xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain

enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one gives from one’s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled and encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).

1251. Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one’s station in life or of one’s superfluities, the following points should be noted:

(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is bound to give all the goods necessary to one’s state of life, since a neighbor’s life is a more important good than one’s own position in life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for preserving one’s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for ransom by bandits.

(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities. Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.

1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a benefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of the clergy.

1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be contributed to alms?

(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute enough, according to one’s ability, either in conjunction with others or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps--for example, that one pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health would be benefitted by the travel.

(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically, and that only the general direction can be given that one should be generous according to one’s means, and regulate one’s yearly alms according to the prevalence of poverty.

1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If one has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty is avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are in great need--a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to divide his money between the three.

1255. The Time for Giving Alms.-(a) One should give at one time all the amount of one’s alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this, and there is a need that calls for it--“He gives twice who gives quickly” (Prov., iii. 28)--for the poor may perish or may be driven to acts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may distribute one’s almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it--that is, one may make partial contributions at various times, retaining meanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future charities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.

1256. The Manner of Giving Alms.--(a) One gives alms directly when one ministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving and medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives alms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses, public hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.; when one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to organizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society); when one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those who cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of laborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the aged, etc.

1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.

(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most deserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes for the support of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation of contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave necessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so it also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.

(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and it is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the place of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for both soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received gratefully.

1258. Fraternal Correction.--Fraternal correction is defined: “An act of charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in order to convert one’s neighbor from sin to virtue.”

(a) Thus, it is an act of charity, for it is a love of our neighbor and the desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction. Hence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a correction administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of the public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of charity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of justice.

(b) Fraternal correction is an act of mercy, for, just as feeding the hungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition of sinners remove spiritual misery.

(c) Fraternal correction uses suitable words or other means, for while it proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence. It is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the need of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they shall be words or equivalent signs (e.g., sad looks, a gesture of disapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal of help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or warning.

(d) Fraternal correction aims at turning a neighbor from sin to virtue. It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction is for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin that has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to include the prevention of sin in the future, since there is no less an obligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in dangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable warning is given.

(e) Fraternal correction is given to a neighbor (i.e., to an individual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is given by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are prevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect good and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a preacher from the duty of correction.

1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than that of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should do unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone ought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even the pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a monitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers of evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who refuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame.

(b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one’s brother in order to save him from another offense (Ecclus., xix. 13, 14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual should instruct with mildness those who have committed some transgression (Gal, vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an enemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).

1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and seek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under one’s care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek him as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes after the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and superiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b) If the sinner is not under one’s care, there is no duty to seek him out; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not to any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for the persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet. Hence, a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice and crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at large has duties regarding such cases.

1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does not oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so performed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but the circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of correction (viz., the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the circumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a) Hence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or improve a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some of the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it will not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances would seem to call for it (Ecclus., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person ought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the influence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is said of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other superior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in order to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the protection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.

1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own purpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction, for his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his rejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened and embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or more serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made worse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct him as to those ways: “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee” (Prov., ix. 8).

1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the knowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the following cases may occur: (a) If one is certain that the correction will be beneficial, one should give it; if one is certain it will not be beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is likely that the admonition will be profitable, and certain that it will not be positively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to help a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though only probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done. (c) If it is doubtful whether the admonition will do any good, and also doubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a stranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good and the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next paragraph.

1264. Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction may occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil that is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems that a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a time estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of conversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or estrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt a dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good of freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared are about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative precept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of doing him a service.

1265. When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If the correction is omitted out of charity, the omission is good and meritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he thinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because he awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted contrary to charity (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or disregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin. Example: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to see Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his enmity. (c) If the correction is omitted in spite of charity, the omission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails to correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give offense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter’s spiritual welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give the correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.

1266. The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be judged according to the rules just given about omission of correction. But is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner, through experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more tractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through correction, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless about the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible hardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If there is no probability of present amendment through correction, one can only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may bring the prodigal back to God.

1267. It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make fraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist before one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be attained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances, which are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known and serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one who has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the correction should be such as will promote the end in view.

1268. One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally sure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For this reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil where there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making corrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not suffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and, if his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the corrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids us to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not done, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the corrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.

1269. Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of those whom one suspects of wrongdoing?

(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority is bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before acting.

(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other superior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the conduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his children ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so neither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his attention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on the one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the hatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand, which will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he should not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will be harmful to the latter’s reputation.

(c) If there is question of fraternal correction, private individuals should not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about spying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are acting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to improve; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need reformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be annoyed or otherwise injured: “Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest” (Prov., xxiv. 15).

1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as follows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a soul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15), (b) slight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when they are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and superiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for these faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an intolerable burden would be laid on everyone, Persons who scold and lecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more harm than good.

1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who is in danger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those sins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to sins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.

1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting a sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one’s neighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed. Thus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a) when a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin; (b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old ways.

1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected unless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope of amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the sinner’s guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from the admonition and correction.

1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of formal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal correction. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially by superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of various evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to God, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions that are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not understanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to the neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day causes scandal by not keeping the fast.

1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result, one should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury to God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an instruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be omitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as parents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various cases as follows:

(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through inadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal; Balbus did the same thing, and this caused considerable scandal. Now, there might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to repair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of Titus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good faith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily rectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will abandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious discords and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.

(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or divine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned and useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of art belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married; Claudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot make it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus should be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.

(c) Material sin may be about to be committed against human law. Sempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence, which they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has forgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say Mass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the day of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the attention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.

1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those sins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a relapse (e.g., a wife should not be always reminding her now sober husband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those sins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one’s intervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he drank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon approach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to make the correction and will not fail to do so.

1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction can be given only to one’s subjects, since it supposes authority; (b) fraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals, but also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are in need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the danger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should be remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their subjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially advantageous.

1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the superior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility, imitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the inferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but respectfully and mildly: “An elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father” (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the correction be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed from contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault. Example: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or neglect religion, to mend their ways.

1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction as just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction may be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction from him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required, however, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were necessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?

1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the state of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproves, does not unfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his own sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to correct wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by a sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that of the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the sinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to conceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the mode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride, as if he himself were above correction: “Wherein thou judgest another thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest” (Rom, ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a sinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a person who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this has a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words rather than good deeds are important.

1281. One who prefers his neighbor’s conversion to his own deviates from the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But a person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal correction seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.

(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions of the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of correcting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made by a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others, or by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be just as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But it is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better correction of another.

(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to correct himself before he attempts to correct another, as when self-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end. Thus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is unobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the latter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who cannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests repentance--all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should take the beam out of one’s own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the mote from a neighbor’s eye (Matt, vii. 5).

1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal correction: “He gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor” (Ecclus., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some than on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of justice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b) Other prelates, confessors, parents, husbands, masters, teachers and guardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason of their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave personal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of charity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose office requires them to make corrections.

1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason that he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if correction by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better able than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will bring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.

1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an injury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the correction is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e., damnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life itself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a contagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to advise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual evil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person should be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to health. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this will bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to correct, for this would cause him worries and suffering.

1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:

(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one corrected and humility as regards one’s own fitness. For fraternal correction is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the weaknesses of others (Gal, vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self to others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally, equals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there should be seriousness mingled with mildness.

(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in Matt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be given privately, and that one should not proceed to accusation before superiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have proved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law. For the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done for ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction be given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to his feelings and to his good name.

1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?

(a) For public sins (i.e., real sins known or soon to be known to the larger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since the guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the contrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: “Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear” (I Tim., v. 20).

(b) For occult sins that are against the common good or the good of a third person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce them immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the multitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than the reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however, for the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one can correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others. Examples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of Balbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring him into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If Claudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the other boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and hence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the confessional must be observed.

(c) For occult sins that are not against the common good or that of a third person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before making the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of reputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save others from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by publicity.

1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing harm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for telling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from silence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to speak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a bad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them into stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted and the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm to himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers are regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will result from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great inconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two are being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur the ignominy of being regarded as a spy.

1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious to others, are reproved publicly, without previous private admonition. (a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins, although He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or through external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known the sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God’s justice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b) Members of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of transgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of fraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in these reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of faults in religious orders.

1289. May a prelate (e.g., in a visitation) oblige his subjects to carry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be accused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are not harmful to others?

(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced their right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has no right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule given by Christ requires that a fraternal correction be first given. A subject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey the divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9).

(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their right to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that information be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain religious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to the prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher superior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the matter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.

(e) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications (such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require that information be brought to him immediately.

1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no hope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears that the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they should be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when old ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will do harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that harms only the sinner should be given up.

1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal reproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:

(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in making the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more important than his reputation with these others; whereas their knowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of being a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should arouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case is brought before the superior for correction.

(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the superior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove successful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known to dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be enraged by a reproof from this superior, charity would urge one to say nothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from time to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to correct Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks Caius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three of them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no effect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the parents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep him away from occasions of drink.

1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been reported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the truth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the character and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes in his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser and accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5). Those who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are disturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their accusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own business.

(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in question is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at the same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected. For the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as father of the person accused, and hence public punishments or corrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an office, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this can be done prudently.

1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for fraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible; for the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is affirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a) Thus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition by the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to the superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more advantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the superior is more revered by the person to be corrected and will be listened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making previous admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before the superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also to some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be better received.

1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may be summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is certain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by oneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will be profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the corrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present are meddlesome or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound to report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is harmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by private admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except by oneself, and that one’s report will be for the good of others and not an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice when these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or rash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.

Art. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 34-36.)

1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b) sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal, which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

1296. Hate.--Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of dislike (_odium abominationis_) is the opposite of love of desire, for, as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (_odium inimicitiae_) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes evil to the object of its dislike.

1297. Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth), cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will, such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has given him being, for existence of itself is something good and desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin, or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).

1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is not God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.

(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given above from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on account of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.

(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience, not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of God.

1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.--(a) Interpretative hatred of God is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin; but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession. This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost (see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.

1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without hatred of God.

1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.--(a) A new species of sin is added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example: Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of God that is concealed.

1304. Hatred of Creatures.--All dislike of God is sinful, because there is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents (Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor (i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St. Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”

1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.

1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself? (a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b) If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in them and beneficial to himself: “Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy” (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v. 29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John, xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, if this is necessary to save his life.

1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one’s neighbor under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss, but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the desire of a neighbor’s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property one expects to inherit, for the neighbor’s life is more important than private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal., v. 12).

1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death. Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to others.

1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God, diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.--(a) Hatred, whether of dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.

1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.--(a) Hatred is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15). The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may happen from a severe blow.

1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate--i.e., a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred--does precede the other sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate--i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one’s own inferiority--does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy, for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of God.

1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.--(a) Hatred of God and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor as evil--that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.

1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.

(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.

(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse himself of sinful dislike.

(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his friend.

1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as follows: (a) when they add a new species--thus, the person hated (e.g., one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

1320. The Sin of Sloth.--Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem for one’s Last End and the means thereto.

(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs from the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The passions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed to God are to be attended to.

(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about the smallness of one’s good. Humility demands that one be sensible of one’s own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are better. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate and grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.

(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity. Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.

(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as eternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of God, which is a sadness over God’s own goodness; and from envy, which is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.

(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one as an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with repose and ease.

1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: “Bow down thy shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).

1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.--(a) Sloth is a special sin, since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden in the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.

1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking, however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the divine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to, is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a venial sin.

1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.--(a) To escape his sadness about divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden him--his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his grief--the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, and he must be continually moving from place to place.

1325. The Conquest of Sloth.--(a) Flight is a suitable form of resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance, when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see 257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.

1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (_pigritia_) is a tardy performance of duty, and will be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (_torpor_) is a perfunctory discharge of duties, without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as tepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes one to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live holily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and generosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against evil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.

(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one concerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a sinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to grave sin. Thus, we read: “I know thy works, that thou art neither cold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth” (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).

(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the disrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to God.

1328. The Sin of Envy.--Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor, which one considers as a detriment to one’s own excellence or glory, and therefore as an evil to self.

(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy, although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from pride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).

(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability, rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one’s sins, regret that one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make of health or wealth.

(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.

(d) The envious man considers his neighbor’s good as a detriment to his own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart from other forms of repining at another’s good fortune. Thus, displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.

(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor’s prosperity as a calamity to self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one’s own desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own misfortune.

1329. The Objects of Envy.--(a) The material objects are many, but they are reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on public knowledge of one’s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause received by his less able opponent.

(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same, that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened his excellence.

1330. The Subjects of Envy.--(a) The persons most inclined to envy are of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

1331. It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly, whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (_nemesis_) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus fears, Caius envies.

1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things, it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31). St. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another does not take away or lessen the other’s good, but improves his own good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius, or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable, that of Balbus is unreasonable.

1333. Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved. This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves has or has not exclusive rights.

(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child loves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when the child does this.

(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false teachers (II Cor., xi).

1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice; when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix. 2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers. It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive the other of his prosperity.

1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be about spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is about temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the undeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked; those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: “Be not emulous of evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly wither away as grass” (Ps. xxxvi. 1).

1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity is had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins; for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be shunned: “My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners” (Ps. lxxii. 2, 3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.

1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, envying one another” (Gal, v. 26); “The patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt” (Acts, vii. 9), “Charity envieth not” (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.

1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity, such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful envious.

1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good; (b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of one who is unworthy.

1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the object is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as good looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or full consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults feel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first movements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts are not mortal, because not fully adverted to.

1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.--(a) There are no different species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another, viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of one’s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is a sin against God (viz., envy at another’s spiritual good, or sorrow at the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the neighbor.

(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another’s influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another’s ability to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of the body than about dress, style, etc.

1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The fruits of envy are progressive in evil.

(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly (sin of detraction).

(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a neighbor’s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the affliction over the neighbor’s prosperity now spoken of is of the same species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.

(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the causes of hate (see 1316).

1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is caused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence will easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that excellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory, for one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be grieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.

1344. In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of envy--namely, envy of a brother’s spiritual good--which has a place among those gravest offenses called “sins against the Holy Ghost” (see 899).

(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world, for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world” (Wis., ii. 24). It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and to the loss of original justice by the Whole race.

1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.--(a) Envy is useless, since it does not obtain that on which one’s heart is set, or obtains it only by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis., vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor. Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).

1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish charity and of emulation of what is best in others: “So that by all means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice” (Philip., i. 18); “Let us consider one another, to provoke unto charity and to good works” (Heb., x. 24).

Art. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

1348. Discord.--As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that they be in agreement.

(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires. Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is a disagreement in judgments.

(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but not in the second.

(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor. Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g., justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a creditor is dishonest.

1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter about which charity requires that he agree;

(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

1350. Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

1351. Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his using evil means for a good end.

1354. The Origin of Discord.--(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

1355. Contention.--Contention is discord carried into words or equivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the intention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and the matter in question.

1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error. Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary. Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.

(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.

1357. The Sin of Contention.--Contention is a sin when its aim is the concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b) From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent, this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows is true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.

1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection of the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a particular character in which important rights are involved. Example: An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.

1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly, makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.). (a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus, while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from contention.

1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a) when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on carrying one’s point that one does not care whether it is true or false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.

1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii. 14).

1362. The Causes of Sinful Contention.--(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention--namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error--is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention--namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders--is anger.

1363. The sins in act against the peace of charity are the following: (a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the Church; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition, which is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to peace between individuals.

1364. Schism.--Schism (etymologically, a split, rent) is defined: “A voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church.”

(a) Schism is a voluntary separation, that is, a separation intended for its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity, for sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the schismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners expressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not the same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated themselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church herself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.

(b) Schism is a separation from unity, and so it differs from disbelief in unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate oneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity, and yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not necessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the setting up of such a body.

(c) Schism is a separation of oneself from unity--that is, schism does not deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the schismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The schismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he accomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.

(d) Schism is a separation from unity, that is, from fellowship in the mystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the authority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those subject to him. Thus, schism differs from disobedience to the head of the Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey orders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.

(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the Church, that is, of the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters purely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not schism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the Church Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church Triumphant cannot fall away from unity.

1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.--(a) In Apostolic times there were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at Corinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b) In post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that of the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in Egypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the fourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century. The most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those whom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius in the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Caerularius in the eleventh century.

1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) directly, when one intends schism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of the Church; (b) indirectly, when one intends to do that from which schism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a member of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or presiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even though he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case is similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and yet is determined to do something from which the neighbor’s death will surely result.

1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity in the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have the same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of similarity; (b) unity between head and members. There is but one head of the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ an earth. Thus, there is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the Church. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one great whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.

1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2). (a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth and the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii. 18, 19). The mere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make him a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy See. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The sin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the Church. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters of faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things, is a schismatic.

1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in three ways:

(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the thing commanded, and not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep a fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he considers it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of disobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his refusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of the Church.

(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the command, considered as a private individual. As the Pope in his personal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by hatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming judgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is reasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and that the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is concerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither schism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the person should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.

(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope’s judgment may be the one who gave the command considered in his official capacity as Pope. In this case the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the thing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will be unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of Pope in him who issued the judgment.

1370. Comparison of Heresy and Schism.--(a) These sins are not the same, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who really believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may nevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest, self-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the head, or not to communicate with the body. (b) There is an intimate union between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself from the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some heresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the Eastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church, and history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of papal primacy.

1371. The Opposition between Schism and Charity.--(a) Charity in itself is a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is unitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his neighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an individual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) Charity in its effect is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of Christ, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals, but also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire world. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a schismatic.

1372. The Sinfulness of Schism.--(a) Schism has a special seriousness, since it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the universal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the greatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the individual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin is against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I Cor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn the sin of schism.

(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is against God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its consequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic sins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of more danger to others.

1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828). (a) Formal schism is that described above, in which one wishes to separate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable revolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) Material schism is that in which one is in fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith. An example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were rival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the people as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal sin.

1374. The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.--(a) The power of Orders is not lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a consecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence, a schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the power of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of the Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the Church permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an inferior except as permitted by the superior.

(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that power depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be withdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction could not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other acts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.

1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:

(a) All schismatics incur _ipso facto_ excommunication, as well as various inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that those who separate themselves should be declared outside the communion of the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the time of the schism of Core: “Depart from the tent of these wicked men and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin” (Num., xvi. 26).

(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the active use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals, except when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of death, as declared in Canon 2261.

(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in certain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common good. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or in common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not _vitandi_ or sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities that the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical jurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the conferring of the Sacraments.

1376. War.--War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war, rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations, etc.

1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation); (b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the enslavement of a nation).

1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right (e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of one’s country).

1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it declared war.

1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34). Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).

1381. Certain sayings of our Lord--for example, that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)--are not an endorsement of extreme pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor. Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals. The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace, but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would be set on iniquity.

1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

1385. What public authority has the right to declare war? (a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power--that is, the person or body in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the nation--can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause for war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. “A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right, charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of war.

1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.

1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are tyrannized over by their government.

1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?

(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or polygamous.

(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades, which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a _casus belli_; for in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

1395. What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however, hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the controversy.

1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory, but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if causes are traced farther back.

1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.--It is clear that those charged with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many--not merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.--It is also clear that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.--Prudence demands that, even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.--Even if the cause is just and the war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means. Hence, pacific means--such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.--should be tried in the first place.

1399. The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.--(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake (such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense. (b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of national policy, indicates progress for this view.

1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral. (b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international law.

1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war, massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.

1404. The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.--(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at those times.

1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.--(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.--(a) It is lawful for clerics to cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

1408. The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.--(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without hastening the decision.

1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.--(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect (see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford, S.J. (_Theological Studies_, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.

1411. The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.--(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel or break faith.

1412. Imprisonment and Restraint.--(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

1413. The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.--(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery? (a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In modern times and according to present international law, looting is strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

1416. Stratagems in War.--(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for concealing one’s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2). (b) It is lawful also to conceal one’s identity by wearing the uniforms of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num., xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.

1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however, without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy citizens who are in one’s power.

1418. Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.--(a) The victorious nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.

1419. The Rights of the Victor.--(a) If the cause of the victorious nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things: (i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him forced agreements.

1420. The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.--(a) If the victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It does not make a bad cause good.

1421. The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, or with a Wrong Purpose.--(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings, robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b) Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.

1422. What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?--(a) According to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay at present.

1423. In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither party is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its ability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of settlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual condonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the war, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission to an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as well as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and productivity.

1424. Guarantees for the Future.--(a) One may insist on such guarantees as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by the conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.

(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the territory taken during war, if one’s rights or reasonable security does not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or securities.

1425. Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during War.--(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The Nurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.

1426. Preparation for Future Wars.--(a) Reasonable preparedness is not only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war. Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.

1427. Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.

(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.

(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments, to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify international law. History bears witness to the many and great services to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray: “From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.”

1428. Fighting.--Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more persons carried on by means of physical violence.

(a) Thus, it is an angry conflict, and so differs from contests of strength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation, health, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches, football games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair play and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here understood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were sports or spectacles, rather than fights.

(b) It is a conflict, and so differs from punishment inflicted by lawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a crime, a parent or teacher chastises insubordinate children, or a sober man scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic to deprive him of a weapon.

(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of a multitude.

(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye) or indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).

1429. Kinds of Fighting.--(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or defending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject, the civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one’s fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.

1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.--(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its nature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate, as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another’s hair or throw snowballs.

(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only to defend one’s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to enter one’s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin, when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was attacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.

1431. Causes of Fighting.--The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him--that is, to injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 sqq.).

1432. Hatred and Fighting.--(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling and fighting as a means to his purpose.

1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.--(a) Boasting about self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take offense occasions fights, for “he that boasteth and puffeth himself up stirreth up quarrels” (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the respective merits of nations or political parties often bring on bloody encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the mind that one minimizes one’s danger and exaggerates one’s own strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).

1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.--(a) Charity is wounded by fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords, scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.

1435. Duelling.--A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private quarrel.

(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the “suicide duel,” in which the contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.

(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter of acceptance precede the fight.

(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings, ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a duel.

(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel, therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of one’s sword, loading one’s revolver with blanks, firing into the air, as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to stab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for, while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.

(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their countries.

1436. The Morality of Duelling.--(a) Generally, the duel is mortally sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one’s own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State. This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one can decline the combat to which one is dared.

(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor. Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a case as happening in normal conditions.

1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.--(a) The amusement of the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is savagery.

(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of the judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in the right.

(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill, cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the substitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an encouragement to crime.

(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs of honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act against the wrong opinions of the multitude?

1438. Penalties against Duelling.--(a) Church law deprives of ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers (Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.

1439. What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to restitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right to restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave compulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs should be compensated.

1440. Sedition.--Sedition is a discord between different factions of the same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the destruction of the unity of the State.

(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.

(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic. Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting (which is between individuals).

(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities, it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome the other.

(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the people against a tyrannical government.

1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord, for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.

1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful. (a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c) Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on the amount of damage that is due to one’s influence or acts.

1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good, whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus, the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of sedition.

Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)

1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to treat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts of charity--beneficence and brotherly correction.

1445. Scandal.--Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense, it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

1446. The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a scandal to the crown. (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

1447. Definition of Scandal.--In the strict sense, scandal is defined as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”

(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is, sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as being such.

(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the wide senses given in the previous paragraph.

(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by scandal.

(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.

1448. Causes of Scandal.--There are various divisions of scandal according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words, as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b) There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements or announcements on one’s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.

1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious, and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b) Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action, although not directly willing the neighbor’s guilt that will result. Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example encourages them to drink.

1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.

1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly, the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur spiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.

1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin--for example, offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor.,