Chapter 41

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp Williamsburg, Sept. 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL.--Your letter of the 2d September is just come to hand. Mine of yesterday mentioned that the ships in York river had gone down. Inclosed is the account of an engagement off the capes. What disposition has been made for the internal protection of the bay, I do not know. James river is still guarded, but we have not as yet received any letter from Count de Grasse relative to his last movements. I hasten to communicate them as your Excellency will probably think it safer to keep the troops at the Head of Elks until Count de Grasse returns. Indeed, unless the greatest part of your force is brought here, a small addition can do but little more than we do effect. Lord Cornwallis will in a little time render himself very respectable.

I ardently wish your whole army may be soon brought down to operate.

We will make it our business to reconnoitre the enemy's works and give you on your arrival the best description of it that is in our power. I expect the governor this evening and will again urge the necessity of providing what you have recommended.

By a deserter from York I hear that two British frigates followed the French fleet and returned after they had seen them out of the capes. A spy says that two schooners supposed to be French have been seen coming up York river, but we have nothing so certain as to insure your voyage, tho' it is probable Count de Grasse will soon return.

I beg leave to request, my dear General, in your answer to the Marquis de St. Simon you will express your admiration at this celerity of their landing and your sense of their cheerfulness in submitting to the difficulties of the first moments. Indeed I would be happy something might also be said to Congress on the subject.

Your approbation of my conduct emboldens me to request that Gen. Lincoln will of course take command of the American part of your army; the division I will have under him may be composed of the troops which have gone through the fatigues and dangers of the Virginia campaign; this will be the greatest reward of the services I may have rendered, as I confess I have the strongest attachment to these troops.

With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~[1]

Footnote:

1. See Letter of Washington, Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 157. A plan of operations in Virginia at p. 158.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Williamsburg, 10 Sept. 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Gourion is just arrived, he says you may be on your way. We hasten to send to the commanding naval officer in the bay. Hitherto I had no way to write to you by water, but Count de Grasse being at sea we request the officer he has left to have every precaution taken for the safety of navigation. It is probable they are taken, but I would have been too uneasy had I not added this measure to those that have been probably adopted.

I wrote several letters to you; the surprising speedy landing of the French troops under the Marquis de St. Simon; our junction at Williamsburg; the unremitted ardor of the enemy in fortifying at York; the sailing of Count de Grasse in pursuit of 16 sail of the line, of the British fleet, were the most principal objects. I added we were short of flour, might provide cattle enough. I took the liberty to advise James River as the best to land in, the particular spot referred to a more particular examination, the result of which we shall send tomorrow.

Excuse the haste that I am in, but the idea of your being in a cutter leaves me only the time to add that I am, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp before York, September 30th, 1781.

My Dear General--You have been so often pleased to ask I would give my opinion on any subject that may occur, that I will this day take the liberty to mention a few articles.

I am far from laughing at the idea of the enemy's making a retreat. It is not very probable, but it is not impossible, indeed they have no other way to escape; and since we cannot get ships at York I would be still more afraid of a retreat by West Point than any thing else. The French hussars remaining here, our dragoons and some infantry might be stationed somewhere near West Point, rather on the north side. I see the service is much done by details, and to use your permission would take the liberty to observe that when the siege is once begun it might be more agreeable to the officers and men to serve as much as possible by whole battalions. Col. Scamel is taken: his absence I had accounted for by his being officer of the day. I am very sorry we lose a valuable officer, but tho' Col. Scamel's being officer of the day has been a reason for his going in front, I think it would be well to prevent the officers under the rank of generals or field officers reconnoitering for the safety of their commands from advancing so near the enemy's lines.

There is a great disproportion between Huntington's and Hamilton's battalions. Now that Scamel is taken we might have them made equal and put the eldest of the two Lieutenant Colonels upon the right of the brigade.

I have these past days wished for an opportunity to speak with your Excellency on Count de Grasse's demand relative to Mr. de Barrass's fleet. This business being soon done, we may think of Charleston, at least of the harbor or of Savannah. I have long and seriously thought of this matter but would not be in a hurry to mention it until we knew how long this will last. However it might be possible to give Count de Grasse an early hint of it in case you agree with him upon the winterly departure of the whole fleet for the West Indies. One of my reasons to wish troops (tho' not in great number) to be sent to Glocester county by way of West Point is that for the first days it will embarrass any movement of the enemy up the river or up the country on either side, and when it is in Glocester county it may be thought advantageous by a respectable regular force to prevent the enemy's increasing their works there and giving us the trouble of a second operation, and in the same time it will keep from York a part of the British forces.

With the highest respect and most sincere affection I have the honor to be, &c.~[1]

Footnote:

1. For a "Plan of the Siege of Yorktown," see Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.8. p. 186.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

November 29th, 1781

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed you will find some numbers, a copy of which I have kept, and which contains some names that may probably occur in our correspondence. I need not tell you, my dear General, that I will be happy in giving you every intelligence in my power and reminding you of the most affectionate friend you can ever have.

The goodness you had to take upon yourself the communicating to the Virginia army the approbation of Congress appears much better to me than my writing to the scattered part of the body I had the honor to command. Give me leave, my dear General, to recall to your memory the peculiar situation of the troops who being already in Virginia were deprived of the month's pay given to the others. Should it be possible to do something for them it would give me great satisfaction.

I will have the honor to write to you from Boston, my dear General, and would be very sorry to think this is my last letter. Accept however once more the homage of the respect and of the affection that render me for ever--

LAFAYETTE.

APPENDIX I.

A SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781,

TO SERVE AS EXPLANATION TO THE MAP.

After the combat of MM. Destouches and Arbuthnot, the project on Portsmouth was abandoned: the French sailed for Rhode Island; the militia were dismissed, the regular troops proceeded to the north. Arnold was afterwards reinforced by Major-general Phillips, and the conquest of Virginia became the true object of the English during this campaign. The allied army, under the Generals Washington and Rochambeau, proceeded towards New York; that of General Greene attacked the posts which had been left in Carolina, both about five hundred miles from Richmond: Major-general the Marquis de Lafayette was charged with defending Virginia.

_April_ and _May_.--From preparations made at Portsmouth, he conceives that the capital was the proposed aim; a forced march of his corps from Baltimore to Richmond, about two hundred miles; he arrives in the evening of the 29th of April; the enemy had reached Osborn; the small corps of militia assemble in the night at Richmond; the next morning the enemy at Manchester, seeing themselves forestalled, re-embark at Bermuda Hundred, and re-descend James River.

The Americans at Bottom's Bridge, a detached corps in Williamsburg; General Phillips receives an _aviso_, and re-ascends the river, landing at Brandon; second reinforcement from New York; Lord Cornwallis, who was reported to have embarked at Charlestown, advances through North Carolina.

The Americans at Osborn, to establish a communication on James and Appomattox, are forestalled by the march of Phillips to Petersburg, the 10th, at Wilton; the 18th, canonading and reconnoitring, on Petersburg, which, by assembling on one point, the hostile parties permit a convoy to file off for Carolina; the 20th, at Richmond; junction of Lord Cornwallis with the troops of Petersburg; the great disproportion of the American corps, the impossibility of commanding the navigable rivers, and the necessity of keeping the important side of James River, do not allow any opposition.

Having sent a portion of the troops to Portsmouth, Lieutenant-general Lord Cornwallis selected for himself an army of about five thousand men, three hundred dragoons, and three hundred light horsemen; crosses to Westover. The Americans had only about three thousand men, formed of one thousand two hundred regulars, fifty dragoons, and two thousand militia. All the important forces had evacuated Richmond; our troops at Wintson's Bridge; a rapid march of the two corps, the enemies to engage an action, the Americans to avoid it, and retain the heights of the country with the communication of Philadelphia, which is equally necessary to our army and to the existence of that of Carolina.

_June_.--The magazines of Fredericksburg are evacuated; the Americans at Mattapony Church; the enemy at Chesterfield Tavern; heavy rains, which will render the Rapid Ann impassable; Lord Cornwallis marches to engage the front; our troops hasten their march, and repair to Racoon Ford, to await General Wayne, with a regular corps of Pennsylvanians.

Despairing of being able to engage in action, or cut off the communication between Wayne and Philadelphia, Lord Cornwallis changes his own purpose,and endeavours to defeat that of the Americans; he suddenly directs his movements against the great magazines of Albemarle Court House; a detachment of dragoons strives to carry off the Assembly of State at Charlottesville, but does not accomplish this end; another detachment bore upon Point-of-Fork, where General Steuben formed six or seven hundred recruits; he evacuated that point, and thought he ought to retire in the direction of Carolina; some objects of slight importance are destroyed. The passage of the Rapid Ann was necessary, to avoid being embarrassed by Lord Cornwallis; the communication with Philadelphia was indispensable. It was impossible to hope, even by fighting, to prevent the destruction of the magazines before the junction with the Pennsylvanians. Lafayette takes, therefore, the resolution of waiting for them, and, as soon as they arrive, regains the enemy with forced marches.

The 12th, the Americans at Boswell's Tavern; Lord Cornwallis has reached Elk Island. The common road, which it is necessary for him to cross to place himself above the enemy, passes at the head of Bird's Creek; Lord Cornwallis carries thither, his advance-guard, and expects to fall upon our rear; the Americans repair, during the night, a road but little known, and, concealing their march, take a position at Mechunck Creek, where, according to the orders given, they are joined by six hundred mountaineers. The English general, seeing the magazines covered, retires to Richmond, and is followed by our army.

Various manoeuvres of the two armies; the Americans are rejoined by General Steuben, with his recruits; their force then consists of two thousand regulars, and three thousand two hundred militia. Lord Cornwallis thinks he must evacuate Richmond; the 20th, the Marquis de Lafayette follows him, and retains a posture of defence, seeking to manoeuvre, and avoiding a battle. The enemy retires on Williamsburg, six miles from that town; their rear-guard is attacked in an advantageous manner by our advanced corps under Colonel Butler. Station taken by the Americans at one march from Williamsburg.

_July_.--Various movements, which end by the evacuation of Williamsburg; the enemy at Jamestown. Our army advances upon them; the 6th, a sharp conflict between the hostile army and our advance-guard under General Wayne, in front of Green Spring: two pieces of cannon remain in their hands; but their progress is arrested by a reinforcement of light infantry; the same night they retire upon James Island, afterwards to Cobham, on the other side of James River, and from thence to their works at Portsmouth.

Colonel Tarleton is detached into Amelia County; the generals Morgan and Wayne march to cut him off; he abandons his project, burns his wagons, and retires with precipitation. The enemy remaining in Portsmouth, the American army takes a healthy station upon Malvan Hill, and reposes after all its labour.

_August_.--The Americans refusing to descend in front of Portsmouth, a portion of the English army embarks and proceeds by water to Yorktown and Gloucester. General Lafayette takes a position at the Fork of Pamunkey and Mattapony River, having a detached corps upon both sides of York River. The Pennsylvanians and some new levies receive orders to remain on James River, and think them selves intended for Carolina. An assembly of militia on Moratie or Roanoke River; the fords and roads south of James River destroyed on various pretence; movements to occupy the attention of the enemy. As in the event prepared by Lafayette, the means of escape would remain to the garrison of Portsmouth, Lafayette threatened that point. General O'Hara thinks he ought to nail up thirty pieces of cannon, and join the largest part of the army. The whole was scarcely united, when the Count de Grasse appears at the entrance of Chesapeak Bay. General Wayne crosses the river, and places himself in such a manner as to arrest the enemy's march, if he should attempt to retreat towards Carolina. The French admiral is waited for at Cape Henry by an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, to report to him the respective situations of the land troops, and ask him to make the necessary movements to cut off all retreat to the enemy. He anchors at Cape Henry, sends three vessels to York River, and fills James River with frigates; the Marquis de Saint Simon, with three thousand men, lands at James Island or Jamestown.

_September_.--The river thus defended, General Wayne receives the order to cross it; the Marquis de Lafayette marches upon Williamsburg, and assembles together, in a good position, the combined troops, to the number of seven thousand three hundred men. He had left one thousand rive hundred militia in the county of Gloucester, and sends to hasten some troops coming from the north. This station, which closes all retreat to Lord Cornwallis, (our advance posts nine miles from York,) is retained from the 4th to the 28th of September. Lord Cornwallis reconnoitres the position of Lafayette, and despairs of forcing it.

The 6th September, the Count de Grasse, quitting the defended rivers, goes out with the remainder of his fleet, pursues Admiral Hood, who had presented himself, beats him, and sinks the _Terror_; he takes the _Iris_ and _Richmond_ frigates; the 13th, he joins, in the bay, the squadron of M. de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, with eight hundred men and the French artillery: the fleet of the Count de Grasse consists, at this period, of thirty eight ships of the line.

Admiral de Grasse and General Saint Simon, commanders of the French under Lafayette, urge him to attack Lord Cornwallis and offer him a reinforcement from the ship garrisons. He prefers acting on more secure grounds, and waiting for the troops from the north. General Washington succeeded in reality, in completely deceiving General Clinton as to his intentions; he was advancing towards Virginia with an American detachment, and the army of the Count de Rochambeau embarked at the head of the Chesapeak; they proceeded upon transports, to Williamsburg. The 28th, they march upon New York, and the combined army commences investing it; the 29th, reconnoitring the place; the 30th, the enemy evacuates the advance posts, and retires into the works of York.

_October_.--The 1st, a new reconnoitre; the 3rd, a skirmish between the legion of the Duke of Lauzun and that of Tarleton, in which the former gained the advantage. That legion and eight hundred men from the ships under M. de Choisy, had joined the militia at Gloucester. The night of the 6th, the trenches were opened; that of the 11th, the second parallel. The night of the 14th, the redoubts of the enemy's left were taken, sword in hand, the one by the grenadiers and French light horsemen, the other by the light infantrymen of the Americans. The first directed by the Baron de Viomenil, a field-marshal; the 2nd by the Marquis de Lafayette. The morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis asked to capitulate; that same evening the firing ceased. The English Army, reduced to eight thousand men, comprising 900 militia gave themselves as prisoners of war.

APPENDIX II.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Havre, 18th July, 1779.

SIR,--You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As it is not a fixed plan which you require, nor a memorial addressed in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your wishes.

The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our assistance, both by sea and land. The smallest effort made now, would have more effect on the people than a great diversion at a more distant period; but besides the gratitude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed states, a body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent. In short, sir, without entering into tedious details, you know that my opinions on this point have never varied, and my knowledge of this country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to our own country.

Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to take Halifax; but as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we should then receive assistance, and, under pretext of invading Canada, we should endeavour to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the British navy in the new world.

Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to, I will diminish, as much as possible, the necessary number of troops. I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and chasseurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally, abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who can relinquish, for one year, the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect American.

I would ask, then, for four thousand three hundred men, and, as I am not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know that I shall not court the choice of the king. Although I have commanded, with some success, a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my own claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly, and as, setting talents apart, it is on the political conduct of the leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that half the success must depend, I am obliged, reluctantly, to set forth a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some basis.

Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix; troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~[1]

Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing batteries onshore; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen, but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of January;~[2] it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are assured that four or five weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.