Memoirs of the Marchioness of Pompadour (vol. 2 of 2)
Part 8
The court of London sent my Lord Hertford to Paris, to replace the Earl of Albemarle. This Ambassador was compared to a herald at arms: it was said that he was come to declare war against France. He spoke, in fact, in such a tone, as testified that every thing was ready in England to invade America. M. Rouille was so intimidated, that he said to the King: “Sire, Great Britain must have resolved to declare war, for her Ambassador talks in such a stile, as if the English were ready to open the campaign.”
Upon the first report of the preparations of an armament, the military men, who, since the last campaigns in Flanders, had deserted Versailles, came in shoals to make their court to me. All my apartments were lined with officers, who, in intreating my interest to recommend them to the Prince, set forth their talents in the military art.
The Bishops war, nevertheless, still continued. The Archbishop of Paris, banished to Conflans, was not thereby rendered more submissive. He, from the extremity of his exile, braved the court and the city. He was removed to _Lagny sur Maine_, a little town that had neither the grandeur nor magnificence of Conflans. This retreat, by diminishing his episcopal pomp, no way changed his character, which remained inflexible. The other rebellious bishops were treated with more severity: but these lettres de cachet had a very opposite effect to what was intended. They served only to make them more important in the eyes of their partizans, which increased their arrogance.
A courtier said to the King, that a seminary should be built at Rome, to which should be sent all the French bishops who rebelled against his orders, with an establishment of 100 Roman crowns per head, for supporting their grandeur.
It is certain that too much respect was paid to these people; and the very chastisements that were inflicted on them, when they swerved from their duty, were tempered with so much consideration, as to prevent their returning to it.
The bishops having nothing to do in their exile but to write, and being unable to employ any other arms than their pens, France was deluged with letters and mandates. These were so many manifestoes against the royal authority. The King was often advised to hang the Printers, who were instrumental in the circulation of these seditious papers; but Lewis XV. would never have recourse to these violent methods.
The English, at length, explained themselves with respect to their warlike preparations, the news of which Fame had trumpeted throughout Europe. They declared to the government, that the French in Canada had made incursions upon lands under the dominion of Great Britain, and that England was not inclined to suffer such usurpations. We have seen that the two crowns, when peace was concluded, left the decision of this affair to commissaries. Count de Argenson had foreseen, at first, that these commissaries would completely ruin the interests of the two courts. “Sir, said he, when two powers, with arms in hand, cannot agree upon certain differences, it is impossible for individuals to reconcile them.”
Nevertheless, the English council did not say that they should declare war, but only that they were discontented with the French in America.
This declaration afflicted the King, who did not desire war. The national debts were not yet paid, the same imposts still subsisted as before, the people were always oppressed; so that a new war must overwhelm them. Lewis XV. spoke to me of the misfortune that threatened France, in such a manner as persuaded me he was sensibly affected. I was a witness to his uneasiness upon this account; and it is but justice, which I owe this Prince, to say he was penetrated with grief upon the occasion. This was not the case with the ministers and military courtiers, who were in hopes to advance their fortune by means of this new revolution. The difficulty was not to undertake the war, but to find generals to carry it on.
Marshal Saxe, the terror of France’s enemies, and in whom the troops placed an implicit confidence, was dead. Of all the officers who had served under him, there was not any one who furnished the same hopes of his abilities. They had courage and experience: but these were not sufficient; for I have heard it said, that to form a hero, requires an assortment of qualities, which are seldom found in the same man.
Amongst the generals who had served in the late wars, Marshal Belleisle was the most desirous of commanding in chief; but besides his never having been a good general, his capacity was greatly impaired. He expressed himself in diffuse terms, and was very verbose. It was said of him at court, that of all the genius that had elevated him to the pinnacle of greatness, he retained nothing but loquacity.
The state was now threatened with three different wars, two of which were declared. That of the Bull, as it was called, which was upon the point of causing a revolution in the state: that of the Barbarians, who, notwithstanding the faith of treaties, interrupted the trade of the nation; and that of the English, who were ready to give us battle.
A man of wit, who was told that the English were going to be our foes, said, _God be praised, the bishops quarrel is now at an end, for these people are never at war but in time of peace_.
The Archbishop of Paris, who was still exiled, and still obstinate, wrote a letter to the King in a stile truly original, and without example since the foundation of the monarchy. He said to the King, in very formal terms, that “His power was superior to that of the Sovereign, in matters relative to the administration which God hath entrusted him with; that his duty was that of conducting his flock; that he acknowledged no other upon earth; finally, he would not, nor could not, retract from the first steps he had taken; that these were his last sentiments, which would continue always the same to the grave, &c. &c.”
This was a period distinguishable for disobedience. The clergy gloried in rebelling against the orders of the King. This obstinate disposition had made its way into the provinces. The deputy of Languedoc related to the King an event that happened at Montpellier, which pointed out to this Prince the necessity of stopping the progress of such abuses. This man said, that the wife of a counsellor of that city, who had refused to receive the Bull, and whose life was in danger, requested the curate of her parish to administer the sacraments to her. Upon her first request, the curate and four vicars fled. Application was made to the other parishes, but it was found that all the clergy who administered had deserted. The chief justice then ordered an independent priest, and who was not belonging to any church, to administer to the Lady. This ecclesiastic thought it was his duty to obey; but he had observed that the host had accompanied the priests in their retreat. He did not find a single wafer in the tabernacles of the different churches of the city. The curates and the secondaries had eat them all before their departure. He consecrated one: but this was not sufficient; it must be administered. A general insurrection was feared. The commander of the place was obliged to put the garrison under arms, and appoint guards for the conducting of the host in safety to the sick Lady’s house.
Such scencs as these, in a city full of Protestants, made the Romish religion become a subject of public derision. The King was greatly affected at it, though he would not yet resolve to use violent remedies.
I have said that the King did not desire war; to prevent which, if it were yet possible, he sent Bussy to Hanover, where George II. was expected. I was not for employing this man, thinking he had not sufficient capacity to succeed in a negociation of this importance; but Lewis XV. had been prejudiced in his favour.
Bussy’s partizans said he spoke with resolution, and an absolute tone; qualities that were looked upon as essential at a free court, where moderation and suppleness are always unsuccessful. But the contrary was the truth. Bussy negociated badly to prevent the war, and he failed some years after to restore peace; but I laid it down as a maxim, never to oppose the King’s sentiments.
Orders were dispatched to all the commanders in the American colonies, to fit out as many ships as they could, to oppose the designs of the English. I heard Marshal Noailles then say, that troops should have been sent, and not orders.
The death of Marshal Lowendahl, the pupil and companion of Count Saxe, that happened at this time, created sorrow, which in the present circumstances was the more sensibly felt. His military talents had made us conceive hopes that his death destroyed. The conquest of Bergen-op-zoom had acquired him a reputation, from which France might have derived advantages in the war with which she was threatened. I testified my chagrin, upon this occasion, to the King. “You have reason to lament the death of this officer, he replied to me; he was among the number of those who were most deserving of any confidence. It is in vain for me to seek amongst my subjects, I shall find no one capable of supplying his place.”
Lewis XV. who had honoured him during his life-time, was willing to bestow marks of distinction upon him after his death. He was at the expence of his funeral obsequies, and granted pensions to his children of both sexes; recompences that were due to his merit, and with which the King gratified his heirs. All those who were eclipsed by this general’s merit, rejoiced at his death; none but real patriots lamented it.
Whilst France was employed about the means of supplying the expences of the war, we learnt at Versailles that England found voluntary resources in her subjects for her’s. Private persons offered money to such sailors as enrolled themselves in the royal navy, and others engaged to support their families at their own expence during the war, had it continued six lustrums.
Certain communities offered free gifts to those who would bear arms against France. I said to Marshal Belleisle, who related these facts to me: “It appears to me, sir, that a people who act in this manner, has the advantage over those who give no money but what they are compelled to part with, for the expences of the war.” _That is true_, replied the old Courtier; _but this same English nation, who thus voluntarily part with their riches for a war, which they think useful to the state, often lose all their advantages at a peace. A Lord who wants to make his way to the administration by a system of pacification, intrigues with the king, gains his confidence, and has his creatures. These set forth, that sieges and battles ruin the state, that commerce is hurt by them, and that industry perishes. The cabal acquire strength, the candidate minister’s party increases, he gains the ascendent, and the peace is signed, at the expence of the nation’s blood and treasure._
M. de Mirepoix still continued his negociations at London: he conferred with Sir Thomas Robinson, who gave him hopes; but this was only to gain time: the war was resolved upon. Count D’Argenson often said to the King, that this Embassador should be recalled, as his residence in London only amused the state, and made the French nation ridiculous. The King and council were greatly perplexed; Lewis XV. was not willing that Europe should be able to reproach him with having committed the first hostilities.
Marshal Lowendahl, who before his death was witness to this embarrassment, said publickly at court, that _it was better to attack as a principal, than to be beat as a second_. This counsel was not followed, but we repented of it.
As for me, I was neuter in this great affair. It was reported that I wished for this war, to make myself more considerable at court. I had no occasion for either sieges or battles, things constantly destructive to a state, to support my credit with the King. Lewis XV. honoured me with his confidence: all those who had endeavoured to prejudice me had miscarried in their attempt; rank and grandeur had no longer any charms for me: the only ambition I had remaining was the settling of my daughter; but she was not arrived at an age to be married, and I did not doubt that the King would honour her with his protection.
Peace was still the subject of conversation at London and Paris; but we at length learned that the English had declared war against France in the new world; the court of Versailles received advice, that Admiral Boscawen had with his fleet taken the _Alcide_ man of war, upon the banks of Newfoundland. The manner in which he took this ship aggravated the offence. The _Alcide_ should not have been attacked, at the time it was attacked, for she had no fighting orders. It is a custom established amongst all civilized nations, when they declare war, to publish a manifesto, containing the grievances which induce them to have recourse to arms; and England had not published any such: therefore this step was considered as a real piracy. This was observed to the King, who immediately sent orders to the duke of Mirepoix and Bussy to return to France, without taking leave of the court of England. Henceforward all means of accommodation were suspended.
The King, who had been desirous of avoiding a war before it began, took his measures as soon as he was acquainted with this first act of hostility. His honour would let him no longer put up an affront offered to his flag. He said, upon retiring from the council, “Madam, war is declared; the English are my enemies.”
The operations of the war office took place; the armaments by land and sea, the augmentation of the troops, and the means of supporting the army, were taken into consideration.
From this time the King lived more retired, he did not hunt so often, and he debarred himself several diversions which he took before. He conferred regularly with his ministers. Count D’Argenson, with whom he was often locked up, gave him a circumstantial detail of his land forces, and the naval minister laid before him a similar account of his navy. Lewis XV. made several objections to them concerning the principal points of their administration, to which these chiefs in office were obliged to answer.
The count D’Argenson, whose administration was then the most important, as he was at the head of military affairs, told the King that his troops were in a good state, that military discipline was well enforced, that the French were fond of war, and that we might flatter ourselves with successful campaigns, provided the generals seconded the ardour of the troops, and were not themselves an obstacle to the grandeur of France.
The conferences with the minister of the finances were of a still more intricate nature; there were many ancient debts unpaid, the revenues of the crown were mortgaged, commerce and industry, which had just recovered some little vigour since the peace, were upon the point of returning to their inactive state.
The comptroller-general said to the King, “Sire, the state of things must not be disguised to your Majesty; great springs must be put in motion to maintain the burthen of the war. I have made a calculation from the state of your finances, and they will procure me resources for four years: if at the end of that time peace should not take place, the campaigns cannot be carried on without imposing very oppressive taxes upon your people.”
The King, who after this conference paid me a visit, said, _that he had just been conversing with a minister, who was the honestest man in all France; for such I must call him_, he added, _who has so much probity as to speak freely to his King_.
The minister of the war department required an augmentation of 40000 men, which was granted him, and orders were issued accordingly for raising recruits. M. Belleisle told me, that so many men were not necessary for the defence of a handful of barbarians, that this would increase the expences of the state, and only tend to weaken it. He did not forsee that these levies were nothing in comparison of those that were to be afterwards made.
France had been perfectly secured by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. Her ports were open and defenceless. Upon the commission of the first acts of hostility in America, it was resolved to restore the works at Dunkirk. The prince of Soubise was appointed by the King to see this operation take place: eight thousand troops were allotted him to favour the execution of this design.
Upon the first reports of the revolutions in Canada, two successive squadrons were dispatched, of which no news had yet been received. The uncertainty of the success of this small naval armament suspended the grand operations by land.
The council of state could not resolve upon any fixed plan of operations, the members being divided in their opinion. I was a witness to a great part of the diversity of sentiments which then disturbed the court, with respect to this grand affair.
A man of much good sense said, like Marshal Belleisle, “that great armies were useless; that land campaigns were not the object, but a sea war; that the colonies should be put in a state of security, which alone could be conquered; that the plan of the English was not to increase their power in Europe, but to extend their limits in America; that all their designs tended that way, and that we should direct ours to the same object; that France was guarantied in Europe by the general balance; but that there was no system whereby our settlements in the new world were guarantied; that the crown would lose its influence, when trade would be entirely in the power of the English; that the British navy was already superior to the navies of all Europe, but that after the loss of Canada and the other parts of the continent of America, it would be the only one in Europe; that this was the crisis for France, and that if the opportunity was neglected of protecting ourselves from this last attempt, it would never return; that all other plans of warlike operations should be given up, to pursue that of the colonies, as they interested the general republic; but that this personally and solely interested France; that America being once conquered, the whole body of Europe could not restore the equilibrium, because the power of the first states of the continent did not extend to the sea; that the English in the center of the christian world, were separated from Christendom; that they could not be attacked in their own islands; that nature had secured them from all invasions in Europe, _&c._”
The opposite party, on the contrary, said, “that great armies should be raised to oppose the allies of England, who would not fail to form designs in Germany; that here the capital strokes would be struck; that the war in America was only the pretext for that which was to be carried on in Europe; that some troops should be sent to Canada; but that numerous legions should be raised for Germany; that we were mistaken if we thought the English limited their enterprizes to America, as it was visible that their designs tended to excite a revolution in the north of Europe; that the general balance guarantied France no farther than she herself contributed to support a just equilibrium; that with respect to trade in general, there was no reason to apprehend that England could engross it, as there were not sufficient materials in that country to compass the design; that the English were compelled to have recourse to industrious nations, and where the price of labour was not so high; that universal trade consisted in exchanges, and that a people who should considerably diminish that of other states, would greatly cramp their own; that with respect to the navy, one could not be immediately formed to balance that of England; that the expences made upon this account would be endless, as the time was too short and the means too circumscribed; that the loss of Canada was not certain, the events of war being casual; that the savage nations loved the French and hated the English; that they would prefer being exterminated, rather than submit to the British yoke; lastly, that if Canada should be conquered in this war, it might be retaken in another; but that if the English, united with their allies, should avail themselves of favourable circumstances to gain advantages in Europe, it would be then too late to repair the damage, as the last victories would be guarantied by new treaties of peace; whereas in America the barbarous nations in alliance with France, who are unacquainted with the laws of nations, are always ready to create revolutions: in a word, that it was France’s interest to set on foot numerous armies to support her pretensions by land, and to yield for some time the dominion of the sea, _&c._ _&c._”
A third party maintained that both these objects should be attended to: “We should (said they) prevent the English making conquests in America, and hinder any taking place in Europe. France is sufficiently powerful for this; she need only manage well her forces; she will prevail every where, when those who govern the state unite in one common interest; that is to say, the glory of the nation, and the happiness of the people. If the northern powers of Europe are inclinable to avail themselves of the misunderstandings in America, we must keep our engagements, and send 24000 men into Germany. A more numerous army can only procure us a greater loss without any advantage. These moderate succours will enable us to send more considerable assistance to the new world, to protect our colonies; the revolution in Canada is not a maritime quarrel, it is a land war. The point is to defend the continent, and it is only necessary to land troops there; and this the English cannot prevent. They have taken no measures yet to block up the passages; but if we do not make haste, we shall be too late; for the English, who keep a steady eye upon our operations, will no sooner find that we do not make any great preparations by land, than they will begin to make very considerable ones by sea.”
There was also a numerous party inclined for peace: the reasons which they alledged, were founded upon our inability of carrying on the war; but the minds of the people were too much agitated to listen to plans of pacification; each had his schemes for pushing his fortune, and private interest always prevails over the common weal. Subaltern officers who wanted advancement, were desirous of sieges and battles. Those who endeavoured to obtain the command of armies, were desperate advocates for war; and such as would be employed in furnishing the necessaries for carrying it on, thought it indispensable: it is plain from these motives, how little the interest of the state was considered.
During this crisis the clergy of France were assembled; they deliberated very seriously, whether sick people should have the sacraments administered, or whether they should die without them. The bishops who had been brought over by the court and the parliament, were of opinion, that they could not be refused this assistance. Those who expected nothing of the King, and who hated the parliament, maintained on the contrary, that they should be refused them like heretics. At length, after many debates, they seemed inclinable to leave this great affair to the determination of the Pope.