CHAPTER XIII.

Stuart had now received his final instructions from General Lee, authorizing him to move into Maryland, around the rear of the enemy and between him and Washington. He was likewise instructed to do them all the damage he could on his way. With his transportation destroyed and communications broken, Hooker would be seriously embarrassed in pursuing General Lee, or probably forced to fall back for supplies, or to defend the capital against this demonstration. In the meantime, while Hooker was thus delayed, the Confederates would have been levying contributions on the farmers in Pennsylvania. His original plan, which was bold in conception and perfectly practicable in execution, was thwarted by an event which he could not control. It was obvious now that Hooker would not _initiate_ any movement, but would confine himself to covering the capital and observing his adversary. It was equally plain that when the Confederate army made a move west of the Blue Ridge, Hooker would make a corresponding one on the east. It was, therefore, all important for the success of Stuart's movement that the _status quo_ of the two armies should be preserved until he could get through Hooker's army to the river, when it would be too late for Hooker to take any step to defeat it. The distance was not more than twenty miles to the Potomac from the point where he would enter Hooker's lines; and this could be got over between sunrise and sundown, as he intended to march in three parallel columns. He knew the country well, and the position of each corps; and it would have been easy enough for him to flank them. Before Pleasanton could have got ready to follow the blazing meteor, it would have been out of sight. The three brigades that were to accompany Stuart were quietly withdrawn from Pleasanton's front on the evening of June 24, and marched in a southerly direction to their rendezvous at Salem. Those of Jones and Robertson were put in the position they had held about Middleburg, and, of course, were charged with the ordinary duty of cavalry on a post of observation. As Gen. Stuart says in his report, "_Robertson's and Jones's brigades, under command of the former, were left in observation of the enemy, on the usual front (about Middleburg), with full instructions as to following of the enemy, in case of withdrawal, and joining our main army_." An order to a cavalry officer to _observe_ an enemy, of course implies that he is to report what he sees; otherwise, there is no use in his observing. Stuart left behind a force of over 3000 cavalry, which was amply sufficient for every purpose. By daybreak, on the morning of the 25th, his column debouched through Glassock's Gap, in the Bull Run, and proceeded towards Haymarket. At the same time I started across by the route I had been travelling for a week, to connect with him at the appointed place. We had stopped at a spring on the mountain side to make our breakfast on some sutlers' stores that had been saved from our captives. Two men had been sent forward on a picket; but they had scarcely got a hundred yards before a volley was fired; and the bullets whistled all around us. We sprang upon our horses; but, as the men did not return, we knew that they must have been killed or captured. General Meade, whose camps were near by, had prepared an ambuscade a second time for me, but I had escaped. (I wonder if he would have called this _bushwhacking_.) We made a _detour_ around them, and hurried on to join Stuart; as we could hear his cannon about Haymarket. It seems that when Stuart got there, he found the roads on which he intended to march that day occupied by Hancock's corps, that had broken up camp that morning, and was moving towards the Potomac. When I got to the Little River Pike, about eight miles below Aldie, which was to be our point of junction, instead of meeting him we struck the head of Hancock's column. His divisions were marching on every road. I spent the day and night riding about among them, and with great difficulty extricated myself from the dilemma in which I was placed. I could not find out where Stuart was, nor he where I was; for Hancock was between us. So I retraced my steps and went on to Pennsylvania through the Shenandoah Valley, passing General Robertson's command, that was quietly resting in Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, in the Blue Ridge, after the enemy retired on the 26th. Pleasanton that day had moved by his flank, across General Robertson's front, to Leesburg, to cover the crossing of Hooker's army. Why he should have halted and remained idle three days in the gaps of the Blue Ridge in Virginia after both armies had marched into Pennsylvania is a mystery that has never been satisfactorily explained. If there were any sound military reasons for his staying there _three_ days, there were equally as sound ones for his not leaving at all. His proper position was on General Lee's flank, next to the enemy, in order to protect his rear and to keep him informed of their movement.

If General Robertson had then in obedience to General Lee's and Stuart's instructions, promptly followed the enemy along the base of South Mountain through Boonesboro, the Confederate cavalry might easily have reached Gettysburg in advance of the Federal troops. In this event, there would not have been the accidental collision of armies. General Lee would have fought a defensive battle, and Gettysburg might have been to Southern hearts something more than "a glorious field of grief." Even as it was, Stuart's movement around his rear had so confused General Meade, that his army was more scattered than ours, and two of his corps in the first day's fight, were caught _in delicto_ and crushed. He was looking for Lee on the Susquehanna, when in fact he was concentrating on Gettysburg.

On account of Hancock's unexpected movement, Stuart had been compelled to make a wider circuit than he had intended, and did not cross the Potomac until the night of the twenty-seventh, the day after Hooker got over. He thence moved northerly towards the Susquehanna, to put himself on Ewell's flank in accordance with the instructions of General Lee. But owing to the derangement of his plans by the advance of the Union army, without General Robertson having given him notice of it, Ewell had been recalled, and Stuart did not join the army until July the second, at Gettysburg, when the battle was raging. But Robertson's command had not even then come up. This movement of Stuart's around the rear of Hooker's army has been condemned by General Long, the military secretary and biographer of General Lee, as having been undertaken either "from misapprehension of his instructions, or love of the éclat of a bold raid" (which, of course, implies disobedience of orders);[13] and General Longstreet says that as he was leaving the Blue Ridge, he instructed Stuart to follow him down the Valley, and cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, but that Stuart replied that he had discretionary powers from General Lee where to cross the Potomac.

[13] In the "Memoirs of General Lee," p. 271, General Long says: "Previous to the passage of the Potomac, General Stuart was instructed to make the movements of the cavalry correspond with those of the Federal army, so that he might be in position to observe and report all important information. In the performance of this duty Stuart had never failed, and probably his great confidence in him made Lee less specific in his instructions than he would otherwise have been. But on this occasion either from the misapprehension of instructions or the love of the éclat of a bold raid, Stuart, instead of maintaining his appropriate position between the armies, placed himself on the right flank of the enemy, where his communication with Lee was effectually severed. This greatly embarrassed the movements of General Lee, and eventually forced him to an engagement under disadvantageous circumstances."

In the Century Magazine, General Longstreet, in his article on Gettysburg, says: "When Hill with his troops and well-supplied trains had passed my rear, I was ordered to withdraw from the Blue Ridge, pass over to the west of the Shenandoah and to follow the movements of the other troops, only to cross the Potomac at Williamsport. I ordered Gen. Stuart, whom I considered under my command, to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavalry and to follow with his main force on my right, to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and move on my right flank. Upon giving him this order, he informed me that he had authority from Gen. Lee to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavalry, and to follow the Federal army with the remainder. At the same time he expressed his purpose of crossing the river east of the Blue Ridge and trying to make way around the right of the Federal army; so I moved my troops independent of the cavalry, following my orders, crossed at Williamsport, come up with A. P. Hill in Maryland, and we moved on thence to Chambersburg."... "On the 30th of June we turned our faces toward our enemy and marched upon Gettysburg. The third corp, under Hill, moved out first, and my command followed. We then found ourselves in a very unusual condition: we were almost in the immediate presence of the enemy with our cavalry gone. Stuart was undertaking another wild ride around the Federal army. We knew nothing of Meade's movements further than the report my scout had made. We did not know, except by surmises, when or where to expect to find Meade, nor whether he was lying in wait or advancing." Gen. Longstreet will find it difficult to reconcile what he now says were his orders to the cavalry with his letter to Stuart, or the following one to Gen. Lee:

HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863, 7.30 P.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, _Comdg., &c._

GENERAL:--Yours of 4 O'C. this afternoon is rec'd. I have forwarded your letters to Gen. Stuart with the suggestion that he pass _by the enemy's rear_, if he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing of the enemy to-day.

Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET, _Lt.-Genl., Comdg._

So it appears that it was Gen. Longstreet who suggested to Stuart the idea of "another wild ride around the Federal army."

When this charge was made against Stuart, both the critics were viewing his movement in the light of the disaster to our arms at Gettysburg, and it was more agreeable to put the blame of it on a dead man than a living one. General Long, who had access to the Confederate archives, may plead the blindness with which he is afflicted as an excuse for his error, and I have no doubt that General Longstreet has forgotten that his own letter to Stuart contradicts his statement.

Gen. Lee made two reports of this campaign; one written in July, 1863, a few weeks after the battle; and a more detailed one in January, 1864. There is a slight color of truth in the imputation cast upon Stuart that Gen. Lee intended to censure him in his report. But this is owing to a false interpretation given to it by persons who have construed a single sentence literally, and not in connection with others that qualify and explain it.[14] Gen. Lee does say: "It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, _Gen. Stuart_ would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were therefore issued to move on Harrisburg." Now if all that Gen. Lee says in his report about Stuart's cavalry is read, together _as a whole_, it is apparent that in the sentence above quoted, he uses _Stuart's_ name not in a personal sense, but descriptive of his cavalry corps, for in another place he says that Stuart had been directed to divide his cavalry, leaving a portion to watch the enemy in front of the mountain passes in Virginia, and "with the _remainder_ to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of Gen. Ewell," who was marching on Harrisburg.[15]

[14] General Lee says: "In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland with Jenkin's cavalry, advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

"General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain-passes with part of his command _as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac_, and with the _remainder_ to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer, that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward.

* * * * *

"The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking, by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville.

* * * * *

"The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the mountains. In the absence of the cavalry it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing farther west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

* * * * *

"The movement of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [Wm. E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army _without delay_, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the _remainder_ of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal army, with three brigades, and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that by that route he would be able to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24th, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Court House and Drainesville, he arrived at the Potomac below the mouth of Seneca Creek in the evening. He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but after great exertion gained the Maryland shore, before midnight, with his whole command. He now ascertained that the whole Federal army, which he had discovered to be drawing towards the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving towards Fredericktown, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

* * * * *

"Robertson's and Jones's brigades arrived on July 3d, and were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss sustained by the army, and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was therefore determined upon to withdraw."

[15] Stuart has been criticised for carrying into our lines a train of one hundred and twenty-five wagons, which he captured in Maryland, with supplies for Hooker, on account of the delay it produced in joining Gen. Lee. But the expedition has been condemned, not as an independent raid, but because it is said that it deprived Gen. Lee of his cavalry, which ought to have given him notice of Hooker's advance into Pennsylvania. But as Gen. Lee actually received notice of it on the very night that Stuart crossed the Potomac, it is hard to see what harm was done by taking the wagons with him. And I have shown that Stuart left with Gen. Lee sufficient cavalry to do the work of guarding his flank and observing the enemy.

Clearly Gen. Lee did not intend to involve himself in the contradiction of saying that he expected Stuart _personally_ to perform at the same time the double duty of watching Hooker along the Potomac, and guarding Ewell's flank on the Susquehanna.[16] Gen. Lee in thus referring to Stuart was somewhat careless and inaccurate in his language, as he was when, in describing the battle of Gettysburg, he said that Robertson's command _arrived_ on July 3d, when, in fact, it never got nearer than Cashtown, some eight miles from the battle-field. But Gen. Lee is explicit in saying, _in his report_, that he gave Stuart full authority to make the movement around the enemy's rear. Among the Confederate archives in Washington, I have at last found in Gen. Lee's confidential letter-book his final instructions to Stuart, which have never been published, which must set this controverted question at rest forever. At the time when they were written, Gen. Lee's headquarters were at Berryville. They are dated June 23, 1863, 5 P.M.

[16] So far as keeping Gen. Lee informed of Hooker's movements is concerned, it was immaterial whether Stuart crossed east or west of the Ridge. In either event he would have been separated from Gen. Lee and unable to watch the line of the Potomac. Stuart was _ordered_ to take three brigades to the Susquehanna and to leave two behind him to watch Hooker. He was simply given discretion as to the point of crossing the Potomac. He is not responsible for the division of his command.

In them Gen. Lee presents to Stuart the alternative of crossing the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge at Shepherdstown and moving over to Frederick, Md., or, "_you will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc._" In a letter to Stuart dated June 22, he had said: "_If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmetsburg route, another by Chambersburg._" The intention of General Lee clearly was that Stuart with one portion of the cavalry was to guard Ewell's flank and give him information of the enemy. The other was to be left[17] behind, as he says in his report, "to hold the mountain passes _as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac_." To suppose that Gen. Lee intended them to remain there after the enemy had gone is to suppose that he was not only unfit to command an army, but even a corporal's guard. It is clear that he intended the two brigades under Robertson to perform the same service for the column of Longstreet and Hill (with whom he had his headquarters) as Stuart was to do for Ewell, who was separated from him. When these two corps crossed the Potomac on the 25th, _he knew_ that Stuart had not crossed _west_ of the Ridge in advance of them. He would not have committed the blunder of marching all his infantry into Pennsylvania knowing that all his cavalry was in Virginia. He must, therefore, have expected for Stuart to cross the Potomac on the same day to the _east_ of the Ridge; which he would have done but for Hancock's movement. Some have contended that his anxious inquiries for Stuart when he got to Chambersburg prove that he did not know which way he had gone. They only show that he did not know where Stuart was _at that time_. As Stuart had been directed to open communication, as soon as he got into Pennsylvania, with Ewell, and had not been able to do so on account of the Federal army getting between them, Gen. Lee, not having heard from him, very naturally felt a great deal of solicitude for his safety. If Gen. Lee had not thought that he would cross the Potomac somewhere on the same day that he did, he would have waited and sent for him. But again, Gen. Lee would not assume the responsibility of authorizing Stuart to go around Hooker's rear unless the movement had the approval of Gen. Longstreet, whose headquarters were at Millwood, not far from Berryville. Gen. Lee's instructions to Stuart were therefore sent through Longstreet. In a letter to Stuart, Longstreet not only approves of Stuart's going into Maryland around the rear of the enemy, but _opposes_ his going the other route through the Shenandoah Valley, on the ground that it would disclose their plans to the enemy. In concluding his letter he says:

"_N.B.--I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy._" By "_our rear_" Longstreet meant through the Shenandoah Valley. The reasons he gave Stuart were conclusive in favor of the course he took. It was Gen. Lee's policy to detain Hooker as long as possible in Virginia. But if Stuart passed to the west of the Ridge and crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, he would be discovered by the signal stations of the enemy on Maryland heights. This would indicate, of course, that the infantry was to follow him. On the contrary, Hooker would interpret a movement around his rear as nothing more than a cavalry _raid_, and it would be a mask to conceal Lee's designs. It was no fault of Stuart's that he was unable to execute his plan.

[17] On June 22, 1863, 3.30 P.M. Gen. Lee, writing from Berryville, Va., to Ewell, who was then about Hagerstown, Md., says:

"My letter of to-day, authorizing you to move toward the Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. I have also directed Gen. Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep _you advised of the movements of the enemy_, and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since." As Stuart was not ubiquitous, Gen. Lee must have relied on the cavalry left behind to do for him what he intended that Stuart should do for Ewell.

The Count of Paris says that it was impracticable from the first, and differed in its condition from his other operations of this kind, because they were undertaken while the armies were both stationary. Now, at the time when Stuart resolved on going into Maryland by this route, both armies were as stationary as when he rode around McClellan on the Chickahominy; and Hooker was waiting for the Confederates to move. But it could not be expected for Hooker to stand still while his adversary was in motion. Now it so happened that the corps of Longstreet and Hill moved from Berryville on June 24, towards the Potomac, which they crossed the next day, Hill at Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport.[18] Their route of march was in plain view of Maryland Heights, and the news was immediately telegraphed from there by General Tyler. This set the whole of Hooker's army in motion, on the morning of the 25th, for the Potomac. About the time, therefore, that Stuart's column appeared on the eastern side of Bull Run, on the morning of the 25th, Hancock broke up camp and started on the same road that Stuart intended to march. Hancock was ahead of him, and had the right of way. Gen. Longstreet had urged Stuart to go that route, for fear that if he went through the Shenandoah Valley, the plans of the commanding general would be disclosed to the enemy.

[18] [_Telegram._]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK, _General-in-Chief_:--

Longstreet's corps, which camped last between Berryville and Charlestown, is to-day in motion and before 6 O.C. this morning commenced crossing by the ford one mile below Shepherdstown to Sharpsburg.

GEN. TYLER, _Brigadier-General_.

I am unable to understand why he could not foresee that the march of all the Confederate infantry in full view of the enemy would have the same effect. If the corps of Longstreet and Hill had delayed a single day in leaving Berryville, Stuart would have landed on the north bank of the Potomac on the night of the 25th. Hooker would then have been utterly confounded. Before he could have made up his mind what to do, the Confederate cavalry would have been watering their horses in the Susquehanna, and all the communications between Washington and the North would have been broken. But now to return to the cavalry which Stuart, under Gen. Lee's orders, had left in front of the enemy in Virginia, as he says, "_to observe his movements, and follow him in case of withdrawal_." Of course, this duty could not be discharged without keeping in sight of the enemy. But instead of following, they fell back in an opposite direction, and gave no information to Gen. Lee and no trouble to the enemy. Gen. Lee says that on the night of the 28th he heard through a scout that had come in that Hooker was over the river, and was moving north. He is mistaken as to the date, as there is a letter of his to Gen. Ewell, dated Chambersburg, June 28th, 7.30 A.M., which says, "I wrote you _last night_, stating that Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown,--the head of his column being at that point in Frederick County, Md." He directs Ewell to move to Gettysburg, which had become to him what Quatre Bras was to Wellington, when he learned that Napoleon was over the Sombre. In his report of the campaign, Gen. Lee says that as soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to Gen. Robertson to rejoin the army "_without delay_." The very fact that Gen. Lee had to send back for this cavalry shows that it was in the wrong place, and where he did not intend it to be. In his instructions to Stuart, when leaving, he had said: "_Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, bringing everything clean along the valley, close upon the rear of the army._" It is clear that the instructions to Gen. Robertson were to leave Virginia when the enemy left; for how could he otherwise "_watch the flank and rear_" of the Confederate army, and be "_close upon_" it. Gen. Robertson[19] says that during the time he was lying in the gaps of the Virginia mountains, after the enemy had crossed the river, he was in daily communication by couriers with Gen. Lee's headquarters.[20] Then so much the worse if he did not inform him that the enemy had disappeared from his front. The inquiry is now naturally suggested, _What did he communicate_?

[19] See his letter of Dec. 27, 1877, in _Phila. Times_.

[20] Stuart's report says: "I submitted to the commanding general the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, and passing through Hopewell, or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountain, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. The commanding general wrote to me, authorizing this move if I deemed it practicable, and also what instructions should be given the officer left in command of the two brigades left in front of the enemy. He also notified me that one column should move via Gettysburg and the other via Carlisle towards the Susquehanna, and directed me, after crossing, to proceed with all dispatch to join the right (Early) of the army in Pennsylvania.

* * * * *

"Robertson's and Jones's brigades, under command of the former, were left in observation of the enemy on the usual front, _with full instructions as to following up the enemy in case of withdrawal and rejoining our main army_." This report was read by Gen. Lee and not one word of dissent by him is endorsed on it. It bears his initials in pencil, _R. E. L._, in his own handwriting.

Again he says, "He [Gen. Lee] was fully aware of my position and the specific duty I was then performing." But what that specific duty was no one knows. If Gen. Lee ordered him to remain there unemployed, then he could blame no one but himself for the want of cavalry, and the responsibility would rest on him.[21] But the fact that Gen. Lee sent for him to join the army as soon as he heard that the enemy was advancing north, is proof that he never intended him to stay in Virginia after they had gone. Gen. Lee had issued orders from Chambersburg for the concentration of his army at Gettysburg, and as he says, sent back for Robertson's command to join the army _without delay_. When the order was read, Gen. Robertson marched his two brigades that night to Berryville, which is west of the mountain, on a route almost parallel and in an opposite direction from Gettysburg, which is east of it. On June 30, he continued his westerly and circuitous march to Martinsburg, and on July 1, the day of the battle, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. If he had crossed at Shepherdstown and gone to Boonesboro, he might easily have reached Gettysburg after receiving Gen. Lee's order on the morning of July 1, when it was held by Buford with only two brigades of cavalry. Gen. Meade had sent off most of his cavalry in search of Stuart. It was this diversion created by Stuart that saved Gen. Lee's communications from attack. Buford was too weak to assume the offensive. On June 24, when Gen. Lee moved with Longstreet and Hill down the Shenandoah Valley, he left Gen. Robertson's command between him and the enemy. On July 3, Gen. Robertson had so manoeuvred that _Gen. Lee had got between him and the enemy_. Stuart had ridden around Gen. Hooker while Gen. Robertson rode around Gen. Lee. _Sic itur ad astra._

[21] Gen. Robertson says that when he received Gen. Lee's order he was at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge in Fauquier County. Jones's brigade was twelve miles farther north, at Snicker's Gap in Loudoun, and joined him at Berryville. Stuart had placed them about fifteen miles to the front of the Gaps at Middleburg to watch the enemy. After he left, they retired to the mountain and rendered Gen. Lee no more service while there than if they had been west of the Mississippi.

There are reports of their operations on file from all the brigade and regimental commanders of the cavalry in this campaign _except Gen. Robertson_, who, at his own request, was relieved of his command as soon as he returned to Virginia.

Since the above was written, I have found in the archives of the war office a copy of Stuart's orders to Gen. Robertson when leaving Virginia; but he does not appear to have been in the least governed by them. They confirm all I have said as to the duty required of the cavalry that were left under his command. Through abundant caution Stuart repeated them to Gen. Jones. He was instructed to watch the enemy and report their movements through a line of relay couriers to Gen. Longstreet; and when the enemy withdrew, to harass his rear and impede his march, and follow on the right of our army. There seems to have been no effort made to execute these orders; for both Gens. Lee and Longstreet say that no intelligence having been received through the cavalry of Hooker's crossing the Potomac, it was supposed that he was still south of it; while Pleasanton says that he never had a skirmish in retiring. The fact that Pleasanton's cavalry corps reached Leesburg by noon of the 26th shows that they must have left Gen. Robertson's front at Aldie early that morning. In a despatch[22] from Leesburg to Hooker's headquarters dated June 26, 12.45 P.M., he significantly says that all is _quiet_ towards the Blue Ridge, and that only a few cavalry videttes were seen about Middleburg, and none on the Snickersville Pike. If his flank and rear had been harassed, all would not have been _quiet_. Again, Gen. Robertson was directed to keep his command on the right of the army and in contact with the enemy when they left, in order that he might keep the commanding general informed of their movements.

[22] [_Telegram._]

LEESBURG, [VA.], 12.45 P.M., June 26, 1863.

MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD, _Headquarters, A.P._

Have just arrived. One division is covering the flank from Aldie to this place by way of Mount Gilead. Three brigades of Second division are covering the three roads from Aldie and Gum Springs. _All quiet towards the Blue Ridge. Very few cavalry pickets seen near Middleburg this morning. None in the Snicker's Gap pike._

A. PLEASANTON, _Major-General_.

But when Gen. Lee had sent an order for him to come on and join the army, as there could be no reason for his remaining any longer in Virginia after the enemy had left, he actually followed on the _left_ and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Gen. Lee's _right_ flank was thus left exposed to the enemy's cavalry, but fortunately they had nearly all been sent in search of Stuart. If the pressure of the column of three thousand cavalry with two batteries under Robertson had been brought to bear on the flank of the Union army, its advance into Pennsylvania would have been less rapid, and Meade could not have spared two-thirds of his cavalry to send after Stuart to embarrass his march. If the force of cavalry which Stuart left behind him had promptly moved in obedience to his orders on the 26th to place itself in its proper position on the right of the army, then it could easily have occupied Gettysburg in advance of the enemy. It did nothing of the kind, but quietly rested three days at Ashby's Gap to learn through Gen. Lee where the enemy had gone. The professed historians of the war make no mention of these facts. _Stuart is dead_: "O! for one hour of Dundee."

HEADQUARTERS, June, 22, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, _Commanding Cavalry_.

GENERAL:--I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, and keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmetsburg route, another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Fredericktown. A cavalry force (about one hundred) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins' brigade and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff-officers, for their respective departments, by no one else. They will be paid for or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, _General_.

HEADQUARTERS, MILLWOOD, June 22, 1863, 7 P.M.

MAJ.-GEN'L J. E. B. STUART, _Comdg Cavalry_.

GENERAL:--Gen. Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving via Hopewell Gap and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are, than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order Genl. Hampton--whom I suppose you will leave here in command--to report to me at Millwood either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

Most respectfully,

J. LONGSTREET, _Lt.-Genl._

N.B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.

J. LONGSTREET, _Lt.-Genl._

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTH VIRGINIA, June 23, 1863, 5 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, _Commanding Cavalry_.

GENERAL:--Your notes of 9 and 10.30 A.M. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them; but I can have nothing seized by the men.

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others; but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army and (in event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving towards Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them; but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow.

Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.

I am, very respectfully and truly yours,

R. E. LEE, _General_.

[_Confidential._]

HD. QRS. CAV'Y DIV.: ARMY OF N. VA., June 24, 1863.

BRIG.-GEN'L B. H. ROBERTSON, _Com'dg Cavalry_:

GENERAL:--Your own and Gen'l Jones's brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps; yourself, as senior officer, being in command.

Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert, let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.

After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.

As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by Gen'l R. E. Lee, Lt.-Gen'l Longstreet, or myself, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.

If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.

You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieut.-Gen'l Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.

I send instructions for Gen'l Jones which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpikes.

In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions; and, if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the gaps.

In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can compatible with previous instructions.

You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse artillery.

Very respectfully your obl. servt.

J. E. B. STUART, _Major Gen'l Com'dg._

Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning unless compelled to do so.