Part 5

On the morning of the 29th, the light division of 3,000 men, under Major General Crawford, joined the army from Oropesa; it was immediately ordered to form the advance, and take up a position in the front of the field of battle. The allies were employed in attending their wounded, and burying or burning the dead of both armies.

The British loss was 5,000 men in killed or wounded; the loss of the Spaniards was much inferior. The French loss was estimated by themselves at 14,000 men. Joseph retired in the course of the 29th with the greatest part of his army, to Sta. Olalla; a rear guard of 6,000 men was left at Casas Leguas, to cover his retreat, but it retired on the night of the 30th, and joined the corps to which it belonged, near Toledo.

The army of General Vanegas, which had advanced from Madrilejos, in obedience to the orders of the supreme Junta, had arrived upon the Tagus, near Aranjuez and Toledo on the 28th. The advance of his corps pushed on in the night to within a short distance of Madrid, and took some patroles which had been sent out from the garrison; but General Vanegas having heard that the French army was retreating towards the capital from the field of Talavera, recalled the parties that had crossed the Tagus, and abandoned any further offensive operations. Sir Arthur Wellesley (who was still unable to advance, from the total want of provisions in which the Spaniards kept him) recommended to General Cuesta to form a junction with General Vanegas; but while this movement was in contemplation, information was brought from Placencia, that the corps of Soult was moving upon that town, and that the troops at Bejar, hearing of its advance, had abandoned that position, and left the road open to its march. Sir Arthur Wellesley could hardly believe that the strong positions about Bejar had been so hastily given up; the corps of Marshal Beresford was ready to have assisted the troops in occupation of them, and a brigade of British, under the orders of Major General Catling Crawford, was within a few days’ march, and would have assisted in their defence. But the intelligence being soon after confirmed, Sir Arthur Wellesley decided to carry the British army to attack General Soult; and proposed to General Cuesta to remain in the position of Talavera, to cover the movement of the English upon Placencia. Sir Arthur Wellesley also proposed to leave his wounded in charge of General Cuesta, to whose kindness and generosity he intrusted them, with a solemn promise from him, that if any thing should oblige the Spanish army to retire, his first care should be, to move the British to a place of safety. General Cuesta was delighted with the plan which was proposed to him. He felt that his own army was unequal to any contest with the French in an open plain, and that it must be to the British only, that he could look for the expulsion of the enemy from his rear; he also expressed himself most particularly gratified by the confidence which Sir Arthur Wellesley reposed in him, intrusting the wounded to his care.

The necessary arrangements being made, and Major General Mackinnon placed in the command of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched on the morning of the 3d of August for Oropesa. A short time after his arrival at that place, he learnt that the advanced guard of Soult’s army was arrived at Naval Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had retired from Bejar, had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and destroyed the bridge; he determined, however, to move upon the French, and was in hopes of finding them the following day. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was moving along the Tietar, and was destined to act upon the left and rear of the French. About four o’clock in the afternoon, however, a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, announcing to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from intelligence upon which he could rely, he was persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had evacuated Gallicia, and formed a junction with the corps of Marshal Mortier, from Valladolid; that the two were united with Marshal Soult; and that the amount of the collected force upon the rear of the allied army, could not be less than 55,000 men; that Marshal Victor was at no great distance from Talavera, upon the other side; that he (General Cuesta) apprehended an attack from him; and had in consequence determined to break up immediately from that town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa. This information was as disastrous as it was unexpected: the letter from General Cuesta further stated, that his movement was already begun, and that his army would form its junction with the British in the course of the night: there remained, therefore, no hope of preventing or delaying it, and the whole plan, upon which Sir Arthur Wellesley had undertaken his operation, was at once destroyed.

The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in existence; the bridge of Arzobispo was exposed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to the corps of Victor, and the whole allied army, if it advanced, might be cut off from any retreat across the Tagus, while its movement upon Portugal must depend upon the success of its attack upon the combined army of Ney, Soult, and Mortier. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley did not hesitate to give up offensive operations, and retire across the Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had every reason to complain of the conduct of General Cuesta; he had abandoned the position intrusted to him, without any ground for so doing; for it afterwards appeared that Victor was at some distance from Talavera, and not occupied in a movement upon the corps of General Cuesta; but, at any rate, the Spaniards evacuated the post intrusted to them, and abandoned the British wounded, with a precipitancy that nothing but the actual presence of an enemy could justify. If General Cuesta was actuated by a desire of bringing his army to the assistance of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was about to attack a force which he had reason to believe was superior to him, he ought to have waited a few hours, till he had communicated with him, and in the mean time, he should have given assistance to the removal of the British wounded. If he thought that the return of a messenger from Oropesa (a distance of only five leagues), would have exposed him by too much delay, he ought at least to have left a corps to check the enemy in his front, and to have protected the retreat of the hospitals. And, last of all, it was his duty, to which he had also pledged himself in the most solemn manner, to have given all the means in his power to facilitate the removal of the British wounded. He did, however, the direct reverse: he abandoned his position with his whole army, without communication with Sir Arthur Wellesley; (indeed, he precluded the possibility of any, by stating in his letter that his army was in march); and to the wounded, instead of every assistance he could command, he gave but _four carts_, for the whole 4,000 men. It is impossible to conceive, that the importance of the occupation of Talavera, to the movement of Sir Arthur Wellesley, should have escaped the observation of General Cuesta, the ground about that town afforded the only situation in which the advance of the French army upon the rear of the British, while moving upon Soult, could possibly be resisted; the rest of the country was plain, and offered no defensive position; so that in abandoning it, General Cuesta exposed the whole allied army to an attack, in front and rear. In short, it is very difficult to discover a sound or equitable reason for the precipitancy with which this movement was executed; but the total disregard which was shewn to the British wounded, the paltry number of four carts which was afforded them, by an army that was provided with them to excess, remains a stain upon the character of General Cuesta, that no time will ever efface.

Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his army, upon the morning of the 4th of August, to the bridge of Arzobispo; the nature of the campaign was changed; Gallicia was delivered from the French; and the corps of Romana was now in peaceable possession of it, with the opportunity of augmenting its own numbers, and improving its discipline; the whole province was in a situation to dispose of its military means, and to create, in a short time, a powerful diversion, upon the rear of the enemy assembled upon the Tagus. The north of Spain was almost entirely in the same situation as Gallicia. The French had abandoned it, with very few exceptions, to concentrate their force against the British army; and Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived, that although he had been foiled in his attempt to rescue Madrid, yet he had restored independence to Gallicia, and in great part to the provinces adjoining it; which might, in the end, prove most advantageous to the cause of Spain. This opinion has since been proved to be correct; Gallicia retained its freedom, and the other northern provinces were never afterwards but in partial subjection to the enemy.

As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo, he detached Major General Crawford, with the light division, to occupy, with as much rapidity as possible, the pass at Almaraz; where it was to be feared the enemy, whose advanced guard had seen the passage of the allies at Arzobispo, might push a force across the Tagus, and endeavour to intercept the British army on its march upon Deleytosa. Major General Crawford arrived, however, in time to prevent that operation; the movement of the army was undisturbed; General Cuesta remained at Arzobispo; and the British moved to Deleytosa. The Spaniards were, however, attacked a few days after by the French at Arzobispo; their advanced guard was driven from the bridge; and their whole army retired to Deleytosa, whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to Jaraseco.

The force under General Vanegas had remained since the battle of Talavera, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, but to the southward of the Tagus. General Cuesta was in communication with it, and apprized Vanegas of his retreat from Arzobispo. He directed him in consequence to fall back to the positions about Madrilejos, from which he had originally moved, and upon no account to risk an action with the enemy, but to keep his corps ready to make any movement, in co-operation with the allied army, that might afterwards be determined upon. General Vanegas prepared to carry these orders into execution, and retired a considerable distance through La Mancha; but, from a fatality which has never been explained, he was induced to move forward again, over some of the ground which he had passed, and to engage his corps in a general action with the French under Sebastiani, at Almonacid. The Spaniards were completely routed in this battle; their best troops were engaged in it, and many of the corps behaved with great gallantry and good conduct; but they were defeated with considerable loss, and were driven to the Sierra Morena. This disaster was severely felt; the dispersion of the troops that could be most depended upon, and who were intrusted with the defence of the great pass into Andalusia, was an event that could not easily be repaired; and, in addition, it destroyed all confidence in the movements of the Spaniards; they were no longer to be depended upon, for the most trifling operations: when they were required to act, they remained unmoved; when intrusted with a position, as at Talavera, they deserted it without reason; when directed to avoid an action, which, if successful, could be of no benefit to their cause, they seemed to court one; and when engaged, exposed themselves to the most disastrous defeats. With this battle terminated the campaign, which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The corps under Sir Robert Wilson retired through the mountains from Escalona to Bejar, where it was attacked and routed by the advanced guard of Marshal Ney, who was returning from the Tagus to the neighbourhood of Salamanca.

Sir Arthur Wellesley remained at Jaraseco, till the French, who had collected upon the Tagus, had dispersed their corps; and till the total failure of supplies obliged him to retire to the frontiers of Portugal, from whence alone he could secure the provisioning of his army.

He placed his head-quarters at Badajos, his advance at Merida, and the rest of his army in cantonments, upon the frontiers of Spain and Portugal. The supreme government of Spain was thrown into considerable consternation by this movement, of which it had been the sole and entire cause. The individuals who composed it sought, notwithstanding, to throw the blame from themselves, upon those who had the most materially suffered by their misconduct.

The Marquis Wellesley, who was at this time the British representative in Spain, complained most bitterly of their inattention and neglect to an army, which had so valiantly fought in their defence; and whose blood had been so profusely spilt, in supporting the great cause in which they were engaged; but these complaints were only too ably urged. The Spaniards (proud of their former glories) can but ill brook the interference of foreign powers; their pride and haughty independence prompt them to spurn the assistance or control of foreigners; and when their government was justly accused of neglect, and even treason to Spain herself, yet as that reproach was from a foreign hand, they rallied round that government, and repelled the accusations, by the most idle and unfounded attacks upon those who made them, and who had full reason to complain of their unjust and unfriendly conduct. A spirit of hostility was thus raised between the allied nations, and for some time there was much of that unpleasant feeling which is generated by mutual accusations. The magnanimous conduct of the British government, however, soon set those jealousies at rest, and by degrees acquired for itself the unbounded confidence of the Spanish nation.

The supreme government of Spain had displaced General Cuesta from the command of his army, during the time that Sir Arthur Wellesley, (now become Lord Wellington) remained at Jaraseco, and General Eguia was intrusted with that important situation. This officer was soon after directed to move the Spanish army, (leaving only the Duke of Albuquerque with a small corps in Estremadura) and to form a junction with General Vanegas, in the Sierra Morena, and in the neighbourhood of La Carolina. This operation was dictated, in no small degree, by a feeling of jealousy towards the English. The Spaniards wished to keep their army separate from the British, because they believed it could be rendered more subservient to their own views. While it remained in presence of so distinguished an officer as Lord Wellington, it was curbed, and restrained in the movements it might be directed to undertake; his advice must necessarily be listened to, and it is not too much to say, that some of the rulers of the country were not at that time unwilling to see their armies directed by weaker counsels than such as would be derived from him. There was another reason for the movement of that army. It was believed, by many persons in the direction of affairs in Spain, that Lord Wellington was determined to evacuate the country, and retire into Portugal; they thought, however, that by removing the Spanish army from Estremadura, they should shift the defence of that province upon the shoulders of Lord Wellington; by which means they flattered themselves, they should retain him against his will. Lord Wellington was not so easily to be overreached: he stated to the Spanish government, that he should remain at Badajos so long as he felt he could be serviceable to its cause, but without neglecting the first object which he was directed to attend to; namely, the defence of Portugal. He pressed the government to make such arrangements as would secure the provisioning of his army, if he was enabled again to take the field; but above all, he recommended it to preserve the Spanish armies from being harassed, or on any account risked with the French, excepting in such operations as should be agreed upon, according to a general combination of all the forces that could be brought against them. The army of the Marquis of Romana was moved from Gallicia to Ciudad Rodrigo; where it was placed under the orders of the Duke del Parque.

A state of tranquillity now succeeded to the active operations of the preceding months; the French armies had been in almost constant movement since the entrance of Buonaparte into Spain, in the month of November. When he quitted the country to prepare for the German war, he had left his armies in possession of all the north of Spain; Soult afterwards added the north of Portugal. Victor was advanced to the confines of Andalusia, near Monasterio; and Sebastiani occupied La Mancha; Suchet was in force in Arragon, and St. Cyr was employed in the siege of the fortresses in Catalonia. The situation of these corps was now considerably changed. The north of Spain and Portugal was almost entirely free from the incursions of the French; the province of Estremadura was relieved from them; and a great portion of La Mancha was in the occupation of the Spanish armies. The French had therefore lost considerably during the last months; and, notwithstanding their activity and military talents, they had been forced to retire from the provinces which they had subdued, and to concentrate for their own defence, in a country which they believed, after the capture of Madrid, they had totally subjected. When Buonaparte re-crossed the Pyrenees, he directed his imperial eagles to be placed upon the towers of Lisbon; he proclaimed his empire in the Peninsula, and boasted that there no longer existed any force that was capable of obstructing the accomplishment of his imperial mandate. But the strength of patriotism in a whole people was as yet unknown to him. The constant reduction of his forces, the ever succeeding evacuation of apparently conquered provinces by his troops, the never-ending conflicts in every corner of the Peninsula, have since convinced him that a great people with one intent and one resolution, with patriotism as their guide, are too powerful to be subdued, though they have neither armies nor military science to oppose to the invaders.

The British troops had been also in constant activity since the arrival of Lord Wellington in Portugal, they therefore required rest. It became then the interest of both French and English to preserve that state of tranquillity which had succeeded since the passage of the Tagus.

The state of Spain about this time, was most extraordinary; the whole people were hostile to the French, yet their exertions at the commencement of their struggle had so far surpassed any former efforts they had been called upon to make, that they now reposed in security, confiding their cause to the means which they had already provided, and sheltering themselves from any further calls, by the loud and re-echoed declarations that they were invincible. It was in vain to combat against this argument; if a doubt as to its validity was started, the instances of Moncey’s retreat from Valencia and of Ney’s from Gallicia, were thought sufficient to remove all apprehensions, and to silence for ever the discussion of the subject; the best informed amongst the Spaniards were carried away by feelings so congenial to their haughty spirits, and so well adapted to the indolence of their natures. The defence of Saragossa and of Gerona convinced them that the attempt to conquer Spain would be unavailing, and they sunk at once into a security for which they since have most dearly paid. If at Granada, you questioned the public authorities as to the preparations they were making to bring new armies into the field, they answered by an account of what had already been produced. If in Valencia, the defeat which the French had already sustained there was a guarantee of the destruction which would await a second corps, that should attempt the invasion of their country; Murcia could boast the terror with which it had inspired the enemy, since he had never ventured to attack it; and in this manner every part of Spain relied with confidence upon the levies which it had already produced, and looked upon its entire deliverance from a foreign yoke, as within little of being accomplished.

During the period of which we have been speaking, Marshal Ney commenced an operation against the corps of the Duke del Parque: that officer had collected his troops in a strong position at Tamanes; the French made a desperate assault upon him, but were repulsed with considerable loss. This action confirmed the Spaniards in the belief that they were invincible; and a general feeling was raised, that their armies should advance upon Madrid, and that the successes of Baylen would shrink before the glories that awaited them in the neighbourhood of the capital.

The disastrous termination of the German war seemed in no degree to shake the confidence of the Spanish nation; proud of its own feats, it disdained a feeling of dependence upon any other people for the success of its cause.

The government partook of the same sentiment; and, most singular to relate, during the period of this eventful repose from active operations, made not the slightest effort to prepare for the struggle which was to succeed.

The army of Lord Wellington which was cantoned upon the Guadiana became extremely sickly; and numbers of the officers and men fell victims to the disorders generated by the noxious exhalations of that river, and to the fatigues which, amidst the greatest privations, they had previously undergone. The Spaniards made no exertions to secure provisions for the army; so that it was incapable of active operations.

The Spanish government seized this opportunity to attempt a scheme, which will ever stand unrivalled in absurdity and folly. The Spanish army which was assembled at the Carolina formed an effective force of 48,000 men; it had been placed under the orders of General Eguia, when he marched with the greatest proportion of his army from Estremadura; but it had afterwards been entrusted to the command of General Arisaga, a very young and inexperienced officer; he was only a brigadier when he was appointed to this important station, but was advanced to the rank of a major-general upon assuming it.

It appears that this officer was befriended by a strong party of the ministers at Seville, who had considerable influence with the supreme government, although their views were hostile to it. He was appointed for the purpose of carrying their objects into effect; and every officer senior to him was removed, to enable him to assume the command. The other Spanish corps which communicated with the central one, were commanded by the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque, both of superior rank to General Arisaga; it was, therefore, the object of his employers to prevent their co-operation with him, lest by taking upon themselves the direction of the forces, to which they were entitled by their rank, they should prevent the execution of the project the ministers had in view.

These persons conceived that it was possible to enter Madrid; and they are supposed to have purposed, in so doing, to effect a revolution, to displace the government of the Junta Suprema, and to seize it for themselves.