Chapter 22

Lord Spencer writes to Lord Grenville by the same opportunity. Neither he nor I see much prospect of making ourselves useful in the shape and with the views proposed, and we are therefore naturally anxious to see the ordinary course resumed in some other person, and any such arrangements taken as may admit of our return as soon as without inconvenience might be. We speak the more directly on this matter, from the entire and perfect agreement of our view of it, and our opinions concerning it; at the same time, if, in your determinations at home, it should seem to you that Lord Spencer can and ought to stay longer, with any fair prospect of such advantages to this great subject as his peculiar situation alone could promise, I do not doubt but that he would consent to protract his stay a little longer; and while he does, I certainly will not ask to desert him, _bien entendu_, that I cannot think of staying one hour after him.

Ever, my dear Duke, Very truly and faithfully yours.

The session had been protracted to the beginning of July, not merely by the interest of passing occurrences, but by the efforts of the Opposition to damage the character and embarrass the action of Ministers. The most remarkable of these movements was a string of resolutions moved in the Upper House by the Duke of Bedford, and in the Lower by Mr. Fox, and urged upon the consideration of both Houses with an amount of ability that could not have failed of its object, had that object been a sound one, or sustained by the public opinion of the country. The main purpose was to obtain from Parliament a protest against the war, and to compel the Government to enter into proposals for a peace with France. After setting forth that the policy of the Administration had been that of strict neutrality before the commencement of hostilities, and that, after the declaration of war, Ministers adopted the policy of resistance to the ambition and aggrandisement of France, the resolutions went on to state, that at the beginning of the war it was considered a matter of general concern in which His Majesty was to have the cordial co-operation of the powers united with him by the ties of interest and alliance; that His Majesty had not received that co-operation; that Russia had not contributed in any shape to the common cause; that Denmark and Sweden had coalesced to defend themselves against any attempt to force them into it; that Venice and Switzerland remained neuter; that Sardinia was subsidized merely to act on the defensive; and that Great Britain was loaded with a subsidy which ought properly to be borne by Prussia; and, finally, that the time was now come when peace might be secured on a permanent basis, and that it was the duty of His Majesty's Ministers to avail themselves of the opportunity.

There was some truth in these statements, although the general deduction was erroneous, and the colouring throughout false. The allies had not given that cordial co-operation to Great Britain which they were bound to do, and Prussia had evaded the onus of the coalition. Mr. Thomas Grenville's letter to the Duke of Portland discovers a great deal more than was known to the Duke of Bedford or Mr. Fox in illustration of these facts; and the correspondence that follows, which is of the highest importance from the confidential character of its details, confirms them. But the attempt to cast the responsibility of these circumstances upon the English Cabinet was equally ungenerous and unjust. The policy of Ministers had undergone no change, except that which was contingent upon the altered situation of affairs. To preserve a strict neutrality in the face of a declaration of war, was clearly impossible; and to abandon the war, from an abstract desire for peace, at a time when the common enemy had gained enormous advantages, and were menacing the tranquillity and liberties of other nations, and threatening an invasion of England, would have precipitated results the very reverse of those contemplated by the Opposition. To have made proposals to France on what the resolutions termed "equitable and moderate conditions of reconciliation," would have involved two serious difficulties--the negotiation, in the first place, with a Government of anarchy which England had justifiably refused to treat with from the outset; and, in the second place, the admission of the power of France to dictate terms which England could not accept without degradation, or refuse without aggravating the existing grounds of hostility. Circumstances might arise--such as a change in the Government--to obviate the former difficulty; but the latter was insuperable. It would have been inconsistent with the principles upon which the war was undertaken to have proposed or submitted to any conditions which France, exulting over her recent successes, could have been expected to approve; and the result of such a negotiation at such a moment must have been, in any event, fruitless and inglorious. The decision of Parliament was unequivocal and decisive. The Duke of Bedford's motion was lost on the question of adjournment, and Mr. Fox's thrown out by a majority of 210 against 57 votes. The influence of the Opposition was overthrown. The country was against them, and their ranks were daily weakened by secessions. So strongly and unanimously had the Parliament pronounced its judgment in favour of the maintenance of the war, that His Majesty at the close of the session was enabled to urge both Houses "to persevere with increased vigour and exertion in the present arduous contest against a power irreconcilably hostile in its principles and spirit to all regular and established government."

Immediately after the close of the session, some changes took place in the _materiel_ of the Administration, arising out of the accession of power the Ministry had obtained by the adhesion of some of the leading Whigs. The Duke of Portland (to whom Mr. Thomas Grenville addressed his first letters from Vienna) was appointed Third Secretary of State; Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord President of the Council; Earl Spencer, Privy Seal; and Mr. Wyndham, Secretary at War. Further changes took place before the close of the year, when Lord Fitzwilliam accepted the Government of Ireland, and was succeeded as President of the Council by Earl Mansfield. Lord Spencer, at the same time, was placed at the head of the Admiralty; and Lord Chatham, the brother of the Premier, who had for some years occupied that department, was made Lord Privy Seal.

The junction with the Whigs was, as far as it went, a new coalition; but, under the circumstances which led to it, a coalition of a very different character from that which had been entered into by Mr. Fox and Lord North. The old elements of the Cabinet still held the ascendancy; and although some sincere friends of Mr. Pitt doubted the prudence of admitting the Whigs to office, no actual disturbance of the existing system was apprehended from it. All agreed upon the question of the war--the one great question upon which agreement was essential to the repose and security of the country. In forming this alliance, however, another question had been overlooked, which was now daily rising into importance, and upon which the Whigs differed widely from Mr. Pitt, not so much in principles, as in the time and mode of their application. That question, the clog and difficulty of every Administration, was Ireland. But the moment had not yet arrived when the dangers of this question became manifest.

The following series of letters trace the whole course of the negotiations going forward on the continent, and exhibit in minute detail the actual position in which England stood in her relation to the rest of the allies, and the incessant energy she exerted in vain to awaken them to a just sense of their obligations.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 26th, 1794. MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I have to acknowledge your private letters, which I do not attempt to answer by this conveyance for obvious reasons, and only write that you may not receive my public despatch without a line to tell you that your private letters have reached me, and that I will state to you, by a safer opportunity, what occurs to me upon them. I am a little out of humour with you for not telling me how you bore your journey, and how you are, but I am willing to hope it has not renewed any symptoms of your former complaint. There never was such a succession of cross-incidents as seem to have accompanied every part of poor Merey's mission, and I fear his loss is a serious one to us all. What do you think of Robespierre's death? I look upon it as a very favourable event, not from any opinion that I ever entertained of his personal talents, but because those who succeed him are evidently under the necessity of lowering the despotism of the Revolutionary Government, and of giving up thereby the great instrument with which they worked. A strong proof of this, and a circumstance very favourable in itself, is, that instead of a Committee of six or eight efficient persons who conducted the Government in all its branches, and with absolute power, they have already been obliged to institute twelve Committees, who are to be chosen with a sort of rotation, those who go out not being re-eligible. This is, in fact, a substitution of the weakest possible form of Executive Government in lieu of the strongest.

God bless you, my dearest brother, and believe me Ever most affectionately yours, G.

We have received this morning accounts from Italy, mentioning the reduction of Calvi. You will probably have heard it by this time.

It was in the beginning of this month of August, that the Duke of York, at that time stationed at Breda, retreated before the French towards Bois-le-Duc; and afterwards, upon the advance of General Pichegru, crossed the Maese, and took up a fresh position near Grave. Seeing the necessity of placing the conduct of the campaign in more experienced hands, Ministers now proposed to give the command in chief to Lord Cornwallis; but before this step could be finally resolved upon, it was necessary to consult the feelings of His Majesty on the subject. Mr. Pitt therefore submitted a statement to the King, assigning the reasons which induced him to urge the appointment of Lord Cornwallis upon His Majesty's consideration; and suggesting that Mr. Wyndham should be sent on a mission to the army. The following was His Majesty's answer:

Weymouth, August 27th, 1704. Thirty-five minutes past One, P.M.

I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's letter accompanying the Paper of Considerations, which I undoubtedly should wish to keep; but not knowing whether Mr. Pitt has a fair copy of it, I have thought it safest to return.

Whatever can give vigour to the remains of the campaign, I shall certainly as a duty think it right not to withhold my consent; but I own, in my son's place, I should beg my being allowed to return home, if the command is given to Lord Cornwallis, though I should not object to the command being entrusted to General Clairfayt. From feeling this, I certainly will not write, but approve of Mr. Wyndham's going to the army, and shall be happy if my son views this in a different light than I should.

I will not delay the messenger, as I think no time ought to be lost in forming some fixed plan, and that the measure of sending Mr. Wyndham is every way advantageous.

GEORGE R.

It is hardly necessary to observe that Mr. Wyndham was sent upon his mission; and that the Duke of York, having met some further reverses, which almost incapacitated the troops from acting even on the defensive, shortly afterwards returned to England.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 29th, 1794. MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The despatch which you will receive by this messenger, and the letter which Wyndham has promised to write to you from the British head-quarters, will explain to you the whole of the system which we have adopted, as affording the only hope of vigorous or successful exertion. The Austrian Government is already prepared for your proposal, respecting the giving to Lord Cornwallis the command of the whole combined force, as Count Starhemberg is apprized of it, having, indeed, himself in a great degree suggested the measure, on some general hints which I threw out to him, in order to try the ground. For the moment, the great point seems to be to bring them to acquiesce in the virtual command which his rank of Field-Marshal will give him over Clairfayt, and to send positive orders to the latter to that effect; and if there should be any difficulty in Clairfayt's submitting to this, then to let Clairfayt absent himself for the moment, and leave the Austrian troops under the command of some officer whose standing will occasion no difficulty in this respect. You will observe that, by virtual command, we mean precisely the same deference as the Duke of York has shown to the Prince of Coburg, not extending to any of the points of military etiquette by which command is usually rendered ostensible, but going to the effect of complying with his suggestions respecting the mode of executing the operations agreed upon in concert, when the instructions of his Court do not interfere with such suggestions. Before you receive this letter, Lord Cornwallis will probably be on the spot; and it is therefore urgent, to prevent the first beginnings of dissension, that no time should be lost in making the Austrians give their orders to Clairfayt. Knowing the delay of that Government, and the difficulty of getting them to adopt any decided line of conduct, we have thought it best to do the thing first, and afterwards to try to obtain their consent to it. If you succeed, or, indeed, in any case, it will be useful that you should write directly to Lord C. upon the subject, as that may save a week, at a time when a week's delay might be of the utmost importance.

With respect to the Duke of York, Wyndham will probably tell you in confidence how he succeeds in his negotiation. It certainly is a pretty strong instance of zeal and desire to facilitate whatever can promote the cause, when he undertakes a task of no less difficulty than the reconciling the mind of a young Prince to a supercession in his military command, and that too at the precise moment of moving forwards, after so mortifying a retreat. I am, however, not without hopes of his success; and, at all events, the moment was too critical to suffer any consideration to interfere with the only means of salvation that appeared practicable.

With respect to the languor of the Austrian Government, and the doubt whether even money will obtain from them decisive efforts, we have strongly felt the force of all that you have stated on that head. But we are inclined to flatter ourselves, that if we once obtain so large a force as is mentioned in my despatch, and can put that force, in addition to our own, under the absolute and supreme direction of such a man as Lord Cornwallis, we shall at least be able to say to ourselves, whatever be the result, that we have done everything that it was possible to do; and without trying this measure, I confess for one that I should not have that sentiment in my mind. I lament that we have thought ourselves obliged to bring forward the discussion of a precise barrier, and yet I do not see how it could be avoided. But the impression may be very bad on their minds, if we appear to be narrowing the benefits which they are to derive from exertion, instead of animating them by the hope of increased advantage. I have not dwelt on this point in my despatch, as you mention that you intended to write further upon it.

When the idea of transferring the subsidy was opened to me by Starhemberg, from Merey's instructions it was expressly stated, as a part of the plan, that the empire could be made to subsidize the Prussian troops; and this agrees with every information we receive on the subject, all which concur in stating the efforts of the empire, particularly in money, as being very far below what they could be brought to make by the joint exertions of Austria and Prussia. But on my pressing Starhemberg for further detail on this point, he has always avoided it, assuring me, whether truly or not, that he found no particulars respecting it among Merey's papers. You will see that in the despatch we make the whole dependent on a complete and _bona fide_ execution of this point, and my language to him has always been of the same nature. But I confess that it is on this point that I feel the strongest apprehensions, and I much fear that Austria will both be disposed to evade it, and, in truth, unable to accomplish it. Should this be the case, the whole plan must be abandoned; and we should, I believe, in that event, be disposed to turn our subsidy to the object of raising other force, of whatever nature, so as, if possible, to form a separate British and Dutch army, destined to act under Lord Cornwallis, without the pretence or show of concert with either of the German Powers.

With respect to your remaining at Vienna, you will easily conceive, that having a project of this nature to propose, none of us thought we should give it its fair chance if we put it into other hands than those in which the business now is. We allow for your natural desire of quitting a scene which, God knows, must be mortifying enough to men who feel how much of the safety of Europe depends on the conduct of the Austrian Government, and who see how unfit that Government is to be trusted with the interests of the smallest corporation. But we are confident that as long as there may remain the hope of doing so much good as would, we trust, be done by the complete success of the present plan, you will not be unwilling to give your assistance to it.

With respect to what you mention about yourself, you know my wishes on the subject, but I certainly will not urge them beyond what you are disposed to do. The proposal Lord Fitzwilliam makes to you is, I fairly own, in my apprehension, one less eligible than that of Vienna; but I fear a nearer view of that Court has rather strengthened than diminished your indisposition to that situation. You know, as well as I do, all the _desagremens_ belonging to the post of Irish Secretary; but it is certainly an important and honourable one, and such as to afford you ample room for showing yourself such as you are: more, perhaps, than many others which commonly rank higher in public estimation. My objection to it is the banishment, which obtains as much as in the foreign missions, and certainly to the most disagreeable of all countries. I do not know well how to make myself quite a disinterested adviser; but if I was to give you fairly the result of my thoughts upon it, I should still beg you to look at the foreign line, and if that must not be, I should then say _yes_ to the question of Ireland.

Supposing that _yes_ were decided, let me ask you whether your remaining some time longer at Vienna, so as finally to conclude, not the leading points only, but all the details of the arrangement now in question, and of the preparations for the active scene of next year, is wholly out of the question? It seems very clear that no arrangement will happen before that time which can change the Irish Government, and in the meanwhile you would be honourably and _most usefully_ employed. I have, however, not hinted this idea to any individual, nor will I. If all this is wholly out of the question, I conclude that my reply to your answer to these despatches, will bring to Lord Spencer and you the King's permission to return to England.

It would be very satisfactory to you to see how well things are going on here, and how completely our hopes have been realized on the subject which employed so much of our time and thoughts this summer.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

At this time, the new changes in the Administration, already alluded to, were under discussion in the Cabinet; and, amongst the rest, it was proposed that the government of Ireland should be offered to Lord Fitzwilliam. As soon as this appointment was suggested, his Lordship wrote to Mr. Thomas Grenville to offer him the office of Secretary.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO EARL FITZWILLIAM.

(Private.) Vienna, Aug. 30th, 1794, DEAR LORD FITZWILLIAM,

You will already have heard enough of our proceedings here to give you no considerable expectations of any great good to be done here; and if you happen to have been in London, and to have read a very tedious and long letter which I wrote on the 24th to the Duke of Portland, you will have seen there, more at large than it is necessary to repeat, the general view and impression of our minds as to the business with which we are charged; and the little ground which there appears to us for hoping that even by satisfying their pecuniary demands, we could depend upon such exertions being made in consequence, as the country would expect in return for expense of so great and heavy a scale. It is very true, to be sure, that in this as well as in many other cases, the difficulties present themselves something more readily than the remedies to them, yet upon the question of the subsidy, if we are right in our conception that it would not probably produce, either in degree or in shape, that energy and cordial co-operation which we are looking for, perhaps no difficulty could be much more serious than that of engaging ourselves at home in an expense, the disappointment of which might produce in the minds of the public an effect, both with respect to the war itself and with respect to the Government which supports it, of the most perilous description. It is very true that great objects must sometimes be pursued at great hazards, and nobody is more ready than I to acknowledge that a greater object cannot be found than the successful prosecution of this war; but the peculiar question of subsidy seems to me to apply chiefly to the mode of carrying on the war, and, I would hope, not to the entire decision of pursuing or abandoning it.