CHAPTER II.

ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

_Certain Distinctions may be noticed._--Including, under the term sensibility, according to the definition already given, whatever is of the nature of _feeling_, in distinction from thought or cognition, and limiting the term also to feelings strictly _mental_, in distinction from merely physical sensation, it is obvious that there are certain leading distinctions still to be observed in this class of our mental states, certain great and strongly marked divisions or differences, by which we shall do well to be guided in our arrangement and classification of them. Our feelings are many and various; it is impossible to enumerate or classify them with perfect precision; yet there are certain points of resemblance and difference among them, certain groups or classes into which they naturally divide themselves.

_A general Distinction indicated._--One general distinction lies at the outset, patent and obvious, running through all forms and modes of sensibility, namely, the difference of _agreeable_ and _disagreeable_. Every feeling is, in its very nature, and of necessity, one or the other, either pleasing or painful. In some cases the distinction is much more strongly marked than in others; sometimes it may be hardly perceptible, and it may be difficult to determine, so slight is the degree of either, whether the feeling under consideration partakes of the character of pleasure or pain; sometimes there is a blending of the two elements, and the same emotion is at once pleasing and painful to the mind that experiences it. But I cannot conceive of a feeling that is neither agreeable or disagreeable, but positively indifferent. The state of indifference is not an exercise of sensibility, but a simple _want_ of it, as the very name denotes by which we most appropriately express this state of mind, _i. e._, _apathy_ ([Greek: a pathos]).

_Simple Emotions._--Passing this general and obvious distinction, we find among our sensibilities a large class which we may denominate _simple emotions_. These comprise the joys and sorrows of life in all their varieties of modification and degree, according as the objects which awaken them differ. Under this class fall those general states of the mind which, without assuming a definite and obvious form, impart a tinge and coloring of joyousness or sadness to all our activity. Under this class, also, must be included the more specific forms of feeling, such as the grief or sorrow we feel at the loss of friends, sympathy with the happiness or sorrow of others, the enjoyment arising from the contemplation or persuasion of our own superiority, and the chagrin of the reverse, the enjoyment of the ludicrous, of the new and wonderful, of the beautiful, to which must be added the satisfaction resulting from the consciousness of right action, and those vivid feelings of regret in view of the wrong, which, in their higher degree, assume the name of remorse, and fall like a chill and fearful shadow over the troubled path of earthly life. These all are simple emotions, and all, moreover, are but so many forms of joy and sorrow, varying as the objects vary which give rise to them.

_Further Difference of instinctive and rational Emotion._--It will be observed, however, that of these several specific forms of simple emotion, some are of a higher order than the others. Such are those last named in the series, the feelings awakened in view of the ludicrous, in view of the new and wonderful, in view of the beautiful, and in view of the right, or, in general, the æsthetic and moral emotions. These, as seeming to possess a higher dignity, and to involve a higher degree of intellectual development, we may denominate the _rational_, in distinction from the other simple emotions, which, to mark the difference, we may term _instinctive_.

_Emotions of a complex Character._--Passing on in our analysis, we come next to a class of emotions differing from that already considered, in being of a complex character. It is no longer a simple feeling of delight and satisfaction in the object, or the reverse, but along with this is blended the wish, more or less definite and intense, of good or ill, to the object which awakens the emotion. The feeling assumes an active form, becomes objective, and travels out from itself and the bosom that cherishes it, to the object which calls it forth. In this desire of good or ill to the object, the simple element of joy or sorrow, the subjective feeling, is often merged and lost sight of; yet it ever exists as an essential element of the complex emotion.

_Further Subdivision of this Class._--Of this class are the feelings usually denominated _affections_, which may be further subdivided into _benevolent_ and _malevolent_, according as they seek the good or the ill of their respective objects. As the _simple emotions_ are all but so many modes and forms of the feeling of _joy_, and its opposite, _sorrow_, so the _affections_ are but so many different modifications of the one comprehensive principle of _love_, and its opposite, _hate_.

_Various Objects of Affection._--The affections vary as the objects vary on which they rest. Of the benevolent class, the more prominent are, love of kindred, of friends, of benefactors, of home and country. Of the malevolent affections, so called, the more important are the feeling of resentment in view of personal injury, of indignation at the wrongs of others, the feeling of jealousy, and the like.

_The Passions._--These various affections, both malevolent and benevolent, when they rise above the ordinary degree, and become impatient of restraint, imperious, no longer under the control of reason and sober reflection, but themselves assuming the command of the whole man, and impelling him toward the desired end, regardless of other and higher interests, become the _passions_ of our nature, with which no small part of the self-conflict and self-discipline of this our mortal life is to be maintained.

_The Desires._--There is still another class of emotions, differing essentially in their nature from each of the two leading divisions already mentioned, that is, our _desires_. These are of two sorts. Those which are founded in the physical nature and constitution of man--as the desire of food, of muscular exertion, of repose, of whatever is adapted to the animal nature and wants--are usually denominated _appetites_: those, on the other hand, which take their rise from the nature and wants of the mind, rather than of the body, may be termed _rational_, in distinction from _animal_ desires or appetites. Of these the more important are the desire of happiness, of knowledge, of power, of society, of the esteem of others.

As joy has its opposite, sorrow, and love its opposite, hate, so also desire has its opposite, aversion; and the objects of aversion are as numerous as the objects of desire. The desire of wealth has its counterpart, the aversion to poverty and want; the desire of life and happiness stands over against the aversion to suffering and death. The two are so to speak, the positive and negative poles of feeling.

_Hope and Fear._--There is yet another and important class of our emotions, having not a little to do with the happiness or misery of life, casting its lights and shadows over no small part of our little path from the cradle to the grave, our _hopes_ and our _fears_. These, however important in themselves, are, nevertheless, but modifications of the principles of desire and aversion, and are, therefore, to be referred to the same general division of the sensibilities. Hope is the desire of some expected good, fear the aversion to some anticipated evil.

_Summary of Classes._--To the three comprehensive classes now named, _Simple Emotions_, _Affections_, and _Desires_ may be referred, if I mistake not, the various sensibilities of our nature; or, if the analysis and classification be not complete and exhaustive, it is at least sufficiently minute for our present purpose.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE LEADING DIVISIONS OF THE SENSIBILITIES ADOPTED BY DIFFERENT WRITERS.

_Important to know the Principles of Division adopted by others._--The discussion of the present topic would be incomplete without a glance at the _history_ of the same. It is of service, having obtained some definite results and conclusions of our own, to know also what have been the views and conclusions of others upon the same matter. As with regard to the intellectual powers, so also with respect to the sensibilities, different principles of division and classification have been adopted by different writers. Our limits will allow us to glance only at the more important of these.

_General Principles of Classification._--Of those who have written upon the sensibilities, some have placed them in contrast to each other, as hope and fear, love and hate, etc., making this the principle of division; others have classed them as personal, social, etc.; others as relating to time, the past, the present, and the future; others as instinctive and rational; while most who have had occasion to treat of this part of our mental constitution, have considered it with reference solely or mainly to the science of ethics or morals, and have adopted such a division and arrangement as best suited that end, without special regard to the psychology of the matter.

_Of the Greek Schools._--Among the Greeks, the Academicians included the various emotions under the four principal ones, fear, desire, joy, and grief, classing despair and aversion under grief, while hope, courage, and anger were comprised under desire.

To denote the _passivity_ of the mind, as acted upon, and under the influence of emotion, the Greeks named the passions in general, [Greek: pathos], suffering, whence our terms pathos, pathetic, etc., whence also the Latin _passio_ and _patior_, from which our word _passion_. The Stoics, in particular, designated all emotions as [Greek: pathê], diseases, regarding them as disorders of the mind.

_Hartley's Division._--Among the moderns, _Hartley_ divides the sensibilities into the two leading classes of _grateful_ and _ungrateful_ ones; under the former, including love, desire, hope, joy, and pleasing recollection; under the latter, the opposites of these emotions, hatred, aversion, fear, grief displeasing recollection.

_Distinction of primitive and derivative._--Certain other English writers, as _Watts_ and _Grove_, derive all the emotions ultimately from the three principal ones, admiration, love, and hatred, which they term the _primitive_ passions, all others being _derivative_.

_Division of Cogan._--_Cogan_, whose treatise on the passions is a work of much interest, divides the sensibilities into _passions_, _emotions_, and _affections_; by the first of these terms designating the first impression which the mind receives from some impulsive cause; by the second, the more permanent feeling which succeeds, and which betrays itself by visible signs in the expressions of the countenance and the motions of the body; while by affections, he denotes the less intense and more durable influence exerted upon the mind by the objects of its regard. The passions and affections are, by this author, further divided into those which spring from _self-love_ and those which are derived from the _social principle_.

_Classification of Dr. Reid._--_Dr. Reid_ divides the active principles, as he terms them, into three classes, the _mechanical_, the _animal_, and the _rational_, including, under the first, our instincts and habits, under the second, our appetites, under the third, our higher principles of action.

_Of Stewart._--_Dugald Stewart_ makes two classes, the _instinctive_ or _implanted_, and the _rational_ or _governing_ principles, under the former including _appetites_, _desires_, and _affections_, under the latter, _self-love_ and the _moral faculty_. The desires are distinguished from the appetites, in that they do not, like the former, take their rise from the body, nor do they operate, periodically, after certain intervals, and cease after the attainment of their object. Under the title of affections, are comprehended all those principles of our nature that have for their object the communication of good or of ill to others.

_Of Brown._--_Dr. Brown_ divides the sensibilities, to which he gives the general name of _emotions_, with reference to their relation to _time_, as _immediate_, _retrospective_, and _prospective_. Under the former, he includes, as involving no moral feeling, cheerfulness and melancholy, wonder and its opposite, feelings of beauty and the opposite, feelings of sublimity and of the ludicrous; as involving moral feeling, the emotions distinctive of vice and virtue, emotions of love and hate, of sympathy, of pride and humility. Under _retrospective_ emotion he includes anger, gratitude, regret, satisfaction; under _prospective_ emotion, all our desires and fears.

_Of Upham._--Prof. Upham divides the sensibilities into the two leading departments, the _natural_ and the _moral_, the former comprehending the _emotions_ and the _desires_, the latter, the _moral sentiments_ or _conscience_. Under the class of desires, he includes our instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections.

_Of Hickok._--Dr. Hickok classes the sensibilities under the departments of _animal_, _rational_, and _spiritual_ susceptibility; the former comprehending instincts, appetites, natural affections, self-interested feelings, and disinterested feelings; the second, æsthetic, scientific, ethic, and theistic emotions; while the latter or spiritual susceptibility differs from each of the others, in not being, like them, constitutional, but arising rather from the personal disposition and character.

_Remarks on the foregoing Divisions._--Our limits forbid, nor does the object of the present work require, a critical discussion of these several plans of arrangement.

It is but justice to say, however, that no one of these several methods of arrangement is altogether satisfactory. They are not strictly scientific. The method of Cogan, for example, derives all our sensibilities ultimately from the two principles of self-love, or desire for our own happiness, and the social principle, or regard for the condition and character of others; which again resolve themselves, according to this author, into the two cardinal and primitive affections of _love_ and _hate_. This division strikes us at once as arbitrary, and, therefore, questionable; and, also, as _ethical_ rather than _psychological_. There are many simple emotions which cannot properly be resolved into either of these two principles. On the other hand, the psychological distinction between the emotions and desires is overlooked in this arrangement. The same remarks apply substantially to several of the other methods noticed.

_Objection to Stewart's Division._--The arrangement of Mr. Stewart is liable to this objection, that the principle of self-love, and also the moral faculty, which he classes by themselves as _rational_ principles, in distinction from the other emotions as _implanted_ or _instinctive_ principles, are as really implanted in our nature, as really constitutional or instinctive, as any other. Appetite, moreover, is but one form or class of desires; self-love is but another, _i. e._, the desire of our own happiness.

_To Upham's Division._--The division of Mr. Upham is still more objectionable on the same ground. The _natural_ and the _moral_ sentiments, into which two great classes he divides the sensibilities, are distinct neither in fact nor in name; the moral sentiments, so called, are as really and truly _natural_, founded in our constitution, as are our desires and affections; nor is the term natural properly opposed to the term moral as designating distinct and opposite things. The terms instinctive and rational, which Mr. Stewart employs, though not free from objection, much more accurately express the distinction in view, could such a distinction be shown to exist.

_Difference of ethical and psychological Inquiry._--In a work, the main object of which is to unfold the principles of ethical science, it may be desirable to single out from the other emotions, and place by themselves, the principle of self-love, together with the social principle and the moral sentiments, as having more direct reference to the moral character and conduct. In a strictly psychological treatise, however, in which the aim is simply to unfold, and arrange in their natural order, the phenomena of the human mind, such a principle of classification is evidently inadmissible. The different operations and emotions of the mind must be studied and arranged, not with reference to their _logical_ or _ethical_ distinctions, but solely their _psychological_ differences. Viewed in this light, the moral sentiments, so far as they are of the nature of feeling or sensibility at all, and not rather of intellectual perception, are simple emotions, and do not inherently differ from any other feelings of the same class. The satisfaction we feel in view of right, and the pain in view of wrong past conduct, differ from the pain and pleasure we derive from other sources, only as the _objects_ differ which call forth the feelings. They are essentially of the same class, the difference is specific rather than generic. They are modifications of the one generic principle of joy and sorrow, and differ from each other not so much as each differs from a _desire_, or an affection of love or hate.

_Objection to Brown's Arrangement._--The classification of Dr. Brown, if not ethical, is, perhaps, equally far from being psychological. The relation of the different emotions to _time_ is an accidental, and not an essential difference, and it is, moreover, a distinction wholly inapplicable to far the larger portion of the sensibilities, viz., those which he calls immediate emotions, or "those which arise without involving necessarily _any notion_ of time." This is surely _lucus a non lucendo_.

SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

SIMPLE EMOTIONS.