CHAPTER IX.
THE LIMITS OF MILITARY DUTY.
_‘I confess when I went into arms at the beginning of this war, I never troubled myself to examine sides; I was glad to hear the drums beat for soldiers, as if I had been a mere Swiss, that had not cared which side went up or down, so I had my pay.’_--MEMOIRS OF A CAVALIER.
The old feeling of the moral stain of bloodshed--Military purificatory customs--Modern change of feeling about warfare--Descartes on the profession of arms--The old-world sentiment in favour of piracy--The central question of military ethics--May a soldier be indifferent to the cause of war?--The right to serve made conditional on a good cause, by St. Augustine, Bullinger, Grotius, and Sir James Turner--Old Greek feeling about mercenary service--Origin of our mercenary as opposed to gratuitous service--Armies raised by military contractors--The value of the distinction between foreign and native mercenaries--Original limitation of military duty to the actual defence of the realm--Extension of the notion of allegiance--The connection of the military oath with the first Mutiny Act--Recognised limits to the claims on a soldier’s obedience--The falsity of the common doctrine of duty illustrated by the devastation of the Palatinate by the French and by the bombardment of Copenhagen by the English--The example of Admiral Keppel--Justice between nations--Its observation in ancient India and Rome--St. Augustine and Bayard on justice in war--Grotius on good grounds of war--The military claim to exemption from moral responsibility--The soldier’s first duty to his conscience--The admission of this principle involves the end of war.
It must needs be that new questions arise, or old perplexities in a fresh form; and of these one that has risen again in our time is this: Does any moral stain attach to bloodshed committed upon the battle-field? Or is the difference between military and ordinary homicide a real one, and does the plea of duty sanction any act, however atrocious in the abstract, provided it be committed under the uniform of the State?
The general opinion is, of course, that no soldier in his military capacity can be guilty of crime; but opinion has not always been so fixed, and it is worth noticing that in the forms of civilisation that preceded our own, and in some existing modern races of lower type than our own, traces clearly appear of a sense of wrong attaching to any form of bloodshed whatever, whether of fair battle or of base treachery, calling alike for the purifying influences of expiation and cleansing. In South Africa, for instance, the Basuto returning from war proceeds with all his arms to the nearest stream, to purify not only his own person but his javelins and his battle-axe. The Zulu, too, practises ablutions on the same occasion; and the Bechuana warrior wears a rude kind of necklace, to remind him of the expiation due from him to the slain, and to disperse the dreams that might otherwise trouble him, and perhaps even drive him to die of remorse.[310]
The same feelings may be detected in the old world. The Macedonians had a peculiar form of sacrificatory purification, which consisted in cutting a dog in half and leading the whole army, arrayed in full armour, between the two parts.[311] As the Bœotians had the same custom, it was probably for the same reason. At Rome, for the same purpose, a sheep, and a bull, and a pig or boar, were every year led three times round the army and then sacrificed to Mars. In Jewish history the prohibition to King David to build the temple was expressly connected with the blood he had shed in battle. In old Greek mythology Theseus held himself unfit, without expiation, to be admitted to the mysteries of Ceres, though the blood that stained his hands was only that of thieves and robbers. And in the same spirit Hector refused to make a libation to the gods before he had purified his hands after battle. ‘With unwashen hands,’ he said, ‘to pour out sparkling wine to Zeus I dare not, nor is it ever the custom for one soiled with the blood and dust of battle to offer prayers to the god whose seat is in the clouds.’[312]
For the cause of this feeling we may perhaps choose between an almost instinctive reluctance to take human life, and some such superstition as explains the necessity for purification among the Basutos,--the idea, namely, of escaping the revenge of the slain by the medium of water.[313] The latter explanation would be in keeping with the not uncommon notion in savage life of the inability of a spirit to cross running water, and would help to account for the necessity there was for a Hebrew to flee, or for a Greek to make some expiation, even though only guilty of an act of unintentional homicide. And in this way it is possible that the sanctity of human life, which is one of the chief marks, and should be one of the chief objects, of civilisation, originated in the very same fear of a post-mortem vengeance, which leads some savage tribes to entreat pardon of the bear or elephant they have slain after a successful chase.
But, account as we like for the origin of the feeling, its undoubted existence is the point of interest, for it is easy to see that under slightly more favourable conditions of history it might have ripened into a state of thought which would have held the soldier and the manslayer in equal abhorrence. Christianity in its primitive form certainly aimed at and very nearly effected the transition. In the Greek Church a Christian soldier was debarred from the Eucharist for three years if he had slain an enemy in battle; and the Christian Church of the first three centuries would have echoed the sentiment expressed by St. Cyprian in his letter to Donatus: ‘Homicide when committed by an individual is a crime, but a virtue when committed in a public war; yet in the latter case it derives its impunity, not from its abstract harmlessness, but solely from the scale of its enormity.’
The education of centuries has long since effaced the earlier scruple; but there are tens of thousands of Englishmen to whom the military profession is the last they would voluntarily adopt, and it would be rash to predict the impossibility of the revival of the older feeling, or the dimensions it may ultimately assume. The greatest poet of our time, who more than any other living man has helped to lead European opinion into new channels, may, perhaps, in the following lines have anticipated the verdict of the coming time, and divined an undercurrent of thought that is beginning to flow even now amongst us with no inconsiderable force of feeling:--
La phrase, cette altière et vile courtisane, Dore le meurtre en grand, fourbit la pertuisane, Protège les soudards contre le sens commun, Persuade les niais que tous sont faits pour un, Prouve que la tuerie est glorieuse et bonne, Déroute la logique et l’évidence, et donne Un sauf-conduit au crime à travers la raison.[314]
The destruction of the romance of war by the greater publicity given to its details through the medium of the press clearly tends to strengthen this feeling, by tempering popular admiration for military success with a cooling admixture of horror and disgust. Take, for instance, the following description of the storming of the Egyptian trenches at Tel-el-Kebir, by an eye-witness of it:--‘In the redoubts into which our men were swarming the Egyptians, throwing away their arms, were found cowering, terror-stricken, in the corners of the works, to hide themselves from our men. Although they had made such a contemptible exhibition, from a soldierly point of view, it was impossible to help pitying the poor wretches as they huddled together; _it seemed so much like rats in a pit when the terrier has set to work_.’ And some 2,500 of them were afterwards buried on the spot, most of them killed by bayonet wounds in the back.
This is an instance of the _tuerie_ that Victor Hugo speaks of, which we all call glorious when we meet in the streets, reserving, some of us, another opinion for the secret chamber. Still, when it comes to comparing the work of a victory to that of a terrier in a rat-pit, it must be admitted that the realism of war threatens to become more repellent than its romance was once attractive, and to deter men more and more from the choice of a profession of which similar disgusting scenes are the common and the probable episodes.
Descartes, the father of modern philosophy and of free thought, who, from a youthful love for arms and camp-life, which he attributed to a certain heat of liver, began life in the army, actually gave up his military career for the reasons which he thus expressed in a letter to a friend: ‘Although custom and example render the profession of arms the noblest of all, I, for my own part, who only regard it like a philosopher, value it at its proper worth, and, indeed, I find it very difficult to give it a place among the honourable professions, seeing that idleness and licentiousness are the two principal motives which now attract most men to it.’[315]
Of course no one in modern times would come to the same conclusions as Descartes for the same reasons, the discipline of our armies being somewhat more serious than it was in the first half of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, it is impossible to read of the German campaign in France without hoping, for the good of the world, that the inevitable association of war with the most revolting forms of crime therein displayed, may some day produce a general state of sentiment similar to that anticipated by Descartes.
It may be, said that the example of Descartes proves and indicates nothing; and we may feel pretty sure that his scruples seemed extravagantly absurd to his contemporaries, if he suffered them to know them. Nevertheless, he might have appealed to several well-known historical facts as a reason against too hasty a condemnation of his apparent super-sensitiveness. He might have argued that the profession of a pirate once reflected no more moral discredit than that of a soldier did in his days; that the pirate’s reply to Alexander, that he infested the seas by the same right wherewith the conqueror devastated the land, conveyed a moral sentiment once generally accepted, nor even then quite extinct; that in the days of Homer it was as natural to ask a seafarer whether he were a freebooter as whether he were a merchant; that so late in Greek history as the time of Thucydides, several tribes on the mainland of Greece still gloried in piracy, and accounted their plunder honourably won; and that at Rome the Cilician pirates, whom it devolved on Pompey to disperse, were joined by persons of wealth, birth, and education, ‘as if,’ says Plutarch, ‘their employment were worthy of the ambition of men of honour.’
Remembering, therefore, these things, and the fact that not so very many centuries ago public opinion was so lenient to the practice of bishops and ecclesiastics taking an active part in warfare that they commonly did so in spite of canons and councils to the contrary, it is a fair subject for speculation whether the moral opinion of the future may not come to coincide with the feeling of Descartes, and it behoves us to keep our minds alive to possibilities of change in this matter, already it would seem in process of formation. Who will venture to predict what may be the effect of the rise of the general level of education, and of the higher moral life of our time, on the popular judgment of even fifty years hence regarding a voluntarily adopted military life?
We may, perhaps, attribute it to the extreme position taken up with regard to military service by the Quakers and Mennonites that the example of Descartes had so slight a following. That thick phalanx of our kind who fondly mistake their own mental timidity for moderation, perpetually make use of the doctrines of extremists as an excuse for tolerating or even defending what in the abstract they admit to be evil; and it was unfortunately with this moderate party that Grotius elected to throw in his lot. No one admitted more strongly the evils of war. The reason he himself gave for writing his ‘De Jure Pacis et Belli’ was the licence he saw prevailing throughout Christendom in resorting to hostilities; recourse had to arms for slight motives or for none; and when war was once begun an utter rejection of all reverence for divine or human law, just as if the unrestrained commission of every crime became thenceforth legitimate. Yet, instead of throwing the weight of his judgment into the scale of opinion which opposed the custom altogether (though he did advocate an international tribunal that should decide differences and compel obedience to its decisions), he only tried to shackle it with rules of decency that are absolutely foreign to it, with the result, after all, that he did very little to humanise wars, and nothing to make them less frequent.
Nevertheless, though Grotius admitted the abstract lawfulness of military service, he made it conditional on a thorough conviction of the righteousness of the cause at issue. This is the great and permanent merit of his work, and it is here that we touch on the pivot or central question of military ethics. The orthodox theory is, that with the cause of war a soldier has no concern, and that since the matter in contention is always too complicated for him to judge of its merits, his only duty is to blindfold his reason and conscience, and rush whithersoever his services are commanded. Perhaps the best exposition of this simple military philosophy is that given by Shakespeare in his scene of the eve of Agincourt, where Henry V., in disguise, converses with some soldiers of the English army. ‘Methinks,’ says the king, ‘I could not die anywhere so contented as in the king’s company, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable.’
_William._ ‘That’s more than we know.’
_Bates._ ‘Ay, or more than we should seek after, for we know enough if we know we are the king’s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.’
Yet the whisper of our own day is, Does it? For a soldier, nowadays, enjoys equally with the civilian, who by his vote contributes to prevent or promote hostilities, the greater facilities afforded by the spread of knowledge for the exercise of his judgment; and it is to subject him to undeserved ignominy to debar him from the free use of his intellect, as if he were a minor or an imbecile, incompetent to think for himself. Putting even the difficulty of decision at its worst, it can never be greater for the soldier than it is for the voter; and if the former is incompetent to form an opinion, whence does the peasant or mechanic derive his ability? Moreover, the existence of a just and good cause has always been the condition insisted on as alone capable of sanctioning military service by writers of every shade of thought--by St. Augustine as representing the early Catholic Church, by Bullinger or Becon as representatives of the early Reformed Church, and by Grotius as representative of the modern school of publicists. Grotius contends that no citizen or subject ought to take part in an unjust war, even if he be commanded to do so. He openly maintains that disobedience to orders is in such a case a lesser evil than the guilt of homicide that would be incurred by fighting. He inclines to the opinion that, where the cause of war seems doubtful, a man would do better to refrain from service, and to leave the king to employ those whose readiness to fight might be less hampered by questions of right and wrong, and of whom there would always be a plentiful supply. Without these reservations he regards the soldier’s task as so much the more detestable than the executioner’s, as manslaughter without a cause is more heinous than manslaughter with one,[316] and thinks no kind of life more wicked than that of men who, without regard for the cause of war, fight for hire, and to whom the question of right is equivalent to the question of the highest wage.[317]
These are strong opinions and expressions, and as their general acceptance would logically render war impossible, it is no small gain to have in their favour so great an authority as Grotius. But it is an even greater gain to be able to quote on the same side an actual soldier. Sir James Turner at the end of his military treatise called ‘Pallas Armata,’ published in 1683, came to conclusions which, though adverse to Grotius, contain some remarkable admissions and show the difference that two centuries have made on military maxims with regard to this subject. ‘It is no sin for a mere soldier,’ he says, ‘to serve for wages, unless his conscience tells him he fights in an unjust cause.’ Again, ‘That soldier who serves or fights for any prince or State for wages in a cause he knows to be unjust, sins damnably.’ He even argues that soldiers whose original service began for a just cause, and who are constrained by their military oaths to continue in service for a new and unjust cause of war, ought to ‘desert their employment and suffer anything that could be done to them before they draw their swords against their own conscience and judgments in an unjust quarrel.’[318]
These moral sentiments of a military man of the seventeenth century are absolutely alien to the military doctrines of the present day; and his remarks on wages recall yet another important landmark of ancient thought that has been removed by the progress of time. Early Greek opinion justly made no distinction between the mercenary who served a foreign country and the mercenary who served his own. All hired military service was regarded as disgraceful, nor would anyone of good birth have dreamt of serving his own country save at his own expense. The Carians rendered their names infamous as the first of the Greek race who served for pay; whilst at Athens Pericles introduced the custom of supporting the poorer defenders of their country out of the exchequer.[319] Afterwards, of course, no people ever committed itself more eagerly to the pursuit of mercenary warfare.
In England also gratuitous military service was originally the condition of the feudal tenure of land, nor was anyone bound to serve the king for more than a certain number of days in the year, forty being generally the longest term. For all service in excess of the legal limit the king was obliged to pay; and in this way, and by the scutage tax, by which many tenants bought themselves off from their strict obligations, the principle of a paid military force was recognised from the time of the Conquest. But the chief stipendiary forces appear to have been foreign mercenaries, supported, not out of the commutation tax, but out of the king’s privy purse, and still more out of the loot won from their victims in war. These were those soldiers of fortune, chiefly from Flanders, Brabançons, or Routers, whose excesses as brigands led to their excommunication by the Third Lateran Council (1179), and to their destruction by a crusade three years later.[320]
But the germ of our modern recruiting system must rather be looked for in those military contracts or indentures, by which from about the time of Edward III. it became customary to raise our forces: some powerful subject contracting with the king, in consideration of a certain sum, to provide soldiers for a certain time and task. Thus in 1382 the war-loving Bishop of Norwich contracted with Richard II. to provide 2,500 men-at-arms and 2,500 archers for a year’s service in France, in consideration of the whole fifteenth that had been voted by Parliament for the war.[321] In the same way several bishops indented to raise soldiers for Henry V. And thus a foreign war became a mere matter of business and hire, and armies to fight the French were raised by speculative contractors, very much as men are raised nowadays to make railways or take part in other works needful for the public at large. The engagement was purely pecuniary and commercial, and was entirely divested of any connection with conscience or patriotism. On the other hand, the most obviously just cause of war, that of national defence in case of invasion, continued to be altogether disconnected with pay, and remained so much the duty of the militia or capable male population of the country, that both Edward III. and Richard II. directed writs even to archbishops and bishops to arm and array all abbots, priors, and monks, between the ages of sixteen and sixty, for the defence of the kingdom.[322]
Originally, therefore, the paid army of England, as opposed to the militia, implied the introduction of a strictly mercenary force consisting indifferently of natives or foreigners, into our military system. But clearly there was no moral difference between the two classes of mercenaries so engaged. The hire, and not the cause, being the main consideration of both, the Englishman and the Brabançon were equally mercenaries in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The prejudice against mercenaries either goes too far or not far enough. If a Swiss or an Italian hiring himself to fight for a cause about which he was ignorant or indifferent was a mercenary soldier, so was an Englishman who with equal ignorance and indifference accepted the wages offered him by a military contractor of his own nation. Either the conduct of the Swiss was blameless, or the Englishman’s moral delinquency was the same as his.
The public opinion of former times regarded both, of course, as equally blameless, or rather as equally meritorious. And it is worth noticing that the word _mercenary_ was applied alike to the hired military servant of his own as of another country. Shakespeare, for instance, applies the term mercenary to the 1,600 Frenchmen of low degree slain at Agincourt, whom Monstrelet distinguishes from the 10,000 Frenchmen of position who lost their lives on that memorable day--
In this ten thousand they have lost, There are but sixteen hundred mercenaries.
And even so late as 1756, the original signification of the word had so little changed, that in the great debate in the House of Lords on the Militia Bill of that year Lord Temple and several other orators spoke of the national standing army as an army of _mercenaries_, without making any distinction between the Englishmen and the Hessians who served in it.[323]
The moral distinction that now prevails between the paid service of natives and of foreigners is, therefore, of comparatively recent origin. It was one of the features of the Reformation in Switzerland that its leaders insisted for the first time on a moral difference between Swiss soldiers who served their own country for pay, and those who with equal bravery and credit sold their strength to the service of the highest foreign bidder.
Zwingli, and after him his disciple Bullinger, effected a change in the moral sentiment of Switzerland equivalent to that which a man would effect nowadays who should persuade men to discountenance or abandon military service of any kind for pay. One of the great obstacles to Zwingli’s success was his decided protest against the right of any Swiss to sell himself to foreign governments for the commission of bloodshed, regardless of any injury in justification; and it was mainly on that account that Bullinger succeeded in 1549 in preventing a renewal of the alliance or military contract between the cantons and Henry II. of France. ‘When a private individual,’ he said, ‘is free to enrol himself or not, and engages himself to fight against the friends and allies of his sovereign, I know not whether he does not hire himself to commit homicide, and whether he does not act like the gladiators, who, to amuse the Roman people, let themselves to the first comer to kill one another.’
But it is evident that, except with a reservation limiting a man’s service to a just national cause, Bullinger’s argument will also apply to the case of a hired soldier of his own country. The duty of every man to defend his country in case of invasion is intelligible enough; and it is very important to notice that originally in no country did the duty of military obedience mean more. In 1297 the High Constable and Marshal of England refused to muster the forces to serve Edward I. in Flanders, on the plea that neither they nor their ancestors were obliged to serve the king outside his dominions;[324] and Sir E. Coke’s ruling in Calvin’s case,[325] that Englishmen are bound to attend the king in his wars as well without as within the realm, and that their allegiance is not local but indefinite, was not accepted by writers on the constitution of the country. The existing militia oath, which strictly limits obedience to the defence of the realm, covered the whole military duty of our ancestors; and it was only the innovation of the military contract that prepared the way for our modern idea of the soldier’s duty as unqualified and unlimited with regard to cause and place and time. The very word _soldier_ meant originally stipendiary, his pay or _solde_ (from the Latin _solidum_) coming to constitute his chief characteristic. From a servant hired for a certain task for a certain time the steps were easy to a servant whose hire bound him to any task and for the whole of his life. The existing military oath, which binds a recruit and practically compels him as much to a war of aggression as of defence at the bidding of the executive, owes its origin to the revolution of 1689, when the refusal of Dumbarton’s famous Scotch regiment to serve their new master, William III., in the defence of Holland against France, rendered it advisable to pass the Mutiny Act, containing a more stringent definition of military duty by an oath couched in extremely general terms. Such has been the effect of time in confirming this newer doctrine of the contract implied by the military status, that the defence of the monarch ‘in person, crown, and dignity against all enemies,’ to which the modern recruit pledges himself at his attestation, would be held to bind the soldier not to withhold his services were he called upon to exercise them in the planet Mars itself.
Hence it appears to be an indisputable fact of history that the modern military theory of Europe, which demands complete spiritual self-abandonment and unqualified obedience on the part of a soldier, is a distinct trespass outside the bounds of the original and, so to speak, constitutional idea of military duty; and that in our own country it is as much an encroachment on the rights of Englishmen as it is on the wider rights of man.
But what is the value of the theory itself, even if we take no account of the history of its growth? If military service precludes a man from discussing the justice of the end pursued in a war, it can hardly be disputed that it equally precludes him from inquiries about the means, and that if he is bound to consider himself as fighting in any case for a lawful cause he has no right to bring his moral sense to bear upon the details of the service required of him. But here occurs a loophole, a flaw, in the argument; for no subject nor soldier can be compelled to serve as a spy, however needful such service may be. That proves that a limit does exist to the claims on a soldier’s obedience. And Vattel mentions as a common occurrence the refusal of troops to act when the cruelty of the deeds commanded of them exposed them to the danger of savage reprisals. ‘Officers,’ he says, ‘who had the highest sense of honour, though ready to shed their blood in a field of battle for their prince’s service, have not thought it any part of their duty to run the hazard of an ignominious death,’ such as was involved in the execution of such behests. Yet why not, if their prince or general commanded them? By what principle of morality or common sense were they justified in declining a particular service as too iniquitous for them and yet in holding themselves bound to the larger iniquity of an aggressive war? What right has a machine to choose or decide between good and bad any more than between just and unjust? Its moral incompetence must be thoroughgoing, or else in no case afford an extenuating plea. You must either grant it everything or nothing, or else offer a rational explanation for your rule of distinction. For it clearly needs explaining, why, if there are orders which a soldier is not bound to obey, if there are cases where he is competent to discuss the moral nature of the services required of him, it should not also be open to him to discuss the justice of the war itself of which those services are merely incidents.
Let us turn from the abstract to the concrete, and take two instances as a test of the principle. In 1689, Marshal Duras, commander of the French army of the Rhine, received orders to destroy the Palatinate, and make a desert between France and Germany, though neither the Elector nor his people had done the least injury to France. Did a single soldier, did a single officer quail or hesitate? Voltaire tells us that many officers felt shame in acting as the instrument of this iniquity of Louis XIV., but they acted nevertheless in accordance with their supposed honour, and with the still orthodox theory of military duty. They stopped short at no atrocity. They cut down the fruit-trees, they tore down the vines, they burnt the granaries; they set fire to villages, to country-houses, to castles; they desecrated the tombs of the ancient German emperors at Spiers; they plundered the churches; they reduced well-nigh to ashes Oppenheim, Spiers, Worms, Mannheim, Heidelberg, and other flourishing cities; they reduced 400,000 human beings to homelessness and destruction--and all in the name of military duty and military honour! Yet, of a truth, those were dastardly deeds if ever dastardly deeds have been done beneath the sun; and it is the sheerest sophistry to maintain that the men who so implicitly carried out their orders would not have done more for their miserable honour, would not have had a higher conception of duty, had they followed the dictates of their reason and conscience rather than those of their military superiors, and refused to sacrifice their humanity to an overstrained theory of their military obligation, and their memory to everlasting execration.
In the case of these destroyers military duty meant simply military servility, and it was this reckless servility that led Voltaire in his ‘Candide’ to put into the mouth of his inimitable philosopher, Martin, that definition of an army which tales like the foregoing suggested and justified: ‘A million of assassins, in regiments, traversing Europe from end to end, and committing murder and brigandage by rules of discipline for the sake of bread, because incompetent to exercise any more honest calling.’[326]
An English case of this century may be taken as a parallel one to the French of the seventeenth, and as an additional test of the orthodox military dogma that with the cause of war a soldier has no concern. It is the Copenhagen expedition of 1807, than which no act of might within this century was more strongly reprobated by the public opinion of Europe, and by all but the Tory opinion of England. A fleet and army having been sent to the Danish capital, and the Danish Government having refused to surrender their fleet, which was demanded as the alternative of bombardment, the English military officials proceeded to bombard the city, with infinite destruction and slaughter, which were only stayed at last by the surrender of the fleet as originally demanded. There was no quarrel with Denmark at the time, there was no complaint of injury; only the surrender of the fleet was demanded. English public opinion was both excited and divided about the morality of this act, which was only justified on the plea that the Government was in possession of a secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit between Napoleon and the Czar of Russia, by which the Danish fleet was to be made use of in an attack upon England. But this secret article was not divulged, according to Alison, till ten years afterwards,[327] and many disbelieved in its existence altogether, even supposing that its existence would have been a good case for war. Many military men therefore shared in the feeling that condemned the act, yet they scrupled not to contribute their aid to it. Were they right? Read Sir C. Napier’s opinion of it at the time, and then say where, in the case of a man so thinking, would have lain his duty: ‘This Copenhagen expedition--is it an unjust action for the general good? Who can say that such a precedent is pardonable? When once the line of justice has been passed, there is no shame left. England has been unjust.... Was not our high honour worth the danger we might perhaps have risked in maintaining that honour inviolate?’[328]
These opinions, whether right or wrong, were shared by many men in both services. Sir C. Napier himself says: ‘Were there not plenty of soldiers who thought these things wrong? ... but would it have been possible to allow the army and navy ... to decide upon the propriety of such attacks?’[329] The answer is, that if they did, whether allowed or not, such things would be impossible, or, at all events, less probable: which is the best reason possible for the contention that they should. Had they done so in this very instance, our historians would have been spared the explanation of an episode that is a dark blot upon our annals.
A more pleasing precedent, therefore, than that of the French officers in the Palatinate, or of the English at Copenhagen, is the case of Admiral Keppel, who, whilst numbers of naval officers flocked to the Admiralty to offer their services or to request employment, steadily declined to take part in the war of England against her American colonies, because he deemed her cause a bad one.[330] He did no violence to his reason or conscience nor tarnished his fame by acting a part, of which in his individual capacity he disapproved. His example is here held up as illustrating the only true doctrine, and the only one that at all accords with the most rudimentary principles of either religion or morality. The contrary doctrine bids a man to forswear the use of both his reason and his conscience in consideration for his pay, and deprives him of that liberty of thought and moral action compared with which his civil and political liberty are nothing worth. For what indeed is this contrary time-honoured doctrine when stripped of all superfluities, and displayed in the outfit of common sense and common words? What is it but that the duty of military obedience overrides all duty of a man towards himself; that, though he may not voluntarily destroy his body, he cannot do too much violence to his soul; that it is his duty to annihilate his moral and intellectual being, to commit spiritual suicide, to forego the use of the noblest faculties which belong to him as a man; that to do all this is a just cause of pride to him, and that he is in all respects the nobler and better for assimilating himself to that brainless and heartless condition which is that also of his charger or his rifle?
If this doctrine is true and sound, then it may be asked whether there has ever been or exists upon the earth any tyranny, ecclesiastical or political, comparable to this military one; whether any but the baser forms of priestcraft have ever sought to deprive a man so completely of the enjoyment of his highest human attributes, or to absolve him so utterly from all moral responsibility for his actions.
This position can scarcely be disputed, save by denying the reality of any distinction between just and unjust in international conduct; and against this denial may be set not only the evidence of every age, but of every language above the stage of mere barbarism. Disregard of the difference is one of the best measures of the civilisation of a people or epoch. We at once, for instance, form a higher estimate of the civilisation of ancient India, when we read in Arrian that her kings were so apprehensive of committing an unjust aggression that they would not lead their armies out of India for the conquest of other nations.[331] One of the best features in the old pagan world was the importance attached to the justice of the motives for breaking the peace. The Romans appear never to have begun a war without a previous consultation with the College of Fecials as to its justice; and in the same way, and for the same purpose, the early Christian emperors consulted the opinion of the bishops. If a Roman general made an unjust attack upon a people his triumph was refused, or at least resisted; nor are the instances infrequent in which the senate decreed restitution where a consul, acting on his own responsibility, had deprived a population of its arms, its lands, or its liberties.[332] Hence the Romans, with all their apparent aggressiveness, won the character of a strict regard to justice, which was no small part of the secret of their power. ‘You boast,’ the Rhodians said to them, ‘that your wars are successful because they are just, and plume yourselves not so much on the victory which concludes them as on the fact that you never begin them without good cause.’[333] Conquest corrupted the Romans in these respects as it has done many another people; but even to the end of the Republic the tradition of justice survived; nor is there anything finer in the history of that people than the attempt of the party headed by Ateius the tribune to prevent Crassus leaving Rome when he was setting out to make war upon the Parthians, who not only had committed no injury, but were the allies of the Republic; or than the vote of Cato, that Cæsar, who, in time of peace, had slain or routed 300,000 Germans, should be given up to the people he had injured in atonement for the wrong he had done to them.
The idea of the importance of a just cause of war may be traced, of course, in history, after the extinction of the grand pagan philosophy in which it had its origin. It was insisted on even by Christian writers who, like St. Augustine, did not regard all military service as wicked. What, he asked, were kingdoms but robberies on a vast scale, if their justice were put out of the reckoning.[334] A French writer of the time of Charles V. concluded that while soldiers who fell in a just cause were saved, those who died for an unjust cause perished in a state of mortal sin.[335] Even the Chevalier Bayard, who accompanied Charles VIII. without any scruple in his conquest of Naples, was fond of saying that all empires, kingdoms, and provinces were, if without the principle of justice, no better than forests full of brigands;[336] and the fine saying is attributed to him, that the strength of arms should only be employed for the establishment of right and equity. But on the whole the justice of the cause of war became of less and less importance as time went on; nor have our modern Christian societies ever derived benefit in that respect from the instruction or guidance of their churches at all equal to that which the society of pagan Rome derived from the institution of its Fecials, as the guardians of the national conscience.
It was among the humane endeavours of Grotius to try to remedy this defect in modern States by establishing certain general principles by which it might be possible to test the pretext of any given war from the side of its justice. At first sight it appears obvious that a definite injury is the only justification for a resort to hostilities, or, in other words, that only a defensive war is just; but then the question arises how far defence may be anticipatory, and an injury feared or probable give the same rights as one actually sustained. The majority of wars, that have not been merely wars of conquest and robbery, may be traced to that principle in history, so well expressed by Livy, that men’s anxiety not to be afraid of others causes them to become objects of dread themselves.[337] For this reason Grotius refused to admit as a good _casus belli_ the fact that another nation was making warlike preparations, building garrisons and fortresses, or that its power might, if unchecked, grow to be dangerous. He also rejected the pretext of mere utility as a good ground for war, or such pleas as the need of better territory, the right of first discovery, or the improvement or punishment of barbarous nations.
A strict adherence to these principles, vague as they are, would have prevented most of the bloodshed that has occurred in Europe since Grotius wrote. The difficulty, however, is, that, as between nations, the principle of utility easily overshadows that of justice; and although the two are related as the temporary to the permanent expediency, and therefore as the lesser to the greater expediency, the relation between them is seldom obvious at the time of choice, and it is easy beforehand to demonstrate the expediency of a war of which time alone can show both the inexpediency and the injustice. Any war, therefore, however unjust it may seem, when judged by the canons of Grotius, is easily construed as just when measured by the light of an imperious and magnified passing interest; and the absence of any recognised definition or standard of just dealing between nations affords a salve to many a conscience that in the matters of private life would be sensitive and scrupulous enough. The story of King Agesilaus is a mirror in which very few ages or countries may not see their own history reflected. When Phœbidas, the Spartan general, seized the Cadmeia of Thebes in the time of peace, the greater part of Greece and many Spartans condemned it as a most iniquitous act of war; but Agesilaus, who at other times was wont to talk of justice as the greatest of all the virtues, and of valour without it as of little worth, defended his officer’s action, on the plea that it was necessary to regard the tendency of the action, and to account it even as glorious if it resulted in an advantage to Sparta.
But when every allowance is made for wars of which the justice is not clearly defined from the expediency, many wars have occurred of so palpably unjust a character, that they could not have been possible but for the existence of the loosest sentiments with regard to the responsibility of those who took part in them. We read of wars or the pretexts of wars in history of which we all, whether military men or civilians, readily recognise the injustice; and by applying the same principles of judgment to the wars of our own country and time we are each and all of us furnished for the direction of our conscience with a standard which, if not absolutely scientific or consistent, is sufficient for all the practical purposes of life, and is completely subversive of the excuse which is afforded by occasional instances of difficult and doubtful decision. The same facilities which exist for the civilian when he votes for or against taxation for a given war, or in approval or disapproval of the government which undertakes it, exist also for the soldier who lends his active aid to it; nor is it unreasonable to claim for the action of the one the same responsibility to his own conscience which by general admission attaches to the other.
It is surely something like a degradation to the soldier that he should not enjoy in this respect the same rights as the civilian; that his merit alone should be tested by no higher a theory of duty than that which is applied to the merit of a horse; and that his capacity for blind and unreasoning obedience should be accounted his highest attainable virtue. The transition from the idea of military vassalage to that of military allegiance has surely produced a strange conception of honour, and one fitter for conscripts than for free men, when a man is held as by a vice to take part in a course of action which he believes to be wrong. Not only does no other profession enforce such an obligation, but in every other walk of life a man’s assertion of his own personal responsibility is a source rather of credit to him than of infamy. That in the performance of any social function a man should be called upon to make an unconditional surrender of his free will, and yield an obedience as thoughtless as a dummy’s to superior orders, would seem to be a principle of conduct pilfered from the Society of Jesus, and utterly unworthy of the nobility of a soldier. As a matter of history, the priestly organisation took the military one for its model: which should lead us to suspect that the tyranny we find fault with in the copy is equally present in the original, and that the latter is marked by the same vices that it transmitted to the borrowed organisation.
The principle here contended for, that the soldier should be fully satisfied in his own mind of the justice of the cause he fights for, is the condition that Christian writers, from Augustine to Grotius, have placed on the lawfulness of military service. The objection to it, that its adoption would mean the ruin of military discipline, will appear the greatest argument of all in its favour when we reflect that its universal adoption would make war itself, which is the only reason for discipline, altogether impossible. Where would have been the wars of the last two hundred years had it been in force? Or where the English wars of the last six, with their thousands of lives and their millions of money spent for no visible good nor glory in fighting with Afghans, Zulus, Egyptians, and Arabs? Once restrict legitimate warfare to the limits of national defence, and it is evident that the refusal of men to take part in a war of aggression would equally put an end to the necessity of defensive exertion. If no government could rely on its subjects for the purposes of aggression and injustice, it goes without saying that the just cause of war would perish simultaneously. It is therefore altogether to be wished that that reliance should be weakened and destroyed.
The reasoning, then, which contains the key that is alone capable of closing permanently the portals of Janus is this: that there exists a distinction between a just and an unjust war, between a good and a bad cause, and that no man has a right either to take part knowingly and wilfully in a cause he believes to be unjust, nor to commit himself servilely to a theory of duty which deprives him, at the very outset, of his inalienable human birthright of free thought and free will. This is the principle of personal responsibility which has long since won admission everywhere save in the service of Mars, and which requires but to be extended there to free the world from the custom that has longest and most ruinously afflicted it. For it attacks that custom where it has never yet been seriously attacked before, at its real source--namely, in the heart, the brain, and the conscience, that, in spite of all warping and training, still belong to the individual units who alone make it possible. It behoves all of us, therefore, who are interested in abolishing military barbarism, not merely to yield a passive assent to it ourselves, but to claim for it assent and assertion from others. We must ask and reask the question: What is the title by which a man, through the mere fact of his military cloth, claims exemption from the moral law that is universally binding upon his fellows?
For this principle of individual military responsibility is of such power, that if carried to its consequences, it must ultimately prove fatal to militarism; and if it has not yet the prescription of time and common opinion in its favour, it is sealed nevertheless with the authority of many of the best intellects that have helped to enlighten the past, and is indissolubly contained in the teaching alike of our religious as of our moral code. It can, in fact, only be gainsaid by a denial of the fundamental maxims of those two guides of our conduct, and for that reason stands absolutely proof against the assaults of argument. Try to reconcile with the ordinary conceptions of the duties of a man or a Christian the duty of doing what his conscience condemns, and it may be safely predicted that you will try in vain. The considerations that may occur of utility and expediency beat in vain against the far greater expediency of a world at peace, freed from the curse of the warrior’s destructiveness; nor can the whole armoury of military logic supply a single counter-argument which does not resolve itself into an argument of supposed expediency, and which may not therefore be effectually parried, even on this narrower debating ground, by the consideration of the overwhelming advantages which could not but flow from the universal acceptance of the contrary and higher principle--the principle that for a soldier, as for anyone else, his first duty is to his conscience.
Or, to put the conclusion in the fewest words: The soldier claims to be a non-moral agent. That is the corner-stone of the whole military system. Challenge then the claimant to justify his first principle, and the custom of war will shake to its foundation, and in time go the way that other evil customs have gone before it, when once their moral support has been undermined or shattered.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Halleck’s _International Law_, ii. 21. Yet within three weeks of the beginning of the war with France 60,000 Prussians were _hors de combat_.
[2] ‘Artem illam _mortiferam et Deo odibilem_ balistrariorum et sagittariorum adversus Christianos et Catholicos exerceri de cætero sub anathemate prohibemus.’
[3] Fauchet’s _Origines des Chevaliers_, &c. &c., ii. 56; Grose’s _Military Antiquities_, i. 142; and Demmin’s _Encyclopédie d’Armurerie_, 57, 496.
[4] Fauchet, ii. 57. ‘Lequel engin, pour le mal qu’il faisait (pire que le venin des serpens), fut nommé serpentine,’ &c.
[5] Grose, ii. 331.
[6] Dyer, _Modern Europe_, iii. 158.
[7] Scoffern’s _Projectile Weapons_, &c., 66.
[8] _Sur l’Esprit_, i. 562.
[9] Reade, _Ashantee Campaign_, 52.
[10] Livy, xliv. 42.
[11] These Instructions are published in Halleck’s _International Law_, ii. 36-51; and at the end of Edwards’s _Germans in France_.
[12] ‘It would have been desirable,’ said the Russian Government, ‘that the voice of a great nation like England should have been heard at an inquiry of which the object would appear to have met with its sympathies.’
[13] _Jus Gentium_, art. 887, 878.
[14] Florus, ii. 20.
[15] Edwards’s _Germans in France_, 164.
[16] This remarkable fact is certified by Mr. Russell, in his _Diary in the last Great War_, 398, 399.
[17] Cicero, _In Verrem_, iv. 54.
[18] See even the _Annual Register_, lvi. 184, for a denunciation of this proceeding.
[19] Sismondi’s _Hist. des Français_, xxv.
[20] Edwards’s _Germans in France_, 171.
[21] Lieut-Col. Charras, _La Campagne de 1815_, i. 211, ii. 88.
[22] Woolsey’s _International Law_, p. 223.
[23] Cf. lib. xii. 81, and xiii. 25, 26; quoted by Grotius, iii. xi. xiii.
[24] iii. 41.
[25] _Cambridge Essays_, 1855, ‘Limitations to Severity in War,’ by C. Buxton.
[26] See Raumer’s _Geschichte Europa’s_, iii. 509-603, if any doubt is felt about the fact.
[27] General Order of October 9, 1813. Compare those of May 29, 1809, March 25, 1810, June 10, 1812, and July 9, 1813.
[28] Vattel, iii. ix. 165.
[29] Sir W. Napier (_Peninsular War_, ii. 322) says of the proceeding that it was ‘politic indeed, yet scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilised warfare.’ It occurred in May 1810.
[30] Bluntschli’s _Modernes Völkerrecht_, art. 573.
[31] For the character of modern war see the account of the Franco-German war in the _Quarterly Review_ for April 1871.
[32] Halleck, ii. 22.
[33] Vehse’s _Austria_, i. 369. Yet, as usual on such occasions, the excesses were committed in the teeth of Tilly’s efforts to oppose them.
‘Imperavit Tillius a devictorum cædibus et corporum castimonia abstinerent, quod imperium a quibusdam furentibus male servatum annales aliqui fuere conquesti.’--Adlzreiter’s _Annales Boicæ Gentis_, Part iii. l. 16, c. 38.
[34] _Battles in the Peninsular War_, 181, 182.
[35] _Ibid._ 396.
[36] Foxe’s _Actes and Monuments_, iii. 52.
[37] Saint-Palaye, _Mémoires sur la Chevalerie_, iii. 10, 133.
[38] Vinsauf’s _Itinerary of Richard I._, ii. 16.
[39] Matthew of Westminster, 460; Grose, ii. 348.
[40] Monstrelet, ii. 115.
[41] _Mémoires sur la Chevalerie_, i. 322.
[42] Petitot, v. 102; and Ménard, _Vie de B. du Guesclin_, 440.
[43] Petitot, v. 134.
[44] Meyrick, _Ancient Armour_, ii. 5.
[45] i. 123.
[46] Monstrelet, i. 259.
[47] ii. 5.
[48] ii. 11.
[49] ii. 22, compare ii. 56.
[50] Monstrelet, ii. 111.
[51] ii. 113.
[52] See for some, Livy, xxix. 8, xxxi. 26, 30, xxxvii. 21, xliii. 7, xliv. 29.
[53] Livy, xliv. 29.
[54] Meyrick, i. 41.
[55] Demmin, _Encyclopédie d’Armurerie_, 490.
[56] Meyrick, ii. 204.
[57] Grose, ii. 114.
[58] Petitot, xvi. 134.
[59] Grose, ii. 343.
[60] iv. 27.
[61] iv. 36.
[62] iii. 109.
[63] _Mémoires_, vi. 1.
[64] Halleck, _International Law_, ii. 154.
[65] _Elements of Morality_, sec. 1068.
[66] _Des Droits et Devoirs des Nations neutres_, ii. 321-323.
[67] _History of the Royal Navy_, i. 357.
[68] Nicolas, ii. 341.
[69] Nicolas, ii. 405.
[70] Monstrelet, i. 12.
[71] Nicolas, ii. 108.
[72] _Ibid._ i. 333.
[73] Froissart, ii. 85.
[74] Entick, _New Naval History_ (1757), 823. ‘Some of the Spanish prizes were immensely rich, a great many of the French were of considerable value, and so were many of the English; but the balance was about two millions in favour of the latter.’
[75] From Entick’s _New Naval History_ (1757), 801-817.
[76] Martens, _Essai sur les Corsaires_ (Horne’s translation), 86, 87.
[77] _Ibid._ 93.
[78] III. xv. 229.
[79] Emerigon, _On Insurances_ (translation), 442.
[80] Martens, 19.
[81] Hautfeuille, _Des Droits et Devoirs des Nations neutres_, ii. 349.
[82] _De Jure Maritimo_, i. 72.
[83] _Despatches_, vi. 145.
[84] _Despatches_, vi. 79.
[85] The last occasion was on April 13, 1875.
[86] Halleck, _International Law_, ii. 316.
[87] Bluntschli, _Modernes Völkerrecht_, art. 665.
[88] James, _Naval History_, i. 255.
[89] James, ii. 71.
[90] _Ibid._ ii. 77.
[91] Ortolan, _Diplomatie de la Mer_, ii. 32.
[92] Campbell’s _Admirals_, viii. 40.
[93] _Campbell_, vii. 21. _James_, i. 161. Stinkpots are jars or shells charged with powder, grenades, &c.
[94] James, i. 283.
[95] Brenton, ii. 471.
[96] Caltrops, or crows’-feet, are bits of iron with four spikes so arranged that however they fall one spike always remains upwards. Darius planted the ground with caltrops before Arbela.
[97] Chapter xix. of the _Tactica_.
[98] Frontinus, _Strategematicon_, IV. vii. 9, 10. ‘Amphoras pice et tæda plenas; ... vascula viperis plena.’
[99] Roger de Wendover, _Chronica_. ‘Calcem vivam, et in pulverem subtilem redactam, in altum projicientes, vento illam ferente, Francorum oculos excæcaverunt.’
[100] Brenton, i. 635.
[101] _De Jure Maritimo_, i. 265.
[102] Rees’s _Cyclopædia_, ‘Fire-ship.’
[103] Brenton, ii. 493, 494.
[104] Halleck, ii. 317.
[105] Woolsey, _International Law_, 187.
[106] James, i. 277.
[107] Phillimore, _International Law_, iii. 50-52.
[108] _International Law_, ii. 95.
[109] Villiaumé, _L’Esprit de la Guerre_, 56.
[110] De Commines, viii. 8.
[111] Watson’s _Philip II._, ii. 74.
[112] _Ibid._ i. 213.
[113] _Memoirs_, c. 19.
[114] Villiaumé (_L’Esprit de la Guerre_, 71) gives the following version: ‘En 1793 et en 1794, le gouvernement anglais ayant violé le droit des gens contre la République Française, la Convention, dans un accès de brutale colère, décréta qu’il ne serait plus fait aucun prisonnier anglais ou hanovrien, c’est-à-dire que les vaincus seraient mis à mort, encore qu’ils se rendissent. Mais ce décret fut simplement comminatoire; le Comité de Salut Public, sachant très-bien que de misérables soldats n’étaient point coupables, donna l’ordre secret de faire grâce à tous les vaincus.’
[115] Herodotus, vii. 136.
[116] Livy, xlv. 42.
[117] _Ibid._ xlv. 43.
[118] Ward, _Law of Nations_, i. 250.
[119] Petitot’s _Mémoires_, xvi. 177.
[120] Livy, xlii. 8, 9.
[121] Monstrelet, _Chronicles_, i. 200.
[122] _Ibid._ i. 224.
[123] _Ibid._ i. 249.
[124] _Ibid._ i. 259.
[125] Monstrelet, ii. 156.
[126] _Ibid._ 120.
[127] Philip de Commines, ii. 1.
[128] _Ibid._ ii. 2.
[129] _Ibid._ ii. 14.
[130] Philip de Commines, iii. 9.
[131] Motley’s _United Netherlands_, iii. 323.
[132] Vattel, iii. 8, 143.
[133] Borbstaedt, _Franco-German War_ (translation), 662.
[134] Ward, i. 223.
[135] Quintus Curtius, iv. 6, and Grote, viii. 368.
[136] Quintus Curtius, vii. 11.
[137] _Ibid._ iv. 15.
[138] Arrian, iii. 18.
[139] Quintus Curtius, vii. 5.
[140] ‘Tous deux furent très braves, très vaillants, fort bizarres et cruels.’
[141] Lyttleton, _Henry II._, i. 183.
[142] Hoveden, 697.
[143] 2 Samuel xii. 31.
[144] _Memoirs of a Cavalier_, i. 47.
[145] _Memoirs of a Cavalier_, 49.
[146] ‘Life of Bayard’ in Petitot’s _Mémoires_, xvi. 9.
[147] Major-General Mitchell’s _Biographies of Eminent Soldiers_, 92.
[148] Livy, xxxi. 40. When Pelium was taken by storm, only the slaves were taken as spoil; the freemen were even let off without ransom.
[149] _Ibid._ xxviii. 3.
[150] _Ibid._ xxviii. 20, xxvii. 16, xxxi. 27.
[151] _De Officiis_, i. 12. Yet on this passage is founded the common assertion that among the Romans ‘the word which signified stranger was the same with that which in its original denoted an enemy’ (Ward, ii. 174); implying that in their eyes a stranger and an enemy were one and the same thing. Cicero says exactly the reverse.
[152] _Recueil de Documents sur les exactions, vols, et cruautés des armées prussiennes en France._ The book is out of print, but may be seen at the British Museum, under the title, ‘Prussia--Army of.’ It is to be regretted that, whilst every book, however dull, relating to that war has been translated into English, this record has hitherto escaped the publicity it so well deserves.
[153] _Ibid._ 19.
[154] _Ibid._ 8.
[155] _Ibid._ 13.
[156] Chaudordy’s Circular of November 29, 1870, in the _Recueil_.
[157] _Recueil_, 12, 15, 67, 119.
[158] _Ibid._ 56.
[159] _Ibid._ 54.
[160] _Recueil_, 33-37, and Lady Bloomfield’s _Reminiscences_, ii. 235, 8, 9.
[161] The _Times_, March 7, 1881.
[162] _Recueil_, 29; compare 91.
[163] Morley’s _Cobden_, ii. 177.
[164] Professor Sheldon Amos quotes the fact, but refrains from naming the paper, in his preface to Manning’s _Commentaries on the Law of Nations_, xl. Was it not the _Journal de France_ for Nov. 21, 1871?
[165] iii. i. viii. 4.
[166] _De Officiis_, i. 13.
[167] _Modernes Völkerrecht_, Art. 565.
[168] Polyænus, _Strategematum libri octo_, i. 34.
[169] Polyænus, v. 41.
[170] Ortolan’s _Diplomatie de la mer_, ii. 31, 375-7.
[171] James’s _Naval History_, ii. 211; Campbell’s _Admirals_, vii. 132.
[172] James, _Naval History_, ii. 225.
[173] Nicolas, _Royal Navy_, ii. 27.
[174] Hautefeuille, _Droit Maritime_, iii. 433. ‘Les vaisseaux de l’Etat eux-mêmes ne rougissent pas de ces grossiers mensonges qui prennent le nom de ruses de guerre.’
[175] xiii. 1.
[176] Montaigne, ch. v.
[177] vii. 4. ‘Quia appellatione nostra vix apte exprimi possunt, Græca pronuntiatione Stratagemata dicuntur.’
[178] Livy, xlii. 47.
[179] _Histoire de la France_, iii. 401.
[180] The word musket is from _muschetto_, a kind of hawk, implying that its attack was equally destructive and unforeseen.
[181] Polyænus, ii. 19.
[182] Polyænus, iii. 2; from Thucydides, iii. 34.
[183] _Ibid._ vii. 27, 2.
[184] _Ibid._ iv. 2-4.
[185] Liskenne, _Bibliothèque Historique et Militaire_, iii. 845.
[186] _Memoirs_, ch. xix.
[187] ix. 6, 3.
[188] vi. 22.
[189] vi. 15.
[190] iv. 7, 17.
[191] E. Fournier, _L’Esprit dans l’Histoire_, 145-150.
[192] iii. 10.
[193] Liskenne, v. 233-4.
[194] _Soldier’s Pocket-Book_, 81.
[195] Polyænus, viii. 16, 8. ‘Lege Romanorum jubente hostium exploratores interficere.’
[196] Livy, xxx. 29. According to Polyænus, he gave them a dinner and sent them back with instructions to tell what they had seen; viii. 16, 8.
[197] Watson’s _Philip II._ iii. 311.
[198] Liskenne, iii. 840.
[199] Hoffman, _Kriegslist_, 15.
[200] Petitot’s _Mémoires de la France_, xv. 317.
[201] Polyænus, ii. 27.
[202] _Ibid._ v. 1, 4.
[203] _Memoirs_, ch. xix.
[204] Livy, xxxiv. 17.
[205] As at the Brussels Conference, 1874, when such a proposal was made by the member for Sweden and Norway.
[206] In Pinkerton, xvi. 817.
[207] Turner’s _Nineteen Years in Samoa_, 304.
[208] Schoolcraft’s _Indian Tribes_, iv. 52.
[209] _The Basutos_, 223.
[210] Potter’s _Grecian Antiquities_, ii. 69.
[211] Turner’s _Samoa_, 298.
[212] Ellis’s _Polynesian Researches_, i. 275.
[213] Hutton’s _Voyage to Africa_, 1821, 337.
[214] Colenso and Durnford’s _Zulu War_, 364, 379.
[215] Petitot’s _Mémoires_, xv. 329.
[216] The evidence is collected in _Cetschwayo’s Dutchman_, 99-103.
[217] Henty’s _March to Coomassie_, 443. Compare Reade’s _Ashantee Campaign_, 241-2.
[218] Florus, ii. 19; iii. 4; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 1.
[219] Florus, ii. 20.
[220] _Ibid._ iii. 7.
[221] Florus, iii. 4; Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, ix. 44.
[222] Morley’s _Cobden_, ii. 355.
[223] Sir A. Helps’ _Las Casas_, 29.
[224] T. Morton’s _New England Canaan_, 1637, iii.
[225] Belknap’s _New Hampshire_, i. 262.
[226] Penhallow’s _Indian Wars_, 1826, republished 1859, 31-3.
[227] _Ibid._ 105, 6.
[228] _Ibid._ 103. For further details of this debased military practice, see Adair’s _History of American Indians_, 245; Kercheval’s _History of the Valley of Virginia_, 263; Drake’s _Biography and History of the Indians_, 210, 373; Sullivan’s _History of Maine_, 251.
[229] Kercheval’s _Virginia_, 113.
[230] Eschwege’s _Brazil_, i. 186; Tschudi’s _Reisen durch Südamerika_, i. 262.
[231] Parkman’s _Expedition against Ohio Indians_, 1764, 117.
[232] Argensola, _Les Isles Molucques_, i. 60.
[233] Drake’s _Biography and History of the Indians_, 489, 490.
[234] R. C. Burton’s _City of the Saints_, 576; Eyre’s _Central Australia_, i. 175-9.
[235] Borwick’s _Last of the Tasmanians_, 58.
[236] Tschudi’s _Reisen_, ii. 262.
[237] Maccoy’s _Baptist Indian Missions_, 441; Froebel’s _Seven Years in Central America_, 272; Wallace’s _Travels on the Amazon_, 326.
[238] Bancroft’s _United States_, ii. 383-5; and compare Clarkson’s _Life of Penn_, chaps. 45 and 46.
[239] Brooke’s _Ten Years in Sarawak_, i. 74.
[240] Captain Hamilton’s _East Indies_, in Pinkerton, viii. 514.
[241] W. H. Russell’s _My Diary in India_, 150.
[242] _Annals of the Propagation of the Faith_, viii. 280-6.
[243] _Caffres and Caffre Missions_, 210.
[244] _Memorials of Henrietta Robertson_, 259, 308, 353.
[245] _Ibid._ 353.
[246] Colenso and Durnford’s _Zulu War_, 215.
[247] Holden’s _History of Natal_, 210, 211.
[248] Moister’s _Africa, Past and Present_, 310, 311.
[249] Tams’s _Visit to Portuguese Possessions_, i. 181, ii. 28, 179.
[250] Robertson’s _America_; Works, vi. 177, 205.
[251] Thomson’s _Great Missionaries_, 30; Halkett’s _Indians of North America_, 247, 249, 256.
[252] Le Blant, _Inscriptions Chrétiennes_, i. 86.
[253] Bingham, _Christian Antiquities_, i. 486.
[254] Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, vi. 14. ‘Druides a bello abesse consuerunt ... militiæ vacationem habent;’ and Origen, _In Celsum_, viii. 73, for the Romans.
[255] Vaughan’s _Life of Wycliffe_, ii. 212-3.
[256] Turner’s _England_, iv. 458, from Duchesne, _Gesta Stephani_.
[257] ‘Non filius meus est vel ecclesiæ; ad regis autem voluntatem redimetur, quia potius Martis quam Christi miles judicatur.’
[258] Turner’s _England_, v. 92.
[259] ‘Sanxit ut nullus in posterum sacerdos in hostem pergeret, nisi duo vel tres episcopi electione cæterorum propter benedictionem populique reconciliationem, et cum illis electi sacerdotes qui bene scirent populis pœnitentias dare, missas celebrare, etc.’ (in _Du Cange_, ‘Hostis’).
[260] Guicciardini. ‘Prometteva che se i soldati procedevano virilmente, che non accetterebbe la Mirandola con alcuno patto: ma lascierebbe in potestà loro il saccheggiarla.’
[261] Monstrelet, i. 9.
[262] Crichton’s _Scandinavia_, i. 170.
[263] _Mémoires du Fleurange._ Petitot, xvi. 253.
[264] See Palmer, _Origines Liturgicæ_, ii. 362-65, for the form of service.
[265] _Petitot_, xvi. 229.
[266] _Ibid._ 135.
[267] Petitot, viii. 55. ‘Feciono venire per tutto il campo un prete parato col corpo di Christo, e in luogo di communicarsi ciascuno prese uno poco di terra, e la si mise in boca.’
[268] Livy, xxxvi. 2.
[269] Robertson, _Charles V._, note 21. Ryan, _History of Effects of Religion on Mankind_, 124.
[270] M. J, Schmidt, _Histoire des Allemands traduite, etc._, iv. 232, 3.
[271] ‘Christianis licet ex mandato magistratus arma portare et _justa_ bella administrare.’
[272] _Policy of War a True Defence of Peace_, 1543.
[273] _Pallas Armata_, 369, 1683.
[274] In his treatise _Du droit de la guerre_.
[275] _L’Esprit_, i. 562.
[276] _Strafgesetzbuch_, Jan. 20, 1872, 15, 75, 150.
[277] Fleming’s _Volkommene Teutsche Soldat_, 96.
[278] Benet’s _United States Articles of War_, 391.
[279] Grose, ii. 199.
[280] See Turner’s _Pallas Armata_, 349, for these and similar military tortures.
[281] Crichton’s _Scandinavia_, i. 168.
[282] Grose, ii. 6.
[283] Sir S. Scott’s _History of the British Army_, ii. 436.
[284] ii. 16. ‘Omnes autem signarii vel signiferi quamvis pedites loricas minores accipiebant, et _galeas ad terrorem hostium ursinis pellibus tectas_.’
[285] Scott, ii. 9.
[286] Scott, i. 311.
[287] Said to have been invented about 400 B.C. by Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse.
[288] Mitchell’s _Biographies of Eminent Soldiers_, 208, 287.
[289] Compare article 14 of the German _Strafgesetzbuch_ of January 20, 1872.
[290] _Nineteenth Century_, November 1882: ‘The Present State of the Army.’
[291] _De Re Militari_, vi. 5.
[292] Bruce’s _Military Law_ (1717), 254.
[293] See Fleming’s _Teutsche Soldat_, ch. 29.
[294] See the War Articles for 1673, 1749, 1794.
[295] 82.
[296] Quintus Curtius, viii. 2.
[297] _Military Law_, 163.
[298] 286, 290.
[299] _Despatches_, iii. 302, June 17, 1809.
[300] Compare also _Despatches_, iv. 457; v. 583, 704, 5.
[301] _China War_, 225.
[302] Scott’s _British Army_, ii. 411.
[303] _Wellington’s Despatches_, v. 705.
[304] See Windham’s Speech in the House of Commons. April 3, 1806.
[305] _Ibid._
[306] P. 122.
[307] Fleming, 109.
[308] Preface to b. iii. ‘Ergo qui desiderat pacem, præparet bellum.’
[309] Lord Wolseley’s _Soldier’s Pocket Book_, 5.
[310] Arbousset’s _Exploratory Tour_, 397-9.
[311] Livy, xl. 6.
[312] _Iliad_, vi. 266-8; and comp. _Æneid_, ii. 717-20.
[313] Casalis’s _Basutos_, 258.
[314] Victor Hugo’s _L’Ane_, 124.
[315] Baillat’s _Vie de Descartes_, i. 41.
[316] ii. 25, 9, 1. ‘Tanto carnifice detestabiliores quanto pejus est sine causâ quam ex causâ occidere.’
[317] _Ibid._ 2. ‘Nullum vitæ genus est improbius quam eorum qui sine causæ respectu mercede conducti militant, et quibus ibi fas ubi plurima merces.’ Both the sentiment and the expression are borrowed from Lucan’s _Pharsalia_, x. 408: ‘Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur Venalesque manus; ibi fas ubi plurima merces.’
[318] 364.
[319] Potter’s _Greek Antiquities_, ii. 9.
[320] Henry’s _Britain_, iii. 5, 1; Grose i. 56.
[321] Grose, i. 58.
[322] _Ibid._, i. 67.
[323] _Parliamentary Debates_, May 24, 1756.
[324] Sir S. Scott’s _British Army_, ii. 333.
[325] N. Bacon’s Notes to _Selden’s Laws_, ii. 60.
[326] _Candide_, c. xx.
[327] Alison’s _Europe_, vi. 491.
[328] _Life of Sir C. Napier_, i. 77.
[329] _Military Law_, 17.
[330] _Keppel’s Life_, by T. Keppel, ii. 1.
[331] _Indian Expedition_, ix.
[332] Livy, 39, 3; 42, 21; 43, 5.
[333] Livy, xlv. 22. ‘Certe quidem vos estis Romani, qui ideo felicia bella vestra esse, quia justa sint, præ vobis fertis, nec tam exitu eorum, quod vincatis, quam principiis quod non sine causâ suscipiatis, gloriamini.’
[334] _De Civitate Dei_, iv. 4 and 6.
[335] _Arbre des Batailles_, quoted in Kennedy’s _Influence of Christianity on International Law_.
[336] Petitot, xvi. 137.
[337] III. 65. ‘Cavendo ne metuant, homines metuendos ultro se efficiunt, et injuriam ab nobis repulsam, tamquam aut facere aut pati necesse sit, injungimus aliis.’
INDEX.
Achæan, curious mode of warfare, 131
Alexander II. of Russia, 3, 10
Armed neutrality, the, 86
Armour, 55, 224
Ashantee battle song, 86
Balloonists in war, 148
Battles, allusions to: Agincourt, 201, 262 Bouvines, 194 Camperdown, 80 Crecy, 9, 54 Dover, 84 Musselborough, 56 Navarette, 59 Neerwinden, 6 Nicopoli, 56 Nile, 81 Otterbourne, 196 Pavia, 141 Poitiers, 207 Tel-el-Kebir, 253
Bearskin hats, 223, 224
Becon, Thomas, on military service in the sixteenth century, 208
Bishops in war, 35, 52-3, 193-8, 261
Blinding of prisoners, 42-3
Blockade, effective, 92
Bloodhounds used in war, 171-2
Bombardment, theory and practice of, 12, 15, 17, 106, 116
Bounties for scalps, 156
Brigand, meaning of, 57
Britons, love for military life, 156
Brussels Conference on laws of war, 10, 94, 95, 105, 123, 130, 141-6-7-8, 158
Bullinger, limits to right of military service, 208, 263
Cannons, 5
Cannon-shot oath, 130
Capitulations, 100-1
Chain-shot, 6
Chivalry, age of, 32
Church, influence of, on war, 52, 185-193, 204-16, 252
Churches, destruction of, 48
Church parade, 219
Cities, fate of, in war: Amiens, surprise of, 148 Badajoz, storming of, 27 Barcelona, siege of, 138 Brescia, storming of, 103 Calais, siege of, 44 Constantine, storming of, 27 Copenhagen, bombardment of, 15, 268 Dinant, storming of, 102 Gaza, storming of, 107 Grammont, massacre at, 35 Gravelines, massacre at, 36 Haarlem, siege of, 97 Liège, storming of, 102 Limoges, massacre at, 37 Londonderry, siege of, 197-8 Magdeburg, massacre at, 27, 112 Malta, siege of, 97 Meaux, surrender of, 45, 101 Mirandola, siege of, 197 Oudenarde, siege of, 47 Pekin, English at, 237 Persepolis, burning of, 108 Poitiers, massacre at, 34 Rome, sack of, 103 Rouen, surrender of, 47, 101 San Sebastian, storming of, 28 Strasburg, bombardment of 15, 17, 106 Terouanne, destruction of, 137 Thebes, sack of, 103 Toledo, siege of, 42 Tyre, siege of, 108 Ulm, surprise of, 149 Washington, English in, 16
Conference stratagem, 136
Conscription, the, 242-8
Consecration of banners, 201
Contraband, 88
Contributions, military, 20, 118
Costume, military, 222-3
Crossbow, 4, 133
Cruelty and courage, 110
Custom of war, character of, 186, 210
Decimation, story of, 222
Declaration of Paris, 73, 78, 86-9
Declaration of St. Petersburg, 2, 3, 81
Declaration of war, 19, 198
Desertion, 230-1
Discipline, 7, 218, 234, 236
Dress, philosophy of military, 229
Duty, 74, 121, 264
Embargoes, 89
Explosive bullets, 1-2, 81
False flag, stratagem of the, 128-130
False information in war, 152
Fecials, Roman, 271
Firearms, feeling against, 5, 226
Fireships, 84-5
Flogging, 234-5
Forged despatches, 151
Free Companies, 60, 260
Free ships, free goods, 87
Fruit-trees, 16, 17, 47, 161
Germans, the, in war, 40, 106, 115-9
Greek fire, 83-4
Grenadiers, 223
Hanging in war, 44-7
Honour, variable notions of, 155-6, 267
Hostages, taking of, revived, 117
Innocent III., 206
Invention of the bayonet, 6
Jomini, Baron, President of Brussels Conference, 95
Julius II., story of, 196
Jus Angariæ, 90
Justice in war, 208, 258-9, 271, 273-80
Khonds, theory of war, 203
Kidnapping soldiers in Germany, 241
Kissing the earth, custom of, 201
Lateran Council, Third, 4
Laws of war among savages, 159
Lent, observation of, in war, 51, 205
Leo the Great, 204
Letters of marque, 74, 78
Letters, military contempt for, 156
Limoges, Council of, 203
Loha Pennu, an Indian war-god, 203
Macedonian warfare, 133
Magic, use of, in war, 199
Malingering, 231-4
Marriage, restrictions on, 218-9
Mercenary service, 260-3
Military cant, 21, 105-6, 118, 163
-- vandalism, 16, 48, 163, 237
Missionaries, 176-182
-- failure of, 177
-- legal control of, 181
Missionaries, Norwegian, in Zululand, 179
Mission stations destroyed, 180
Mozley, Canon, on war, 212
Musket, 5, 133
Mutiny Act, first, 265
Names of weapons, 200
Neutral ships and property, 86
Night attacks, 133
Numbers slain in war, 8-10
Oath, military, 264-5
Oath by cannon-shot, 130
Ophthalmia, artificial, 233
Palatinate, devastation of the, 17, 267
Pay, soldiers’, 239, 261
Perfidy, cases of, 135
Perjury, cases of, 139
Perpetual peace, Von Moltke on, 119
Piracy, 67-70, 255
Plunder of property at sea, 67-70
Plunder of property on land, 61-3, 66, 118
Poison, use of, in war, 13, 14, 172-3
Poisoning the air, 49
Poisoning water, 14, 29
Press, influence of, in war, 112, 177, 182, 253
Prisoners, treatment of, 17, 18, 40, 85, 99, 113
Prisoners, beheaded, 97, 106
-- blinded, 43
-- burnt, 103, 111
-- drowned, 101-2-6
-- hung, 46, 101-3
-- maimed, 43, 103
-- massacred, 41, 111
-- tortured, 194
Privateering, 70-9
-- Lord Nelson on, 77
Prizes and prize-money, 70
Prize Court, 76
Punishments, military, 221-6
Purificatory battle rites, 250
Pursers on privateers, 76
Recruiting, difficulty of, 240
-- former system of, in France and Germany, 241
Red, the military colour, 223
Red-hot shot, 5, 83
Reprisals, 93-118
-- savage German, 117-8
Right of search, 88
Right of wreck, 89
Roman warfare, 114, 132, 271-2
Sacred buildings in war, 16, 48-9
Sea battles, 80, 83
Scalping enemies, 170
Sentry-go, 229
Slavery, influence of its cessation on war, 112
Socialism, chief cause of, 245-8
Soldiers of mark: Alaric, 204 Alexander the Great, 107-10, 133 Barbarossa, 100 Bayard, 6, 57, 149, 151, 165, 201, 226, 273 Bertrand du Guesclin, 40-1, 44 Black Prince, the, 37, 59 Blücher, 16, 17 Cæsar, 98, 156, 169, 272 Catinat, 145 Chandos, Sir John, 55 Charles of Anjou, 100 Charles the Bold, 111 Charles XII. of Sweden, 133, 226 Crillon, 22, 73, 243 Custine, 145 David, king of the Jews, 111, 251 David I. of Scotland, 111 Des Adretz, 111 Edward I., 106 Edward III., 44 Eugene, Prince, 149 Feuquières, 97, 138, 149 Francis I., 140 Francis de Vere, 104 Frederick the Great, 16, 142 Genseric, 205 Godfrey de Bouillon, 100 Gustavus Adolphus, 19-20, 22, 221 Henri Quatre, 30 Henry V., 101 Keppel, Admiral, 270 Manny, Sir Walter, 44, 57 Maurice, Prince, 150 Montluc, 107, 121, 133, 137, 145, 156 Moltke, 119 Orange, Prince of, 152 Parma, Prince of, 146 Pélissier, 165 Peterborough, Lord, 138 Pyrrhus, 157 Richard I., 111, 195 Saxe, Marshal, 226 Scipio, 146 Sertorius, 143, 145 Sully, 30 Suwarrow, 238 Wellington, Duke of, 20, 236 Wolseley, Lord, 143-4, 151, 244 Xerxes, 47, 99, 146
Spaniards in war, 40, 42, 97, 167-9, 200
Spies, 141-8 Vattel on, 141 Frederick the Great on, 142 Lord Wolseley on, 143-4
Storming cities, 27, 238
Surprises, 148-9
Surrender at discretion, 45, 100, 123
Ternate, island of, 131
Torpedoes, first use of, 5
-- introduced into European warfare, 85
Treatise on Tactics by Leo VI., 83
Truce of God, 205
War, real character of, 27, 186, 210
Wars, abolition of private, 205, 227
Weapons, 50
Women, imprisoned in war, 38
Women and children, slaughter of, 23, 33-8, 117
Women as soldiers, 242
Writers, &c.: Arrian, 109 Bluntschli, 127 Bynkershoeck, 14, 127 Cicero, 114, 126 Descartes, 254 Dobritzhoffer, 160 Emerigon, 73 Erasmus, 186, 244 Froissart, 23 Frontinus, 134 Grotius, 14, 17, 23, 126, 187, 256, 258, 273 Hallam, 32, 50 Hautefeuille, 67 Kant, 23, 30 Las Casas, 167 Molloy, 77 Origen, 190 Palmerston, Lord, 227 Penn, 173 Polyænus, 135 Quintus Curtius, 109 St. Pierre, Abbé, 30 Sepulveda, 167 Tertullian, 189 Turner, Sir James, 259 Valin, 73 Vattel, 14, 18, 21, 73, 104-5, 139, 141, 266 Vauban, 15 Victor Hugo, 252 Voltaire, 210, 267-8 Whewell, 67 Wycliffe, 193 Zwingli, 263
_Spottiswoode & Co., Printers, New-street Square, London._
Transcriber's notes:
The following is a list of changes made to the original. The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one.
Page 11, footnote:
like England should have been heard an inquiry of which like England should have been heard at an inquiry of which
Page 78:
which abolished privateering beween the signatory Powers, which abolished privateering between the signatory Powers,
Page 244:
such an expositon as the following of the relation between such an exposition as the following of the relation between
End of Project Gutenberg's Military Manners and Customs, by James Anson Farrer