CHAPTER XI.

Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall of Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours to the Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks.

In accordance with the treaties entered into with the Sikh government, the Jullundur Doab, and the hill country immediately bordering upon it, became a portion of the British territory. Within the latter stood the celebrated fortress of Kote Kangra, the killedar of which refused to deliver up possession of the place to the British authorities, declaring that, unless the Maharajah Runjeet Singh himself appeared before the gates, he would not surrender the keys. “The fort of Kangra is one of those which is strong from its position: it is built near the conflux of the Bub Gunja with the Beeas; and is bounded, for the most part, by precipices nearly perpendicular; and where the declivities are less formidable, the aid of masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable under European engineers. * * * The occupants of the fort were believed to amount to about 500, principally Akalis, and their guns were said to be ten in number.”[105]

It now, of course, became necessary to reduce this fortress to subjection. Accordingly, a force, under Colonel Wheeler, was sent against it. It consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th native infantry, with a wing of the 63rd, and a siege-train composed of three 18–pounder guns, two 8–inch howitzers, and six mortars, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, with Captain Swinley’s troop (3rd troop 1st brigade), and Captain Fitzgerald’s (2nd company 7th battalion), and Captain Christie’s (4th company 6th battalion) batteries. The march was one of the most arduous character. It seemed impossible that heavy guns could be transported up the precipitous defiles which led to the fort. “With our heavy guns,” writes an officer of the force, “we had to cross the river Gooj no less than fifty-six times between the Beeas and Kote Kangra; and the last day we crossed it, rain having fallen on the hills, it swelled to a roaring torrent. Frequently the guns got completely fixed between enormous boulders of rock, so as to defy all the ingenuity both of artillery officers and engineers; when the united strength of men, horses, and bullocks, aided by two elephants dragging had failed, one fine old mukhna (a male elephant, with tusks like a female) was always called for. Coming forward with an air of pitying superiority—his look seeming to express clearly, ‘What! can’t you do it without me?’ he would look carefully at the gun in every direction, and when he had found the point where his power could be best applied, he put his head to it, and gave it a push, as if to weigh the opposition; then followed another mightier push; and if that did not suffice, a third, given with tremendous force, almost invariably raised the gun out of its fixed position, and sent it on. He would then retire with the air of Coriolanus, when he said to Aufidius, ‘Alone I did it!’—a more valuable ally than Coriolanus, because he said nothing, and was always willing.” Such, indeed, were the difficulties of the march, that the enemy, believing that our heavy ordnance could never be brought under the walls of the fort, determined to hold out. The same opinion of the impracticability of the road was entertained by many of our own officers. “The brigadier,” says the writer above quoted—Colonel Jack, of the 30th native infantry—“was recommended to leave his 18–pounders on the other side of the river Beeas; he, however, determined to take them on as far as possible, and, by extraordinary management and exertion, he succeeded in taking them all the way. They turned out, as the Europeans quaintly remarked, to be the really influential _politicals_.”

On the 25th of May this tremendous march—one of which it has been rightly said, that it “reflects everlasting credit on the artillery”—had been successfully accomplished. Preparations were commenced for the erection of batteries and the planting of the guns in position; but siege operations were rendered unnecessary by the unconditional surrender of the fortress. A portion of the artillery force, including the heavy guns, remained at Kote Kangra throughout the greater part of the year, being finally withdrawn in December. The return march of the heavy ordnance was little less difficult than the ascent; but on this, as on the former occasion, the elephant-draught was found to be admirably adapted to the required service. “From the experience of this march,” says Lieutenant Clifford in an elaborate report, “I am satisfied, that from their intelligence, docility, and strength, elephants are admirably adapted for the draught of heavy ordnance through a mountainous country; and I doubt whether the heavy guns could possibly have been taken up to Kangra and back without the assistance of these animals; for though bullocks answered sufficiently well for the draught of carts and lighter carriages, the number requisite to move a siege-gun could not have been used at many of the windings and declivities met with during this march, to say nothing of the difficulty of guiding bullocks over narrow, dangerous roads, in which the elephants appeared to show a sense of the necessity of caution. Throughout the march, ten elephants were immediately attached to the four guns; viz. two in draught with each piece, accompanied by two spare.”

The year 1847 was one of almost uninterrupted tranquillity. During the first quarter of the following year little occurred to break the quiet that reigned in the Punjab; but in the month of April, affairs began to wear a more threatening aspect. The refusal of Moolraj, the Dewan of Mooltan, to give up that fortress to the British officers commissioned to transfer it to the hands of another chief, and the murder of those officers (Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson) by the people of the garrison, led, in the course of that year, to the celebrated siege of that stronghold. Before, however, we dwell upon this important event, it should be mentioned that, in the month of May, some disturbances having been created in the Manjha country by a Sikh Ghooroo (Bhaee Maharaj), two guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade (which had marched from Loodianah to Lahore early in the month), under Lieutenant A. Bunny, accompanied the detachment sent in pursuit of the rebels; and subsequently, the entire troop, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, proceeded on a similar service.

The operations of Lieutenant (now Major) Edwardes having brought him before the walls of Mooltan, it became matter of discussion between the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident at Lahore (Sir F. Currie),[106] whether a regular force should be sent against the fortress at that time, or delayed to a later period. Eventually, the Resident took upon himself the responsibility of ordering the advance of the force; and Major-General W. S. Whish, commandant of the Lahore division, an old and experienced artillery officer, proceeded in command of it.

The artillery with this force was commanded by Major Garbett. Lieutenant J. Mill was appointed major of brigade. The 4th troop of the 1st brigade, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, marched down with the Lahore column, along the left bank of the Ravee. The 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain John Anderson,marched with the Ferozepore column along the right bank of the Sutlej. The 2nd company 2nd battalion, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 3rd battalion, and the 6th company 7th battalion, under the command of Major E. F. Day, went by water down the Sutlej with the heavy ordnance. Lieutenant Peter Christie was appointed commissary. These details set out towards the close of July. The land column reached Mooltan before the end of August. On the 4th of September the siege-train arrived. On the 5th, General Whish, in the name of the Maharajah and the Queen of England, called upon the garrison to surrender. No answer being returned to the summons, the engineer officers were called upon to submit their plans for the attack of the place. It was finally determined to commence regular siege operations; and on the morning of the 7th, the first parallel was commenced. It had previously been in contemplation to attempt the seizure of the place by a coup-de-main; and on the 6th, our mortar batteries had commenced playing on the town. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, there was some slight skirmishing. At daybreak on the 10th, some of our guns were got into position, and a tolerably heavy fire was maintained throughout that day. On the following day orders were issued for an attack upon a position which the enemy maintained in advance of the city. The column named for this service was accompanied by 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain Mackenzie. The attack took place on the morning of the 12th, and was highly successful, though attended with considerable loss. Among the officers wounded, was Lieutenant Bunny, of the horse-artillery: General Whish had a horse shot under him. This successful attack placed all the defensible points on this side the city in our hands, and by enabling the heavy guns to be advanced to within 600 yards of the city walls, would have considerably shortened the operations of the siege, but the defection of Shere Singh, which took place on the 14th, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. This circumstance, combined with other causes, the most prominent of which was the numerical inefficiency of the force employed to carry on the various duties of the siege, embracing the formation of trenches and batteries, the protection of the camp and lines of ammunition, as well as the thorough investment of the place, induced the general most unwillingly to suspend operations until the arrival of reinforcements should enable him to proceed with the siege.

In the meanwhile the standard of revolt had been raised in the countries beyond the Indus, and on the banks of the Chenab. The Sikh troops at Bunnoo had mutinied and murdered their officers; and Chuttur Singh, a chief of considerable note, headed the insurrection in the Hazareh. Towards this point the eyes of Shere Singh were directed. He was the son of Chuttur Singh, and after his defection, did not long remain with Moolraj, but marched northward to join the rebels, taking with him 5,000 men, 12 guns and howitzers, and 80 zumbooruks. It was now no longer an isolated case of rebellion in remote provinces. The whole Sikh nation appeared to be rising up in arms against us. The very troops which had been despatched by the Durbar to assist General Whish in his operations, had joined the insurgent force, and it was doubtful whether we had a single friend, Sikh or Mahomedan, in the country. It became necessary, therefore, to take the field on a more extended scale, and the Commander-in-Chief determined to place himself at the head of the army.

It was thus that in vain General Whish applied to Simla for reinforcements. All the available troops were required for the campaign, which appeared inevitable, on the Chenab. Accordingly orders were sent to the Bombay Government to afford the necessary assistance. Here for a time we must quit that division of our army, and follow the movements of the Commander-in-Chief.

In October, 1848, orders were issued for the assembly of the army of the Punjab, under the personal command of Lord Gough; Brigadier Tennant was nominated to the command of the artillery, with the rank of brigadier-general; Brevet-Captain Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd brigade horse-artillery, was appointed deputy assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant H. Tombs, deputy assistant quartermaster-general; Captain Hogge, commissary of ordnance, and Lieutenant P. Christie (with General Whish at Mooltan), deputy commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts was subsequently nominated aide-de-camp to the brigadier-general. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, C.B., 2nd brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant C. V. Cox, his adjutant, were respectively appointed brigadier and brigade-major of horse-artillery; and Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, C.B., 1st brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant E. Kaye, his adjutant, were nominated to the same situations in the foot-artillery.

The artillery division was constituted as follows: Head-quarters and 4th troop (at Mooltan) 1st brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th troops 2nd brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th troops (at Mooltan) 3rd brigade horse-artillery; 1st company 1st battalion (No. 10 horse field-battery); 3rd company 1st battalion (No. 17 horse field-battery); 2nd company 2nd battalion (at Mooltan); 3rd and 4th companies 3rd battalion (at Mooltan); head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies 4th battalion; 2nd company 7th battalion (No. 6 horse field-battery); 3rd company 7th battalion (No. 5 horse field-battery); and 6th company 7th battalion (at Mooltan).

The several components of the army crossed the river Sutlej near Ferozepore, at different times—the majority during the month of October, or early in November; but some of the corps and the artillery train, with No. 6 field-battery, and some reserve companies, did not move across the bridge till the middle of November. Brigadier Huthwaite was intrusted with the equipment and preparation of the train and park, and all arrangements regarding a plentiful supply of ammunition.

Some regiments of cavalry and troops of horse-artillery had been early pushed forward, under command of General Cureton; and Brigadier-General Campbell followed him across the Ravee with his division of infantry and some field-batteries. The Commander-in-Chief followed with General Gilbert’s division.

At the time that our troops crossed the frontier, the Rajah Shere Singh was in force on both banks of the Chenab, with his advanced parties pushed forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally even to the banks of the Ravee. These, however, fell back before the advancing columns under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell, and the Rajah abandoned the town of Ramnuggur, and placed the principal part of his force on the right bank of the river, but still holding the left with large masses of cavalry, and some smaller bodies of infantry. The town of Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two miles from the river, from which it is divided by a low tract of waste _cander_ land, subject to occasional inundation, and intersected by a few easy nullahs. Nearly midway between the town and the river was a small but dense grove of trees, around which hovered the advanced bodies of the Sikh army.

On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell were within an easy march of Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day the first collision took place between the army of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to the loss of some valuable lives without any corresponding advantages to ourselves. Lord Gough was on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General Campbell was that day in command. However, as the work was entirely confined to the cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was the actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to drive Shere Singh completely across the river. The Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned, hovering between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s) were pushed forward rapidly to dislodge them. The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far in advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled with Sikh infantry, and were received with a heavy musketry fire, which caused them considerable loss. Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish, and also the brave old General Cureton. Nor was this all; one of our troops of horse-artillery (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries, and was compelled to retreat with the loss of a gun, which stuck against the bank of a nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the unpropitious commencement of the campaign. The Sikhs were certainly compelled to confine themselves to the right bank, but no doubt the same object might have been gained without so great an expenditure of life.

Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery, and Penny’s brigade of infantry, were moving up as rapidly as possible. After crossing the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main road for the purpose of attacking a fort of some strength, called Jhubber, into which a rebel sirdar, Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two guns of No. 6 field-battery, with small detachments of infantry and irregular cavalry, proceeded in advance against the fort, while the main body followed. The garrison, however, refused to surrender to the nine-pounders, and the walls were too strong for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw open their gates, and yield themselves prisoners. Some small pieces of ordnance were captured in the fort, which, together with the neighbouring village, were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.

On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance, anxiously awaited by Lord Gough, joined head-quarters at Ramnuggur, and that very night several pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and also farther to the right and higher up the stream, while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all the cavalry, Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up the stream to find a ford whereby to effect a passage, and so turn the enemy’s position.[107] This Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell found himself under the necessity of moving nearly as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect the passage. This of course occasioned considerable delay.

On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of shots between our batteries and those of the enemy on the opposite bank; but the distance was too great to allow of any effect being produced. On the night of the second, our batteries were advanced to within 400 yards of the river’s edge; but in the morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn back a great part of his camp, though he had left some batteries near the river, between which and ours some desultory firing took place. In the afternoon heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river. This was Thackwell, who had been attacked while resting after several long marches.

There was nothing more than a cannonade from either side. Shere Singh tried to dislodge Thackwell, but could effect nothing by his fire, while, on the other hand, he himself was soon driven from the field by three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, under Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two field-batteries (No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of No. 10 under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no pursuit; being ignorant of the strength of the enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops being somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become more closely engaged. The enemy suffered considerably, but our loss was trifling, and principally in the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10 heavy field-battery, was severely, and Lieutenant J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, slightly wounded.

As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered by the indefatigable General Gilbert, as he rode from our batteries to the river’s edge, that the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A ford was immediately sought for, and soon discovered; Thackwell, reinforced from head-quarters,[108] pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered a thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider it prudent to follow them. He accordingly encamped at Hailah, his camp equipage and baggage having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur. About the 8th or 9th he was again reinforced. The remainder of the horse-artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17 heavy field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the 1st company 4th brigade with four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C. Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly all the force; two brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s battery (No. 6), and the park, being all now left at head-quarters. His camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive and for the most part uncultivated plain. In his front was the broad belt of jungle before mentioned, which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks of the Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into the Dooab. At the further edge of this belt lay Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank being at Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards the river. After the 5th December, each force remained inactive for a considerable period, save that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties of horse through the jungle, who annoyed Thackwell by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.

On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed across the river, head-quarters, Mountain’s brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular cavalry (with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left at Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his staff, crossed the Chenab, and were then joined by No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant Robertson. On the 1st January, the head-quarters force moved to Janu-ke (about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah), when the artillery train and park joined from Ramnuggur, at which place a bridge-head had been constructed, armed with two 24–pounders and the guns of No. 6 heavy field-battery.

On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under Madwell changed ground, and effected a junction at Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road from Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance of the Chenab. Here it was supposed that the force would remain for a considerable time, and no doubt such was the original intention; but Attock, long defended by the gallant Herbert, fell, and Chutter Singh was known to be in full march to join his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson, the Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the advisability of overthrowing the latter before reinforced by his father. His lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels, readily consented: he reviewed his army, ordered up two corps of native infantry from Ramnuggur, on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee, and on the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.

The strongest part of the enemy’s position was supposed to be his left, at Russool, on the extremity of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the river Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee was pretty free from jungle, but along the base of the sand ridge, and in front of the whole of the Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering all military operations (especially movements of cavalry or artillery) most difficult and hazardous; and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It was Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool with his right (Gilbert’s division), while General Campbell should operate upon Lallianwallah and Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much counter advice offered to him on the night of the 12th, that he was induced to forego his intention of attacking the enemy on the following morning. The force, however, marched from camp on the 13th, and the line of contiguous columns at first bore steadily down towards the enemy, the right directed on Russool. After a time, the right was brought more forward, so that the direction of our march became parallel to the enemy’s line, and Lord Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s department to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going too near the enemy, and, at the same time, without the necessity of retracing our steps towards Dhingee. This was somewhat difficult, as the army had just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao, between which and Chillianwallah there was no water. At Chillianwallah, on a mound, or small hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of this, however, we were not aware, till a small party of our cavalry came upon it unexpectedly, and was fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was _forced_ to fight the action on that day.

Our cavalry (with exception of 3rd and 9th irregulars, under Hearsay, our rear-guard) was divided between the two extreme flanks. Gilbert’s division formed the right wing, Campbell’s the left, and Penny’s brigade was in reserve.

The 1st troop 2nd brigade, 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 2nd troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, were with the cavalry on the right; Captain Dawes’s, H.F.B. (No. 17), was with Gilbert; No. 5, H.F.B., and three guns of No. 10 (the other three guns being on rear-guard), were, under Major Mowatt, with Campbell. The 2nd troop 2nd brigade, 4th troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind. The heavy guns (consisting of six 18–pounders and four 8–inch howitzers), under Major Horsford (the respective batteries commanded by Majors Ludlow and Sir R. C. Shakespear), were in the centre of the line. These were all drawn by elephants, which were, however, exchanged for bullocks before the action commenced. Brigadiers Brooke and Huthwaite were, with their respective brigades, on the march, but during the action with the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. The army moved in line of contiguous columns of brigades, at first directed towards the enemy’s position, but subsequently changing front to the left, parallel to the Sikh line, our right towards it. As soon as the Sikh post on the mound at Chillianwallah had been discovered, line was formed from the columns. The outpost was of course soon driven in; after which, Lord Gough again changed front,—to his right this time, so as to bring our front again opposite the Sikh line. The army halted, arms were piled, and the quarter-masters proceeded to mark out ground for encampment. But the Sikhs, determined to bring matters to an issue under cover of the jungle, brought up some light pieces, and fired upon us. As it was evidently impossible to encamp within reach of their guns, which the denseness of the jungle enabled them to move up unobserved by us, and as we could not encamp elsewhere from want of water, without retracing our steps, which would have borne too much the appearance of retreating, Lord Gough was _compelled_ to fight, and that, too, under peculiar disadvantages, as he knew little or nothing of the ground in his front, nor did the thick jungle admit of his reconnoitring. He was forced, too, to abandon his original plan of attacking Russool, as we had now got opposite their centre; the enemy, too, had frustrated all, by moving out of their position into the jungle in front of it.

The enemy’s position was a very extensive one, and Lord Gough was forced to lengthen his own line. The consequence was, that our left and right wings were at a considerable distance apart. The cavalry on the right was divided into two parties; the one under Brigadier Pope comprised the 14th dragoons, a wing of the 9th lancers, the 1st light cavalry, and a wing of the 6th; with these were Huish’s troop (1st troop 2nd brigade) and half of Christie’s (3rd troop 2nd brigade), under Colonel Grant. Further to the right, and somewhat to the rear, so as to cover the right flank of our army, were a wing of 9th lancers and a wing of 6th light cavalry, with Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade), and half of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, under a subaltern. To the left of Brigadier Pope was Gilbert’s division, with Dawes’s battery; and left of these again the heavy guns. Campbell’s division and the remaining cavalry, with which were three troops of horse-artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, were far removed to the left, and could not be seen from the centre of the line. The action commenced with the heavy guns. It would have been well had they had the battle to themselves a little longer. They produced soon a very considerable effect on the enemy’s fire. In the words of the Commander-in-Chief, “After about an hour’s fire, that of the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to justify an advance. I then ordered my left division to advance.” Campbell soon became closely engaged. Lord Gough then deemed it necessary to push forward his right wing, and the heavy guns were ordered to cease firing. The Commander-in-Chief soon received intelligence of a great misfortune having happened to Pennycuick’s brigade (one of Campbell’s division)—the 24th regiment of foot especially suffered severe loss.[109] The other brigade, consisting of 61st foot and two native corps, had, however, made a more successful advance. The reserve under Penny was now ordered forward to support Gilbert’s division; but this consisted of but two native regiments (one having been left on rear-guard). Sir W. Gilbert’s division, well supported by Dawes’s brigade, met with but little loss, with the exception of the 30th and 56th native infantry, which corps suffered severely. But further on the right, Pope’s brigade of cavalry, and the horse-artillery under Colonel Grant, were driven back with much loss. The cavalry, it seems, had formed line on the right of the guns, and were then ordered to advance through the jungle. From some unexplained causes, they had only just come within sight of the enemy, when the brigade—notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to stop the movement—retreated, not, however, without loss, for the Sikh cavalry hung closely on their heels. Unfortunately, the men did not retreat directly to the position from whence they had advanced, but, obliquing, came in front of the guns (some of which were unlimbered) and galloped through them, the Sikhs mixed up with them, or close behind; so that our men could not fire without slaying our own cavalry. The consequence was, many of the gunners were cut down at their guns, and six of the pieces fell into the enemy’s hands (two were afterwards recovered by Lieutenant C. Cookworthy, of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, who, after the action, took limbers and horses, and sought for his division). Major Christie received several severe sword and spear wounds, of which he died on the 15th. The other three guns and the cavalry retreated through the jungle, until they reached an open space, near which stood the Chief and his staff. Here the guns drew up, and the cavalry rallied, with the exception of a small party, which continued its flight as far as the field hospital, established on the mound near Chillianwallah.

The Sikh cavalry, who had followed in pursuit, halted at the edge of the jungle, and a few rounds from our remaining pieces soon forced them to retire. Colonel Lane, who commanded on the extreme right, had also been attacked by cavalry, but he had repulsed them with a grape fire from his guns. Meantime our cavalry and artillery on the left had made a successful advance, and Campbell, at the head of the 61st foot and some native infantry, had swept all before him, taking several batteries. Gilbert too, in his advance, had overthrown everything, capturing a great quantity of ordnance. The enemy was everywhere driven from his ground and forced back upon his positions, and our troops, somewhat shattered, remained in possession of the field. But night had now come on, and, seeing the great loss that we had met with, the difficulty of the ground, and that our men were weary and exhausted, the Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with Campbell, considered it expedient to bivouac on the edge of the jungle, at the foot of the mound at Chillianwallah. Unfortunately, this caused the loss of nearly all the guns which we had taken from the enemy—most of them were recovered by them in the night—four of our own too, were carried off, and we secured only thirteen of the enemy’s. Whether the Sikhs claimed the victory, or whether it was in exultation at the trophies gained—some colours besides the guns—or whether it was merely to inform their friends that they still held Russool, they fired a salute that night from the summit of the ridge.

Our loss in this action was severe. Of the artillery, Major Christie, as before mentioned, died of his wounds, as also did Lieutenant Manson, of the 4th troop 2nd brigade; Captain Dawes and 1st Lieutenant Dundas were wounded. The total loss of _killed_ was 2 serjeants, 14 rank-and-file, 1 lascar and 1 syce; _wounded_, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank and file, 8 lascars, and 1 syce; _missing_, 2 rank and file, and 6 syces.

The morning of the 14th set in wet and gloomy, and the Chief then issued orders to pitch camp upon ground marked out immediately in rear of the mound, fronting the enemy’s position. Whatever intentions Lord Gough may have half-formed of resuming the attack on the 14th, the heavy fall of rain which commenced that evening and continued during several following days, induced him to abandon them. He immediately set about strengthening his position, and the sad task of collecting and burying his dead. And so the British and Sikh armies sat down in sight of each other, with scarcely four miles of ground between their respective camps.

Such was the battle of Chillianwallah; a victory, certainly, insomuch as we remained in possession of the field of battle; but a failure, inasmuch as Lord Gough did not accomplish his object—to drive Shere Singh across the Jhelum, and to completely overthrow him before Chuttur Singh could form a junction with his son.

A month of inactivity succeeded. Our position was a bad one; it covered no road, did not protect the country in our rear, nor guard our communications; neither did it in any way confine the enemy. Our communication with Dhingee was exceedingly precarious; supplies and forage, as well as water, were scarce. We should have felt the want of the latter severely, had it not been for several heavy falls of rain, which filled some dry hollows. As considerable reinforcements were in progress to join Shere Singh, it seemed not at all improbable that he might venture to attack us in our camp. The Commander-in-Chief therefore strengthened our position as much as possible. A good deal of jungle which might conceal the enemy’s designs was cut down; several trenches were dug in front of the line, to afford temporary protection to picquets; the heavy ordnance was placed in battery at the mound to sweep all the ground in front,—and subsequently, a square redoubt was erected to strengthen our right flank, which approached the sand-ridge, and was more liable to attack than any other part. This redoubt was at first armed with some spare field-pieces, drawn by bullocks, but afterwards by the 3rd company 2nd brigade horse-artillery,[110] to which Captain Kinleside, of No. 5 heavy field-battery, had been appointed—Major Ludlow succeeding him in command of the battery. The right flank of our camp was thrown back nearly at right angles. In it were two troops of horse-artillery under Colonel Grant. Fordyce’s troop (2nd company 2nd brigade) of 9–pounders was at the angle, and afterwards placed in a small battery a short distance to the front. Dawes was in the front face with Gilbert, sending out two guns on picquet; the heavy ordnance at the mound; No. 5, with Campbell’s division near the village; No. 10, in rear with Penny. Beyond the village were three troops of horse-artillery under Colonel Brooke (when the 3rd troop 2nd brigade was removed to the redoubts, the number with him was reduced to two). Our left, beyond the village, was slightly retired in an oblique direction. The park was in rear of the mound. As the enemy became stronger and more threatening, several changes took place. The whole of the left was thrown back so as to unite the village of Mojawalla in rear of camp—with the front face, and our right flank was also connected with the village by a rear face—thus our camp formed an irregular quadrilateral figure, or rhomboid, and four pieces of heavy ordnance were placed near Mojawalla. But it was some time before our camp had assumed this form.

The enemy almost daily received accessions of strength. Chuttur Singh joined the Sikh force, and salutes were common in their camp. Reports were frequent of their intention to attack, but little credit was given to them. The Chief, however, considered it prudent to be prepared; half the men, and latterly all, were ordered to sleep in their clothes, and a signal (three guns from the mound) was agreed upon, at which all the troops should turn out. The enemy occasionally made some demonstration. Sometimes his whole line turned out, but more frequently he brought small parties into the jungle, below Russool, and then attacked our right wing, which was frequently on the alert. But the Sikhs gave us the greatest annoyance by capturing our baggage-cattle. This they did frequently, and we were obliged to send out very strong parties of cavalry to protect them. Our horse-artillery, too, had very fatiguing work, guns being frequently out with detachments sent to protect convoys of grain, &c. These had to make long, harassing marches, and latterly it became necessary to send out parties of cavalry and horse-artillery to reconnoitre the country in our right rear.

Thus wearily passed the time, news from Mooltan being most anxiously looked for. At length we had the pleasure to fire a royal salute for its capture and to discuss the circumstances of the successful siege. What those circumstances were, should be here briefly recorded:—On the 26th of December the Bombay troops joined General Whish under the walls of Mooltan. The force now amounted to 17,000 men, with sixty-four pieces of artillery. The time for renewed action had arrived, and Whish was ready to commence operations. Indeed, on the morning of the 26th, before the Bombay division had come up, he had issued an order, expressing his hope that within twenty-four hours after their arrival, “all the enemy’s posts that are a requisite preliminary to the commencement of a regular attack on the citadel,” would be carried; and in the course of the following day they were in our possession. In these operations, four guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain Anderson, and four guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade, under Captain Mackenzie, were engaged; the former with the centre column, and the latter with the right column. On the following day Whish, reporting these operations to the adjutant-general, wrote, “I hope to-morrow morning to have an 8–inch mortar-battery of six pieces playing on the citadel, at five or six hundred yards’ distance.”

On the 30th the general reported that our batteries were in full play, and that already a shell from a mortar, laid by Lieutenant Newall, had exploded the principal magazine in the citadel. Whish had been with the rocket troop at Hatrass, when the great magazine had been blown up there, and now he wrote that the sight of the Mooltan explosion was “awfully grand, and precisely similar to that at the siege of Hatrass, on the 1st of March, 1817.” “I hope,” he added, “that the consequence may be the same; in which case the enemy would abandon the fort to-night; otherwise I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow.” The batteries at this time in operation, as reported in the general’s letter, were six 8–inch mortars, three 10–inch ditto, four 5½-inch ditto (opened on the 28th), six 18–pounders (opened on the Kooneeh-Boorj), two 8–inch mortars, two 10–inch ditto, and two 24–pounders (with the mortars in the first line, opened on the 29th). Five more 8–inch mortars were then laid down.

Seldom or never in any part of the world has a city been exposed to such a terrific shelling as the doomed city of Mooltan. The well served ordnance did tremendous execution upon both houses and inhabitants; and soon the ruined streets were choked with the mutilated bodies of the dead. The effect was highly creditable to the skill of both artillery and engineers. On the first day of the new year (1849) the breaches in the city walls appeared to be practicable, and the assault was fixed for the following day. It was on the 2nd of January that the city of Mooltan was carried by the British troops. The gallantry of the infantry column, on this occasion, will never be overlooked by the general historian; but it does not come within the scope of this memoir to record it. Mooltan was carried at the point of the bayonet, but the citadel still remained in the hands of Moolraj.

The batteries now, therefore, opened again, with tremendous effect, on the fortress. The possession of the city had enabled Whish to advance his guns, and he had erected new batteries of heavy ordnance to bear upon the citadel. On the 7th a battery of seven 18–pounders was completed and armed, and a mortar battery for three 10–inch howitzers. On the 8th a battery for six 24–pounders and six 18–pounders was commenced. “The object of this battery,” wrote the general, “is to keep down the fire of the citadel opposite to it, and eventually to breach at the north-east angle.” On the following day a shell from the enemy’s position ignited the seven 18–pounder battery, which was constructed of fascines and sand-bags, and burnt it down, in spite of every effort to extinguish the flames. The engineers in the mean time were sapping up to the foot of the glacis; and the enemy, alarmed by our near approach, were thinking of making terms for themselves. The interior of the citadel had become a ruin; and further resistance was, indeed, hopeless. The garrison declared that they could no longer hold out against the terrible shelling, which was destroying them. Moolraj was at the last gasp. All his efforts to rally his followers were in vain. They told him that he must either sally out at the head of his men and cut his way through the besiegers, or abandon his post and trust himself to the clemency of the victors. So the Dewan began to sue for terms. The answer of the British general was, that nothing would satisfy him but an unconditional surrender. So on the morning of the 22nd of January the garrison laid down their arms, and Moolraj came into the British camp.

The operations had lasted nearly four weeks, throughout which time the artillery were continually engaged—keeping up an incessant fire of shot and shell, from guns, howitzers, and mortars—first upon the city, and then upon the citadel of Mooltan. The practice is admitted to have been excellent. It was, said General Whish, with the enthusiasm of an old artillery officer, “the theme of admiration with all.”[111] The officers of the Bengal division especially named in his official despatch were Majors Garbett and Day; Captains Daniel, Anderson, Master, and Mackenzie; Lieutenant Mill (brigade-major), and Lieutenant Peter Christie (commissary of ordnance).

The following officers were present at the siege of Mooltan:—

_Majors_—H. Garbett, E. F. Day; _Captains_—J. H. Daniell, J. Anderson, E. V. Master, M. Mackenzie; _Lieutenants_—W. Hay, G. Moir, F. W. Swinhoe, F. Alexander, H. Francis, R. Mecham, D. J. Newall, A. Bunny, W. Miller, J. F. Raper, J. Thompson, H. T. Bishop; _2nd Lieutenants_—F. R. Debudé, J. Hunter, C. T. Graham, F. C. Simons, M. C. Sankey, J. G. Worthington, W. F. Quayles, E. W. Day;—Lieutenant John Mill, brigade-major; Lieutenant P. Christie, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant W. K. Footes, brigade quarter-master.

In the course of the operations, the casualties in the Bengal artillery amounted to 1 European officer (Lieutenant James Thompson), 2 havildars, and 10 rank and file, _killed_; with 4 European officers (Lieutenants Bunny, Hunter, Sankey, and Graham), 3 havildars, and 62 rank and file, _wounded_. These include all the casualties since the raising of the siege. Lieutenant Bunny was wounded in September, and Lieutenant Sankey in November, 1848; the other two officers in the course of the January siege.

Before quitting the subject of these memorable operations, we must insert the following memorandum of the artillery practice at Mooltan, by Lieutenant Newall, which affords much interesting information relative to the details of the siege:—

“During the siege of Mooltan, the Bengal artillerymen were so few, that it was found impossible to afford a relief in the batteries without withdrawing gunners from the troops of horse-artillery. A relief, however, was thus effected daily between 3 and 4 P.M., which was found the most convenient hour, as it afforded time to the relieving officer to ascertain his range, &c. before nightfall, and to prepare and fix his ammunition for expenditure during the night. It was convenient, also, for the men in other respects.

“In the howitzer batteries, it was the practice to receive the charge ready weighed out from the magazine; but in the mortar batteries the charges were invariably weighed out in battery. The bursting charges of all shells were received in battery ready weighed out in small bags, and the shells were always filled by means of a funnel, and fuzes prepared and set by means of a fuze-bench in the battery. Live shells were never sent down to battery from the magazine, as no advantage in point of time was to be gained thereby, the preparing of shells being found in the hands of expert men to fully keep pace with the working of the ordnance. The practice was thus rendered very much more satisfactory, as the length of the fuze could be altered according to circumstances; such as the variation of strength of powder, which was found to be most dependent on the state of the weather, and even of the ordnance, which as the day advanced would gradually warm, contracting the dampness of the powder, and rendering necessary an alteration in the length of fuze. The effects of the howitzers employed in breaching was a subject of satisfaction and astonishment to all; indeed it is doubtful whether the natural mounds of the fort would have been practically breached without their aid. Even against the brickwork their effects were conspicuous. These shells, made to burst at the moment of contact with the walls, afterwards during their passage through the revêtement, and ultimately with a longer fuze in the earth beyond it, would probably (against such masonry) have alone effected practicable breaches without the assistance of heavy guns.

“At a distance of 150 yards, both the 8–inch and 10–inch howitzers were employed in breaching a scarp wall, part of which was invisible from the battery, and only reached by a plunging fire, obtained by very small charges, and succeeded admirably. At a distance of thirty-five yards, 8–inch howitzers were similarly employed with a charge of 8 oz., a very low velocity being requisite to prevent the shell from burying itself too far in the soft earth. Of the effects of the vertical fire, nothing could have afforded a clearer proof than the ruinous appearance presented by the interior of the fort on its surrender; and the explosion of the great magazine, which took place within one hour of its site being indicated to the batteries, was a subject of congratulation to the Bengal artillery employed, bearing testimony as it did to the accuracy of their practice.

“On the 9th January, 600 shells were fired from an 8–inch mortar battery of six pieces in twenty-four hours, and the mortars did not suffer. No new feature, however, presented itself from the employment of these pieces, nor from that of the heavy guns, which, however, vied with the mortars and howitzers in utility. Doubtless it is by a judicious combination of the three that such powerful effects are produced,—but it may be worth inquiring whether, in the siege-trains employed against fortresses in the East, built as they generally are of old and often crazy materials, a greater proportion of howitzers might not be used with advantage, in cases where no particular object exists to curtail the transport of the shells, which is doubtless great. In addition to what has been above stated of the effects of these most useful pieces in mining the defences and in counter-battery, which was conspicuous throughout the siege, it may be remarked that one shell was often found sufficient to silence the fire from an embrasure of the enemy for a whole day. Rack-lashing platforms were used by the Bengal artillery throughout the siege for the guns and howitzers, and were found to answer most satisfactorily, and the small Bengal mortar platforms, consisting of three sleepers, upon which seven strong planks, each four feet long, were pegged transversely, were made up in the park, and thus taken down to the batteries, where they were expeditiously laid, and stood the firing both of the 8–inch and 10–inch mortars without renewal during the siege; the only difference being, that from the 10–inch mortars other sleepers were laid transversely beneath, to prevent the platforms sinking.”

Having now reduced Mooltan, and captured the Dewan, General Whish determined to move forward, with all possible despatch, to reinforce the Commander-in-Chief. Leaving, therefore, a British garrison in Mooltan, he commenced his march, with the head-quarters, on the 29th January; an advanced brigade, with a troop of horse-artillery, having broken ground two days before. The main body of the Bengal division was accompanied by a siege-train of twelve pieces. The march which he then accomplished, though it has been unaccountably slurred over in the published papers, is one of the most memorable upon record. It was not only distinguished by the energy and rapidity which marked the general’s movements, but by its effect upon the issue of the entire campaign. Had not Whish, with his leading column, reached Ramnuggur, as he did, on the 13th of February, Shere Singh would have ravaged the Rechna Doab, and the campaign would have been a long and desultory one.[112]

Whilst the troops under the Commander-in-Chief were patiently awaiting the coming of General Whish, which would enable them to resume the offensive, the enemy seemed at one time inclined to become the assailant, but by some unaccountable freak of madness chose to abandon his strong position, and take to the open country. His probable object was more readily to procure food. In the second week of February, about half the Sikh army changed ground to its left, and took possession of the Khuri defile, running through the sand-ridge. His advanced parties held Noor Jumal and Dingee, and occasionally even the villages of Burra and Chota Omrao, between our camp and Dingee. They were now on both sides of us; but as our camp was now formed, we were well prepared for an attack. On the 11th, the signal-guns were fired, and our whole army turned out. The enemy was threatening us on both sides; but to our rear, his line had advanced from Khuri, even beyond the villages of Omrao, and could be plainly seen at the edge of the jungle from Mojawalla. Cavalry and horse-artillery were sent out to meet him on this side. The former threw out a chain of videttes, which the Sikhs did not attempt to break. It was not Shere Singh’s object to attack us in camp, but to draw us out into the jungle. After a demonstration of about four hours, the Sikhs withdrew into their camps.

Early on the morning of the 12th, it was discovered, to our surprise, that the enemy had abandoned his position at Russool. His rear-guard was then quickly leaving the sand-ridge. On the 13th, he withdrew also from Khuri. At first we were rather perplexed to ascertain in what direction he had proceeded, but it was soon ascertained that his march was towards Goojerat. Thus he had completely turned our right flank, and our remaining at Chillianwallah was consequently no longer prudent; but, on the contrary, there was the utmost need that we should make a corresponding movement, as it seemed to be the design of the enemy to cross the Chenab, and march straight upon Lahore. Luckily this was frustrated. On the 15th, the army marched to Lussooria, which we had so fruitlessly quitted only a month before. From this it had been intended to cross the river at Ramnuggur, and endeavour to outstrip the enemy in the race to Lahore. But, fortunately, General Whish had now reached Ramnuggur, and, seeing the danger, should the enemy be able to cross the Chenab, he pushed forward the 53rd foot (which had come out from Lahore), with two guns of No. 6 field-battery, and some other troops, to guard the fords near Wuzeerabad, and Markham’s brigade, with two guns of 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery,—those lower down. Thus Shere Singh was foiled, and his army remained encamped near the town of Goojrat, the centre of a richly-cultivated province.

From Lussooria our army moved towards the enemy, slowly, to enable the Mooltan troops to join. On the 16th, they marched to Sadoolapore; on the 17th, to Kunjur; and after a halt, they reached Shahdiwaol on the 20th. By this time all Whish’s force had joined, except Markham’s brigade, and two guns—4th troop 3rd brigade—watching the fords. The brigade, however, crossed before the action.

The accession of strength in artillery which Whish brought us, was as follows:—4th troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, under Captain M. Mackenzie; 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery (2 guns absent), under Captain J. Anderson; a troop of horse-artillery of the Bombay army (the horse field-battery of Bombay was on rear-guard duty), and four 18–pounders, and four 10–inch howitzers, under Major Day.

Our march from Lussooria had been through most beautiful cultivation. We had marched in a line of contiguous columns, encamping in the same order.

On the 21st, our artillery was thus disposed:—On the extreme right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Warner’s troop, 1st troop 3rd brigade (attached to Lockwood’s cavalry brigade), with Whish’s division; Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s troops, under Major H. Garbett, with Gilbert’s division; Fordyce’s troop, and Dawes’s battery.

In the centre, Major Horsford; four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Major Sir R. Shakespear; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain J. D. Shakespear.

Major Day; two 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Master; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers under Captain Austin.

On their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Kinleside’s and Lane’s troops, with Campbell’s division—No. 5 (Major Ludlow’s), and 10 (under Lieutenant Robertson), horse field-battery, commanded by Major Mowatt, with the cavalry on the extreme left,—Huish’s and Duncan’s troops.

This time we had everything in our favour—a beautiful, level, open country, with no obstructions, a richly-cultivated plain, dotted with a few villages and trees. It was a bright sunny day: before nine the action was commenced. The enemy’s camp was close to Goojrat, but he moved out about a mile to oppose us, occupying the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha, in front of his centre and left. But we were not aware at first that he had any troops in them. As soon as he perceived our line, he fired three signal-guns. Our line then halted, while the Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred and made his dispositions. But little delay was, however, necessary—all was so clear—and we had marched from camp in battle order. The action soon commenced.

“At half-past seven o’clock,” says the Commander-in-Chief, in his official despatch, “the army advanced with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery, covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed.[113] The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and resolutely maintained its position. But the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back.”

In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, General Gilbert says,—“Having received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to show their position, I immediately advanced a troop of horse-artillery (Fordyce’s), and Dawes’s field-battery, which constantly drew a very heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy had established on either side of the village of Kalrha, by which they were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light companies, were still further pushed forward. The heavy guns on our centre at this time opened a very destructive fire.”

Of the artillery with his division, General Whish observes,—“Both troops (Anderson’s and Mackenzie’s) began a spirited cannonade, and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour, until the enemy’s guns in our front were silenced.”

Nos. 5 and 10, light field-batteries, were attached to the infantry division, under General Campbell. Of these, the General writes:—“I cannot find language to express my sense of the calm, steady, and admirable manner in which these two batteries were commanded and worked by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow, and Lieutenant Robertson. The infantry of the 3rd division had not occasion to fire a shot. The enemy were driven from their different positions, and from the field, by the fire of these two field-batteries, aided by that of the Bombay troop.”

In the meanwhile, Huish’s and Duncan’s troops on the left, and Warner’s on the right, acted in conjunction with the cavalry on our flanks. Of the former, General Thackwell thus writes:—“To oppose the enemy’s guns, I ordered Captain Duncan to move his troop of horse-artillery to the front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600 yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish’s troop, and both did considerable execution upon the enemy. These troops [the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers] made a most brilliant charge upon the enemy. At the same time I advanced the guns and cavalry towards the enemy’s line. The fire of the guns soon put the Gowcherras to retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on the right, caused their whole force to seek safety in flight.” Brigadier Lockwood says:—“At the commencement of the action, I directed Captain Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy near a village in our front. But as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I changed position, left back, and the horse-artillery ceased firing. The enemy’s horsemen now appeared in great force on our right, threatening to turn our flank. So I changed front to the right. Captain Warner’s guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them; but they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular cavalry moved round by a circuitous route and got completely into our rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns, with a squadron of the 16th dragoons, who, in conjunction with Major Christie’s corps of irregular cavalry, drove them off. About this time a large _gole_ of horse came on towards me, but as they turned at once from the fire of the guns, I refrained from advancing after them.”

The two troops of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Brind were in reserve at the commencement of the action, but soon afterwards were brought to the front, for the purpose of enfilading one of the enemy’s batteries.

After detailing the attacks on the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha, which were taken in the most spirited manner by Brigadiers Penney and Hervey, Lord Gough continues, in his published despatch: “The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries, which I strengthened, by bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all points.”

The battle was now over, and the pursuit commenced, the whole of the horse-artillery accompanying. The action was almost entirely an artillery fight. For about two hours and a half that arm alone was engaged. It was before the terrible fire of eighty-eight guns that the Sikh army abandoned the field.

In his official despatch, the Commander-in-Chief thus writes:—“To Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm, the artillery, to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious victory of Goojrat, I am indeed most grateful. Conspicuous as the artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over the enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown than in this battle. The heavy batteries manœuvred with the celerity of light guns; and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed fire of the troops of horse-artillery and light field-batteries merit my warmest praise.”

At the two villages alone were the infantry seriously engaged. Penney’s (late Godby’s) and Hervey’s brigades were sent to take them, and were somewhat surprised to find them occupied by some considerable parties. Our left wing scarcely fired a shot. The cavalry was hardly engaged at all. The Scinde horse made one charge. All the horse-artillery suffered severely, especially the 4th troop 1st brigade, the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, and the 4th troop 3rd brigade. Captain Anderson, of the last-mentioned troop, was killed, as was also Lieutenant Day, of No. 10 horse field-battery.

The artillery loss was greater than that of any other branch in proportion to its numbers.

The artillery division lost in _killed_, 2 officers, 1 sergeant, 20 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, and 3 syces; _wounded_, 1 European officer (Sir Richard Shakespear), 1 native officer, 4 sergeants, two trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, and 7 syces: _total_, killed and wounded, 111.

The enemy did not attempt to rally at the town of Goojrat, as it was supposed they would, but fled precipitately at once, leaving camp, baggage, and a vast quantity of material and artillery in the hands of the victors. It was almost to be regretted that they did not wait on their ground a little longer; their loss, except in the two villages, was from the artillery alone, and they suffered but little that afternoon in the pursuit.

The broken Sikh army fled across the Jhelum, with a few hundred Afghan cavalry, who had left their mountains, hoping for some opportunity to avenge themselves on their old enemies. Sir W. Gilbert, with two divisions of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, was ordered in pursuit.

The artillery branch consisted of the 2nd troop 2nd brigade and the 4th troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, Blood’s troop horse-artillery, Dawes’s horse-battery, the Bombay horse brigade, and four reserve companies, with a well-equipped train, adapted to elephant-draught, the whole under Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., with Brigade-Major Kaye as his staff officer. The brilliant success which attended Gilbert’s rapid pursuit is well known. No further opportunity was given to our troops to gain distinction in the field. The march was an arduous one, the country most difficult, especially for heavy ordnance; but perseverance overcame all. The Sikhs soon saw the futility of further opposition; the sirdars surrendered,—their army was disarmed, and disbanded at Hoormuch and Rawul-pindee,—and Gilbert drove the Afghans across the Attock, and into the rugged mountains of the Khyber; and thus ended the second Sikh war.

The under-named artillery officers were mentioned in general orders:—

Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Tennant; Lieutenant Olpherts, A.D.C.; Captain Abercrombie, D.A.A.G.A.; Brigadiers Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigade Majors Kaye and Cox; Captain Hogge, commissary, and Lieutenant Christie, deputy-commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant-Colonel Grant; Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day; Lieutenant-Colonel Brind; Major Mowatt; Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B.; Majors Ludlow, Fordyce; Captains J. D. Shakespear, F. K. Duncan, L. P. Master, R. R. Kinleside, A. Huish, Major Sir R. Shakespear; Captains E. G. Austen, M. Mackenzie, W. K. Warner, M. Dawes; Lieutenants A. Robertson, H. Tombs (deputy assistant quartermaster-general), E. B. Johnson (deputy judge-advocate-general).

The following honorary distinctions were conferred:—

To be a Knight-Commander of the Bath.—Major-General Whish.

To be Commanders of the Bath.—Colonel Tennant, Lieutenant-Colonels Grant, Brind.

To be Lieutenant-Colonels.—Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day, Mowatt, Ludlow, Fordyce, Sir R. Shakespear.

To be Majors.—Captains J. D. Shakespear, Duncan, Master, Kinleside, Huish, Austen, Mackenzie, Warner, Dawes, Hogge, Abercrombie.

Also to be Majors on promotion to Captains regimentally.—Lieutenant E. Kaye, C. V. Cox, A. Robertson, P. Christie, H. A. Olpherts, H. Tombs, E. B. Johnson.

Brigadier-General Tennant was subsequently created a K.C.B.

In commemoration of the victories of the Punjab, a medal was struck, of which the following is a transcript:—

A vote of thanks was passed by both Houses of Parliament and by the Court of Proprietors to the armies engaged in these operations, and the eminent services of General Whish and Brigadier Tennant, of the artillery, were especially named. To the splendid working of the artillery the highest military authorities in the country mainly attributed the brilliant termination of the war: and we know not how this record of the services of the corps can be more fitly brought to a close than with the following well-merited tribute paid to the artillery by Lord Hardinge in the House of Lords, on the 24th of April, 1849:—

“It was, it appeared, to the skilful employment of the artillery that they were indebted for this victory; and great as the result had been with so small a loss of men, he (Viscount Hardinge) felt that that arm of the service was most admirably conducted on that occasion. This argued most admirable conduct on the part of the artillery; and it would appear, by most of the accounts received, that so effectually had this arm of the service been employed, that the Sikh artillery, though managed as usual with great bravery, was, notwithstanding all their efforts, perfectly silenced; so that it was not necessary for the British infantry to fire in line, with the exception of two regiments of Europeans and four regiments of Native Infantry. With the exception of those regiments, not a regiment of their infantry fired a musket-shot, so considerable was the service rendered by the Indian artillery. That force was certainly a most splendid one, and second he would say to none; and it had been mainly instrumental in obtaining for Lord Gough one of his best and most splendid triumphs. The statement made by his Lordship, in his despatch, was, that the heavy artillery—eighteen-pounders—were actually manœuvred and handled with the facility of field-guns. He (Viscount Hardinge) had seen the same thing done with those eighteen-pounders during the campaign of the Sutlej. Two elephants were harnessed to each eighteen-pounder, and they carried the guns with the greatest facility over every sort of ground without any assistance and without causing any delay or impediment to the infantry. That practice was first resorted to in the campaign of 1846, when the heavy guns were brought up from Delhi, a distance of 300 miles, and were carried on every occasion without any trouble, and he believed that had never before been seen in India. The able officer who commanded the artillery in the late battle had been mentioned,—he referred to Brigadier-General Tennant, who had been so much praised by Lord Gough; and he (Viscount Hardinge) wished to say that he had the honour of knowing him, and he was ably seconded by another excellent officer. Seeing the great importance of artillery in modern warfare, and seeing, also, that its value had been so signally manifested in India, he would remind their Lordships at the same time that a committee was sitting elsewhere to investigate the state of the Ordnance Department; and he trusted that their Lordships would not allow that valuable arm of the service, which took so much time to create, and which when created was so valuable, to be reduced below a scale of proper strength and efficiency. In Bengal alone, the regular army had 200 pieces of artillery ready to be moved, comprising 120 nine-pounders, and the remainder three and six-pounders, and that was exclusive of all the artillery that belonged to local and irregular corps. Besides that, there was during the campaign more than 100 pieces of heavy artillery, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, actually on the Sutlej, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun. They were all complete and ready for action, and all that was required was the actual necessity for their movement. That was a state of readiness that was very much to be admired, and he hoped they would never consent to cripple that noble arm of their service.”

* * * * *

_Note to page 435._—It is stated at page 435, that a monumental column was raised (at Dum-Dum) to the memory of Captain Nicholl and the officers and men of the 1st troop 1st brigade, who perished so gloriously on the retreat from Caubul. As this sheet is going through the press, I learn that the column has been blown down during a _typhaun_, and that it is the intention of the regiment not to restore it, but to place, in its stead, a monumental slab in the Dum-Dum church. I trust that I shall be pardoned for saying that I believe such a resolution, if carried into effect, will be greatly regretted by many of the relatives of the brave men to whom the column was dedicated, and by some, at least, of the original promoters of the testimonial.—_Editor._

* * * * *

ERRATA.

In the preface, page x, line 4, _for_ “Sikhs crossed the Punjab,” _read_ “Sikhs crossed the Sutlej.”

Page 130, line 8 from bottom (Colonel Deare’s Epitaph), _for_ “Royal Artillery,” _read_ “Bengal Artillery.”

Page 371, line 8, _for_ “G. R. MacGregor,” _read_ “R. G. MacGregor.”

Page 409, last line of text, _for_ “Walrek,” _read_ “Walker.”

ILLUSTRATIONS TO CHAPTER IV.

FIELD-CARRIAGES.

AMMUNITION-WAGGONS.

ELEVATING-SCREWS.—_Page 176._

SIEGE-CARRIAGES.

COLONEL DUFF’S PATTERN.—_Page 179._

HARDWICKE’S PATTERN.—_Page 183._

HORSFORD’S MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.—_Page 184._

MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.

AMMUNITION-CARRIAGE (1823).—_Page 187._

INDEX.

Abbott, A. Capt. 195; Lieut. 386; Capt. 415, 426, 432, 440, 442, 444, 445, 446, 451

—— J. Lieut. 386, 409, 411

Abercrombie, Sir Ralph, 229

—— Sir Robert C. C. 154, 156

—— Lieut. 407, 443, 446, 471; Capt. 526, 571

Achmuty, Sir Samuel, 300

Adams, Major, 20, 23; Col. 352, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359

Adamson, Lieut. 23

Addison, Lieut. 90

Agnew, Mr. 522

A’Hearne, Gunner, 448

Ahmuty, Lieut. 214

Aldercron, Col. 4, 8

Alexander, Lieut. 385; Capt. 443, 444, 446, 451; Major, 457, 462; Lieut.-Col. 499, 503, 513, 514, 515

Allen, Sub-Lieut. 373

Amyatt, Mr. 19

Anderson, W. Capt. 195; Lieut. 385; Capt. 427, 437, 447, 448, 451

—— J. Lieut. 409; Capt. 523, 550, 554, 561, 562, 564, 569

Archer, Lieut. 297

Armstrong, Lieut. N.I. 326

Ashburnham, Brig. 504, 510

Atlay, E. Lieut. 497, 483

Auckland, Lord, 394

Austen, Lieut. 468, 492, 504

—— E. G. 571

Austin, Capt. 455, 499, 514, 533, 562

Backhouse, Major, 185; Lieut. 385; Capt. 400, 413, 427, 431, 440, 441, 442, 446, 448

Baillie, Capt. 31, 39; Major, 69; Lieut.-Col. 70, 73; Col. 84, 90

—— Lieut. 77, 82, 83, 84

Baker, Lieut. 156

—— O. Lieut. 327

Balfour, H. Lieut. 84, 150; Capt.-Lieut. 214

Ball, Lieut.-Col. 290

Barr, Lieut. 413, 414

Barton, Lieut. 89; Capt. 127, 159, 166; Major, 204

Battine, Capt.-Lieut. 316, 334, 346; Major, 385

Bayle, Lieut. 214

Bazely, 2nd Lieut. 386

Beagham, Lieut. 256, 284

Beatson, 217

Bedingfield, Lieut. 376

Begbie, Lieut. 378

Bell, C. H. Lieut. 322, 323

—— W. Lieut. 296, 357; Capt. 385; Maj. 407

Best, R. Capt.-Lieut. 246, 250, 255, 284

Biddulph, Capt. 371, 379, 455; Lieut.-Col. 499; Brig. 507, 514, 515

Biggs, Capt. 327, 345, 353; Lieut.-Col. 385

Bingley, Lieut. 385

Bishop, Lieut. 554

Black, Lieut. 30

Blacker, Col. 354

Blaquiere, Col. 174

Blair, Col. 74

Blake, E. Lieut. 371

—— G. Lieut. 319, 345, 352, 354; Capt. 385

Blood, Capt. 570

Blundel, Lieut. 89

Blunt, Sir Charles, 99

Boileau, Lieut. 283; Capt.-Lieut. 303, 314; Capt. 333

—— F. 2nd Lieut. 385; Capt. 468, 503, 515

Bolton, Capt. 158

Bourchier, Lieut. 455

Boyce, Lieut. 69

Boyle, J. D. Lieut. 264

Bowie, Lieut. 479

Bradshaw, Major, 319

Brady, Lieut. 376, 378

Brind, F. Capt. 171; Lieut. 376; Capt. 455, 461, 462; Major, 469, 483, 485, 492, 493, 494, 495, 514, 515; Lieut.-Col. 538, 540, 541, 562, 567, 571

Briscoe, Lieut. 127, 151

Broadbridge, or } Broadburn, } Capt. 15, 18, 19

Broadfoot, Major, 472, 473, 514

Brooke, Lieut. 214, 215; Capt. 288, 289, 290, 314, 317; Lieut.-Col. 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 499, 507, 514, 515, 527, 534, 538, 547, 567, 571

—— G. Lieut. 331

Brougham, Lieut. 436, 447

Broughton, Lieut.-Col. 261

Brown, B. Lieut. 371, 376; Capt. 455, 462

—— Chas. Lieut. 146, 151, 156

—— Clement, Lieut. 119, 121; Brev.-Capt. 231, 242, 250; Capt. 260, 271, 272, 283, 284; Major, 364; Brig. 385

Brown, J. Lieut. 23

—— M. Lieut. 260, 284

—— Lieut. 89, 94

Browne, R. Lieut. 119, 214

Bruce, R. Lieut. 69; Major, 153; Lieut.-Col. 204

—— W. Lieut. 89

Buchan, Lieut. 134, 148, 151

Buck, Lieut. 17, 327

Buckle, Lieut. 376, 407; Capt. 509

Bunny, Lieut. 522, 524, 554, 555

Burn, Col. 270

Burnett, Lieut. 31; Capt. 147, 150, 200; Major, 204

Burrington, Col. 158

Burroughs, W. 155

Burton, Lieut. 376

Butler, Lieut. 121, 146, 250; Capt. 273; Major, 302, 303, 333

Caldwell, Capt.-Lieut. 214; Major, 296, 301

Cameron, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 300, 301, 302, 303

Campbell, A. 7

—— C. H. Lieut. 288; Capt.-Lieut. 289, 314, 333

—— G. N. Lieut. 331, 373, 385

—— G. 455, 461, 462; Brev.-Major, 468, 483, 513, 514, 515

—— Gunner, 282

—— Sir Archibald, 372, 379

Cardew, Lieut. 374

Carnac, Major, 19, 25; Col. 73

Carne, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361

Carnegie, Lieut. 88; Capt. 155; Major, 204; Col. 293

Cartwright, Capt. 317, 326, 331, 333

Cautley, Lieut. 386

Chesney, Lieut. and Adj. 316

Champion, Col. 26, 38, 39

Christie, A. Lieut. 432, 443, 449

Christie, P. Lieut. 454, 523, 527, 554

—— E. Capt. 499, 514, 515, 518, 533, 540, 543, 566

Clark, Lieut. 121; Capt. 159

Clarke, E. Lieut. 150, 159; Capt. 214, 228, 229

Cleland, Serg. 448

Clerk, Lieut. 386

Clifford, Lieut. 454, 521

Clifton, Capt.-Lieut. 29

Cochrane, Lieut. 16

Cockerell, Lieut.-Col. 121, 126

Collier, Capt.-Lieut. 214

Combermere, Lord, 383

Constable, Lieut. 89; Capt. 246, 250, 284

Cookworthy, Lieut. 543

Cooper, Lieut. 409, 414, 428, 429, 447

Cornish, Lieut. 436, 449

Cotes, H. Lieut. 69

Coulthard, Lieut. 334; Capt.-Lieut. 357, 361, 363

Counsell, Lieut 319, 363, 371

Cox, C. V. Lieut. 455, 479, 527, 571

Crabb, Major, 77, 78, 83

Cranch, Lieut. 121, 144

Cranell, Capt. 150

Crawford, Lieut. 318, 354, 355, 358, 359

Crommelin, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361

Cross, Corp. 280, 282

Crossdill, Lieut.-Col. 363

Croxton, Lieut. 319, 334

Cruikshanks, Lieut. and Adj. 317

Cureton, Brig. 506, 529, 530

Curphy, Capt. 385

Curtis, Lieut. 314

Cullen, Lieut. 107, 385

Daniell, Lieut. 378; Capt. 554

Dashwood, F. Lieut. A.-D.-C. 385, 389; Capt. 469, 475, 476, 478, 479

Davies, Major, 227

Dawes, Lieut. 409, 415, 426, 431, 440; Capt. 444, 534, 538, 540, 542, 544, 547, 562, 564, 570, 571

Day, E. F. Capt. 409, 454, 468, 483, 507, 514, 515; Major, 523, 554, 561, 562, 571

—— E. W. Lieut. 554, 569

Deare, C. Capt. 89, 99, 100, 130; Lieut.-Col. 150, 151, 165, 167, 210

—— G. Lieut. 39; Capt 99; Lieut.-Col. 119, 121, 122, 126; Col. 130, 134, 204, 209, 210; Major-Gen. 211, 261

De Brett, Lieut. 318, 363

Debudé, Lieut. 554

Deckers, Lieut. 23

Delafosse, Lieut. 302, 303, 334; Capt. 443; Major, 446, 451

Delamar, Serg. 24

Denniss, Lieut. 327; Lieut.-Col. 455, 470, 480, 483, 499, 507, 515

Dickson, Lieut. 334, 358

Dirom, Major, 137

Dixon, C. B. Lieut. 316

—— R. C. Lieut. 385

Don, Col. 264, 270

Douglas, Lieut. 89, 127, 141, 150, 154, 214, 443, 446

Dow, Lieut.-Col. 43

Dowell, Lieut. 121, 151, 154; Capt.-Lieut. 260

D’Oyley, Lieut. 358, 361

Doxat, Lieut. 39; Capt.-Lieut. 75

Drummond, Lieut. 119, 134, 151, 214, 231, 233, 245, 263

Duff, Lieut. 27; Capt. 29; Major, 47; Col. 48, 100, 101, 135, 139, 140, 146, 148, 149, 150, 170, 179; Major-Gen. 204, 209, 210, 242

Duncan, Lieut. 386, 409; Capt. 562, 565, 571

Dundas, J. Capt. 296

Dunn, Lieut. 88, 151; Capt. 214, 284

—— A. Lieut. 156, 214, 244, 245, 263

Dyke, Lieut. 374

Edwards, Lieut. 386

Egerton, Capt. 496

Elliot, Capt. 88; Lieut.-Col. 95

Ellis, Lieut. 386

Ellwood, Capt. 150

Erskine, Lieut.-Col. 155, 214

Ewart, Lieut. 295, 385

Exshaw, Lieut. 89, 134, 150

Eyre, Lieut. 434, 435, 448, 463

Faithful, G. Lieut. 262, 288

—— H. Capt. 296

Faithfull, Lieut. 513

Farnabie, Lieut. 296, 298

Farrington, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 301, 302, 303, 385; Lieut.-Col. 455

Fawcett, Lieut.-Col. 260, 265

Feade, Lieut. 121, 122, 123, 151; Capt.-Lieut. 260, 265

Fenning, Lieut. 374

Ferris, Capt.-Lieut. 289

Fitzgerald, A. Lieut. 443, 446; Brev.-Capt. 454, 518

Fleming, Capt. 30

Flemyng, Lieut. 90, 231; Capt.-Lieut. 233

Floyd, Col. 129, 131

Footes, Lieut. 554

Forbes, A. Lieut. 69

Forde, Col. 15

Fordyce, T. D. Lieut. 295; Capt. 317

Fordyce, Lieut. 334, 374

—— J. Capt. 468, 510, 514, 515, 547, 562, 564; Major, 571

Forrester, Lieut. 285

Fortnham, P. Inf. Cadet, 151

Francis, Lieut. 554

Fraser, A. Capt. 244, 334

Frazer, Capt. 154

Frith, Lieut. W. H. 283

—— Major, 268

Fuller, Lieut. 244; Major, 306

Fulton, Lieut. 319

Gaitskell, Lieut. 374

Garbett, Lieut. 385; Capt. 409, 422, 469, 483, 489, 515, 523, 554, 562, 571

Gardiner, Lieut.-Col. 322

Garrett, Lieut. 386

Geddes, Lieut. 327; Major, 461, 462; Lieut.-Col. 469; Col. 474, 475, 483, 485, 488, 490, 492, 493, 507, 514, 515

Gibbs, Col. 300

Giddes, Capt. 99

Gillespie, Lieut. 84

Glass, A. Lieut. 73, 135; Capt. 141, 150, 166, 214; Major, 169

Goddard, Col. 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 97, 103, 201, 217; Gen. 218, 219

Gordon, Major, 169, 204, 246, 247

Gore, J. Inf. Cadet, 151

Gowan, Lieut. 303, 314, 317, 334

—— G. Lieut. 333; Capt. 345; Col. 454, 458, 459, 462, 498; Brig. 514, 515

Gowing, Lieut. 279, 284

Gowdie, Major, 136, 141, 142

Graham, Lieut. 159, 214; Capt.-Lieut. 295

—— C. 317, 373, 382

—— George, Lieut. 378

—— C. T. Lieut. 554, 555

Grace, Capt. 108, 119, 169, 214; Lieut.-Col. 307

Grand, F. W. Lieut. 76

—— J. E. Lieut. 84

Granishaw, Lieut. 288, 289

Grant, C. Lieut. 373; Capt. 409, 454, 457, 459, 462; Major, 499, 507, 513, 514, 515; Lieut.-Col. 538, 540, 542, 547, 562, 571

Green, Capt.-Lieut. 21

—— J. Lieut.-Fireworker, 89

—— C. Capt.-Lieut. 89; Major, 156, 180, 181; Lieut.-Col. 204, 211, 226, 233

—— H. Lieut. 119, 121, 151

—— T. Lieut. 134, 150, 214; Capt. 246, 248, 250, 251, 252

—— Charles, Lieut. 409, 427, 431, 435

Groat, Lieut. 88

Grote, Lieut. 385

Grove, Lieut. 284

Groves, Lieut. 273

Hall, Capt. 317, 374

Hardwicke, Lieut. 89, 121, 129, 132; Capt. 150, 156; Gen. 191, 342, 347, 368

Hamilton, Lieut. 69

Hardinge, Lord, 464, 465, 466, 467, 482, 498, 512

Harris, Lieut. 69; Capt.-Lieut. 89, 285, 286, 296, 303

Hart, Lieut. 73

Havelock, Col. 530

Hawkins, Lieut. 409, 428, 447, 463

Hay, Major, 55

—— Lieut. 214, 244, 245, 256, 261, 283, 284

—— W. Lieut. 554

Hearsey, Major, 322, 534, 535, 538

Hele, Lieut. 334

Herbert, Lieut. Qr.-Mast. 89, 536

Hetzler, Lieut. 214; Capt.-Lieut. 262, 263; Capt. 357, 358, 361; R. Brig. 385, 388, 389

Hill, Capt. 77, 83, 84; Col. 115; Lieut. 113, 114, 127, 142, 144, 151, 302

Hind, Lieut. 149

Hinde, Lieut. 127, 154, 242; Capt.-Lieut. 244; Capt. 284

Hislop, Corp. 280, 282

Hockler, Lieut. 23

Hogge, Capt. 527, 571

Holland, Lieut. 88, 455, 514; Major, 204

Hollingsbury, Lieut. 90

Holmes, Lieut. 503, 535

Home, Col. 48

Hopper, Lieut. 119, 156, 260; Capt. 287

Horsborough, Lieut. 89, 133, 147, 150, 151

Horsburgh, Lieut. 121, 122

Horsford, Capt. 121, 123, 150, 166; Major, 204; Lieut.-Col. Commt. 250; Col. 251, 252, 254, 255, 257, 267, 269, 284, 285, 293; Sir J. Major-Gen. 333, 337, 338, 340, 341

—— R. H. Lieut. 386; Capt. 469, 476, 483, 488, 510, 514, 515; Major, 538, 562, 571

Hotham, Lieut. 374, 375

Howell, Capt. 147, 148, 150, 155, 166

Hudson, Matross, 282

Hughes, Lieut. 386

Huish, A. Capt. 454, 533, 540, 562, 565, 571

Humfrays, Lieut. 455

Humphrays, Lieut. 154, 227, 228

Humphries, Lieut. 121, 159

Hunter, Lieut. 354

Hunter, J. Lieut. 554, 555

Hussey, W. W. Lieut. 39; Capt. 88, 94; Lieut.-Col. 155; Col. 210, 211

Hutchinson, Capt. 250, 267, 268, 279, 280, 282, 284

Huthwaite, Lieut. 377, 386; Lieut.-Col. 469, 471, 482, 484, 485, 492, 507, 514, 515, 527, 528, 535, 538, 570, 571

Hyde, Capt. 385

Ironside, Col. 22, 100

Jack, Col. 520

Jennings, Lieut. 8, 11, 15; Capt. 20, 23, 24, 27

Johnson, Conductor, 121

—— Lieut. 121; Capt. 169; Lieut. Brig.-Major, 385

—— E. B. Lieut. 571

Johnstone, Gunner, 282

Jones, Capt. 38

—— Lieut. 119, 121, 134, 151; Major-Gen. 245

Kaye, E. Lieut. 409, 411, 416, 499, 514, 527, 570, 571

Kaylor, Lieut. 21

Kean, Gunner, 448

Keeble, Cadet, 151

Kelly, Col. 123, 124, 127, 128, 134, 328, 329

Kempt, L. Lieut. 69, 319

Kennedy, Lieut. 314

Kinch, Lieut. 15, 18, 19; Capt. 23

Kindersley, Major, 30, 31

Kinleside, Lieut. 404; Capt. 533, 547, 562, 571

Kirby, Lieut. 358, 361, 374

Kirkpatrick, Major, 12

Knox, Capt. 18

Lane, Lieut. 376; Capt. 407, 443, 451; Brev.-Major, 455, 457, 458, 462; Lieut.-Col. 470, 499, 501, 503, 504, 510, 513, 514, 530, 543, 562, 571

Larkins, Lieut. 443

Laurence, L. Lieut. 334, 374

Laurenson, Lieut. 371, 379; Major, 501, 503; Lieut.-Col. 507, 514, 515

Lawrence, H. M. Capt. 432, 444, 445, 451; Major, 514, 515

Lawrie, Major, 326

Leathes, Lieut. 462

Legertwood, Lieut. 72, 73

Leslie, Gen. 50, 67

—— Col. 98, 219

—— Capt. 436

Levey, W. Matross, 320

Lewin, Lieut. 374

Lindsay, Capt.-Lieut. 285; Capt. 319, 328, 329, 334, 357, 358; Lieut.-Col. Commdt. 374

Lloyd, Col. 126, 128

Ludlow, Major, 317, 538, 547, 562, 565, 571

Lumsden, Lieut. 314, 333; Capt. 373, 379, 382

Luxford, Lieut. 314, 315, 316

Lyons, Lieut. 316

Macalister, Lieut. 119

Macbeagh, Lieut. 89

Mackay, Lieut. 385

Mackenzie, M. Lieut. 409, 416, 418, 421, 424; Brev.-Capt. 471, 496; Capt. 514, 522, 523, 524, 550, 554, 561, 562, 564, 571

Mackinnon, Lieut. 488, 489

Mackintyre, Capt. 156; Lieut.-Col. 169, 180; Major, 204

MacLean, Lieut. 385

Macklewaine, Capt. 73

MacLeod, Col. 107, 108, 124

MacNee, Serg. 448

Macpherson, Lieut. 121, 140, 151

Maidman, Lieut. 385

Maitland, Hon. Capt. 108

Manson, Lieut. 544

Marshall, Lieut. 289; Major-Gen. 336, 357

Martin, Capt. 30, 562

Mason, Capt. 291, 317; Major, 319, 333, 338

Master, Capt. 554

Mathison, Lieut. 319, 320, 321, 352, 353

Matthews, Lieut. 119, 121; A. 151, 250, 246, 254; Capt. 284

Maud, Lieut. 88

Maule, Lieut. 426, 432

Mawbey, Capt. 158; Col. 314, 316

Maxwell, Col. 134, 148

—— H. H. Lieut. 499, 514

Mayaffre, Capt. 72, 73, 74, 75, 76

Maynard, F. Lieut. 156

McDermott, Lieut. 89

McDonald, Lieut. 88

—— Lieut. 371; Major, 462

MᶜDouall, Gen. 227

McDowall, Capt. 318, 358, 360

McGregor, G. Capt. 439, 442, 444, 445, 446, 451

—— R. G. Lieut. 371, 386

McLean, Lieut. 69

McLeod, A. Lieut. 151, 156; Major, 317, 327, 333, 338; Lieut.-Col. 368; Brig. C.B. 388

—— D. Lieut. 289

MᶜMorine, Lieut. 385

McPherson, D. Lieut. 150

McQuake, Lieut. 285, 286; Capt.-Lieut. 314

Mecham, R. Lieut. 554

Miles, Capt. 534

Mill, Lieut. 500, 523, 554

Miller, W. Lieut. 554

Milligan, Lieut. 455

Mills, Brev.-Capt. 455; Capt. 483, 487, 489

Moir, Lieut. 455, 470, 471, 483, 554

Montague, E. Lieut. 48; Capt.-Lieut. 89; Capt. 124, 127, 134, 135, 136; Major, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 166; Lieut.-Col. 204, 214, 215, 216, 217

—— J. Capt. 217, 219, 220; Major, 221, 222; Lieut.-Col. 223, 242

Montresor, Col. 215

Moore, Capt. 91

Mordaunt, Capt. 156, 157

Moorhouse, Col. 126; Major, 135

Moreland, Lieut. 314, 333, 385

Morgan, Charles, Col. 71

Morris, Lieut. 250, 261, 265, 284

Mowatt, Major, 558, 562, 565, 571

Muir, Col. 73

Mulhall, Serg. 433, 435

Muller, Matross, 282

Murray, Col. 267

Musgrave, Col. 123

Nash, Lieut. 90, 121, 122, 123, 134, 151

Neish, Lieut. 88

Nelly, Lieut. 89, 121, 150; Capt. 250, 279, 284

Newall, Lieut. 550, 554, 555

Nicholl, Lieut. 385; Capt. 426, 427, 434, 435

Nicolls, Col. 322, 323

Noble, Capt. 297

O’Hanlon, Lieut. 371, 372

Oliphant, Capt. 385

Olpherts, H. Lieut. 527, 571

—— W. Lieut. 456, 461

Owen, Capt. 91

Palmer, C. H. Lieut. 244

Parker, W. Lieut. 256, 284; Lieut.-Col. 385; Brig. 403

Parlby, Lieut. 285, 303, 314; Capt. 366

Paschaud, Capt.-Lieut. 242, 245, 284

Patch, Lieut. 357, 358, 361

Paton, Lieut. 373, 377, 497

Pearse, Major, 30; Lieut.-Col. 31, 33, 36, 37, 38, 42, 49, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66, 72, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 100, 103, 107, 109, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 164, 209, 242, 294, 341

Pennington, Lieut. 214, 242; Capt. 279, 283, 284; Major, 314, 316, 331, 333, 339; Lieut.-Col. 353

—— Lieut. Fireworker, 333; Lieut. 385

Percival, Lieut. 279, 284

Pereira, Lieut. 295, 319, 334; Capt. 385

Perry, Lieut. 23

Pew, Major, 194, 361, 363, 385, 409

Pickersgill, Lieut. 328

Pillans, Lieut. 385; Capt. 514, 515

Playfair, Lieut. 314

Polhill, Lieut. 81

Polier, Major, 22

Pollock, George, Lieut. 261, 284; Capt. 327; Major, 371; Lieut.-Col. 379, 382; Major-Gen. 443, 446, 450, 464, 465, 478

Pollock, R. H. Lieut. 443, 444, 445, 446, 449, 476, 478, 479

Popham, Major, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82, 83, 84

Pryce, Lieut. 285; Capt.-Lieut. 334

Purvis, Lieut. 280

Quayles, Lieut. 554

Raban, Capt. 250, 264, 265, 273, 284

Ralfe, Lieut. 301

Raper, J. F. Lieut. 554

Rattray, Lieut. 69, 71; Capt. 112, 166; Major, 204

Rawlins, Lieut. 295; Capt. 374

Rawlinson, Lieut. 371

Raymond, Col. 160

Read, Lieut. 23

Reid, Brev.-Capt. 461

Remington, Lieut. 455

Richards, Lieut. 214, 260; Capt. 296, 298; Major, 317

Richardson, Lieut. 407, 443, 449

Roberts, R. Lieut. 319, 334; Capt. 385

Robertson, Lieut. 432, 443, 535, 562, 565, 571

Robinson, Lieut. 89; Capt. 246, 250, 251, 252, 284

Rodber, Lieut. 283; Capt. 314, 333, 345, 354, 355, 356, 358

Rosat, Lieut. 31

Ross, R. Capt. 148

Rotton, Lieut. 386

Russell, Lieut. 31

Rutherford, Lieut. 376

Sage, Lieut. 386

Salmon, Lieut. 407

Sampson, Capt. 121, 126, 147, 150, 151

Sand, Lieut. 76, 84

Sanders, Lieut. 334, 386, 403, 462

Sankey, M. C. Lieut. 554, 555

Saunders, Lieut. 357, 358, 361; Brev.-Major, 455

Sconce, Lieut. 314, 333

Scott, Capt.-Lieut. 73; Major, 204

—— J. Lieut. 296, 319, 373, 374, 376, 385

—— G. R. Lieut. 334, 371

Sears, Capt. 69

Shakespear, R. Lieut. 409, 411, 444, 446, 448, 451, 462; Capt. 534, 538, 562, 569; Major, 571

—— J. D. Capt. 562, 571

Shaw, S. Capt. 302, 303

Sherwood, Capt. 347

Shipton, Lieut. 84, 146, 151, 156; Capt. 246, 250, 251, 252, 284

Simons, F. C. Lieut. 554

Sladen, Lieut. 455

Smith, Capt. 121, 123, 124, 147, 150, 151

—— C. Lieut. 316, 334; Capt. 376

—— L. Lieut. 443

—— N. Capt. 265

—— J. D. Lieut. 245, 273, 284, 296

Smyth, Lieut. 407, 463

Sotheby, Lieut. 352; Capt. 436, 447, 451

Speediman, Capt. 124

Starke, Lieut. 231, 260, 272, 284; Capt. 314; Lieut.-Col. 385, 387

Stewart, Lieut. 426, 435

Swiney, Lieut. 261, 279, 284

Swinhoe, W. Lieut. 554

Swinley, Capt. 469, 475, 483, 485, 492, 514, 515, 518

Syme, Lieut. 90

Tennant, Lieut.-Col. 113; Lieut. 316; Capt. 368, 385, 389; Col. 454; Brig. 460; Brig.-Gen. 526, 564, 568, 571

Thelwall, Capt. 294

Thompson, Lieut. 373, 378; Major, 416, 554

Tilfer, Lieut. 156, 157

Timbrell, Major, 171, 187; Lieut. 304; Capt. 317, 334, 371, 376, 382

Timmings, Lieut. 373, 378; Capt. 409, 416, 422

Todd, Lieut. 386; Capt. 410, 411, 451, 469, 483, 485, 488, 496

Tollemache, Capt.-Lieut. 334

Tombs, Lieut. 461, 504, 527, 571

Tomkyns, Lieut. 89, 121, 150; Capt. 214, 226, 260

Toppin, Lieut. 127, 175; Capt.-Lieut. 214

Torckler, Lieut. 386

Trant, Capt. 376

Trower, Capt. 469, 476, 477, 478, 479

Tulloh, Lieut. 127, 151, 154, 471

Turner, Lieut. 409, 437, 438, 447, 448; Brev.-Capt. 463

Turton, Lieut. 88; Capt. 288

—— J. Lieut. 377; Capt. 501, 503, 513, 514

Twemlow, Lieut. 318, 358

Vanrenen, Lieut. 319, 334

Vernon, Lieut. 72

Wade, Lieut. 386; Col. 413, 414

Wakefield, Lieut. 385

Walcote, Lieut. 328

Walcott, Lieut. 319, 358

Walker, J. Lieut. 89

—— R. Lieut. 409, 438, 447

Waller, Lieut. 426, 435, 448; Capt. 499, 500, 514, 515

Walton, Gunner, 448

Warburton, Lieut. 409, 426, 448, 463

Warner, Lieut. 455; Brev.-Capt. 471, 480, 483, 496, 499, 514, 530, 533, 562, 565, 566, 571

Watkins, Lieut. 156; Capt. 245

Watson, J. E. Lieut. 533

Webbe, Capt. 317, 318, 327

Wheelwright, Lieut. 479

Whinfield, Lieut. 334, 385

Whish, Capt.-Lieut. 314, 331, 333, 339; Major, 385; Major-Gen. 523, 524, 526, 527, 550, 552, 553, 557, 558, 560, 561, 562, 564, 571

White, Col. 260, 261

Whiteford, Lieut. 455

Wiggins, Lieut. 385

Wilding, Lieut.-Col. 45

Wilkinson, Lieut. 88, 510

Wilson, R. B. Lieut. 322, 323, 334

Wilton, W. Lieut. 114, 115

Winbolt, Lieut. 119, 151, 159; Capt.-Lieut. 250, 252, 253, 267, 269

Wintle, Lieut. 455

Winwood, Lieut. 15; Capt. 27

Witherington, Capt. 5

Wittit, Lieut. 121, 122, 123, 124; Capt. 150; Major, 170, 244

—— C. Capt. 245, 260, 266

Wood, Lieut. J. 7; Capt. 183

—— H. Lieut. 334; Capt. 385; Lieut.-Col. 500, 504, 507, 514, 518

Woodburn, Lieut. 88; Major, 127, 150, 166, 176; Lieut.-Col. 204, 212

Woodroofe, Capt. 385

Worthington, J. G. Lieut. 554

Young, J. Lieut. 260, 272, 284; Lieut.-Col. 343

FOOTNOTES:

Footnote 1:

_Calcutta Review._

Footnote 2:

There were probably some perquisites or other sources of emolument.

Footnote 3:

The following was copied from an inscription in charcoal, on the wall of a small mosque on the declivity of a hill, about a mile from Chunar, and the same distance from the Ganges, in October, 1780:—

“This is the place of confinement of Ann Wood, wife to Lieutenant John Wood, taken prisoner by Jaffir Beg, Commandant to Sir Roger Dowler, taken out of the house at Calcutta where so many unhappy gentlemen suffered; the said Jaffir Beg obtained promotion of Segour Dowler for his long service, Fouzdar of Chunar Gur.”

“I, Alexander Campbell, was taken, along with the unfortunate lady, at eleven years old, by the same persons who afterwards made me an eunuch; my only employment was to attend this lady, which I did in this place four years. 1762, May 3rd, the said Jaffir Beg sent to acquaint the lady that if she did not consent to live with him the 4th of the said month, she should be strangled, and by my hands. The 3rd, at midnight, we jumped out of this window and got to the river side, where I hired boat for fifty gold rupees, to carry us safe to Chinsurah, where we arrived on the 11th. The first news we heard was that Lieutenant Wood died for grief; soon as she heard this, she fell sick, and died the 27th of the month.”

“Mr. Drake behaved with the greatest imprudence, he did deserve to be shot! shot! shot!

“Alexander Campbell, I am now in Dowlah’s service.”

“N.B.—Mrs. Wood’s apartment, and which is all the house consists of, is 9 feet 5 inches by 8 feet 9 inches, and 7 feet 9 inches high; the window, 18 inches.”

“Mrs. Bowers was a young woman, and inhabitant of Calcutta when it was taken by the Moors in the year ——, where upwards of —— British subjects were confined in the dungeon; she concealed herself until night in one of the warehouses in the factory, from whence she made her escape on board a small vessel lying in the river opposite the old fort.”—_Hickey’s Gazette_, 1780.

Neither of these names is mentioned by Holwell.

Footnote 4:

It is probable that Captain (afterwards Sir R.) Barker was in this vessel; he was transferred from the Royal to the Bengal Artillery, but appears to have been employed in line commands, and never to have joined the regiment.

Footnote 5:

This man was afterwards a member of council, and a bitter opponent of Clive.

Footnote 6:

This was rather a detachment of Royal, Bombay, and Bengal Artillery; Lieutenants Winwood and Kinch, of the Bengal Artillery, seem to have been with it, but nothing very distinct can be ascertained.

Footnote 7:

This date is doubtful.

Footnote 8:

His real name was Walter Reinhart, but he was called Sombre from the darkness of his countenance, and this was easily changed into Sumroo. Franklyn says:—“Major Polier, at Delhi, to Colonel Ironside, at Belgaum, in May, 1776, writes—‘His name is Balthazar ——; the rest I have forgot. Sombre is ‘son nomme de guerre.’ He is a deserter of ours; he enlisted at Calcutta before the taking of the place, I think, in one of the Swiss companies, commanded by a young officer, I suppose Vussarot or Ziegler, and deserted shortly after. This anecdote is not generally known, and might serve, should he ever fall into our hands, for a valid plea to hang him, which could not well be done otherwise without straining a point, as he certainly only executed the commands of his infamous master, and his life might have been endangered by non-compliance.’”

Footnote 9:

Six subalterns of artillery, including a commissary and adjutant, appear to have perished: Lieutenants Hockler, J. Brown, Deckers, Perry, Adamson, and J. Read.

Footnote 10:

This was _not_ the battle of _Korah_, for which the 1st and 10th regiments of N. I. wear an honorary distinction; that took place in 1778, between the English and some of the Nawab’s troops, on their being disbanded.

Footnote 11:

────────────────────┬──────┬────── │ Per │Total │Comp. │ ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Major. │ │ 1 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Captain. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Capt.-Lieut. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── 1st Lieut. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── 2nd Lieut. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 3│ 12 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Serjeants. │ 6│ 24 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Corporals. │ 6│ 24 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Drummers. │ 3│ 12 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Bombardiers. │ 8│ 32 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Gunners. │ 24│ 96 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Matrosses. │ 53│ 212 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Adjut. & Qr.-Master.│ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Deputy Comr. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Conductors. │ 2│ 8 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Serj.-Major. │ 1│ 4 ────────────────────┼──────┼────── Qr-Mast. Serjt. │1[114]│ 4

Footnote 12:

In consequence of this want, the recent mutiny and perhaps the inefficiency of some of the officers of the corps. Russell, Baillie, and Thelwall came into the corps from Madras; Rosat and Burnett from H.M.S. _Folly_, from Bencoolen.

Footnote 13:

With a staff of 1 surveyor of stores, 1 regimental adjutant, 5 adjutants and quarter-masters, and 12 conductors.

Footnote 14:

Cadets.

Footnote 15:

Since writing the above, the want is being supplied by some spirited articles in the Calcutta Quarterly [Review].

Footnote 16:

The Cutcha road was formed (of its present breadth) in 1782–3.—Colonel Green’s Letter, 21st October, 1801.

Footnote 17:

Was there not a member of council of that name?

Footnote 18:

In all probability this formed the regular road to Berhampore.

Footnote 19:

Captain Macklewaine, Captain-Lieutenant Scott, Lieutenants Legertwood, Hart, Glass, and Baillie.

Footnote 20:

Lieutenant F. W. Grand was a younger brother of the Mr. Grand whose name is connected with Sir Philip Francis, from the latter having seduced his wife, who afterwards was married to Talleyrand. Lieut. G. commanded two 6–pounders attached to the two companies of Popham’s regiment acting as a bodyguard to Hastings.

Lieutenant Sand probably commanded two guns with the remaining companies of the wing of the regiment.

Footnote 21:

The Governor-General noticed Lieutenant Baillie’s conduct in General Orders of 8th September and 19th October, 1781; on the latter occasion the order says: “The strong recommendation which Major Crabb has given Lieutenant Fw. Baillie for his distinguished attention and activity in the management of the artillery under his charge, affords the Governor-General a second occasion of acknowledging the services of that officer on the same campaign, and publishing his thanks for it.”

Footnote 22:

Major Popham received 2,94,000; Major, 44,956; Captain, 22,478; Subaltern, 11,239; Serjeant, 200; Soobadar, 300; Jemadar, 140; Havildar, 100; Naick, 80; Sipahi, 50.

Footnote 23:

Captains Mayaffre and J. Hill,§ Lieutenants Gillespie§ and B. Bruce,§ Lieutenant Fireworkers E. F. Baillie, H. Balfour, W. Shipton,§ J. E. Grand, R. Sands.§

Footnote 24:

───┬────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬─────────┬─────────── No.│Company.│Battalion.│Serjeants.│Corporals.│Drummers.│Gunner, &c. ───┼────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────── 2│ 4│ 2│ 6│ 6│ 2│ 61 5│ 5│ 1│ 6│ 7│ 2│ 55 10│ 5│ 2│ 7│ 6│ 3│ 56 ───┴────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴─────────┴───────────

Footnote 25:

24–pounder 12 pair 18–pounder 9 pair 12–pounder 6 pair 6–pounder 3 pair 3–pounder 2 pair 8–inch Howitzer 7 pair 5½-inch Howitzer 5 pair 4½-inch Howitzer 3 pair Wagon 7 pair Tumbril 5 pair

Footnote 26:

When quarters were not furnished.

Footnote 27:

Four 18–pounders, eight 12–pounders, twenty 6–pounders, two 3–pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers.

Footnote 28:

In the Calcutta burying-ground is a tomb to the memory of Lieut.-Colonel and Mrs. Deare. She died a few days before him. The inscription on the tomb is as follows:—

HERE REST THE REMAINS OF MRS. CATHERINE DEARE, WHO DIED AT CALCUTTA 6TH SEPT. 1791, AGED XXXIV YEARS: IN MEMORY OF HER AND HER HUSBAND, LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES RUSSELL DEARE, WHO FELL BY A CANNON-SHOT ON THE 13TH OF THE SAME MONTH, WHILE COMMANDING THE BENGAL ARTILLERY, IN AN ACTION FOUGHT BETWEEN A DETACHMENT OF THE BRITISH FORCES AND THOSE OF TIPPOO SULTAN, NEAR SATTIMUNGULUM, AGED XL YEARS. THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED BY HIS BROTHER, COLONEL GEORGE DEARE.

Footnote 29:

Among them two brass 6–pounders which had been lost at Sattimungalum.

Footnote 30:

Lieutenants Douglas, Hinde, Dowell, Tulloh, and Humphrays.

Footnote 31:

A bar of iron was however let into the axle.

Footnote 32:

Major Woodburne and Captain Howell going away, were succeeded by Captains Barton and Rattray.

Footnote 33:

A letter from Colonel Green to the Secretary of the Military Board, July, 1801, says, “As the two 6–pounders, with brass cheeks, the Board were pleased to direct the agent to make up for the service of the horse artillery experiment, carrying on under my control, to replace those sent to Egypt, will take some time, &c.” These carriages were proved by Major Wittit, when ready, and some alterations suggested. It is probable some mistake between brass and iron has crept into the report from which the extract was taken, or else both brass and iron were tried.

Footnote 34:

At this time serge had not been introduced it is supposed, and cartridges were made of paper—that now called cannon-cartridge, or packing.

Footnote 35:

Another was a crutch in which to receive the needle.

Footnote 36:

So great had been the alarm at one time, excited by the desperate projects (of some officers), that Sir John Murray, the commandant of Fort William, without communicating his precautionary proceedings to the Governor-General, placed the fortress in a state of defence, relying on the unshaken steadiness of the artillery; (_Life of Lord Teignmouth_, vol. i. p. 351) ... and but for the firmness of the artillery at Calcutta, and the manly resistance of several officers at Cawnpore, the army would have dictated to the Government their own terms.—_Idem_, _L. M. to Lord C._, p. 371.

Footnote 37:

Major-Gen. Duff, Col.-Gen. Deare, Lieut.-Col. Bruce, Lieut.-Col. C. Green, Lieut.-Col. Woodburn, Lt.-Col. Montague, Major Scott, Major Rattray, Major Mackintyre, Major Burnett, Major Holland, Major Barton, Major Carnegie, Major Gordon, Major Horsford.

Footnote 38:

Ten had been added in December, 1797.

Footnote 39:

The lascars can scarcely be called artillerymen; it is true that they fill certain _numbers_ at the gun, but the greater portion were employed on the drag-ropes.

Footnote 40:

3 King’s Regiments 3,000 2 Companies European Regiment 2,500 17 Native Regiments 35,360 —————— 40,860 ——————

Footnote 41:

The 6-pounder of that day was probably four hundred weight and a half.

Footnote 42:

Lieut.-Colonel Montague, Commandant; Lieutenant Drummond, Adjutant; Lieutenant R. Browne, Quarter-Master.

───────────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────── Lascar Companies. │6, 20 │11, 27 │18, 25 │10, 17 ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Company. │3 │5 │1 │2 ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Battalion. │1 │2 │3 │3 ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Captains. │Grace │Clarke │Tomkyns │Glass │Dunn │ │ │ ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Captain-Lieutenants. │Caldwell │Collier │Toppin │Balfour ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Lieutenants. │Pennington│Hetzler │ │A. Dunn │Green │Douglas │ │ ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Lieutenant-Fireworkers. │Bayle │Graham │Hay │Ahmuty │Richards │ │ │Brooke ───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────── Non-Com. Officers and │56 │63 │69 │72 Gunners. │ │ │ │ ───────────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────

Footnote 43:

Royal Artillery.

Footnote 44:

Beatson’s Seringapatam.

Footnote 45:

His brother was one of the council of revenue at Dinagepoor in 1766.

Footnote 46:

There is some unaccountable error in the above. Goddard left Culpee in May, 1778, with Leslie’s force. He was employed in 1781 at the Bhoreghat against the Mahrattas, who may have been mistaken for Rohillas. The detachment with Sir Eyre Coote sailed from Calcutta in October, 1780. Montague appears on the returns of one of these companies, but from the circumstantial account of his wound, we must suppose he went round and joined Goddard, and returned in the end of 1781. The regimental returns are blank from July 1780 to April 1781, and the companies absent on service are not included till their return. We had thought that Lieutenant Montague was quarter-master to the artillery in 1781.—E. B.

Footnote 47:

The following conversation took place between the deputy adjutant-general and Major Montague as the latter passed headquarters on his march: “Lord C. has it in contemplation to give Colonel Smith the command of the artillery to be employed against Severn-droog, and he wishes to know if that circumstance will be any impediment to your exertions.” The major replied, “that he did not expect to take the command; that his only wish was to be employed, and that his lordship might rely on his utmost exertions for the public service under Smith.” The deputy adjutant-general did not think that answer sufficiently explicit; and said, “Lord C. wished to know whether Major M. could act with more effect when independent of Colonel Smith, than when under his command?” The major answered, “that he could certainly carry a plan of his own into execution in the same time that it would require to suggest and explain it to another.” The deputy adjutant-general therefore concluded that Major M.’s real opinion was that he should prefer to conduct the business by himself, and informed him that his lordship was disposed to give Colonel Smith an opportunity of knocking down the walls of the place where he had been so long confined in a former war; but as it might be attended with some risk to the service, he was at length determined to appoint Major M. to command and conduct the artillery against that important place, as the capture of it was absolutely necessary to the further progress of the campaign.

Footnote 48:

He married a Miss Fleetwood at Masulipatam in 1792, when on his return to Bengal from the first campaign against Tippoo.

Footnote 49:

The note in a former page may serve to explain this neglect, as the commanding officer of artillery was the same Colonel Smith to whom he had been preferred at Severn-droog.

Footnote 50:

Minute by Governor-General, January 19, 1800.—“The conduct of the artillery and lascars attached to the regiment during the time of its absence from these provinces is equally entitled to commendation.”

Footnote 51:

Captain Humphreys at the time of the massacre was seized by a junior assistant surgeon who rolled with him down the steep where the dead were flung; they remained concealed three or four days, but being discovered were taken before the king and separately confined.

Footnote 52:

On the march from Rosetta to Alexandria the axletree of one of the limbers broke, and for want of a forge-cart the detachment was detained eighteen hours on the desert without water or provisions; had a forge-cart been there, two hours would have sufficed.—Captain Brown to Colonel Green, 2nd April, 1803.

Footnote 53:

Returned to India on sick certificate September, 1801.—Letter from Military Board to Military Secretary, 26th September, 1801.

Footnote 54:

The uniform at this time consisted of the bearskin cap, long coat, with scarlet facings and embroidered button-holes, and grey trowsers with a red cord down the seam.

Footnote 55:

English 516, Irish 484, Scotch 74, Welsh 19, Foreigners 211, no description 32.

Footnote 56:

Letter of John Duncan, 10th November, 1802, to Supreme Government.

Footnote 57:

Lieutenant Mathews was appointed fort adjutant at Agra the following year, and afterwards deputy commissary of ordnance at Futteygurh, and on his promotion to a captaincy was retained. “At the particular recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, in consideration of the peculiar services of Lieutenant Mathews, who lost his leg and thigh in the battle of Delhi, the Governor-General is pleased to determine that Captain Mathews shall be exempted from the operation of the General Orders of 14th November, declaring the situation of deputy commissary of ordnance to be incompatible with the rank of regimental captain.”

“This exemption is admitted as a mark of attention and indulgence to a deserving officer, who has suffered severely in the execution of his duty on active service against the enemy.”—General Orders of May 15, 1806.

Footnote 58:

In moving for the production of papers in the House of Commons on this occurrence, Sir Philip Francis said it had cost “two complete companies of sipahis, some cannon, and fifty European artillerymen, every man of whom were cut to pieces: the loss of the sipahis is to be lamented, that of the artillerymen is invaluable.” A most infelicitous expression for the author of Junius.

Footnote 59:

Two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder, two howitzers, and tumbrils.

Footnote 60:

Cross was appointed to the Ordnance Commissariat Department, and at the present moment is living at Penang, having, after a long, laborious, and honourable career, been allowed to retire on a pension with the rank of captain.

Footnote 61:

Capt.-Lieutenant A. Graham; Lieutenant T. Pereira; Lieut.-Fireworker Ewart, I. Rawlins, H. C. Baker, T. D. Fordyce.

Footnote 62:

In this year the Java Light Cavalry, with H. A. attached, was formed; Capt.-Lieutenant Boileau, Lieutenant Gowan, and Lieutenant Parlby accompanied it; but we believe this corps was never engaged.

Footnote 63:

1st Troop,—Major Pennington; Lieutenants Gowan, Kennedy, Campbell, Moreland.

2nd Troop,—Capt. Starke; Capt.-Lieutenants Whish, Boileau; Lieutenants Playfair, Curtis, Lumsden, Sconce.

3rd Troop,—Captain Brooke; Capt.-Lieutenant Rodber; Lieutenants Parlby, Hyde, Luxford.

Captain-Lieutenant McQuake was quarter-master to the reserve.

Footnote 64:

Four 18-pounders, 2,400 shot; two 8-inch mortars, 400 shells.

Footnote 65:

Capt.-Lieutenant Battine; Lieutenants Tennant, Lyons, C. Smith, C. G. Dixon; Chesney, adjutant.

Footnote 66:

Major McLeod, commandant; Lieutenant Cruikshanks, adjutant; Captains Webbe, G. Brooke, Mason, Fordyce, Cartwright, C. Graham, Timbrell, and Hall and E. P. Gowan, who joined at Nahun.

Footnote 67:

Captain McDowall; Lieutenants De Brett, Crawford, Twemlow.

Footnote 68:

Major Mason, commandant; Lieutenant Walcott, adjutant; Capt. Lindsay; Lieutenants Roberts, Kempt, Blake, Mathison, Counsell, Vanrenen, Fulton, Pereira, Scott, Croxton.

Footnote 69:

Captains Pollock and Biggs; Lieutenants Marshall, Denniss, Geddes, Buck, and O. Baker.

Footnote 70:

1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 lieutenant-fireworker, 10 non-commissioned officers, 80 troopers, 5 sirdars, 60 surwans, 70 camels, 20 horses, 4 cars, 20 bouches à jeu, and 960 rockets.

Footnote 71:

The subject is fully gone into in “Considerations on behalf of the Officers of the Indian Artillery and Engineer Corps,” by Lieutenant-Colonel James Young, of the artillery. Published in 1816.

Footnote 72:

During the most severe part of this affair, a circumstance occurred truly creditable to the character of this officer, and fully substantiated by the testimony of an eye-witness. An European horse artilleryman fell deadly wounded, and on his comrades attempting to carry him to the rear, he entreated them to desist, adding, “I know I must die, and I only wish to shake Lieutenant Mathison by the hand before I die.” His wish was immediately gratified, and he expired uttering “God bless you.”

Footnote 73:

The artillery were in front, and the first gun that opened was a Madras horse-artillery gun under Lieutenant Hunter, which killed the enemy’s beenee-wala, or quarter-master-general, upon which they took to flight. One of Captain Hunter’s two guns sticking on the stump of a tree, Lieutenant Crawford moved on with the other, accompanying Captain Rodber’s guns.

Footnote 74:

Lieutenant Crawford says, “After a five-mile gallop we pulled up, having no troops near but about 80 of the 5th cavalry, and so dead beat were we all with the long march and gallop, that the Peshwah and those with him, being fresh, got off easily.”

Footnote 75:

The explosion of a shell we believe.

Footnote 76:

2 24-pounder guns 22 18-pounder guns 4 12-pounder guns 3 12-pounder guns brass 16 6-pounder guns 14 —— -pounder guns gallopers 4 10-inch mortars 8 8-inch mortars 9 5½-inch mortars 6 8-inch howitzers 7 5½-inch howitzers 4 4⅖-inch howitzers

Footnote 77:

The 6th independent company of golundaz, and 40th company of gun lascars were reduced on their return from Ceylon in March, 1819.

Footnote 78:

Joined in December, 1824.

Footnote 79:

Maharajah Bulwunt Sing succeeded his father in 1824, and was dethroned by his cousin, Durjun Sal in March, 1825.

Footnote 80:

16 24-pounders, 20 18-pounders, 4 12-pounders, 12 8-inch howitzers, 2 13-inch mortars, 12 10-inch mortars, 46 8-inch mortars.

Footnote 81:

─────────────┬───────────── 2nd company,│ 1st brigade ─────────────┼───────────── 1st company,│ 2nd brigade ─────────────┼───────────── 2nd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 3rd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 4th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 1st company,│ 3rd brigade ─────────────┼───────────── 2nd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 4th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 2nd company,│1st battalion ─────────────┼───────────── 3rd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 4th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 1st company│3rd battalion ─────────────┼───────────── 2nd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 3rd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 4th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 2nd company,│4th battalion ─────────────┼───────────── 3rd company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 3rd company,│6th battalion ─────────────┼───────────── 4th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 5th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 13th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┼───────────── 17th company,│ 〃 ─────────────┴─────────────

Footnote 82:

The daily expenditure of ammunition and artillery details of this siege will be found in the East-India United Service Journal for 1837.

Footnote 83:

R. A. P. R. A. P.

Lieut.-Colonel 1,032 4 0 752 14 0 per mensem. Major 789 3 0 580 14 6 per mensem. Captain 433 10 0 354 13 0 per mensem. 1st Lieutenant 265 12 0 209 14 0 per mensem. 2nd Lieutenant 213 5 0 167 10 6 per mensem.

Footnote 84:

R. A. P.

Lieutenant-Colonel per mensem 827 14 0 Major 580 14 6 Captain 392 5 0 1st Lieutenant 234 14 0 2nd Lieutenant 192 10 6

Footnote 85:

The effect is clearly shown in the brigading the late army of the Sutlej, where the army, consisting of fifteen cavalry and thirty-seven infantry regiments, formed into six divisions and sixteen brigades, was thus commanded:—

Cavalry regiments 3 Queen’s, 12 Company’s Infantry regiments 8 Queen’s, 29 Company’s Division Commanders 4 Queen’s, 2 Company’s Brigade regiments 7 Queen’s, 9 Company’s

Of the cavalry, although four-fifths were Company’s regiments, the division and three of the brigade commands fell to H.M.’s service.

Footnote 86:

1st company, 3rd battalion, and field-battery. Detail of golundaz, and 2 6-pounders. Gwalior contingent battery. 6 18-pounders. 2 8-inch howitzers. 4 8-inch mortars.

Major Bell. Captain Lane. Lieut. Buckle, commissary of ordnance. Lieut. Richardson. Lieut. Kinleside. Lieut. Abercrombie. Lieut. Salmon, adjutant. Lieut. J. H. Smyth, Gwalior contingent.

Footnote 87:

(No. 6 battery.)

Footnote 88:

Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Salter of the cavalry, and Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers (since killed in action).

Footnote 89:

The highest point surmounted, the Irak pass, was 12,400 feet above the sea.

Footnote 90:

A good practicable road across the mountains had, ere this, been made.

Footnote 91:

The 4th company 6th battalion, with Lieutenants A. Christie and Robertson, formed part of this force. Captain Lawrence, as political agent, accompanied it, and procured four guns from the Seiks, which, however, were of little use, as their carriages broke down.

Footnote 92:

Captain Sotheby, Lieutenants Cornish and Brougham.

Footnote 93:

From the report of Brevet-Captain Reid, assistant quartermaster-general. The latter portion of the extract is adopted word for word by General Gray in his despatch.

Footnote 94:

This, and the following paragraphs distinguished by inverted commas, are taken verbatim from a very valuable article on the “Bengal Artillery” in the _Calcutta Review_, No. xviii.

Footnote 95:

The following extract from a minute by Sir Henry Hardinge, dated January 20, 1845, relates to this important subject. “In reference to the 4-horse field-batteries, it appears to me essential that 9-pounders should be drawn by eight horses instead of six; that a battery of six pieces should therefore have, when ordered on field service, a complement of 120 horses, instead of 98; and considering the immediate result of a few weeks’ campaigning, the number ought to be 130 horses. When not under orders for field service, the number may remain at 98. On this matter, and every other relating to the artillery, the Governor-General requests the Honourable Sir George Pollock to make the arrangements which his experienced judgment may decide, so as to secure the utmost efficiency; for in all these matters, efficiency will be found to be true economy.” [The number of horses would seem to have been raised in the first instance from 89 to 98.]

Footnote 96:

On the deaths of Captains Dashwood and Todd, Captain Mills (of the political department) commanded the 1st troop 1st brigade at Ferozeshuhur, and Lieutenant Mackinnon commanded the 2nd troop in the same action; Captain Waller commanded the latter at Sobraon.

Footnote 97:

Two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade accompanied this troop throughout the action.

Footnote 98:

During the night of the 18th and the morning of the 19th the ammunition-boxes of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries were replenished, as far as practicable, from the spare waggons attached to each troop and battery. The two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, which had originally marched from Muttra merely on escort duty, being unprovided with spare ammunition, borrowed a few rounds from other guns, but not sufficient to complete.

Footnote 99:

Ferozeshuhur is a small village between Moodkee and Ferozepore, and about five miles south of the high-road from the latter place to Loodianah.

Footnote 100:

Sir Hugh Gough has stated in his despatch, that the ammunition of the artillery had been completely exhausted in this protracted engagement. And an able writer in the _Calcutta Review_ (No. XI.) has made a similar assertion, which, however, is not quite correct as to the time indicated, as all the troops of horse-artillery present were engaged with Tej Singh. The author of the article on the “Sikh invasion of British India” adds, “We believe the complement of a horse-artillery gun on service is 300 rounds.” This is not quite accurate. Each 6-pounder gun carries with it 128 rounds of all sorts; and each 12-pounder howitzer has 80 rounds. The troops of horse-artillery from Umballah and Loodianah had each two spare 6-pounder waggons, and one howitzer waggon, making up the complement to 166⅖ rounds per gun, and 140 per howitzer. The Ferozepore troops brought out with them no extra waggons, and the two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade had no spare ammunition at all.

Footnote 101:

The order was given to the brigadier, without authority from the Commander-in-Chief.

Footnote 102:

“The royal waggons carry 146 rounds a gun, the Indian waggons, I believe, only contain 96 rounds. In the royal service, the (6-pounder) gun and waggon carry 194 rounds a gun. The extra waggons in the royal service have 29 rounds a gun, and in the Indian service only 19 rounds a gun. The waggon in the Indian service is, I have no doubt, best adapted to the country and the draught animals, but if a battery of five guns had ten waggons (and the howitzer one waggon), the number of rounds a gun would be about 220. The 9-pounder field batteries, I understand, take into action 139 rounds a gun. The royal 9-pounder takes 166.”—_Minute of Lord Hardinge, Feb. 2, 1847._

Footnote 103:

In a memorandum on this subject left by Captain Buckle, the author says:—“At Sobraon, the heavy guns, which had been waited for nearly a month, were placed on the plain about 1,300 yards from the intrenchments, instead of in batteries prepared for them at half that distance, and the facilities for which were great in the abundance of men and material, and in the softness of the soil. They might easily have been erected during the night of the 9-10th of February, had previous arrangements been made; and had this been done, the enemy’s intrenchments, instead of being nearly uninjured, would have been swept away by the storm of shot poured upon them. As it was, the effect of the fire was greater on the defenders of the works than upon the works themselves; and quite as much as was expected by those competent to form an opinion, considering the greatness of the distance, and the shortness of time during which they fired. And for the selection of the distance we are credibly informed that the artillery are not responsible.”

Footnote 104:

“For the severe punishment inflicted on the Sikhs during their retreat across the river, we are indebted to the singular forethought and cool calculating judgment of the Governor-General. Owing to the paucity of artillerymen, men had been taken from the horse-artillery to serve the heavy guns in the field; and the troops—three if not four—to which they belonged, were _left behind in camp_. The services of these troops would have been lost to the army on the 10th February, had not Sir Henry Hardinge, while the battle was yet raging, ascertained that the ammunition of the heavy guns was nearly expended, and deduced, from this misfortune, the more than _fortunate_ conclusion, that the horse-artillerymen would soon be again available for their proper duties. He accordingly sent back orders to the troops left in camp to move down without delay to _Rhodawallah_; and they _were_ brought down _by their drivers alone_, to that post, where they found their own artillerymen waiting for them, and were galloped into action. The anecdote is not generally known, but is worthy of record as highly characteristic of a mind peculiarly happy in the arrangement of _details, whose judicious combination alone produces military success.”—Reviewer._ [Colonel Alexander’s, Major Campbell’s, and Captain Turton’s troops were on the right; Colonel Lane, with Sir R. Dick’s division. Major Grant, as before mentioned, had commenced the action with his 24-pounder howitzers. The officers and men of the 2nd troop 1st brigade, 3rd troop 1st brigade, 5th troop 1st brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were employed with the heavy batteries, rockets, and reamers. The 1st troop 1st brigade had remained with Wheeler near Loodhianah.]—_Editor._

Footnote 105:

MacGregor’s “History of the Sikhs.”

Footnote 106:

Colonel Lawrence had by this time proceeded to Europe for the recovery of his health.

Footnote 107:

Thackwell marched without baggage or camp equipage.

Footnote 108:

A brigade had been sent across previously by pontoons a few miles up the river, but too late to take part in the action of Sadoolapore.

Footnote 109:

With regard to Pennycuick’s brigade, the Commander-in-Chief says in his official despatch: “In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed to state that they behaved heroically, and but for their too hasty and, consequently, disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct of the left brigade, which, left unsupported for a time, had to charge to their front and right wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of horse-artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.”

Footnote 110:

This troop had been on the detachment system experimentally, but, after Chillianwallah, when new guns were given, it reverted to the old system.

Footnote 111:

The following remarks by Major Siddons on the artillery practice at Mooltan, taken from his admirable report of the siege, will be read with interest:—“The artillery practice was most excellent, and the exertions of officers and men indefatigable. It is impossible to over-rate the service rendered by the 8-inch and 10-inch howitzers. The walls are mostly of mud, or brick and mud; and it so happened that the part selected for the breach was very defective—a mere facing over the old wall. In this the 24-pounder shot brought down large masses; but where the wall was sound the shot buried themselves, whereas the shells penetrated and then acted as small mines. Against a mud fort, an howitzer must therefore be considered far preferable to a gun, though of course the latter would be more effective against a well-built stone wall. The inconvenience to howitzers is the difficulty of preserving the cheeks of the embrasures. The iron howitzer might, perhaps, with advantage be lengthened.”

Footnote 112:

As another opportunity is not likely to occur, it may be mentioned here that General Whish was instrumental in introducing some important improvements in the internal organization of the artillery. He was the first, when in temporary command of the horse-artillery (April, 1821), to establish regimental libraries for the use of the men. In 1836, he so far reformed the horse-artillery system, as to render it unnecessary that the guns should be accompanied into action by their waggons,—a change, however, which was reversed in 1845. He was also, in 1841, instrumental in the abolition of winkers, as a portion of the harness of the horses.

Footnote 113:

“The batteries engaged in action by those attached to the 1st and 2nd divisions, advancing to within about six hundred yards; and the heavy guns within eight hundred or one thousand yards of the enemy’s artillery, on which they opened their fire about nine o’clock A.M.”—_Brigadier-General Tennant’s Despatch to the Commander-in-Chief._

Footnote 114:

Non-effective—1 pay serjeant, 1 drill serjeant, 1 major serjeant, 1 park serjeant, 1 drill corporal, 3 camp colour-men, a bullock serjeant, and overseer of bildars in time of service.

The ordnance with each company appears to have consisted of six light 6-pounders and two howitzers; to assist in working these and the field-pieces with sipahi battalions, a large body of lascars were attached to each company.

Heavy guns and mortars were supplied from magazines at the head-quarters of brigades to the extent available and required for any particular service.

PRINTED BY COX (BROTHERS) AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

Transcriber’s note:

1. Several tables with more columns than rows were rotated 90° left so they would fit portrait format.

2. All items in the ERRATA were corrected in the text.

3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.

4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.