CHAPTER IV.

MEN, SHIPS AND GUNS IN 1812.

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS was a man of the time, a typical naval officer of the period. He was minutely careful about the food and habits of his men, and made the _President_ as homelike as a ship could be. He was not precisely a man of science, as was the case with his son in the monitor _Weehawken_, for this was the pre-scientific age of naval warfare. Indeed, it can scarcely be said with truth that he had either patience with or appreciation of Robert Fulton, the Pennsylvanian whose inventions were destined to revolutionize the methods of naval warfare. This mechanical genius who anticipated steam frigates, iron armor, torpedoes and rams, rather amused than interested Rodgers. To the commodore, who expected no miracles, he seemed to possess “Continuity but not ingenuity.” Fulton had not yet perfected his apparatus, though he had in 1804 blown up a Danish frigate off Copenhagen, and in 1810 had published in New York his “Torpedo War and Submarine Explosion.” This book is full of illustrations so clear, that to look at them now provokes the wonder that his schemes found so little encouragement. Five thousand dollars were appropriated by Congress March 30, 1810, for submarine torpedo experiments. Discouragement evidently followed: for our government in 1811, following the example of France and England rejected his plans for a submarine torpedo boat.

“The Battle of the Kegs” was too often referred to in connection with Fulton’s projects. This threw a humorous but not luminous glow over the whole matter. It gave to a serious scientific subject very much the same air as that which Irving has succeeded in casting over the early history of New York.

Having glanced at the typical American commander, let us now see what kind of sailors handled the ships and guns of 1812. In an old order book of Commodore Rodgers’, we find one to midshipman M. C. Perry, dated “President off Sandy Hook 26th May 1813,” directing him to proceed to New York and enter for the ship six petty officers and fifty seamen and boys. From this we may guess the quality of the crews of American men-of-war.

“You are desired to be particular in entering none but American citizens, and indeed, native-born citizens in preference.” He is especially directed to ship good healthy men able to perform duty, active and robust, while only those of good character and appearance are to be accepted for the warrant and petty officers. As Matthew Perry was but seventeen years of age, the order shows the confidence his commander placed in his judgement. In Perry’s diary the simple entry under May 28 is “At 12 P. M. the pilot boat left the ship with Mr. Hunt and Midp. M. C. Perry as a recruiting officer for the ship.”

It is the favorite idea of Englishmen who have formed their opinions from James the popular historian of the British navy, that the victories of American ships over their own in 1812 were owing to the British deserters among the Yankees. James, with amazing credulity, believes that there were two hundred Englishmen on the _Constitution_, that two-thirds of the sailors in the navy of the United States were bred on the soil and educated in the ships of Great Britain, and to these our navy owed at least one half of its effectiveness.

It is much nearer the truth to state that nine-tenths of the American crews were native-born, and but about one-twentieth of British nationality, the rest being a mixture. Three-fourths of the natives were from the northern states; half of the remaining quarter from Virginia, and nearly all of respectable parentage.

Of the officers, the midshipmen were lads of from eleven to fifteen years of age. There were in commission during the war about 500 naval officers, 34,960 sailors and petty officers, and 2,725 marines. The government possessed six navy yards.

In addition to the officer’s knowledge of the scientific principle of gunnery, and the thorough familiarity of the gun-crews with their duties, each ship’s company when away from its cannon was a disciplined battalion. The manual of small arms comprehended every possible stroke of offence and defence. Pikes, cutlasses and axes were the weapons relied on, though a few rifles, in the hands of sharp shooters perched in the crows-nests and in the tops, and a brace of pistols at each man’s belt had their places. The Yankee cutlass had already crossed with the Moorish scimiter at Tripoli, in more than one victory, and “our sailors felt a just confidence in its merits.”[2] The pike was the boarding weapon, the sailor’s bayonet, with which he charged the enemy on his own decks, or repelled his attacks, and was not the least of small arms. The war of 1812, with men speaking the same language, was practically a civil war in which the sword was again to be taken up against equals in every respect. Hence the need of constant practice in handling tools. The uninterrupted drill bore its fruit in due season.

One potent secret of American excellence of naval service, which raised our standard of war ships and guns even higher than the highest in Europe, was the rule of promotion for merit. This nerved every sailor and petty officer to do nothing less than his best at all times. In this respect, the navy of the western world contrasted effectively with that of Great Britain, where commissions were bought and sold in open market.

The Yankee captain taught his men to take pride in their guns as if they were human. Of many an American sailor in 1812 it could be said:

“His conscience and his gun, he thought His duty lay between.”

The American men-of-war went to sea with sights on their guns that enabled a cannonneer to fire with nearly the accuracy of a rifle. In their occasional use of sheet-lead cartridges, which required less sponging and worming after firing than those of flannel and of paper, they anticipated the copper shells of recent American invention.

The broadsides of that day may seem to us ridiculous in weight, as compared to those of our time. A projectile from an iron-clad now exceeds the entire mass of metal thrown by the largest of the old line-of-battle ships. The heaviest broadside in the United States in 1812—that thrown by the _United States_ carrying fifty-four guns—was but 846 pounds. Nevertheless the American ships had usually heavier and better guns and of longer range than the British. The power of a line-of-battle ship had been condensed into the space of a frigate. This was the American idea, to increase the weight of metal thrown in broadside without altering the ship’s rating.

With their guns every man and boy on board was constantly familiar by daily practice, and the name and purpose of each rope, crook, pulley, and cleet on the carriages were fully known to all. It must be remembered that horizontal shell-firing was unknown sixty years ago. Bombs could be thrown only from mortars as in a land siege, but never from cannon in naval duels, though short howitzers were occasionally employed in Europe to fire bombs. “Bomb-guns, firing hollow shot,” on ships, were not invented until 1824. The seeming advantage to the old time sailor, in his exemption from exploding shells, was in reality and from a humane point of view, a disadvantage; since in navals annals short sharp engagements were less common. A vast waste of ammunition causing “prolonged mutilation and slaughter” was rather the rule. It was the coolness of the American cannonneer, his economy in firing his gun only when he was reasonably sure of hitting, his ability to hold the linstock from the touch-hole till the word was given to fire, that made the duels of 1812 short and decisive.

As a feeble substitute for bomb-shells, the Americans were driven to the use of all sorts of hardware and blacksmith’s scraps as projectiles. This kind of shot was called “langrel” or “langrage,” and the metal magazine of a cruiser in 1812 would be sure to cause merriment if looked into in our decade. In old and in recent times, each combatant aimed to destroy the propelling power of the other. As the main design now is to strike the boiler and disable the machinery, so then the first object was to cut up the sails and rigging, so as to reduce the ship to a hulk. For the purpose, our blacksmiths and inventors were called on to furnish all sorts of ripping and tearing missiles and every species of dismantling shot. Their anvils turned off “star shot,” “chain shot,” “sausages,” “double headers,” “porcupines” and “hedge-hogs.” The “star shot” made of four wrought iron bolts hammered to a ring folded like a frame of umbrella rods. On firing, this camp stool arrangement expanded its rays to the detriment of the enemy’s cordage and canvas. The “sausage” consisted of four or six links, each twelve inches long and when rammed home resemble a disjointed fishing pole or artist’s sketching chair packed up. When belched forth it was converted into a swinging line of iron six feet long which made havoc among the ropes. The “double header” resemble a dumb bell. The “chain shot,” “porcupine” and “hedge-hog” explain themselves by their names. Such projectiles, with a small blacksmith’s shop of bolts and spikes, were to the weight of half a ton, taken out of the side of the _Shannon_ after her fight with the _Chesapeake_ and sold at auction in Halifax where most of them were converted into horse-shoes and other innocent articles. In preparing for the battle of Lake Erie, all the scraps of iron saved at the forges were sewn in leather bags. This flying cutlery helped largely to disable the enemy and bring about the victory. In battle, the carronades charged with this “langrage” were tilted high and pointed at the rigging, while the solid shot of the regular broadsides hulled the enemy with decisive effect. This kind of projectile, though it had been in use in Europe since 1720, was denounced by the British as inhuman and uncivilized. As the history of war again and again proves, what is first denounced as barbarous is finally adopted as fair against an enemy.

The British neglected artillery practice and knew little of nice gunnery. Their carronades and long deck guns were less securely fastened, and were often over charged. By their recoil they were often kicked over and rendered useless during a fight. A terrible picture in words is given by Victor Hugo in his “93” of a carronade let loose in a storm on the deck of a French ship. British discipline too, had fallen behind the standard of Nelson’s day. A nearly uninterrupted series of victories had so spoiled with conceit the average English naval man that he felt it unnecessary if not impossible to learn from an enemy. In the autobiography of Henry Taylor, the author of “Philip Van Artevelde,” who in his youth was midshipman on a British frigate in 1812, he tells us that during a whole year he was not once in the rigging. Very little attention was paid to scientific gunnery, and target practice was rare. In some ships, not a ball was shot from a gun in three years. Dependence was placed on the number of cannon rather than on their quality, equipment or service. They counted rather than weighed their shot. Most of the British frigates were over-gunned.

The carronade, invented in 1779, had become immediately popular, and by 1781 four hundred and twenty-nine British war vessels were equipped with from six to ten carronades. These were above their regular complement and not included in the rate or enumeration. Hence a “thirty-eight,” a “forty-two,” or a “seventy-four” gun-ship might have many more muzzles than her professed complement. The fearful effect of short range upon the timber of ships enabled the British to convert their enemy’s walls into missiles, and make splinters their ally in the work of death and mutilation. Farragut’s “splinter nettings” were then unknown nor dreamed of. Hence the terrific proverbial force of the British broadsides in the Nile and at Trafalgar. After such demonstration of power, such manifest superiority over foemen worthy of their steel, it seemed absurd in British eyes to make special preparation, or abandon old routine in order to meet the Yankees in their “pine board” and “fir built” frigates. What they had done with the French they expected to with the Americans, and more easily. They did not know the virtues of the American long guns nor the rapidity, coolness, and unerring accuracy of the American artillerists. They were now to learn new lessons in the art of war. They were to fight with sailors who took aim.

At the outbreak of hostilities our naval force in ships consisted of one hundred and seventy gun-boats afloat, three second class frigates under repair, three old brigs rotten and worthless, with five brigs and sloops, three first-class and two second-class frigates which were seaworthy. After the embargo of April 14th most of the fast sailers in the American merchant service were converted into privateers.

The British naval force all told consisted of over a thousand sail and her sailors were flushed with the remembrances of Aboukir and Trafalgar. Before hostilities and at the date of the declaration of war, there were off our coast the _Africa_, one sixty-four gun-ship; the _Shannon_, _Guerriere_, _Belvidera_, and _Eolus_, second class frigates; besides several smaller vessels.

The war with Great Britain, our “second war for independence” was declared when the treasury was empty and the cabinet divided. Some pamphleteers stigmatized it as “Mr. Madison’s war.” So great was the cowardly fear of British invincibility on the seas, and so shameful and unjust were the suspicions against our navy that many counsellors at Washington urged that the national vessels should keep within tide-water and act only as harbor batteries. To the earnest personal remonstrance of Captains Bainbridge and Stewart we owe it that our vessels got to sea to win a glory imperishable.

Borrowing a point from the English who, in older days, usually chose their time to declare war when the richly-laden Dutch galleons were on their homeward voyage from the Indies, President Madison and Congress, hoping to fill the depleted treasury, passed the act declarative of war about the time the Jamaica plate fleet of eighty-five vessels was to arrive off our coast. This sailed from Negril Bay on the 20th of May and war against Great Britain was declared on the 12th of June, at least one week too late.

[2] Roosevelt’s “Naval History of the War of 1812.”