Part 16
Then came the Revolution in France, followed by that of Belgium; and like the former revolutions of Naples and of Spain, they naturally excited a strong sensation here; that excitement, increased by speeches made in various parts of the country, created a strong desire for Parliamentary Reform. But I did not think then, any more than I think now, that that desire was irresistible. If Parliament should see reason to decide that the proposed alteration in the Constitution is not necessary, and ought not to be made, I am confident the country will acquiesce in that decision. I believe that the wish for reform is strong and growing; but if the people see that the subject is fairly discussed, and honestly determined here, I am sure they will submit without a murmur. Already the sensation produced by the French and Belgian Revolutions has subsided; the natives of the country have seen the deplorable results by which those commotions have been followed, and are wisely warned by the sufferings of their neighbours.
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Upon the defeat on the Civil List, finding I had the misfortune no longer to enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, I thought proper to resign the situation which I held in his Majesty's service. Upon that occasion, the question of Parliamentary Reform had no more to do, as far as I was concerned, with the resignation which I tendered to his Majesty on the day following the defeat on the Civil List, than anything else in the world. I admit I resigned next morning, because I did not wish to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might result from the Government going out on the success of the question of Parliamentary Reform. This is the truth; but, to say I resigned on account of Parliamentary Reform, is wrong; I resigned upon the ground before stated; and I resigned at that particular moment on the Tuesday, because I did not choose to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might ensue from the occurrence of the case just mentioned. This is the real fact of the story. But the noble and learned Lord has said, that the late Ministry gave up the principle of Parliamentary Reform by their resignation; no such thing--we resigned because we did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons, and we thought that the same majority which defeated us on Monday on the Civil List, might defeat us Tuesday on Reform; and then we should have sacrificed (as the noble Lord says), the principle of Parliamentary Reform in the Commons. We did not think it worth while to make any farther struggle in order to retain office a day or two longer.
_March 28, 1831._
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_The Civil List principle, on what arranged._
My Lords, the principle on which I and my colleagues drew up the Civil List, was always directed to enable the Sovereign, so far as was practicable, to defray all the expenses necessary to be incurred in supporting the dignity, splendour, and comforts of the Crown, without mixing them up with the other expenses of the Government. For this purpose, it was formerly the practice to grant a considerable sum for those various, but necessary expenses. Certainly, the Crown enjoyed great advantage in supporting its dignity, influence, and efficiency, as long as the system of supporting itself on its hereditary revenues remained in practice. That system, my Lords, was departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III.; and a further departure from it has since taken place, into which I shall, with your Lordships' permission, examine presently, and compare that departure with those proposed by the late Government. From the accounts I have seen of the hereditary revenues enjoyed by Geo. II., I have reason to believe that were they now enjoyed by our Sovereign, and employed in defraying the civil expenses of the Government, and sustaining the dignity and splendour of the Crown, they would amount to a sum larger than would be necessary to meet those expenses, notwithstanding the increase which has been made in them by the increased salaries of the judges, the increased number of the public officers, and the vast increase of the royal family of England. I say, my Lords, that these hereditary revenues would be more than adequate to defray all these charges. I believe that these revenues, independent of droits and West Indian duties, amount, at the present moment, to 850,000 l. a-year; and these revenues, my Lords, I consider as much the King's property, as I hold the possessions of your Lordships to be yours. I make this statement, because it is important that your Lordships should recollect it, and the public should know that notwithstanding the magnitude of the expenses of the Sovereign, the Sovereign has as much right to the sum which I have mentioned, as any of your Lordships to your own estates. The system of giving the Sovereign the amount of certain taxes to defray the expenses of the civil government, was first departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III., when a fixed sum was appointed, instead of that mode of payment, for its support. In process of time the expenses of the civil government increased, and the Civil List became a debt. The consequence was, that in the year 1815, an inquiry was instituted into the circumstances which had caused this increase of charges upon the Civil List, up to the period of the Regency. What was the course then adopted by Parliament? Why, it was to bring certain charges--as, for instance, the charges for ambassadors and ministers abroad--under the annual vote of Parliament; and the immediate object was to avoid thereby the fixing of any fresh debt, for which no estimate could be previously made, upon the Civil List. In 1820 it was determined that nothing whatever should be brought before Parliament, in connexion with the Civil List, that was a casual expense, or for which a regular vote could not be submitted.
The original system, I have already stated, had been departed from in the reign of George III., and the late Government in presenting their civil list made a still further departure from it, and upon this principle;--wherever a part of a salary was to be paid out of the civil list, and part out of the consolidated fund, it was resolved to pay all out of the consolidated fund. The course was adopted with regard to the salaries of the Judges, the Lord Chancellor, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, and also of various other offices, some of which have been since abolished. This was thought a less objectionable mode than that of subjecting those salaries to an annual discussion in the Committee of the House of Commons. We wished my Lords to place those salaries upon the consolidated fund, in order to prevent the possibility of the country being left without a proper and efficient administration of public affairs. We did not wish to leave the Government to the chance of being impeded by a small majority, in the House of Commons, which, according to other proposed plans, might diminish the salaries of public officers at pleasure. If my Lord we look to the period of the Revolution we shall find that there were long discussions respecting the right of the crown to its hereditary revenues, which ended in a concession of the principle that these revenues did belong to the crown. At that time nobody ever dreamed of separating the expenses of the crown from those of the civil government, and of making a separate provision for the support of the state and dignity of the crown, which should be subject to the controul of parliament. The plan of separation, my Lords, is one of modern invention altogether, and I totally dissent from it. Because, let us look to the situation in which the crown is placed under the operation of such a system, and we must observe that it will place the crown in a situation such as it ought not to be reduced to; namely that it will render it liable to be deprived of the assistance--say of a public officer, whose salary may be lost by a single vote in a committee of supply.
_April, 19th, 1831._
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_The Expenses of Ministers ruinous, unless they have large Private fortunes._
With respect to the reduction in the salaries of the great officers of state, I have only to observe, that even under the existing rate of salaries, unless a First Lord of the Treasury, (and the remark will apply to the other state officers) possesses a large private fortune, he must be ruined in consequence of the heavy expences entailed on him by his situation, and the inadequacy of the sum allowed by the public for the maintenance of those expenses. In proof of this, I may instance the case of three prime ministers--Mr. Pitt, Mr. Percival, and Mr. Canning,--all of whom were almost ruined by their being in office. I took upon myself to propose a provision for the family of Mr. Canning in consequence.
_April, 19th. 1831._
_The Roman Catholic Relief Bill settled the question of the Repeal of the Union._
It is not my intention at present to enter into the question, as to the expediency of granting the Roman Catholic claims; for I hope that question is for ever set at rest. The former government of this country derived some advantage from the settlement of that question; and I believe that this advantage will at least be admitted to have flowed from it,--that now there is no question either in this or the other House of Parliament, or among the public, respecting the necessity or expediency of repealing the Union. When I introduced the Catholic Relief Bill, I stated that political power already existed in the hands of the Roman Catholics, and that was a statement, generally admitted by noble Lords on both sides of the House. What the Bill effected was to give the capacity of enjoying political power to the higher classes of the Roman Catholics, and to take it out of the hands of those of the lower classes who did not exercise it themselves for their own purposes, and according to the suggestion of their own sentiments, but at the dictation of a body among the Catholic people, who, it will be admitted by everybody, ought not to possess any political power whatever,--I mean the Roman Catholic priesthood.
_April, 21st. 1831._
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_If the Reform Bill be passed, it will be impossible to preserve inviolate the Union with Ireland._
My opinion is, that your Lordships will find it difficult, indeed, after having passed the Bill under discussion of the other House of Parliament, to maintain inviolate that Union which now exists between the two countries. I mean to say, that in the event of that bill passing, it would be impossible to maintain that article of the Union which recognises the Church of England as a branch of that Union, and which guarantees its safety. I beg to call to your Lordships' recollection, that his Majesty is sworn to maintain that Union inviolate; and that, in adopting the Reform measure, the Parliament do actually expose his Majesty to the risk of consenting to a bill calculated to break down the Church Establishment in Ireland. This is the impression I have always entertained--and it is an impression which I cannot remove from my mind; and, I must confess, that when I heard the other night the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack (Lord Brougham) assert that the Reform Bill had put down agitation in Ireland, on the subject of a Repeal of the Union, I was much surprised.
_April 22, 1831._
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_Importance of Portugal to England._
There is no country in Europe whose alliance is so important to England as Portugal; there is no country, the preservation of whose independence is so important to us, as that of Portugal.
_July 26, 1831._
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_A preventive Police checks Crime._
In all foreign countries there exists a preventive police,--but there is no such thing in England,--which preventive police has the effect of checking crime in a very great degree. We have nothing of the sort in England, neither can there be, according to the principles of our law and constitution. Such being the case, your Lordships must use great caution in drawing comparisons between convictions in this and foreign countries; if that is not done, the most erroneous conclusions will be arrived at.
_September 6, 1831._
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_A War of Opinions the worst of Wars._
The truth is, that the government of Portugal has, for the last ten months, been looked upon with inimical feelings and with passion by the King's servants; and this measure[13] is not brought forward with any view to revenue, but for the purpose of opposing and embarrassing the existing Government of that country. The noble Lords opposite do not like the situation of the Government of Portugal; it is not to their mind; and they are anxious, either by revolutionary measures, or any other, to overthrow it. Let them, however, look well at the responsibility they are incurring. Let them consider the frightful consequences in which their planning may involve this country, and the whole of Europe. If their designs even met with a temporary success, they would inevitably lead to a war of opinion, to a war of religion--the worst of wars, and the most deplorable consequences for all Europe would ensue.
_September 30, 1831._
[Footnote 13: The Wine Duties Bill; for regulating the tariff as regards Portugal.]
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_The Duke's Declaration against all Reform._
But, my Lords, if I wanted an example of the value of the House of Commons, I should find it in the opinion of the noble Earl (Grey) the last time, I believe, the last time that he spoke of the House of Commons. In the month of February, 1817, the noble Lord said, "constituted as it now was, he, in his conscience, believed that the House of Commons was, of all other institutions, in all the other countries of the world, the institution best calculated for the general protection of the subject. Supported by the people, in temperate and firm claims for redress, it was not only able, but certain to remedy every wrong. It was capable of acting as the most efficient control upon the executive, by diminishing the means of consumption, and reducing the pressure of a severe and grinding taxation." That was the opinion of the noble Earl himself, in 1817; and what, I would ask, has the Parliament done, subsequently, to deserve the disapprobation of the noble Earl? What had it done between 1817 and the moment when I pronounced that approbation of Parliament, of which my noble friend (Earl Winchelsea) and the noble Earl (Grey) have so much disapproved? When the noble Earl quoted what I said not quite a twelvemonth ago, he might, I think, quote it correctly. What I said was, that Parliament had done its duty by the country, and enjoyed its confidence. I said, that if I had to create a constitution of Parliament, I could not create that which now existed, because I did not believe the art of one man could invent such a system; but I said, that I would do my endeavour to establish one like it, in which property in land should be preponderant. That was what I said; and I afterwards had the satisfaction to hear the noble Marquis (Lansdowne) deliver a similar opinion. He stated that, in any system of representation which he could support, property and learning must be preponderant. I said that I should consider it my duty to resist the adopting of any plan of reform that should be brought forward. I spoke as a minister of the Crown; I meant to resist reform. The noble Lords say, that this statement of mine caused great enmity to me, and created that spirit of reform which has since pervaded the whole country. I beg the noble Earl's pardon; but the spirit of reform in this country was the consequence of the French revolution. It is true, that ever since the American war, a desire for Parliamentary Reform has been manifested, particularly when any disturbance or insurrection has occurred in any of the neighbouring foreign countries--above all, since the French revolution; and when there has been any extraordinary distress or difficulty in the country. At the same time, I believe that, from year to year, the manifestations of such a desire have been less frequent. I have, indeed, the authority of those most friendly to reform for saying that the manifestations of the desire for reform were less frequent, till the period of the revolution of July, 1830, than they had formerly been for a number of years.
_October 4, 1831._
_Electoral Pledges Unconstitutional._
It is on the ground of the dissolution, and of the Speech from the Throne,[14] that I charge the noble Lords with having excited the spirit which existed in the country at the period of the last general election; and with having been the cause of the unconstitutional practice, hitherto unknown, of electing delegates for a particular purpose to Parliament--delegates to obey the daily instructions of their constituents, and to be cashiered if they should disobey them, whatever may be their own opinion; instead of being, as they have been hitherto, independent members of Parliament, to deliberate with their colleagues upon matters of common concern, and to decide according to the best of their judgment, after such deliberation and debate. This is an evil of which the country will long feel the consequences, whatever may be the result of these discussions.
[Footnote 14: The Whig ministry dissolved the Parliament in April, 1831. A new Parliament met in June; and, on the 21st of that month, the King made the speech alluded to. In the interval there had been great excitement in the country.]
My Lords, this measure, thus delegated by the people, and thus brought forward by the Government in Parliament, for the decision of members thus delegated to give it the force of a law, alters every thing; and requires, as the noble Secretary of State (Lord Melbourne) says, new powers, in order to render it practicable to carry on the Government at all.
_October 4, 1831._
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_A Democratic Assembly of the worst description will be elected under the Reform Bill._
Throughout the whole of the empire, persons of the lowest condition of life, liable to, and even existing under, the most pernicious influences, are to have votes; or, in other words, are to exercise political power. Persons in those stations of life do exercise political power already; but, in a few places, in large masses; preponderating over the influence of other classes of society. What must we expect when these lower classes will preponderate everywhere? We know what sort of representatives are returned by the places I have described. What are we to expect, when the whole will be of the same description?
We hear, sometimes, of radical reform; and we know that the term applies to universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual parliaments, and their consequences. But, I declare, that looking at these changes pervading every part of the representation, root and branch, destroying or changing everything that has existed, even to the relative numbers of the representatives from the three kingdoms fixed by treaty, I should call this a radical reform, rather than reform of any other description.
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I cannot but consider that the House of Commons returned by it will be a democratical assembly of the worst description; that radical reform, vote by ballot, and all the evil consequences to be expected from the deliberations of such an assembly, must follow from this establishment. I entreat your Lordships to pause before you agree to establish such a system in your country.
_October 4, 1831._
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_The popular Will no ground for conceding Reform._
But we are told that the people wish for this measure; and when we express our sense of the danger which attends it, on account of the democratical power which it tends to establish, an endeavour is made to calm our apprehensions, by the assurance that the people are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons.
If we are to rely upon that feeling of the people--if we are to adopt this measure because it is the pleasure of the people, and because they are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, why do we not, at once, adopt the measure which we know the people prefer--I mean radical reform; that is to say, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and annual parliaments? If we are to make a change, there can be no reason for not going the full length that the people wish, if we can be sure that the measure will not injure the Government--that to which they are attached--of King, Lords, and Commons.
_October 4, 1831._
_Necessity of the Influence of Property in the House of Commons._
But before we go further, it is desirable that we should examine what is the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, as established in this kingdom. In this Government the King is at the head of everything. All the power is in his hands. He is the head of the Church, the head of the law. Justice is administered in his name. He is the protector of the peace of the country, the head of its political negociations, and of its armed force--not a shilling of public money can be expended without his order and signature. But, notwithstanding these immense powers, the King can do nothing that is contrary to law, or to the engagements of himself or his predecessors.
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Every act of the Government, or of the King, is liable to be brought under discussion in, and is in fact controlled by, the House of Commons; and for this reason alone, it is important that we should consider of what description of men the House of Commons is likely to be composed, when we are discussing a question of Parliamentary Reform, in order that we may be quite certain that they will exercise their high function with wisdom and discretion.
It was on these grounds, that I, some time ago, called upon the noble Earl (Grey) to state by what influence he intended to carry on the King's Government in Parliament, according to the principles fixed at the period of the Revolution, and in practice from that period to this, when this Reform Bill should be passed. The noble Lord answered immediately--not by means of corruption. I am aware of that, my Lords. I am convinced that the noble Lord is incapable of resorting to such means, as I hope he believes that I am incapable of resorting to them. I did not consider this any answer to my question, which I repeated in a subsequent discussion, on the motion of my noble friend, the noble Baron behind me (Lord Wharncliffe). The noble Earl said, that the Government had nothing to do with such questions; that Parliament was to decide for itself; and that there was no necessity for the interference of Government.