CHAPTER XI

IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY

WHILE at Narunyu there was a lull in the fighting for several weeks, the enemy had shown considerable activity in the section of Portuguese territory occupied by Stuemer’s force. Several English columns from the south-west and south had concentrated on Mwembe, and Major von Stuemer, not thinking himself strong enough to resist, had evacuated Mwembe. The different companies had then gradually retired on the Rovuma. North of this river Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen, who had been sent from Headquarters to Tunduru, and under whom the various companies of Stuemer’s force had re-formed, had taken over the command. Enemy forces were also advancing on Tunduru from Ssongea.

It was difficult to obtain detailed information about the enemy. My impression was that he wanted to bring our main force to a halt, invade our supply-area in the Tunduru-Massassi-Ruponda district with strong forces, and carry off our supplies. I did not then think it out of the question that we might score a success, and I, therefore, marched on the 10th September, 1917, with five companies, from our camps at Narunyu towards Massassi. From there Captain Goering immediately marched with three companies towards Tunduru; Jantzen’s division stood north-east of this place. I reconnoitred the road to Tunduru on a bicycle and feared that the difficulties of supply would be very serious. These fears were unfortunately realized. Supplies from the land could not be brought up and there was no time for a prolonged operation that would allow of additional supplies being obtained from Massassi.

The small English and Portuguese patrols which attacked our supplies and transport from across the Rovuma to the south did not cause us to hurry our movements. But the enemy from Kilwa, whom Captain Koehl’s heavy attack from Mbeo-Chini and a number of lesser encounters had not been able to stop, reached the neighbourhood of Nahungu. His flying columns, for the most part mounted, outflanked Koehl’s force, and pressed forward up the Mbemkuru river to Nangano. Communication with Captain Koehl by means of the telephone-line from Nahungu to Nangano was first interrupted for a few days, and then broken off completely. The supply dumps fell into the enemy’s hands and were destroyed. To provide against the interruption of the exposed telephone-line a new line had been laid from Ruponda, running north-east, but connection by messenger between this line and Koehl’s division took several days.

In view of the slow means of communication with Koehl’s detachment, it was not possible to get an accurate view of the situation in time, and as the intended success at Tunduru could not in any case be attained, I marched the five companies from Massassi to Ruponda at the beginning of October, and then further north-east, joining forces with Koehl’s force at Likangara. On receiving the report that enemy detachments were approaching Ruponda, I ordered the removal of the sick and the stores from Ruponda to Lukuledi and Mnacho. On 9th October, 1917, an enemy patrol was beaten off with some losses at Ruponda. On 10th October a considerable force of the enemy—the 25th Indian Cavalry Regiment was identified—assaulted Ruponda from several sides. The withdrawal of our companies had, therefore, unfortunately been rather premature; otherwise the enemy might have encountered some of our passing companies at Ruponda and perhaps suffered a serious defeat. As it was, there were no troops in Ruponda except a few of our patrols; most of the sick fell into the enemy’s hands, and also some 90,000 kg. of supplies. At Likangara there was no fighting worthy of notice. Some enemy patrols and weak detachments did appear, but our fighting-force, which was attacking the enemy’s main line of communication along the Mbemkuru river, firing on and destroying motor-transport, and capturing mails and supplies, led me to suppose that the strongest part of the Kilwa force was recuperating further west in the direction of Ruponda.

The increased enemy activity a few days’ march east of Likangara, where he established requisitioning stations, as well as the stories of the natives, made it seem probable that considerable enemy forces were marching from Nahungu towards the south, and therefore against General Wahle. Captured mails revealed the fact that in spite of his extensive intelligence and spy systems the enemy was groping in the dark. He did not know, for instance, where I was, although he seemed to place the greatest importance upon knowing. The knowledge of my Headquarters would tell him the probable position of our main force. While one letter thought that I was in the neighbourhood of Lukuledi, another professed to know that I was at Tunduru, and according to a third I was at Mahenge. The talkativeness of these Europeans, who, in spite of all warnings, cannot refrain from communicating to one another in their private letters their knowledge and their conjectures about the war situation, had in this case done good: there was so much gossip, the rumours were so contradictory, and even the most improbable things were so indiscriminately believed, that anything at all could be read into the German correspondence. In spite of this unintentional misleading of the enemy, it is difficult to understand how intelligent people can entrust to the post important matters, the knowledge of which must be kept from the enemy, knowing how unreliable the post is, and that the letters often fall into the enemy’s hands.

It was clear to me that the enemy’s obvious uncertainty about the situation would give me a great opportunity if it could be used quickly and decisively. I ventured to hope that the intended decisive blow might now be struck for which I had tried twice near Lindi and once at Tunduru, and the success of which at Narungombe had hung on a hair. The development of the situation on Wahle’s front seemed favourable for this attempt. His forces had gradually withdrawn from the Mtua district to Mahiwa. The enemy’s whole handling of the campaign suggested that his various columns would press forward with all their weight and try to crush us by a concentration from all sides. The enemy’s Lindi Division was advancing energetically with the rest. General Wahle’s nine companies, fighting stubbornly, had retired before them to Mahiwa. I had a fair personal knowledge of the country at Mahiwa. It was very probable that my march in that direction would not be observed by the enemy in time.

On the 10th October, 1917, trusting in the fortune of war, I crossed the Linkangara mountains to Mnacho with five companies and two mountain guns. I arrived there at dark and left again at daybreak on the 15th. On the narrow mountain paths the force got very scattered. The guns were left far behind, and the pack-animals gave trouble. Askari and bearers came to the rescue, and again and again Sergeant-Major Sabath rose superior to the difficulties and brought his guns forward. It surprised me that we were unable to get any information from Mahiwa, but the rifle and machine-gun fire indicated that fighting was in progress. Before dark I reached Lieutenant Methner’s company, which was in reserve behind Wahle’s left wing. The enemy seemed to be attacking this company with a view to enveloping it. His fire had the unfortunate effect of causing the disappearance of my bearer, with my dispatch-box, containing most important dispatches and maps: he did not return for two days. The first two companies to come up were immediately thrown against the enemy’s enveloping movement, and the enemy was thrown back. The companies then dug themselves in. On the morning of the 16th I went to reconnoitre, and found that the enemy had also entrenched himself immediately in front, at a distance of sixty to a hundred metres. When Lieutenant von Ruckteschell offered me a cup of coffee, care had to be taken, as the enemy was keeping a fairly sharp look-out, and shot with tolerable accuracy. I thought the opportunity favourable for a determined surprise attack. It was decided to launch the attack at noon, on the left (north) wing, and try to turn the enemy’s flank. Goering’s detachment was to lead the attack.

After we had eaten our midday meal undisturbed, I went at once to the left wing, where Captain Goering had just begun his advance with his two companies. When he had crossed a wide depression in the ground, to my surprise he changed direction still further to the left. The companies were soon in action. Only gradually I realized the significance of this surprising move. Captain Goering had come unexpectedly upon a new enemy who had come from Nahungu and was now attacking from the north. The force consisted of several battalions and two guns of the Nigerian Brigade who knew nothing of our arrival at Mahiwa and were expecting to smash General Wahle’s force by an attack on his left flank and rear, while his front, facing east, was vigorously attacked by a division. The Nigerian Brigade was as much taken by surprise as Captain Goering and was not so quick to adapt itself to the new situation. Captain Goering, closely supported by the reserves, threw himself so vigorously against the enemy in the bush that he ran through some of his detachments, threw them into confusion, and finally put them to flight. An enemy officer in command of an ammunition column took our men for his own, with the result that we captured about 150,000 rounds of ammunition. A gun with ammunition was taken by assault, and the killed did not consist wholly of Nigerian Askari. On Captain Goering’s right, where two companies under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell and Lieutenant Brucker, wounded in this action, were fighting, the enemy was also thrown back some way into the bush.

While this fighting was going on on the flank, and on the following day also, the enemy attacked Wahle’s force with all his strength. Here the enemy was in great superiority; wave after wave of fresh troops were thrown against our front. There was a danger that General Wahle’s front would give way, and the fighting was very severe. There was also serious danger that our enveloping movement, in the very difficult swampy ground of the bush, would be held up so long by weak enemy forces that a defeat would be inflicted upon our front before it could make itself felt. In that case the battle was lost. I thought it expedient to increase the disadvantages that the enemy was bringing upon himself by his costly frontal attack and used all my available strength in such a way that the enemy by the increasing fierceness of his frontal attack was bleeding himself to death.

The original intention of enveloping the enemy’s left wing was not developed further on the following days, but, on the contrary, every available company was withdrawn from the left wing to stiffen General Wahle’s front. In this way we not only succeeded in holding our ground, but, by immediately taking advantage of the enemy’s moments of weakness to make heavy counter-attacks with our reserves, we were able to inflict a real defeat. My, perhaps surprising, tactics were prompted by the personality of the enemy commander. I had learned in the engagement at Reata (11th March, 1916) that General Beves threw his men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try for a success, not by skilful handling and small losses, but rather by repeated frontal attacks which, if the defence held its ground and had anything like adequate forces, led to severe losses for the attack. I guessed that here at Mahiwa he was carrying out the same tactics. I think it was by taking advantage of the enemy leader’s mistaken tactics in this way that we were able to win this splendid victory. Until the 18th October, for four days therefore, wave after wave of the attack broke on our front, but my own observation told me that the weight of the attack here on the right wing was diminishing and that the enemy’s defeat was absolute.

On the evening of the 18th October we had, with some 1,500 men, completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least 4,000, and probably not less than 6,000, strong. With the exception of Tanga, it was the most serious defeat he had suffered.

According to a high English officer the enemy lost 1,500 men; but I have reason to believe that this estimate is much too low. Our casualties were: 14 Europeans and 81 Askari killed, 55 Europeans and 367 Askari wounded, 1 European and 1 Askari missing. Considering the smallness of our forces these losses were for us very considerable, and were felt all the more seriously because they could not be replaced. We captured a gun, six heavy and three light machine guns, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition.

The situation, unfortunately, did not allow us to take full advantage of our victory; in our rear was the enemy who had occupied Ruponda on the 10th October, advanced in strong force further south and on 18th October attacked Major Kraut at Lukuledi. It must be remarked in passing that our troops which had fought under Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen near Tunduru had gradually retired north-east to the upper Mbenkuru and had reached Headquarters above Ruponda before the occupation of that place by the enemy on the 10th October. Two of these companies had reinforced the company which was guarding our supplies near Lukuledi, and it was these three companies, under the command of Major Kraut, which were attacked by a superior enemy from the north on the 18th October.

The enemy, believed to be six companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, was driven off, but in order to protect our supplies and material lying at Chigugu and Chiwata, Major Kraut retired to the first of these places. As well as Chigugu and Chiwata, Ndanda, where we had large stores of war material, was also threatened by the enemy, who had doubtless, in my opinion, been reinforced at Lukuledi. The enemy from Lukuledi might at any moment attack our lines of communication, capture our stores and supplies, and so put us out of action. We had no means of protecting our lines of communication locally, for the few thousand men we had were required for fighting. As, however, the force had to be kept alive, the danger had to be overcome in some other way.

There was only one way: to beat the enemy decisively at Lukuledi. It was necessary therefore to lose no time at Mahiwa, and, hard though it was, I had to abandon the idea of an annihilating pursuit. When, early on the 19th October, a few scattered detachments of the enemy were seen and fired on, I had already begun my march with six companies and two guns. On the next day at two o’clock we entered Lukuledi from the east, and on 21st of October at dawn we attacked the enemy, who was apparently taken completely by surprise. North of Lukuledi, on the Ruponda road, Major Kraut’s column surprised the camp of the 25th Indian Cavalry Regiment, which, with transport harnessed, stood ready for the march on Massassi; the camp was taken by storm and the regiment lost almost the whole of its transport horses, altogether 350. Whilst I was engaged with the detachments of Koehl and Ruckteschell in a fairly serious action against the enemy entrenched at Lukuledi, I waited in vain for the intervention of Kraut’s force. An attack on the camp without the advantage of surprise had little hope of success. When the force began to come under the fire of the enemy’s mine-throwers on the flank, I withdrew the greater part from the zone of the effective cross-fire, after beating off a strong enemy attack, in order to avoid unnecessary losses. A fresh enemy, in the shape of a company of King’s African Rifles (English East African Askari), who appeared unexpectedly from the bush, was quickly driven off. In this engagement Lieutenant Kroeger fell at the head of his company. The action was then broken off. No news came of Major Kraut until night; thinking he could no longer attack successfully at Lukuledi, and hearing no sounds of fighting, he had made a détour and then approached Lukuledi from the south.

Owing to unfavourable circumstances we had not succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy at Lukuledi, and the operation had only in part gained its objective, but the enemy’s losses must be regarded as serious. The impression made on him was even greater than I had supposed. At any rate, it was reported that he had evacuated Lukuledi and withdrawn to the north. Among our casualties were three company-commanders killed. I can still see Lieutenant Volkwein, severely wounded in the leg, limping through the bush at the head of his company. I had also spoken with Lieutenant Batzner and Lieutenant Kroeger shortly before they fell. Sergeant-Major Klein also fell, who had so often led his patrol on the Uganda railway. He was a capable machine gun leader. But our losses were not in vain. Our patrols pursued the enemy and fired on his camp near Ruponda and also his lines of communication. The impossibility of maintaining large bodies of troops in the neighbourhood of Ruponda—our supplies collected there had fallen into the enemy’s hands—forced me to give up all idea of pursuing the enemy.

At that time I thought it possible that the enemy’s withdrawal from Lukuledi might have been due to the movements of Captain Tafel’s force, which was marching from Mahenge to join us. We had lost touch with him since the beginning of October. He had received orders to retire gradually before the strong enemy columns which were advancing on Mahenge from the north (Ifakara), west and south-west (Likuju, Mponda), and to try to get into touch with the main force under my command. I thought it quite possible that he had already arrived in the district of Nangano, or west of that place, and that the enemy had turned about again out of anxiety for his lines of communication.