CHAPTER IX

THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES

IN August, 1916, Major Kraut had gradually retired from Kilossa on Mahenge, leaving only Schoenfeld’s division at Kidodi, on the Ruaha. Captain Braunschweig’s force was embodied in Major Kraut’s command. Of these Captain Falkenstein, with the 5th Field Company, had retired, at the end of May, 1916, from Ipyana, and Captain Aumann, with his company, from the Mbozi region in the direction of Lupembe and Maubire. During the retirement there was continual skirmishing. Our weak divisions had to make a stand against the pursuing enemy, at least a brigade strong.

At the end of June, 1916, Captain Braunschweig, who was then at Dodoma, was sent through Iringa, and his force was strengthened to five companies by the addition of the Kondoa troops and others brought from Dar-es-Salaam, including the two companies from Langenburg. One hundred of the crew of the _Königsberg_ from Dar-es-Salaam and a field howitzer were added to this force. At Malangali he accepted battle with the enemy, and apparently inflicted heavy losses. Then, however, he evacuated the position, and abandoned the howitzer, which was difficult to move, first making it useless. The difficulties of Braunschweig’s position were increased by the action of an important Wahehe chief in his rear, who rebelled and went over to the enemy with all his people and cattle. Captain Braunschweig then retired on Mahenge, fighting a succession of minor rearguard skirmishes, and put himself under the orders of Major Kraut.

After numerous minor engagements Major Kraut’s retiring divisions established themselves on the line of the Ruhudje and Ruaha rivers. In the fertile region round Mahenge the supplies were excellent, even after the evacuation of a large part of the rice-field west of the Ruhudje. On this river the enemy had established a strongly fortified camp at Mkapira. With our insufficient resources it was impossible to take this position by force, but there was a chance that by cutting the enemy’s line of communication with Lupembe, we might force him to evacuate the camp owing to shortage of food.

Major Kraut crossed the river with five companies and a light field gun, and occupied a position in a semi-circle of hills in the enemy’s rear and right across his line of communication. In the enemy’s front weak forces covered the river bank on the Mahenge side. Unfortunately the fortified positions of our companies were so extended that, owing to the difficulties of the country, there was no guarantee that support could be brought up in time. On the——, before daybreak, the 10th Company on the right wing was surprised by a heavy enemy attack. The enemy also cleverly took the company’s position in the rear and, after inflicting heavy losses, put the machine guns out of action. On the left wing Lieutenant von Schroetter’s company was also attacked from all sides, and had to cut its way out with the bayonet, losing the light field gun and a machine gun. In view of the heavy casualties of the enemy, Major Kraut would have been able to remain on the west bank of the Ruhudje, in spite of this partial disaster, but fighting could be heard from the direction of Lupembe, where the 25th Field Company was covering his rear. Major Kraut thought, wrongly, that there, too, a sharp attack had been made, and, therefore, retired again to the east bank of the Ruhudje. To his astonishment the enemy’s strong entrenchments at Mkapira were found to be evacuated a few days later, the enemy having withdrawn in the night. Closer inspection showed that he had suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting. This, however, was not enough to explain his withdrawal; this riddle was not solved until later, on the appearance of General Wahle, with whom no communication had been established.

In expectation of the opening of the big operations of 1916 the reinforcements that had been provisionally sent to Victoria Nyanza, Ruanda, the Russissi and the Tanganyika area were brought back and embodied into our main forces along the North railway. A single command for these minor theatres of war was required, and with this object a “western command” was established under Major-General Wahle, who for the most part co-ordinated and directed these operations from Tabora. In April and May, 1916, when the British main forces in the Kilima Njaro area had completed their march, and, after the rainy season, were beginning a fresh advance to the south, English and Belgians from Muansa, Lake Kiwu, the Russissi and Bismarckburg began to advance concentrically on Tabora through these minor theatres of war. Our weak divisions retired on this place.

Major von Langenn retired at once from Tschangugu to Issawi, followed by Captain Wintgens from Kissenji. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the pursuing Belgian brigades in successful rearguard actions. The German detachment later continued its retirement on Mariahilf. The danger to our district from the strong Belgian forces on our heels had been correctly estimated by Captain Gudovius. When in June, 1916, strong English forces advanced across the Kagera, he retired south from Bukoba with his division. Owing to the difficulties of communication and getting information, a part of his force unfortunately ran upon strong Belgian forces in Ussuwi district. Captain Gudovius himself was wounded in the abdomen and fell into the enemy’s hands. The engagement went badly for us and cost us heavy losses. Individual bodies of the detachment, however, managed to fight their way through to Muansa and Uschirombo.

In the middle of July, 1916, the English succeeded in effecting a surprise landing with about a brigade in the neighbourhood of Muansa. There, too, there was some skirmishing, favourable to us, and there the Commanding Officer, Captain von Chappuis, retired in the direction of Tabora. The troops from Muansa and those under Major von Langenn and Captain Wintgens established a new front, approximately on the line Schinjanga-St. Michael, and repulsed several Belgian attacks. Captain Zimmer had sunk the steamer _Goetzen_ at Kigoma and blown up the Wami. He then retired slowly along the railway to Tabora. Captain Hering von Usumbura followed suit. The fact that the operations were nearing Tabora gave General Wahle the opportunity to bring up quickly part of the troops from the north of Tabora, to make a dash west by rail and retire again at once. In this raid the 8th Field Company completely routed a Belgian battalion west of Tabora, and Wintgens’ detachment brought off a successful surprise attack west and north of Tabora. These minor victories were often considerable, and on several different days of skirmishing the enemy losses amounted to hundreds; several light howitzers were also captured in these raids.

On 2nd June, 1916, the 29th Field Company was surrounded in its fortified position in the Namema mountains. In fighting his way through, the brave company commander, Lieutenant Franken, was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Lieutenant Hasslacher retired step by step on Tabora. In an affair of patrols south of this place he met with a hero’s death.

In this way the troops of the western command were actually assembled at Tabora, and the moment had come for a systematic retirement to the south-east. These last operations and the capture of Tabora were not known at Headquarters until long afterwards. There was no means of communication with the western command. Major-General Wahle was aware that this retirement of our main forces was of first importance for the Mahenge area. Accordingly he gave orders for the march. At first the railway could be used for supplies and transport. The eastern column, under Major von Langenn, marched on Iringa, the centre column, under Captain Wintgens, on Madibira, and the western column, under Lieutenant Huebener, on Ilembule. Major Wahle accompanied the centre column. In this way they came upon the line of communication between Neu-Langenburg and Iringa, and the enemy’s dumps along this line. Huebener’s detachment lost touch, and surrendered, being enveloped by a superior force of the enemy at Ilembule. Langenn’s detachment was most unfortunately surprised by a burst of fire while crossing a ford near Iringa and lost heavily. The subsequent attack on Iringa was also costly and without success.

Wintgens’ detachment surprised enemy dumps and columns near Madibira, and also captured a gun and some wireless apparatus. In spite of several days of stubborn fighting, they were unable to take Lupembe and the surrounding farms. The influence of Wahle’s advance immediately made itself felt in the Mahenge district. The apparently strong enemy troops, who from their fortified positions at Mkapira had carried out the successful raid against Major Kraut, now felt themselves seriously threatened in their rear. They evacuated their strong positions and retired on Lupembe. General Wahle took over the command of all the forces at Mahenge.

At the end of 1916 the troops of General Wahle’s western command were grouped round Mahenge. From here he directed the operations extending approximately to the line Ssongea—Lupembe—Iringa—Kidodi.

It has been said that all touch with General Wahle had been lost since July, 1916, until in October, 1916, his patrols joined up with those of Major Kraut south of Iringa.

It was not, therefore, until after the fighting at Mkapira that Major Kraut, and through him Headquarters, learned of General Wahle’s advance; the development of the situation made a very different impression on the enemy. He must have regarded the advance of General Wahle’s columns against the English line of communication from Iringa to Langenburg, and Major Kraut’s accidentally simultaneous threat to Mkapira, as a widely-planned joint operation, which was seriously endangering his troops at Mkapira, even after Major Kraut had withdrawn to the east bank of the Ruhudje. He avoided this danger by a hasty retirement from Mkapira in a westerly direction.

General Wahle’s columns at once concentrated in the Lupembe-Mkapira area. No news was received of Huebener’s western column. Its capitulation was not known until much later.

Welcome though this reinforcement of the forces in the west was, there were difficulties of supplies, and it became necessary to put under cultivation a considerable area, stretching almost to Ssongea. Major Grawert’s detachment advanced to Likuju on the Ssongea—Liwale road, that of Major Kraut to the Mpepo region and Captain Wintgens’ surrounded an enemy detachment in a fortified camp at Kitenda. The enemy quickly marched to the relief of this force, but the relieving troops were driven off with heavy losses. At the same time the position of Grawert’s detachment took a very unfavourable turn. The enemy had succeeded in driving off this force’s live-stock. As other supplies in the district were scanty, Major von Grawert, exaggerating the difficulties of supply, thought his position hopeless and surrendered in January, 1917. A transportable 8.8 air naval gun which had been brought to Lihuju with great difficulty fell into the enemy’s hands, as well as a number of good machine guns. In reality the position of Grawert’s force does not appear to have been so desperate as he supposed; at any rate, a strong patrol under Sergeant-Major Winzer, who refused to surrender, made its way south without being molested by the enemy, and, a few days later, found abundant supplies at small cost in the districts west of Tunduru. The conduct of this patrol gave further proof that there is almost always a way out, even of an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face the risks.

Meanwhile General Wahle’s supply difficulties were increasing. Whether they could have been modified by ruthlessly reducing the number of non-combatants, as had been done on the Rufiji, or whether the material welfare of the western command could have been substantially improved by greater care in procuring and rationing the available resources, could not be decided from my position on Lake Utungi. The temporary telegraph to Mahenge was very inefficient and often interrupted, and it took several days to get a despatch through from General Wahle in Mahenge to the troops. This made it difficult for me to get a view of the situation from the incomplete information at hand. Suffice it to say that the difficulties of supply in Mahenge were regarded as so acute that it was not considered possible to keep such strong forces concentrated there, and part of them would have to be withdrawn.

Kraut’s and Wintgens’ forces were marched west to Gumbiro, whence they were to press on across the Ssongea-Wiedhafen road. It was thought that they would find adequate supplies in the mountains south of Ssongea. The report of this move reached me too late for me to interfere. From Gumbiro Captain Wintgens turned north and, near Lake Rukwa, successfully engaged an enemy column which had been following him; on nearing Tabora he got typhus and was taken prisoner. Captain Naumann led the force on until finally he surrendered to the pursuing enemy column near Kilima-Njaro towards the end of 1917. It is to be regretted that this operation, carried out with so much initiative and determination, became separated so far from the main theatre of war as to be of little use.

Major Kraut had separated from Captain Wintgens in Gumbiro, and, carrying out General Wahle’s orders, had marched south. There was no difficulty about crossing the line of communication Ssongea-Wiedhafen, but as the enemy had strongly entrenched and secured his supply dumps, no booty was captured. In the open little was to be found in March, 1917, the poorest season of the year, a few months before the new harvest. After some rearguard actions against English troops a success was scored in a surprise attack on the small Portuguese camp at Mitomoul, on the Rovuma. Major Kraut then followed the river downstream to Tunduru and himself came to Headquarters to report. Two of his companies remained at Tunduru to guard the fertile district. The other three marched further east and were temporarily taken over by Captain Loof at Lindi.