Part 17

"Every thing that can contribute to his accommodation on the voyage will be prepared, without regard to the expense; and the prefect has received orders for this purpose.

"Such provision for himself and suite will be sent on board by the prefect, as is compatible with the profound secrecy to be observed respecting his abode and his embarkation.

"When Napoleon has embarked, the frigates will put to sea within four-and-twenty hours at farthest, if the wind permit, and the enemy's cruisers do not prevent their sailing.

"They will not remain in the road twenty-four hours after the embarkation of Napoleon, unless he desire it; for it is of importance, to depart as soon as possible.

"The frigates will proceed with all possible speed to the United States of America; and will land Napoleon and his suite either at Philadelphia, or at Boston, or at any other port of the United States, that they can most easily and speedily reach.

"The commanders of the two frigates are forbidden to enter any roadsteads, from which they might find difficulty or delay in departing. They are authorized to do so, only if it should be necessary for the safety of the vessels.

"They will avoid all the ships of war they may fall in with: if they should be obliged to engage a superior force, the frigate, that has not Napoleon on board, will sacrifice herself to detain the enemy; and to give that, on board of which he is, an opportunity of escaping.

"I need not remind you, that the chambers and the government have placed Napoleon under the protection of French loyalty.

"When arrived at the United States, the disembarkation will take place with all possible celerity; and the frigates will not remain there more than four-and-twenty hours, under any pretence whatever, unless they be prevented from sailing by a superior force; and they will return directly to France.

"The laws and regulations respecting the police of vessels at sea, and the military subordination of the persons embarked as passengers to the commanders of the vessels, will be strictly observed.

"I recommend to the captains' own sense of duty, as well as to their delicacy, every circumstance not provided for by these presents.

"I have nothing to add to what I have said already, that the person of Napoleon is placed under the safeguard of the loyalty of the French people; and this trust is confided specially, on the present occasion, to the captains of the Saale and the Medusa, and the officers and crews of these two vessels.

"Such are the orders, which the committee of government has directed me to transmit to captains Philibert and Poncé.

(Signed) "The Duke DECRÈS."

On the 29th of June, the committee informed the two chambers by a message, that "the approach of the enemy, and the fear of an internal commotion, had imposed on it the sacred duty, of causing Napoleon to depart."

The terms, in which this message was couched, gave reason to suppose, that the Emperor had shown some resistance. M. de Lavalette called on the Duke Decrès to explain the facts; and it was then known, that the Emperor had not hesitated for a moment, to submit to the fate imposed upon him by his abdication; and that, if he did not set out before, it was because the committee had judged it proper to defer his departure, till the arrival of the safeconducts demanded.

The Emperor had at first expressed his intention of not stopping on the road. When he arrived at Rambouillet, he alighted from his carriage, and said, that he would pass the night at the castle. He made the grand marshal write to the keeper of the moveables of the crown, to require him to send to Rochefort, where they would be embarked, the necessary beds and furniture for seven or eight principal apartments. He had previously claimed the library of Petit Trianon, M. de Visconti's Greek Iconography, and a copy of the grand work of the Egyptian Institute. The faculty of associating thoughts the most serious with ideas of the greatest simplicity, occupations the most vast with cares the most minute, was one of the distinguishing features of the character of Napoleon.

At daybreak he received a courier from M. de ****. He read his despatches, and then said to General Beker, casting a sorrowful look toward Heaven: "The business is finished! it is all over with France! let us begone!"

He was received on his journey with the most lively testimonies of interest and attachment: but nothing could equal the transports, which the troops and inhabitants of Niort expressed at seeing him. He recommended to General Beker, to inform the government of this. "Tell them, general, that they knew little of the spirit of France; that they were too hasty in sending me away; that, if they had accepted my proposal, the face of affairs would have been changed; that I might still, in the name of the nation, exert a great influence on the course of political transactions, in backing the negotiations of government by an army, to which my name would serve as a rallying point."

The general was preparing, to forward to the committee the words of the Emperor; and had just finished his despatch, when information was brought that a heavy cannonade had been heard on the 30th. The Emperor immediately made him add the following postscript, which the general wrote from his dictation: "We hope, that the enemy will allow you time, to cover Paris, and to see the issue of the negotiations. If, under these circumstances, the English cruisers should prevent the Emperor's departure, he is at your disposal as a soldier."

The Emperor continued his course; and, his journey from Niort to Rochefort affording no remarkable incident, I resolved, though with regret, to lose sight for a moment of this august victim, and return to the government, that had succeeded him.

The government, impressed with the importance of its functions, had not ceased, since its formation, to use its utmost endeavours, to justify the confidence of the chambers. Its politics, which were perfectly open, were included in these few words: no war, no Bourbons: and its double resolve was, to make every concession to the allies, necessary to obtain a peace conformable to the wishes of the nation; or to oppose to them an inflexible resistance, if they resolved to intrench on the independence of the nation, and impose on it a sovereign not of its own choice.

The Duke of Otranto, president of the committee, appeared in the council, and in public, to approve the principles and determinations of his colleagues. In private, it was a different affair. Devoted in appearance to all parties, he flattered and deceived them in turn, by pretended confidential communications, and chimerical hopes. He spoke of liberty to the republicans, of glory and Napoleon II. to the Bonapartists, of legitimacy to the friends of the King, of guarantees and a general peace to the partizans of the Duke of Orleans; and thus contrived to secure himself on all sides, in case of need, favourable chances and supporters[78]. Men familiar with his practices were not the dupes of his artifices, and endeavoured to unmask them: but his apparent conduct was so irreproachable, that their warnings were considered as the result of personal prejudice, or unjust suspicion.

[Footnote 78: The Emperor, informed of the manoeuvres of M. Fouché, said: "He is ever the same; always ready to thrust his foot into every one's slipper."]

Besides, it was agreed on all hands, that the fate of France depended on the negotiations with foreign powers: and it was hoped, that the plenipotentiaries, and particularly Messrs. d'Argenson and la Fayette, whose principles were inflexible, would render every kind of surprise or treachery impracticable.

These plenipotentiaries had left Paris on the 25th of June. Their instructions were as follows:

_Instructions for Messieurs the Plenipotentiaries of the Committee of Government to the Allied Powers._

"Paris, June the 23d, 1815.

"The object of the mission of messieurs the plenipotentiaries, appointed to repair to the allied powers, has no farther need of being developed. It is in their hearts, as it is in the hearts of all Frenchmen: the business is, to save their country.

"The salvation of the country is connected with two essential subjects: the independence of the nation, and the integrity of its territories.

"The independence of the nation cannot be complete, except the constituent principles of the present organization of France be secure from every foreign attack. One of the principles of this organization is the inheritance of the throne in the imperial family. The Emperor having abdicated, his rights have devolved on his son. The foreign powers cannot make the least attack on this principle of inheritance, established by our constitutions, without violating our independence.

"The declaration of the 13th, and the treaty of the 25th of March, have received an important modification by the explanatory article, which the British cabinet annexed to the ratification of this treaty: an article, by which this cabinet announces, _that it has no intention of pursuing the war for the purpose of imposing a particular government on France_. This modification has been adopted by the allies; it has been sanctioned by Lord Clancarty's letter of the 6th of May, to the drawing up of which all the other plenipotentiaries gave their assent; it has been sanctioned by a note of Prince Metternich's, dated the 9th; and finally by the declaration of the combined powers dated the 12th of the same month.

"It is this grand principle, acknowledged by the combined powers, to which messieurs the plenipotentiaries ought particularly to appeal.

"We cannot conceal, that it is much to be feared, that the combined powers will think themselves at present bound more by the declarations, which they made before the commencement of hostilities. They will not fail to object,

"That, if, previous to the war, they set up a distinction between the nation and the Emperor, this distinction no longer exists, when the nation, by uniting all its forces in the hands of this prince, has in fact united his fate with its own:

"That, though, previous to the war, they were sincere in their intention of not interfering in the internal concerns of France, they are compelled to interfere in them now, precisely for the prevention of any similar recurrence of war, and for ensuring tranquillity for the future.

"It would be superfluous, to point out to messieurs the plenipotentiaries the answers they may make to these objections. They will find their best refutation in the sentiments of national honour, which, after the whole nation had joined the Emperor, could not but fight with him and for him; and could not separate from him, till some act, such as that of an abdication, dissolved the ties between the nation and its sovereign. It will be easy to them to demonstrate, that, if this sacred duty of honour compelled the French nation, to make war for its own defence, as well as that of the head, that was attempted to be taken from it; the abdication of this head replaces the nation in a state of peace with all the powers, since it was this head alone, that they wished to remove: and that, if the declaration made by the combined powers, of having no intention to impose on France a particular government, were frank and sincere, this sincerity, and this frankness, ought now to be manifested by their respect for the national independence, when recent circumstances have removed the only grievance, of which they thought themselves authorised to complain.

"There is an objection of a more serious nature, which the combined powers might bring forward first, if they be determined to avail themselves of all the advantages, which their military position seems to offer them. This objection would be that of an inclination to refuse to acknowledge the committee of government, and the plenipotentiaries, and the acts of the national representatives, as proceeding from a state of things illegal in their eyes, because they have constantly refused, to admit the principle, on which it is founded. This objection, if it be strongly urged, and the combined powers will not wave it, will leave little prospect of the possibility of an accommodation. However messieurs the plenipotentiaries will assuredly neglect no endeavour, to combat such objections; and they will be in no want of arguments, to combat them with success, particularly with respect to the British government, the present dynasty of which reigns solely in virtue of those principles, the application of which we in our turn have occasion to claim.

"Perhaps, too, without disavowing the independence of the French nation, the allied sovereigns will persist in declaring, that they have no proof, that the wishes of the nation are the wishes expressed by the government, or even by the chambers; and that thus, in order to know the real wishes of the nation, they must begin by restoring things to the state in which they were before the month of March, 1815; leaving to the nation afterwards to decide, whether it ought to retain its old government, or give itself a new one.

"The answer to these objections also will be found in that which England itself formerly gave to the enemies, who were for disputing its right of changing its government and its dynasty. England then answered, that the simple fact of the possession of the sovereign authority authorised foreign powers, to treat with him, who was invested with it. Thus, in case the authorities actually existing in France were not, what in fact they are, clothed in the most perfect legality, the refusal to treat with them can be supported by no solid argument. It would be declaring, that they are resolved to try, how far they can carry the claims of force; and announcing to France, that there is no security for her but in the resources of desperation.

"In fine, there is one less obnoxious chance, against which also we ought to be provided. It is, that the combined powers, faithful at least in part to their declaration, do not absolutely insist on imposing the Bourbon family on France; but that, on the other hand, they require the exclusion of the son of the Emperor Napoleon, under pretence, that a long minority might give rise either to a dangerous display of ambitious views on the part of the principal members possessing the authority in France, or to internal commotions, the shock of which would be felt abroad. Were the question brought to this point, messieurs the plenipotentiaries would find in the principles of the objection itself the principle of its answer; since the division of power in the hands of a council commonly renders its authority weaker, and the minority of a prince is always a period of slackness and languor in the government. They would find it particularly in the present temper of the French nation, in the want it feels of a long peace, in the fears which the idea of a continuation or renewal of war must inspire, and in the shackles imposed by the laws of the constitution on the passions of the members of the government. Besides, whatever its construction may be, they will find in all its circumstances, and in a thousand others besides, very valid arguments, to oppose to those, that may be alleged against the maintenance of hereditary principles in the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon.

"The first and most solid pledge, that the allies can give the French nation of their intention to respect its independence, is to renounce without reserve all design of subjecting it anew to the government of the Bourbon family. The allied powers must now be well convinced themselves, that the re-establishment of this family is incompatible with the general tranquillity of France, and consequently with the repose of Europe. If it be their wish, as they declare, to produce a stable order of things in France and other nations, the purpose would be completely defeated. The return of a family, strangers to our manners, and continually surrounded by men, who have ceased to be French, would rekindle a second time among us every kind of animosity, and every passion; and it would be an illusion, to expect a stable order to arise from the midst of so many elements of discord and trouble. Thus the exclusion of the Bourbon family is an absolute condition of the maintenance of the general tranquillity; and for the general interest of Europe, as well as for the particular interest of France, it is one of the points, to which messieurs the plenipotentiaries must most strongly adhere.

"The question of the integrity of the territory of France is intimately connected with that of its independence. If the war, declared by the allied powers against the Emperor Napoleon, were in fact declared against him alone, the integrity of our territory is not threatened. It is of importance to the general balance of power, that France should retain at least the limits assigned it by the treaty of Paris. What the foreign cabinets themselves considered as proper and necessary in 1814, they cannot look upon with other eyes in 1815. What pretence can justify now a dismemberment of the French territory by the foreign powers? Every thing in the system of Europe is altered; all to the advantage of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; all to the detriment of France. The French nation is not jealous; but it will not be subjugated, or dismembered.

"Thus the efforts of messieurs the plenipotentiaries will have two leading objects; the maintenance of the national independence, and the preservation of the integrity of the French territories.

"These two objects are linked together, and mutually dependent on each other: they cannot be separated, and no modification of either of them can be admitted, without endangering the safety of the country.

"But if the foreign powers should make any proposals, capable of being reconciled with our dearest interests; and they should be offered to us as the ultimatum of our safety; messieurs the plenipotentiaries, refraining from the expression of a premature opinion, will hasten _to give an account of them, and to demand the orders of government_.

"Whatever may be the dispositions of the foreign powers; whether they acknowledge the two principles, that are pointed out to messieurs the plenipotentiaries as the bases of their mission; or the negotiations lead to other discussions, of a nature to require enlarging upon; it is highly important, on either supposition, that a general armistice should be previously agreed on. The first care of messieurs the plenipotentiaries must consequently be, to demand an armistice, and insist on its being promptly concluded upon.

"There is one sacred duty, that the French nation cannot forget; which is, _to stipulate the safety and inviolability of the Emperor Napoleon out of its territory_. This is a debt of honour, which the nation feels the necessity of acquitting toward a prince, who long covered it with glory; and who in his misfortunes renounces the throne, that the nation may be saved without him, since it appears, that with him it cannot be saved.

"The choice of the place, to which the Emperor will have to retire, may be a subject of discussion. Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will appeal to the personal generosity of the sovereigns, to obtain a residence to be fixed upon, with which the Emperor will have reason to, be satisfied.

"Independently of the general considerations, which messieurs the plenipotentiaries will have to urge to the allied sovereigns indiscriminately, they will themselves judge of the various arguments, which they will have to employ with respect to the different cabinets separately.

"The interests of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, not being the same; it will be proper, to exhibit under different points of view to each of these cabinets the advantages, that the new order of things, recently established in France, may offer them respectively. All the powers will find in it a guarantee of the preservation of whatever they possess, either of territory, or of influence: but, with these general advantages, some of them must find themselves separately benefited.

"Austria may well be supposed, not to see with pleasure the re-establishment of one branch of the Bourbon dynasty on the throne of Fiance, while another branch of the same house reascends the throne of Naples.

"This circumstance, which belongs to the policy of the cabinet, may also receive some support from family affection: the regard of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria for his grandson may induce him, not to oppose the high destiny offered to him. It may be, that the Austrian cabinet may perceive in this bond of relationship a means of strengthening its cause by the support of the French nation; and that, alarmed at the aggrandisement of Russia and of Prussia, whose alliance no doubt is a grievance to it, it may lay hold of the opportunity of an advantageous reconciliation with France, so as in case of need to find in it a powerful auxiliary against those two governments.

"Other reasons offer themselves, to incline the cabinet of Petersburg toward us. The liberal opinions professed by the Emperor of Russia authorize a language to be held to his minister, and even to this potentate himself, to which few other sovereigns would be capable of listening. There is room for thinking also, that this monarch takes but little interest personally in the welfare of the Bourbon family, whose conduct in general has not been pleasing to him. He had not much reason to be satisfied with it, when he found it express its gratitude almost exclusively to the Prince Regent of England. Besides, the object of Russia is attained all its thirst of power, and its self-love, are equally satisfied. Tranquil for a long time to come, and victor without having fought, the Emperor Alexander may proudly return to his dominions, and enjoy a success, that will not have cost him a single man. The continuance of the war with France would now be to him a war without an object. It would be repugnant to all the calculations of good policy, and to the interests of his people. Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will avail themselves of these circumstances, and of many others also, to endeavour to neutralize a power so formidable as Russia.

"That continental power, from which France has the least favour to expect, is the court of Berlin: but this court is that of which the forces have received the most violent check; and if Russia and Austria be ever so little disposed; to enter into negotiations, Prussia will be inevitably compelled to accede to them. Besides, even with this court, arguments of great weight will not be wanting, to render it more amicably disposed, if it will listen only to its real and permanent interests.

"Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will find with the allied sovereigns the British plenipotentiaries and it will be with these, perhaps, that the negotiation will present most difficulties. The question with respect to the allies is scarcely a matter of discussion: with this power, every argument and every principle are in our favour; but it remains to be seen, whether its will be not independent of all principles, and of all arguments.

"The particulars noticed above were no doubt unnecessary; as every thing there mentioned would have suggested itself to messieurs the plenipotentiaries themselves. But these hints may not be without their use, since their natural effect will be, to lead the minds of messieurs the plenipotentiaries to more weighty considerations, and more powerful motives, which they will know how to employ seasonably for the grand purpose of the important and difficult mission with which they are charged.