Tormazov was wrong in his original decision. The capture of Warsaw would have been a terrific shock to Napoleon’s prestige. The Russians could not have held it long, but they would have been able to destroy the depôts there collected, and might have cut up Reynier’s corps had Napoleon, as was probable, urged it in overhasty pursuit of an enemy whose strength he underestimated. In that case Napoleon would have been obliged to divert against him not merely Schwarzenberg’s Austrians, but perhaps also the 8th Corps. In any case he would have been forced to employ some of his new formations in the rear to meet the irruption.

The plan now imposed upon Tormazov had the advantage that it must, in the nature of things, call back Schwarzenberg from his march to reinforce Davout. On the other hand, it involved passing the Pinsk Marshes, which would oppose a dangerous barrier to retreat in case of a reverse; and the chances of crushing the 7th Corps were minimised, since a few concentric marches would unite Reynier and Schwarzenberg.

General Sacken with his reserves had been left in eastern Volhynia; some of his troops were detached to strengthen the force at Mozyr. On July 22 Tormazov ordered Lambert to leave General Kruchov, with a brigade of dragoons and 2 regiments of Cossacks, to observe the Polish frontier, and with 4 battalions, 16 squadrons, 5 Cossack regiments and 6 guns, to march by both banks of the Bug upon Brest-Litovsk. Four battalions and 7 squadrons, under Major-General Melissino, were to make a demonstration towards Pinsk, while the corps of Kamenski and Markov advanced upon Brest-Litovsk and Kobrin. Tormazov’s strength, exclusive of Kruchov, was probably about 36,000 men, with 144 guns. He was consequently nearly three times as strong as Reynier’s corps; but the latter could be sustained within a few days by 30,000 Austrians.

On the 24th Reynier’s main body was about Bezdizh on the Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk high-road. Klengel’s brigade occupied Kobrin. Two squadrons of cavalry were at Brest, and another detachment was on the road to Pinsk. Reynier’s small corps was thus spread out over a line of 80 miles. Reynier appears to have realised his danger, and provided against it to the best of his ability by keeping his main body together. He was perhaps to blame in detaching Klengel, but in justice it must be said that his duties were out of all proportion to his strength.

On the 24th Lambert expelled the Saxon cavalry from Brest-Litovsk. Melissino drove in the outposts on Reynier’s left, and occupied Pinsk, expelling its Austrian garrison and capturing a gun. Reynier was thus alarmed on both flanks, and doubted in which direction to turn. Early on the 27th Tormazov’s advanced guard, under Major-General Chaplitz, approached Kobrin from the south, while at the same time Lambert’s cavalry came up from the west. His infantry, who were fatigued by hard marching, he had left in the rear.

Klengel’s brigade consisted of only about 2600 men with 8 guns. Obviously he could make no effective resistance to the Russian army; but he considered himself bound by Reynier’s orders to defend Kobrin to the last extremity. Reynier’s comment was that, being the advanced guard of the corps, the brigade should have retired when it became obvious that it ran the risk of being surrounded. It appears to be a somewhat uncertain point among military men as to how far detachment commanders are justified in departing from the letter of their orders. On the morning of the 27th Klengel’s line of retreat on Pruzhani was certainly open. On the other hand, his corps commander would probably come by the Pinsk road; and he appears to have made at least one attempt to break through in that direction, which gives some index to what was passing in his mind. By midday Lambert had cut the road to Pruzhani, and the brigade was surrounded. The Saxons were driven by overwhelming numbers from their hasty entrenchments into the town, and after a gallant resistance, and having expended all their ammunition, were forced, about 2 p.m., to surrender. They had lost 76 killed and 182 wounded, including 13 officers. Seventy-six officers and 2382 rank and file were captured, with 8 guns and 4 standards.[3] Reynier’s advance-guard had only reached Horodetz, about 11 miles east of Kobrin, when it was met by fugitives who bore tidings of the disaster.

Tormazov, with diplomatic courtesy, complimented the Saxon officers on their really creditable defence, and returned them their swords. He could not, however, push his advance. His commissariat was defective and supplies were running short. He had also his prisoners to dispose of. His infantry were fatigued with hard marching on execrable roads. He therefore was obliged to halt for two days, which Reynier utilised to effect his retreat. He appealed for help to Schwarzenberg, who informed Napoleon that Reynier was too weak to resist Tormazov, who was estimated to be 40,000 strong, and that he must perforce turn back to his rescue from Nesvizh. On August 2nd he reached Polonka, 18 miles from Slonim, now occupied by Reynier. Tormazov, leaving Kobrin on the 30th, occupied Pruzhani and Antopol and pushed out detachments; while Kruchov’s force crossed the Bug and made reconnaissances towards Warsaw. The Poles were panic-stricken; and Loison, the Governor of Königsberg, thought it necessary to advance towards Bielostok with nearly the whole of his force--some 10,000 men. More than this Tormazov could not do. He was still very short of supplies; every march in advance took him farther from his base, and he had the Pinsk Marshes in his rear.

Napoleon, probably with some misgivings, informed Schwarzenberg on July 31st that he was to support Reynier according to his information, which, as he was on the spot, must necessarily be better than that of the Emperor. On August 2nd he placed the 7th Corps under his orders, and instructed him to march against Tormazov and drive him into Volhynia. The Government at Warsaw meanwhile was making desperate efforts to form a field force at Zamosc, under General Kosinski.

On August 3rd the Austrians and Saxons were in close communication, and on the 4th the united force began to advance. Tormazov’s advanced guards were attacked on August 8th and driven back, except at Pruzhani, from which Lambert was only expelled on the 10th after a well-contested rear-guard action. Tormazov, finding his outposts everywhere assailed by superior forces, ordered Markov and Kamenski to Gorodeczna, about half-way from Pruzhani to Kobrin. Lambert and Markov united there in the night of the 10th-11th, and next day Kamenski also arrived. Melissino’s detachment and the other advanced guards, under Generals Chaplitz and Prince Khovanski, could not rejoin under some days. Tormazov therefore had only 24 battalions, 36 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks, amounting with artillery to about 21,000 men. In artillery, however, he was strong, having 84 pieces, a large proportion of which were heavy.

The Russian position was a fairly strong one, if defended by adequate numbers. The Pruzhani-Kobrin road passes over a low plateau, at the foot of which flows a marshy stream. This plateau is some three miles long and a little less in breadth. It extends roughly east and west, its eastern extremity being opposite Gorodeczna. West of it is a valley about a mile in breadth, beyond which rises a second plateau, thickly wooded, through which another road leads from the village of Cherechev to join that to Kobrin some miles south-west of Gorodeczna. The eastern end of the plateau was also shut in by woods. Besides the causeway across the marsh at Gorodeczna, there was a second at Poddubno about three miles above, and a third a mile farther on at the Cherechev road. Obviously all should have been guarded; but only that at Gorodeczna was actually held. The reasons for this extraordinary oversight are not clear. It is possible that Tormazov expected a turning movement on the right rather than the left. It is also possible that he did not intend to fight a general action, but only a rear-guard engagement, in order to gain time for Chaplitz, Khovanski and Melissino to close up. Apparently also he considered that Schwarzenberg and Reynier were following him in one column on the Kobrin road. In any case he merely kept the bulk of his force opposite Gorodeczna. His opponents were moving in two columns, the Austrians upon Gorodeczna, Reynier with the Saxons on the right towards Poddubno. Schwarzenberg had made considerable detachments to guard his communications, but his entire force can hardly have numbered less than 36,000 men, including 12,000 Saxons, with 96 guns.

Reynier pointed out to Schwarzenberg that Tormazov’s negligence afforded opportunities for a flanking movement. Schwarzenberg assented and supported him with Siegenthal’s division, Hesse-Homburg’s brigade of Bianchi’s division, and a brigade of light cavalry, while with the rest of his forces he observed the main Russian force. Tormazov was drawn up in three lines on the Kobrin road, facing Gorodeczna, Markov’s 12 battalions in front line, Kamenski’s 12 (temporarily commanded by Prince Cherbatov, Kamenski being ill) a verst to the rear, Lambert with the cavalry behind Cherbatov.

In the night of the 11th-12th a Saxon detachment seized the Poddubno dyke. Tormazov apparently heard of this about 9 a.m. on the 12th and promptly sent Cherbatov with 10 battalions, 2 dragoon regiments and 24 guns to Poddubno. This appeared temporarily to secure the left, but about noon Siegenthal arrived and threatened a direct attack, while Reynier, who had moved the bulk of his corps along the Cherechev road, debouched from the woods and menaced the Russian rear. Tormazov at first simply fronted Cherbatov to the left, leaving the guns and a single infantry regiment at Poddubno, and covered the new front with the fire of 24 more guns brought up from the reserve. It soon, however, became evident that the turning movement was being executed by considerable forces, and that Cherbatov could not withstand it unaided. Tormazov thereupon called up Markov with 8 battalions to prolong Cherbatov’s line, and Lambert with 4 battalions and 24 squadrons to cover the left flank. Lambert deployed across the Cherechev road, barring it against the farther advance of General Zechmeister with his Austrian cavalry and Saxon infantry. Schwarzenberg on his side, instead of attacking the weak detachment now before him at Gorodeczna, sent another infantry brigade and one of cavalry to the right, and himself proceeded thither.

At 3 a.m. Frimont’s Austrian cavalry and Trautenberg’s infantry at Gorodeczna were demonstrating against weak detachments, while nearly the whole Russian army had faced to the left and rear. Tormazov, considering that the extension of the hostile line afforded an opportunity for piercing it, developed a fierce attack by Cherbatov’s infantry upon Sahr’s Saxon brigade, which was driven back, barely saving its artillery from capture by the Russian dragoons. To extricate it General Bianchi led forward Lilienberg’s brigade, while Schwarzenberg, now at Poddubno, ordered Hesse-Homburg’s across the stream, and Siegenthal sent forward part of his division. By these combined efforts the advance of the Russians was brought to a stand and finally converted into a retreat. The brigades of Lilienberg and Sahr moved forward together, Hesse-Homburg joining in on the left, Lecoq’s Saxon division prolonging the line to the right, while Zechmeister, reinforced by Froelich’s Austrian and Gablenz’s Saxon cavalry, renewed his attacks on Lambert. The latter had hitherto held his own with considerable success, but was now driven back and forced to seek shelter behind Markov’s line. Night ended the conflict, and under cover of darkness Tormazov rallied his detachments and retreated on Kobrin, covered by a rear-guard, under Lambert. At Teveli, 7 miles from the battle-field, Chaplitz rejoined and took over rear-guard duty from Lambert.

The Russian loss appears to have been about 3000 men out of a total of about 18,000 actively engaged: of these perhaps 500 were prisoners. That of the allies was probably a little less. Schwarzenberg estimated the loss of the Austrians at about 1300, of whom 865 were in Bianchi’s division. Reynier only admitted 931 casualties.

Tormazov did not stay his retreat at Kobrin, but continued on his way southward, intending to make for the Styr and stand on the defensive behind it. His resolution was undoubtedly wise. With Chaplitz’s and Khovanski’s troops he had in hand 30,000 men, and might abide the chances of another battle. But his force was too small to rout Schwarzenberg’s, and a heavy defeat might leave Admiral Chichagov, who was at last on the way from Bukharest, too weak to face Napoleon’s right wing. On the other hand, by retreating on Lutsk he would lessen the distance between himself and the Admiral, would be in closer communication with his base at Kiev and Sacken’s reserves, and his position behind the marshy Styr might well induce the cautious Austrian general and his half-hearted or openly disaffected lieutenants to call a halt.

On the 13th there was some rear-guard fighting on the Kobrin road, but it was not serious, and Tormazov continued his retreat to Kovel, which he reached on the 24th. There he apparently would have stood firm, but Schwarzenberg threatening to turn his left he abandoned his position and marched towards Lutsk, where he arrived on the 29th. Schwarzenberg’s pursuit was not very energetic, owing to scarcity of supplies and the difficulty of the Pinsk fenlands.

Tormazov therefore found himself at the beginning of September in the same position which he had occupied five weeks before. His strategy had been far from faultless: in particular his detachments previous to the battle of Gorodeczna seem to have been unnecessarily large. His tactics at Gorodeczna had been bad at the outset, however much his boldness and energy may have compensated for his earlier carelessness. Still, whatever his faults, he had inflicted a heavier loss than he had sustained, and had drawn upon himself, away from the main theatre of war, the whole of the Austrian auxiliary army and the 7th Corps, as well as Kosinski’s Polish column from Zamosc. Moreover, Admiral Chichagov’s advanced guard was only fourteen or fifteen marches away, and might be relied upon to join him by the middle of September.

It has already been seen that when Barclay evacuated Drissa he had left Count Wittgenstein to cover the road to St. Petersburg. Wittgenstein had for his principal bases of operations the ancient towns of Pskov and Velikii Novgorod; his advanced depôt was Sebezh, some 60 miles from Polotsk, on the road to Pskov. In addition to his own 1st Corps he was given the bulk of the depôt troops at Drissa and Dünaburg, and his artillery was strengthened by a heavy battery. The 18 reserve battalions hardly mustered 5700 bayonets, but the 15 depôt squadrons could furnish 1900 sabres and lances, and included those of the Imperial Guard, some of the finest in Europe. Wittgenstein’s fighting strength, after the departure of Barclay, totalled some 29,000 men, of whom 4500 were cavalry and Cossacks, with 108 guns. Of this total 10 reserve battalions and 4 squadrons, about 3700 strong, were at Dünaburg; the rest were united under Wittgenstein’s immediate command.

The 1st Corps contained in its staff a considerable foreign element. Wittgenstein, his chief-of-staff, Major-General D’Auvray, and the Quartermaster-General Diebich, were all Germans. Wittgenstein himself was a man of no special talent, but active and energetic, and in the prime of life. D’Auvray was an older man, but possessed plenty of vigour, and was a good theoretical officer, though somewhat deficient in practical experience of warfare. Colonel Diebich, a Prussian, only twenty-seven years of age, was probably the most intellectually distinguished of the three. His enduring fame as “Zabalkanski”--the Balkan-Passer--dates from the year 1829, when he commanded in chief against the Turks. For the present all that need be observed is that the command of the Russian army of the Düna was in vigorous hands. Clausewitz notes that D’Auvray, especially, could “lay about him” at need; and doubtless the process was often necessary in dealing with the gallant but amateurish and frequently indolent Russian officers.

From Dünaburg to Riga, a distance of some 130 miles, there were practically no Russian troops. In the great Baltic port and its neighbourhood there were 30 depôt battalions, 8 squadrons, and some Cossacks and field artillery, which, with garrison troops, totalled perhaps 14,000 men, sufficient to defend the fortifications and outlying places, but not to furnish any considerable detachment for the field. Riga was furthermore defended by Russian and English gunboats and bomb-brigs; and naval assistance to almost any amount was available from the British Baltic fleet, should it be necessary. Riga was practically secure against any but a very large army. Its commander, Lieutenant-General Essen I, was an officer of no great ability, and in poor health.

The Russian forces therefore available for the defence of Kurland and the line of the Düna amounted in all to perhaps 43,000 men, but could be reinforced to nearly double that number by militia and regulars, the latter partly depôt troops, but chiefly belonging to Count Steingell’s army of Finland, soon rendered disposable by the conclusion of peace with Sweden.

Towards Riga Napoleon had directed the so-called 10th Corps, under Marshal Macdonald. It had, in fact, as Macdonald complained, no proper corps organisation or administration; and consisted of two distinct bodies--Grandjean’s Polish and German division, formerly attached to the 1st Corps, and the bulk of the Prussian contingent under General Grawert. The operations of the corps were languid; it certainly was not strong enough to besiege Riga; and Napoleon paid curiously little attention to it. It would almost seem as if his real object in constituting it at the last moment was to have the notoriously disaffected Prussian contingent accompanied and watched by a competent force of troops drawn from states which he regarded as devoted to him.

The 10th Corps, having swept the right bank of the Niemen, concentrated on Rossieni, whence it set out on July 8th for Riga, Grawert advancing directly on the port by way of Mitau, while Grandjean’s division, accompanied by Macdonald, moved on the right. Before the 30,000 or 32,000 men of the 10th Corps the Russian detachments in Kurland were helpless, and fell back at all points into Riga. By the 18th the invading forces were ranged along the Aa river, which passes by Mitau, the capital of Kurland, and, flowing nearly parallel to the Düna, enters the Baltic some 20 miles west of Dünamunde. Mitau, Bausk, and the other towns along the Aa were occupied, and the Prussians reached out with their left to the sea. Essen could form for field operations only a force of 8 depôt battalions, 8 squadrons, a battery and some Cossacks--4500 men at most, with 10 guns--which he sent under Lieutenant-General Lewis towards Bausk. Lewis was too late to defend Mitau or Bausk, and took up a defensive position at Eckau between the latter place and Riga. Against him Grawert advanced on July 19th with 7 battalions, 4 squadrons and 4 batteries--5000 men and 32 guns. Lewis was beaten with a loss of over 600 prisoners besides killed and wounded, and driven back upon Riga. The Prussians moved up nearer to the city, and Essen, on July 22nd, losing his head, ordered the suburbs to be fired. There was absolutely no need for this reckless step. Macdonald had not a siege gun within reach. The misery and destitution occasioned were, of course, terrible; the mere immediate material loss is said to have been valued at 15,000,000 paper rúbles (about £600,000).

Macdonald, after Eckau, moved with Grandjean’s division towards Jakobstädt, and established his head-quarters there on the 22nd. His advance-guard of 4 Polish battalions, under Prince Radziwil, moved down the left bank of the Düna on Dünaburg. Radziwil occupied the place on the 30th and 31st, the garrison having been withdrawn by Wittgenstein, and on August 8th Macdonald arrived with the rest of Grandjean’s division. He blew up the half-finished fortifications, and destroyed all the artillery, ammunition and tools which he could not carry away. De Chambray blames him for this, saying that he should have retained them for the siege of Riga; he also criticises him for not crossing the Düna and striking at Wittgenstein’s communications. It seems, however, clear that Macdonald’s appointed task was the siege of Riga; and he obviously could not undertake independent operations without Napoleon’s order. His position, as he told Oudinot, was very difficult. His force was scattered over a wide extent of country, and in the absence of any proper staff he was burdened with petty details.

On August 7th Essen made an attack on Schlock, the port at the mouth of the Aa, with 6 British and 13 Russian sloops and gunboats, and about 1000 troops, all under General Lewis. Schlock was taken, but the light craft could not pass the Prussian batteries on the Aa, and Lewis abandoned Schlock and withdrew.

Oudinot, after his fruitless attack on the bridge-head of Dünaburg on July 13th, moved up the left bank of the Düna to join in the general advance on Vitebsk. He also endeavoured to render the works at Drissa indefensible. Wittgenstein, realising that Macdonald and Oudinot could not easily combine their operations, at first resolved to attack the 2nd Corps as it passed up the Düna; but on receiving a report that Macdonald was bridging the river at Jakobstädt he took up a position near Razitzi (? Pazitzi), about 16 miles from Druia on the road to Sebezh, and awaited events.

Oudinot, moving up the left bank of the Düna, left Merle’s division, chiefly Swiss, and Corbineau’s brigade of light cavalry to watch the river about Drissa, and with the rest of the 2nd Corps and Doumerc’s Cuirassier division, occupied Polotsk on the 26th. On the 28th, leaving a battalion at Polotsk, he advanced on Sebezh to cut Wittgenstein’s communications with St. Petersburg. He crossed the Drissa at Sivokhino and, early on the 30th, reached the hamlet of Kliastitzi, some 34 miles from Sebezh. As he was very badly informed as to Wittgenstein’s movements he decided to halt and send out reconnaissances.

Meanwhile Wittgenstein, informed of Oudinot’s advance, had determined to attack without delay. On the 30th he was within easy reach of Oudinot’s left flank; and about four in the afternoon his advance-guard came into contact with Legrand’s division at Jakubovo, about 2 miles west of Kliastitzi, posted on a narrow front between two woods.

Wittgenstein had with him the whole 1st Corps and 6 depôt battalions, in all about 21,000 men and 96 guns, organised into a vanguard, under Kulnev, 2 infantry divisions under Major-Generals Berg and Sazonov, and a mixed division commanded by Major-General Kakhovski.

Kulnev, a fiery cavalry officer, at once attacked Legrand, sending to Wittgenstein for reinforcements. Legrand was posted between the woods on a front of apparently only 800 yards, half of which was occupied by the mansion and hamlet of Jakubovo. Verdier and Doumerc were on the main road, there being no room wherein to deploy. An obstinate action ensued as reinforcements were thrown in on both sides and without any special success for either. Legrand’s narrow front, though it enabled him to concentrate his infantry, only permitted him to bring into action twelve guns as against 36 Russian pieces. On the 31st Wittgenstein, having collected his whole force, ordered a general attack. The fighting was very fierce. Jakubovo, defended by the 26th Léger, was taken and retaken; but on the whole the French held their own, and there was no sound reason for the retreat which Oudinot ordered. He says that he feared for the security of his left flank, threatened by an enemy twice as strong as himself! This latter idea is scarcely in accordance with his confident advance upon Sebezh. At any rate, he evacuated Jakubovo and retreated across the Nitcha, southward to Sivokhino, pursued and harassed by the Russians who, not unnaturally, claimed the affair as a complete victory. Wittgenstein had actually engaged 18 battalions. He claimed to have taken 900 prisoners and much baggage, but the estimates of the French losses in the Journal of the 1st Corps are greatly exaggerated. The Russians, also, must have lost severely in the fierce fighting about the mansion of Jakubovo; and Oudinot claimed 500 prisoners.

At Sivokhino Oudinot was rejoined by Merle’s division, coming from Drissa. He deliberately left the ford unguarded; and took up a position a little to the southward at the hamlet of Oboiarzina, with his flanks thrown forward and his whole force skilfully concealed in the woods and gullies with which the country abounded.

At daybreak on the 1st of August the impetuous Kulnev was leading the pursuit. He had with him some companies of sharpshooters, 7 infantry battalions, 6 squadrons and a horse battery, with which he crossed the ford and pushed forward into the sort of _cul-de-sac_ formed by Oudinot’s position to the southward. The Marshal had more than 40 guns ranged in a deep curve round the advancing Russian columns. As they opened fire Kulnev realised that something more serious than a mere rear-guard action was toward, and requested Sazonov, whose division was following, to support him. Sazonov sent forward the Tula Regiment and a heavy battery at once, but it was too late. The vanguard was overwhelmed by a furious cross cannonade, and broke before the charge of Verdier’s and Legrand’s infantry. The reinforcements were swept away in the rout; and the Russians poured back through the ford in a wild crowd of struggling men and horses, amid which the French fire made terrible havoc. Kulnev strove desperately to repair the consequences of his fatal impetuosity, but in vain. He was following the retreat when a cannon-ball shattered both his legs, ending at once his despair and his life. He bade his aides carry away his orders and insignia--“lest these French triumph over a Russian general”; and so passed a fiery and enthusiastic spirit who might have rendered his country good service.

Verdier’s division, driving before it the broken Russians, pressed through the ford in hot pursuit. Wittgenstein, who was advancing with his whole force, sent on Major-Generals Prince Iachvil and Helfreich to rally the vanguard, and took up a position at the hamlet of Golovitzi to sustain it, with 48 guns ranged before his line. Berg’s division was on the right and Kosakovki’s on the left. As soon as the remains of the vanguard had passed behind the batteries they opened a heavy cannonade, and Berg and Kozakovski moved forward to the attack. Wittgenstein’s second line, under Sazonov, also moved forward, and as the leading divisions diverged somewhat in their advance some of its battalions filled up the gap thus opened. Verdier, assailed by a greatly superior force, was unable to bear up against it; and was driven back, fighting hard but losing heavily, to Sivokhino, where he repassed the Drissa, covered by Legrand’s division.

The losses of the 2nd Corps from July 30th to August 1st amounted according to Oudinot’s returns (which appear trustworthy) to 464 officers and men killed, 2925 wounded, and 1596 prisoners and missing. This was certainly a gaping chasm in an effective strength of about 28,000 men; but the Russians admitted 4300 casualties, and again there was no solid reason for the French retreat upon Polotsk next day. Napoleon was greatly annoyed, and expressed his angry astonishment at the movement, which appeared to him entirely unnecessary. He ordered Oudinot to resume the offensive and, on August 4th, directed St. Cyr, with the 6th Corps, to reinforce him.

Wittgenstein on August 1st had been wounded, and had handed over the command to D’Auvray. The really indecisive nature of the fighting is shown by the fact that no attempt was made to pursue the French. On the contrary, D’Auvray withdrew by his right towards Dünaburg, in order to rally Hamen’s detachment, which was now to join the 1st Corps. On August 7th he once more took position at Razitzi. He decided to cross the Düna and to destroy Macdonald’s small force at Dünaburg; and to this end was already bridging the river, when he was recalled by a fresh advance of Oudinot from Polotsk.

St. Cyr, with the suffering remains of the Bavarian infantry and artillery--about 12,000 bayonets--reached Polotsk on August 7. Apart from his feeling that his troops were being sacrificed, he was angry at his subordination to Oudinot. St. Cyr had, in truth, a far better right to the Marshal’s bâton, and nothing but Napoleon’s dislike for him had hitherto deprived him of it. Oudinot, leaving the 6th Corps to follow, started westward from Polotsk with the 2nd on the 7th, and on the 9th reached Valéinzi, 8 miles from Drissa. Next day D’Auvray marched from Razitzi; and on the 10th the Russian advance-guard, now under Helfreich, collided with Oudinot’s advance, consisting of his light cavalry, supported by the 11th Léger, at Svolna, a few miles north of Valéinzi. D’Auvray arrived with his main body on the 11th. Expecting that Oudinot would advance in full force, he at first stood on the defensive, but, finding that the bulk of the 2nd Corps remained inactive at Valéinzi, attacked the advance-guard and drove it back. Thereupon, with curious timidity, Oudinot once more, on the 13th, retrograded to Polotsk, where he arrived on the morning of the 16th. On the 13th Hamen joined the Russian 1st Corps, and next day Wittgenstein resumed the command.

Polotsk, a place of much importance in the struggles between Poland and Russia during the 15th and 16th centuries, lies on the right bank of the Düna, at the point where it is joined by the little river Polota. The country around was in 1812 wooded to within a few miles of the town. Polotsk was traversed from north-west to south-east by the Riga-Vitebsk high-road, to which that from St. Petersburg united itself some miles out. From the south-west the Vilna road reached the town across the Düna. A fourth road left the Riga highway on the right a little way from Polotsk, and ran north-eastwards to Nevel.

The advance-guard of the Russians came in contact with the French outposts during the afternoon of the 16th, and the sound of the firing broke up a council-of-war which Oudinot had called to consider the situation.

During the evening the French troops took up position. Oudinot’s plan of action is difficult to understand. He left nearly the whole of Verdier’s and Merle’s divisions and the bulk of his cavalry on the left bank of the Düna. On the right bank, along the Polota, stood St. Cyr’s weak corps, with its right at the village of Spas, about a mile from Polotsk. Wrede’s division was in front line and Deroy in reserve. To the left of the Bavarians were Legrand’s division, 1 regiment of Verdier’s, and Corbineau’s cavalry brigade. Oudinot’s whole force was over 35,000 strong, with about 130 guns.

The Russian 1st Corps and the reserve troops attached to it--the latter now combined into regiments--totalled about 23,000 or 24,000 men and 99 guns. It was distributed in three mixed divisions, under Major-Generals Berg, Sazonov and Kakhovski, and two mixed brigades commanded respectively by Major-General Helfreich and Colonel Vlastov.[4]

Wittgenstein and his staff considered that Oudinot’s position about Polotsk was too strong, defended as it was by superior forces, to be attacked, and decided to confine themselves to a vigorous demonstration upon Spas to cover the bridging of the Düna and a raid on Oudinot’s communications. Early on the 17th, covered by Helfreich and Vlastov, the Russian main body debouched from the woods and deployed. The divisions as usual were broken up in the line of battle. In general, however, it may be said that Vlastov’s detachment formed the extreme left opposite Spas, and thence Berg’s division and Helfreich’s vanguard continued the line towards the Düna. Sazonov and Kakhovski were in reserve.

Vlastov, and part of Berg’s division, under the general direction of Prince Iachvil, attacked Spas, which was gallantly defended by the Bavarians. To sustain the attack Wittgenstein was obliged to direct to the left the rest of Berg’s division, replacing it by only two battalions of his second line. Oudinot thereupon ordered Legrand to attack the weakened Russian centre, but after some sharp fighting this was repelled by the advance of fresh battalions from Sazonov’s division. Legrand renewed his attacks, but was again forced to retire, but to repulse him nearly the whole of Sazonov’s division had to be employed. Around Spas a furious conflict raged all day, the Russian attacks being repelled time after time by a much smaller force of Bavarians. The outlook for Oudinot was entirely promising; by night almost all Wittgenstein’s army had been engaged and had been held at bay by the division of Legrand, about half of Wrede’s and one regiment of Verdier’s. All this time two strong divisions were inactive south of the Düna. It was probably fortunate that in the evening Oudinot was severely wounded and forced to transfer the command to the stronger hands of St. Cyr.

The latter general made up his mind that the badly shaken morale of his army, no less than the Emperor’s interests, imperatively demanded a victory, and determined to give battle. But he was too wary to deprive himself of the advantage of allowing the Russians to waste their strength against his defensive position before himself taking the offensive. He therefore waited during the morning of the 18th for Wittgenstein to come on. The latter, on his side, having driven Oudinot again into Polotsk, decided to withdraw, his mission being to defend the St. Petersburg road, and greatly overestimating the strength of the force opposed to him. His troops were to commence their march at 9 p.m.

St. Cyr during the morning made a parade of retiring his trains and reserve parks through the town towards Vitebsk, while Merle and Verdier were brought nearer to it as though to cover an evacuation. Some of the cavalry also defiled along the southern bank of the Düna with their horses laden with forage. These devices do not appear to have tricked the Russian staff into the belief that Polotsk was about to be abandoned; but they did give it the impression that there was no fear of an attack. The Russian army lay bivouacked in the order in which it had fought on the 17th, and head-quarters were at the hamlet of Prizmenitza, only half a mile from Spas.

St. Cyr, finding that Wittgenstein did not show any sign of attacking, and doubtless marking the obvious unpreparedness of the Russians, decided to take the offensive. About 2 p.m. Verdier’s division began to cross the Düna, screened from the sight of the Russians by the houses of Polotsk and the high banks of the Polota. Merle, Doumerc, and Castex’s light cavalry followed. Meanwhile at Spas Deroy’s division relieved Wrede’s, and a battery of 31 guns was massed at the village.

St. Cyr’s plan, as he defines it, was to smash Wittgenstein’s line by a heavy and concentrated attack of four infantry divisions advancing at the double, Wrede’s Bavarians leading on the right, Deroy to their left rear, Legrand and Verdier in echelon on the left of Deroy, while the cavalry followed in support, and Merle’s division stood in reserve at Polotsk. St. Cyr in his report to Berthier says that he had intended to commence the attack at 4 p.m., but the bringing up of the troops from the left bank of the Düna proved a tedious operation; and it was not until nearly 5 that St. Cyr was able to give the signal to commence the battle.

The French and Bavarian artillery opened a tremendous cannonade against the unsuspecting Russians, with great effect, especially among two batteries in advance of Prizmenitza, which lost nearly all their horses, and had a number of guns and waggons disabled or blown up against the Bavarian artillery. Diebich skilfully placed some guns in a battery on the extreme Russian left, which, being masked, caused considerable loss, but could not silence the far stronger array of pieces ranged before Spas.

For some reason which is not very apparent the infantry attack did not take place immediately. Possibly St. Cyr hoped that the fire of his 130 guns or thereabouts would soon demoralise the Russians, but he was deceived. Wittgenstein’s troops fell quickly into their places in the line, and their artillery stoutly responded to the greatly superior mass of Franco-Bavarian batteries.

After a cannonade of about an hour’s duration, Wrede moved forward, threatening to turn the Russian left, while Deroy marched straight against Prizmenitza. Legrand’s division, however, moved forward rather slowly, and Verdier’s division (temporarily commanded by General of Brigade Valentin) was still farther to the rear. The result was that the Russian resistance was by no means crushed by the impetus of a combined charge. As the Bavarians advanced they screened the fire of their guns, and the Russian artillery was able to play heavily upon the infantry. Deroy, a venerable officer respected by all, was mortally wounded as he directed his division, and the Bavarians, shaken by their losses, began to give way. Legrand, now in line on their left, carried Prizmenitza, but was driven out again by Hamen with seven battalions of Sazonov’s division. St. Cyr himself hastened to the front and directed a fresh advance of Legrand against Prizmenitza, supported by Sieben’s brigade of Deroy’s division. Wrede was directed to assume the command of the whole 6th Corps, and himself rallied and led on Deroy’s shaken troops. The four French and Bavarian infantry divisions, now supported by Merle on the left rear, moved forward together, breaking down the obstinate resistance of the Russians and forcing them back into the woods. The Russian cavalry charged repeatedly and brilliantly to cover the retreat of their infantry, and the combined Guard regiment created a panic in Corbineau’s brigade, and rode almost up to the walls of Polotsk. St. Cyr himself, who had been slightly wounded on the 17th and was obliged to use a carriage, was nearly captured, and the daring horsemen were only checked by the fire of the reserve artillery. They were fired into from all sides, and charged by one of Doumerc’s Cuirassier regiments, but the survivors regained the Russian line, sorely diminished in numbers, but covered with glory. The Russian army, badly defeated but by no means routed, made good its retreat during the night to Sivokhino, where it halted. St. Cyr did not pursue. He was not strong in light cavalry, and Corbineau’s brigade was obviously demoralised. Still it seems that more use might have been made of Merle’s Swiss regiments, which had scarcely fired a shot; several of Verdier’s and Wrede’s regiments also had not been heavily engaged.

The losses on both sides had been very heavy. Wrede gave the Bavarian loss as 118 officers and 1161 men killed and wounded. That of the 2nd Corps, which had 190 officers _hors de combat_, can hardly have been less than 3500. The Russians admitted a loss of 5000 killed and wounded. St. Cyr claimed 1000 prisoners; and 14 Russian guns were captured.

On the French side General Deroy was mortally wounded. Oudinot, St. Cyr, Verdier and Wrede were wounded. Of the brigade leaders the Bavarian Sieben was killed, and two French and two Bavarians wounded. The Russians had Generals Berg, Kozakovski and Hamen wounded.

Polotsk was hardly a very glorious victory, St. Cyr having some 35,000 men on the field against Wittgenstein’s 23,000 or 24,000 at most, but it had important results in freeing Napoleon from anxiety for his left flank. He showed his satisfaction by at last giving St. Cyr his Marshal’s bâton.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 3: Klengel gives his whole strength as only 1985; but he had obvious motives for minimising the disaster. The figures given in the text are confirmed by the muster-rolls of the 7th Corps.]

[Footnote 4: For Plan see Appendix.]