CHAPTER V

BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER

IN face of the enemy’s orders we had captured I had to anticipate that within a short time comparatively strong hostile forces would be coming from Quelimane to attack us. The country between the Namacurra and the Zambesi, however, offered a large number of river barriers, so that a march to the Zambesi would be full of difficulties for us and hinder our freedom of movement to an extraordinary degree. Equally unfavourable for campaigning, from our point of view, was the country south and south-west of our present halting-place. In the last resort we should find ourselves cooped up on the Zambesi without being in a position to effect a crossing of that mighty river which was commanded by the enemy’s gun-boats.

I thought it better to abandon our previous march direction. Yet in view of the total absence of news it was very difficult to say where I ought to make for. Only one thing appeared to be clear—that the enemy was not directly on our heels. At any rate our rearguard and the patrols they had sent out behind them were not being pressed at all by the enemy. It seemed probable that if hostile bodies were following us at all they were engaged in trying to overhaul us on some route parallel to that we had taken. If I were right in that view—and it seemed to be confirmed by such reports as the natives brought in—we could assume that the enemy was insufficiently informed of our presence at Namacurra and further that the Portuguese soldiers among our prisoners whom we had turned off could give him no clear or trustworthy information.

We had, therefore, to devote all our efforts to making those fellows believe we intended to fortify and put up a stiff defence of Namacurra and, further, that we had our eye on Quelimane.

The unexpected disaster at Namacurra was bound to speed the steps of the pursuing enemy. It was probable that his columns, advancing on a parallel line to us, would overshoot the mark, especially as they must be anxious about the important port of Quelimane. I therefore decided to wait at Namacurra until the pursuing enemy columns had actually shot ahead of me and then turn about to the north-east. What chiefly influenced me in this decision was that a march in this direction, leading towards Mozambique, on the main line of communication, would cause the enemy anxiety, and as soon as he became aware of it he would at once turn about to protect the neighbourhood of Mozambique with its wealth of stores. If he did not do so we should have a free hand at Mozambique. As the position would then develop the enemy would be forced to undertake marches that would exhaust his troops, while we gained time to recuperate our strength and allow our sick and wounded to recover.

It was difficult to decide on the most favourable moment for our change of direction north-east; we should have to rely to some extent on the fortune of war. Even if I made the movement too soon and encountered one of the enemy columns there was always a chance of defeating it when cut off from the rest. The first thing, however, was to get safely across the Likungo river again. The available information as to the fords was very unreliable. In order not to use the same fords as before I marched with my main body on the evening of 4th July to a crossing further to the south. Lieutenant Ott, however, ascertained by personal reconnaissance that no ford existed at the place of which we had been informed. On the other hand, it was apparent from native information as well as from tracks discovered that on the same day an English patrol had halted in this neighbourhood. The position might become awkward. In order to lose no time in investigation I marched along the west bank of the Likungo to our previous ford. Unfortunately I had withdrawn the covering force that had hitherto been left there and I did not know whether it was free. I was therefore very relieved when on 5th July the crossing was effected without further interference. Koehl’s detachment was still at Namacurra and followed as rearguard.

When we were again marching as a single column through the bush, the great length of the column was unwieldy and, in the event of an encounter with the enemy, would be a source of danger. We therefore tried to shorten the column and to march in two, and later in several parallel columns through the bush. The disadvantage of this arrangement was that instead of one head of a column having to cut a way through the bush this had now to be done by several. But the advantages of the shorter length outweighed this disadvantage.

Information from our patrols and from the natives indicated that the march of the enemy columns to the south-west had not been pressed so far as I had anticipated. Enemy troops were reported both between the Moniga and the lower Likungo and also at Mujebain; in some cases they were ascertained to be marching south-west. This brought about the extraordinary situation that the enemy troops were marching in several columns south-west while we were passing between these columns in the contrary direction, north-east. This fact could not long remain hidden from the enemy, especially as the patrols soon began to come in contact, and the enemy troops, marching along the line of telephone communication from Mulevalla to Murubella, crossed our track. We continued our march to Oriva, threw back a weak Portuguese detachment west of this place, and occupied Oriva itself on 14th July. Unfortunately the abundant stores of supplies and ammunition that we had expected to find at this station were not forthcoming; apparently either the numerous enemy troops had drawn heavily on the resources of the neighbourhood or the stores that had been originally left here had already been removed. A small patrol, sent out to Muatama under Sergeant-Major Hüttich, succeeded in surprising a small mixed detachment of English and Portuguese; as it was unfortunately impossible to get away the supplies found in this station the stores had to be burned.

Meanwhile our attempts to get information from the natives as to the whereabouts of supplies met with no success; it was impossible to wait for the reports of other patrols dispatched to Murua in search of supplies. Various patrol actions showed us that the enemy had meanwhile become aware of the change in the situation and had accordingly turned his columns about. Want of supplies forced us to continue our march, and the attack of a mixed Portuguese-English column on our rearguard under Captain Koehl could not be developed into a complete success as our main force was already on the march. We halted for a few days in the tolerably fertile territory between Oriva and Murua. Captured papers showed us that an English patrol had closely observed our movements.

It was interesting to notice that the English prisoners whom we took with us, for the most part, accepted as a matter of course the hardships of the long marches, the constant crossing of rivers and the countless difficulties connected with supplies and transport; they realized that we Germans had exactly the same hardships to endure as themselves and were in addition burdened with a number of further duties such as patrol expeditions, fighting, carrying of supplies and watch-keeping. They bore everything with a certain humour and it was obviously interesting to them to see the war from the German point of view. It was quite otherwise with the Portuguese officers. It is true they were in an unenviable position: for the most part they were infected with syphilis and were carefully avoided by the English prisoners. In addition they were not real campaigners. They had received a generous share of the booty captured at Namacurra, but had not learned how to make the best of it. They had at once consumed the precious oil with rice and it was too much to expect that the Germans should now share with them their own meagre ration. Marching was a burden to them, their boots were torn to pieces—in short, their spokesman, the general staff officer captured at Namacurra, was continually complaining to me of the inconveniences which with the best will in the world I could not help. He was continually asking to be released. I should have been only too glad to consent if he would have given his parole not to fight against us, but this he would not do. I could not be expected to release people without any obligation and so put them in a position to attack us again immediately.

Considerations of supply drove us on. After the failure of the Oriva neighbourhood to come up to our expectations in this respect, I planned to reach the territory east of the Ligonja, which was marked on the map as thickly populated and well cultivated. On the way the advance guard, under Captain Müller, quickly took Boma Tipa, where several days’ supplies, particularly pig-nuts, fell into our hands. The weak Portuguese garrison offered only slight resistance and then fled at once; the leader, a Portuguese sergeant, was the only prisoner captured.

We had reached a high degree of efficiency in the rapid and systematic distribution of booty; the main force hardly lost a day’s march and I can still see the approving smile of one of the English prisoners who seemed to have entirely forgotten that the Portuguese were his allies. Apparently it amused them to see with what little ceremony we took from them their depots one after the other, together with their supplies. The captured enemy papers repeatedly gave us valuable information. Two days’ march from Tipa lay another _boma_ called Namirrue, where the Portuguese garrison had been strengthened by an English company. Apparently considerable stores lay here. At any rate, according to information, supply columns had been sent to replenish at Namirrue. The English troops there probably belonged to an enemy force newly appeared from the direction of Mozambique. It was impossible for the enemy force to which we had hitherto been opposed, and which had taken part in the general march south-west north-east, to have established such a lead on us. Accordingly the advance guard with our gun at once marched on Namirrue (the smaller gun had been put out of action at Namacurra and left behind after firing its few cartridges). Captain Müller was instructed to reconnoitre the position at Namirrue and act independently as might be required. For the time being the main force remained at Tipa, on the east bank of the Moloque. It was to obtain supplies and hold up the enemy advancing from the south-west long enough to allow Captain Müller the necessary time at Namirrue. It was not long before small enemy reconnoitring forces appeared at Tipa, or the west bank of the Ligonja, which at this point offers no obstacle worth mentioning. There was a series of unimportant patrol engagements on the east bank also. The rearguard, under Captain Koehl, carried out a number of delaying actions at places along the Tipa-Namirrue road which for the most part have already been mentioned. As I was not clear whether the main force would find the best opportunity to attack in Koehl’s position or at Namirrue I began by following cautiously with him Müller’s detachment. The report then came in from Captain Müller that an enemy force of some two companies was entrenched on the heights at Namirrue and that he could not get at them even with his gun. On the other hand, he reported that in all probability English troops would come to the support of the enemy from the north or north-west. There was a favourable opportunity for us to defeat these troops in the open. I therefore marched the main force to Namirrue and on the 22nd July crossed the Namirrue river, about three miles above the rocky hill occupied by the enemy. Camp was pitched on the east bank and immediately there were patrol engagements. I myself, with Lieutenant Besch, made a detour of the hill to join Captain Müller, who was encamped immediately south-east of it. The enemy position had been encircled with patrols and machine guns. On the heights above several horses could be seen and, here and there, men too. Wherever a target offered the enemy was fired on to prevent him from sending down men to fetch water. It appeared, however, that the enemy must have been able to keep himself supplied with water from a source unknown to us.

After drinking a cup of coffee with Captain Müller we went further round the hill and came upon Lieutenant Kempner and other patrols, keenly engaged on reconnoitring work. In order to keep under cover we had to work our way partly through the thick bush and came on large quantities of cow-itch: contact with this plant produces an intolerable irritation of the skin. We were just in the middle of a thicket of this plant when we heard lively firing from the camp of our main force. At the same time the enemy in the hill fired several salvoes, apparently as a signal to their friends. I was immediately convinced that a not very strong enemy detachment was approaching which was unaware of the arrival of our main force. I was seized with the desire to use this rare opportunity at once with my full strength. I tried with all haste to get to the main force, but the cow-itch hampered my progress and the irritation was maddening. Eventually we reached the camp before dark. My second in command, Major Kraut, had begun the attack with small forces. In the bright moonlight I could still hope to use the approaching night for a successful battle. All available forces, with the exception of a company left to protect the camp, were at once prepared for action. On the left wing, Captain Goering, who was to undertake an enveloping movement, took his force round to a position in the rear of the enemy. There he heard the barking of a dog, ran forward at once and found the English commanding officer, Colonel Dickinson, with his adjutant and a medical officer, telephoning in a ravine and took them prisoner. Captain Goering at once attacked and the detachments of Captains Spangenberg and Poppe, in front and on the left wing, did the same. In a very short time the enemy, consisting of one battalion, was completely overwhelmed and routed. All the detachments engaged in a hot pursuit, but in the darkness and the thick bush touch was lost with the enemy.

It turned out later that the enemy’s troops marching parallel with us had crossed the Namirrue at the same time a little further upstream. In view of the constantly changing situation, due to the continuous movement of the forces and the impenetrable screen of the bush which made it impossible to see far in any direction, and also owing to the large number of his marching columns, it was quite impossible for the enemy, in spite of the unremitting labours of his wireless service, to obtain a clear picture of the situation as a whole and to keep his subordinate leaders informed in time of all the changes of the situation. In this case a column had become detached and had run upon us with only a part of its strength: only one battalion had crossed the river. In an exposed and very dangerous position this battalion had been badly handled by our main force.

A company detailed for the further pursuit of the retreating enemy returned the following day without having achieved anything more; here, again, after such a favourable action the subordinate leaders and the troops themselves could only with difficulty be persuaded to throw themselves in to the last ounce to wring every possible advantage from their success. Lieutenant Schroetter, who then for several days carried on the pursuit in a manner in keeping with the situation, was unable to effect more than a few patrol skirmishes. The enemy had, in the meantime, gained too great a start. No information was obtained except as to the very hurried flight of the enemy.

I, with the main part of my forces, stood my ground. The full exploitation of the success lay less in the pursuit of the beaten enemy than in the chances offered by the situation of the enemy we were surrounding on the hill, now that the help intended was for the moment unavailable.

For the first time in this campaign we had captured a trench-mortar with ammunition. The various parts were collected on the field of action and the seventeen rounds of ammunition made ready for firing. Experiments made with practice ammunition gave satisfactory results, and we were able to arrange for the bombardment of the enemy among the rocks at four o’clock in the afternoon. The command of this attack was entrusted to Captain Müller, whose detachment had not taken part in the fighting on the previous day and had known nothing about it. To this detachment was added Lieutenant von Ruckteschell’s, which had remained in the camp. The trench-mortar was placed in position on one side of the hill, the gun on the other; our machine-guns were disposed round the hill in readiness for the attack. At 3.45 Lieutenant von Ruckteschell took leave of the English Colonel Dickinson, who had been placed in his charge, saying that he expected to be back in an hour. At 4 o’clock the first round from our trench-mortar burst in the centre of the enemy’s position. The enemy commander was just considering whether he should make a sortie during the night. In a moment the hill burst into life: everywhere men could be seen running up and down the rocks. They were brought under the fire of our gun and machine guns. Very soon the enemy showed the white flag, but continued to fire.

Lieutenant von Ruckteschell returned to his guest as he had promised, an hour later, but unfortunately with a shattered leg. His orderly who, when he was wounded, had tried to carry him out of the fight, was shot down under him. Meanwhile Captain Müller had climbed the hill from the other side and stormed the camp. It was occupied by a squadron of mounted infantry of the Gold Coast Regiment of whom hardly one came out alive. Even the horses were killed almost without exception. On our side brave Lieutenant Selke was killed by an enemy bullet shortly before the storming of the camp. He was buried on the battlefield. The _matériel_ captured was small, but the two days of fighting had cost the enemy heavy losses in men. His detachments, which were numerically hardly less strong than our own, were literally annihilated. Here, as at Namacurra, it turned out that the English had conscripted black troops from German East Africa into their fighting force, including a considerable number of old German Askari.

Our thorough work at Namirrue had been made possible by Koehl’s detachment, consisting only of three companies, which had kept us free from interference. This detachment had fallen back gradually from Tipa on Namirrue, daily fighting rearguard actions with the enemy who was pressing on with all his strength. They were now within half a day’s march of Namirrue and I ordered them across to the east bank of the Namirrue river. Patrols sent out to reconnoitre had meanwhile learned from the natives that there was an enemy depot with a garrison at Pekera. This seemed to me very probable, as Pekera lies in the thickly populated area east of the Ligonja river, said to be a fertile district. Our expectations were realized when after two days’ march we arrived at Pekera. The mounted squadron of the Gold Coast Regiment stationed there was at once destroyed and several motors were captured. In the same way we quickly took possession of the Boma of Chalau and a number of other stations where the Portuguese had stored large quantities of supplies, particularly pig-nuts. Our patrols advanced as far as Angoche and in a very short time we were masters of the wide and exceptionally fertile district. One night some of the Portuguese officer prisoners escaped and succeeded in joining the enemy troops at Angoche. Apparently there were among these gentlemen some who knew the country well by reason of their occupations in peace.

The period of rest during our stay in the Chalau district made it possible for our sick and wounded, who had been brought with us on the long marches, to recover; the fit, too, benefited by the respite. All had suffered more or less from the uninterrupted marching and exertions they had just gone through. It was noteworthy how the recent successes brought out the warlike spirit of the bearers, who were for the most part a very sound and reliable lot of men. A large number offered their services as Askari. Even my old cook was not disinclined to take up arms.

On 5th of August supplies began to run short and there remained as our chief article of diet only the still bitter _muhogo_. Several enemy patrols approaching us from the north-east showed me that the enemy columns following us from the south-west had actually overtaken us during our halt and were concentrating for an attack at Wamaka, north-east of our camp.