CHAPTER IV.

CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE PRECEDING.

§ I.--CONTRARY CHOICE.

_The Question stated._--In the preceding chapters our attention has been directed to the psychological facts respecting the will, and also to the general question respecting the freedom of the will. Closely connected with this main question, and involved in its discussion, are certain inquiries of a like nature, which cannot wholly be passed by, and for the consideration of which the way is now prepared. One of these respects _the power of contrary choice_. Have we any such power? Is the freedom, which, as we have seen, belongs to the very nature of the will, _such_ a freedom as allows of our choosing, under given circumstances, any otherwise than we do? When I put forth a volition, all other things being as they are, _can_ I, at that moment, in place of that volition, put forth a different one in its stead?

_Not identical with the preceding._--This question is not identical with that respecting the freedom of the will, for it has been already shown that there may be true freedom without any such power as that now in question. My will is free, provided I can put forth such volitions as I please, irrespective of the power to substitute other volitions and choices in place of the actual ones.

_Such Power not likely to be exercised._--The question, however, is one of some importance, whether we have any such power or not. And whether we have it or not, one thing is certain--we are not likely to exercise it. If among the fixed and given things, which are to remain as they are, we include whatever inclines or induces the mind to choose and act as it does, then, power or no power to the contrary, the choice _will_ be as it is, and would be so, if we were to try the experiment a thousand times; for choice depends on these preceding circumstances and inducements--the inclination of the mind--and if this is given, and made certain, the choice to which it will lead becomes certain also. A choice opposed to the existing inclination, to the sum total of the existing inducements to action, is not a choice at all; it is a contradiction in terms. The power of contrary choice, then, is one which, from the nature of the case, will never be put in requisition, unless something lying back of the choice, viz., inclination, be changed also.

_But does such Power exist._--The question is not, however, whether such a power is likely to be employed, but whether it _exists_; not whether the choice _will be_ thus and thus, but whether it _can be_ otherwise. When, from various courses of procedure, all practicable, and at my option, I select or choose one which, on the whole, I will pursue, have I no _power_, under those very circumstances, and at that very moment, to choose some other course instead of that? _Can_ my choice be otherwise than it is?

_In what Sense there is such Power._--Abstractly, I suppose, it can. Power and inclination are two different things. The power to act is one thing, and the disposition to exert that power is another thing. _Logically_, one does not involve the other. The power may exist without the disposition, or the disposition without the power. There is _power_, logically, abstractly considered, to choose, even when inclination is wanting; you have only to supply the requisite inclination, and the power is at once exerted, the choice is made, the act is performed. But the change of inclination does not _create any new power_; it simply puts in requisition a power already existing.

§ II.--POWER TO DO WHAT WE ARE NOT DISPOSED TO DO.

_The Question under another Form._--Closely analogous to the question last discussed, virtually, indeed, the same question under another form, is the inquiry, whether we can, at any moment, will or do what we are not, at that moment, inclined to do. Have I any such power or freedom as this, that _I_ CAN _do what I am not_ DISPOSED _or do not wish to do?_ My disposition being to pursue a given course, is it really in my _power_ to pursue a different one?

In order to determine this question, let us see what constitutes, or in what consists, the _power_ of doing, in any case, what we _are_ disposed to do; and then we may be able to judge whether that power still exists, in case the disposition is wanting.

_In what Power consists._--It is admitted that I _can_ do what I wish or am disposed to do. Now, in what consists that power? That depends on _what sort_ of act it is that I am to put forth. Suppose it be a physical act. My power to do what I wish, in that case, consists in my having certain physical organs capable of doing the given thing, and under the command of my will. Suppose it be an intellectual act. My power, in that case, of doing what I like, depends on my having such mental faculties as are requisite for the performance of the given act, and these under control. So long, then, as I have the faculties, physical or mental, that are requisite to the performance of a given act, and those faculties are under the control of my will, so that I can exert them if I please, and when I please, so long my power of doing what I like is unimpaired, and complete, as, _e. g._, the power of walking, or adding a column of accounts.

_But suppose the Disposition wanting._--Suppose, now, the disposition to be wanting; does the power also disappear, or does it remain? I have the same faculties as before, and they are as fully under the control of the will as ever, and that constitutes all the power I ever had. I have the power, then, of doing what I have no inclination to do. Whatever I can do if I like, that also I _can_ do, even if I do _not_ like. In itself considered, the power to do a thing may be quite complete, and independent of the inclination or disposition to do or not to do.

_Will it be put in Requisition?_--But will this power be ever exercised? Certainly not, so long as the disinclination continues. In order to the doing of any thing, there must not only be _power_ to do it, but _disposition_. If the latter be wanting, the former, though it may exist, will never be put forth.

_Our Actions not consequently inevitable._--Have I, then, no power, that is really available, to do what I do not happen to be, at this moment, inclined to do? Am I shut up to the actual inclinations and choices of any given hour or moment? Am I under the stern rule of inevitable necessity and fate to do as I do, to choose as I choose, to be inclined as I am inclined? By no means. My inclinations are not fixed quantities. They may change. They depend, in part, on the intellectual conceptions: these may vary; in part on the state of the heart: divine grace may change the heart.

_Actual Choices not necessary ones._--The actual choice of any given moment is by no means a necessary one. Another might have been in its stead. A different inclination is certainly possible and conceivable, and a different inclination _would_ have led to a different choice. If, instead of looking at the advantage or agreeableness of a proposed course, and being influenced by that consideration, I had looked at the right, the obligation in the case, my choice would have been a different one, for I should have been influenced by a different motive. Two different objects were presented to my mind, _a_ and _b_. As it is, I choose _a_, but _might_ have chosen _b_, and _should_, had I been so inclined. Why did I choose _a_? Because, as the matter then presented itself to my mind, I was so inclined. But I might have taken a different view of the whole thing, and then my inclination and my choice would have been different. It was in my power to have thought, to have felt, to have acted differently. What is more, I not only _might_, but, perhaps, _ought_ to have felt and acted differently. I am responsible for having such an inclination as leads to a wrong choice responsible for my opinions and views which influence my feelings; responsible for my disposition, in so far as it is the result of causes within my own control.

_Different Uses of the Term Power._--It ought to be clearly defined in all such discussions _what we mean_ by the principal _terms_ employed. In the present instance what we mean by the words _power_, _ability_, _can_, etc., ought to be distinctly stated. Now, there are two senses in which these words are used, and the question before us turns, in part, on this difference.

1. We may use the word power, _e. g._, to denote all that is requisite or essential to the _actual doing_ of a thing, whatever is so connected with the doing, that, if it be wanting, the thing will not be done.

Or, 2. In a more limited sense, to denote merely all that is requisite to the doing the thing, provided we please or choose to do it, all that is requisite in order to our doing what we _like_ or wish.

The latter distinguishes between the _ability_ and the _willingness_ to do; the former includes them both in the idea of power. In order to the _actual doing_ there must be both. But does the word _power_ properly include both? In ordinary language, certainly, we distinguish the two. I _can_ do a thing, and I wish to do it, are distinct propositions, and neither includes the other. It is only by a license of speech that we sometimes say I _cannot_, when we mean simply, I have no wish or disposition. If we make the distinction in question between power and disposition, then we _can_ do what we have no wish to do. If we do not make it, but include in the term power the disposition to exert the power, then we _cannot_ do what we have no disposition to do.

§ III.--INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES

I. IS THE WILL ALWAYS AS THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD?

_The Answer depends on the Meaning of the Question._--If by this be meant simply whether the mind always wills as it is, on the whole, and under all the circumstances, disposed or inclined to will, I have already answered the question. If more than that be meant, if we mean to ask whether we always, in volition, act with reference to the one consideration of _advantage_ or utility, the good that is to accrue, in some way, to ourselves or others from the given procedure--and this is what the question seems to imply--I deny that this is so. I have already shown, in presenting the psychological facts respecting the will, that our motives of action are from two grand and diverse sources: _desire_ and _duty_--_self-love_, or, at most such love as involves mere natural emotion, and _sense of obligation_; that we do not always act in view merely of the agreeable, but also in view of the _right_, and that these two are not identical. Now the greatest apparent good is not always the right; nor even the _apparent_ right. We are conscious of the difference, and of acting, now from the one, now from the other, of these motives. But to say that the will is always according to the greatest apparent good, is to resolve all volition into the pursuit of the agreeable, and all motives of action into self-love. It is to merge the feeling of obligation in the feeling of desire, and lose sight of it as in itself a distinct motive of action.

_Defect in the Socratic Philosophy._--This was the capital defect in the ethical system of Socrates, who held that men always pursue what they think to be good, and, therefore, always do what they think is right, since the good and the right are identical; sometimes, indeed, mistaking an apparent good for a real one, but always doing as well as they know how; from which it is but a short step to the conclusion that sin is only so much ignorance, and virtue so much knowledge--a conclusion to which the modern advocates of the doctrines under discussion would by no means assent, but from which that shrewd thinker and most consistent logician saw no escape.

II. IS THE WILL DETERMINED BY THE STRONGEST MOTIVE?

_The Term "strongest" as thus employed._--Much depends on what we mean by "strongest" in this connection, and what by the word "determined?" If we mean, by the strongest motive, the one which in a given case prevails, that in view of which the mind decides and acts, then the question amounts merely to this. Does the _prevalent_ motive actually _prevail_? To say that it does, is much the same as to say, that a straight stick is a straight stick. And what else can you mean by strongest motive? What standard have you for measuring motives and gauging their strength, except simply to judge of them by the _effects_ they produce? Or, who ever supposed that, of two motives, it was not the stronger but the weaker one that in a given case prevailed?

_The Word "determined."_--The question may be made, however, to turn upon the word _determined_. Is the will _determined_ by that motive which prevails? Is it _determined_ at all by _any_ motive or by any thing? If by this word it be meant or implied that the motive, and not the mind itself is the producing cause of the mind's own action, then I deny that the will _is, in any such sense_, determined, whether by the strongest motive, or any other. The will is simply the mind or the soul willing; its acts are determined by itself, and itself only. If you mean simply that the motive _influences_ the will, prevails with it, becomes the _reason why_ the will decides as it does, this I have already shown to be true, and in this sense, undoubtedly, the motive determines the volition, just as the fall of an apple from a tree is, in the first instance, produced or caused by the law of gravitation; but the particular direction which it takes in falling, depends on, and is determined by, adventitious circumstances as, _e. g._, the obstacles it meets in its descent. Those obstacles, in one sense, determine the motion; they are the reason and explanation of the fact that it falls _just as_ it does, and not otherwise; but they are not the producing cause of the motion itself.

III. ARE MOTIVES THE CAUSE, AND VOLITIONS THE EFFECT?

_Incorrect Use of the Term Cause._--It is common, with a certain class of writers, to speak of motive as the _cause_ of action or volition. This is, if at all correct and allowable, certainly not a fortunate use of terms. The agent is properly the _cause_ of any act, and in volition the soul itself is the agent. It is the mind itself, which is, strictly, the efficient cause of its own acts. The motive is the _reason why_ I act, and not the producer or cause of my act. In common speech, this distinction is not always observed. We say, I do such a thing _because_ of this or that, meaning for such and such reasons. In philosophical discussion it is necessary to be more exact.

_Liable to be misunderstood._--The use of the word, as now referred to, is particularly to be avoided as liable to mislead the incautious reader or hearer. It suggests the idea of physical necessity, of _irresistibility_. Given, the law of gravitation, _e. g._, and a body unsupported _must_ fall--no choice, no volition; whereas, the action of the mind in volition is, by its essential nature, _voluntary_, directly opposed to the idea of compulsion. Those who use the word in this manner are generally careful to disclaim, it is true, any such sense; but such are our associations with the word _cause_, as _ordinarily_ employed, that it is difficult to avoid sliding, unawares, into the old and familiar idea of some sort of absolute physical necessity. It were better to say, therefore, that motives are the reasons why we act thus and thus. To go further than this, to call the motive the _cause_ of the volition, is neither a correct nor a fortunate use of terms, since the idea is thereby conveyed, guard against it as you will, that, in some way, the influence was irresistible, the event unavoidable.

_The Phrase "moral Necessity."_--The same objections lie with still greater force against the phrase _moral necessity_ as applied to this subject. Those who use it are careful, for the most part, to define their meaning, to explain that they do not mean necessity at all, but only the _certainty_ of actions. The word itself, however, is constantly contradicting all such explanations, constantly suggesting another and much stronger meaning. That is necessary, properly speaking, which depends not on my will or pleasure, which cannot be avoided, but must be, and must be as it is. Now, to say of an act of the will, that it is necessary, in this sense, is little short of a contradiction in terms. The two ideas are utterly incongruous and incompatible.

A volition may be certain to take place; it may be the motive that makes it certain, but if this is all we mean, it is better to say just this, and no more. If this is all we mean, then we do not mean that volitions are necessary in any proper sense of that term. There is no need to use the word necessity, and then explain that we do not mean necessity, but only certainty. It is precisely on this unfortunate use of terms that the strongest objections are founded, against the true doctrine of the connection of motive with volition. Even Mill, one of the ablest modern necessitarians, objects to the use of this term, and urges its abandonment.

_The true Connection.--What, then, is the connection between Motive and Volition?_--I have all along admitted, that there is such a connection between volitions and motives, that the former never occur without the latter, that they stand related as antecedent and consequent, and that motives, while not the producing cause of volitions, are still the _reason why_ the volitions are _as_ they are, and not otherwise. They furnish the occasion of their existence, and the explanation of their character. So much as this, the psychology of the subject warrants--more than this it does not allow. More than this we seem to assert, however, when we insist on saying that motive is the cause, and volition the effect. We seem, however we may disclaim such intention, to make the mind a mere mechanical instrument, putting forth volitions only as it is impelled by motives, these, and not the mind, being the real producing cause, and the volitions following irresistibly, just as the knife or chisel is but the passive instrument in the hand of the architect, and not at all the producing cause of the effects which follow.

_Difference of the two Cases._--Now there is a vast difference between these two cases. The impulse, communicated to the saw, produces the effect irresistibly; not so the motive. The saw is a passive instrument; not so the _mind_. There is, in either case, a fixed connection between the antecedent and the consequent, but the _nature_ of the connection is widely different, and it is a difference of the greatest moment. It is precisely the difference indicated by the two words _cause_ and _reason_--as applied to account for a given occurrence--the one applicable to material and mechanical powers and processes, the other to intelligent, rational, voluntary agents. There is a _cause_ why the apple falls. It is gravitation. There is a _reason_ why mind acts and wills as it does. It is motive.

_But_ IS _the Mind the producing Cause of its own Volitions?_--This, the advocates of moral necessity deny. "If we should thus cause a volition," says Dr. Edwards, "we should doubtless cause it by a causal act. It is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act. And as it is supposed that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a free act, _i. e._, an act of the will, or volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal act must be caused by another, and so on infinitely, which is both impossible and inconceivable." That is, if the mind causes its own volitions, it can do it only by first acting to cause them, and that causative act is, itself, a volition, and requires another causative act to produce it, and so on ad infinitum.

_The Dictum Necessitatis proves too much._--This celebrated argument has been called, not inappositely, the _dictum necessitatis_. It rests upon the assumption, that no cause can act, but by first acting to produce that act. Now this virtually shuts out _all_ cause from the universe, or else involves us in the infinite series. Apply this reasoning to any cause whatever, and see if it be not so. Suppose, _e. g._, that _motive_, and not the mind itself, is the producing cause of volition. Then, according to the dictum, motive cannot act, but by first acting in order to act, and for that previous causative act, there must have been an ulterior cause, and so on forever, in an endless succession of previous causative acts.

_The Dictum as applicable to Mind._--But it may be said this dictum applies only to mind, or voluntary action. How, then, is it known, that mind cannot act without first acting in order to act? Would not this virtually shut out and extinguish all mental action? The mind thinks; must it first think, in order to think? It reasons, judges, conceives, imagines; must it first reason, judge, etc., _in order_ to reason, and judge, and conceive, and imagine? If not, then why may it not _will_ without first _willing_ to will?

_The Dictum as applicable to Deity._--If mind is not the cause of its own volitions, then how is it with the volitions of the infinite and eternal mind? Are they caused or uncaused? If caused, then by what? If by himself, then there is again the infinitely recurring series according to the dictum. If by something else, still we do not escape the series, for each causative act must have its prior cause. Are the volitions of Deity, then, _uncaused_? Then certainly there is no such thing as cause in the universe. Motives, then, are no longer to be called causes. Deity is not, in fact, the cause of any thing, since not the cause of those volitions by which alone all things are produced. If he is not the cause of these, then not the cause of their consequences and effects. In either case, you shut out all cause from the universe, whether the dictum be applied to mind or to motion, to man or to God; or else you are, in either case, involved in the vortex of this terrible infinitive series.

To give up the dictum, is to admit that mind may be the producing cause of its own volitions.