Chapter 84

this subject, as his views are substantially a repetition of Butler's Supremacy of Conscience. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Butler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the command of the Deity, a point peculiarly insisted on by Stewart. His words are these:--

'According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how; it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition We reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

'The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

'But farther, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

'In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong; of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between, these and the general course of human affairs.'

In a chapter (VII.) entitled 'certain principles co-operating with our moral powers,' he discusses (1) a regard to character, (2) Sympathy, (3) the Sense of the Ridiculous, (4) Taste. The important topic is the second, Sympathy; which, psychologically, he would appear to regard as determined by the pleasure that it gives. Under this head he introduces a criticism of the Ethical theory of Adam Smith; and, adverting to the inadequacy of the theory to distinguish the _right_ from the _actual_ judgments of mankind, he remarks on Smith's ingenious fiction 'of _an abstract man_ within the breast;' and states that Smith laid much greater stress on this fiction in the last edition of the Moral Sentiments published before his death. It is not without reason that Stewart warns against grounding theories on metaphorical expressions, such as this of Smith, or the Platonic Commonwealth of the Soul.

In Book IV. of the Active Powers, Stewart discusses our Duties to Men,--both our fellow-creatures and ourselves. Our duties to our fellows are summed up in Benevolence, Justice, and Veracity. He devotes a chapter to each. In Chapter I., on Benevolence, he re-opens the consideration of the Ethical systems founded on Benevolence or Utility, and argues against them; but merely repeats the common-place objections--the incompetency of individuals to judge of remote tendencies, the pretext that would be afforded for the worst conduct, and each one's consciousness that a sense of _duty_ is different from enlightened benevolence.