Part 4

During the month of June, Victor, (in consequence of the successful operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley against Soult, and his return upon the Tagus) withdrew his corps from the neighbourhood of Monasterio, crossed the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and took up a position at Talavera de la Reyna; General Cuesta followed him to that place, but finding him in position, retired to Almaraz, where he remained, with his advance corps, under the Duke of Albuquerque, at Arzobispo. Towards the end of the same month, Marshal Soult arrived with the corps under his command, at Puebla di Senabria, from whence he marched to Zamora and Salamanca.

In this state of things, Sir Arthur Wellesley (after having received the most distinct declarations from the supreme Government of Spain that his army should be supplied with provisions) advanced on the 25th and 26th of June, from Abrantes, towards Placencia. Marshal Beresford moved at the same time to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir Arthur Wellesley went on the 12th to the head-quarters of General Cuesta, at Casas del Puerta, near the bridge of Almaraz, to concert with him the operations of the campaign. He proposed as the first object, to occupy in strength the positions of Baños and Bejar, which commanded the only road from Upper Castile into Estremadura, and the country about Coria, and Placencia. Sir Arthur Wellesley, (aware that his own army was the only one that was efficient for the operations of a campaign,) recommended that a corps of Spaniards should be destined for this service.

It has since been known, that amongst the numberless intriguers who at this moment sought to disunite the counsels of the allies, one of the most busy had awakened the jealousy of General Cuesta upon this point, and had represented to him, that the English general, with a view of weakening the Spanish force in the field, would recommend him to make a considerable detachment from his army. When the recommendation was given, therefore, General Cuesta was convinced that the information he had received was correct; and from the violence of his own nature, could not easily repress his resentment at a proposal, which he thought was intended to reduce his army, for the purpose of diminishing his share of glory in the expulsion of the French from Madrid; a result which he anticipated from the movements about to be carried into execution. General O’Donaju, the adjutant-general of the Spanish army, prevailed upon him, however, to agree to the arrangement, but General Cuesta never carried it fairly into effect. The small force he afterwards sent to Bejar was incompetent to any resistance, and was totally unprovided, even with ammunition.

The remainder of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was, that his army should join that of General Cuesta, and should advance in the first instance to the attack of Victor at Talavera. By a movement in co-operation, General Vanegas was ordered to break up from the position in La Mancha, about Madrilejos; to march upon Pembleque and Ocaña, and pass the Tagus at Fuente Dueñas; where he was to arrive on the same day, the 22d of July, that the armies under Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Cuesta, were to arrive at Talavera, and attack the corps of Victor. General Vanegas received this order, and agreed to its execution. Sir Arthur Wellesley removed his army from Placencia, according to the plan which had been arranged; passed the Tietar, and arrived at Oropesa on the 20th of July; where he effected his junction with the army under the orders of General Cuesta, amounting to 35,000 effective men. The next day, the Spanish army advanced towards Talavera; and on the 22d the British corps moved forward to the same place. While upon his march, Sir Arthur Wellesley received several messages from General Cuesta, stating that the enemy was disposed to attack him. Sir Arthur Wellesley pushed forward, but upon reaching the ground, found only two squadrons of French, who had come from Talavera to reconnoitre the position of the Spaniards.

The light troops of both armies advanced upon the rear-guard of the French, the Spanish cavalry attempted to charge it, but without effect, and the whole French army took up a position upon the heights, to the eastward of the Alberche. The British and Spanish armies occupied the ground about Talavera with their advance upon the right of the same river. Sir Arthur Wellesley had expected to hear from General Vanegas: according to the orders which had been sent to him, he should have been at Fuente Dueñas upon the 22d; but from every information which could be obtained, no movement appeared to have been made by him. The history of the defection of his corps deserves to be recorded. When General Vanegas received the orders from General Cuesta to move upon Madrid, he returned for answer, that he would do so; he despatched, however, at the same time, a courier to the supreme Junta, communicating to it the orders he had received. That body replied, that he was not to execute the movement, but to await its further commands in the positions which he occupied. These directions, (which were neither announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley nor to General Cuesta), arrived in time to stop General Vanegas. It was difficult to explain the motive of this conduct; but it was afterwards discovered that the supreme Junta, amongst other reasons, was not anxious that General Cuesta should enter Madrid. He was supposed to entertain sentiments hostile to many of those who composed it, and not friendly to the whole body; the Junta, therefore, feared, that if he reached Madrid, he would effect a counter-revolution, and place himself at the head of the government; or at least overturn the Junta’s power. This explanation of its motive gained considerable weight from the conduct of that body, when it received General Cuesta’s despatches, stating that he had formed his junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and was proceeding to Madrid. The Junta then, with as much alacrity as it had sent counter-orders before, directed General Vanegas to move forward, and constituted him Captain-General of the province of Madrid; so that, upon his arrival there, he would be superior to General Cuesta, under whose orders up to that moment he had been placed. Although by this conduct the general effect of the plan proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley was destroyed, yet he resolved to attack the corps of Marshal Victor, and on the morning of the 23d moved his columns for that purpose into a wood close to the Alberche, and stretching along the right of the French army.

The plan of the movement which he determined upon, was to cross the river, attack the right of Marshal Victor with the whole of the British infantry, move the whole cavalry upon the centre of the enemy, and engage their left with the Spanish infantry.

The corps of Marshal Victor was 22,000 men; the allied army was 50,000. The troops of which it was composed were not all of equally good materials; but the number of English only would almost have secured success if the attack had taken place. General Cuesta, however, refused to march till the following morning; and Sir Arthur Wellesley with considerable reluctance was constrained to yield to his determination. Some alterations were made in the course of the night in the disposition of the troops. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was ordered to the left of the British, and was to have passed the Alberche in the rear of the enemy. Sir R. Wilson, who commanded a corps of light troops, Spanish and Portuguese, was also ordered still further along the banks of the Alberche to Escalona.

Marshal Victor, however, got information of the intended attack, and retired from his position in the night. Nothing could have been more unfortunate for the allied army; infinitely superior in numbers, it was at the point of making a combined attack upon him, from which it would seem almost impossible he should have escaped without considerable loss; by his retreat unhurt, the nature of the campaign was changed, and the bright prospects of the allies destroyed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, since his arrival at Talavera, had complained of the total failure on the part of the Spaniards in the supply of his army with provisions. The necessities of the British troops made it impossible to advance; and after the retreat of the French army, Sir Arthur Wellesley was compelled to remain at Talavera till supplies should arrive to him: but recommended the Spaniards, who had not the same deficiencies, to move upon Cavalla, upon the road to Toledo, and endeavour to communicate with General Vanegas, who was still supposed to have made some movement in La Mancha. General Cuesta, however, without communicating with Sir Arthur Wellesley, took the road to Sta. Olalla, where he arrived with the whole Spanish army on the morning of the 25th. From this place he gave notice of the defection of the corps of Vanegas.

On the morning of the 26th General Cuesta’s advance was attacked by the advanced guard of the French army. It appeared that Joseph had called General Sebastiani from La Mancha to Toledo; that with all the force he could withdraw from Madrid, he had marched himself to join him; and that he had formed a junction with these two corps and the corps of General Victor, at or near Torrijos; that he had immediately advanced upon General Cuesta; and was in hopes of beating him before he should be joined by the British. General Cuesta, however, upon learning the force of the enemy, retired to Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley had endeavoured to find a situation in which to fight a battle in front of the Alberche; but not having succeeded, determined to take up a position, the right upon the town of Talavera, the left upon some heights, about a mile to the northward of it. The Spanish army retired during the 26th and 27th, and took up the ground marked out for it about the town of Talavera. On the morning of the 27th Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a brigade of cavalry and two brigades of infantry; the whole under the orders of Major General Mackenzie, to watch the enemy upon the left of the Alberche, and to protect the retreat of the Spaniards.

Towards two o’clock in the afternoon the French advance of cavalry began to skirmish with the British. Major General Mackenzie soon after retired, and about four o’clock passed the Alberche with the whole of his corps. He took up a position in a wood upon the right bank of it, from which he could observe the movements of the enemy.

Joseph had brought the whole of his army to the opposite side of the river; and believing (from the small number of troops that were to be seen upon the right bank,) that the allies were retreating, he determined to push in their advanced guard immediately, with the hope of falling upon their army on its march to the bridge of Almaraz; to which place alone, after abandoning the line of the Alberche, he thought it could be retiring. The French infantry passed the river; the brigade of Colonel Donkin, which was posted to defend it, was to a certain degree surprised. The river was fordable at all points, and the French advanced guard fell upon this brigade and caused it considerable loss. Sir Arthur Wellesley (who had just arrived upon the ground) ordered the whole of Major General Mackenzie’s division to retire from the wood, and to fall back upon the position in the rear, into which the army was at this time moving. The French, elated with their first, successes, pushed forward as rapidly as the passage of their troops would allow, and threw their right forward, with the view of turning the town of Talavera. The Duke of Albuquerque shewed, however, so good a front with the cavalry under his orders (which was in a plain upon the left of the British,) that this movement was considerably delayed. Sir Arthur Wellesley was tempted, (while a part only of the French army had passed the Alberche), to attack it with the whole of the allies; but upon considering the lateness of the hour, he continued his movement to the position he had fixed upon. The British advanced guard retired under cover of the cavalry, and took up the ground allotted to it. The French continued to press forward; and, at last, when it was nearly dark, brought a battery of six guns, supported by a considerable corps of infantry, to some high ground opposite the height upon which the left of the British was to rest. The troops destined for this point had not at that moment reached it. Colonel Donkin’s brigade, which was retiring near it, was ordered to form at the foot of the hill upon the left of the Germans under General Sherbrooke. But the French, supported by their guns, attacked these corps, drove them from the ground they occupied, and carried the height. Lieutenant General Hill’s and Major General R. Stewart’s brigades were at that moment ascending it from the other side; their advance found the French upon the top. The battalion of detachments under Colonel Bunbury wheeled into line, charged, and retook the hill. The French, however, returned to the attack, but were finally driven to the foot of it. The action upon this point was severe; Major General Hill was at one moment mixed with the French soldiers; several men of both armies were killed or wounded with the bayonet, but the gallantry of British soldiers, and the intrepidity of their officers, prevailed.

During this attack, the Spanish troops were alarmed by the fire of the French, who were following the British cavalry in its retreat through the centre of the allies; they immediately began a fire which was taken up by the whole of the first line. Several of the officers of the Guards who were standing in front of their men, and many of the light troops of the Germans who were posted in advance, were killed or wounded by this fire. The French, however, were checked by it, and remained without making any further attack during the night. It appeared afterwards that the French officers discovered that the whole army was in front of Talavera, only from the firing which has just been described; they were ignorant of any position about that town, and, therefore, till then, had given out to their soldiers that the allied army was retiring.

At day-break on the 28th the French recommenced their attack with 14,000 men, by assaulting the hill from which they had been driven the night before. Their troops had been collected during dark, and were formed at the bottom of the height; they moved at a signal given, and succeeded in ascending to a considerable distance before they were checked by the fire of the British. From the conical shape of this hill it was difficult to form any considerable number of men to defend it: but the regiments which were on it charged the French troops with an impetuosity they were unable to resist, and drove them, with considerable loss and in total confusion, beyond the ground from which they had moved to the attack.

The British cavalry had been ordered up to charge the French right as they were retiring, but unfortunately it was at too great a distance to effect this object.

After the failure of this attempt upon the hill, the French continued to cannonade the British line for a considerable time; but the fire ceased at length on both sides, and perfect tranquillity reigned throughout the opposing armies. During this interval, Sir Arthur Wellesley communicated with General Cuesta near a house in the centre of the lines, and afterwards slept, till some fresh movements in the enemy’s camp were reported to him.

Joseph, having been defeated in the several efforts he had made upon the British left, determined to try his fortune upon the centre of the allied army. The attack which followed was made under cover of a wood of olives, and fell principally upon the brigade commanded by Major General Alexander Campbell; this officer had taken advantage of some high banks which intersected the ground he occupied, and through the means of which he was enabled, with a very inferior force, to arrest the progress of the enemy’s principal column. Being at one time, however, driven from one of these banks, he rallied the regiment which was retiring, charged the column which was pursuing him, drove it from the ground of which it had taken possession, and took twelve pieces of artillery; at the same time some squadrons of the Spanish regiment of cavalry of the King, charged the head of a French column of infantry which was advancing through the wood (in pursuit of some Spanish infantry that had given way,) and cut up a considerable part of it. Thus terminated the second attack of the memorable 28th of July; the enemy was completely repulsed, with the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery upon different points, and a very considerable number of his best troops. His failures seemed decisive of the day; another pause ensued, considerable movements on the part of the enemy were observed, and for some time were construed by the allied army as indicative of a retreat; but the severest action was yet to come.

The whole état major of the French was observed to have collected in front of the left of the British; after some consultation amongst the officers who composed it, they appeared to have decided upon a new arrangement of their army. The aides-de-camp were despatched in different directions, and soon after the French divisions were observed to be moving to their new destinations. It now seemed to be the intention of the enemy to bring the great body of his force to act upon that part of the British line which was occupied by the Guards; and, at the same time, to move with three columns of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, along the valley which extended under the height which formed the left of the British line. These columns were supported by some light infantry, which the enemy had thrown upon the chain of hills which run westward beyond the valley, and which were destined to turn the British left and attack it upon the flank and rear.

To meet this movement Sir Arthur Wellesley directed the cavalry (which was concealed in the valley) to be prepared to charge the columns of infantry, as soon as they should have extended their formation, and exposed their flank. He also directed the guards to be prepared for the attack which was going to be made upon them, and upon no account to move from the ground they occupied.

The French columns of infantry which had moved into the valley, were more advanced than those destined for the attack upon the Guards; they had halted near a house within gun-shot of the British left, and appeared to be waiting for orders to advance. Major General Payne, who commanded the British cavalry, seized this opportunity to attack them; the enemy, observing the forward movement of the cavalry, formed himself against the side of this house in solid column; he had a deep ravine, or water-course, along his front, of which the British cavalry was not aware, and he was besides supported by sixteen guns. The charge of the cavalry was thrown into confusion by this ravine; many of the horses fell into it; and the portion which got over it was so divided and broken as a body, that the effect of the charge was completely done away. The bravery of the British soldier was not, however, to be daunted by this check. The Honourable Major Ponsonby led the men who were near him upon the bayonets of the enemy; but their valour could not compensate for the total confusion into which they had been thrown. The bravery of individuals could effect nothing against a solid body of infantry; the soldiers who were repulsed by the French columns galloped forward upon the regiment of cavalry which supported them, and in a short time the whole plain was covered with British dragoons dispersed in all directions, and totally without formation. In this state they were charged by some French regiments which were in reserve; many of them were taken, the remainder passed through the intervals in the French columns, and those that escaped their fire, (of whom Lord William Russel was one), retired within the British lines.

In this attack the 23d Light Dragoons lost two-thirds of its number; its charge was injudicious; the ground in front had not been reconnoitred, and the French infantry was too strongly posted to promise it success. The order for the cavalry was to charge when the French columns had extended and exposed their flank. They had done neither when the attack was made, but the bravery with which it was conducted, put an end to the movements which the enemy had intended on that side; and he never stirred afterwards from the ground upon which he was formed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley observed this hesitation, and profited by it, in detaching the 48th Regiment, (which he had called for the defence of the height when it was threatened with an attack), to support the movement which the guards had at this moment made upon the enemy. These troops, with a part of Major General Cameron’s brigade, had been attacked by the whole reserve of the French army; but they had received it with so tremendous a fire, that they forced it to give way; charged it with great impetuosity; and pursued it into a wood. They had not proceeded to any great distance, however, when the enemy brought so considerable a number of guns to bear upon their flank, that in a very few moments all their mounted officers were killed or wounded and near 500 of their men. In this situation the Guards were forced to fall back in considerable confusion: they passed through the intervals of the 48th Regiment, which had just arrived to support them, and which checked the advance of the enemy. The attack was most severe upon this regiment; it maintained its ground in the most gallant manner, till the guards had re-formed, and moved forward to its support. When the French perceived these troops advancing, they retired; the Guards instantly huzza’d; the cry was echoed along the whole line; the enemy continued their retreat; and thus ended the last achievement of the battle of Talavera. The enemy was soon perceived to be moving to the rear; he shewed a considerable force of cavalry, and maintained a heavy cannonade to cover the retreat; and at the close of the day he had already passed a portion of his troops across the Alberche.

There never was a more extraordinary battle than the one which has now been described: the French brought into the field a force of not less than 47,000 men, and the whole of their attacks, with the most trifling exception, were directed against the British army, not exceeding 18,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry. Yet the British general had nerve to maintain the contest, and ability to baffle the efforts of the enemy. The army displayed a courage and perseverance, which did justice to the confidence with which its commander had relied upon it; and proved to Spain and to the world, what the dauntless spirit of the British soldier is capable of effecting, when under the direction of such an officer.

The enemy did justice to the talent of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and to the unrivalled bravery of his troops; Marshal Victor admitted to an English officer who was taken prisoner, that much as he had heard of the gallantry of English soldiers, still he could not have believed that any men could have been led to attacks so desperate as some that he had witnessed in the battle of Talavera. The glory of the British arms shone forth in brighter colours on this memorable day than it had ever done amidst its countless triumphs of years preceding. The soldiers struggled against privations of every description; as well as against a force which seemed calculated to overwhelm them; their native valour spurred them on to conquest, and stifled every feeling which could arrest or make it doubtful.