Part 27
The numbers of a meeting--that is to say, such an assembly of persons as would create terror in the minds of people living in the neighbourhood,--would justify the magistrate in taking measures to disperse it.
_June 15, 1838._
_Real cause of our interference in Spain._
The system of interference adopted by his late majesty's government, by means of the quadruple treaty, was with a view to the contest between extreme opinions--it was more with a view of aiding these extreme opinions, than to the arrangement of the mere differences between Don Carlos, upon the one side, and the queen, or her daughter, upon the other; to support certain opinions, and not to determine the succession, was the cause of interference. I regret interference upon that ground; I object to interference upon that ground; and I say, moreover, that we were not right in interfering upon that ground. I maintain that, more particularly on account of the extreme opinions that prevailed, we ought not to have interfered at all; but most especially we ought not, according to the common practice of this government, and in accordance with the declared political principles of the noble lords themselves, to have interfered in a question involving extreme political opinions. Now it has unfortunately happened that extreme political principles have been forced upon a great part of Europe by means of large armies and of great military forces, and it was consequently expected that the same thing would succeed in Spain. This, I believe, was the object of our interference with Spain, and not to determine the Spanish succession.
_June 19, 1838._
_We had no right to interfere against Don Carlos._
I say we had no business to interfere in the question of succession. There might have been some pretext for interference in the question of succession, if any of the powers of Europe had taken part with Don Carlos, but that was not the case. The noble baron (Lord Holland) cheers. I say, confidently, that not one of the powers in Europe had stirred a finger in support of the pretensions of Don Carlos. I say, then, that, according to all principles--the principles supported and acted upon by this country, in the case of the house of Braganza, and many other cases that I could mention--we ought to have avoided interference; and we ought to have avoided interference by armies more particularly, in the contests in Spain. I say, my lords, that not a sword had been moved in Europe in favour of Don Carlos. When Don Carlos went to Spain, in the summer of 1834, there were not three battalions in arms in that country in his favour. This I positively state as a fact. But, on the contrary, in the space of forty leagues there were forty fortified posts in possession of the queen's troops. Now, my lords, this is a positive fact; and I say that, in the year 1835, when the armistice was negotiated, when the exchange of prisoners was negotiated by Lord Eliot, Don Carlos had then acquired a superiority over the queen's forces, who were obliged to take up a position on the right of the Ebro. That is to say, between the interval of time I have mentioned,--and this is a positive fact upon which your lordships may rely, and to which I pledge my word,--between the summer of 1834 and the period at which the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon in 1835,--that is, in the course of a very few months,--the superiority had been gained by Don Carlos in that part of the country, so far that he had forced the enemy to take up a position on the other side of the Ebro, abandoning all their fortified posts, except Pampeluna and one other; and, I must add, they had very wisely abandoned them, because they found they could not march to their relief through the country. Now, my lords, this is literally and truly a fact; and it is a fact not to be forgotten, with respect to the present contest in Spain. I say, then, that it was the business of this government not to have interfered by force. We ought not to have done so, according to the noble marquis's principle--that there ought to be no interference between two hostile parties in a nation like Spain.
_June 19, 1838._
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_The Legion a failure._
The noble viscount has told your lordships, certainly, that he sent out an expedition; and the noble marquis has informed us that it has always been the policy of this country to encourage such expeditions. Now, without meaning to assert that the result of that expedition was a dire catastrophe, I must be permitted to say that the legion has been, in my opinion and conviction, a complete failure. It has cost the Spanish government an enormous sum of money. Great expectations were raised respecting it, not one of which has been fulfilled. When the legion went to Spain, the Queen of Spain's army was in all the provinces, with the exception of Biscay and Navarre. Her government was established in all parts of Spain, excepting these places. Excepting them, all other places might be said to be in a state of tranquillity. But it appears the Queen of Spain could not carry on the war, unless she got ten thousand Isle of Dogsmen--a legion from England, and another from France. If the Spanish government had asked for officers, or for arms, or for money, or for artillery, I should not have been surprised, as I know well the manner in which the Spanish arsenals are supplied. But asking for 10,000 men from England to destroy Don Carlos, who was shut up in the mountains, was a matter really not to be seriously thought of. The object was not to bring 10,000, or 15,000, or 20,000 men into action, but to bring the red coats and the blue coats, the French and English troops, into the contest; that was the object, and the view was, to produce a moral effect. But the government ought to have known that that which gave them the influence on the one side, was fatal to that influence on the other. Thus was an end put to that moral influence which this country could, and ought to have exerted, but which can only be effectually exercised by strict adherence, throughout all her proceedings, to the plain principles of justice. If this country enter into a treaty, let her carry it honourably through; but let her not push her interference further than is necessary for exerting her influence over both parties, in order to settle existing differences. I have said that the legion was a failure. Of that there cannot be the slightest doubt. The war is now in the same state as it was in the year 1835, except that Don Carlos has more men.
_June 19, 1838._
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_The Opposition should give aid to the Government when a war is inevitable._
The noble viscount tells us that we did not object to the appointment of the Earl of Durham as governor-general of Canada--that we did not object to the powers confided to him; that we--referring particularly to me--urged this government by all the means in their power to send out large forces, and take care to be strong in that part of the world; advice which, I admit, I did repeat over and over again, until I fatigued myself and the house by doing so. But why did I not object to those powers being given to the Earl of Durham? Because, seeing the government in difficulties--seeing the colony in a state of rebellion--and seeing that the government possessed confidence in another place--I thought it was not my duty to excite opposition to measures which they thought it might be proper to adopt; and therefore I took them all upon their recommendation. Very possibly I was wrong in so doing; indeed, it appears that I was wrong; but I took the course which I then considered it my duty to take. I declared that I would not follow the example of those who, being convinced of the certainty that the country would be involved in a war, yet thought proper to oppose all measures that were necessary for carrying on that war. Neither would I deny assistance to those who were absent, and who were carrying on the government to the best of their ability; but I would give the government a fair support, in order to pacify a country which might be in a state of war or rebellion. That was the course which I followed on the occasion alluded to by the noble viscount. With respect to the Earl of Durham, I am personally unacquainted with him; and I considered that the noble viscount and her majesty's government ought to have known best who was the person most qualified to act as governor of Canada.
_August 9, 1838._
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_Lord Durham's Ordinance[20] a grossly illegal Act._
A grossly illegal act has been committed--not a mere technical error, or one having reference to small or nice points of law, but an illegal act of great magnitude, and relating to points of the most grave importance--an act so clearly illegal, that no man capable of understanding the first principles of justice can doubt of its impropriety. It is impossible that the people of this country can suffer any man to be driven into banishment without trial, or that they can allow him, afterwards, to be condemned to death, without having been convicted of any crime but that of returning to his own country.
[Footnote 20: The Earl of Durham, governor-general of the Canadas, had issued an ordinance, transporting to Bermuda Dr. Nelson and seven others, guilty by confession of high treason, and subjecting them to death if they returned to Canada. Lord Brougham, actuated, as was asserted by some, by personal feeling against Lord Durham, protested against this act in the face of the country. His speech on the occasion was one of the most powerful he ever delivered. It is scarcely necessary to add that Lord Durham immediately and precipitately resigned his governorship.]
_August 9, 1838._
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_Inadequacy of our Navy._
There is nothing more certain than that, if you come to be entirely dependent for corn on the countries bordering on the Baltic, you would have the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia (as has been known before), levying a tax upon the exportation of that article of food to the Thames, and elsewhere in this country. * * I entirely agree with the noble and learned lord on the expediency of avoiding any interference with foreign powers on the subject of commercial matters; but I confess that I cannot view the state of our commercial relations, and of our position in the world generally, in connection with these commercial pursuits, with any degree of unmixed satisfaction. On the contrary, I do deplore the state in which we find ourselves placed in many parts of the world, particularly as it has been described in the course of the evening by my noble friend (Viscount Strangford). What I attribute that state of our commercial relations to, in a great degree, is, the extreme weakness and tottering condition of our naval establishments. I do not mean to complain of the distribution of our naval establishments; though, at the same time, I by no means intend to unsay what I have said in respect to the expeditions to Spain, which I cannot approve of; but I repeat my expression that I consider our naval establishments to be in too weak and tottering a condition to answer the purpose for which they were intended, which was to give protection to the commercial interests of the country in all parts of the world; for the commerce of England does extend to all parts of the world. There is not a port, not a river, which is not visited by the ships of her majesty's subjects; and her majesty's subjects have an undoubted right to protection in whatever part of the world they may think proper to visit in the pursuits of commerce. The circumstance of which I complain I do not at all attribute to neglect upon the part of the admiralty, neither do I include in my censure the noble earl who is at the head of the admiralty; but those I do blame are the individuals who have thought proper to reduce the establishments of the country to such a degree, that protection cannot possibly be given in all places where it is required.
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I will remind your lordships that, since the peace, and particularly within the last twenty years, three great navies have sprung up in Europe, which are four times as strong as they were at any former period. Other navies, it is true, are put down; but we remain much the same. A great deal has been said, by way of comparison, between the strength of our navy in 1792, and in the years 1814 and 1815; but when we talk of strength in this case, we ought not to look at the subject without adverting to the naval establishments of other powers. Now, although our marine force should even be on the same footing as before, our commerce is not only tripled, but extended to a degree ten times greater than it ever was before; and there is not a part of the earth, from one pole to the other, in which the protection of our navy is not required for our commerce. I must say that, if we should at any time incur the misfortune of being involved in another war--which God forbid!--the only mode of keeping out of the difficulty would be to maintain such a navy as would give protection to her majesty's subjects in all parts of the globe.
_August 14, 1838._
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_Neutrality of Belgium._
I hope that it never may be lost sight of in this country, that the original foundation of the independence of Belgium, as a separate kingdom, was this condition, namely, its perpetual neutrality. That condition I consider to have been the foundation of that transaction, and I hope that this will never be forgotten by this country, or by Europe.
_February 5, 1839._
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_Aggressions on Canada from the United States._
I must say I should very much wish to see suitable measures adopted to carry into execution the intentions which her majesty declares in her speech, of maintaining her rights of sovereignty over Canada. The system of levying private war which prevails on that continent is not wholly unknown in other parts of the world. I have read of it as existing in the deserts of Central Asia; I have heard of its being practised, as a system, by the Asiatics on the frontiers of the Russian monarchy, where a perpetual warfare is going on between those tribes and the troops sent to repress their inroads--a warfare that has been waged in those countries from century to century. We read also of circumstances of the same kind occurring in Africa--of wars carried on by barbarous tribes against the possessions of the British government in Africa, the contests of savages against a civilized people. But this is a war carried on by a nation supposed to be considerably advanced in the scale of civilization--by men governing themselves, electing their servants by ballot and general suffrage, and living under institutions of that description. Yet these are the very men who come in at night, and with fire and torch destroy the property of her majesty's subjects, for no reason whatever except that they obey her majesty's laws, and carry into effect her royal commands. Of such a system of warfare there are, I believe, no examples, except, as I have stated, among the most lawless of the barbarous tribes of the East and of Africa. It is quite out of the question that her majesty's loyal subjects, invited to their habitations, and fixed in them, by her majesty's authority and that of her predecessors, should not endeavour to retaliate the sufferings thus inflicted upon them, unless protected by the strong arm of government; but how can government protect them, except by taking strong measures, when these persons are found invading her majesty's dominions for the purpose of plundering and destroying the property of her majesty's subjects, to intercept them in their retreat, to take them prisoners, and punish them according to the laws of the country they have insulted?
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There can be no doubt a civil government in any country is capable of preventing the collection of a body of troops, and the invasion of the territory of a neighbouring power. A body of "sympathisers" has been organised in the States to carry on the plan of invasion; and are we to sit down quietly and pass unnoticed this unwarrantable interference?
_February 5, 1839._
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_Agitation by Authority._
I now come to the last paragraph of the speech, in which her majesty complains, that she has observed with pain the efforts which have been made, in some parts of the country, to excite her subjects to disobedience and resistance to the law, and to recommend dangerous and illegal acts. Now, I really think that this affecting paragraph cannot have raised very pleasant reflections in the breasts of many noble lords who are in the habit of supporting her majesty's ministers. It is but too true that various persons have endeavoured to excite her majesty's subjects to resist the law; but I am afraid much of this spirit may be traced to what has taken place in this house on former occasions. I have heard persons, charged with the highest employments of government, insisting upon the rights of this people to assemble for the expression of their sentiments, declaiming against any restriction on that right, and preaching upon this doctrine without restricting it in the manner declared by law--namely, that these assemblies must not be in numbers sufficient to create alarm. It was but very lately that a great officer of state, travelling about the country, made a speech to the same purport at Liverpool, and stated those opinions in the most unreserved manner, at the very moment when men were assembling by torch-light meetings. We have heard for a number of years past of the extraordinary tranquillity of Ireland, and as often as I have listened to the phrase, I have protested against it; but there is a gentleman, high in the confidence of government, who goes about devising new modes of agitation every day. That gentleman ought to have a special copy of the speech sent to him! One time he talks of raising 2,000,000 of men--at another time of a fund of 20,000 l. sterling, which is deposited in his private bank, and ultimately to be deposited in his private pocket. In order to further his new schemes of agitation, that gentleman has declared his intention of raising 60,000 fighting men for her majesty, though he has never, that I am aware of, been employed as a recruiting officer. Sometimes these boasts do not turn out to be true; but if not 60,000 persons, there may be 6,000, or some force of that description, which would be a serious inconvenience to the government.
_February 5, 1839._
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_Folly of carrying on war with a peace establishment._
This country is at war--at war in two quarters of the world--at war in America and at war in Asia; and what I say is this, that when a country is at war, I understand that the fleet of that country should be put upon a war establishment; whereas, these returns are made on a peace establishment--nay, I believe on one much lower,--on a reduced peace establishment; and yet we are pretending to carry on war in two countries of the world with such means! I warned your lordships a year and a half ago--indeed nearly two years ago, against any such attempt. I believe that we have been feeling the inconvenience of such an attempt from that period up to the present time, and I only hope and trust in God, that we shall not experience still further inconvenience and disasters from our perseverance in it. A peace establishment, and a reduced peace establishment, may be very fit and very proper for carrying on the service of the country in time of peace; but when we come to carry on war, our peace establishment is not found equal to the performance of the duties required from the establishment in time of peace, and still less to those extended duties which must be performed in time of war.
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We are carrying on a war in North America, and a most expensive war in Asia; and both of them require all the force this country can employ in order to bring them to an early and an honourable termination. We are, however, engaging in both with a reduced peace establishment, and we are incurring all descriptions of risks, in every other part of the world, in order to do this. The noble earl (Minto) has been talking about a few masts and sails, when the whole force which the country can command ought to be engaged in the war now waging, in order to bring the contest to the honourable termination I speak of. I said this about a year and a half ago, and I now repeat it.
_March 7, 1839._
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_The Corn Laws have improved Agriculture._