Part 22

Generally speaking the underground uses three types of hide-outs: (1) _temporary_, an abode for a courier or Party member en route to another destination. This will probably be a room in the home of a “politically reliable” individual; (2) _emergency_, a home or apartment where a member, perhaps feeling he is being watched or suddenly becoming sick, can hide on an emergency basis. It is not to be used too frequently; (3) _permanent_, or “deep freeze,” where one or more comrades can remain for extended periods, maybe a month, or even a year, with all necessities being provided. Farms or cabins in remote areas make excellent “deep freezes.”

Here are some of the requirements demanded for a “safe” hide-out. They illustrate the Party’s attention to detail.

1. The owner must be absolutely loyal to the Party.

2. If an apartment, there must be no doorman or elevator operator. A walk-up apartment of three or four stories is preferable.

3. If a family home, the members must be thoroughly reliable. There should be no children, relatives, or maids.

4. The proprietor should not be too closely identified with the Party, either as a sympathizer or member.

5. The hide-out must be located where there are no curious or talkative neighbors.

6. The quarters must be sufficiently large to accommodate extra guests. Excessive cramping attracts attention.

7. The neighborhood should be well known to the owner and one in which some trusted friends reside. In this way any inquiries in the vicinity will immediately come to their attention.

Meetings

Elaborate security must surround all underground contacts, whether between just two people or groups. Here are a few points the underground has to remember:

1. Don’t use the same meeting place too frequently. It might excite suspicion.

2. If a meeting is held at a home, a member of the family (who, of course, is thoroughly reliable) should be there to answer the door in case an outsider knocks. He can handle the situation and also serve as a lookout.

3. If large numbers are involved, times of arrival and departure should be staggered. Everybody should not arrive or depart at the same time.

4. If the comrades don’t know each other, a predetermined means of identification (a code word, piece of clothing, etc.) should be used.

5. Bring no more documents (books, papers, etc.) than absolutely necessary. Avoid note-taking. Make effective use of memory.

6. Upon departure, a “rear-guard” comrade should thoroughly check for any incriminating items. Have any papers been left on the floor? Is there a telephone number scratched on the wall? Has someone forgotten his coat, which might contain Party data?

In one instance six weeks allegedly were spent in bringing twenty people to a national underground conference.

If two comrades don’t know each other, advance arrangements must be made, usually by notes, to effect identification for a meeting. Here is one example. The note read:

On Friday, April 6, 8 P.M. at NE corner, Oak and 9th Sts.—my courier will be standing with a _Field and Stream_ magazine. Bill’s courier will approach her and ask, “Mrs. Polk, what time is it?” She will reply, “I’m sorry, my watch is stopped.”

Note the use of a magazine and code words for identification. Just in case the first contact didn’t work out, there were alternative instructions. The note continued:

In case no one shows, she will be on the SW corner, Walnut and 10th, same magazine, Friday, 13, 8 P.M., same question and answer. She will wait around only ten minutes each time.

Noncommunists probably will find it difficult to understand the reckless abandon, personal risk, and sheer physical endurance displayed by communists to conceal their underground activities. Here are a few of the tactics employed by communists to determine if they are being followed:

_Driving cars_:

1. Driving alternately at high and low rates of speed.

2. Entering a heavily traveled intersection on a yellow light, hoping to lose any follower or cause an accident.

3. Turning corners at high rates of speed and stopping abruptly.

4. Suddenly leaving a car and walking hurriedly down a one-way street in the direction in which vehicle traffic is prohibited.

5. Entering a dark street in a residential area at night, making a sharp U-turn, cutting into a side alley, and extinguishing the car’s lights.

6. Driving to a rural area, taking a long walk in a field, then having another car meet them.

7. Waiting until the last minute, then making a sharp left turn in front of oncoming traffic.

8. Stopping at every filling station on the highway, walking around the car, always looking, then going on.

_On foot_:

1. Leaving subways, buses, and trains at the last minute, even holding the door open and jumping off.

2. Entering hotels, bus terminals, and department stores where there are many exits.

3. Stooping over in the aisles, then suddenly rising and looking around to see if anybody is searching for them.

4. Doubling back after rounding a corner.

5. Putting a coin in a pay telephone booth, dialing a number, then rushing to the adjoining booth to see if anybody is trying to listen.

6. Leaving a taxicab, but instructing the driver to go around the block and pick them up again.

7. Using store windows as mirrors to see behind them.

8. Walking slowly to a corner, then starting to run down an alleyway.

Always there is the fear of being followed. One Party couple registered at a motel, then the husband parked the car several miles away. He walked back and climbed through a side window. Maybe in this way he could conceal his night’s lodging!

A woman in a Midwestern city kept riding streetcars, buses, and taxis for thirty hours, stopping at no time except for meals. In communist language she was “_dry-cleaning_”; that is, making certain that she was not being followed.

The pressure becomes terrific. As long as a comrade feels he is “dirty” (that is, he suspects the “enemy,” meaning the FBI, is near), he must keep up his “dry-cleaning.” He can make his “meet” or enter a hide-out only when he’s certain he is “clean.”

Two dry-cleaning techniques are of special interest. One is the _switch-point_ operation: The communist leader is driven to a certain location in a car (called a “drop car”). There he alights and enters another car (called a “pickup car”). Before entering the second car, however, he will walk across a parking lot, over a bridge, or through a department store—the object being to lose any pursuer. In the double switch, the pickup car drops the Party leader at a second switch, where he will be picked up by a third vehicle and then taken to his destination.

In the _scramble_, members (as on leaving meetings) enter automobiles. The drivers start the motors. Suddenly the doors of the cars will open and the comrades will get out, including the drivers. They scramble, meaning they quickly take seats in the other cars, whereupon all autos will move away in different directions. It’s hard for any “pursuer” to tell who went in which car.

The underground creates intense strains on family life. The undeviating demands of the Party (its interests must come first, regardless of personal consequences) leave deep scars.

For years many families are separated. On some occasions a midnight contact or a few days of furlough are permitted. Children grow up without seeing their fathers. In one instance a child was stricken with polio. His underground father did not leave his Party work to come to the child’s bedside. Mothers are often hard pressed to give answers to the question, “Where’s Daddy?” Some “explain” that Daddy is away on a trip, in another town, or dead. One little boy, whose father was gone, said: “I wish my father was in jail. Then I could at least see him.”

Normal family relationships are disrupted. The Party may promise financial assistance to the families of underground comrades, but many times the support is miserly or does not come at all. Heart-rending results ensue:

During the past four years, Hank and I have been separated most of the time [one Party wife wrote]. There has never been any question about carrying out the decisions made, even when Hazel [small daughter] and I were set adrift by the Party with no financial provision and I had to go to my family so that my infant could have food and a place to live. When Hazel almost died from third-degree burns, Hank didn’t even know about it since we had no way to communicate. I have been cut off from my family completely. The furniture, clothes and other things that we accumulated during our marriage we’ll probably never see again. We have moved, and moved, and moved yet again ... dragging Hazel around from place to place, carrying out decisions made, guarding our security and that of others.

The total effect was demoralizing. The wife continues:

I can’t have an operation because it would mean six months in a cast and on my stomach—and there is no one to take care of Hazel .... I get overtired physically, and the past four years of the kind of life we have led, with its many pressures of loneliness, financial scrounging, security measures and the sword of Damocles—that of being discovered—hanging over my head, finally took its toll.

Despite this woman’s hardships the Party brought charges that her husband had been seeing her without permission. The utter fanaticism of Party discipline is shown by her reaction toward the charges: “If in spite of all this the Board feels that there has been a breach of discipline, then I am willing to abide by any decision made and accept whatever control is agreed upon.”

The underground, perhaps more than any other phase of Party activity, brings out the fanaticism of communist discipline. The member becomes so entranced with his mission that his hardships, sufferings, and obstacles become challenges to overcome, not reasons for discouragement. The very thought of working on this assignment, as one Party leader stated, should make him “ooh and ah.”

Some Party wives, however, did not always “ooh and ah,” but bitterly resented their husbands’ long absences from home and the disruption of family life. This presented the Party with a serious problem. These wives were potential weak links in communist security; they might jeopardize the husbands’ location by making unauthorized contacts, might give information to the “enemy” or impair morale by their uncongenial attitude. One Party instruction, for example, urged that wives should be spoken to and the importance of the Party’s policies explained. They must be indoctrinated more. For some Party wives it would certainly take a lot of explaining.

Children have been born in the communist underground, children who were not even given their true family names. In one instance a father and mother living as an underground couple (_transformed couple_) entered their child at a nearby school under the family alias. In another case a baby born to underground parents was registered with county authorities under the underground alias. Imagine the hypocrisy of such a family situation. A whole world of falsehoods must be invented to satisfy youthful curiosity. What about the parents’ childhoods? What about grandparents? Every family matter discussed must be carefully weighed: Will it give away any secrets?

The very character of the underground, with its emphasis on stealth and deceit, degrades human values. While many comrades struggle in poverty, living in squalid conditions at great personal sacrifice, a few enjoy the very best—comfortable hide-outs equipped with all conveniences. For them the underground is a “good life,” with others paying the bill. Moreover, Party discipline often places great power into the hands of some who, as petty dictators, do not hesitate to use it to inflict revenge and spite on their personal enemies. Many times the underground becomes a catacomb of back-stabbing and the settling of old scores.

Sexual immorality is also abetted. In one instance an organizer, leaving his wife and children, lived in Chicago with another woman. In an Eastern city, a woman whose husband was underground carried on an affair with another man. In still another instance a wife kept company with a man while her husband was forbidden by the Party’s underground leaders to see her.

This is the communist underground. It may appear as a “beehive of crazy confusion.” But it is not. All these shifts, midnight meetings, and escape routes find meaning in only one thing: the strengthening of the Party. The cardinal question always is, “What is best for the Party?”

As one Party leader stated, “Our best people are in this field.... They are not in it for adventure, romance, thrills or pleasure....” They “are in it because that is where the Party wants them for political reasons....” “... it is ... probably one of the toughest and hardest assignments for anyone.”

That is why the Party, as we have seen, tries desperately to create the communist man, the individual obedient even when he is beyond the Party’s immediate control. “It’s not me who speaks,” one leader said, “but the Party.” Any allegiance outside the Party must be broken. The underground worker is the member who, even if cut off from leadership, will know what to do, will carry out the assignment, regardless of what it is. He is the man on whom all revolutionary plans depend.

Here is an example of how this fanaticism works:

Shortly before noon one day a top Party official drove east out of town. At the outskirts he doubled back, twice turning corners and coming to abrupt stops. Then, at speeds varying from forty to eighty miles an hour, he continued east for twenty-six miles. Turning around, he retraced his route at eighty miles an hour.

He was “dry-cleaning” in a most dangerous and reckless fashion. Back in town, for three hours he parked and reparked his car, darting up streets, entering and immediately leaving hotels.

At roughly 4:00 P.M. he left town again, this time driving south, again at various speeds. After five hours he cut east for fourteen miles, north for two, doubled back for twelve, south-east for forty-two, sometimes running without his lights; parking for a few minutes near buildings, then darting out at savage speed.

Late that night, after roughly twelve hours of furtive, reckless driving, often at highly dangerous speeds, he arrived at his destination and checked into a hotel. He had covered some 360 miles; the normal driving distance was 195.

This type of fanatical communist, if so instructed, would not hesitate to lead a riot, steal vital military secrets, sabotage defense industries, or perform illegal activities. Here is the true communist at work, without concern for personal risk or safety.

21.

_Espionage and Sabotage_

The communist underground is designed to carry forward phases of the Party’s program which cannot be conducted openly and lawfully. In addition, it contains weapons of attack which must always remain hidden (the permanent part of the underground), such as aid to Soviet espionage, attempts to place members in strategic positions in industry for potential sabotage, techniques to discredit law enforcement, and endeavors to infiltrate the armed forces.

Lenin taught that the enemy must be weakened in advance. To wait for something to happen is not the way to achieve revolution. The way must be prepared. The enemy must be softened up: weaken his will to resist, nullify his capacity for counteraction, impair his morale. Then, as in November, 1917, in Russia, when the crisis comes, communists can march to power through the ranks of a demoralized enemy.

The Party’s relation to Soviet espionage is one of the most potent weapons in the communist underground arsenal. As past events have proven—for instance the Harry Gold-Klaus Fuchs combination and the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed in 1953 on espionage charges—Moscow-directed spying represents a vital danger to the integrity and safety of free government. Espionage is utilized not only to secure information but also to weaken the “enemy” from within.

The Soviets very early instituted espionage operations against the United States with the full cooperation of the Communist Party. In 1919 the Comintern was established and, as we have seen in Chapter 4, Comintern “reps” became common figures in Party circles. In January, 1919, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, a member of the Russian Communist Party, was appointed as the first Soviet representative to the United States. Although never recognized by the American government, he set up an office in New York City. Arthur Adams, later identified as a Soviet atom spy, was a member of Martens’ staff.

In the light of today’s well-organized, efficiently operated spy apparatus, the Soviets in the early days were crude and clumsy. Many of the Russians were not proficient in English. They lacked knowledge of our customs and possessed no special espionage training. Many were propaganda as well as espionage agents and could be identified by their rabid preaching of communism. Often the security of their communications was not of the best.

In late July, 1920, a seaman on the SS _Stockholm_ walked up Pier 95 in New York City. Noticing customs officials searching two other seamen, he turned and ran down the pier. Later, after the seaman’s apprehension, a package was found concealed in his trousers. Inside was a series of envelopes, one inside the other with the smallest containing over 200 uncut diamonds valued at 50,000 dollars. The smuggling of diamonds was one of the early Bolshevik techniques of financing operations in the United States. For whom was the package destined? Inside was a typewritten letter starting, “Comrade Martens.”

Unfamiliarity with America made dependence on the Communist Party, USA, more important than ever. Without the ready base of the Communist Party, USA, with its fanatical allegiance to Moscow, Soviet espionage would have had tremendous problems in getting started. As it was, there were Party members available, able and willing to carry out Soviet instructions. Often it was difficult to distinguish between a member’s work for the Party and for Moscow. Comrades traveled back and forth to Russia, were given assignments by the Kremlin, and felt it their highest duty to gather information for the Bolsheviks.

Party officials made assistance to Moscow priority Number One. We have seen in Chapter 4 how the communist leadership, for example, promised to help Comrade Loaf (a Comintern agent) collect information on the American labor movement. In another instance the Party Secretariat actually approved the release of a Party member for Soviet intelligence duties.

What were some of the ways through which the Communist Party, USA, rendered aid to Soviet espionage?

Most important, of course, was recruitment. The Party was able, time after time, to supply recruits, both members and sympathizers, for espionage use. Suppose the Soviets needed a photographer? a source of information in a Pennsylvania steel plant? a trusted short-wave radio expert? The Party would be expected to, and did, “fill the bill.”

This funneling of talent to the Soviets was often accomplished through a special Party contact who was called a “steerer.” A trusted old-time member, he was able to spot recruits for espionage among the Party’s ranks and to fulfill requests made by the Soviets. As espionage operations became more complex, the “steerer’s” role became ever more vital. The Party was a vast recruiting ground for spy talent.

The Party provided many essential “services” to Soviet espionage. Suppose a Russian espionage agent secretly entered the United States, to operate here or while en route to another country. Most likely, as so often happened, he would need a “new identity,” or, in espionage language, a “change of feathers.” This probably meant a faked birth certificate, a false passport, and other identification papers. Maybe he would be placed in “deep freeze” for several months. If so, he had to be “serviced”—that is, fed and clothed. After being “re-feathered,” he would be on his way.

Then there were “business covers.” A Party member, perhaps with Soviet funds, would set up a business, allegedly for legitimate purposes but actually for espionage. In 1927, World Tourists was incorporated in New York, ostensibly for tourist business. Actually, this “business,” under the operation of Jacob Golos, a communist “steerer,” became an active espionage “cover.”

The Party, in addition, helped arrange the transfer of funds, established mail drops (where espionage communications come to a third person, later to be given to the espionage network), and operated couriers. In one instance a Party member even served as an interpreter for a Soviet agent.

Even from these early days, however, evidence existed that the Soviets were aware of the dangers of too close an affiliation with the United States Party. An espionage operation might be jeopardized by a known Party member’s participation. Similarly, in the event of a “blow-up,” the Party, in the public’s eyes, would be linked directly with a foreign power, Soviet Russia. This was one thing both the Soviets and Party officials wanted to avoid. Hence, by the early 1940’s there was a definite lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the U.S. Party for espionage assistance.

The Soviet spy system, moreover, was now better able to stand on its own feet. In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation (a Soviet government commercial agency) was established. This gave the Soviets their first “legal” base for espionage operations. In this way persons or institutions in a country openly as representatives or agents of a foreign power have an ideal cover to fulfill their assignments of clandestine espionage. In 1933 diplomatic recognition was afforded the Soviet Union. Now trained espionage agents, operating under diplomatic immunity, could direct operations. After World War II Russians assigned to the United Nations in this country gave additional striking power to Soviet espionage. Moreover, assistance was possible through the espionage networks of Soviet satellite countries operating in the United States.

This lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the Party was a gradual development. Whereas in the early 1920’s Party and espionage work were often indistinguishable, the Soviets now instructed members tapped for service to drop all connections with the Party. One old-time Party member, turned spy, told the FBI that the Soviets had instructed agents to conceal their Party affiliations. This soon became a standard technique. If engaged in espionage, cut off all connections with the Party, even contacts with former Party friends. Ethel Rosenberg, for example, indicated that she no longer bought the _Daily Worker_ at her usual newsstand. Another agent, while in the company of a Soviet superior, stopped to purchase a communist publication. He was severely reprimanded. The communist label might betray the espionage ring.

The Soviets, however, still depended on communists or sympathizers for assistance. In one major apparatus detected by the FBI, for example, twelve of seventeen participants had been Party members. Both Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, executed as Soviet spies, had communist backgrounds.