Part 24

12. That hereafter each alternate vacancy in each grade of each Regular regiment shall be filled by competitive examinations of such officers in the next grade below as may choose to enter the lists; the examinations to be made annually during the months of June and July at such places as it may be practicable to convene summer encampments of at least a brigade, embracing all arms of the service, and that (in addition to the present methods) each candidate be required to handle tactically company, battalion, and brigade in presence of the board, and, if a foot officer, to march with his proper command (using for a reasonable part of the distance each of the prescribed gaits) a distance of fifteen miles in six hours, each day, for three consecutive days; if a mounted officer, the distance to be twenty miles; the examination to include field officers. The judgment of such boards to be final and determinate in each case.

13. That the monthly pay of the enlisted men of the Line of the Regular Army shall hereafter be as follows:

Regimental Sergeant Major and Quartermaster Sergeant, $90, less the actual cost of his subsistence and clothing. First Sergeant, $75, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing. Sergeant, $50, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing. Corporal, $40, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing. Private, $30, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing. Wagoner, Artificer, Blacksmith, and Saddler, the pay of Corporal.

As the aggregate number of Senators and Representatives is 447, this project would create that many regiments of Militia (or National Guardsmen) which, allowing for the increased number of companies in Artillery and Infantry, would constitute an Army on a war footing of about 500,000 men; an added third battalion would increase it to 750,000, and then again if the number of enlisted men in each company in time of war was increased to, say, 200 men, would give us an Army of 1,500,000 men (all that the country is likely to need under any emergency) which would quickly blend and assimilate, Regulars and Volunteers, in one harmonious whole.

The present pay of the officer is ample but none too great, while the pay of the men is too niggardly to entice any one into any kind of employment in this country, save the unfortunate or the idle and vicious, seeking temporary relief from suffering for food, shelter and raiment.

The number and monthly pay on first entrance in the different grades (omitting musicians, artificers, etc.) of the Line of the Army, are as follows:

40 Colonels $291.67 40 Lieutenant Colonels 250.00 70 Majors 208.33 430 Captains Foot, $150.00 Mounted 166.67 530 First Lieutenants " 125.00 " 133.33 430 Second Lieutenants " 116.67 " 125.00

Mark here the great gulf between officers and men in the gradation of pay, uniformity above and uniformity below:

Pay Rations Clothing 40 Sergeant Majors $23 $4.00 $3.83 Total, $30.83 430 First Sergeants 25 4.00 3.81 " 32.81 1,860 Sergeants 18 4.00 3.73 " 25.73 1,720 Corporals 15 4.00 3.71 " 22.71 17,264 Privates 13 4.00 3.34 " 20.34

Perhaps the police of our great cities, in the character of duties and the ends to be accomplished, bear a greater resemblance to the Army than any one other public organization in the country, and it may not be unfair to compare their pay, organization and administration (in the 454 largest cities there are about 36,000 policemen). The following represents the grades, numbers, salaries, etc., in the three representative cities of the Republic, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, omitting surgeons, detectives, clerks, etc.:

NEW YORK

Number Grade Monthly Salary 1 Superintendent $500.00 1 Chief Inspector 416.66 3 Inspectors 291.66 35 Captains 229.66 197 Sergeants 166.66 166 Roundsmen 108.33 2,548 Patrolmen--First Grade 100.00 287 Patrolmen--Second Grade 91.66 251 Patrolmen--Third Grade 83.33

CHICAGO

1 Superintendent $416.66 2 Assistant Superintendents 250.00 5 Inspectors 233.33 14 Captains 187.91 35 Lieutenants 125.00 55 Patrol Sergeants 100.00 1,738 Patrolmen--First Class 83.33 525 Patrolmen--Second Class 60.00

SAN FRANCISCO

1 Chief of Police $333.33 5 Captains 150.00 38 Sergeants 125.00 336 Patrolmen 102.00

Mark the uniformity in gradation of pay throughout! Their average hours of duty are nine. The only articles they furnish themselves which the soldier does not are quarters, subsistence, clothing, and equipments. The average cost of clothing and equipments per month in New York is $5.42. San Francisco has a retired list on half pay after twenty years' service at sixty years of age.

In 1891 there were employed in the Post Office Department in the 454 largest cities in the United States, 10,443 letter-carriers (nearly half the number of enlisted men in the Army) with monthly pay as follows: 1st class, $83.33; 2d class, $66.66; 3d class, $50.00; the average monthly pay being $73.00 per month, or a total annual pay of $9,161,137.00, nearly one-third more than the total pay and allowances of the 25,000 enlisted men in the Army.

On the breaking out of the Civil War in the early part of 1861, there were borne on the rolls of the Regular Army 1,083 commissioned officers and 15,367 enlisted men. These officers and men had been maintained by the Government, under the long existing organization and administration before referred to, for the main purpose of preparing them for the emergency that was then suddenly thrust upon them, as a nucleus for the large army then organizing.

Let us see how well they were prepared for that serious business: 282 of the officers abandoned their flag, leaving 801, with almost the full number of enlisted men remaining loyal. These, under a proper organization and administration, should have completely officered, with abundance to spare, the entire 2,000 volunteer regiments called into the Federal Army, but when they came in contact with them, there arose great distrust and want of confidence, the volunteers alleging that the Regular Officer was supercilious and determined to enforce upon them discipline which they deemed degrading and dishonorable. On the contrary, the Regular Officers asserted that the volunteers were ignorant, insubordinate, and unappreciative of the great trials that were set before them, and it came to pass that by long isolation on the plains and martinetism the Regular Army had become so alienated from the sympathies and confidence of the people that even as late as April 1, 1863, but 112 of the 801 had attained the rank of General, and comparatively few of these were successful. On the contrary, there were some 175 officers who had ceased to belong to the Army--most of them having discarded it, but some having been discarded by it--who had for years mingled with the people, becoming known to them and in sympathy with them. Of these, 45 had become general officers by the same date, and a remarkable proportion of them successful ones. But here again comes the remarkably instructive fact that for 23 years after the retirement of General Scott in November, 1861, the Army was commanded exclusively from this latter class--McClellan for 1 year, Halleck for 2 years, Grant for 5 years, and Sherman for 14 years; the only officers borne on the list of the Army at the breaking out of the war who succeeded to command it being Generals Sheridan and Schofield, and these latter not until long after the war had closed.

Then comes the additional instructive fact that of the 18 most distinguished Army and Corps commanders during the war, 12--Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Halleck, Fremont, Rosecrans, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Dix, Curtis, and Slocum (two-thirds), came from the same class of ex-officers while only 6--Hancock, Thomas, Buell, Pope, McDowell, and Sheridan (one-third) were from continuous service in the Army.

The only plausible explanation that can be given for these remarkable facts is that after 5 or 10 years' service in the Army, in time of peace, under its present organization and administration, ambition, grasp, individuality, and self-reliance are dwarfed, as compared with the school of the ex-officer who enters the list of civil pursuits on the lines of "The survival of the fittest."

As to the 15,000 enlisted men above referred to, from whom such great service was reasonably expected, they--by reason of the great gulf that had been placed between them and their officers--had lost much of their self-reliance, and personal pride, and made small figure in this four years' terrible war.

To illustrate what unwise and unjust discriminations are brought about by our present Army organization, where the enlisted men have so little voice and influence, here is a possible case, an extreme one it is true, but possible--many of its incidents often occurring.

First Sergeant Jones, sixty years of age, has forty years' continuous service; receives for his services in pay and allowances $32.81 per month; his grandson, Smith, with no other merit than the personal preferment of his Congressman, at the age of sixteen receives his education and $45 per month for four years while at West Point, at the expiration of which time he joins his grandfather, who is now sixty-four, and assumes command of the company, his pay jumping to $125 per month, but his grandfather's remaining the same. If they should both be killed the next day in battle (see paragraphs 85 and 162, Army Regulations) Sergeant Jones, the grandfather, may be buried but at an expense not exceeding $15; Lieutenant Smith, the grandson, may be buried by the Government at an expense not exceeding $75.

If they should both be disabled by wounds or otherwise and retired, Jones, the grandfather, receives $27 per month, while Smith, the grandson, receives $93.75.

If Smith, the grandson, approaches a guard in command of his company under arms, the guard will turn out and salute. If Jones, the grandfather, in command of the same company under arms, approaches the same guard, neither the company nor its commander will be honored.

If both these officers are ordered from San Francisco to New York as witnesses before a court martial, and travel on the same train throughout the distance, the grandfather, Jones, receives the actual cost of his ticket and $7.50 only for commutation during the journey. Smith, the grandson, receives the actual cost of his ticket and $156.64 as mileage, etc.

If the Sergeant deserts en route, he is advertised with a reward; if apprehended, confined and tried as a felon. If the Lieutenant should do so (as some 24 have done since the Civil War), he would probably not be pursued, as none of the 24 referred to have been.

Article 66 of the Articles of War reads as follows:

"Soldiers charged with crimes shall be confined until tried by court martial, or released by proper authority."

Any other authorities of the Government would interpret the word "crimes," as here used, to cover only acts known as felonies or threats of violence, where the danger to law and order was too great to allow the accused to run at large, yet for over a hundred years Army officers, under the unwritten laws handed down from the Middle Ages, have interpreted this word to embrace every trifling offense for which a soldier is triable by court martial, even neglects and omissions, such as "Failure to attend roll-call" and "Neglect to clean arms"; that the article was mandatory--that no soldier could be tried by court martial until first confined in the guard-house, and grave and serious courts have refused to enter upon the trial of such enlisted men unless previously confined. The disgrace of the accused and the presumption of guilt were at once established by the commencement of punishment, and in hundreds of cases prisoners were held for weeks on trivial charges awaiting courts for their trial, when the scarcity of officers and the remoteness of their stations rendered it impracticable to promptly convene them.

The Adjutant General of the Army, in his report to the General commanding for the year 1891, reports "From January, 1867, to June 30, 1891 (24½ years), the number of desertions from the Army was 88,475," over one-third the number that enlisted during that period; he estimates the loss to the Government by their desertion and the necessary enlistments to replace them at $23,003,500, and further states that during that period 16,000 deserters were apprehended or surrendered, and estimates the expense for rewards of apprehension, transportation, and trials by court martial of these 16,000 at $2,500,000, making an aggregate pecuniary loss to the Government by desertion for this period of $25,503,500, or an annual loss from deserters alone of over $1,000,000.

If the pay of the enlisted men be increased and uniformly graded down from the commissioned officers as proposed in the project for a permanent military establishment, it would increase the cost of the Army but a little over four million dollars per annum; thereafter it is fair to presume desertion would be almost as infrequent in the Army as it now is in the police of the large cities or the letter-carriers of the Federal Government. If so, this saving of one million per annum would repay one-fourth of this additional expense, but the betterment only begins here. A large percentage of the force of each garrison is constantly in the guard-house for other offenses than desertion. This, and their frequent trials by court martial (in some years aggregating almost the total number of enlisted men), it is fair to presume, would almost totally disappear, and there would be another great saving in the expense, and an equally valuable gain in the efficiency of the Army.

The project referred to would bring a large per cent of the younger officers constantly in contact with citizens and the National Guard, and they would thus soon become imbued with the spirit and desires of the people and gain their sympathy and confidence in the same degree that the ex-officers in civil pursuits have done before them.

On the other hand, the National Guard would soon learn to appreciate the excellence of Regular Army methods--which in the main are valuable--so that should another occasion occur for the nation again to organize a vast Army, Regulars and Volunteers would soon harmoniously unite.

During the four long years of sturdy war, in which was developed the grandest, most intelligent, patriotic and chivalrous army that ever trod the face of the earth, save perhaps that which it overcame but was too magnanimous to subjugate, the Regulars were compelled by force of intelligent reason to abandon more of their idiosyncrasies than the Volunteers were of theirs--courts martial and confinements were comparatively rarely known. The soldier, both in the Regulars and Volunteers, had attained an individuality and self-reliance not before known in our Army or that of any other nation. But on separation from contact with the Volunteers and people, by isolation in the West, the Regulars, under old methods of organization and administration, soon lapsed into former conditions. Without remedies, like emergencies will produce like results in the future.

At the beginning of the war, the War Department issued the following order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, "WASHINGTON, _November 20, 1861_.

"GENERAL ORDERS NO. 101.

"The intention of the Government, in reserving the original vacancies of Second Lieutenants for the most deserving among the non-commissioned officers of the new regular regiments, was twofold: to secure the services of brave, intelligent, and energetic officers, by appointing only those who had fully proved themselves to be such, after a fair competition with all who chose to enter the lists against them, and to give to the young men of the country--those especially who were poor, unknown, and without any social or political influence--an equal opportunity with the most favored. In General Orders No. 16, of May 4, 1861, this intention was publicly announced. It is now reaffirmed, and commanding officers of the new regiments will see that it is carried out in good faith.

"By order,

"L. THOMAS, "_Adjutant-General_."

Immediately the newly enlisted men of the Regulars became inspired with ambitious hope and self-reliance; promotion from the ranks was the rule, and the recipients of that period have ever since proved equal to those commissioned from other sources.

It may be said that the proposed change of giving one-half the vacancies to the enlisted men would be a hardship to the graduates of the Academy when there are now barely sufficient vacancies in the Army to give them all commissions, but it can hardly be considered a hardship to a young man favored with an appointment there and graduated free of expense to himself and family, when if thrown upon the world he would be better qualified than almost any of his fellows to fight the battle of life, and in case of war would prove, like the ex-officers before referred to, most valuable to this country. If it should be a hardship, it would be no greater than would befall the hundreds of enlisted men who under this project would doubtless qualify themselves quite as well for commissions as the graduates, and for whom, likewise, there would be an insufficiency of vacancies.

No one will assail the excellence of the Military Academy, though the present course there seems too severe in the higher mathematics and directed mostly to the production of engineer officers rather than officers for the command of men; for the former there should be an extended course, as in the military schools of other nations, but while admitting the excellence of this course for a portion of the officers of the Army, from long and varied contact with the people of almost every State and Territory, I know that he misjudges them seriously who thinks there is no other method equally good by which at least a portion of them can be supplied. No profession can maintain a healthy status where its members are derived solely from one source.

It ought to be understood by the law-makers in dealing with the Army, as it is in relation to every other service, public or private, that the Nation is but a joint stock company of seventy million holders, each with a certain amount of stock; that they require but 2,000 Army Officers; that commissions, as far as practicable, should be open to all competitors; that the best qualified may win on original entrance, promotion thereafter to be on lines of merit which can not be the case under present methods.

John Stuart Mill says:

"The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centers of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of custom is complete."

For the reasons above, so clearly expressed, there is little hope for the reform before advocated to emanate successfully from the Army itself, which would be the greater beneficiary. Its officers have little power in political influence and it is to be regretted that the efforts they have made to use it have been principally directed to increasing their own number, rank, tenure of office and pay, or the establishing of such pernicious vested rights as "lineal promotion." That is to say, that Tom, who graduated in 1882, shall in no case be Captain before Dick, who graduated in 1881.

If any change for the betterment come, in this direction, the greater hope is with the National Guard of the States, who have not been so long hampered by imperious custom and who are more in contact with the legislative authorities. Eventually something in this direction must come about.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

SEPTEMBER 15, 1913

MR. PRESIDENT: We survivors of the Army of the Cumberland with our guests are met here on the semi-centennial of its greatest battle to do honor to the glorious achievements of its members, living and dead, in the most sanguinary and yet the most chivalrous war ever waged in all the tide of time; a war, too, that had more significance at the time it was waged, and has had since, and will continue to have for the betterment of mankind, than any other war of recorded history.

If, indeed, "it needs be that wars must come," it seems we should all be thankful to High Providence that it fell to our lot to participate in this war for the Union rather than any other of which we have knowledge, and, further, from our knowledge of the past history of mankind, we should be thankful that it fell to our lot to live in our generation, race, and country, with all its blood and tears.

In fact, we of our generation who are still alive have witnessed more and greater progress for betterment physically, mentally, and morally, than all that had gone before.

But to revert to our text, "The Army of the Cumberland," and the war itself. My theme is to inspire just but long-belated honors to the Confederate soldiers in arms.

The nucleus from which sprang the new race and nation of thirty millions of unmilitary and unwarlike Americans called suddenly to form the mighty hosts of over three million Confederate and Union warriors, was the Puritans and Cavaliers of Northern Europe, who for conscience's sake exiled themselves from religious, social and political persecution over two hundred years ago to the American wilderness where they hoped, untrammeled by the imperious custom of ages, to raise a new people self-reliant and of universal common interests where all should be schooled in the same ethics politically, socially and morally.